crs 7/14/2015 # 1 llnl this work was partially performed under the auspices of the us department of...

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CRS 03/21/22 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. Safeguards and Cooperative Monitoring of Reactors With Antineutrino Detectors Adam Bernstein P.I. Nathaniel Bowden P.I. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories

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Page 1: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

CRS 04/19/23 # 1

LLNLThis work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of

California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.

Safeguards and Cooperative Monitoring of Reactors With Antineutrino Detectors

Adam Bernstein P.I. Nathaniel Bowden P.I.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories

Page 2: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

How Does The IAEA Monitor Fissile Material Now ?

(1-1.5 years) (months) (forever)

1. Check Input and Output Declarations

2. Verify with Item Accountancy

3.Containment and Surveillance

1 ‘Gross Defect’ Detection

2 Continue Item Accountancy

3. Containment and Surveillance

1 Check Declarations

2 Verify with Bulk

Accountancy:

(months to years)

Operators Report Fuel Burnup and Power HistoryNo Direct Pu Inventory Measurement is Made Until the Fuel is Reprocessed

Page 3: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Antineutrino Detectors Offer Unique Advantages for Reactor Safeguards

A. Measure fissile content directly

B. Measure thermal power, which constraints fissile content C. Operate continuously, nonintrusively, and remotely

• our experimental work has already demonstrated B and C with a simple detector, and our data are fully consistent with A

• This approach complements Item Accountancy of assemblies with Bulk Accountancy of plutonium at the earliest possible moment in the regime

Page 4: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Properties of Antineutrinos

Rate and energy spectrum are sensitive to the isotopic composition of the core• 200-250 kg of new plutonium is generated in a typical cycle

• Real data and detailed reactor simulations show a reduction in the antineutrino rate of about 8% through a 500 day cycle caused by Pu ingrowth

Rates near reactors are high- 0.64 ton detector, 25 m from reactor core - Core thermal power = 3.46 GW - 4000 events/day/0.64 ton with a 100% efficient detector- Our detector is about 10% efficient and counts 400 events per day

Page 5: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

The Basic Technical Idea

A. Monitor operating reactors with ~1 m3 antineutrino detectors placed a few tens of meters from the reactor core

B. Compare measured and predicted antineutrino rate or spectra to identify changes in fissile content.

U-238Pu-241

Daily antineutrino count rate

Page 6: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

How Does it Work Operationally ?

100% of rate

90-95% of rate

Persistent antineutrino signal from distant reactor

Non-antineutrino backgrounds

The systematic shift in inventory is reflected by the changing antineutrino count rate over time

days

Page 7: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Testing the Idea at a Reactor Site

20 meter heterogenous overburden

25 meters standoff from core A crack team of investigators

Page 8: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Cutaway Diagram of the LLNL/Sandia Antineutrino Detector

Currently operational:4 cells with 640 kg of scintillator;quasi-hermetic muon veto; hermetic water shield

Page 9: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

• The antineutrino interacts with a proton producing…

– A 1-7 MeV positron

– A few keV neutron

– mean time interval 28 sec

• Both final state particles deposit energy in a scintillating detector over 10s or 100s of microsecond time intervals (depending on the medium)

• Both energy depositions and the time interval are measured

Detection of Antineutrinos

Page 10: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

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Net 400 events/day

Daily Power Monitoring Using Only Antineutrinos

Page 11: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

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A Preliminary Indication of the Burnup Effect

Date

Jun '05 Jul '05 Aug '05 Sep '05 Oct '05 Nov '05 Dec '05

Cou

nts

per

day

400

450

500

550

600

PredictedDataFit to data

Page 12: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Current Work: Compare Effectiveness against Diversion Scenarios With and Without an Antineutrino Detector

Use reactor and detector simulations and a ‘fault-tree analysis’ to compare safeguards with and without the antineutrino detector

Page 13: CRS 7/14/2015 # 1 LLNL This work was partially performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore

LLNL

Next Steps in the LLNL/SNL program

Complete quantitative comparison with existing IAEA safeguards

Solicit further input from Safeguards Agencies Applied Antineutrino Physics Workshop September 25-26 at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA(Link soon at www.llnl.gov/neutrinos)

Reduce detector footprint and increase sensitivity

Detector deployment is essential for demonstrating practical utility: Deployment in a non-nuclear weapons state under IAEA safeguards is the best way to demonstrate the effectiveness of this technology