critical assessment of damage control system technologies · 2012-08-03 · baseline requirement...

Defence R&D Canada – Atlantic

DEFENCE DÉFENSE&

Critical Assessment of Damage Control

System Technologies

Lloyd CosbyInternational Safety Research Inc., Ottawa, Ontario

Yvan LamontagneL-3 Communications MAPPS Inc.

L-3 Communications MAPPS Inc.8565 Cote-de-LiesseSaint-Laurent, QuebecH4T 1G5

Project Manager: Janet Browne, 514-787-4763

Contract Number: W7707-053149/001/HAL

Contract Scientific Authority: Dr. John A. Hiltz, 902-427-3425

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and thecontents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Contract Report

DRDC Atlantic CR 2006-283

December 2006

Copy No. _____

Defence Research andDevelopment Canada

Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada

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Critical Assessment of Damage Control System Technologies Lloyd Cosby International Safety Research Inc., Ottawa, ON Yvan Lamontagne L-3 Communications MAPPS Inc. L-3 Communications MAPPS Inc. 8565 Cote-de-Liesse Saint-Laurent, Quebec H4T 1G5 Project Manager: Janet Browne, 514-787-4763

Contract number: W7707-053149/001/HAL

Contract Scientific Authority: Dr. John A. Hiltz, 902-427-3425 Emerging Materials Section

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Defence R&D Canada - Atlantic Contract Report DRDC Atlantic CR 2006-283 December 2006

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Abstract The Canadian Navy is currently in the process of developing requirements and contracting for delivery of two new classes of ship, the Joint Support Ship (JSS) and the Single Class Surface Combatant (SCSC). The Navy has identified the reduction of through-life costs of these new ships as a priority, primarily through reduction of crew size, which is a major contributor to the overall operating cost. Significant interest has been expressed in how crewing levels can be reduced, without jeopardizing the ability of the ship to complete its mission. The objective of this report is to complete a critical assessment of available technologies, both commercial and militarized, in Damage Control Systems (DCS). The report will also include a discussion on new technologies in development, and provide some insight on the future vision for naval damage control as it relates to the goal of crew reduction/optimization. The review will cover technologies that are currently deployed as well as those that are being proposed for use on future naval vessels. This report will address the criticality, viability and advantages of integrating the DCS system within the Platform Management System (PMS) as well as associated links to the Combat Direction System (CDS). The primary goal of an integrated DCS is a reduced crew size, which can lead to significant risks in damage control efforts should the technology implemented to address automation not be sufficiently robust. The impact of marine standards on damage control systems will also be discussed and compared to equivalent naval standards.

Résumé La Marine canadienne est en train de définir les caractéristiques de deux nouvelles classes de navire, le navire de soutien interarmées (NSI) et le navire de combat de classe unique (NCCU) et de préparer un marché de production correspondant. La Marine a établi que la réduction des coûts du cycle de vie de ces nouveaux navires était une priorité, et que celle-ci passait principalement par une réduction de la taille des équipages, qui explique la majeure partie des coûts de fonctionnement. La façon de réduire les équipages sans compromettre la capacité des navires de remplir leur mission a suscité beaucoup d’intérêt. Ce document présente une évaluation critique des technologies commerciales et militaires disponibles dans le domaine des systèmes de lutte contre les avaries de combat. Il contient aussi une analyse des technologies en cours de développement et des renseignements sur la vision future de la lutte contre les avaries du point de vue de la réduction/l’optimisation des équipages. L’examen porte sur les technologies en usage et sur celles qui sont proposées pour les navires de l’avenir. Le document aborde la question de l’importance, de la viabilité et des avantages de l’intégration d’un système de lutte contre les avaries au système de gestion de la plate-forme et de l’établissement de liens

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avec le système de direction des combats. L’objectif premier d’un système intégré de lutte contre les avaries est de réduire la taille de l’équipage, ce qui peut entraîner des risques appréciables sur le plan de la lutte contre les avaries si la technologie d’automatisation n’est pas suffisamment robuste. L’incidence des normes navales sur les systèmes de lutte contre les avaries est également abordée et comparée à celle de normes navales équivalentes.

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Executive Summary Background The Canadian Navy is currently in the process of developing requirements and contracting for delivery of two new classes of ship, the Joint Support Ship (JSS) and the Single Class Surface Combatant (SCSC). The Navy has identified the reduction of through-life costs of these new ships as a priority, primarily through reduction of crew size, which is a major contributor to the overall operating cost. Significant interest has been expressed in how crewing levels can be reduced, without jeopardizing the ability of the ship to complete its mission. To this end, Defence Research and Development Canada – Atlantic (DRDC Atlantic) has initiated a project called “Damage Control and Crew Optimization” to investigate how the goal of further crew reductions on the new classes of ships can be achieved without affecting damage control capabilities. Results A critical assessment of available technologies, both commercial and militarized, in Battle Damage Control Systems (BDCS) has been completed. It includes a discussion of new technologies in development, and provides some insight on the future vision for naval damage control as it relates to the goal of crew reduction/optimization. The review covers technologies that are currently deployed as well as those that are being proposed for use on future naval vessels. This report also addresses the criticality, viability and advantages of integrating the DCS system within the Platform Management System (PMS) as well as associated links to the Combat Direction System (CDS). Finally, the impact of marine standards on damage control systems are discussed and compared to equivalent Naval standards. Based upon a review of currently available Damage Control System products designed for both commercial and military applications, those that are designed for military use have a much greater set of features and overall effectiveness. Commercial packages all have the basic plotting and damage control functional capabilities; however, they do not have the same expert systems built into them, or a built-in training capability that is a baseline requirement for naval vessels. Significance Platform Management Systems aboard modern naval warships are moving towards effectively integrating humans into the system through a process called Human System Integration. Damage Control Systems play an extremely important role in the overall integration, as they have the capability to significantly reduce life cycle costs by allowing crewing reductions through automation of DC functions. Despite the effort by many nations to move towards true PMS integration, effective HSI has not been achieved for a number of reasons, primarily due to the hesitancy of the operational community to allow engineering systems to be integrated with combat direction/management systems.

Cosby, L., Lamontagne, Y. 2006. Critical Assessment of Damage Control System Technologies. DRDC Atlantic CR 2006-283. Defence R&D Canada - Atlantic.

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Sommaire Contexte La Marine canadienne est en train de définir les caractéristiques de deux nouvelles classes de navire, le navire de soutien interarmées (NSI) et le navire de combat de classe unique (NCCU) et de préparer un marché de production correspondant. La Marine a établi que la réduction des coûts du cycle de vie de ces nouveaux navires était une priorité, et que celle-ci passait principalement par une réduction de la taille des équipages, qui explique la majeure partie des coûts de fonctionnement. La façon de réduire les équipages sans compromettre la capacité des navires de remplir leur mission a suscité beaucoup d’intérêt. Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Atlantique (RDDC Atlantique) a lancé à cette fin un projet baptisé « optimisation des équipages et de la lutte contre les avaries » dans le but de voir comment l’équipage des nouvelles classes de navires pourrait être réduit d'avantage encore sans réduire la capacité de lutte contre les avaries. Résultats On a fait une évaluation critique des technologies commerciales et militaires disponibles dans le domaine des systèmes de lutte contre les avaries de combat. Le document présente une analyse des technologies en cours de développement et des renseignements sur la vision future de la lutte contre les avaries du point de vue de la réduction/l’optimisation des équipages. L’examen porte sur les technologies en usage et sur celles qui sont proposées pour les navires de l’avenir. Le document aborde la question de l’importance, de la viabilité et des avantages de l’intégration d’un système de lutte contre les avaries au système de gestion de la plate-forme et de l’établissement de liens avec le système de direction des combats. Enfin, l’incidence des normes navales sur les systèmes de lutte contre les avaries est également abordée et comparée à celle de normes navales équivalentes. Un examen des systèmes actuels de lutte contre les avaries destinés à des fins commerciales et militaires a montré que les systèmes destinés à des usages militaires présentaient beaucoup plus de caractéristiques et étaient globalement plus efficaces. Les systèmes commerciaux ont tous des capacités élémentaires de repérage et de lutte contre les avaries, mais ils n’ont ni les systèmes experts intégrés ni la capacité d’instruction intégrée dont doivent disposer les navires de la Marine. Portée Les systèmes de gestion de plate-forme des navires de guerre modernes tendent de plus en plus vers une intégration efficace des humains par le biais d’un processus appelé intégration des systèmes humains (ISH). Les systèmes de lutte contre les avaries jouent un rôle très important dans cette intégration globale puisqu’ils permettent de réduire sensiblement les coûts du cycle de vie grâce aux réductions d’équipage que l’automatisation des fonctions de lutte contre les avaries rend possibles. Malgré les efforts que de nombreux pays ont faits pour parvenir à une véritable intégration des systèmes de gestion des plates-formes, aucun n’a obtenu encore une bonne ISH, et ce,

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pour diverses raisons, dont principalement la répugnance du milieu des opérations à autoriser l’intégration de systèmes techniques à des systèmes de direction ou de gestion des combats.

Cosby, L., Lamontagne, Y. 2006. Critical Assessment of Damage Control System Technologies. DRDC Atlantic CR 2006-283. Defence R&D Canada - Atlantic.

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Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 Purpose of Report.................................................................................................. 1 1.1.2 Joint Support Ship ................................................................................................. 1 1.1.3 Single Class Surface Combatant ........................................................................... 2

2 HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACES .................................................................................... 3 2.1 Development Methodology............................................................................................ 3

2.1.1 Human Factors Engineering.................................................................................. 3 2.1.2 Systems Safety Engineering.................................................................................. 3 2.1.3 Training Development and Delivery ..................................................................... 4 2.1.4 Health Hazard Engineering ................................................................................... 4 2.1.5 Personnel/Manpower Management ....................................................................... 4

2.2 Integration of HMI into MA&S Management Process .................................................. 4 2.2.1 Material Acquisition & Support (MA&S) Life Cycle Process.............................. 5 2.2.2 HSI Integration...................................................................................................... 5 2.2.3 Technical Integration - JSS ................................................................................... 6 2.2.4 Concept Development & Experimentation ........................................................... 7 2.2.5 Research & Development...................................................................................... 7

3 BATTLE DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS........................................................................ 8 3.1 Functional Categories .................................................................................................... 8

3.1.1 Basic Damage Control Functionality .................................................................... 8 3.1.2 Human Machine Interface - Information Display ................................................. 9 3.1.3 Human Machine Interface - Incident Management/Plotting ............................... 11 3.1.4 DCS Integration with PMS and External Systems .............................................. 11 3.1.5 Expert System Design ......................................................................................... 14 3.1.6 Training Support ................................................................................................. 15 3.1.7 Company Experience .......................................................................................... 16

4 DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM ASSESSMENT.............................................................. 17 4.1 Commercial Damage Control Systems ........................................................................ 17 4.2 Naval Damage Control Systems .................................................................................. 17 4.3 Future Developments for Damage Control Systems.................................................... 17

4.3.1 Damage Control Systems in Development.......................................................... 17 4.3.2 Future of Damage Control Systems (2015 and Beyond)..................................... 19

4.4 Research Opportunities to Reduce Existing Risks in Damage Control ....................... 19 5 CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY STANDARDS ................................................................... 20 6 Summary............................................................................................................................... 22 ANNEX A: DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS - DETAILED ASSESSMENT ......................... 23 ANNEX B: OEM DATA .............................................................................................................. 40 LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS............................................................ 41 7 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 42

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List of Figures Figure 1: Isometric View (L-3 MAPPS) ....................................................................................... 10 Figure 2: Plan View (L-3 MAPPS) ............................................................................................... 10 Figure 3: Boundary Cooling (L-3 MAPPS) .................................................................................. 12 Figure 4: Attack Route (L-3 MAPPS)........................................................................................... 12 Figure 5: Smoke Removal Plan (L-3 MAPPS) ............................................................................. 13

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background There has been a significant transition in crew requirements from the manpower intensive steam powered warships in the 1960s, through the introduction of the Tribal Class Destroyers in the 1970s, and further in the 1990s with the delivery of the Canadian Patrol Frigates. Introduction of a machinery control and automated command and control systems on the Tribal Class ships led to a crew size of 255, modestly larger than the steam ships at 215, but on a ship with twice the displacement. The significant advancement in integrated machinery control and advanced communications, navigation, and command and control systems on the Canadian Patrol Frigates led to roughly a 20% reduction in crew from the Tribal Class (200 vice 255), on an equivalent sized platform. Most of these reductions came from the Marine Engineering Department due to the significantly reduced watch keeping requirement. Despite the introduction of these advanced systems, there was a limit to the allowable crew reduction due to the requirement for labour intensive operations in battle, primarily damage control and fire fighting. Navies around the world are now turning to enhanced damage control and firefighting systems, through automation of many aspects of these activities, to achieve further reductions in crew sizes. To this end, Defence Research and Development Canada – Atlantic (DRDC Atlantic) has initiated a project called “Damage Control and Crew Optimization” to investigate how the goal of further crew reductions on the new classes of ships can be achieved.

1.1.1 Purpose of Report The objective of this report is to complete a critical assessment of available technologies, both commercial and militarized, in Battle Damage Control Systems (BDCS). The report will also include a discussion on new technologies in development, and provide some insight on the future vision for naval damage control as it relates to the goal of crew reduction/optimization.

1.1.2 Joint Support Ship In the JSS “Project Definition Statement of Work” [i], the process of Human Machine Integration (HMI) to achieve a fully integrated Platform Management System (PMS) is mandated. The iterative HMI Design and Acceptance process are key to achieving the goal of a reduced crew without placing a high degree of risk on the overall platform ability to achieve its goals; while at the same time it provides insight into the balance between the cost of technology introduction and the savings achieved through a reduced manning requirement.

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1.1.3 Single Class Surface Combatant The SCSC is currently in the definition phase and has not advanced to the point where detailed requirements have been determined in terms of capability and crewing targets. It is likely that the HMI Design and Acceptance process, similar to that being used by JSS, will also be used for the development of the SCSC; thus, this report will focus on the currently defined JSS process.


2 HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACES

2.1 Development Methodology An optimized Human Machine Interface is achieved through the Human Systems Integration (HSI) process. The guiding documents for HSI are MIL-STD-1472 Human Engineering [ii] and DEF-STAN 0025 Human Factors for Designers of Systems [iii]. The HSI process is designed to integrate the five defined domains including: Human Factors, Systems Safety, Training, Health, and Personnel & Manpower. Collectively these five domains define how the integration of humans into a system affects that systems capability performance, or its ability to effectively achieve its mission including the safety of the crew and through life cost/supportability. Conversely, the HSI domains also define how the systems will impact the human aspects including trade structure, skill gaps/training requirements, workload leading to optimized manning levels, and personnel traits such as body size and strength. The HSI process is integrated into the material life-cycle process, and places a high demand on the design issues that impact the human system components. The HSI process formalizes the coordination of effort between technical specialists in each of the five domains at all stages of the life cycle. Each of the five domains is outlined below.

2.1.1 Human Factors Engineering The Human Factors domain is responsible for defining human performance objectives and indicators during the acquisition phase. The Human Factor specialist applies their knowledge of human capabilities and limitations to the total system design. The primary aims of the Human Factors domain are to make systems easier to operate, maintain and support, optimize human performance within that system, and reduce the chance of human error that would lead to an accident, or mission failure. Human Factors domain also has a secondary responsibility to minimize the cost of training, and reduce the need for selection/recruitment of personnel with a specialist background.

2.1.2 Systems Safety Engineering Systems Safety domain deals with the overall safety of the entire platform including the operators, maintainers and support personnel, typically driven by MIL-STD-882C Safety System Program Requirements [iv]. Through design or implementation of controls, it eliminates or reduces safety related hazards, which is a condition or circumstance that would lead to an undesirable event, to an acceptable level in order to prevent accidents. In order to achieve this goal, Systems Safety analysis uses a proactive approach to determine opportunities for improvement prior to their occurrence, vice identifying deficiencies after an incident for rectification. Probabilistic risk assessment (i.e., probability vs. severity) is utilized to identify those events that would have a detrimental effect on the ships systems and personnel, and appropriate design considerations are


given to those events that would jeopardize their survivability to the detriment of the mission.

2.1.3 Training Development and Delivery The training development domain must consider the tools, devices and methods of individual training in order to develop the necessary skills and knowledge at the appropriate levels to conduct all tasks required of the platform and its systems. Conversely, due consideration must be given at the platform design stage to permit cost-effective training of personnel to meet the requisite performance standards. An overly complicated, poorly designed system cannot be compensated through training. The Training domain specifies performance targets and monitors the achieved results in order to identify and address shortcomings.

2.1.4 Health Hazard Engineering The Health Hazard domain considers those issues that could cause either short or long term health effects for the personnel that operate the system. Consideration must be given to platform design features that could cause significant risk of personnel injury, including death, physical injury or disability, and acute chronic illness, leading to reduced system performance. The Health Hazard domain addresses all areas of human vulnerability, and includes compliance with recognized safety-related legislation for the protection of individuals.

2.1.5 Personnel/Manpower Management The Personnel/Manpower domain assesses the overall platform to determine the aptitudes, knowledge and skills necessary for personnel to be able to operate and maintain the systems. Through identification and assessment of the tasks required to operate and maintain the systems, the appropriate mix of personnel skills can be recognized and gaps in the occupational trades identified. Through this process, the actual manpower requirements to operate and maintain the system can be assessed against current and future personnel availability and skills, leading to possible design constraints. This process also identifies impact on the introduction of new platforms on the existing trade structures and career development, and could affect recruiting requirements in specific areas of skill sets.

2.2 Integration of HMI into MA&S Management Process The approach used by National Defence in Canada is based upon MIL-HDBK-46855A Human Engineering Program Process and Procedures [v], and is consistent with the approach used by both the US Department of Defense and the UK Ministry of Defence.


This document contextualizes the total systems approach of HSI as it applies to acquisition of military systems. For this approach to be successful, the five HSI domains are optimized with each other, taking into consideration the whole system design, with the goal of improving system performance and reducing life-cycle costs. The cost of personnel that operate, support and maintain military systems is one of the highest contributors to overall life-cycle cost; therefore, it is critical that continuous re-evaluation of the HSI requirements and their impact on the overall system development must occur from the beginning and carry on throughout the entire life-cycle of the system.

2.2.1 Material Acquisition & Support (MA&S) Life Cycle Process For large capital acquisitions within DND, the MA&S process takes into due consideration both the Life-Cycle Management System (LCMS) and the Defence Planning and Management (DP&M) processes. These processes outline the steps that must be followed to manage the through-life support to a system from acquisition to disposal. A Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) process or a Research and Development (R&D) process to refine the requirement definition often precedes the MA&S process. The stages in the material life-cycle, as defined by the LCMS and the DP&M processes, is as follows:

• Identification; • Options Analysis; • Definition; • Implementation; • In-Service; and • Disposal.

At each of these stages, HSI plays an integral part in optimizing the system both in terms of human-machine integration (i.e., system performance) and life-cycle cost. The goal of the HSI process is not to rationalize the domains individually; instead the process provides a systematic and formalized means whereby the technical experts within each of the domains can contribute to the development and acquisition process. In this way, the most efficient, effective and affordable solutions can be determined that fully consider human-centered requirements.

2.2.2 HSI Integration The HSI process must be followed throughout the MA&S life cycle, and plays a key role in the acquisition process. Consideration must be given to the In-Service and Disposal phases of the system life-cycle during the acquisition process, as these phases have a significant impact on life-cycle costs. The HSI process is iterative throughout the system life-cycle, and end-user participation in the process is key to obtaining the capability and functionality desired of the system. At each stage of the MA&S life-cycle, HSI deficiencies, requirements and constraints are defined within each of the domains, from


this a plan is developed and risks identified, the plan is then analyzed to determine mitigating factors and finally the possible solutions are determined and evaluated. As solutions are developed, they are fed back into the model and the process begins again. During this iterative process, issues that arise must be tracked and managed to resolution in a coordinated manner. These processes are not necessarily conducted sequentially, as they can cross phases of the acquisition process, but they do provide the means to continually conduct a review of the system throughout its life. Verification and validation at each stage of the process, especially with the end user, is critical to the final outcome. Once the system enters service, a hand-over to the In-Service support organization must occur, which will then conduct HSI monitoring of the system through its life.

2.2.3 Technical Integration - JSS In the case of the JSS, the builder is responsible to develop the HSI plan, which will detail the approach to ensuring that all systems are completely and efficiently interfaced and integrated into the construction of the JSS including the functions allocated to hardware, software and personnel. The HSI plan will include the details of crew requirements, human engineering/habitability, safety, personnel and training requirements, support personnel and a description of how these will be validated. The builder is also responsible for establishing a HSI problem tracking and resolution process. Based upon this approved plan, the builder will then prepare a series of reports that will detail the Safety Management Plan, the Preliminary System Specifications, a complete Hazard Analysis and a Crew and Embarked Personnel plan for various mission profiles (e.g., Ro-Ro, Task Force Support, etc.). As these reports are approved, they are then fully analyzed and broken down into sub-components that will provide greater detail of equipment, personnel specifications including trade, rank, training requirements, etc., and a Human Engineering Plan that describes how the Human-Machine Interfaces will be accomplished and validated. Validation will be conducted by both DND and independent contracted resources, and as mentioned earlier this process will have a heavy reliance on the end-user. Furthermore, at each of these stages the builder and DND must agree on the way ahead prior to the next stage, and where conflicts arise, they must be resolved prior to the next stage commencing (thus the iterative approach). Within the Preliminary System Specifications report, the builder must detail all of the specific systems they intend to integrate into the platform. For JSS, the intention is to have an Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) that includes the Damage Control System, based upon the requirements outlined in the JSS Project Definition Statement of Work. The builder would be responsible for integrating the various systems into the IPMS, and DND would be responsible for validating that the integration has met the goals for HSI and performance, based upon the requirements definition for the platform.


2.2.4 Concept Development & Experimentation The role of CD&E in the MA&S process is to define future requirements for operations and systems, and conduct experimentation to validate these concepts. As Canada and many other maritime nations move towards operating combatant ships with fewer people, HSI is critical to the design of these new systems. As new concepts are developed for introduction into the naval environment, a means of testing, validating and accepting these technologies is necessary. Any program that would take into consideration HSI in future concept development would require end-user participation and involve simulation and physical mock-ups of proposed system configuration to validate those concepts.

2.2.5 Research & Development R&D for system concepts that would become part of future acquisition programs are conducted through the Technology Demonstration Program, normally a joint DND and Industry activity. In the Damage Control System domain, considerable research is being done by a number of nations in order to achieve better and more reliable DC Systems that would not only match current capabilities with a reduced crew, but would actually enhance their ability to control damage and incidents through automation. More and more commercial technologies are being accepted into the naval environment to reduce overall construction costs, as many of the commercial technologies are ahead of the naval equivalents. This does, however, introduce some risk when the commercial product does not fully meet the larger naval requirement. Through the Technology Demonstration Program, DND could work with commercial vendors to develop or improve technologies to meet the naval requirements in advanced damage control and the larger platform management functions.


3 BATTLE DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS Aboard most warships operating today, damage control is mostly a manual and manpower intensive function. Damage control is critical to the survival of a warship and the safety of its crew; consequently, it is very important to the ship operators. Effective damage control requires a high degree of HSI across several levels of interaction, often under demanding circumstances. The DCS operator depends upon a variety of information sources to maintain situational awareness and conduct high-level management of damage control efforts. Repair party leaders use more detailed information, also from a variety of sources, but at a much narrower level of complexity to more directly manage the response at lower levels. Finally, repair parties interact directly with components of ship systems to control and/or rectify the damage. These varying levels of detail required by different personnel from the same system poses a challenge. The DCS must be sufficiently robust to be able to manage the complex equipment and systems on modern warships. On the other hand, their ease of use, especially under demanding and stressful damage control situations, is critical to their overall effectiveness. A description of desirable functionalities in a DCS is included in this section of the report. Another important aspect of a DC System is its adaptability to new or emerging standards. As technology is in continuous evolution, it is critical that a DC System package be capable of incorporating new technologies without the DC System going through an entire redesign cycle. In the future, smart sensors, volume sensors and intelligent vision systems will become readily available. These technologies will have varying new interface requirements; thus, the choice of a well supported DC System and it ability to communicate with emerging technologies through an open architecture is of importance. Current technologies in development and future possible enhancements are discussed later in this section.

3.1 Functional Categories In order to conduct a comparison of the various Damage Control System products that were included in this study, the various functionalities were broken down into a number of major categories. Each of these categories was broken down into sub-categories and an assessment of each Damage Control System product against those sub-categories is included at Annex A to this report.

3.1.1 Basic Damage Control Functionality Basic damage control functionality includes remote starting and stopping of fire pumps, valves and ventilation fans, monitoring of damage control sensors and equipment, and remote activation of damage control equipment from the DC console. These


functionalities are mandatory for any DC System. Without these basic capabilities the system would be of little value to the vessel or crew. All of the Damage Control System products had the capabilities described in this section. One area that the Canadian Navy specializes in is the ability to provide Collective Protection against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events through establishment of a "Citadel". This entails making the ship into an air-tight enclosure with a small positive pressure compared to the surrounding environment. In order to create the citadel condition, all external valves, vents, exhausts, etc. must be closed and the ships ventilation system set on recirculation. The positive pressure is maintained by bringing in air from the surrounding environment through a series of contaminant scrubbing filters. Reconfiguration of the ships systems and maintenance of the citadel condition is an extremely manpower intensive activity and, despite the basic capability of the DC Systems to start/stop equipment/ventilation and monitor citadel conditions (pressure, hatch/door status, etc.), none of the systems reviewed had the capability to completely automate the citadel management process. Of the products reviewed in this study, the most capable product in this area was the L-3 MAPPS product that was developed based on the Canadian Navy model. In order to automate the citadel process, all doors, hatches, valves, vents, exhausts, etc. that lead to the external environment, as well as many of the internal systems that would require reconfiguration in citadel conditions, would have to be automated (i.e., sensors, controls, etc.). This would then have to be integrated into the DCS and the citadel monitoring function revised to include citadel management (automation) based upon the various threat scenarios. The technology to fully automate the process is currently available; however, the cost would be significant. Furthermore, the gains in reducing the crewing requirement would likely be lost due to the increase in maintenance load to maintain such a complex system.

3.1.2 Human Machine Interface - Information Display The most important feature of a DCS HMI is the ability to obtain and display an accurate overview of the damage control situation in a minimum amount of time. Therefore, the DCS HMI package must have the ability to show the entire ship in addition to the ability to zoom in on any specific zone of the ship. This capability would provide the DC Operator the ability to view any area of the ship on screen and also control the level of detail shown on the view without requiring additional pages to get the same level of detail. All of the products assessed have the basic capability to provide various views of the General Arrangement Plan (GAP); however, only a few have the ability to manage the level of details, and for the DC Operator to add/remove detail as the situation required. This is a distinct advantage, as the DC Operator does not have to navigate multiple pages under stressful and demanding conditions during a DC incident. Furthermore, the ability to zoom in/out on a particular area (e.g., DC incident, particular compartment, etc.) without changing pages was not possible in all of the products. Finally, for the purpose


of situational awareness, a good feature is the ability to display both plan and side views at the same time, a feature again that not all products were capable of doing. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show an example of the Isometric and Plan views possible with the L-3 MAPPS product, which clearly is the most advanced of the products evaluated.

Figure 1: Isometric View (L-3 MAPPS)

Figure 2: Plan View (L-3 MAPPS)


3.1.3 Human Machine Interface - Incident Management/Plotting The most important feature in plotting a DC incident is the use of symbology specified by the end-user, which is consistent from platform to platform and the differing DC systems on those platforms. Any package that cannot be adapted to the specified user symbology would result in a requirement for expensive platform-specific training. An equivalent important feature is the ability of the DC System to automatically update the damage control information on the GAP as the information becomes available. Comparison of the features of the DC Systems considered in this report indicates that there are significant differences in the capabilities of the systems that will impact on the DC Operator. Some of these capabilities would provide the DC Operator with significant additional flexibility, such as the ability to:

• plot damage into system layers to show the location of damage; • make plot systems "Compartment" or "Free" based; and • propagate an incident into adjacent compartments or split an incident into two or

more incidents, as necessary. All of the products had some capability in this area, but again the L-3 MAPPS product was the front-runner in terms of additional capability as noted above, as well as providing significant additional information to the DC Operator such as recommended boundary cooling options, attack and escape routes, smoke boundaries, blast routes, etc. These additional functionalities make the L-3 product well suited to the Naval environment. Some of these capabilities are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5.

3.1.4 DCS Integration with PMS and External Systems In a damage control scenario, the ship must still attempt to complete its mission. This will require the continued ability of the ship to float, move and fight. Damage control priorities must take into account the ship's mission, and conduct repair operations in such a way to support that mission and the priorities of Command. This requires effective communication of the damage condition (problem identification, systems affected, course of action necessary to ameliorate/control the damage, and the progress against the planned action) not only to damage control personnel, but also to the bridge, combat systems and machinery control personnel.


Figure 3: Boundary Cooling (L-3 MAPPS)

Figure 4: Attack Route (L-3 MAPPS)


Figure 5: Smoke Removal Plan (L-3 MAPPS) Traditionally, the DC System is isolated from the remaining systems, and communication is conducted through verbal means to the various parties. This is very labour intensive, inefficient, and leads to the various organizations often having a differing view of the incidents in progress. Furthermore, in a battle scenario it is key that the DC organization, as well as the engineering and combat teams, all work together to ensure that Command priorities are met in the most expedient manner, else the likelihood of losing the ship becomes significant. This coordination can best be realized through the integration of Damage Control, Platform Management and Combat Direction Systems. The integration with the machinery control system should include those aspects of Machinery Control, Liquid Cargo Management and the Power Generation and Distribution system that are integral with the DC System. On the Combat systems side, the CS Emergency Response Teams should be integrated into the DC System for a common view of the event management, but other aspects that should be included are the Navigation System, Meteorological System and the CBRN Condition Designation/Monitoring System. All of the products evaluated were well advanced in the integration of the DC System into a PMS; however, none of them addressed the integration points with the Combat Direction System. The biggest obstacle to full platform integration is the opposition from the operations personnel to permit the engineering systems to be integrated with any system that is command oriented [vi]. It is in this area where technology demonstration could be of significant benefit to achieving a fully integrated PMS. An important feature of integration of the DC System with the PMS is the ability to switch between the PMS and DCS without changing workstations or the HMI style (i.e.,


coherent views). Another important feature is the interaction of the DCS with a Closed-Circuit TV System, providing the DC Operator with an instantaneous view of the situation at a remote location. Finally, direct interaction with the PMS equipment from the DC System would also be a desirable feature. Having the DCS share the same application framework as the PMS allows synergy between the two systems. In a fully integrated system, the operator can access all parts of the system in order to perform the correct actions. Furthermore, the use of the same HMI for both systems reduces the training requirement in order to operate the systems. In a highly stressful situation, this would reduce the likelihood of human error occurring due to unfamiliarity of the otherwise disparate systems. In addition to safety related actions, DCS actions have a direct impact on electrical power generation and distribution, and other system vital to the combat suite and other machinery. To simplify the DC tasks, the DC Operator should be able to perform all DC System actions from the same console in an optimal manner. Lack of integration between the DCS and the PMS will invariably increase operator workload, as the operator will be required to report similar information to multiple systems, increasing the possibility for errors. Furthermore, lack of integration would make it difficult to use dynamic checklists (e.g., killcards) as actions taken by the DC Operator will not be immediately visible to the PMS operator.

3.1.5 Expert System Design The expert system should make the operator's job less complicated by presenting information in a clear and concise manner. For instance, naval doctrine stating the damage control actions that must be taken with each type of incident for each compartment onboard a ship should be readily available to the DC Operator. This makes static and dynamic killcards (hierarchical checklists) very important as they list the actions that should be taken for given incidents to make an incident area safe as well as restore services as the situation permits. Killcards are based on the baseline knowledge of the ship systems and sub-systems, including their permissives (e.g., power supplies and services such as fuel, cooling, HP/LP air, and hydraulics necessary to operate) and their possible operating states (normal, emergency, etc.). Requirements for the management and handling of incidents can influence the level of automation required within the DCS and PMS. For example, if there is a requirement that a fire be extinguished with X minutes of occurrence, then this may require improved detection (i.e., using a smart or more sensitive fire detection system) or that the suppression system be automatically controlled with the logic in the detection system. Furthermore, remote control of doors and hatches might need to be implemented in order to have the affected area isolated within a specified period of time. The driver behind expert system development is the ability of the ship to survive a DC incident. With smaller crew sizes, there will be less surge capability to handle significant


DC events, or even a large number of smaller events; hence, the advancement of expert systems that would automate many of the response functions is essential. Trials aboard the USS SHADWELL as part of the US Navy Damage Control - Automated Reduced Manning (DC-ARM) project [vii] & [viii] have shown that a properly designed and functioning DC System, utilizing sophisticated smart sensors, water mist for fire suppression and containment, and a "Smart" Supervisory Control Console, would permit a small crew to more effectively manage a DC incident than a larger crew with a more primitive DC system. Albeit there is a direct link between the level of automation and ship survivability, the cost of implementing this level of complexity is also extremely high. The technology described above is part of the USN "Smart Ship" program, and numerous new and existing vessels are being fitted with the technology. A good example of the savings that can be achieved through crew reductions is the introduction of the Smart Ship innovations into the Ticonderoga class, which permitted the Engineering Control Station watch to be reduced from 11 to 4 personnel on watch [ix]. The development of expert system/decision tools will continue, and DC Systems of the future will incorporate real time fire spread, smoke, flooding and stability models that are input into advisories that aid the operator in making decisions concerning damage control activities. There are many areas of opportunity for research and development of improved, and cheaper, sensors and equipment to support expert system advancement such as autonomous sensors that can take immediate action to prevent the spread of fire, volume sensors that can discriminate real events from nuisance sources (e.g., hot work), and more efficient water mist systems that operate at lower pressures [x] [xi] [xii] [xiii].

3.1.6 Training Support An essential requirement for DCS training is to embed the training into the various occupational training, as all crew will need at least a minimum level of understanding of the system. All personnel must receive at least baseline training prior to arrival on a ship. A further important feature of DC Systems is to have a training capability in the onboard system such that any DC Console can be used to create and manage various damage control scenarios as well as react to these scenarios for training purposes, both at sea and alongside. This would be very helpful for refresher training, to further combat readiness, and to aid Sea Training Staff in creating realistic scenarios for assessment purposes. Another essential feature of training is the capability to record a training session and permit it to be played back to conduct real-time assessment of individual and group performance. This feature would also be useful in a real event, as the DC System information would become evidence post event.


3.1.7 Company Experience All of the products assessed as part of this study had significant experience with commercial applications of their product; however, the only product company that has experience with naval applications of their DC System is L-3 MAPPS. The L-3 MAPPS system was first developed as part of the Canadian Patrol Frigate program. It has evolved over the years from a basic monitoring system to a fully integrated and capable DC assessment and action system. It has been installed on Naval ships from Canada, the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates and Australia [xiv]. The only competition would be the US NAVSEA sponsored enhanced Damage Control Assessment and Management System (eDCAMS), supplied by Oak Management and marketed in Canada by GasTOPS. Unfortunately, GasTOPS declined to respond to this study, so an assessment of the capability of the eDCAMS system against the L-3 MAPPS system cannot be performed at this time.


4 DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM ASSESSMENT

4.1 Commercial Damage Control Systems Commercial damage control systems are in many ways ahead of their naval counterparts. The philosophy for merchant ship design is to develop minimally-manned vessels that can navigate between destinations totally on autopilot. Fully integrated platform and navigation management systems make sure that the cargo gets to its destination in the most optimal, cost-effective way. For merchant shipping, cost is of the highest importance, and the commercial systems reflect this in that they do not have all of the additional functionality desirable in the naval environment for a DC System. Therefore, in terms of the larger system, commercial systems would not be suitable in the naval context, albeit many of the integration and sensor technologies could be integrated into a Naval DC System.

4.2 Naval Damage Control Systems The L-3 MAPPS system is based on a distributed, open architecture that includes multi-function control consoles and remote terminal units. The remote terminal units acquire data and control equipment at the process level, while the consoles provide the user interface for the operators at various locations throughout the ship. The system is connected by a multiple-redundant ship-wide databus of either copper or fiber optic construction. Because of this modular design with widely distributed intelligent electronics, the system provides excellent survivability through layered redundancy. This is a key requirement for a DC System as the reduced crew size would place a high degree of risk on platform survivability in battle scenarios should the system fail. Future enhancements of the L-3 MAPPS system should include greater integration with the other system management systems (i.e., Combat, Machinery, Liquid Cargo, etc.) into a larger PMS. However, as mentioned earlier, numerous doctrinal and cultural barriers will have to be overcome before the door to full platform management integration can be opened. The challenge is to demonstrate in an operational sense that reductions in workload and crew requirements, while at the same time maintaining or enhancing mission readiness and safety, would be possible through system integration.

4.3 Future Developments for Damage Control Systems

4.3.1 Damage Control Systems in Development Advancements in smart sensors that constantly monitor the systems they are integrated into are a subject of recent research and development. Sensor technology is sufficiently


advanced that it may be possible to not only monitor the system, but to also determine its health through identification of problems, such as incorrectly positioned valves, or failing components through monitoring differential pressures, temperatures, etc. and comparing these to the baseline. These smart sensors would be self-diagnosing, able to determine if they had failed, and possibly self-calibrating. Developments in probabilistic neural networks (smart systems) could be applied to future DC Systems to increase the system capability to act independently and improve overall effectiveness. Other simple improvements to the DC Systems currently being considered include better team management through wireless tracking of personnel (e.g., attack teams, emergency response teams, etc.,), text messaging to reduce unnecessary congestion on the voice networks and even voice recognition software that could potentially increase HMI effectiveness. Increased sensing capabilities and automatic fire suppression equipment is the subject of various studies. Normally, advisory functions to operators are typically provided to automation suppliers for implementation in their control systems based upon end-user doctrine. The area of future study required to meet the ever increasing demand for reduced manning through automation will include advances in advisory functions implemented directly in the ship's integrated control system. These advisory functions take many forms as were demonstrated by the numerous presentations on this topic at the 13th Ship Control Symposium in April 2003, most notably as follows:

• Complexity Management in Shipboard Automation Architectures; • employing Component Level Intelligence [xv]; • Self-configurable Distributed Control Networks [xvi]; • Risk-Based Decision Aid for Damage Control [xvii]; • Operator-Computer Interfaces for Automated Shipboard Engineering Plant

Control Systems [xviii]; • Application of Network Fragment Heating Technology to a Reconfigurable

Electrical System [xix]; • Condition and Casualty Assessment: Proposals for the Applications of System

Fault Prognosis and Healing to Plant and Systems on Future Naval Platforms [xx];

• Advanced Damage Control System Concepts [xxi]; • Reliable Autonomous Systems: Feasible Applications that lead to Substantial

Workload Reductions [xxii]; • Contingency Model Based Integrated Design and Control Analysis for Ships

Service and Damage Control System Networks with Real-Time Reconfiguration [xxiii];

• Distributed Supervisory Control System (SCS) for Advanced Shipboard Damage Control Systems [xxiv]; and

• An Overview of the Advisory Functions on RNLN's ADCF [xxv].


4.3.2 Future of Damage Control Systems (2015 and Beyond) The 21st century combatant will need to be capable of both independent and battle group operations. The ability to operate independently requires a stout self-defence capability, and an offensive capability when needed. There are numerous means for improving a combatant's war fighting capability including increasing weapons capacity, increasing endurance, and improving survivability and the ability to "fight hurt". The ability to complete a mission through improved survivability is the focus of future advancement in the DC System technologies. The survival of future ships is likely to depend on a more extensive suite of ship systems working in concert with a smaller number of people to conduct damage control. Aboard a future ship, the problems caused by inflicted damage would be amplified in complexity, confusion and importance to the survival of the ship. A key factor in achieving enhanced performance of the whole system is through effective HSI. Conversely, ships can sustain damage as a result of equipment failure, weather, and other accidents as well as weapon damage. The extent of damage must be detected and assessed, contained and mitigated, no matter what the cause. At the same time this must be accomplished with minimal damage to the ship and its systems, and the sailors must be protected from unnecessary harm. Future systems must be able to handle the sublime incident up to the catastrophic, and do so with precision and reliability. Whether the ship is in a battle scenario, or alongside in home port, the DCS as part of the larger IPMS must be capable of protecting the platform and the crew with and without human intervention.

4.4 Research Opportunities to Reduce Existing Risks in Damage Control One of the major areas of research opportunity is the development of new doctrine and tactics to best utilize the existing and future advances in DC technologies. The full integration at the platform level of system management tools is the wave of the future; however, significant hurdles must be overcome in terms of the reluctance of the operations community to accept common system architecture with the engineering systems. To overcome this reluctance, it will have to be proven that integration of the various systems into a truly integrated PMS is advantageous, both to the operators and the engineers. To achieve this will require real-time modeling of systems as a means of demonstrating enhanced capabilities. These models would demonstrate the effectiveness of improved communication and reliability in an integrated system, as well as the space reductions that could be achieved through a common system.


5 CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY STANDARDS Many countries have their own classification societies, among these being the UK's Lloyd's Register and Lloyd's Rules and Regulations for Naval Ships, Germany's Germanischer Lloyd's, Norway's Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Rules for Naval Vessels and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Rules. All of these societies have similar rules concerning damage control equipment and procedures, and the Canadian Navy traditionally follows the Lloyd's Rules and Regulations for Naval Ships in its new ship construction programs. However, none of these classification societies have rules that would impact incorporation of DCS, sensors or a fire suppression system to a greater degree than the ABS rules. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Rules that apply to the JSS are the Steel Vessel Rules 2006. These rules have multiple sections covering the type of fire fighting equipment, the type of fire detection equipment and the number and required locations for display of fire/damage control information. However, the rules have no requirements concerning the information that must be displayed as part of the fire/damage control system The specific rules associated with the Fire Safety System are listed in Part 4 Chapter 7 Sections 1-3. Section 1 gives the General Provisions for Fire Safety Systems including the Plans and Data required for submission for ABS approval. This section also includes requirements for the Fire Control Plan. The general arrangement plans are to be permanently exhibited for the guidance of the vessel's crew and clearly show the following information:

• Fire sections enclosed by bulkheads; • Particulars of the fire detection and alarm system; • Sprinkler information; • Fire extinguishing appliances; • Means of access to compartments and decks; • Ventilation system including particulars of the fan control positions and damper

positions; and • Arrangement of ventilation fans serving each section.

Section 2 specifies the fixed and portable fire fighting equipment that must be included as part of the vessel's equipment. Section 2 also outlines the fire detection equipment and sensor coverage requirements. Section 3 covers fire extinguishing systems and equipment. It states the capacity, pressures and coverage required for fire fighting equipment, including a section on the automated sprinkler, fire detection and alarm system requirements, but only to the extent of outlining the principles for alarming and activation of sprinkler systems.


The products assessed as part of this study are all capable of meeting these standards. None of the standards have specific requirements as it relates to survivability in a battle scenario; therefore, an assessment of these systems against a "Militarized" requirement cannot be made. Again, the system that was designed to meet the needs of the Naval platform (L-3 MAPPS) is best capable of surviving in a battle situation due to its multiple redundant open architecture.


6 Summary Platform Management Systems aboard modern Naval warships are moving towards effectively integrating humans into the system through a process called Human System Integration. Damage Control Systems play an extremely important role in the overall integration, as they have the capability to significantly reduce life cycle costs by allowing crewing reductions through automation of DC functions. Despite the effort by many nations to move towards true PMS integration, effective HSI has not been achieved for a number of reasons, primarily due to the hesitancy of the operational community to allow engineering systems to be integrated with combat direction/management systems. Experience has shown that effectively implementing human-centered design techniques is complicated and costly. State of the art DC Systems, some of which were reviewed as part of this study, have a long ways to go to achieve true human integration into a comprehensive Platform Management construct. Instead, Navies of the G8 nations are focusing on reducing the cost of military operations and, with Naval applications as they relates to DC Systems, the general trend is to reduce operational costs through reduced manning levels on the ships. When reducing crew sizes, due consideration must be given to the associated safety and risks that a smaller crew would face in a damage control scenario. To mitigate these risks, future development in the area of damage control automation is necessary, including:

• Improved sensing capabilities; • Advisory functions to assist operators; and • Automatic fire detection and suppression capabilities.

Based upon a review of currently available DC System products designed for both commercial and military applications, those that are designed for Military use have a much greater set of features and overall effectiveness. Commercial packages all have the basic plotting and damage control functional capabilities; however, they do not have the same expert systems built into them, or a built-in training capability that is a baseline requirement for Naval vessels. In the future, the near term will bring improved human-centered design techniques that can be demonstrated through research and development programs that focus on improved interfaces. Longer-term initiatives involve education of the Naval community to advance full platform integration, and development of design methods and tools to improve the efficiency of human centered design, with the goal of improved platform survivability at the optimal through-life cost.


ANNEX A: DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS - DETAILED ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION Information was requested from ten vendors of Damage Control Systems (DCS). The companies solicited for information on their DCS products and their responses are shown in the table below. COMPANY NAME RESPONSE

ABB Imtech Logimatic Lyngso Marine L-3 MAPPS Martec Northrop Grumman

ABB chose not to respond to the request for information on their damage control product. However, their website (http://www.abb.com) has extensive information on their product [xxvi]. The product called Control System 800xA is the closest product that they have to a damage control system on their website. The system is essentially a Distributed Control System and has no functionality specifically pertaining to Damage Control; therefore, the ABB products have not been included in this study. Imtech chose not to respond to the request for information on their damage control product. Logimatic chose not to respond to the request for information on their damage control product. Lyngso Marine submitted documentation (see Annex B) on their package called SeaSense, a real-time onboard decision support system [xxvii]. The SeaSense system has been included in this study. The L-3 MAPPS Battle Damage Control System (BDCS) is included in this study. Documentation for the BDCS is included at Annex B. Martec submitted documentation (see Annex B) on their package called Safety Management System [xxviii]. The Safety Management System has been included in this study. Northrop Grumman chose not to respond to the request for information on their damage control product.


COMPANY NAME RESPONSE Oak Management Rockwell Automation Siemens

Oak Management supplies the US NAVSEA sponsored enhanced Damage Control Action Management Station (eDCAMS). GasTOPS is the company in Canada that represents Oak Management; however, they chose not to respond to the request for information on the eDCAMS product. Rockwell Automation chose not to respond to the request for information on their damage control product. Historically, Rockwell Automation has taken the approach of being an equipment supplier and partnering with a third party to perform integration activities. An example is Rockwell Automation's partnership with Northrop Grumman to provide the UK Navy Type-45 program's Platform Management System (PMS). Siemens submitted documentation (see Annex B) for the MM8000 MP3 15 Management Station [xxix]; which has been included in this study.


DETAILED ASSESSMENT To aid in the evaluation, Damage Control System functionality was divided into the following major categories: a. Human Machine Interface - Information Display; b. Human Machine Interface - Incident Management/Plotting; c. DCS Integration with Platform Management Systems (PMS) and External

Systems; d. Expert System Design; e. Basic Damage Control Functionality; f. Training Support; and g. Company Experience. The detailed assessment for the included Damage Control products, including a break-down of the main categories above into relevant sub-categories, follows:


Basic Damage Control Functionality

# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Remote start/stop of fire pumps, valves and ventilation flaps.

√ √ √ √

2 Remote activation of fire suppression systems (water mist, carbon dioxide, aqueous film forming foam, etc.).

√ √ √ √

3 Monitoring of fire pumps, valves, firemain pressure, ventilation fans, citadel pressure, tank levels.

√ √ √ √


Human Machine Interface - Information Display

# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Use of vector based graphics for display of General Arrangement Plan (GAP) with unlimited levels of zoom. Vector based GAP provides the ability for the operator to assess any part of the GAP of the ship at the required resolution (zoom feature). There is no need to call up different pages to show greater level of details, as these details can be embedded within the same mimic page. This feature allows the focus to be on what the operator wants to see instead of searching for the right page to be displayed.

√ √ √

2 Ability to get extra details shown/hidden automatically on the GAP as the zoom factor is increased. The goal is to avoid cluttering the screen with irrelevant detail (when not required) in order to not confuse the operator. This should be done automatically, not requiring an operator decision.

√ √(1) √

3 Ability to display GAP in 2D (plan view).

√ √ √ √

4 Ability to display GAP in ISOMETRIC view.

√ √ √ √

5 Ability to display GAP in both 2D and ISOMETRIC views concurrently. Although many Navies are accustomed to operating their damage control state boards with an isometric view, it is also very useful to be able to show a 2D representation of the ship on which system layers, such as fire main, bilge, fire suppression, and high voltage systems, can be overlaid. This ability to switch between both representations of the GAP without loss of focus for the operator is advantageous.

√ √

6 Ability to overlay extra layers of detail such as fire main, sprinkling and fuel systems on the GAP (2D or ISOMETRIC views). In certain circumstances, the operator must have access to system layers in order to determine the systems that might be impacted by an incident. This ability to show additional information (through layers) is of considerable usefulness to the operator.

√ √

7 Ability to show side view concurrent with the plan view of the ship. For an operator fighting a damage control incident, a "side view" of the ship is important in locating the incident on the ship in respect to the associated decks and sections.

√ √


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

8 Ability to zoom in/out on side views to get extra details (compartment name, equipment layout, etc.). In the process of fighting an incident, it is important to provide the DC Operator with the ability to identify the adjacent compartments (i.e., above, below, forward and aft) as well as systems within those compartments that may be impacted by the incident.

√ √

9 Ability to select a compartment in the side view and have that same region shown in the 2D/ISOMETRIC views. Simplicity and speed of maneuvering within the different views of the DCS are important in reducing operator overload.

√ √

10 Ability to navigate within the GAP view by on-screen selection (i.e., via a mouse drag box). This feature provides the operator with a simple means of selecting the area of interest that is to be enlarged.

√ √(2)

11 Ability to select equipment (pumps, valves, doors, engine, etc.) on any mimic page or list, and navigate to the appropriate compartment in the GAP where the equipment is located. In certain circumstances, the ability to locate the equipment on the ship/GAP is required in order to better understand the interaction between countermeasure actions, such as mechanical and electrical isolation of a compartment, and the equipment in that compartment.

√ √

12 Have an area dedicated to displaying alarms, events and incidents related to DC from which the operator can select the appropriate alarm, event or incident, and navigate directly to its location. On a Human Machine Interface with a Damage Control System integrated in to a Platform Management System, it is important that all DCS actions/alarms can be "isolated" from other PMS functions/alarms; thus permitting continued operation of the platform.

√ √(3) √(3)

13 Be able to navigate within the GAP with a single click to any deck overview where the decks above and below are also shown (i.e., displaying 3 decks concurrently). Simplicity and speed of maneuvering within the different views of the DCS are important in avoiding operator overload.

√ √

14 Ability to handle a multi-screen console display, having more than one GAP displayed concurrently with each one having different layers selected at different zoom factors if required.

√ √


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

15 Ability to navigate directly to the location of the compartment on the GAP from an active incident. Simplicity and speed of maneuvering within the different views of the DCS are very important in order to avoid overloading the operator.

√ √ √

16 Ability to display in "child" window any PMS mimic page for support to DCS actions (where "child" window is defined as a pre-determined sized window). DCS actions often require the operator to be aware of the platform status; thus, it is mandatory that PMS mimic pages be displayed within the same framework as the DCS.

√

17 Be able to adapt the DCS display layout to any size of the LCD.

√ √ √ √

18 Provide display and updates of State boards (Command brief, Command, etc.). The DCS should not be limited to GAP/Incident display. It should also have the ability to support dedicated mimic pages such as state boards.

√

Notes: (1) No automatic de-cluttering. (2) Aerial view with non-changeable square. (3) Dedicated alarm line but cannot navigate directly to location.


Human Machine Interface - Incident Management/Plotting # Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Ability to plot directly on the GAP all types of incidents, resources and notes as per the client's chosen symbology.

√ √(1) √(1)

2 Have full integration with the fire detection system, providing immediate feedback to operator when sensors are activated/triggered.

√ √ √ √

3 Ability to move and resize any plot objects drawn on the GAP.

√

4 Ability to acknowledge a fire alarm directly with the DCS and concurrent generation of a confirmed incident plot.

√ √ √ √

5 Automatically confirm fire incident plot when sensors of different types (e.g., Smoke and Heat) are activated in the same space. The incident automation must be configurable to take into account new generation DCS sensors incorporating image, sound, IR and smoke (volume) sensors.

√ √ √

6 Have full integration with the flooding detection system, providing immediate feedback when bilge level increases abnormally in a specific compartment.

√ √ √ √

7 Provide incident management allowing the operator to time stamp all major activities/milestones-achieved in the process of fighting an incident.

√ √ √ √

8 Ability to plot damage into system layer in order to show location of damage. These plots are only visible when that system layer is made visible. Managing an incident includes the ability to annotate problems/countermeasures against a particular ship system, such as electrical distribution networks (e.g., patch cable) and fire main systems (e.g., rupture and patch).

√

9 Ability to make plot symbols "compartment based" or free based. Compartment based plot symbols normally represent an action/incident or resource that has no meaning unless linked to a particular compartment, such as a fire incident. Free plots normally represent annotation of extra information that could be added anywhere on the GAP without having a direct relation to a compartment (e.g., notes added on the GAP).

√


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

10 Provide automatic plotting of fire and flooding boundaries for a confirmed incident. Given a pre-defined set of boundaries for each compartment (defined by the client and/or builder at the design stage), the DCS should automatically draw the boundaries on the GAP, at the request of the operator, when a specific incident occurs. It should also be possible to view these boundaries as advice and, before accepting this advice; the operator should be allowed to change the boundaries in order to meet the current ship condition. Once the boundaries are accepted, the DC operator can pass it on to all other DCS users as a "planned boundary".

√

11 Provide pre-defined attack and escape route plots for each compartment/ship section. Given a pre-defined set of attack and escape routes for each compartment (defined by the client and/or builder at the design stage), the DCS should automatically draw them on the GAP, at the request of the operator, when a specific incident occurs. It should also be possible to view these routes as advice and, before accepting this advice; the operator should be allowed to change the boundaries in order to meet the current ship condition. Once the boundaries are accepted, the DC operator can pass the routes on to all other DCS users as a "planned attack/escape route".

√

12 Provide direct access to killcards (static or dynamic) from active incidents or compartment selection.

√ √ √

13 Provide capability to enter water level in any compartment (either in height or volume) and categorize this water as being bilge or fire fighting.

√

14 Ability to enter "simulated" water level into a compartment in order to determine stability countermeasures efficiency. Simulated water levels are local to the station initiating the simulation.

√ √

15 Provide mechanism to automatically distribute all plots/events to all DCS consoles for replication.

√ √ √ √

16 Synchronize all plots/incident events on startup of a new DCS console.

√

17 Ability to propagate confirmed incident to other compartments. Incidents may, in certain circumstances, propagate to adjacent compartments; hence the ability to add them to the current incident without having to create a new incident is advantageous.

√


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

18 Ability to "split" a propagated incident into two or more distinct incidents. An incident that is spread over more that one compartment may be better controlled as more than one distinct incident; therefore, the ability to split large incidents into smaller. More manageable event is advantageous.

√

Notes: (1) No fire-fighting symbology.


DCS Integration with Platform Management Systems (PMS) and External

Systems # Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Provide an HMI framework that provides seamless change from DCS to PMS operation. The operator should have the ability to view and control the DCS and the PMS from the same console.

√ √

2 CCTV Support: The DCS should have the ability to interact wit a CCTV system and automatically show a CCTV window in the DCS framework upon fire alarm activation or upon operator request. Given authority, an operator should be capable of controlling the pan/tilt and zoom of the camera. By adding "control buttons" directly on the GAP, the operator should be able to activate (i.e., start, stop, open, close, etc.) equipment remotely from the compartment where the equipment is located.

√ √ √ √

3 Provide ability to interact directly from the GAP with any PMS devices (e.g., pumps, valves, engines, etc.). If the PMS is designed so that it provides "hooks" for the DCS to activate components remotely, then incident suppression logic, resident in the DCS killcards/checklists, can be used to activate PMS internal sequences and devices (e.g., pumps, valves, engines, etc.).

√

4 Provide full interaction between an automated control sequence located in the PMS and specific DCS actions performed (e.g., plotting of a fire in a compartment triggers the ventilation stop sequence for that space).

√ √ √ √

5 Provide the ability to send current DCS status information (e.g., fire/flooding/damage state of each compartment) to combat direction system (CDS). If the DCS has a data link with the CDS, then any changes in ship requirements are automatically passed over to all automated sequences and the "checklist" logic.

√ √ √ √

6 Ability to receive the following parameters from the CDS: current ship loading conditions (ammunition, combustible, crew list, etc.), current ship readiness state, and command aims such that they can be used in advisory functions.

√ √ √ √

7 Provide connections with any compliant data sources in order to get extra ship parameters related to DCS.

√ √ √ √


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

8 Ability to interact with a stability calculator engine so that internal PMS sensor information (e.g., tank content/volume) and current plotted damage are passed to this calculator engine and the results are shown on a dedicated stability DCS view. For example, DCS actions carried out on the GAP are transferred to the "ship stability calculator" such that a complete revalidation of the ship stability is performed automatically and countermeasures proposed.

√ √

9 Possibility to connect to a shore-based workstation via Satellite Link. This link enables continued support when the ship is at sea or in a remote location.

√(1) √ √ √

10 Ability to send an e-mail/page or dial an emergency number in the event of an alarm.

√ √ √

Notes: (1) Via interface to CDS only.


Expert System Design # Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Static Killcards: Static killcards (HTML or PDF type of document) are hierarchical lists that the operator can refer to help control an incident.

√ √ √

2 Dynamic Killcards: Dynamic killcards (hierarchical checklists) are automatically loaded at all DCS consoles. The killcards can be used to send requests to any DCS/PMS operator to execute a specific action. They can also have pre-built actions performed (command to the plant) upon acknowledgement of an order. Dynamic killcards can be used to navigate to any part of the GAP or any other mimic page of the DCS/PMS. Access to static killcards can be instantiated directly within a dynamic killcard. The status/state of every action within the killcard is automatically transmitted to all DCS consoles in order to have a common view of the killcard.

√ √

3 Killcard Builder: Provide an offline tool to create killcards. Killcards can be adapted to changing needs/requirements resulting from changes in a ship's operating procedures. Provide a means to automatically upload the new killcard set to all DCS consoles.

√ √ √

4 Smoke Boundary Advisory: Ability to automatically set up a smoke boundary based upon fire sensor activation. This boundary should be automatically re-evaluated upon occurrence of a new alarm. Advice can be applied as received or the operator can modify the advice by adding to or deleting compartments from the currently defined boundary. Once the advice is accepted, it is automatically propagated to all other DCS consoles.

√

5 Boundary Cooling Advisory: The DCS operator can ask the system for advice (graphical and textual) on the boundary cooling plan for a confirmed fire in a specific compartment. The advice can be applied as is or the operator can modify the advice by adding/deleting boundaries. Once the advice is accepted, it is automatically propagated to all other DCS consoles.

√


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

6 Attack and Escape Route Advisory: The operator can ask the system for advice (graphical and textual) on the primary and secondary attack and escape routes. The advice can be applied as is or the operator can modify the advice by modifying the routes. All routes are validated to ensure they are not conflicting with other ship conditions (XYZ closing state, blast routes, radar in use, etc.). Once the advice is accepted, it is automatically propagated to all other DCS consoles.

√

7 Hazardous Location Advisory: The DCS operator is advised when an adjacent compartment to an incident contains hazardous materials (fuel, ammunition, etc.). This advisory provides guidance to the operator on how this hazardous situation should be handled.

√

8 Smoke Removal Advisory: The operator can ask the system for advice (graphical and textual) on the smoke path and engine room overpressure to be used to evacuate smoke from a contained smoke boundary. The advice can be applied as is or the operator can modify the advice by modifying the smoke path. Once the advice is accepted, it is automatically propagated to all other DCS consoles as a smoke removal plan. When the plan is executed, then all smoke sensors along the path are inhibited.

√

9 Blast Route Advisory: Upon detection of an unexploded bomb, the DCS can provide an advisory (graphical and textual) for the best "blast route" that can be set up in order to minimize the damage should the bomb detonate. The advice can be applied as is or the operator can modify the advice by modifying the route. Once the advice is accepted, it is automatically propagated to all other DCS consoles.

√

10 Attack Team Management: Ability to manage the attack team dispatched to an incident. Also, provide locations for resting, Oxygen Breathing Apparatus (OBA) timing, time of arrival on scene, etc.).

√

11 Casualty Management: Ability to manage casualties; name and rank of injured person, type of injury, location of injured person, casualty team responsible for handling the incident, location of emergency room where injured person will be transferred.

√


# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

12 Citadel Differential Pressure Monitoring: Ability to monitor the airtight status of the citadel based on the required level (XYZ or gas tight). Provide visual feedback on the GAP of hatches/dampers/doors that do not meet the desired condition. Provide the ability to determine in advance if next level of damage control condition can be achieved and if not, identify the faulty hatches/dampers/doors.

√

13 Readiness State Change Management: Ability to manage the readiness state requirements (normally received from the CDS) and send back DCS/PMS status to the CDS regarding the level of compliance to the requested readiness state.

√

14 Stability Calculation Display: Display the results of the stability calculation:

√ √ √ √

15 Fire Main Remaining Capacity Advisory: Provide advice on the current capacity of the fire main system to provide sea water to all consumers (usage and reserve capacity) based upon the current configuration of valves and pump states.

√

16 Machinery Safeguarding Advisory: Upon confirmation of a new fire or flooding incident, provide an advisory/management checklist that the operator can activate, either in full automatic, semi-automatic or manual modes, which will safely shut down all machinery in the affected compartments.

√ √

17 Electrical Isolation Advisory: Upon confirmation of a new fire or flooding incident, provide an advisory/management checklist that the operator can activate, either in full automatic, semi-automatic or manual modes, which will safely isolate every electrical consumer and distribution panel within the affected compartments, including a list of those "consumers" that will be lost due to the electrical isolation.

√


Training Support

# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Have the capability to convert any console into a training mode where all aspects of the DCS can be simulated and tested against a model of the actual ship.

√ √

2 Capability to have a Record/Playback function that captures all operator interactions with the system, and retains a copy for future playback

√


Company Experience

# Title/Description

L-3

MA

PPS

Mar

tec

Siem

ens

Lyng

so

1 Experience with two or more commercial applications of the damage control system.

√ √ √ √

2 Experience with Naval application of the damage control system. √


ANNEX B: OEM DATA Available on CD


LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS ABS American Bureau of Shipping CAD Computer Aided Design CCTV Closed Circuit Television CDS Combat Direction System DCS Damage Control System DND Department of National Defence DXF Data Exchange Format GAP General Arrangement Plan HMI Human Machine interface JSS Joint Support Ship PMS Platform Management System SCSC Single Class Surface Combatant


7 REFERENCES [i] JSS Project Definition Statement of Work. [ii] MIL-STD 1472 Human Engineering. [iii] DEF-STAN 00-25 Human Factors for Designers of Systems. Part 19: Human

Engineering Domain: Technical Guidance and Data. [iv] MIL-STD-882C Safety System Program Requirements. [v] MIL-HDBK-46855A Human Engineering Program Process and Procedures. [vi] Bridging the Divide Between the Warfighters and the Engineers. J. Janssen,

Janes International Defence Review, January 1, 2001. [vii] Human Systems Integration & Shipboard Damage Control. Cdr E. Runnerstrom,

USN (Ret). [viii] DC-ARM Marks the Wave of Future Damage Control. NRL Press Release,

March 25, 2002. [ix] CC-47 Ticonderoga. Military Analysis Network report. [x] L-3 MAPPS - Integrated Platform Management Systems. Naval-Technology.com

report. [xi] Network-Based Control, Monitoring and Calibration of Shipboard Sensors.

Eusebio, P. Da Silva, Masters Thesis, September 2003. [xii] Ship Operational Characteristic Study. Military Analysis Network report. [xiii] Shipboard Damage Control. US NRL on-line report. [xiv] Fiber Optic Damage Assessment System. Office of Naval Research, Advanced

Engineering Development Program report. [xv] Lively, K., Dalessandro, D., & Smith, S. Complexity Management in Shipboard

Automation: Architecture Employing Component Level Intelligence. USA. [xvi] Janssen, J.A.A.J., & Maris, M.G., (2003, April 7th). Self-Configurable

Distributed Control Networks on Naval Ships. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.


[xvii] Gillis, M.P.W., Keijer, W., & Meesters, J. (2003, April 7th). Risk Based Decision

Aid for Damage Control. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xviii] Lively, K., Kirkpatrick, M., & Smith, S. (2003, April 7th). Operator-Computer

Interfaces for Automated Shipboard Engineering Plant Control Systems. USA. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xix] Tucker, W., Callahan, B., & Smith, S. (2003, April 7th). Application of Network

Fragment Healing Technology to a Reconfigurable Electrical System. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xx] John, D., & Mackay, P.J. (2003, April 7th). Condition and Casualty Assessment:

Proposal for the Application of System Fault Prognosis and Healing to Plant and Systems on Future Naval Platforms. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxi] Kuzma, H., Gorton, J., O'Mara, J., Kelleher, P., & Rhoades, D. (2003, April 7th).

Advanced Damage Control System Control System Concepts. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxii] Logtmeijer, R., & Westermeijer, E. (2003, April 7th). Reliable Autonomous

Systems: Feasible Applications that Lead to Substantial Workload Reduction. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxiii] Russell, K., & Broadwater, R. (2003, April 7th). Contingency Model Based

Integrated Design and Control Analysis for Ships Service and Damage Control System Networks with Real-Time Reconfiguration. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxiv] Downs, R. (2003, April 7th). Distributed Supervisory Control System (SCS) for

Advanced Shipboard Damage Control Systems. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxv] Hagenaars, C.H.A (2003 April 7th). An Overview of the Advisory Functions on

RNLN's ADCF. Paper presented at the 2003 International Ship Control Symposium, Orlando, Florida.

[xxvi] Industrial IT System 800xA (2006). Retrieved March 20th, 2006 from

http://www.abb.com


[xxvii] Naval Integrated Platform Management Systems (2006). Horsholm, Denmark:

Lyngso Marine. [xxviii]Safety Management System (2006) brochure. Martec [xxix] MM8000 MP3.15 Management Station: System Description (2005). Switzerland:

Siemens Building Technologies AG.


Distribution list Document Number: DRDC Atlantic CR 2006-283 LIST PART 1: Internal distribution by Center 5 - DRDC Atlantic Library (4 CDs, 1 hardcopy) 2 – AUTHOR (CD, hardcopy) 2 - Section Heads EMERGING MATERIALS and DL(P) 3 - Group Leaders EMERGING MATERIALS 1 - Thrust Leader 1G 1 - Dr. Royale Underhill, DRDC Atlantic, EMAT ____________________ 14 TOTAL LIST PART 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST PART 2: External Distribution by DRDKIM 1 - DRDKIM 1 - Dr. Renee Chow, DRDC Toronto 1 - Dr. Abe Jesion, CORA, NDHQ, 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario 1 - DMRS 3 (Commander H. McEwen) 1 - PM SCSC (Commander J. Lavallee) 1 - PMO JSS 4-8 (Mr. James Menard) 1 - PMO JSS 4-5 (for Lt(N) Brennan Blanchfield PMO JSS 4-5-4) ___________________ 7 TOTAL LIST PART 2 21 TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Original document held by DRDC Atlantic Any requests by DRDC Atlantic staff for extra copies of this document should be directed to the DRDC Atlantic LIBRARY.

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Critical Assessment of Damage Control System Technologies

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December 2006

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13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual).

The Canadian Navy is currently in the process of developing requirements and contracting for delivery of two new classes of ship, the Joint Support Ship (JSS) and the Single Class Surface Combatant (SCSC). The Navy has identified the reduction of through-life costs of these new ships as a priority, primarily through reduction of crew size, which is a major contributor to the overall operating cost. Significant interest has been expressed in how crewing levels can be reduced, without jeopardizing the ability of the ship to complete its mission. The objective of this report is to complete a critical assessment of available technologies, both commercial and militarized, in Damage Control Systems (DCS). The report will also include a discussion on new technologies in development, and provide some insight on the future vision for Naval damage control as it relates to the goal of crew reduction/optimization. The review will cover technologies that are currently deployed as well as those that are being proposed for use on future naval vessels. This report will address the criticality, viability and advantages of integrating the DCS system within the Platform Management System (PMS) as well as associated links to the Combat Direction System (CDS). The primary goal of an integrated DCS is a reduced crew size, which can lead to significant risks in damage control efforts should the technology implemented to address automation not be sufficiently robust. The impact of marine standards on damage control systems will also be discussed and compared to equivalent Naval standards.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus. e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified. If it not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title). Damage Control Damage Control Systems Human Machine Interfaces Human Factors Human Systems integration Assessment Research Opportunities

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