Radical Pedagogy (2016) Volume 13 Number 2 ISSN: 1524-6345

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Critical Realism, Neomarxist Theory and Critical Pedagogy

Dean Braa Department of Sociology Western Oregon University, USA E-mail: braad@wou.edu

Abstract Is there an emerging paradigm that links science, theory, and pedagogy?

The work of Roy Bhaskar, Antonio Gramsci, and Paulo Freire is reviewed with the intention of showing a logical consistency that extends from a critical realist version of social science to Neomarxist theory, and on to the critical pedagogy of Freire and others. The paper is also intended for a general audience with a focus on undergraduate students in sociology and the other social sciences.

Keywords: positivism, conventionalism, critical realism, Neomarxism, critical pedagogy

The primary goal of this paper is to propose an outline for the integration of critical realism, critical theory, and the developing paradigm of critical pedagogy. The work of Roy Bhaskar in the philosophy of science will be used to provide a philosophical foundation for a Neomarxist version of critical pedagogy. In other words, the ultimate goal is to demonstrate a logical, paradigmatic integration of the work of Bhaskar in the philosophy of social science, Antonio Gramsci in critical social theory, and Paulo Freire in critical pedagogy. This integration is suggested as a possible emerging paradigm for the social sciences that is dedicated to an emancipatory praxis that is both humanist and scientific.

A second goal is to provide a selected overview of critical realism, Gramscian theory, and critical pedagogy. I am interested in providing an

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introduction for a general audience, particularly undergraduate students in the various social sciences, and thus contribute to the development of a critical collective consciousness or what Paulo Freire called conscientization (1974). This is consistent with the development of the critical public sociology advocated by Michael Burawoy and others. The goal is to make sociology accessible to multiple publics and communities within and beyond academe (2005).

Education as Reproduction

The suggested emerging paradigm outlined in this paper is a direct response to what Gramsci called bourgeois hegemony in formal education. The basic argument is that education contributes to the maintenance and reproduction of an exploitative capitalist system (Apple, 1990; Mayo, 1999; McLaren, 2007). Hegemony is basically domination with consent that is in part, accomplished through the use of formal education. Elites, particularly capitalist elites, are legitimated using various pedagogies in schools and classrooms.

Scholars working within the tradition of critical pedagogy have identified

several pedagogical practices that contribute to hegemony and the reproduction of a capitalist system. One example is the hidden curriculum discussed by Michael Apple (1990), which is basically the recognition of how students are socialized and conditioned to accept hierarchical structures of power within and beyond the classroom. Ira Shor (1992) describes the authoritarian classroom where students are conditioned to become passive, conformist, and obedient members of society, thus generating easily manipulated workers and apathetic citizens.

A second form of hegemonic practice is when teachers promote a set of cultural ideologies that legitimate the status quo, which is essentially a corporate capitalist society. Individualism, meritocracy, laissez faire, neoliberalism, and victim blaming are some of these legitimating ideologies (Giroux, 2003).

Another serious form of hegemony is the omission of various critical forms of knowledge. Analyses of inequalities, poverty, exploitation, oppression, imperialism, revolutions, and class struggles are conspicuously absent from most social science curriculums. There is a broad history that most students never experience unless they read the critical and enlightening work by Howard Zinn, A Peoples’ History of the United States.

The general failure to teach research and a version of science linked to theory and praxis is another form of hegemony. Students learn versions of

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empiricism and positivism when they do actually encounter research and science in the classroom. Research methodology and a concept of science should be linked to problem posing and problem solving (Freire, 1974). Problem solving requires a clear identification of causes, which is the result of the development of theory as the goal of research and science. Science can be inherently critical if taught using a critical realist paradigm (see below).

The Sociology Department at Western Oregon University has developed an undergraduate major in sociology that has implemented basic concepts of critical pedagogy (Braa & Callero, 2006). Our approach is primarily Neomarxist with a strong emphasis on the development of theory and research methods connected to issues of social justice. Based on the collective experiences of the faculty, we believe that there is a need to develop a pedagogy devoted to the integration of science, theory, and praxis. It is also our belief that our seniors can understand and appreciate such an integration. This paper represents part of our effort to develop a discourse for our senior, undergraduate students that hopefully will assist them in comprehending the potential of an integration of science, theory, and praxis.

Limitations and Contradictions in the Philosophy of Social Science

We present a critical introduction to the philosophies of social science. The goal of this discussion is to suggest the comparative advantages of critical realism as a viable and defensible version of science. A key problematic here is to establish a concept of science as the basis of social research and theory.

Critical realism is basically a philosophy of social science that is promoted as an alternative to the serious limitations and contradictions in versions of science known as positivism and conventionalism (Keat & Urry, 1982). In order to understand the limitations and contradictions in the positivist and conventionalist versions of social science, it is necessary to provide brief overviews of the various approaches to social science. Positivism

Positivists assume that explanatory and predictive knowledge of the world is gained directly through observation. Patterns or regularities in empirical data are promoted as laws and patterns and are usually conceptualized as conjunctions of events. Knowledge is linear and a posteriori which means no a priori truths or knowledge (Popper, 1959). Science is an attempt to gain predictive knowledge through empirical observation and thus the real or actual can only be known

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through experience. This is the essential meaning of the term a posteriori, as opposed to the assumption a priori, which refers to the existence of principles or some form of knowledge that is necessary to even acknowledge experience. Does experience presuppose innate principles, for example, as a condition to even have an experience? Examples often suggested are the principles of time, space, and causation as presuppositions necessary for the recognition of any experience. Keep in mind that positivists deny a priori principles or presuppositions for knowing the world (epistemology).

Theories are expressed as laws, which are general statements about observed or experienced regularities and patterns. Systematic observations and experiments are the basis for the recognition of patterns, and patterns are characterized as distinct variables that display regular, linear connections. Social science then is perceived to be the recognition of events as conjunctures of variables that recur and therefore constitute patterns in social life. In short, positivists argue that patterns of observable variables are the basis of social laws and therefore the basis of social theory.

A form of positivism known as the inductive-statistical (I-S) model dominates social science (Hempel, 1965). Social scientists collect data, facts based on experience, and use probabilistic models to establish patterns such as correlations and regression. These models as recognition of patterns are used then to predict and even explain future events. Keep in mind that this is based on the assumption that patterns will continue and that knowledge is essentially experiential and observational. So the explanation of a given social, cultural action is based upon the recognition of a pattern of conjunctural, observable variables. Patterns discerned in data predict and explain future social actions.

The most serious problem with positivism is the inability to postulate or

identify causes of a given phenomenon. Positivist laws identify patterns but not causes and therefore such laws are not explanations. Various structural-functionalist theories/approaches in the social sciences are positivist such as the classic analysis of suicide by Emile Durkheim (Keat and Urry, 1982). Durkheim provided a correlation between frequencies of suicide and the relative strength of collective conscience, shared values, beliefs, and ethics, as the basis of community solidarity (1952). But what social mechanisms were responsible for the relatively weak and strong manifestations of integration and regulation of members of various societies? In short, what were the causes of the patterns that Durkheim identified? What were the structures or mechanisms of societies that generated what could be called the motive force of suicide?

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Conventionalism (Constructivism)

Conventionalists argue that science is essentially a social convention which is a set of beliefs, values, and procedures agreed to by a community of scientists or scholars (see Kuhn, 1970). Conventions as suggested paradigms determine research questions and set agendas. Empirical observation always presupposes a convention or theory and as a result, observation cannot determine validity or falsity of explanations. There is no necessary correspondence between theories of science and what is external and real (actual). Concepts or theories of science presuppose a cultural or hermeneutic moment that is not subject to observation. Scientific validity or truth is subject to specific and changing paradigms. One paradigm is dominant at any given moment in the history of a society and paradigms are not the result of observation and experience.

A brief discussion of hermeneutics would be helpful at this juncture. Hans-George Gadamer (1989) was an important social philosopher. We will now focus on his use of hermeneutics. Gadamer and others were hostile to what they considered the instrumental and manipulative use and application of the natural sciences to society (naturalism). Experience and objectivity are constructed historically and culturally, and there is no necessary acknowledgement of independent, external realities that shape human consciousness (actualism and realism). The meaning and understanding of society is historically and culturally relative. Group behaviors or actions have meaning relative to specific, historical contexts and these differ widely from culture to culture. Human beings develop meaning by constantly relating specific actions as parts to the larger social totality. Even the understanding of the individual must be connected to history, culture, and, broadly speaking, traditions. We understand actions through the preconditions of traditions and the prejudices inherent in our culture. In the human struggle to make sense of the world we constantly move from parts to wholes and thus we are involved with a hermeneutic circle, and it is because of this movement, we become aware of our prejudices and hopefully overcome them. Prejudices are considered prejudgments about the social, historical parts or moments in people's lives. Through group interactions people come into contact with the traditions and culture of other people and thus prejudices become apparent.

Prejudices as essentially preconditions for assigning meaning or validity, can come under scrutiny when experience is inconsistent with given preconditions and presumably this becomes the basis for new meaning and the transcendence of a given prejudice. So if my precondition for the meaning of administrator is someone who cannot or does not want to teach is inconsistent in my experience with

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administrators, then a new meaning and thus preconditions are connected to the concept. The key to Gadamer’s hermeneutics is the authority of tradition and culture in the development of meaning and validity. In the conventionalism of Kuhn, the tradition and culture of a given historical, scientific community is used to establish a paradigm that directs and limits scientific practice. Kuhn and Gadamer thus argue for a hermeneutic moment in the development of scientific discoveries, paradigms and theories. The concept of a hermeneutic moment in the development of social science will return when we discuss the assumptions of critical realism below.

Kuhn’s version of conventionalism is based on a close history or evolution of great discoveries in science, broadly understood. He identifies some serious inconsistencies or contradictions in what he calls the context of discovery and the context of justification. The explanation or justification of a new discovery depended upon a moment of spontaneity and creativity. Even the recognition of a discovery depended upon pre-existing knowledge of the world applied creatively to a new experience. The use of a pool table and the striking of balls to explain Newton’s laws of motion are probably well known to every high school physics student.

The creative application of analogies and metaphors derived from society to explain a discovery is a hermeneutic moment in the scientific process that Kuhn and other conventionalists recognize. Conventionalists argue that the history of science clearly indicates fundamental changes or revolutions in the major concepts of science. Two classic examples of scientific revolutions are the paradigm shift from the Ptolemaic universe to Copernican astronomy, and the revolution from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. So paradigms shift and with change there develops communities of scholars and scientists who determine research agendas and legitimate questions.

There develops an agreement or convention as to what constitutes legitimate and therefore often fundable research. Notions of scientific “truth” are relative to the dominant paradigm. It is important to note here that conventionalists do not believe that truth is ever established by reference to an external, structural reality that must exist independent of the researcher. In other words, scientific truth or validity is not established by recognition and correspondence to what is usually called the actual.

An important criticism of conventionalism is that theories can and do represent or correspond to the actual. Newton’s theory of gravity must correspond

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to some level of the actual or there would not be universals observed in the phenomenon itself. In short, gravity is not just a convention or imposed paradigm with no demonstrable referent. A second criticism of conventionalism targets the alleged incommensurability of paradigms. Scientific paradigms always share certain assumptions and concepts. For example, Einsteinian physics (relativity) presupposes the accuracy of Newtonian physics in the representation of various forces in the universe, but makes these forces relative to the speed and mass of an object of study. Einstein could not have contemplated the universe without Newtonian concepts (representations).

A last criticism of conventionalism is that the recognition of a hermeneutic moment in science need not invalidate a concept or theory. Einstein’s creative use of metaphors and analogies derived from culture were used to help develop the theory of relativity. His notion of an “intergalactic elevator” was used to ask questions such as: what would the universe look like from my elevator if it were travelling at the speed of light? The concept of an intergalactic elevator can be argued as a hermeneutic moment that actually helps identify, understand, and explain forces of the universe as the Einstein example suggests.

Conventionalism is evident in the social sciences in the form of paradigms, such as structural-functionalism, that generate a limited range of questions about societies and/or cultures. The basic assumption of structural-functionalism is that structures of society have evolved because they provide a beneficial function for members of a given society. In short, structure is function, and function is structure. Using a Durkheim example again, societies develop religion because it has a primary function: it generates collective conscience, which is necessary for essential social bonds among people (1915). As a result, the beneficial function of religion explains its status as a ‘given’ structure. Conventionalists would argue that structural-functionalism as a past dominant paradigm, limits and directs questions/research in the social sciences. Certain questions are not asked in social science such as the origin of conflict and the development of structures that were clearly not beneficial to large numbers of people in a given society (slavery, fascist states, patriarchy, etc.). But as suggested above, does the recognition of limits or even fallibility in a paradigm, preclude the development of a concept of science? This important issue is dealt with in the next section.

Overview of Critical Realism (Transcendental Realism)

The goal of critical realism is to re-examine and rethink the actual processes of scientific discovery in history in order to develop a philosophy of science that

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overcomes the problems inherent in the various forms of positivism and conventionalism (constructionism). Realism and positivism share a concept of science as an empirically based, objective exercise dedicated to explanatory and possibly predictive knowledge. The focus for realists is explanation with prediction as a possible and somewhat fortuitous outcome.

But explanation must go beyond the recognition of patterns or regularities and their so-called laws. Science must recognize that explanation includes both transitive and intransitive dimensions. Transitive refers to what is known or observable about a phenomenon (the actual) and intransitive refers to conditions and/or processes that are part of unseen underlying structures that are independent of our knowledge (Collier, 1994, p. 50-54). Intransitive refers to the necessary conditions for science and experiment to actually occur. For example, how could any experiment work unless there exists an independent reality in some natural form. Newton’s understanding of gravity and its demonstrable effects must presuppose an independent natural phenomenon. Science as cognitive practices can only make sense when it is about something that is real and independent of the thinking subject.

Realists argue that science is a reflexive process and therefore subject to change, but fallibility does not necessarily invalidate the reality of objects and processes that are independent of the conscious subject. Contrary to the conventionalists, realists argue that science does represent and correspond to the actual (externality) and can certainly be explanatory of natural and social phenomenon. Science is not just the convention of a community or just the manifestation of culture. Einstein’s relativity does not invalidate the actuality of Newton’s description of gravity as an externality. Realists seek to establish connections between a given phenomenon and the underlying structures or stratification of structures that are the bases of understanding causation. These structures are natural, physical, and social. An example is the use of “plate tectonics” which uses the structures and mechanism of geological plates to explain earthquakes and other phenomenon. Social institutions such as corporations and states are structures and mechanisms that cause certain social behaviors, remembering that causation in the natural and social sciences is always a conjuncture of forces set into motion by multiple structures that interact dialectically. This is not to argue that natural and social sciences can share the same methods and processes (see discussion below on limits of naturalism).

For critical realists, the defining task of science is to establish connections between the transitive and intransitive dimensions of reality. Scientific theory is a

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description of structures/mechanisms that causally generate observable/empirical phenomenon (see Bhaskar, 1997; Collier, 1994). Rom Harre provides an example with the sound from a violin (1970). An observer can observe the actuality of the violin and the act of plucking a string (empiricism). And there is a pattern established with a connection of the pluck and the resultant sound, or different strings and commensurate different sounds when plucked (positivism). But what else is necessary to explain the sound? The atomic or molecular structure of the string, sonic physics, and the anatomy and neurophysiology of the human brain are all underlying and stratified structures necessary for the explanation of the sound of the violin.

Realists use models, metaphors, analogies, and other heuristic devices to help identify and understand stratified reality. We have already mentioned Einstein’s use of an intergalactic elevator. Watson and Crick’s use of the spiral staircase (double helix) in the representation of the DNA molecule, Huygen’s use of waves of water to identify properties of light, and Bohr’s use of a model of the solar system as an analog for the structure of an atom are all examples of the use of creative heuristic devices to help identify (infer) non-empirical and underlying structures of an intransitive reality. Limits of Naturalism

Critical realists recognize that stratified realities include human intentions and human creativity, referred to as agency or creative praxis). Bhaskar refers to this as the hermeneutic moment in explanation and is the basis of his arguments about the limits of naturalism (1975; Collier, 1994). Naturalism is the belief that the methodology of science derived from the natural sciences can be directly applied to the analysis of social phenomenon; methods in social science can be the same as methods applied in the natural and physical sciences. Bhaskar points out several problems with this. Science as a process presupposes a scientific community with a culture and various paradigms that shape research activities. This is essentially the Kuhnian argument. Science depends upon the culture, language, symbols, existent knowledge, and of course paradigms of the practitioners. But as argued above, this dependence/presupposition does not necessarily invalidate the externality of the actual, given phenomenon and the representation of stratified and underlying structures. The double helix does represent at least part of the actual, which is the DNA molecule. The creative praxis or agency of Watson and Crick, which includes the use of a cultural model (spiral staircase), does not invalidate the representation of an actual DNA molecule.

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Bhaskar suggests a second limitation on naturalism: that the activities of conscious human agents, who reflect on their actions or inactions, maintain, produce, and reproduce social structures. This is not true of structures in nature. Bhaskar (1978) refers to this as activity-dependence. . Actors with beliefs and intentions that at least shape human actions reproduce social structures, and Bhaskar identifies this as concept-dependence. . Social structures are relatively transitory and limited in time and space (time-space dependence). For example, the feudal system was transitory compared to the structures of nature (e.g. gravity) as an example of time-space dependence.

Critical realism does share with naturalism the recognition of an externality that exists and functions independently of the subject (actualism). Naturalism and critical realism also share a commitment to empirical data collection and the recognition of patterns in data (positivism). Some versions of social science argue he assumption of underlying structures (stratified reality), and this is a central argument of all forms of realism. Darwin for example assumed an unknown (non-empirical) mechanism as the basis of phenotypic changes in members of a species that would in turn be the basis of natural selection. Modern evolutionists know that mutations in the genetic code as the structure of DNA/RNA, is the raw material of natural selection. Furthermore, note that there is a stratification of underlying structures in the whole process of natural selection. The structure of mutagens would include the structure/processes that result in radiation that would in turn interact with genetic structures of organisms. A given organism would then interact with various organic and inorganic structures of a given natural environment. Evolution is an explanation of speciation that presupposes underlying and stratified structures. But Darwinian evolution cannot be used to explain social structures or processes because of the above limits of naturalism. Emancipatory Critique

Roy Bhaskar has developed the concept of emancipatory critique as a key component of critical realism (Collier, 1994:169-181). The basic argument here is that science can establish facts as explanations that can serve social values. In short, scientific practice can and should connect facts and values. The reality (actuality) of poverty and the explanation of poverty can be established by a critical realist version of science, understood as underlying structures and processes as causes. Poverty as the denial of the fulfillment of human needs is perceived as a violation of basic social values. Science acts as a dialectic between social values such as morality and justice that are associated with poverty and the explanation of poverty. Science can be used to establish human needs and then

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follow with an explanation of the denial of such needs. The explanation can at least suggest a solution or resolution to the denial or put simply, explanation is the first moment of resolution. Science should be wedded to a humanist and emancipatory praxis. In short, critical realists deny the notion that facts and values must necessarily be separated. Human values can be established through open, free dialog and discourse.

Jurgen Habermas (1989, 1990) has suggested an interesting and certainly controversial means for overcoming the division between facts and values. He argues basically that values and norms can be established through open, free, unforced dialog and discourse. People can come together and openly discuss and debate what is right and just in a society. Or in other words, citizens could convene in a public sphere and use free, open speech referred to as ideal speech acts to establish what is just, right, and the components of a good society. Some form of deliberative or participatory democracy would be essential to this process of communication to establish a just, good, and emancipated society. There is then a social consensus of morality and validity in the work of Habermas and it is referred to as the discourse theory of truth.

Presumably the open discourse would include experiential and observational examples of human oppressions, exploitations and dominations. Human interests as basis of discourse would lead to norms, values, and a morality that would be beneficial to all or most members of a society. Critical realist social science would require the recognition of experiences and patterns of dehumanization consistent with positivism, but then go beyond to require the analysis of structures and mechanism that are the causes of dehumanization in its various forms. So like Habermas, critical realists would require a dialog and discourse on dehumanizations as a means to establish a critique of society and critical or even revolutionary alternatives. Critical realists could agree with the basics of a discourse theory of truth, but then demand in addition an analysis of the structural causes of the dehumanizations. Habermas is not a critical realist but his argument for a discourse theory of truth is consistent with Bhaskar’s notion of a hermeneutic moment in the development of social theory. It is important to note here also that both Habermas and Bhaskar share a telos (ultimate goal) for social science, which is the emancipation of people via some version of democratic socialism. Critical Realism and Gramscian Theory

In this section of the paper, logical consistencies between critical realism and selected examples of critical theory will be suggested. Special attention will be

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given to the work of Antonio Gramsci as an important representative of Neomarxist critical theory. The goal is to show that the ontological and epistemological assumptions made by Gramsci (Neomarxists generally) are consistent with those of critical realism. In other words, a version of critical theory can be shown to be consistent with a critical realist version of science that can transcend the limitations and problems of empiricism, positivism, and various forms of conventionalism. A scientificity of theory can thus be established.

Marxists, including Antonio Gramsci, have assumed a materialist reality which is the basis of class and at least potential class struggle, which in turn at least shapes or influences structures and behaviors that are political, ideological and even cultural. In short, there is a structural correspondence between the mode of production and structures/relationships outside of the mode of production (superstructure or mode of reproduction). This is consistent with the critical realist argument for a complex stratification of levels and mechanisms that must be the basis of causation. The mode of production is part of a model that allows the recognition of an external reality that is knowable and stratified, and is the cause of identifiable social behaviors. The transitive reality of class is the labor process itself and conditions experienced in the work place. The structure of the capitalist mode of production and the alienation of labor as the basis of capitalist wealth and power is not empirical and experiential, and thus the mode of production and alienation is essentially an intransitive mechanism in society. Put simply, workers do not experience the alienation of labor as the difference between the full value of their labor and the value of the wage. In other words, workers do not experience in the work place the expropriation of surplus value.

Antonio Gramsci accepted the reality of the mode of production as a structure in dominance in any given social totality composed of levels of interdependent structures and practices, a structured and stratified reality. Gramsci’s focus was of course the capitalist mode of production that exists within a structured social totality. The mode of production was the basis of class and class interests (class in itself), but was not sufficient to explain the development of class consciousness and class struggle (class for itself) (Boggs, 1976; Jones, 2006; Joll 1977). Gramsci agreed that capitalism was a system that was inherently exploitative and generative of class contradictions. Structural or revolutionary change required the input of other structures and processes associated with civil society such as ideologies, politics, education and even religion. Structures and processes of the superstructure were instrumental and therefore necessary for the development of class struggle and social transformation. For example, ideologies were not passive reflections of class but rather necessary constituents of class. In

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other words, class in itself includes ideology as a necessary constitutive variable. Gramsci recognized that a necessary condition for the development of class consciousness was purposeful/intentional ideological praxis. This could lead to necessary political praxis as condition for the transformation of capitalism into socialism. Class consciousness, which is necessary for revolution, is essentially a product of various forms of superstructural praxis. Now this superstructural praxis must correspond to the actual material conditions or relations of production that the mode of production imposes upon people. Class interests are connected to the actuality of the mode of production, but consciousness of these interests requires superstructural praxis. This is one of the important arguments of Gramsci and the primary reason Gramsci considered Marxism to be a philosophy of praxis (Boggs, 1976: 21-35).

A major theoretical concept logically consistent with the superstructural praxis is Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (Jones, 2006). Hegemony is the recognition of superstructural praxis that is necessary to reproduce the capitalist mode of production and capitalist class domination. Capitalists work to dominate politics, ideology, and culture in capitalist societies and thus gain he subordinate (subaltern) class’ consent for the bourgeoisie to dominate them. And again, domination at all of these levels of society is necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore forms of class struggle could and would develop at the level of civil society as part of the ontogeny of class consciousness. The working class would need to attack bourgeois hegemony at all levels of society as a condition to overthrow or transform the capitalist mode of production. Gramsci referred to conducting class struggle at the various levels of society as the ‘war of position,’ and a later direct confrontation with the bourgeois state and the capitalist class would be a ‘war of maneuver or movement’ (Jones, 2006:29-32). In other words, class struggle would be conducted in civil society in support of a counter-hegemony and success in civil society was a necessary condition for a later confrontation with the state and the capitalist class. Gramsci assumes that the capitalist class generally dominates the state and uses it as basic instrument of class coercion and reproduction.

Gramsci is obviously consistent with the basic Marxist and critical realist

ontology which includes an external reality that operates independent of any given subject, and the recognition of an externality that is knowable through some form of cognitive process (science). But cognitive process is reflexive and subject to change according to Gramsci and this is again consistent with critical realism. As

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workers struggle in the war of position and later the war of maneuver, their conception of society as a totality changes, and this in turn revises their theory of society. Gramsci is very clear on this point when he discusses the role of praxis as an essential part of developing a theoretical consciousness of the social totality as capitalist society (1971:33).

The role of agency is clear in the work of Gramsci, which is ontologically consistent with Bhaskar’s arguments about the limits of naturalism (see above). It is obvious that Gramsci believed that social structures are maintained through the activities (praxis) of human agents who reflect on their respective actions. So any social theory must include a reflexive moment that can lead to changes in the understanding and explanation of society. But this need not invalidate the existence of underlying structures as a reality that is the object of the reflexive moment. In other words, the shift in concepts (Kuhnian paradigms) need not deny or invalidate the existence of a real underlying and stratified reality (structures or mechanisms) that can and does generate human actions.

Another basic position of critical realism related to the limits of naturalism is the recognition of societies as open systems. That is societies are stratified structures with complex, multiple interactions. The Gramscian totality with a mode of production and a civil society composed of polity, ideologies, religion, education and culture generally is obviously a stratified, structured totality. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as a condition for totality is tacit recognition of the complex interactions of the stratified structure of the social totality. In short, Bhaskar’s ontology concerning an external and stratified reality with complex interactions is consistent with Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis.

The goal of the Gramscian theory and praxis is ultimately the end of exploitation and the emancipation of the working classes, proletariat, and peasants of Italy. Most of his work was with the industrial proletariat of Turin and northern Italy. It was the goal of organic intellectuals such as himself to educate and lead workers to revolutionary class consciousness and the development of socialism. Organic intellectuals were part of the working class in the sense that they lived among workers and shared their experiences. They were educated and dedicated to the emancipation of workers and the transformation of capitalism. Their knowledge and leadership was a key to the development through praxis of a movement that would challenge and eventually overcome capitalism. The organic intellectuals understood the necessity for the war of position and the rise through struggle (praxis) of a counter-hegemony. Theory and praxis were always in a dialectical relationship and necessary for workers’ emancipation.

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Bhaskar’s connection of science to values is quite similar to Gramsci on the

use of praxis to develop counter-hegemony and emancipation. Using the concept of hegemony derived from an ontological analysis of capitalist society, structured and stratified reality, Gramsci argued that the stratified reality of capitalist domination could be identified and explained as part of a dialectic reality. This reality of hegemony would be the first moment of the struggle for counter-hegemony and hopefully eventual working class emancipation. A Gramscian version of Marxist analysis, consistent with critical realism, would be a praxis to establish the reality of hegemony and this in turn would be the basis of emancipatory praxis directed at a goal or telos of human emancipation.

As discussed above, one of the efforts of Bhaskar is to provide ultimately a scientific ontology and epistemology that bridges the gap between facts and values (1989: 184-189; Collier, 1994:169-181). Bhaskar’s effort to generate a bridge from facts to value is part of his emancipatory critique (see above). A critical realist science can establish the externality of social facts as a structured, stratified, and underlying reality that is the basis of denying certain basic human needs. A Gramscian version of theory can establish the reality of exploitation and domination as consistent with critical realism and this is in turn, the basis of an emancipatory telos as a value. In short, the Gramscian project is consistent with the emancipatory critique as praxis within the critical realist philosophy of social science. A basic argument here is that the recognition of a value established or derived from facts does not invalidate the reality of a structured, stratified, and underlying social reality. There is no necessary contradiction between facts and values as part of a critical realist scientific praxis. To possibly oversimplify, there is no invalidation of explanation because of a dialectical process that includes the recognition of generative underlying structures and human agency as a hermeneutic moment. So the praxis, emancipatory trajectory of Gramscian theory can be connected to a critical realist scientificity.

Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy

In this section of the paper a brief introduction to selected concepts within critical pedagogy will be presented. A second goal is to show how Gramsci’s work and selected concepts that Paulo Freire, Peter McLaren, and Peter Mayo developed in critical pedagogy are logically consistent. . The ontological and epistemological consistency of critical realism, Gramscian theory, and critical pedagogy will be shown in this section. The ultimate goal is to provide a provisional, logical integration of science, theory, and pedagogy.

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Critical pedagogy is an approach to teaching and learning that focuses on the development of a critical consciousness (conscientization) of the many contradictions in social life (Freire, 1974). Critical consciousness presupposes critical theory, which can explain the reality that “men and women are essentially unfree and inhabit a world rife with contradictions and asymmetries of power and privilege” (McLaren, 2007:194). Contradictions are economic, political, educational, and cultural indicating a complex stratification of structures and mechanisms as the basis of bourgeois hegemony in schools. This is, again, a consistency with critical realist arguments.

Contradictions in social life include all forms of inequality such as classism, racism, sexism, and globalization as forms of imperialism, poverty, lack of health care, environmental destruction and various other contradictions. These realities must be part of the curriculum and linked to an education and praxis dedicated to the elimination of such contradictions (Braa and Callero, 2006; McLaren, 2007). The consistency with Bhaskar on emancipatory critique and Gramsci on the need for counter-hegemony is quite clear.

Conscientization, as part of critical pedagogy, is also a process to provide people with a language and voice that can overcome a culture of silence in schools that is in turn part of a hidden curriculum (Freire, 1974; McLaren 2007; Wink, 2005). The basic argument is that the procedures and protocols in the classroom condition students to be silent, passive, conformist, and obedient. This conditioning is part of the hidden curriculum and it generates eventually easily manipulated and dominated workers and citizens. Note that the concept of a hidden curriculum is a good example of the critical realist notion of an intransitive reality as the conjuncture of capitalism, state, and education in the explanation of behavioral conditioning is not objective to participants in the school, and it is clearly a case of a stratified reality with multiple structures in a conjuncture that is education.

Critical pedagogy has a goal of giving voice to students through the use of dialog, discourse, and dialectics in the classroom. Students are taught to actively participate and develop the direction and discourse of the classroom. All of this is intended to empower students and give them confidence in their powers of reason. In short, it is a goal of critical pedagogy to give students a voice in the process of education. Conscientization and voice are necessary conditions for emancipatory praxis understood as agency in an ongoing dialectic with structure. Note Freire’s and others’ recognition that education and culture are essential parts or mechanisms for the perpetuation of oppression and exploitation, and thus there is a

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need for a critical pedagogy or in Gramscian terms, a need for counter-hegemony. So embedded in the concept of conscientization is the notion of complex, intransitive, and stratified structures (mechanisms) that are the basis of exploitation, which is consistent with critical realism. Also note that education is part of a superstructural, hegemonic process consistent with the Gramscian critique of bourgeois society.

The reader has probably noticed the striking consistency between Freire’s concept of conscientization and Gramsci’s focus on Marxism as essentially a philosophy of praxis guided and derived from theory with emancipation as a goal (see Mayo, 1999). Gramsci and Freire argued that education as a critical consciousness raising should lead to political praxis as the basis of human emancipation. Theory linked to education and political praxis is the essence of the work of Gramsci and Freire, and in turn this is consistent with the critical realist concept of philosophy of social science as emancipatory critique.

Critical Pedagogy Applied: Overview of a Case Study

For just over a decade, sociologists at Western Oregon University have developed the major in sociology based on concepts from critical realism, versions of Neomarxist theory, and critical pedagogy (Braa and Callero, 2006). Select courses in theory incorporate philosophies of social science as well as a survey of major classical and contemporary social theorists. Critical realism is included in two theory courses and it is used as an ontological and epistemological foundation for certain critical theories, notably Neomarxist theories that include basic arguments of Korsch, Lukacs, Gramsci, and others. On a regular basis, an introduction to Marxism and socialism is used as a complement to the two theory courses required for the major. Critique of bourgeois society and political, community praxis is stressed in the theory courses.

In all of our courses we implement basic critical pedagogical concepts such as discourse, dialog, dialectics, and whenever possible, participatory democracy. As discussed above, these basic pedagogies are intended as the means to transcend the hidden curriculum and generate a socialization of student confidence and empowerment.

Praxis as the effort to transform individuals and society is the goal of two courses on community organizing and community action. Students are required to conduct organizing and action projects as part of the two praxis courses. In

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addition, students must write research papers that clearly identify the structure or mechanisms of oppression and exploitation.

One ongoing outcome of the praxis courses is a tenants union that has struggled successfully for nearly a decade to represent tenant interests with serious opposition from landlords and city officials. Students, as the result of this praxis, have learned about class interests and class struggle that are the direct result of a capitalist totality and the process of capital accumulation. Students have come to understand that the totality and process of accumulation are underlying causes of the multiple abuses and exploitation of mostly student tenants. In short, tenant problems are not just the result of bad landlords as an empirical reality. They have also become clearly aware of the role of government in the protection and reproduction of capitalist interests. This is part of the recognition of a stratified reality (ontology) argued by critical realists.

Student activists witnessed the interactions of developers/owners of apartments and city officials with a focus on the local city council. Complicity and collusion were obvious in the pro-business transactions and policies of the city government. In response, the students conducted a political campaign that pressured the city council into certain reforms and protections for tenants. The local tenants union has had a level of success in gaining ordinances and policies that protect tenants and tenant rights. These included certain renters’ protections and a stricter enforcement of certain building and safety codes by the city, and the creation of a renters advocate employed by the city. Many of the “slum lords” in the area have improved their properties and policies as a direct result of the tenants union that was started and maintained by sociology students.

The tenant struggle and creation of a tenants’ union taught our students to recognize the role of a capitalist social totality as a stratified reality, and the role of praxis in at least a limited effort toward emancipation. This small effort as part of courses in community organizing and community action, have helped develop various components of critical realism, Neomarxist theory, and critical pedagogy.

Over the years our students have been active in supporting unions, peace movements, anti-sweatshop actions, gay rights organizations and activities, and other progressive movements. We are particularly proud of our support of migrant workers and their local union. Many of our students were participants in the “Occupy” movement in Salem and Portland.

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Sociology majors are required to complete a research project and thesis as a capstone project. Their project must include the critical pedagogical components of “problem posing” and “problem solving.” Students must demonstrate a competence in research methodologies and a direct link to theory. In short, the senior thesis project must be constructed using a basic critical realist and critical pedagogical integration. A focus is the identification of underlying structures and mechanisms that can be imputed as the cause of a given social problem.

The entire curriculum in sociology at Western Oregon University promotes in various ways, critical pedagogy based mostly on Neomarxist theory which we justify using basic arguments of critical realism. One of our regular courses, Critique of Education, introduces critical pedagogy and connects it to the basics of Neomarxist theory and critical realism (See Braa and Callero, 2006).

Conclusion

A basic critical pedagogical assumption is that education is inherently political as part of a hegemonic process that helps to reproduce forms of oppression and domination, with a focus on bourgeois domination (McLaren, 2007). The telos of critical pedagogy is to provide a counter-hegemony and to thus deny the use of education as a means of reproducing capitalist domination of society. Education can and should be a means of challenging bourgeois hegemony by developing a critique of any and all forms of oppression and domination. In Gramscian terms, education as a superstructural praxis is hegemonic, but can be a site of class struggle as counter-hegemonic struggle, and this praxis is part of the necessary war of position. The parallels here between the work of Gramsci and critical pedagogy are obvious. The basic point for Gramsci and critical pedagogy is that education through praxis can be an important or even essential part of the challenge to domination, and in our contemporary world the most destructive form of domination is global, corporate capitalism. The need for a strong counter-hegemony in our schools has never been greater.

As suggested above, the goal of this short paper is to outline a project that

could have some success at integrating science, theory, pedagogy, and praxis. This brief outline focused on the work of Roy Bhaskar, Antonio Gramsci, and Paulo Freire. There are certainly other thinkers not discussed here who could contribute to this project. A critical realist science can be the ontological and epistemological basis of a social science and social, critical theory. But it is a science that must consider and integrate the reality of human agency, creative praxis, hermeneutics, and a process of structuration. A realist social science can transcend the limitations

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and contradictions of positivism and various forms of conventionalism. Critical realism could also be used as the basis of a serious critique of various forms of postmodernism, a topic certainly worthy of a separate paper. A new scientific and emancipatory paradigm is a real possibility for sociology and other social sciences using the integration of critical realism, versions of Marxism, and critical pedagogy.

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