cse 592 internet censorship (fall 2015) lecture 09 phillipa gill – stony brook university
TRANSCRIPT
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CSE 592INTERNET CENSORSHIP
(FALL 2015)
LECTURE 09
PHILLIPA GILL – STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY
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WHERE WE ARE
Administrative note:
- no class next week
- week after Tuesday lecture given by Nick Weaver!
Last time:
• Different censorship measurement platforms
• Questions?
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HANDS ON ACTIVITY FROM LAST TIME
• Installing/testing OONI
• Trying differentiation detector app
• Any successes?
• Questions?
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TODAY
Case Study: Iran
• Background on filtering in Iran (ONI report)
• Private addresses used within Iran (Anderson 2012)
• Dimming the Internet (Anderson 2013)
• Web censorship in Iran (Pseudonymous + Halderman 2013)
Case Study: Pakistan
• Background (ONI report)
• https://opennet.net/research/profiles/pakistan• Pakistan YouTube hijacking (Renesys)
• http://www.renesys.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/ • Web censorship in Pakistan (Nabi, 2013)
• http://0b4af6cdc2f0c5998459-c0245c5c937c5dedcca3f1764ecc9b2f.r43.cf2.rackcdn.com/12387-foci13-nabi.pdf
• Netsweeper in Pakistan (Citizen Lab report)
• https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/18-2013-opakistan.pdf
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BACKGROUND
• Limited freedom of speech in Iran grounded in their constitution
• Limits on topics ranging from religion, immorality, and politics• State has well established mechanisms for policing traditional
media (e.g., print, radio, TV)
• Internet, initially offered a place for people to express their viewpoints away from the state controls
• 2000-2008 Internet use in Iran grows from <1M users to ~23M users
• Fastest growth in the middle east at that time• As early as 2001 government began asserting control over
Internet access in the country
• Commercial ISPs in Iran are required to connect via the state-controlled Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI)
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CONFLICTING GOALS
• Desire to encourage economic IT developments …
• … but also rein in free speech• Fourth Five Year Development Plan called for 1.5 M high speed
Internet connections worldwide
• … but in 2006 Ministry of Communication and Information Technology issues an order forbidding home Internet connectivity of > 128 kbps
• There were oppositions to the 128kbps rule but it remains in place
• Researchers, faculty and university students are exempt from the restrictions upon providing documentation
• Initially censorship implemented via IP blocking by individual ISPs, gradually replaced by centralized censorship by TCI
• Redirects users to 10.10.34.34 (an address owned by the censor)
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MORE RECENTLY
• 2012: Supreme leader establishes Supreme Council of Cyberspace which controls three government bodies associated with censorship:
• Committee for determining offensive contents, located at internet.ir and peyvandha.ir which controls censorship policies. They are responsible for updating lists of censored Web sites and enforcing Internet communication policies
• Iran cyber police (FATA police) Responsible for prosecuting users involved in illegal Internet activities
• Revolutionary guard cyber defense command, (Iran Cyber Army) responsible for defending Iran against cyber attacks and implementing countermeasures
• Also, the “Fifth Five Year Development Plan” mandates development of national information network
• Many fears of complete blocking of external content
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CAMPAIGN FOR NATIONAL INTERNET
• Head of MICT and other gov’t officials create public campaign extolling virtues of creating such a network:
• A genuinely halal network aimed at Muslims on an ethical and moral level – Ali Agha-Mohammadi
• A national internet can be very effective to protect the country’s information and the people’s security – Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam
• Usage of private IPs within the country could indicate a desire to go in this direction
• But usage of these addresses is not particularly new
• Observed as far back as 2010 (Anderson 2012)
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FILTERING IN IRAN AT A GLANCE
http://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/papers/TWeb.pdf
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NETWORKING 101: RFC 1918
• IP addresses on the Internet need to be globally unique
• IANA: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority is responsible for ensuring this
• Since IP addresses are finite and not all hosts need to be globally accessible, three blocks of IP addresses were reserved for local/private use
• 10.0.0.0/8 (16 M addresses)• 172.16.0.0/12 (1 M addresses)• 192.168.0.0/16 (65 K addresses)
• These IP addresses/routing information for them should not be propagated between networks
• ISPs should filter them (according to RFC)• Commonly used for NAT (ie., multiplexing a single public IP
address across many clients)
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THE HIDDEN INTERNET OF IRAN
Anderson 2012 – Reading on Web page
• Points of observation:
• 2 hosts in Tehran (1 connecting via AS 12880 ITC and 1 connecting via Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (AS 6736))
• Collection of Web proxies within the country that these hosts connect to to test accessibility
• Proxies with both internal + external IP addresses
• Potential shortcomings
• The two hosts may be subject to localized censorship by network owners
• Testing of censorship could lead to reactions from the censor
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ILLUSTRATION OF ABNORMAL TRACEROUTES
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MEASURING THE INTERNAL NETWORK
• Many techniques…
• DNS (fig 6); 10.143.177.18 says
it is an email server with hostname
Webmail.isfidc.com. Running dig on this address gives us the external address for this server
• Can use regional Internet registries to figure out which organization is using the 10.143 address
• Another way to figure out internal IP ownership:
• Spoof a ping to the internal address from an external host• When the external host receives the reply the external address
mapped to the internal host will be revealed
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RESULTS OF MAPPING
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DIMMING THE INTERNET
Anderson 2013 (Reading on Web page)
• http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4361
• Performance degradation to limit free flow of information
• Relation to network neutrality discussions?• Data reused from NDT tool (client initiated network
performance tests run against servers hosted by Measurement Lab (MLab)). NDT integrated into uTorrent
• Focus on:
• RTT• Packet Loss • Network-limited time ratio (where client has sent as much
traffic as it can and needs to wait for ACKs before sending more)
• Network throughput
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AGGREGATING MEASUREMENTS
• National
• ISP/AS + IP prefixes
• Control groups (grouping users with similar performance)
• Using median country-level throughput (based on highest performing measurement for each client on a given day) they find two extended periods of degradation
• Nov. 30 2011 – Aug. 15 2012 (77% decrease)• Oct 4 2012 – Nov 22 2012 (69% decrease)
• Corroboration with reports:
• “The Internet in Iran is Crawling, Conveniently, Right Before Planned Protests”
• Suspected events around holidays, protests, disruption of Google services
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EXAMPLE PLOT
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READING PRESENTATION
Pseudonymous + Halderman
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TODAY
Case Study: Iran
• Background on filtering in Iran (ONI report)
• Private addresses used within Iran (Anderson 2012)
• Dimming the Internet (Anderson 2013)
• Web censorship in Iran (Pseudonymous + Halderman 2013)
Case Study: Pakistan
• Background (ONI report)
• https://opennet.net/research/profiles/pakistan• Pakistan YouTube hijacking (Renesys)
• http://www.renesys.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/ • Web censorship in Pakistan (Nabi, 2013)
• http://0b4af6cdc2f0c5998459-c0245c5c937c5dedcca3f1764ecc9b2f.r43.cf2.rackcdn.com/12387-foci13-nabi.pdf
• Netsweeper in Pakistan (Citizen Lab report)
• https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/18-2013-opakistan.pdf
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INTERNET IN PAKISTAN
• ~130 ISPs: Wateen, Paknet, Linkdotnet, Comsats, Cybernet
• Wateen roll out of WiMAX in 2007 made Pakistan the first country with nationwide WiMAX coverage
• Largest Internet eXchange Point (IXP) in the country (as of 2009) was the Pakistan Internet Exchange (PIE) subsidiary of PTCL (gov’t owned ISP)
• PIE has three main nodes: Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad• + operates two submarine cables (South East Asia – Middle East –
Western Europe: SEA-ME-WE 3 and SEA-ME-WE 4)• In 2009, ISPs no longer had to connect via PTCL and could choose
third party providers
• Second major company in Pakistan Internet market is TransWorld
• Owns and operates Pakistan’s first and only privately owned submarine fiber optic cable system (TW1)
• TW1 has capacity of 1.28 TB more than necessary for the nation
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INTERNET FILTERING IN PAKISTAN
• Filtering regulated by the Pakistan Telecom Authority (PTA) and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) directed by the government, supreme court, and Ministry of IT (MoIT).
• 2006 – MoIT created the Inter Ministerial Committee for the Evaluation of Web sites (IMCEW) responsible for monitoring and blocking Web pages
• Directives about what to block pass from these government agencies to ISPs for implementation
• Wide publicity of censorship in Pakistan because of collateral damage
• 2006: attempt to block 12 sites with cartoons of Mohammad resulted in blocking the entire Blogspot domain for 2 months
• 2008: accidentally taking YouTube offline for hours• 2010: blocking of Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, Wikipedia on
“Draw Mohammad Day”
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INTERNET FILTERING IN PAKISTAN (2)
• 2012: Gov’t solicits proposals for a country-wide URL filtering and blocking system including:
• Filtering at domain level, subfolder level, individual files• Blocking individual IPs or whole address ranges• Remote network monitoring via SNMP, configuration via
HTTP/HTTPS• Operation at L2 and L3• Modularity: stand alone hardware that can block up to 50M
URLs with <1ms latency
• Later in 2012: indefinite ban on YouTube in response to a movie.
• Impact felt on other Google services with common IP addresses
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HISTORY LESSON
YouTubePakistan Telecom
“The Internet”
Telnor Pakistan Aga Khan
University
MultinetPakistan
I’m YouTube:IP 208.65.153.0 / 22
2008: Pakistan uses BGP messages to filter traffic
February 2008 : Pakistan Telecom hijacks YouTube
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HISTORY LESSONHere’s what should have happened….
YouTubePakistan Telecom
“The Internet”
Telnor Pakistan Aga Khan
University
MultinetPakistan
I’m YouTube:IP 208.65.153.0 / 22
X
Hijack + drop packets
going to YouTube
Block your own customers.
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HISTORY LESSONBut here’s what Pakistan ended up doing…
YouTubePakistan Telecom
“The Internet”
Telnor Pakistan Aga Khan
University
MultinetPakistan
I’m YouTube:IP 208.65.153.0 / 22
PakistanTelecom
No, I’m YouTube!IP 208.65.153.0 / 24
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HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE?
• Pakistan Telecom connected to the rest of the Internet via the PCCW network
• This network did not validate the message sent by Pakistan Telecom
• …and proceeded to pass it on to its neighbors who also accepted it
• Worse yet, the route announced by Pakistan was more specific than the route announced by YouTube
• Pakistan announced 208.65.153.0/24• YouTube announced 208.65.152.0/22
• No easy way for networks on the Internet to validate messages
• Direct provider has more of a chance since they should know the prefixes that their customers will be announcing (in theory)
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THE ANATOMY OF WEB CENSORSHIP IN PAKISTAN
• Testing a list of blocked sites which is publicly available ~300 URLs
• Whittled down from 500 because some sites were offline, duplicates etc.
• VPN terminating in the US was used to ensure that the sites were indeed up and were being blocked in Pakistan
• Procedure (for each URL)
• Perform DNS lookup on local + 3rd party DNS server• Try to open a connection to the IP• Test for URL-keyword filtering (append the URL to Google.com).
Expected result is a 404 not found if not -> censorship• HTTP request to the site
• Tests performed on 5 networks (2 University, 2 Home, 1 cellular)
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RESULTS
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O PAKISTAN, WE STAND ON GUARD FOR THEE
Citizen Lab report on Netsweeper being used in Pakistan
(title is reference to a line in the Canadian national anthem)
• After Pakistan solicited proposals for their filtering system an advocacy group (Access) started a petition calling on technology companies to announce that they would not bid on the project.
• Several major IT companies supported the petition• 5 declined to comment: Huawei, ZTE, Blue Coat, McAfee, &
Netsweeper• In previous ONI research block pages with company logos
were common, but over time this decreased
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BACKGROUND: NETSWEEPER
• Canadian-based provider of Web content filtering + threat management products
• Used for state-sanctioned censorship in several countries:
• Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, and Yemen• Enables bulk filtering on specific categories (e.g., Adult,
Entertainment, Information)• + specific URLs and custom categories
• These URL lists are central to their business
• Web site boards 5B categorized URLs and 10M URL categorization requests per day
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HOW CITIZEN LAB LOCATED NETSWEEPER
• Searched using www.shodanhq.com to find the IP of Netsweeper installations in Pakistan
• E.g., search for URL paths like /webadmindeny • Located the IP: 202.125.134.154
http://202.125.134.154/webadmin/deny/index.php
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ON THE SAME IP…http://202.125.134.154/webadmin/start
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OK … BUT IS THIS CENSORSHIP?
• Netsweeper could be used in a corporate setting as opposed to at the national level
• Many user reports of seeing the same block page that Netsweeper generates on multiple ISPs
• More IPs in PTCL found hosting Netsweeper
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IN COUNTRY TESTING
• To validate online reports The Citizen Lab ran tests to confirm
• Web page accessed in Pakistan + Toronto, results manually compared
• List of 1465 URLs tested• Observed a mix of DNS and blockpage blocking
<iframe src="http://202.125.134.154/webadmin/deny/?dpid=1&dpruleid=78&cat=104&ttl=0&groupname=PTCL2&policyname=PTCL2-policy&username=MMBB-9-WLL &userip=X.X.X.X&connectionip=127.0.0.1&nsphostname=X& protocol=policyprocessor&dplanguage=-&url=X"width="100%"height="100%" frameborder=0></iframe>
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HANDS ON ACTIVITY
Look at the Netsweeper testing page:
http://denypagetests.netsweeper.com/
Run wireshark while doing the “test”
Look at the HTTP connections it makes
How might we use a page like this to measure censorship? What might make this hard?
Search www.shodanhq.com for webadmin/deny to find Netsweeper devices around the world.
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HANDS ON ACTIVITY
RIPEstat page for AS 12880:
https://stat.ripe.net/AS12880#tabId=at-a-glance
Try looking up other Iranian networks
NDT data in Google
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=e9krd11m38onf_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=download_throughput&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:364&ifdim=country&ind=false
OOKLA Speed test:
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z8ii06k9csels2_&ctype=l&met_y=avg_download_speed