Faye Donnelly, University of St Andrews, Redefining the Rules of the Game?: A Critical Analysis of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Discourse

Introduction:

This paper analyses how President George W. Bush and his team attempted

to redefine the international order after September 11, 2001. Particularly

examined is how their justifications for the 2003 Iraq war were constructed

against this backdrop. Highlighting the importance of change, specific

consideration is on how the language employed by the Bush administration at

this ‘defining moment’ affected their agency in subsequent spheres of

engagement. Hence, I explore how words not only cause but also constitute

international codes of conduct. Keeping with this theme I address the

legitimisation of democracy as an unquestioned reality. Using Abu Ghraib as

another ‘defining moment’ in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, I argue

that the same concept actually weakened rather than strengthened

America’s defence when this scandal broke. Needless to say these

unexpected paradoxes severely challenge conventional wisdoms circulating

in the vernacular of mainstream IR literature and US foreign policy.

Redefining the world after September 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a monumental turning

point for the conceptualisation of world affairs. Or so the Bush administration

asserted. Proof of the latter is the repetitive references to enormous trans-

formations omnipresent in their foreign policy discourses thereafter1.

Responding to what were labeled “acts of war”2, security became America’s

top priority. Once again change was advocated as being instrumental for

succeeding in this mission. According to the President, “the mind-set of war

must change.  It is a different type of battle. It's a different type of

battlefield.  It's a different type of war” (Bush, 2001: b).

Such grandiose designs are unsurprising given the shock and suffering Amer-

ica encountered3. Nor are they revolutionary in US foreign policy terms4. Sig-

nificantly distinctive, I argue, are the vast yet vague purviews articulated

within the Bush administration’s foreign policy5.

A distinctive narrowness quickly enveloped this overarching strategy, how-

ever. Tellingly the US ‘war on terrorism’ was portrayed by its leading pro-

ponents as a black and white matter. For them the decision was crystal

clear, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001: c). 1Setting the tone just hours after the hijacked planes had crashed into the World Trade Centre, for instance, the President said, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (Bush, 2001: a). Speaking soon after Donald Rumsfeld remarked, “Yesterday, America and the cause of human freedom came under attack, and the first great cri-sis of America's 21st century was suddenly upon us” (Rumsfeld, 2001).

2 President Bush declared them as such on September 12, 2001. Full speech avail-able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html3 Here I am not simply referring to the human fatalities and material damage caused on September 11, 2001. While these were certainly major points of trauma other is-sues were also at play, including the shock that American soil had actually been at-tacked and by non-state actors at that. Reading through the Bush administration’s responses to September it is very apparent that both seriously hurt the pride and identity of the sole-superpower. 4 Anthony Lang (2006: 270) outlines this history very concisely in his piece “The Role of International Law and Ethics”5 Casting aside old boundaries the Vice President stressed that, “world shifted in some respects”.

As shown, while such dualisms were imperative in formulating the Bush

administration’s foreign policy they became more limiting as events evolved.

Ultimately they proved insufficient for enabling it to adapt during the wars6

they created. On the contrary, when faced with unintended crises the rigid

line drawn between good and evil came to entrap their creators. Nowhere is

this more apparent than in Iraq. Declaring this to be the case, of course,

necessitates closely analysing the broader language games constructed to

justify this war.

Justifying the Iraq War:

Manifestly security was certainly a, if not the, major selling point for

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Admittedly the battle fits neatly into the Bush

administrations promise to undertake offensive measure overseas as part if

its “two front” war on terrorism7. A closer inspection reveals, however, that

these larger “war on terror” discursive frameworks had to be specifically

tailored to justify the invasion of Iraq8.

6 I use the plural here to denote both the Iraq war itself and the larger war on terrorism. Clearly it is important to remember and portray that the former is a derivative of the latter7 Explaining the latter the President stated, “We fight a war at home”, yet simultaneously, “our military is conducting a campaign to bring the terrorists to justice” (Bush, 2001: d). 8 In no way am I suggesting that the war on terror initiated post-September 11 re-ceded in importance. Rather my point is to emphasis that while this slogan became a rountinised fact in and of daily parlance it was itself altered.

The principle of state sovereignty9 was one immediate hurdle necessitating

such re-definitions. Aware of the inherent rules associated with this principle

and the implication these had on determining what constituted a legal war in

the international arena, powerful cases for pre-emptive self-defense were

subsequently constructed.

Descriptions of looming dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, their

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and links to al Qaeda were advanced to

substantiate such claims10. Employing oppositional, ‘us versus them’, cat-

egorisations also helped convince the world about the near and present

dangers this country posed. Measured by such discursive yardsticks, Iraq is

conveyed as having made the case against itself11. Noticeably as the charges

leveled against Saddam Hussein grew within the Bush administration dis-

course, inaction turned from being being highly dangerous to non-debatable.

9 This is a highly contested term in international relations and affairs. I do not have the space here to outline all the different interpretations and conceptualisations of what the term itself means or represents. What I am simply referring to here is the absolute power states have to use military force within their territorial jurisdiction. Hence once war is launched against any sovereign states the aggressor is defying this rule. 10 Indicatively, by January 2002, Iraq had been branded as part of “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002). From September 2002 onwards there is a notable shift away from Iraq as part of a troublesome trio to the gravest threat posed to US and worldwide security. President Bush’s address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York in the same month explicitly exemplifies this. Here overthrowing Saddam Hussein is presented as being the only viable option.

11 Speaking on September 14, 2002, Bush stated, “that Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself. He has broken every pledge he made to the United Nations and the world since his invasion of Kuwait was rolled back in 1991. Sixteen times the United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. Saddam Hussein has violated every one of these 16 resolutions -- not once, but many times”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html

Simply, “we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could

come in a form of a mushroom cloud” (Bush, 2002: a)12.

There is no need to rehearse the causes of the Iraq war here. For as Hakan

Tunç (2005: 335) correctly notes, “the least understood aspect of the ongoing

war in Iraq is what caused the United States to invade the country in the first

place”. Instead this paper contends that this invalidation marks another de-

fining moment after which exporting democracy was increasingly entered the

foreground of the Bush administration’s foreign policy proclamations.

Once the chief weapons inspectors submitted their finding on January, 2003,

for instance, Colin Powell noted, “We in the world community desire to help

Iraqis move their country toward democracy and prosperity. We want to help

the Iraqi people establish a government that accepts principles of justice,

observes the rule of law and respects the rights of all citizens” (Powell, 2003:

b). Concurring President Bush noted, “The nation of Iraq -- with its proud

heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully

capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom” just as “the

world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable

and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” (Bush, 2003: a)13.

His second Inaugural Address was more explicit, declaring, “We are led, by

events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our 12 A more detailed argument was presented by Colin Powell at the UN in February 2003 shortly before the war began. Etching a similar pattern Iraq being in material breach of its obligations under Security Council resolutions Condoleezza Rice held the way to proceed was now be clear since, “by both its actions and its inactions, Iraq is proving not that it is a nation bent on disarmament, but that it is a nation with something to hide. Iraq is still treating inspections as a game. It should know that time is running out” (Rice, 2003).13 February 26, 2003

land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands […]. So it is

the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic

movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate

goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005)14.

Inevitably this shifting focus represents an astonishing alteration the Bush ad-

ministrations foreign policy, especially given their avid rebuttal of nation-

building as a US objective. Quoting the President directly, “in this administra-

tion we’re not into nation building, we’re focused on justice and we are going

to get justice” (2001: j). Today this dramatic transformative u-turn is simply

taken for granted. More consequentially, the Bush administration was able to

claim that this apparent contradiction was no contradiction at all. Con-

versely, they made a convincing case that the spreading democracy to initi-

ate regional and global change had always been on the agenda. In the pro-

cess, I claim that they actively redefined the rules of the game.

To clarify, I am not asserting this government never spoke about democracy

post-September 11, 2001, or throughout its global ‘war on terror’ campaign.

Evidently this word was presented intermittently or seriously implied in the

Bush administrations remarks on both matters15. Indeed Jonathan Moten

14 Labeling the same mission as ‘transformational diplomacy’ in early 2006, Condoleezza Rice explained America’s position as follows, “in these momentous times, American diplomacy three great tasks. First, unite the community of democra-cies in building an international system that is based on our shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats to our common security and alleviate terror. And third, spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe.”15 Subsidiary themes of delivering humanitarian aid and liberating innocent Iraqi civil-ian were clearly present in the run up to the war. For example on October 11, 2001 The President announced an ‘American Fund for Afghan Children’: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-8.html

(2005:112) claims, “the promotion of democracy is central to the George W.

Bush administration’s prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall

grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests

are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values

abroad”. While this observation is correct I approach the issue from a differ-

ent angle. Rather than assuming the immediate continuation of democracy

promotion, as Monten does, I aim to outline how democratic references in US

foreign policy discourse grew exponentially once the President and his team

began to distance themselves from their original agendas of preventive force

and WMD.

Importantly Monten does address variations in the current Bush administra-

tions democracy promotion strategy, examining, “the long-term shift from ex-

emplarism to vindicationism” (2005:115). However, his conclusion omits the

crucial fact that neither scheme took precedence in legitimising this govern-

ment’s goals after September 11, 2001. Actually, apart from his address the

very next day16, President Bush made only scant and fleeting references to

democracy in his public speeches or press statements in the immediate after-

math of this event. Freedom instead was predominant heading used to

define America’s global foreign policy objectives. In a nutshell, ‘freedom and

fear’ were war17.

16 President G. W Bush (2001a): “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html17 This slogan has been continuously used by Bush official following the September 11th attacks, originating from the President’s Address to a Joint Congress and the American People in a matter of days. Full speech available at: http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

Furthermore, where the concept of democracy was explicitly mention in the

early stages of the ‘war on terror’, it was not in a promotional capacity but

rather as something to be defended18. Noticeably, at the outset, democracy

was also viewed as a short term solution rather than a long term investment

from the US perspective. Consequently it was presented in their foreign pol-

icy discourse, as well as on the ground in Iraq, in a largely institutionalised

capacity. Expressing this dimension early on Bush declared, “The United

States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new

government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that

one brutal dictator is not replaced by another”. Undercutting any permanent

US involvement, however, he upheld that, “rebuilding Iraq will require a

sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain

in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.” (Bush, 2003: b).19

These limited and pluralist visions are a far cry from the universal promise to

promote global democracy explicitly advanced by the Bush from 2005 on-

wards.

Exposing such miniscule or what some would perceive as purely grammatical

distinctions may seem awfully petty. Nevertheless, I contend that paying

closer attention to the language employed by the Bush administration affords

greater insight into the grand-strategic adjustments they instigated to the 18 Answering “why do they hate us?”, for instance, Bush stated, “they hate what we see right here in this chamber -- a democratically elected government.  Their leaders are self-appointed.  They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (Bush 2001:d).

19 Bush (2003) February 6: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-17.html

contours of US foreign policy. Honing in on their discourse reveals this gov-

ernment advocated a very particular iteration of democracy. Ultimately I

proclaim that it served as a legitimising device when their central justification

for launching the Iraq war became nullified.

Observing the Bush administrations shift to democracy as the epicentre of it

foreign policy also showcases how the same discursive frame became prob-

lematic later. Essentially I maintain this defining moment opened up the

space for inconsistencies between their words and deeds and, consequently,

alternative interpretations of their stated objectives. In light of the Abu

Ghraib scandal20 this language was severely contested. No longer was demo-

cracy seen as the idealistic standard or the moral enterprise espoused by

Bush and his cohort but rather, for many, as a disguise for US torture.

Neither did this word succeed in dispelling tough criticisms which potentially

implicated this government in human rights abuses. Instead, as highlighted

below, after this defining moment the Bush administration clearly became

trapped in their own language.

Before outlining how this unexpected transformation occurred I will provide a

more robust theoretical overview of what I mean by defining moments. Situ-

ating the latter within wider constructivist and discourse analysis scholarship

also draws comprehensive insights for examining and explaining these pro-

found turning points within the Bush administrations foreign policy.

20 This is not the sole scandal that called the Bush administration’s democratic cre-dentials into question, rather the one that this paper focuses on

Defining Moments and Theoretical Developments:

Demonstrably the Bush administrations foreign policy altered in the run up to

the war. Indeed this paper has already mentioned three central ‘defining

moments’ in relation to the Iraq war. Respectively these are:

1) Framing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war and

synchronically inferring that preemptive self-defence as the best way to

protect America and the world thereafter

2) The shifting focus away from disarming Saddam Hussein of his WMD

stockpiles to promoting democracy as the central justification for the 2003

Iraq war.

3) The erosion of democracy as the keystone of US foreign policy following

the Abu Ghraib scandal.

Plainly these particular shifts represent moments of acute crisis for the US21.

Discursively, the latter two showcases how the Bush administration

constructed its response to the same in democratic terms. Deciphering these

linguistic modifications also lends credence to my argument that the Bush

administration chose among a series of viable and alternative options rather

than simply acting unilaterally or friviously. What become apparent on closer

investigation is that they were keenly aware of both the relevant contexts

and audiences necessary to address so as to turn their ideas into action. In 21 1) the failure to actually find any WMD in Iraq 2) the emergence of explicit evidence that US conducted prisoner abuse and torture while proclaiming to spread democracy and peace.

sum, I argue that the Bush administration actively set out to define and

redefine existing structures to justify their foreign policy during these

turbulent times.

These empirical junctures have been labelled ‘defining moments’ rather than

tipping points22 since this heading better captures the ideas and language

underscoring my overall arguments. Furthermore, this terminology is more

appropriate since it illuminates the subtle alterations underlying the Bush

administrations foreign policy discourse rather than merely focusing on the

great instances of change associated with tipping points. While empirical

snippets of the US foreign policy analysed in this paper share an affinity with

the transformational dynamics associated with the latter, it offers a more

thorough investigation into the role that language plays in initially framing

and operationalising these dynamics of change. Additionally captured is how

the Bush administration actively set out to redefine existing rules and

structures to pursue their own foreign policy objectives. Indeed I examine

how the discourse employed by the Bush administration helped constitute

the boundaries of what was permissible in and possible at different stages of

its foreign policy. Speaking of defining moments literally also helps to

express the importance these two had incidents in constructing,

reconstructing and deconstructing the different language games present in

US foreign policy during this epoch23. 22 See Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink (1998: 895) for starting point on nor-mative and political transformations. 23 Worth re-emphasizing here is that I do not think that these are the only metamor-phic points. Rather they are the ones that I have selected to support my argument. Subsequently I will make it quite clear that these discourses did not arise in a vac-uum. Conversely the goal is to demonstrate how they are socially constructed and,

Taking all this on board I now apply it to show how the foreign policy dis -

course of the Bush administration attempted to craft an appropriate response

to the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal in democratic terms.

‘Defining’ Abu Ghraib

The Abu Ghraib incident is the final defining moment under investigation in

this paper. Mainly it has been selected to examine how the concept of

democracy was undermined in and by emerging evidence that American’s

conducted torture there. Scathing comparisons made between the morality

promised in the first and the immorality proven by the latter were clearly

problematic for the Bush administration to confront or defend. For as Alberto

Mora, and John Shattuck (2007) stress, “the promotion of democracy and hu-

man rights is a key element of U.S. foreign policy and fosters a rules-based

international system anchored in the protection of human dignity. But our

ability to achieve this goal -- indeed, even our adherence to this strategic ob-

jective -- is severely compromised when our own conduct is widely perceived

to violate human rights”. A serious tension arises in this respect since, as I il -

lustrate, the Bush administration itself did not abandon the concept. On the

contrary they strongly reinforced it.

Contextual Background

in turn, represent links in a broader linguistic chain.

While Abu Ghraib prison never symbolised cheerful images24, the actual and

perceived agents of torture manning it have altered. Following the public

release of graphic photographs on 28 April 2004, Abu Ghraib is now

tantamount with the torture of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of America

soldiers. Unsurprisingly, the provocative pictures aired on 60 Minutes II25

sparked global shock, anger and disgust.

What is surprising, especially given the sullying of America’s image is how

little impact the incident appears to have had on the Bush administrations

foreign policy rhetoric or agendas. Retrospectively, I believe that the manner

in which this government framed its response to the Abu Ghraib crisis offers

imperative insights into solving this quandary. Analysing how the Bush

administration constructed its own defence under mounting global pressure

also offers insights into the policies and practices governing their behavior.

To do precisely this I have undertaken an extensive study of the rejoinders

given by key players serving at different levels in the administration26. Using

a critical constructivist discourse analysis I identified several core themes

24 While the full extent of what occurred there during his reign in power remains shrouded in secrecy?, accounts of the unabated violations to human rights witnessed there do exist?. 25 60 Minutes is a weekly primetime television programme broadcast in the US by CBS. 26 The reason that I mention the different levels of the administration is because, in the Abu Ghraib affair, the military played a pivotal role in defending the actions taken. In many respects both the Executive and Congressional branches of the US government identified the Army along with the Pentagon as the actors in charge of rectifying this situation.

underscoring them27. Due to space limitations the predominant focus is on

the reclamation of democracy as an outstanding American practice to refute

claims of torture levelled against the Bush administration and classify these

events as being ‘un-American’.

Deconstructing Democracy

Noticeably the term democracy frequently reoccurred during the Bush admin-

istration’s handling of the Abu Ghraib crisis. On May 25 2004, for instance,

Colin Powell proclaimed, “people can see how we handle something like this:

with our democratic system, with congressional oversight, with investigations

that are underway, with people being brought to justice”. Also decontaminat-

ing the negative images of the US Condoleezza Rice noted, “one good thing

about democracies is that when something like this happens, democracies

themselves react. The American people are reacting. The American Congress

is reacting. The American President is reacting because no American wants to

be associated with any dehumanizations now of the Iraqi people” (May, 3:

2004)28.

27 Others categories I am working with in my PhD include a deep sense of shock and disgust, the representation of this as Un-American behavior, the limited nature placed around these events both numerically and geographically, the clear refusal to alter US foreign policy agendas, outlines of the corrective measures being taken to bring those responsible to justice, the conviction that they are not as bad as Saddam Hussein even after the abuses come to light and a focus towards the positive future and accomplishments that have been achieve so far. 28 On December 8, 2005, she further acknowledged that, “just because you are a democracy, it doesn't mean that you're perfect. We saw in Iraq at Abu Ghraib under the traditional framework of the Geneva Convention that we had actions that were outside of U.S. policy and those actions were investigated, investigated thoroughly, and people have been punished”.

The President was very vocal in valorising American efforts of protecting and

promoting democracy. Indeed Bush quickly clarified that, “important for the

people of Iraq to know that in a democracy, everything is not perfect, that

mistakes are made. But in a democracy, as well, those mistakes will be

investigated and people will be brought to justice. We're an open society.

We're a society that is willing to investigate, fully investigate in this case,

what took place in that prison” (May 5, 2004)29.

An additional aspect he brought to the fore when discussing democracy was,

“the goodness and the character of the United States Armed Forces. No

military in the history of the world has fought so hard and so often for the

freedom of others. Today, our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines

are keeping terrorists across the world on the run. They're helping the people

of Afghanistan and Iraq build democratic societies. They're defending

America with unselfish courage. And these achievements have brought pride

and credit to this nation” (Bush, May 10: 2004)30.

Besides representing what America symbolized and its remedial actions, the

concept of democracy was also deeply rooted in the Bush administration’s

avid denial that they condoned the use of torture. To use discursive

29 Seconding this position later that same day, he stressed “it's important for people to understand that in a democracy that there will be a full investigation. In other words, we want to know the truth” [...] “We're a great country because we're a free country, and we do not tolerate these kind of abuses” (Bush, May 5: 2004: b).

30 Scott McClellan, former White House Press Secretary, also made it plain that, “we must continue to speak out about what America does stand for, and what America does represent. America stands for freedom and democracy. America stands for promoting human rights and promoting human dignity. America stands for treating all people with dignity and respect, and that includes treating prisoners humanely and consistent with international accords” (May 6, 2004).

terminology the later operates as a silent category. Indeed the Bush

administration never admits that what occurred at Abu Ghraib constitutes as

torture. Conversely they opt for softer categories such as abuse,

interrogation or human rights violations. Moreover, all of the latter were

presented as being ‘alleged’ to begin with. Whatever the intention for

defining American acts in this way31, the point raised here is that the Bush

administration engaged in a dialogue about torture without ever fully

adopting this terminology.

Beginning with a snippet from Donald Rumsfeld is quite appropriate here

since he immediately clarified, “I think that - - I’m not a lawyer. My impres-

sion is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe is tech-

nically different than torture” […] “I don’t know if – it is correct to say what

you just said, that torture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction

for torture. And therefore I’m not going to address the torture word” (Rums-

feld, May 4: 2004).

Denying similar charges on June 27, 2004, Colin Powell remarked, “Abu

Ghraib was a big hit.  There's no question about it [...] It's also absolutely

clear that the President never, in any way, condoned the use of torture”.

31 The legal implication of torture is one reason the Bush administration distance themselves from such branding. In fact, as shown later, the Geneva Conventions and become crucial benchmarks here. Evidently being found guilty of torture rather than human rights abuse appears to carry far greater reputational costs. Another possible taboo about the uttering the torture word is that it defines the antithesis of democratic conduct.

Verifying the official U.S. position of torture Condoleezza Rice iterated32, “ren-

ditions take terrorists out of action, and save lives. In conducting such rendi-

tions, it is the policy of the United States, and I presume of any other democ-

racies who use this procedure, to comply with its laws and comply with its

treaty obligations, including those under the Convention Against Torture. Tor-

ture is a term that is defined by law. We rely on our law to govern our opera-

tions. The United States does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture under

any circumstances” […] Torture, and conspiracy to commit torture, are

crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may occur in the world. There have

been cases of unlawful treatment of detainees, such as the abuse of a de-

tainee by an intelligence agency contractor in Afghanistan or the horrible

mistreatment of some prisoners at Abu Ghraib that sickened us all and which

arose under the different legal framework that applies to armed conflict in

Iraq” (Rice, December 5, 2005)33.

Un-American Category:

32 I find the very fact that the America felt obliged to clarify its policy on torture inter-esting, perhaps showing that the legitimacy of their arguments were being ques-tioned. 33 Remarks by the Vice President glean further insights into how the Bush administration sidestepped calling what happened in Abu Ghraib as physical torture without dismissing the need for interrogation policies themselves. Being explicit on using the word torture he verified, “I don't want to characterize it beyond what I have. I just -- I think it would be inappropriate for me to do that. It's clear that there -- as say, there was a fundamental breakdown there someplace. People were doing things they should not have been doing under those circumstances, and it's important that it be thoroughly investigated. And it will be -- it is being” (Cheney May 11, 2004). Safeguarding America’s right to gain better intelligence, nonetheless, Cheney advocated, “Well, there's no question, there was a desire -- there always is -- when you've got ongoing military operations, attacks being launched against our troops and soldiers, as well as innocent civilians over there, to learn as much as you can from people that have been detained in order to prevent further attacks and/or to be able to go prosecute guilty parties. But there's a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it” (May 11, 2004).

These denials of torture envelop insistences that what occurred at Abu Ghraib

were totally ‘un-American’. Articulating this sentiment Bush stressed, “We've

discovered these abuses; they're abhorrent abuses. They do not reflect -- the

actions of these few people do not reflect the hearts of the American people

[…] This is not America. America is a country of justice and law and freedom

and treating people with respect” (Bush, May 5: 2004)34.

This conceptualisation is very revealing when explored as a self and other

identity construction. From this a constructivist vantage point this language

demonstrates how the Bush administration tried once again to muster up le-

gitimacy using binary divisions. While the latter framework functioned for de-

fining a polar external other, like a terrorist, it proved to be less so in this

scenario since the culprits themselves are American. Indeed, after the Abu

Ghraib photos were globally disseminated the Bush administrations stark

boundaries between good and evil became exceeding blurry and disputed.

Although designed to signal out the guilty the un-American categorisation

proved too narrow for the Bush administration to escape. Conversely, they

themselves became a scapegoat of blame.

34 Secretary Powell also claimed that this is unacceptable and un-American conduct. Indeed on May 15 he lamented that, “It was so inconsistent with what I have seen during my years as a solider”. On October 18, 2004 he recalled, “These are my, my kids. And it was wrong, and there's nothing else to be said about it. It was wrong, and they’ll be punished”. Donald Rumsfeld was equally astute in articulating that the abuse was an exception in the behavior of American troops. On May 4, 2004 for instance he surmised that, "the actions of the soldiers in those photographs are totally unacceptable and un-American". Equally he stressed here, “the images that we have seen that include U.S. forces are deeply disturbing -- both because of the fundamental unacceptability of what they depicted, and because the actions of U.S. military personnel in those photos do not in any way represent the values of our country or the armed forces” (Garamone, 2004: b).

The demarcation of the Abu Ghraib perpetrators as un-American did permit

President Bush and his allies to represent these abuses as exceptional rather

than normal behaviour. Earmarking agentive culpability at an individual

level, rather than on a systemic one, also mitigated direct involvement in and

responsibility for what took place under their leadership.

Repudiating such disturbing actions and quickly allocating blame to a few

transgressors is obviously not unexpected. Nor is the employment of

democracy by the Bush administration to positively signify its ideals and

distinguish itself from the evil terrorists. Compounding the problem of being

simply ‘un-American’, however, these abuses negated international

expectations of democratic behaviour. Legal rules and regulations were

similarly unkind in their judgements of such practices, albeit easier for the

Bush administration to circumvent in the short term35.

Even so, the very fact that America’s democratic credentials were legally

questioned during this crisis suggests a denial of recognition that it

previously enjoyed as the noble protector of liberty and freedom. In polar

opposition, the vivid photographs of abuse in Abu Ghraib confirmed its

deliberate suspension of individual empathy and wanton cruelty. Crucially,

Richard Jackson notes, “in these images, it was the American ‘heroes’ who

looked liked the savage barbarians, animals, and evildoers, while the

‘terrorists’ looked like the innocent victims of American terror” (working

paper). More importantly from the perspective of this paper, and in stark 35 What I mean here is that the laws surrounding these human rights abuses and tor-ture incidents were not implemented immediately, or, in some case at all. Further-more, any charges that the Bush administration faced were nipped in the bud via their allocation of blame to and punishment of the few bad apples directly respons-ible for such deeply undemocratic behaviour.

contrast to the Bush administration’s response to the WMD crisis, Abu Ghraib

could not be glossed over or excused with democratic rhetoric. Within these

circumstances, that is, it was no longer applicable or appropriate to use the

same basic discourse. Quite simply the language framing what was

permissible had changed.

Conclusion

This paper has critically examined the language, speech acts and discourse

underpinning American foreign policy after September 11, 2001. By

inspecting official reactions to the affair, and the consequences these

executive decisions had, neglected dialectical dimensions were also

incorporated.

Nevertheless, I advocated pushing past the Bush administrations claims that

everything is changing to examine what exactly is. Subsequently I focused

on how such transformations became possible in the first place. Terming

these ‘defining moments’ I outlined how the Bush administration’s foreign

policy justifications altered in response to different challenges. Illuminating

such discursive shifts helped expose how America later became entrapped in

and by its own language. Having blatantly justified the Iraq war on the

grounds of immanent WMD threats and preemptive self defence, for instance,

US invoked the concept of democracy to muster up creditability. Today this

subtle shift in policy is taken for granted. However, the theoretical approach

adopted in this paper portrayed that subtleness of this major shift could only

be upheld by excluding dimensions of social construction from view. In short,

it verified that the Bush administration chose36 to modify their foreign policy.

Needless to say this government could not have foreseen the impact of this

re-definition, which has been tremendous. The point is that they presented

their foreign policy in absolute terms. Consequently any alteration in their

fixed objectives clouded the discursive horizon on which the Bush

administration could defend itself and its previous actions. Furthermore such

rigid categorisation increasingly blurred rather than clarified who was good

and who was evil. In defining moments of acute crisis such as Abu Ghraib,

moreover, the existence of these frames of reference in the Bush

administration foreign policy discourse foreclosed alternative benchmarks

against which they could defend themselves. Their democratic discourse was

crucial in generating this outcome. This element of paradox is worthy of

closer examination since essentially the US used it to shore up support and to

silence harsh criticisms levelled against it at defining moments. Yet, rather

than fulfilling these functions, I posited that the Bush administrations overt

reliance on democracy in later stages of its foreign policy weakened its own

defence. In short, Abu Ghraib enabled America to be criticised for not

upholding its own standards.

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