crs 7/14/2015 # 1 llnl this work was partially performed under the auspices of the us department of...
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CRS 04/19/23 # 1
LLNLThis work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of
California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.
Safeguards and Cooperative Monitoring of Reactors With Antineutrino Detectors
Adam Bernstein P.I. Nathaniel Bowden P.I.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories
LLNL
How Does The IAEA Monitor Fissile Material Now ?
(1-1.5 years) (months) (forever)
1. Check Input and Output Declarations
2. Verify with Item Accountancy
3.Containment and Surveillance
1 ‘Gross Defect’ Detection
2 Continue Item Accountancy
3. Containment and Surveillance
1 Check Declarations
2 Verify with Bulk
Accountancy:
(months to years)
Operators Report Fuel Burnup and Power HistoryNo Direct Pu Inventory Measurement is Made Until the Fuel is Reprocessed
LLNL
Antineutrino Detectors Offer Unique Advantages for Reactor Safeguards
A. Measure fissile content directly
B. Measure thermal power, which constraints fissile content C. Operate continuously, nonintrusively, and remotely
• our experimental work has already demonstrated B and C with a simple detector, and our data are fully consistent with A
• This approach complements Item Accountancy of assemblies with Bulk Accountancy of plutonium at the earliest possible moment in the regime
LLNL
Properties of Antineutrinos
Rate and energy spectrum are sensitive to the isotopic composition of the core• 200-250 kg of new plutonium is generated in a typical cycle
• Real data and detailed reactor simulations show a reduction in the antineutrino rate of about 8% through a 500 day cycle caused by Pu ingrowth
Rates near reactors are high- 0.64 ton detector, 25 m from reactor core - Core thermal power = 3.46 GW - 4000 events/day/0.64 ton with a 100% efficient detector- Our detector is about 10% efficient and counts 400 events per day
LLNL
The Basic Technical Idea
A. Monitor operating reactors with ~1 m3 antineutrino detectors placed a few tens of meters from the reactor core
B. Compare measured and predicted antineutrino rate or spectra to identify changes in fissile content.
U-238Pu-241
Daily antineutrino count rate
LLNL
How Does it Work Operationally ?
100% of rate
90-95% of rate
Persistent antineutrino signal from distant reactor
Non-antineutrino backgrounds
The systematic shift in inventory is reflected by the changing antineutrino count rate over time
days
LLNL
Testing the Idea at a Reactor Site
20 meter heterogenous overburden
25 meters standoff from core A crack team of investigators
LLNL
Cutaway Diagram of the LLNL/Sandia Antineutrino Detector
Currently operational:4 cells with 640 kg of scintillator;quasi-hermetic muon veto; hermetic water shield
LLNL
• The antineutrino interacts with a proton producing…
– A 1-7 MeV positron
– A few keV neutron
– mean time interval 28 sec
• Both final state particles deposit energy in a scintillating detector over 10s or 100s of microsecond time intervals (depending on the medium)
• Both energy depositions and the time interval are measured
Detection of Antineutrinos
LLNL
Net 400 events/day
Daily Power Monitoring Using Only Antineutrinos
LLNL
A Preliminary Indication of the Burnup Effect
Date
Jun '05 Jul '05 Aug '05 Sep '05 Oct '05 Nov '05 Dec '05
Cou
nts
per
day
400
450
500
550
600
PredictedDataFit to data
LLNL
Current Work: Compare Effectiveness against Diversion Scenarios With and Without an Antineutrino Detector
Use reactor and detector simulations and a ‘fault-tree analysis’ to compare safeguards with and without the antineutrino detector
LLNL
Next Steps in the LLNL/SNL program
Complete quantitative comparison with existing IAEA safeguards
Solicit further input from Safeguards Agencies Applied Antineutrino Physics Workshop September 25-26 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA(Link soon at www.llnl.gov/neutrinos)
Reduce detector footprint and increase sensitivity
Detector deployment is essential for demonstrating practical utility: Deployment in a non-nuclear weapons state under IAEA safeguards is the best way to demonstrate the effectiveness of this technology