crushed on the horns of hattin, 1187 (military history, march-april 2008)

8/11/2019 Crushed on the Horns of Hattin, 1187 (Military History, March-April 2008)

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In 1187 Saladin s Muslim armies drove

the Latin Crusaders from the Middle East

y J a m e s L a c e y

n July 4, 118 7, the Crusad er arm y in the Latin East

led by Guy of Lusignan, king of Jerusalem , ceased

^ to exist. Saladin s Muslim armies slaughtered them in

^

the bru tal Battle of Hattin, fought nea r the pre sen t-

day city of Tiberias, Israel. The bloody collapse of

the Second Cru sade, with the failure to take Dam ascus, had already

forecast that the Crusaders would not expand their holdings in the

Middle East. Their cm shin g defeat at Hattin ensu red they wou ld not

even hold o n to w hat they d w on in the Eirst C rusad e. W ithin

months of the battle, the Muslims, under their brilliant leader,

Saladin, had retaken almost every Crusader city and stronghold

including Jerusalem .

The strategic position of the Crusader states, including Edessa

Tripoli and Jerusalem, had always been precarious. Continually

involved in expensive wars, they never became self-sustaining

depending instead on a constant flow of funds from Byzantium and

the West. By 1187 this flow had slowed to a trickle, as European kings

increasingly centralized their power and retained their revenues for

dom estic use. Byzantine suppo rt, which waxed and waned according

to political circum stances, had also reached a low poin t.


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s o m e t h in g o f a h

d e m o n in a 1 6 t h

I ta l i a n p a i n t i n g

wa

d e t e r m i n e d t o r id t

M i d d l e E a s t o f C h r

u s a d e r s . H e s t

s t a t H a t t in i n


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The Crusaders

kept a minimal

number of men in

their strongholds

and shadowed th e

larger Muslim

arm ies, avoiding

the kind of

major batt le that

could lead to

annih i la t ion

Lacktng sufficient cash. Crusader

leaders were unable to hire enough

mercenaries to follow up on battlefield

victories forstrategiceffect. Furthermore,

despite periodic spastns of crusading

zeal, barely enough fighting men were

arriving from the West to make up for

Crusader losses. By the middle of the

12th century many knights found it

easier to join the

Reconquista

in Spain or

slaughterSlavsin the Teutonic rang

nach

sten

than to make the long, perilous

journey to the Latin East.

By the time Saladin invaded the

Kingdom of Jerusa lem in 1187, this

manpower deficit presented Crusader

leaders with a stark choice: They could

either place an army in the field or man

their strongholds, but they could not

do both. If the knights remained behind

their walls until the Muslim army faded

away at the end of the campaign season,

theywouldlikely seetheir

fiel s

wrecked,

further reducing iheir resources for the

following year However, if the leaders

fielded a large army and lost, their weak-

ened strongholds would surely fall

in rapid succession. They could lose

everything. Typically, the Crusaders kept

a minimal nurnber of men in ibeir

strongholds and shadowed the larger

Muslim armies, avoiding the kind of

major battle that could lead to annihi-

lation. When circumstances compelled

them to fight, their ferocity often brought

the Crusaders victorybut not always.

Heavy losses since the en d oftheSecond

Crusade in 1149 had greatly reduced

their options.

These strategic challenges were mag-

nified by other setbacks in the 20 years

leading up to the Battle of Hattin. First,

the great Saracen leader Nur ad-Din had

stripped away the County of Edessa from

the Crusaders and then taken Damascus,

which had often supported the Crusader

cause against its fellow Muslims. More-

over, Nur ad-Din had continually mauled

the Army of Antioch, which had never

fully recovered from the annihilation of

the kingdom s north ern forces on the

Field of Biood in 1119. A final major

blow came when Amalric, soon after his

1162 coronation in Jerusalem, reversed

two generations of Crusader strategic

policy, which had called for the army

of Jerusalem to march north whenever

Arttioch was threatened. Instead, he

turned his attention to the south and led

three invasions of Egypt.

Recent historians have argued th

given the situation and resources avai

able, Amalric made an appropriate de

cision. Conquering Egypt would secur

his southern flank and put almost un

limtted financial resources at his di

posal. As the ruling Fatimid Calipha

was weak and fractured at the tim

Egypt musl have seemed like easy pick

ings.How ever, Amalric s invasion to th

south allowed Nur ad-Din to secur

his position in Syria and gave him

an excuse lo send his own forces int

Egypt, first under his Kurdish genera

Shirkuh and later unde r Shirkuh

nephew. Saladin,

Despite initial payments of tribute b

the Fatimid caliph, Amalric never rea

ized his anticipated financial windfal

Instead, his three invasions bankrupte

the Kingdom of Jerusalem and cost

dearly in trreplaceable knights. Eve

worse was the damage done to the Cru

saders overall strategic position: Afte

Nur ad-Dins death in 1174, Saladi

declared himself sultan of Egypt an

marched on Damascus, Although

took htm more than a decade to secur

all of Nu r ad-D in s ho ldin gs, Saladi

was able lo unify a massive area wit


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substantial war resources and com pletely

encircle the Crusader states.

he Kingdom of

lerusalem was

thrown into po-

litical turmoil fol-

lowing the death

of King Amal-

nc in 1174. The

thiune passed lirsi to his teenage son,

Baldwin IV, a leper, and the n lo Bald-

win s 7-year-old neph ew, Baldwin V,

Baldwin IV s infirmity and the you th

of boih kings led to more than a dozen

years of political strife, as various fac-

tions contended for the position of

regent. Wh en Baldwin V died in 1186

at age 8, these factions coalesced around

two main rivals for the throne: Guy of

Lusignan, who was married to Sibylla

(sister of Baldwin IV and mother of

Baldwin V), and Ra^miond of Tripoli,

Amalricls first cousin,

Sibylla had the support of both

Knighls Templar Grand Master Gerard

ol Ridefort, who hated Raymond be-

cause ofanearlier perceived slight to his

honor, and Raynald of Ghatillon, one of

Jemsalem s m ost powerful nobles. Ray-

nald saw Guy as weak, vain and indeci-

sive and thus much easier to manipulate

than Raymond, However, most of the

nobles would support Sibylla only if she

put aside her marriage to Guy They de-

spised him because several years before,

as regent un de r Baldwin IV, Guy ha d

refused battle with Saladin in almost the

same location and circumstances he

would later face at Hattin. Although

Saladin s army had subsequently broken

up without consequences lor the Cru-

saders, Guy s contemporaries considered

him a coward an d were wary of his

deliciencies as a military leader.

After consenting to divorce Guy on

the condition she could choose her

new husband, Sibylla double-crossed

thf stunned nobles at her coronation,

calling Guy forward to rule the Kingdom

of Jerusalem. An enraged Raymond then

attempted a coup. When it failed, he

returned to hisov aidominion in Tripoli

and made a separate peace with Sal-

adin-a move that would have reper-

cussions for the kingdom.

Earlier, while serv ingasreg ent, [Ray-

mond had negotiated a truce between

the Crusaders and the Muslims (one of

many such tmces during the Crusades),

which unintentionally gave Saladin time

to consolidate his control of Syria

and unfortunately lulled the Crusaders

into feeling so secure ihat they devoted

their time to internal squabbles. With

that truce due to end in April 1 187, Guy

sent two of his most trusted advisers.

Templar Grand M aster Gerard arid Hos-

pitaller Grand Master Roger des Moulins,

to Tripoli to try to bring R aymond back

into the C hristian fold. But in a demon -

stration of just how wide the rifl had

grown between the Crusader factions,

Raymondperhaps hoping to enlist

Saladin s help in overthrovi ing Guy

allowed al-Afdal, Saladin s eldest s on ,

to lead a 7,000-man Muslim army intent

on pillaging Guys lands through his

territory in Galilee. It was an act of out-

righl treachery. When Gerard learned

of the p resen ce of al-Afdal s army, he

assembled some 150 knights and rashly

attacked the Muslims at the Springs of

Cresson, near Nazareth. The knights

charged to their doom against al-Afdal s

considerably larger force. Only three

knights, including a wounded Gerard,

survived. The heads of most other

knights ended up atop the Muslims

spears. As with most medieval bailies.


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Inexplicably, the

Crusader host

marched past Turan

wi thout s topping to

water either horses

or m en. In a lette r

wr i t ten af ter

the batt le, Saladin

described this

oversight as contrary

to their best interest

it can be assumed the Crusader force

also lost a few hu ndred infantrymen,

who were not socially important enough

to merit mention in the chronicles. More

significant, the kingdom had lost some

10 percent of its knights in a minor

engagement. They would be sorely

missed at Hattin,

After the slaughter at Cresson, even

Raymond's strongest supporters de-

nounced his traitorous actions and

forced him to seek peace with the king,

Guy, knowing that Saladin's army was

already forming for a renewed assault on

the kingdom, could not afford to let this

internecine quarrel continue and wel-

comed Raymond with open

arms.

Their

political truce would enable theCrusaders

to pres ent a uni ted front against the

coming Muslim invasion, but ii was

an uneasy peace,

hile the Crusad-

ers worked out

their differences,

Saladin assem-

bled an army of

at least 30,000

men for an as-

sault on the Latin states. He used Ray-

nald's 1186 attack on a caravan travel-

ing between Damascus and Cairo as a

pretext for not renewing the truce with

the Crusaders, Although others, such as

Nur ad-Din, had iried to raise Muham-

mad sidea

oi jih d

(Arabic for struggle ),

the notion of a holy war against the

Crusaders had never taken root in the

greater Muslim world, Saladin's army

was the first that considered its cause

a holy war, and the Crusaders them-

selvesRaynald in particularwere

responsible for provoking this new

mindset. During an earlier round of

hostilities in 1182, Raynald had led an

expedition down the Red Sea coast with

the announced objective of sacking

Medina and Mecca. Although Muslim

forces thwarted this assault, Raynald's

actions enraged the Muslim world and

rallted them to raise the banner

{

ihad

Saladin was so angered by the threat

to tbe holy cities that he vowed to kill

Raynald with his own hands.

Guy realized the upcoming battle

with Saladin would decide the fate

of the Latin states, so he mustered the

full strength of the kingdom. Castles

and cities were stripped ofallbut skele-

ton troops as the army assembled at

Sephoria, By the end of

June,

Guy had

amassed approximately 1,200 knights

and 18,000 to 20,000 other troops of

widely varying quality. Moreover, he

had ordered the True C rossreportedly

fashioned from remnants ofthecross on

which Jesus was crucifiedbe brought

along to inspire the Crusaders.

Toward the end ofJune,Saladin tried

to lure the Crusaders away from thei

water supply at Sephoria, southeas

of Acre, and into an open batde wiih

his superior forces. Failing to do tbis

he launched an assault on the city

of Tiberias, where Raymond's wife

Eschiva, and sons had taken shelter

Unsure how to proceed, Guy called for

a meeting with his leading nobles

on July 2. Despite his family's plight

Raymond strongly advocated that Tibe-

rias be abandoned and that Guy simply

bide his time until the Muslim army

of irregulars dispersed at the onset of

tbe dry season, Guy agreed, although his

use of the same tactic at the same loca

tion four years earlier had resulted in h is

being branded a coward by the other

knights and hounded from the regency

Later that night, however, Raynald

and Gerard reminded Guy of Rayinond's

l

IT DV


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recent treachery and pointed out that

aggressive action had served the Cru-

saders well in the past. During their

conversation a message arrived from

Raymond's wife, urgently requesting

rescue. Although Raymond still advo-

cated leaving Tiberias to its fate, the

rest of the knights took up a call to

go forth and save the Lady of Tiberias.

That apparently strengthened Guy's

resolve, and he immediately issued

marching orders.

uy organized his

columnintothree

groups: The king

himself would

co m m an d th e

center, with Ray-

mond in the van

and Baliun of Ibelin and the Templars

in the rear. On July 3 , the C rusaders set

out from Sephoria toward a small spring

at Turan, about a third of the distance

to

Tiberias, Saladin immediately

broke

off

the siege and led his forces to confront

the advancing Crusaders. Inexplicably,

the Crusader host marched past Turan

without stopping to water either horses

or men, although there was no other

waler source on their direct route across

the treeless hills and plainstoTiberias, on

the shore of Lake Tiberias (now known

as the Sea of Galilee). In a letter written

after the battle, Saladin dispassionately

described this oversight as contrary to

their best interest. From the mom ent

of that decision, the Crusader army

was doomed.

Scorched by the brutal sun, the

armored Crusaders inched toward Ti-

berias, Saladin's skirmishers massed

in from of and on the flanks of Guy's

army, and Crusader casualties began to

mount. The Muslim horse archers kept

up a continual harassing fire while look-

ing for any weaknesses that w ould allow

their heavy cavalry to split the Crusader

column. In keeping with tactical tradi-

tion, Saladin directed his main force

against the Crusaders' rear. He also sent

the wings of his army around the Cru-

sader column to occupy Turan and set

themselves astride the Crusaders' escape

route. By 9 a.m., with ihe temperature

rising, the Crusaders were surrounded

and effectively cut off from any water.

For long hours, Guy pushed his com-

pact formations up toward Maskana, on

the hills overlooking Lake Tiberias, but

incessant Muslim attacks began to string

out the column. In the early afternoon,

messengers from Balian and the Templars

told theIdng the

re r

guardwasin danger

of being overwhelmed. Again uncertain

of whatto

do ,

uysentamessage forward

to Raymond, seeking advice. Back came

counsel that he should halt the column

and pitch tents in order to mass his

forces for a big push toward Tiberias

in the morning. After ignoring Ray-

mond's earlier sensible advice to stay

at Sephoria and await Muslim develop-

ments, Guy then accepted Raymond's

spectacularly bad advice to halt and

make camp on the waterless plain near

the village of M askana.

On the westem end ofaplateau over-

lookingTiberiasand the freshwater take,

the exhausted and thirsty Crusaders

drew together and made camp for the

night. Morale was low, and many of the

infantry had already deserted or ceased

fighting, while all around them swarmed

exultant Muslims. Under cover of dark-

ness,

Saladin had his camel caravans

bring up plentiful water and tens of

thousands of arrows for the next mom-

ing's battle. He also had his men stack

brush upwind of the Crusader camp.


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In the m om ing they lit this great mass of

tinder, enshrouding the demoralized

Crusaders in choking clouds of smoke.

At dawTi, from behind the blinding

haze, the Muslims closed in on the

Crusaders, liring arrows by the thou-

sands as they advanced. According to

a Muslim chronicler:

Th e Muslim archers sent up clouds of

arrows like thick swarms of locusts killing

many o the Frankish horses. The Franks

surrounding themselves with their infantry

tried to fight their way to Tiberias in the

hopeofreachingwater but Saladinrealized

their objective an d forestalled them by

planting himself and his army in the way.

Once more at a loss, Guy sought

advice from Raynald and Gerard, who

both advo cated a breako ut attempt

by the mounted knightsapparently

intending to leave the surviving infantry

to its fate, Guy ordered his brother,

Aimery, constable of the kingdom, to

assemble enough knights for a concerted

charge, lo be led by Raymond.

Asthe Muslims pressed forward, Guy

ordered the charge. Over the preceding

century, the furor of a Frankish charge

had turned the tide of many a desper-

ate battle. However, this time Saladin

was prepared, his men well drilled to

cope w ith such an attack. As Raymond s

mailed fist of armored knights ihun-

dered forward, the Muslim line opened

and let it pass straight through. What

happened after that is cbuded by many

conQicting

accounts:

The force was either

swarmed upon as it paused to regroup

or Raymond, seeing that all was lost,

simply led them away to safety Regard-

less, Raymond and his sons escaped

the Muslim encirclement, and for many

this was proof of his treachery. The fact

that he died within months of the battle

was seen as evidence ofGod sjustice.

uy s position was

now even more

desperate. Under

a storm of arrows

and incessant at-

tacks his army

managed to inch

tts way toward the ragged rim of an

extinct volcano k nown as the Hom s of

Hattin. There the knights sheltered amid

Iron Age walled ru ins, erected the royal

red tent and, presumably, placed the

True Cross within it. But they remained

surround ed, w ithout food or water, and

were apparently too exhausted to break

thro ugh Saladin s army. As a Muslim

chronicler relates:

No matter how hard they fought they wer

repulsed;no matter how often theyrallie

each time they were encircled.N ot even a

ant crawled out from am ong them no

could they defend themselves against th

onslaught. Theyretreated to Mount HaKin

to escape the storm of destruction; but on

Hattin itself they found themselves encom

passed by fatal thunderbolts. Arrowhead

transfixed them; the peaks laid them low

bows pinned them down; fate tore at them

calamity chewed them up; and disaste

tainted them.

Balian managed to lead on e desperate

charge clear of the encirclement. But th

rest of the army was trapped.

Despite iheir dismal predicament

the Crusaders m aintained discipline and

continued fighting. At some point Guy

spotted Saladin on the battlefield and

gathered a force of mounted knight

to assault his position and try to turn

the Crusaders fortunes by killing tbe

MILIT RY HISTORY


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The Muslims swept

over thehil l,

collapsed the tent,

captured the

True Cross and

began round ing up

prisoners, most

of whom lay about

on the ground,

too exhausted

to resist further

Muslim leader. Twice they charged. Both

attacks failed, although for the Muslims

they came perilously close to success.

Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir recorded

an eyewitness account from Saladin's

son, al-Afdal:

The Frankish king had retreated to the hill

with hisband andfrom there he led a

furious charge against the Muslims jacing

hini,forcingthem backuponmv father

I

saw

that he was alarmed anddistraught

and that he tuggeda this beard as he went

forwardcrying "Away with the devils'."

The

Muslims

turned tocounterattack and

drove theFranks backup the

hill....

Bu t

they returned tothe charge with undimin-

ished ardora ndagain drove the Muslims

back upon

myjather.

His response was the

same as before, and the

Muslims again

counterattacked.

I

cried We have beaten

them " Myjatherturnedto me andsaid:

Bequiet. We will nothave beaten them

until that tentfalls."

No sooner had these words escaped

Saladin's lips then the Muslims swept

over the hill, collapsed the tent, cap-

tured the True Cross and began round-

ing up prisoners, most of whom lay

about on the ground, too exhausted

to resist further.

mm ediately after

the battle, Sala-

din had

Guy

and

Raynald brought

i> h im . He o f -

l e d G u y s o m e

water, which the

bcaicii King umiiK greedily When Guy

offered the cup lo Raynald, the latter

refused. Saladin angrily exclaimed,

"Drink, for you will never drink again."

Raynald calmly answered that if il

pleased God, he would never drink

anything offered by Saladin, He then

told Saladin that if the battle had gone

the other way, he would have beheaded

the sultan. Enraged, Saladin called

Raynald a pig, ran him through with

a sword and had him beheaded. The

head was later sent to Damascus and

dragged through the streets.

Saladinalsohad the captured Templar

and Hospitaller knights beheaded after

they refused to conven to Islam. Thou-

sands of others were sold into slavery,

aside from those nobles worth ransom-

ing.Guy washeid prisoner in Damascus.

Saladin released him the following year,

and in 1189 Guy laid siege to Acre,

sparking the Third Crusade.

After the battle, Saladin wasted no

time in exploiting his victory. Within

two weeks he had captured nearly all of

the Cmsader ports. Only Tyre resisted,

due to the timely arrival of Conrad of

Montferrat. Most ofthe castles and cities

in the interioralsofell, with the exception

of the great fortresses at Kerak, BeMor,

Sphet and Bclfort. In September, Saladin

encircled and laid siege to Jerusalem.

The city com mand ed by Baiian of Ibelin

sincehissuccessful breakout from Hattin,

surrendered on October 2.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem had largely

ceased to exist, and tales of the defeat

struck the Westem world like a thunder-

bolt, galvanizing it for yet another great

cmsade. In 1189 Richard the Lionhean,

Philip

Augustus and Frederick Barbarossa

began moving toward the East, vowing

to recapture Jerusalem. 4^

Forjurtherreading James Lacey recom-

mends:

God's

War A

New History of the

Crusades,

byChristopher Tyer-man, and

Arab Historians of the Crusades,

by

FrancescoGabrieli.


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BATTLE OF HATTIN JULY 4 1 1 8 7

he icad-up to the 1187 Battle of Hattin is a tangle of alliances and

betrayals, power struggles and religiotis fervor. Us origins date

from 1174 with the death of Nur ad-Din in Damascus and King

Almaric in the Kingdom of Jerusalem . Saladin marched on D amascus ,

worked to unify the Muslim territories that bordered the C rusader states

and b ided h is time. Meanw hile, the Kingdom of Jentsalcm passed first into

the h and s of Almarie s lepro us teetiage son , Baldwin IV, then to Bald wins

7-year-old nephew , Baldwin V. W hen the child king died in 1 186 , the

throne fell lo Guy of Lusignan, who had married into the royal l ine.

His rival, Raymond 111 of Tripoli, first attempted a eoup, then allowed

Saladin s son to lead a Muslim arm y acro ss his terri to ry to sack Guy s

lands. Raymond later sought a polit ical truce with Guy, hut by then

the Muslim armies had gathered to threaten the kingdom. Saladin drew

ihe Crusaders out of Sephoria by laying siege lo Tiberias, then home to

Raymond s wife. Und er a rain of Muslim arrow s, the knigh ts inarched past

a water source at Turan and made camp on the dry plain near Maskana.

They awoke to a choking hrushfire. Th e Horn s of Hattin loomed ahead.

GUY OF LUSIGNAN

Guy rose to the throne of Jerusalem

in 118 6 based on his w ife s biood

ties to the two previous kings. Many

Crusaders considered him a coward,

however, as he had shown hesitancy

in battie against Saladin at the earlie

Siege of Kerak. Ironically, it was his

rash decision to engage Saladin on

the open, arid plains overlooking

Tiberias that led to doom at Hattin.

Water

Source

MARCH TO TIBERIAS

On July 3, Guy led a column of

Crusaders from Sephoria in relief

of Tiberias, on the shores of the

eponymous lake. Incredibly, the

column marched straight past a

spring at Turan, the main source on

the direct route to Tiberias. From

that moment their fate was sealed.

WATER

As had been the case over centuries

of desert warfare, water would be a

key tactica l consideration at Hattin.

Guy Ignored R aymond s ad vice to

hole up at Sephoria until the Muslim

irregulars dispersed at the onset of

the dry season. Instead, he marched

the heavily armored Crusaders across

a treeless plain under direct sun past

a primary water source. Fatal moves.

TURAN O

Balian of

uy of

usignan

aymond II

of Tripoli

CRUSADER FORMATION

Guy anchored the center of the column,

with Raymond in the vanguard and

Balian of Ibelin and the Templars in

the rear. Both Raymond and Balian

later managed to escape the Muslim

encirclem ent, leaving Guy and his

embattled infantry to face a storm

of arrows and overwhelming odds.

DISTANCES:

Turan to Horns tH Hattin: 5 mlles/S km

Maps by Steve Walkowia

MILITARY HISTORY


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crushed on the horns of hattin, 1187 (military history, march-april 2008)

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