criteria 1.3.3 reliability of engineered safety features 2...performing over-pressure protection and...

0Init

ial

Pr

e-a

pp

lic

ati

on

Me

eti

ng

Criteria Criteria Criteria Criteria 1.3.31.3.31.3.31.3.3

Reliability of Engineered Safety FeaturesReliability of Engineered Safety FeaturesReliability of Engineered Safety FeaturesReliability of Engineered Safety Features

IAEA INPRO DF-7

Vienna, November 19-22, 2013

Jong Tae Seo

1Init

ial

Pr

e-a

pp

lic

ati

on

Me

eti

ng

1/14

1. INPRO Criteria 1.3.3

2. APR1400 ESF Design

Characteristics

3. INPRO Evaluation

4. Summary

2 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

User Requirements and Criteria

INPRO Criteria 1.3.3 Safety Features

Basic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic PrincipleBasic Principle BPBPBPBP1 1 1 1 (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : (Defense in Depth) : Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Installations of an Innovative Nuclear Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced Energy System shall incorporate enhanced defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their depth as a part of their fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in fundamental safety approach and ensure that the levels of protection in defencedefencedefencedefence----inininin----depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.depth shall be more independent from each other than in existing installations.

User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR)User requirements (UR) Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)Criteria (CR)

URURURUR1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 (Design basis accidents):(Design basis accidents):(Design basis accidents):(Design basis accidents):The frequency of occurrence of accidents The frequency of occurrence of accidents The frequency of occurrence of accidents The frequency of occurrence of accidents should be reduced, consistent with theshould be reduced, consistent with theshould be reduced, consistent with theshould be reduced, consistent with theoverall safety objectives. If an accident overall safety objectives. If an accident overall safety objectives. If an accident overall safety objectives. If an accident occurs, engineered safety features should occurs, engineered safety features should occurs, engineered safety features should occurs, engineered safety features should be able to restore an installation of an INS be able to restore an installation of an INS be able to restore an installation of an INS be able to restore an installation of an INS to a controlled state, and subsequently to a controlled state, and subsequently to a controlled state, and subsequently to a controlled state, and subsequently (where relevant) to a safe shutdown(where relevant) to a safe shutdown(where relevant) to a safe shutdown(where relevant) to a safe shutdownstate, and ensure the confinement of state, and ensure the confinement of state, and ensure the confinement of state, and ensure the confinement of radioactive material. Reliance on humanradioactive material. Reliance on humanradioactive material. Reliance on humanradioactive material. Reliance on humanintervention should be minimal, and should intervention should be minimal, and should intervention should be minimal, and should intervention should be minimal, and should only be required after some grace period.only be required after some grace period.only be required after some grace period.only be required after some grace period.

Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Indicators (IN)Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance Limits (AL)Limits (AL)Limits (AL)Limits (AL)

CRCRCRCR1.3.3 1.3.3 1.3.3 1.3.3 safety featuressafety featuressafety featuressafety features

IN IN IN IN 1.3.31.3.31.3.31.3.3: : : : Reliability of Reliability of Reliability of Reliability of engineered safety engineered safety engineered safety engineered safety features.features.features.features.

AL AL AL AL 1.3.31.3.31.3.31.3.3: : : : Equal or Equal or Equal or Equal or superior to superior to superior to superior to existing existing existing existing designs.designs.designs.designs.

3 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Evaluation Parameters and Acceptability

� Specific Evaluation Parameter is not defined in the INPRO

methodology for this CR.

� The Safety System Reliability :

� Robust Reactor Protection System (RPS) Design

� Common Cause Failure Consideration

� Redundant and Diverse Safety Systems

� Passive Design Features

� Single Failure Consideration

INPRO Criteria 1.3.3 Safety Features

4 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Engineered Safety Features

APR1400 ESF Design Characteristics

� Engineered Safety Feature(ESF) systems are provided to

mitigate the consequences of the unlikely events such as

Loss of Coolant Accident(LOCA).

� ESF systems control, mitigate, and terminate such

incidents and hold exposure levels below applicable

limits.

� APR1400 ESF systems are :

� Emergency Core Cooling System

� Safety Injection System� Shutdown Cooling System

� Containment System

� Containment Spray System� Containment Isolation System

� Auxiliary Feedwater System

� Safety Depressurization System

5 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Safety Injection System


� Four (4) Trains

� DVI (Direct Vessel Injection)

� IRWST (In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank)

IRWSTIRWST

IRWSTIRWST

IRWSTIRWST

IRWSTIRWST

6 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7



Core

Downcomer

Direct Vessel

Injection Nozzle

ColdLeg Hot

Leg

Direct Vessel Injection (DVI)

45o45

o

45o4

5 o

7 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7



� Passive Fluidic Device in SIT

� Regulates the injection flow rate effectively & extends

injection time of SIT �� LPSI function of SCS is removed

� Flowrate depends on the Stand Pipe height and resistance

of Supply Port & Control Port

8 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Shutdown Cooling System


� Removes core decay heat during shutdown

� Reduce RCS temperature in post shutdown period from hot

shutdown operating temperature to refueling temperature

� Cooldown RCS to cold safe shutdown condition following

SBLOCA , SLB, FWLB

9 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Safety Depressurization System


� Pilot Operated Safety Relief Valve (POSRV)

� Performing over-pressure protection and safety depressurization

� Main valve open by pilot valve actuation

� No drift of the opening set-point

� Reliable valve operation without chattering and leakage

� Low susceptibility for valve stuck-open

10 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Containment Spray System


� Automatic actuation by Containment Spray Actuation Signal(CSAS)

� Upon SIAS or CSAS, CS pumps start, containment spray header

isolation valves open on CSAS, and spray water flows into

containment spray headers.

11 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Containment Isolation System


� Means of isolating non-safety related fluid systems that

pass through containment to confine any radioactivity

following a design bases event.

� Double barrier

� Automatic & leak-tight closure

� Leak testing

� Periodic operability test

12 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Auxiliary Feedwater System


OUTSIDEOUTSIDEOUTSIDEOUTSIDE

AFWSTAFWSTAFWSTAFWST

AFWSTAFWSTAFWSTAFWST

TDP TDP TDP TDP

MDP MDP MDP MDP

TDP TDP TDP TDP

MDP MDP MDP MDP

S/GS/GS/GS/G

S/GS/GS/GS/G

AFWST AFWST AFWST AFWST

AFWST AFWST AFWST AFWST

RWTRWTRWTRWT

CSTCSTCSTCST

� Four (4) Train AFWS

� 100% capacity for each train

� Redundancy and Diversity

� Physical and Electrical Independency

13 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Plant Protection System


� Plant Protection System (PPS)

� Initiates reactor trip and/or operation of ESF whenever the

monitored process values exceed the pre-defined limits.

� Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System

(ESF-CCS

� Controls the operation of ESF components.

� Manual ESFAS actuation signals are sent to the ESF-CCS

GC via Control Panel Multiplexer (CPM).

� Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS)

� Computes DNBR and LPD value using process values,

RCP speed, CEA position and ex-core neutron flux.

� Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety (APC-S)

� Receives safety field sensor signals and distributes them

to PPS, ESF-CCS, CPCS QIAS-P and DIS.

14 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Plant Protection System

APR1400 ESF Design Characteristics�신고리신고리신고리신고리 3,4 MMIS-BOP Overview

AFAS : Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal

DRCS : Digital Rod Control System

ENFMS : Excore Flux Monitoring System

RTSS : Reactor Trip Switchgear System

DPS (2 CH)

MG set

DRCS

RTSS

PPS (4 CH)

Dedicated Safety Sensors

(4 channels)

ESF-CCS (4 CH)

ESF Actuation

Signals

ESFAS Initiation Signals

Ch A Ch B Ch C Ch D

Ch C Ch D

RT Initiation Signals AFAS

Ch BCh A

Ch N1 Ch N2

RT

ENFMS

(4 CH)

CPCS

(4 CH)Non-safety Sensors

(2 channels)

C A

D B

M

MG

G

480 Vac139/240 Vac

N2

N1

15 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Diverse Actuation System


� Diverse Indication System (DIS)

� Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Control Switches (DMA

switches)

� Diverse Protection System (DPS)

16 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Diverse Actuation System


Diverse Protection System

� ATWS mitigation required by 10CFR50.62

� Provision to cope with CMF of PPS/ESF-CCS(SECY 93-087)

� Energized-to-actuate design

� On the loss of power, the DPS fails to non-actuated

conditions

� Diverse from the PPS

� Diverse equipment from sensor output to final actuation

device

� Two (2) DPS controllers� 2/2 coincidence logic

� 2/2 power interruption scheme to prevent inadvertent actuation on single failure of one (1) DPS channel.

17 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

ESF Improvements

INPRO Evaluation

� Major Advanced Design Features of the APR1400 as

compared to the OPR1000 Design :

� 4-Train high pressure Safety Injection System and no

low pressure safety injection system

� Direct Vessel Injection

� In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank

(IRWST)

� Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device

� Simplified Safety Depressurization System with

POSRV

� Interchagneability of Containment Spray and

Shutdown Cooling Pumps

18 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

SumpSumpSumpSump

CONTAINMENTCONTAINMENTCONTAINMENTCONTAINMENT

SITSITSITSIT SITSITSITSIT


S/GS/GS/GS/G RVRVRVRV S/GS/GS/GS/G

RCPRCPRCPRCP RCPRCPRCPRCP


RWSTRWSTRWSTRWST

HPSIPHPSIPHPSIPHPSIP

LPSIPLPSIPLPSIPLPSIP

HPSIPHPSIPHPSIPHPSIP

LPSIPLPSIPLPSIPLPSIP

CONTAINMENTCONTAINMENTCONTAINMENTCONTAINMENT



S/GS/GS/GS/G RVRVRVRV S/GS/GS/GS/G

SIPSIPSIPSIP

SIPSIPSIPSIP

SIPSIPSIPSIP

SIPSIPSIPSIP

IRWSTIRWSTIRWSTIRWSTRCPRCPRCPRCP

RCPRCPRCPRCP


OPR1000 OPR1400

ESF Improvements

INPRO Evaluation

19 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

ESF Improvements

INPRO Evaluation

APRAPRAPRAPR1400140014001400

OPROPROPROPR1000 1000 1000 1000

20 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

OPR1000

� PSV(3) + SDS(2 train)� POP Open� No Dead Time� Only Steam Discharge is Allowed� Spring Setpoint Change Possibility

PRESSURIZER

PZR Safety Valves

(SLSV)Containment

Rupture

Disk

SDS

Rupture

Disk

RDT

M M

MM

APR1400

� POSRV

� Main Valve + Pilot Valves (POSRV ; 4)

� Dead Time

� Stroke Time : longer than PSV

� Steam/Water/Two-Phase Discharge

ESF Improvements

INPRO Evaluation

21 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

PPS Improvements

INPRO Evaluation

Full Digital with Data Network

� Protection System

– Plant Protection System (PPS)

– Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS)

– Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS)

– Auxiliary Process Cabinet – Safety (APC-S)

Provision to cope with CMF in Digital PPS

� Diverse Actuation System

– Diverse Indication System (DIS)

– Diverse Manual ESF Actuation Control Switches (DMA switches)

– Diverse Protection System (DPS)

22 APR1400

IAE

A I

NP

RO

Dia

log

ue

Fo

ru

m-7

Summary

� APR1400 Engineered Safety Features(ESF) are provided to

mitigate the consequences of the unlikely events such as

Loss of Coolant Accident(LOCA) and other DBEs

� APR1400 ESF has been improved by simplifying system

configuration with passive and reliable components

� Digital Plant Protection System provides reliable actuation

of Reactor Trip and ESFs with CMF provisions

� Therefore, APR1400 Design satisfies Criteria 1.3.3

23

Initial Pre-application Meeting

criteria 1.3.3 reliability of engineered safety features 2...performing over-pressure protection and...

Documents