culture, dialectics, and reasoning about...

SCIENCE WATCH

Culture, Dialectics, and ReasoningAbout Contradiction

Kaiping PengRichard E. Nisbett

University of California, BerkeleyUniversity of Michigan

Chinese ways of dealing with seeming contradictions resultin a dialectical or compromise approach—retaining basicelements of opposing perspectives by seeking a "middleway." On the other hand, European-American ways, de-riving from a lay version of Aristotelian logic, result in adifferentiation model that polarizes contradictory perspec-tives in an effort to determine which fact or position iscorrect. Five empirical studies showed that dialecticalthinking is a form of folk wisdom in Chinese culture:Chinese participants preferred dialectical proverbs con-taining seeming contradictions more than did Americanparticipants. Chinese participants also preferred dialecti-cal resolutions to social conflicts and preferred dialecticalarguments over classical Western logical arguments. Fur-thermore, when 2 apparently contradictory propositionswere presented, American participants polarized theirviews, and Chinese participants were moderately acceptingof both propositions. Origins of these cultural differencesand their implications for human reasoning in general arediscussed.

consider the following statements about recent sci-entific discoveries:

Statement A. Two mathematicians have discovered thatthe activities of a butterfly in Beijing, China, noticeablyaffect the temperature in the San Francisco Bay Area.Statement B. Two meteorologists have found that theactivities of a local butterfly in the San Francisco BayArea have nothing to do with temperature changes in thesame San Francisco Bay Area.

What would be your intuitive reaction to these state-ments? Do you see an implicit contradiction between thetwo pieces of information? What strategy would you use todeal with such contradictions? What is the rationale forusing such a strategy? Does your cultural background af-fect your reasoning and judgments about contradiction? Ifso, how?

Theoretically, there are four possible psychologicalresponses to apparent contradiction. The first, and perhapseasiest, is not to deal with contradiction at all or to pretend

that there is no contradiction, a psychological stance thatcould be labeled denial. A second approach is to distrust ordiscount both pieces of information because they seem tocontradict each other, a stance that could be called dis-counting. However, both of these stances can be counter-normative because the full set of information might haveimportant implications for behavior.

A third response involves comparing both items ofinformation, then deciding that one is right and the other iswrong. Psychologists have found that in group decisionmaking, people exposed to opposing propositions oftenincrease their preference for the proposition they wereinclined to believe initially and decrease their prefer-ence for the less favored proposition (for reviews, seeIsenberg, 1986; Kaplan, 1987). Psychologists have alsofound that people sometimes change opinions to reduce thecognitive dissonance caused by two contradictory cogni-tions. Such polarizing strategies could be characterized asdifferentiation.

Theoretically, however, a fourth response to contra-diction is possible: A person might retain basic elements ofthe two opposing perspectives and believe that both per-spectives might contain some truth, even at the risk oftolerating a contradiction. Such an approach would notregard the two statements about the association between the

Editor's note. Denise C. Park served as action editor for this article.

Author's note. Kaiping Peng, Department of Psychology, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley; Richard E. Nisbett, Department of Psychology,University of Michigan.

This article draws on a dissertation completed by Kaiping Peng underthe guidance of Richard E. Nisbett at the University of Michigan. Theresearch was supported by National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant SBR9729103 and by an NSF traineeship and University of Michigan disser-tation research grant.

We thank Phoebe Ellsworth, Frank Yates, and Donald Munro fortheir much appreciated suggestions and comments on early drafts of thisarticle. We are also indebted to many others who have been associatedwith the Culture and Cognition program at the University of Michigan andmembers of the Culture and Cognition Lab at the University of California,Berkeley.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kai-ping Peng, Department of Psychology, University of California, 3210Tolman Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720. Electronic mail may be sent [email protected].

September 1999 • American PsychologistCopyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/99/S2.00Vol. 54, No. 9, 741-754

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activities of a butterfly and temperature changes as a con-tradiction, but would rather attempt a reconciliation, withthe result that both are believed to be true. This cognitivetendency toward acceptance of contradiction could be de-fined broadly as dialectical thinking. We address four ques-tions about dialectical thinking in this article: (a) Is toler-ance of seeming contradictions a real form of dialecticalthinking? (b) What are the principles underlying dialecticalthinking? (c) Are there cultural differences in the waypeople reason about contradiction? (d) What are the psy-chological and social implications of various approaches toreasoning about apparent contradictions?

We explore dialectical thinking by comparing layChinese reactions to apparent contradictions with those oflay Americans. We argue that reasoning about contradic-tion is guided by tacit ontologies and epistomologies orfolk wisdom about the nature of the world and knowledge.Chinese people believe the world is in constant flux andthat the part cannot be understood except in relation to thewhole (e.g., Nakamura, 1964/1985). Both change and com-plexity imply contradiction. Chinese deal with contradic-tion through what might be a compromise approach, show-ing tolerance of contradiction by finding a "middle way" bywhich truth can be found in each of two competing prop-ositions. Westerners believe in constancy of the world andbelieve it is possible to decontextualize propositions, un-derstanding them just in relation to one another rather thanattending also to a larger field of facts and theories in whichthe propositions are embedded (e.g., Cromer, 1993; Logan,1986). Contradictory propositions are unacceptable by thelaws of formal logic, which have been part of the Westerntradition since Aristotle, and Westerners respond to prop-ositions that have the appearance of contradiction by dif-ferentiation—deciding which of two propositions iscorrect.

DIALECTICAL THINKING ANDNAIVE DIALECTICISM

Dialectical Thinking in WesternPhilosophy and PsychologyThere is a long tradition of concern with dialectical rea-soning in Western philosophy and more recently in thepsychological literature (reviewed recently by Peng, 1997,in press). Dialectical thinking is considered to consist ofsophisticated approaches toward seeming contradictionsand inconsistencies. The key feature of Western dialecticalthinking is integration, starting with the recognition ofcontradiction, then moving on to the reconciliation of basicelements of the opposing perspectives. Its rational founda-tion is still the law of noncontradiction, so that a satisfac-tory solution to contradiction is a noncontradictory one.

The best known dialectical tradition in philosophy isthat of Marx (e.g., Marx, 1859/1930, 1858/1967) and En-gels (1882/1940), who applied dialectical perspectives tothe analysis of civilization and cultures. In their scheme, aproposition or historical fact (thesis) gives rise to an op-posing one (antithesis), which is resolved by a synthesis.Marxist dialectical thought emphasized the permanence ofopposition and contradiction in the real material world andtherefore in thought about reality. According to Marx andEngels, the process of historical development is endlessbecause the synthesis itself becomes a new thesis, and is inturn negated by a new antithesis producing a new synthesis,and so on ad infinitum. The dialectics of Marx and Engelscan be characterized as aggressive or assertive in that thereis constant negation.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a school of devel-opmental psychologists started to look for cognitive devel-opment beyond Piaget's adolescent "formal operations"stage (Piaget, 1952). Klaus Riegel (1973) argued that adultthought, particularly creative scientific activities, "are dom-inated by playful manipulations of contradictions and byconceiving issues integratively which have been torn apartby formal operational thinking" (p. 363). An empiricalapproach to dialectical thinking was offered by MichaelBasseches (1980, 1984), who abstracted 24 "dialecticalschemata," such as recognition of part-whole relationships,reciprocal relationships, and the progression of thesis-antithesis-synthesis (Basseches, 1980). It has been foundthat dialectical thinking becomes increasingly importantand common with age (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 1993;Basseches, 1984; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Kramer &Woodruff, 1986). Middle-aged and older people are morelikely to accept contradiction in reality and to synthesizecontradiction in their thinking than are young people. Anallied tradition in the field of individual differences focuseson "integrative complexity" (Tetlock, 1983, 1985), or abil-ity to view problems from multiple perspectives and usemultiple rules for thinking about them.

The philosophical tradition and the psychological onemake similar fundamental assumptions. They regard con-tradiction as a temporary state that will be replaced byintegrated thoughts—using reasoning that is linear, logical,

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and moves in one direction—from a contradiction to asynthesis. (Even the constant negation of Marx and Englesassumes at least temporary integration.) These traditionsalso assume that integration and synthesis are higher levelsof cognitive functioning, such as philosophical ways ofthinking—sophisticated, advanced models of thought usedby older, wiser people and cognitive elites. They are stillconstrained by the laws of formal logic, which do nottolerate literal contradiction.

Dialectical Thinking in ChineseThoughtThe Chinese have had an enduring reputation for beingdialectical thinkers, reasoning in ways that are distinct fromthe formal logic paradigm dominating the Western tradition(e.g., S. H. Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990; Needham, 1962; Zhang& Chen, 1991). Because of the very nature of the approach,it is difficult to identify the principles of Chinese dialecticalepistemology—the concepts and rules are highly flexible,with a multiplicity of meanings and functions. Hence, theexistence of such a tradition has been generally assumedbut never proven, and the contents of such principles havebeen touched on occasionally (e.g., Zhang & Chen, 1991)but have never been explicitly theorized.

We take a rather nondialectical approach to decom-pose Chinese dialectical epistemology. This approach, wehave to admit, is analytic and logical and is not consistentwith the spirit of dialectical thinking. The principles iden-tified may not cover all aspects of Chinese dialecticalepistemology, but only the ones that are the easiest toabstract and analyze for the purpose of empirical research.

Principle of Change (Man Yi Lu)This principle holds that reality is a process. It does notstand still but is in constant flux. According to Chinese folk

belief, existence is not static but dynamic and changeable.At the deepest level of Chinese philosophical thinking, "tobe or not to be" is not the question because life is a constantpassing from one stage of being to another, so that to be isnot to be, and not to be is to be (e.g., Cao, 1982; X. G. Liu,1988; Wang, 1987). Because reality is dynamic and flexi-ble, the concepts that reflect reality are also active, change-able, and subjective rather than being objective, fixed, andidentifiable entities.

Principle of Contradiction (Mao Dun Lu)This principle states that reality is not precise or cut-and-dried but is full of contradictions. Because change is con-stant, contradiction is constant. Old and new, good and bad,strong and weak, and so on coexist in everything. One ofthe first mandatory books for literate ancient Chinese wasthe Yi-Jing/I-Ching (The Book of Changes; 1991), in whichthe principle of contradiction is clearly expressed. Forexample, its basic theme is that the world is simply a singleentity, integrated over opposites. The founder of the Daoistschool, Lao-Zi (1993 version), said, "When the people ofthe world all know beauty as beauty, there arises therecognition of ugliness; When they all know the good asgood, there arises the recognition of evil. And so, being andnonbeing produce each other" (p. 16). According to theDaoists, the two sides of any contradiction exist in anactive harmony, opposed but connected and mutuallycontrolling.

Principle of Relationship or Holism(Zheng He Lu)This principle probably constitutes the essence of dialecti-cal thinking. It is a consequence of the principles of changeand contradiction. It holds that nothing is isolated andindependent, but everything is connected. If we really wantto know something fully, we must know all of its rela-tions—how it affects and is affected by everythingelse—or to borrow a slogan from Gestalt psychology, thewhole is more than the sum of its parts. Anything regardedin isolation is distorted because die parts are meaningfulonly in their relations to the whole, like individual musicalnotes embedded in a melody. The holistic mode of thoughtrests on the assumption that everything exists in the mys-tical integration of yin and yang, entities that are opposed toone another and yet also are connected in time and space asa whole.

Contrast Between Dialectical Thinkingand Formal LogicThe three principles of Chinese dialectical thinking arerelated. It is because of change that contradiction becomesinevitable; it is because change and contradiction are inev-itable that it is meaningless to discuss the individual partwithout considering its relationships with other parts. Tomany people in the West, this description may soundinteresting, reasonable, and even a bit familiar, particularlythe idea of holism. However, when one contrasts the prin-ciples of Chinese dialectical thinking with the laws offormal logic, the significance of the cultural difference

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becomes obvious. The rational foundation of Chinese dia-lectical thought is quite different from the rational founda-tion of Western thought (including Western dialecticalthought). Western thought rests in substantial part on Ar-istotelian logic, which emphasizes three different princi-ples: the law of identity, the law of noncontradiction, andthe law of the excluded middle.

The Lav* of IdentityThis law holds that if anything is true, then it is true; thus,A equals A. In other words, everything must be identicalwith itself. Leibniz (e.g., 1765/1996) has given expressionto the law of identity that "everything is what it is." Forexample, "a student is a student" is a logical assertionbecause "student" and "student" are identical.

The Law of NoncontradictionThis law declares that no statement can be both true andfalse; thus, A cannot equal not-A. For example, "a studentis not a nonstudent" is an expression of the law of noncon-tradiction because "student" and "nonstudent" are contra-dictory; hence, they cannot both be true. Other commonexpressions of the law are that "contradictory statements(e.g., A is B, A is not B) cannot both be true" and that "it isimpossible for the same thing to be both true and false atthe same time." Aristotle actually declared the law ofnoncontradiction to be the first and most certain of all threelaws of logic.

The Law of the Excluded MiddleThis law expresses the rule that any statement is either trueor false; thus, A or B, and not A and B. A commonexpression of this law of the excluded middle is "A is eitherB or not-fl." For example, "a person must either be astudent or a nonstudent" because "student" and "nonstu-dent" are mutually contradictory and complementary sothat anybody must belong to one of these two categories.Other expressions of the law of the excluded middle arethat "of two contradictory judgments (A is B, A is not B) theone must be true, the other false," and Aristotle's statementthat "between the two members of a contradiction, there isno middle term."

Differences Between the Two TraditionsIt is obvious now to readers that these laws of formal logicare not congruent with the principles of Eastern naivedialecticism. For instance, the principle of change suggeststhat life is a constant passing from one stage of being toanother, so that to be is not to be, and not to be is to be. Thelaw of identity, on the other hand, assumes cross-situationalconsistency; A must be A regardless of the context.

According to Chinese belief, the law of noncontradic-tion of formal logic works only in the realm of conceptsand abstraction. Even in these cases, the rejection of con-ceptual contradiction based on formal logic can be mis-taken, because concepts are reflections of things. As S. H.Liu (1974) put it, "it is precisely because the Chinese mindis so rational that it refuses to become rationalistic and. . . refuses to separate form from content" (p. 325). There

is nothing that does not contain contradiction, and there-fore, there is no concept that does not contain contradiction.A student, in many ways, is not a student, as illustrated bythe experience of many graduate student instructors.

Finally, if change and contradiction are constant, thenreal understanding of truth and reality must be relational.Hence, for a dialectical thinker, both A and B may be right,or both A and B may equal a third element C that may notbe part of the initial contradiction.

We believe such fundamental differences in ontologyand epistemology lead to substantial cognitive differences.We expected that Western stances for dealing with contra-diction would be consistent with Westerners' intuitive un-derstanding of the law of noncontradiction, whereas theChinese stances for dealing with contradiction would bebased on naive dialecticism. We designed five studies todemonstrate the effects of culture-specific epistemology onreasoning about apparent contradictions.

FOLK WISDOM AND CONTRADICTIONA shortcut for studying culture-specific habits of thought isto study folk wisdom as embodied in proverbs. Proverbshave been defined as short expressions of cultural wisdom,truth, morals, and norms in a "metaphorical, fixed andmemorable form," which are shared and "handed downfrom generation to generation" (Mieder, 1993, p. 5). Prov-erbs can sum up a situation, pass judgment, recommend acourse of action, or serve as precedents for present action(Taylor, 1965). Anthropologists have often studied prov-erbs in different cultures and contexts as public represen-tations of cultural wisdom (see Dundes, 1989).

Study 1: Differential Preferences forDialectical ProverbsStudy 1 was designed to show that dialectical thinking isreflected in Chinese folk wisdom, and that dialectical prov-erbs are more common in Chinese everyday language thanin American everyday language and are more preferred byChinese than by Americans. Examples of proverbs contain-ing contradictions include "beware of your friends not yourenemies," which contradicts the very definition of friend-ship, and the proverb "too humble is half proud," whichexplicitly contradicts the very meaning of the word "hum-ble." In comparison, a nondialectical proverb has no suchcontradiction. For example, the proverb "one against all iscertain to fall" stresses the inequality of one versus many;the proverb "for example is no proof makes a distinctionbetween mere examples and more convincing proofs. Suchproverbs may surprise or prompt thought, but they containno internal contradiction and do not point to the inevita-bility of opposing factors in everyday existence.

MethodParticipants. Participants were 70 White Ameri-

can undergraduate students (U.S. citizens) at the Universityof Michigan and 41 Chinese undergraduate students fromTaiwan who identified themselves as Chinese and werecurrently attending the University of Michigan. American


and Chinese participants were comparable in age, gender,and grade point average.

Materials. Two compendiums of proverbs wereselected as the sources of the stimuli (Hirsch, Kett, &Trefil, 1988; Lian, 1964). Proverbs were coded as dialec-tical or nondialectical by four trained coders having anintercoder reliability of .92 as indicated by Kendall's indexof harmony. Eight Chinese and eight American dialecticalproverbs were randomly selected from the pools of dialec-tical proverbs agreed on by all four coders. Five Chineseand five American nondialectical proverbs were also ran-domly selected from the rest of the Chinese and Americanproverbs as controls. Both the dialectical and nondialecticalEnglish proverbs were translated into Chinese by an inde-pendent translator who was fluent in both languages. TheChinese proverbs were already translated by the author(Lian, 1964) of the book from which they were selected.

Procedure. Participants answered four questions:(a) How familiar is this proverb to you in exact words? (b)How well do you think you understand this proverb? (c)How much do you like this proverb? (d) How often do youuse this proverb? Participants rated their responses on a7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

Results

We found that there were nearly four times as many dia-lectical proverbs in the Chinese book (about 12%) as in theAmerican book (fewer than 3%), suggesting that contra-diction plays a larger role in Chinese than in American folkwisdom. The pattern of participants' judgments on all fourquestions—about familiarity, comprehensibility, usage,and likability—was the same, so an index of overall pref-erence for each proverb was created by taking the mean ofthe four judgments. The means of these indexes weresubmitted to a 2 (culture) X 2 (type of proverb) X 2(language) omnibus analysis of variance (ANOVA), bro-ken down by culture and type of proverb. The means areillustrated in Figure 1. We found a significant main effectof culture such that the American participants showed adislike of the Chinese proverbs, regardless of whether theywere dialectical or nondialectical, whereas the Chineserated the American proverbs as favorably as the Chineseones, F(l, 109) = 8.59, p < .01.' Perhaps the Chinesestudents who were studying in the United States wereself-selected for liking American culture or had simplydeveloped a taste for it. The major prediction was sup-ported by a significant three-way Culture X Language XType of Proverb interaction; Americans greatly preferrednondialectical to dialectical American proverbs, and theChinese preferred dialectical to nondialectical Chineseproverbs, F(l, 109) = 12.45, p < .001.

Study 2: Differential Preferences forDialectical Yiddish ProverbsIt is possible that the results of Study 1 might have beendue to mere familiarity. The Chinese might simply havehad more exposure to the dialectical Chinese proverbs, andAmericans may have had more exposure to the nondialec-

Figure 1Index of Preferences for American and ChineseProverbs by American and Chinese UndergraduateStudents

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5 -

3 4^

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2 -

American

Chinese

Non-dialectical Dialectical Non-dialectical Dialectical

American Proverbs Chinese Proverbs

tical American proverbs. More linguistically neutral, unfa-miliar proverbs were chosen for a follow-up study, namelyYiddish proverbs.

MethodParticipants. Participants were 32 Chinese and

34 White (non-Jewish) American natural science graduatestudents living in University of Michigan family housing.The two groups were comparable in age, gender, andeducation.

Materials and procedure. The same coderswho worked on Study 1 were asked to mark each proverbthat they thought was dialectical. Eight dialectical proverbsand eight nondialectical proverbs were randomly selectedfrom a Yiddish dictionary of proverbs (Ayalti, 1963). Prov-erbs were presented to all participants in their Englishform. The instructions and procedure were the same as inStudy 1.

Results

The means for the general preference indexes are presentedin Figure 2. We found a significant Culture X Type ofProverb interaction indicating a significant cultural differ-ence in responses to the dialectical Yiddish proverbs,which the Chinese participants preferred more than theAmerican participants did, and we found no difference inresponse to the nondialectical Yiddish proverbs, F(l, 64) =9.17, p < .01. The results can be seen in Figure 2.

RESOLUTION OF SOCIALCONTRADICTIONSSocial contradiction can be defined loosely as a conditionin which two parties or two aspects of one social system

1 All p levels are based on two-tailed tests.


Figure 2Index of Preferences for Yiddish Proverbs byAmerican and Chinese Undergraduate Students

• American

I I Chinese

Non-dialectical Dialectical

Type of Proverbs

(e.g., a relationship, an institution, or a social function) arein conflict with each other. Interpersonal conflicts are ex-amples of social contradiction. Cross-cultural comparisonsof indigenous preferences for conflict resolution methodshave shown strong cultural variations, with Asians favoringharmonious procedures. For example, Leung (1987; Leung& Lind, 1986) found that Chinese participants in his studieswere more in favor of resolving disputes through informalprocedures, such as mediation and bargaining, because theybelieved that such methods reduce animosity, whereasAmericans were more likely than Chinese to favor adver-sarial methods of conflict resolution.

We suspected that Chinese individuals might adopt acompromise approach toward social contradictions becauseof their naive dialecticism. If the Chinese really have aholistic approach toward life and a tendency to toleratecontradiction, then they would be less likely to take sides ina conflict, and perhaps they would not even regard a socialconflict as a contradiction. Ethnographic analyses of Chi-nese law practices have suggested that Chinese law permitsthe "middleman" to become the key figure in Chinese legaldisputes, thus barring the way for Western-model lawyersand the rule of impersonal law, which often requires thatonly one party may win (Hsu, 1981). The dialectical reso-lution of social contradiction is encouraged by an aspect ofChinese culture, namely the doctrine of the mean, whichemphasizes moderation, sincerity, and most importantly a"reasonable" middle-of-the-road approach. In dealing with

social contradiction, it is not enough that a proposal orsolution be logically correct, or true, or effective. It is muchmore important that it be reasonable.

Study 3: Dialectical Resolution ofSocial ContradictionsIn Study 3, participants from both cultures were asked towrite down what they thought about two everyday-lifecontradictions, including the origin and resolution of thetwo conflicts. Their responses were then coded as dialec-tical or nondialectical. Our prediction was that the Chineseparticipants would apply the doctrine of the mean in theiranalysis of the social contradiction, whereas Americanparticipants would be less likely to do so. Participants werethe same 32 Chinese graduate students and 34 Americangraduate students as in Study 2.

MethodTwo everyday-life scenarios were provided for participantsto analyze: One was a mother-daughter value conflict, andthe other was a conflict between having fun and going toschool (see Appendix A for the texts, which were drawnfrom Basseches, 1984). To analyze participants' responses,we created a simple coding scheme that distinguished di-alectical resolution from nondialectical resolution of eachcontradiction. A dialectical response was defined as onethat (a) addressed the issues from both sides and (b) at-tempted to reconcile the conflicts by compromising. Adialectical resolution usually included sentences that attrib-uted the cause of the problem to both sides and attemptedto reconcile the contradiction, for example, a response suchas "both the mothers and the daughters have failed tounderstand each other." Nondialectical responses generallyfound exclusive fault with one side or the other, for exam-ple, "mothers have to recognize daughters' rights to theirown values." The intercoder reliability was measured byKendall's index of harmony. The indexes were .89 (p <.01) for the Chinese responses and .84 (p < .01) for theAmerican responses.

Results

We found that cultural differences in dealing with socialcontradiction were remarkably strong, as can be seen inFigure 3. For the mother-daughter conflict, many moreAmerican responses were coded as nondialectical (74%)than as dialectical (26%), z(n = 34) = 2.74, p < .01. Incontrast, for the same conflict, many more Chinese re-sponses were coded as dialectical (72%) than as nondia-lectical (28%), z(n = 32) = 2.47, p < .05. A 2 X 2chi-square test showed that the cultural differences werehighly significant, )?(N = 64) = 13.61, p < .001. For theschool-fun conflict, many more American responses werecoded as nondialectical (88%) than dialectical (12%),z(n = 34) = 4.45, p < .001. Although an almost equalnumber of Chinese responses were coded as dialectical andnondialectical, the cultured differences were still signifi-cant, )?(N = 64) = 8.50, p < .01.

The results of Study 3 indicate that cultural differ-ences in dealing with social contradiction at the interper-


Figure 3Percentage of Participants Preferring DialecticalResolution

en3

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Chinese

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Mother-Daughter School-Fun

TYPE OF CONFLICTS

sonal level may be substantial. Most of the Americanparticipants' resolutions of contradictions in everyday lifewere noncompromising, blaming one side for the causes ofthe problems, demanding changes from one side to attain asolution, and offering no compromise in dealing with in-terpersonal conflicts. In contrast, most of the Chinese re-sponses were much more dialectical, usually blaming bothsides and preferring a compromise approach to resolve thecontradictions.

FORMAL ARGUMENTATIONIt has been suggested by scholars in many fields of sciencethat the Chinese and people from other Eastern Asiancultures are less likely than Westerners to engage in de-bates and formal argumentation (e.g., Becker, 1986; Naka-mura, 1964/1985). There are social, historical, linguistic,and philosophical barriers to the acceptance of argumenta-tion and debate as a method of intellectual discourse or asa strategy for the consideration of new proposals for socialor political change (Becker, 1986). Some of the barriers areeasy to identify, such as the Chinese emphasis on harmonyand hierarchy, and the lack of proper forums or institutionsfor debate. Others are more philosophically rooted, such asthe influence of naive dialecticism, which assumes thatthere can be some truth to both of two opposing proposi-tions and hence implies that no side should win in a debate.Perhaps most important, naive dialecticism implies thatconcepts and words are flexible and only auxiliary to hu-man actions, and hence verbal debate and argumentationare not meaningful tools for understanding truth andreality.

Study 4: Differential Preferences forArgument FormsIn Study 4, we attempted to address the question of whetherChinese preferences for dialectical thinking affect the way

they approach matters of formal argumentation. Which aremore persuasive to the Chinese: logical arguments or dia-lectical arguments? Do Chinese scientists accept logicalarguments for scientific questions as much as Americanscientists? In Study 4, American and Chinese participantswere asked to judge two types of arguments that reachedthe same conclusions. These arguments were similar inlength, style, and structure. Both started from issues andpremises, and then proceeded to examples and conclusions.The difference was that one argument applied the law ofnoncontradiction, whereas the other applied naive dialecti-cism, namely the principle of holism. We hypothesized thatAmerican participants would favor arguments complyingwith the law of noncontradiction and that Chinese partici-pants would favor dialectical arguments.

MethodParticipants. The 32 Chinese and 34 American

natural science graduate students from Studies 2 and 3 alsoparticipated in Study 4. It is important to note that none ofthe participants were physicists.

Materials and procedure. Two types of argu-ments—logical and dialectical—were used in Study 4 (seeAppendix B for full texts of these arguments). One argu-ment was Galileo's famous discussion concerning the fal-sity of Aristotle's assumption that a heavier object falls tothe ground first. We used a modern version of Galileo'sthought experiment (adapted from Fisher, 1988): Supposeone puts a heavier object on top of a lighter object; as ajoint entity, they should fall faster than the heavier objectalone according to Aristotle's assumption. However, in thejoined entity, the lighter object is below the heavier objectso it should also act as a "brake" to slow down the heavierobject, making both fall slower than the heavier objectalone. Because this is a contradiction, the initial assumptionby Aristotle must be false. We generated a parallel dialec-tical argument to argue the same position, but this argu-ment applied the principles of holism and stressed theimportance of contexts. The argument suggested that be-cause Aristotle isolated objects from possible surroundingfactors (e.g., wind, weather, and height), his initial assump-tion must be wrong.

The logical argument for the existence of God isanother modified version of a classical argument (adaptedfrom Fisher, 1988), which was cited (but ultimately re-jected) by David Hume (1981/1779) in his Dialogues Con-cerning Natural Religion. This argument uses the law ofnoncontradiction to argue "the first causality" of the uni-verse, suggesting that because everything has a cause, anda mere succession of causes and effects is impossible, theremust be a first or ultimate cause of the universe, whichmust be God. The dialectical argument applying the prin-ciple of holism argues that when two people see a cup fromopposite perspectives, one sees a cup with a handle, and theother sees a cup without a handle. But there must be a Godabove individual perspectives who can see all and whodecides the truth. The participants were instructed to readthe two arguments for each topic, and then to indicate


"which argument is more persuasive (convincing) to youpersonally?" and "which argument do you like more?"

ResultsFigure 4 shows that American participants preferred thearguments that applied the law of noncontradiction andChinese participants preferred the arguments that appliedthe principle of holism. We used participants' judgments ofboth persuasiveness and likability as indications of prefer-ence and summed the two judgments across the two issuesto create a single index based on responses to the fourquestions. Responses could range from 0 (no dialecticpreference on any item) to 4 (greater dialectic preferencefor all four items). We found that Chinese participantspreferred the dialectical arguments (M = 2.22, SD = 1.07)more than did the American participants (M = 1.56, SD =1.05), t(65) = 2.53, p < .05.

Inasmuch as the Chinese participants, like the Amer-ican participants, were scientists living in the West, it isparticularly striking that they preferred the dialectical ar-guments, even for the scientific topic. These findings dem-onstrate again the power of folk theories in the scientificunderstanding of physical phenomena (e.g., Champagne,Klopfer, & Anderson, 1980; McCloskey, 1983; Peng &Nisbett, 1996).

JUDGMENTS ABOUT CONTRADICTORYINFORMATIONEmpirical studies conducted in Western cultural contextshave found that people exposed to two items of contradic-tory information often increase their preference for the item

Figure 4Percentage of American and Chinese ParticipantsPreferring Dialectial Arguments

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Persuasiveness Liking Persuasiveness Liking

Argument forExistence of God

Argument againstAristotelian Physics

of information they were inclined to believe initially anddecrease their preference for the less favored item. Such atendency has been characterized as "group polarization" inthe group-decision-making literature (for reviews, see Isen-berg, 1986; Kaplan, 1987) and as "disconfirmation bias" inthe cognitive literature (e.g., Edwards & Smith, 1996;Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). But do Chinese individualshave different tendencies regarding contradictory informa-tion? A dialectic stance implies that Chinese individualswould not show polarization and disconfirmation biasesbut rather that they would show a tendency to toleratecontradiction.

Study 5: Differential ApproachesToward ContradictionIn Study 5, we presented apparently contradictory researchfindings on various topics to determine whether Chineseand American individuals have different approaches fordealing with contradiction in scientific matters. The expec-tation was that when presented with opposing items ofinformation, American participants would use a differenti-ation strategy, deciding that one of the sides was correctand the other was not, whereas Chinese participants woulduse a compromise strategy, finding truth in both sides.

MethodParticipants. Participants were 102 American

undergraduate students at the University of Michigan and136 undergraduate students at Beijing University. The twogroups were comparable in age and gender composition,and received course credit for their participation.

Materials. The information was presented in theform of brief descriptions of the findings of scientificstudies. The opposing statements were superficially incom-patible but were not true contradictions of one another.This left room for a dialectical approach—for finding somedegree of truth to both statements. The first issue concernedwhether strong or weak family ties are optimal for individ-ual social ability. The second issue was about smoking andweight. Two findings were presented, one of which sug-gested a high correlation between smoking and being thinand the other of which suggested otherwise. The third issueconcerned whether eating white meat is healthier thaneating no meat at all. The fourth issue dealt with whetherolder or younger inmates should be released first in a prisonovercrowding crisis. The fifth issue concerned whetherthere is currently a trend toward global warming. Thestatements are presented in Appendix C.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assignedto one of three conditions. In two of the conditions, par-ticipants read information on only one side of the fivecontradictions (A or B), so that their judgments of theplausibility of each finding could be regarded as baselineiUdPITICntfii In t n e ^ ^ condition, participants read infor-mation on both sides (A and B), so that they were con-fronted with a seeming contradiction. All participants wereinstructed to indicate how much they believed each of thestatements to be true on a 9-point scale from 1 (stronglydisbelieve) to 9 (strongly believe).


Results

Plausibility in no-contradiction conditions.The plausibility of each statement was established by an-alyzing participants' ratings of their beliefs about the ac-curacy of each statement in the only-A or only-fi condi-tions. The statement that received the higher rating in eachpair was defined as the more plausible one. It was found,somewhat surprisingly, that the American and Chineseparticipants both had the same intuitions about which state-ment was more plausible for each topic. (The more plau-sible statement is always the first listed in Appendix C.)The mean of the participants' judgments on the five moreplausible statements was calculated as the aggregate ratingof more plausible findings, and the mean of participants'judgments on the five less plausible statements was calcu-lated as the aggregate rating for less plausible findings.A 2 (culture) X 2 (condition) X 2 (plausibility) omnibusANOVA showed a significant Culture X Condition inter-action, F(l, 237) = 7.90, p < .01, indicating that theAmerican and Chinese judgments about the contradic-tory information were differentially influenced by thecontradictions.

Culture-specific effects of contradiction. Itmay be seen in Figure 5A that American participants fol-lowed a differentiation approach toward contradictory in-formation. The difference was entirely due to higher plau-sibility ratings for the more plausible statements, F(l,101) = 5.10, p < .05, and there was no difference forratings of the less plausible statements. Thus, Americanspresented with evidence against a plausible state of affairsactually judged it to be more likely than if they saw nocontradictory evidence.

The aggregated ratings of plausibility by Chinese par-ticipants showed a quite different pattern (Figure 5B),which suggests a compromise approach toward contradic-tory information. In effect, the Chinese participants be-haved as if they believed that both statements might be(somewhat) true. This pattern was due both to higherratings of the less plausible statements in the both-A-and-Bcondition, F(l, 101) = 6.90, p < .01, and to lower ratingsfor more plausible statements, F(l, 101) = 6.53, p < .01.Thus, Chinese participants presented with evidence againsta rather implausible state of affairs actually judged it to bemore plausible than if they had not seen the evidence.

DiscussionThe results of Study 5 clearly indicate that American andChinese individuals can have very different approaches todealing with contradictory information. American partici-pants who read brief accounts of two contradictory studiesexpressed beliefs that were more polarized than those ex-pressed by participants who read about only one study.Chinese participants who read about two contradictorystudies, in contrast, expressed beliefs that were intermedi-ate between those expressed by participants who read aboutonly one of the studies.

The explanation for this pattern that we prefer is thatboth groups used heuristics in dealing with contradiction,

Figure 5American (A) and Chinese (B) Participants' Ratings inBoth Conditions of Study 5

A — • — More plausible

— O — Less plausible

1•s

1

6-

5-

4 -

O

A or B A and B

Condition

B

6-

5-

4-

A or B A and B

Condition

but that these heuristics are culture specific. For Americanparticipants, the simple heuristic might have been that ifthere is an apparent contradiction between two opposingperspectives, one must be right and the other must bewrong. This heuristic suggests that consistent with the lawsof noncontradiction and the excluded middle, you cannothave it both ways. For the Chinese participants, the patternmight have been due to the dialectical reasoning style ofcompromising between the elements of opposing perspec-tives. The Chinese heuristic for dealing with apparent con-tradiction may consist of believing that both sides of acontradiction might be right and that the truth lies betweenthe two perspectives. Such an approach could be derivedfrom the dialectical epistemology, which advocates toler-ance of seeming contradiction.


The results suggest that both American and Chineseindividuals are prone to make mistakes in dealing withcontradictory information. For the Americans, the mistakeconcerns the more plausible statements. The Americanpatterns found in Study 5 are reminiscent of the results ofa classic study by Lord et al. (1979). In that experiment,participants read about two different studies concerning thedeterrent value of capital punishment. The two studies haddifferent methodologies and came to opposite conclusions.Participants who favored capital punishment believed thatthe study showing capital punishment to be ineffective fordeterring crime was flawed methodologically, and theywere little moved by its conclusions. The same pattern ofbiased evaluation was found for opponents of capital pun-ishment who read the study indicating that capital punish-ment was effective. Remarkably, after reading about thetwo contradictory studies, participants reported being moreconvinced about the correctness of their initial view thanwere control participants who did not read about any study.

For the Chinese participants, the mistake concerns theless plausible statements. It can scarcely be normativelycorrect to judge an implausible view as more plausiblewhen one has just read evidence for another, more plausi-ble stance than if one had read only evidence supporting theless plausible view. Nevertheless, this is what Chineseparticipants did in Study 5.

The current findings are consistent with basic intellec-tual frameworks in both cultures. Characteristics of West-ern thinking include (a) pursuit of a single truth, (b) con-struction of counterarguments, and (c) preference for con-sistency. For Americans, because any argument can lookbetter by comparison, there is a strong desire to generatecounterarguments against a position that one doubts, inorder to find a more secure basis for belief in some otherposition. A good part of Western education, in fact, con-sists of teaching children how to generate arguments andcounterarguments concerning a given position. In contrast,there is very little emphasis on constructing counterargu-ments in the Asian tradition (Becker, 1986; Yates, Lee, &Bush, 1997). Instead, the emphasis is on finding the middleway (S. H. Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990; Nakamura, 1964/1985).

GENERAL DISCUSSIONWe have found empirical support for claims long made byscholars in a variety of fields about the different intellectualtraditions of East and West. The evidence provides confir-mation from the psychological laboratory to support thehistorical, ethnographic, and philosophical work suggest-ing that there are two very different cognitive traditions inthe East and West regarding the treatment of seemingcontradictions. The differences we have found, it should benoted, are actual qualitative ones. Chinese participants pre-ferred dialectic proverbs, whereas American participantspreferred nondialectical ones; Chinese participants pre-ferred compromise solutions to conflicts, whereas Ameri-can participants preferred noncompromising ones; Chineseparticipants preferred dialectical arguments for a scientificproposition and a spiritual one, whereas American partic-ipants preferred logical arguments; Chinese participants

moderated their views when confronted with opposingpropositions, whereas American participants became moreextreme. It should also be noted that the differences wehave found are almost surely muted with respect to theChinese and American populations as a whole. The Chi-nese participants were all students and thus would havebeen exposed to Western forms of thought to a greaterdegree than would be true of other Chinese individuals. Inaddition, all except the participants in Study 5 had beenliving in the United States for several years.

Holistic Versus AnalyticEpistemologiesWe believe that dialectic versus nondialectic reasoning willturn out to be only one of a set of interrelated cognitivedifferences between Asians and Westerners. We and ourcolleagues are pursuing the general notion that East Asiansinfluenced by the Chinese cultural tradition are cognitivelyintegral and holistic, attending to the perceptual and cog-nitive field as a whole. In contrast, Westerners are prone todifferentiate the object from the field and to reason analyt-ically about its behavior, categorizing it and using rulesabout categories to understand its behavior (Nisbett, 1998;Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 1999; Peng, Ames, &Knowles, in press). There is now considerable evidence,for example, that causal attribution differs across cultures,with Asians being inclined to attribute to context the sortsof actions that Westerners attribute to dispositions of theobject—whether the object is human (Choi & Nisbett,1998; Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996; Miller, 1984; Morris& Peng, 1994; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999), animal(Morris & Peng, 1994), or physical (Peng & Nisbett, 1996).See Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999), Morris, Nisbett,and Peng (1995), and Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett(1999) for reviews.

There is also evidence that Asians attend more closelyto the field, whereas Americans attend more closely to thefocal object in the field. Abel and Hsu (1949) found thatChinese Americans tended to give "whole card" responseson the Rorschach, whereas Caucasian Americans tended togive responses based on only a part of the card. Ji, Peng,and Nisbett (in press) found that Chinese participants weremore capable of detecting covariation among arbitraryevents than Americans but were more field dependent asindicated by the greater influence of the position of theframe when Chinese participants judged the verticality ofthe rod in the Rod and Frame Test. In addition, comparedwith Asian populations, Westerners learn arbitrary catego-ries more readily using rules (Norenzayan, Nisbett, Smith,& Kim, 1999), make more use of categories for purposes ofinduction (Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997), are more likelyto use categories for purposes of grouping objects than touse relationships among the objects (Chiu, 1972; Ji &Nisbett, 1999), and are more willing to set aside theirpreconceptions when these are contradicted by logical ar-gument (Norenzayan, Nisbett, et al., 1999).

The tendency toward dialecticism of Easterners maythus be seen as part of a general system of thought in whichattention is directed outward toward the environment, and


complexity and change and contradiction are thereforesalient. The Western tendency toward logical reasoningmay be seen as due to a focus on the object, with itspresumably fixed attributes, resulting in a general system ofthought in which rules and categories concerning the objectare viewed as essential.

A Paradox in the History of ScienceOur contention that East Asians are inclined toward holismand dialecticism, whereas Westerners are inclined towardanalytic thought focusing on the object may be helpful inresolving "Needham's paradox" (Capra, 1975; Needham,1962; Zukav, 1980). British historian of science JosephNeedham noted that the ancient Chinese had rich conceptsconcerning "field" and "force over distance" and under-stood phenomena such as magnetism, acoustic resonance,and the true reason for the tides more than 1,500 yearsbefore these things were understood in the West. Suchunderstanding would seem to flow from a focus on the fieldand a commitment to holistic thought. However, the Chi-nese did not discover the modern physics of electromag-netism or quantum physics (Needham, 1962).

One of the factors contributing to Needham's paradoxcould be naive dialecticism. By emphasizing change, con-tradiction, and covariation, naive dialecticism restricts anyreductive, analytic, and logical quest for understandingnature and the world. The reductionism of quantum physicsrecognizes one force, namely the mechanical force, as themanifestation of momentum and energy exchange of allphysical movements. According to many historians ofphysics, it was because of the prior development of "bil-liard-ball" physics that the modern scientific revolutioncould take place at the beginning of the 20th century (e.g.,Qian, 1985). Indeed, the major aims of Michael Faraday,Lord William Kelvin, and James Maxwell were actually toeliminate "action at a distance" and to provide electric andmagnetic actions with the tangibility of billiard-ball inter-actions. They initiated and mathematized the concepts offield and forces over a distance in the process of establish-ing electromagnetism and found that the force in a "field offorce" is the same Newtonian force that governs billiard-ball interactions (Qian, 1985). Such a linear persistence andlogical approach are not congruent with the principles ofnaive dialecticism. This may be one of the cognitive rea-sons, among many other factors, that the Chinese them-selves did not develop modern physics. Intriguingly, how-ever, the dialectic orientation may have been impor-tant to the development of modern quantum theory. Atany rate, Nils Bohr maintained that his thinking was influ-enced by Chinese metaphysical approaches (Bohr, 1958,1958/1987).

Normative QuestionsOne of the inevitable questions stemming from this re-search is, which approach to dealing with contradiction isbetter, the (flawed) Chinese way or the (flawed) Americanway? The best answer to such a linear question seems to bea dialectic one. On the one hand, life is full of contradic-

tions. Even in science, the concept of a complex systemreflects the reality of the world we are living in, a realitythat is multilayered, unpredictable, and contradictory.Therefore, a dialectical approach may enable people totolerate and even appreciate contradiction, consequentlymaintaining a view of the big picture. On the other hand,the dialectical approach may be accompanied by a ten-dency to accept too much at face value, failing to generatecounterarguments for a statement and trying to reconcileopposing views, even when one viewpoint is inferior interms of the evidence supporting it.

It seems apparent that the Western, nondialecticalapproach is more congruent with Western scientific reason-ing and research. In fact, the laws of formal logic form thefoundations of scientific investigation (e.g., Popper, 1959/1972). Many other intellectual tasks in the West have beentacitly framed in adversarial terms so that results and con-clusions can be falsified. This is true of the adversarial andargumentative approaches that operate in law and publicpolicy analysis.

The Western tradition of counterargument construc-tion seems likely to result in more specific hypotheses andconsequently more solutions than naive dialecticism could(Choi & Nisbett, 1999). Its emphasis on noncontradictionmay also enable people to reason rationally to reject falsestatements (even ones they may like) and accept true state-ments (even ones they may not like). In fact, a large bodyof research on decision making has shown that argument,debate, or conflict in general can improve decision qualityin Western societies (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Johnson &Tjosvold, 1983; Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Schwenk, 1990).Unfortunately, though, many Westerners may not knowtheir own strength or do not use it wisely. Their ability togenerate counterarguments and their fear of the appearanceof contradiction may cause them to reject a statementsimply because they can readily generate counterargu-ments. Their analytic orientation may lead them to focustoo much on one side of an argument and blind them tocompromise solutions—when the truth does indeed liesomewhere between or above the opposing facts orviewpoints.

Therefore, the dialectical response to the linear ques-tion of which is the better way of thinking is "it depends."The logical ways of dealing with contradiction may beoptimal for scientific exploration and the search for factsbecause of their aggressive, linear, and argumentative style.On the other hand, dialectical reasoning may be preferablefor negotiating intelligently in complex social interactions.Therefore, ideal thought tendencies might be a combinationof both—the synthesis, in effect, of Eastern and Westernways of thinking.

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Appendix A

Two Vignettes Used in Study 3

Mother-Daughter ConflictMary, Phoebe, and Julie all have daughters. Each motherhas held a set of values which has guided her efforts to raiseher daughter. Now the daughters have grown up, and eachof them is rejecting many of her mother's values. How didit happen and what should they do?

School-Fun ConflictKent, James, and Matt are college juniors. They are feelingvery frustrated about their three years of routine tests, paperassignments, and grades. They complain that going throughthis process has taken its toll, undermining the fun oflearning. How did it happen and what should they do?

Appendix B

Arguments Used in Study 4

Galileo's Argument Against Aristotle'sAssumption

Aristotle believed that the heavier a body is, the faster itfalls to the ground. However, such an assumption might befalse. Suppose that we have two bodies, a heavy one calledH and a light one called L. Under Aristotle's assumption Hwill fall faster than L. Now suppose that H and L are joinedtogether, with H on top of L. Now what happens? Well,L + H is heavier than H so by the initial assumption itshould fall faster than H alone. But in the joined body L +H, L and H will each tend to fall just as fast as before theywere joined, so L will act as a "brake" on H and L + H willfall slower than H alone. Hence it follows from the initialassumption that L + H will fall both faster and slower thanH alone. Since this is absurd the initial assumption must befalse.

Dialectical Argument Against Aristotle'sAssumption

Aristotle believed that the heavier a body is, the faster itfalls to the ground. However, such an assumption might befalse because this assumption is based on a belief that the

physical object is free from any influences of other con-textual factors ("perfect condition"), which is impossible inreality. Suppose that we have two bodies, a heavy onecalled H and a light one called L. If we put two of them intwo different conditions, such as H in windy weather (W)and L in quiet weather (Q), now what happens? Well, theweights of the body, H or L, would not make them fall fastor slow. Instead, the weather conditions, W or Q, wouldmake a difference. Since these kinds of contextual influ-ences always exist, we conclude that the initial assumptionmust be false.

Hume's Argument for the Existence of GodWhatever exists must have a cause or reason of its exis-tence, since it is absolutely impossible for anything toproduce itself or be the cause of its own existence. Inmoving from effects to causes, therefore, we must have twooptions. One is to go on in tracing an infinite succession,without any ultimate cause at all; the other is that we at lasthave recourse to some ultimate cause that is necessarilyexistent. However, the first option is impossible. This isbecause, in the infinite chain of succession of causes andeffects, each single effect is determined to exist by the


power and efficacy of that cause which immediately pre-ceded. But if the whole eternal chain of succession, takentogether, is no,t determined or caused by anything, this isabsurd. Is nothing the ultimate cause? But that can neverproduce anything, which contradicts the cause-effect suc-cession we have. We must, therefore, have recourse to anecessarily existent Being who carries the reason of hisexistence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not toexist, without an express contradiction. There is, conse-quently, such a Being—that is, there is a God.

Dialectical Argument for the Existence of God

Whatever exists must exist in its own time and location,and with unique properties. Because of these facts, anyparticular entity would have entities competing with it and

contradicting it in terms of viewing the truth, just as twopeople watch a cup on the table, one sees a cup with ahandle, the other must see a cup without a handle if he islooking from the opposite perspective. Then who is goingto tell the truth? It cannot be one of the particular entitiesbecause each one of them can only see a part of the truth.Is nothing the ultimate truth? But that can never tell usanything. We know the truth will eventually come out.Therefore, there must be a way to add up all the differentperspectives to assist at an absolute truth. Such a sum or"whole" consists of every idiosyncratic perspective, butreveals the truth as a whole. This marvelous "whole"cannot be designed or found by any individual alone. Wemust, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existentBeing who is above every idiosyncratic entity, and whocannot be supposed not to exist as argued above. There is,consequently, such a Being—that is, there is a God.

Appendix C

Contradictory Findings Used in Study 5

Statement 1AA social psychologist studied young adults and assertedthat those who feel close to their families have moresatisfying social relationships.

Statement IBA developmental psychologist studied adolescent childrenand asserted that those children who were less dependenton their parents and had weaker family ties were generallymore mature.

Statement 2AA sociologist who surveyed college students from 100universities claimed that there is a high correlation amongcollege female students between smoking and beingskinny.

Statement 2BA biologist who studied nicotine addiction asserted thatheavy doses of nicotine often lead to becoming overweight.

Statement 3AA health magazine survey found that people who live along life eat some sorts of white meat, e.g., fish or chicken.

Statement 3BA study by a health organization suggests that it is muchmore healthy to be a strict vegetarian who does not eat meatat all.

Statement 4A

A survey found that older inmates are more likely to beones who are serving long sentences because they havecommitted severely violent crimes. The authors concludedthat they should be held in prison even in the case of aprison population crisis.

Statement 4B

A report on the prison overcrowding issue suggests thatolder inmates are less likely to commit new crimes. There-fore, if there is a prison population crisis, they should bereleased first.

Statement 5A

A group of environmental science undergraduate studentsexamined fuel usage in a large number of developingcountries and asserted that recent practices are likely tomultiply already worsening environmental problems suchas "global warming."

Statement SB

A meteorologist studied temperatures in 24 widely sepa-rated parts of the world and asserted that temperatures hadactually dropped by a fraction of a degree each of the lastfive years.


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