dare to prepare: taking risk seriously - - research reports and studies

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Dare to prepare: taking risk seriously

&INANCINGEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSFROMlGHTINGCRISISTOMANAGINGRISK

Jan Kellett and Katie Peters

© Overseas Development Institute, 2014

Overseas Development Institute

203 Blackfriars Road | London SE1 8NJ | UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300 Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399

www.odi.org.ukThe views presented in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners.

i

Dare to prepare: taking risk seriously

&INANCINGEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSFROMlGHTINGCRISISTOMANAGINGRISK

Jan Kellett and Katie Peters

ii

Acknowledgements

ODI would like to thank the Inter-Agency Standing for supporting this work. In particular, thanks go to the Financing for Emergency Preparedness Task Team and Advisory Panel and its Chair Sandra Aviles (FAO) and her colleague Daniel Longhurst (FAO). Special thanks go also to Daniel Kull of GFDRR for his guidance throughout this work. This report LVLQIRUPHGE\¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHVDQGWKDQNVJRWRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV5HVLGHQW&RRUGLQDWRUVLQHDFKFRXQWU\DQGWKHLUWHDPV/HDGUHVHDUFKHUVIRUWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHstudies were: Jan Kellett (Philippines), Katie Peters (Myanmar), Lilianne Fan (Haiti), 3DWULFN5RELWDLOOH1LJHUDQG7RP+RFNOH\6XGDQ&RXUWHQD\&DERW9HQWRQXQGHUWRRNWKHFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLVZLWKVXSSRUWIURP)DELHQ5LFKDUGV$GGLWLRQDOUHVHDUFKLQSXWVwere provided by Alice Caravani, Cassia Carvalho, Catherine Allinson, Elisabeth Couture, (PPD/RYHOO(YD&RPEH*O\Q7D\ORU+HOHQ7LOOH\0DUJRW+LOO&ODUYLV1HOOD7UXMLOOR6DUDK%DLOH\6KLUOH\0DWKHVRQ6PLWD1DNKRRGD6WHYHQ=\FNDQG7RQ\9DX[

The research was guided by a Quality Assurance Group comprising ODI Research )HOORZV1HLO%LUG6DUD3DQWXOLDQRDQG7RP0LWFKHOO

We would also like to acknowledge the support of the IASC Task Team (composed of )$2:)381,&()WKH:RUOG%DQN:+22&+$,)5&,6'52[IDP81'3816\VWHP,QÀXHQ]D&RRUGLQDWLRQ816,&DQG:RUOGYLVLRQDQGWKH$GYLVRU\3DQHORIH[SHUWV&KDWKDP+RXVH-DSDQ'),'0H[LFR,&5&81'32&+$)$2*HQHYDPeacebuilding Platform, Christian Aid, World Economic Forum, ISDR, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel and the OECD DAC).

FAO as Chair of the IASC Task Team wishes to acknowledge generous contributions and VXSSRUWIURPWKH*RYHUQPHQWVRI*HUPDQ\3RODQG6ZLW]HUODQG8.'),'DQG-DSDQwithout which this work would not have been possible.

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY

1

Acknowledgements ii

Preface 3

Executive summary 7

1. Emergency preparedness: the current state of play 171.1 Introduction 193UHSDUHGQHVVLQFRQWH[W ,QIRUPLQJWKHSRVWDJHQGD

2. How we understand emergency preparedness 242.1 What is emergency preparedness? 272.2 The preparedness continuum 29(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGFRQÀLFW 2.4 International support: the ideal scenario 32

3. Emergency preparedness in context: the architecture 35,QWURGXFLQJWKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH 3.2 Humanitarian mechanisms/tools 393.3 Risk-related mechanisms 43&OLPDWH¿QDQFHPHFKDQLVPV

4. How emergency preparedness is funded: lessons from !ve country case studies 490DSSLQJWKHIXQGLQJVRXUFHV¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHV (PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJ +RZWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOIXQGLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHZRUNVLQWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV

5. The business case for emergency preparedness: Niger and beyond 777KHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV (PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHUDFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLV (IIHFWLYHQHVVDQDO\VLVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHU

6. Understanding what makes for effective !nancing of emergency preparedness 85,GHQWLI\LQJWKHµEHVW¿W¶PHFKDQLVPIRU¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV :KDWGRHVWKLVWHOOXVDERXWH[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV" 1RQ¿QDQFLDOLVVXHVIRUHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV

Contents

2 DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY

7. Recommendations: a set of options for change 977.1 A set of options: from beyond business as usual through to transformational change 99([SDQVLRQZKHUHLWPDNHVVHQVHµQRUHJUHW¶RSWLRQV 0D[LPLVLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQHQKDQFHGV\VWHP 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQDOFKDQJHVROXWLRQVEH\RQGWKHFXUUHQWV\VWHP $QHZIXQGKRZPLJKWLWZRUN" 7KHFDVHIRUGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJ (PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGUHVLOLHQFH

8. Conclusion: preparing for the foreseeable future 1130RYLQJWKHDJHQGDIRUZDUG

Annex 1: Case studies and background papers 121

Annex 2: Key de!nitions 122

Annex 3: Opportunities beyond funding mechanisms 124

References 126

Acronyms and abbreviations 132

3

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7KLVUHSRUWKDVXQGHUJRQHVLJQL¿FDQWUHYLHZLQFOXGLQJ±WRWKHH[WHQWSRVVLEOH±YHUL¿FDWLRQRI¿QGLQJVZLWKUHVSRQGHQWVLQHDFKRIWKH¿YHFRXQW\FDVHVWXGLHVZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIIXQGLQJPHFKDQLVPVtools, through ODI internal peer review and by the IASC Sub-Working Group on Financing for Emergency Preparedness Task Team and Advisory Panel (see Acknowledgements) and, in particular, its Chair, Sandra Aviles. In recognition that the funding environment is continually evolving, the authors welcome further contributions and additions.

7KHEDFNJURXQGSDSHUVSUHSDUHGIRUWKLVUHSRUWVHH$QQH[ZLOOEHPDGHSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHRQ ZZZRGLRUJXNDQGZLOOEHUHOHDVHGWKURXJKRXW

Enquiries on the research should be directed to Katie Peters, Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute at [email protected].

Photo credits: Kemal Jufri/Panos, GMB Akash/Panos, Adam Patterson/Panos, GMB Akash/Panos, 6DQMLW'DV3DQRV5RE+XLEHUV3DQRV$QGUHZ7HVWD3DQRV0DGV1LVVHQ3DQRV*0%$NDVK3DQRVAdam Dean/Panos, GMB Akash/Panos.

Preface

http://www.odi.org.uk

mailto:[email protected]

Executive summary

7

Executive summary

$VHDFKDQJHLVQHHGHGLQRXUDSSURDFKWRLQWHUQDWLRQDODLG¿QDQFLQJRQHWKDWSULRULWLVHVWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIULVN)RUGHYHORSPHQWDSSURDFKHVWKLVPHDQVWDNLQJPHDVXUHVWRDYRLGSRWHQWLDOJDLQVEHLQJORVWRUXQGHUPLQHGZKLOHIRUKXPDQLWDULDQVLWPHDQVEHLQJEHWWHUSUHSDUHGWRGHDOZLWKWKHJHRJUDSK\RIULVNLQDQGEH\RQG3UHSDULQJIRUFXUUHQWDQGIXWXUHULVNVLVDUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGDEDVLFSUHUHTXLVLWHIRUHIIHFWLYHKXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQWZRUN±LWLVQRWRSWLRQDO

%MERGENCYPREPAREDNESSTHECURRENTstate of playEmergency preparedness has the potential to be truly transformative, a means to reshape the way the aid system approaches crisis. Investment in preparedness seeks to reduce the cost of response over the long term and the ever increasing burden on the humanitarian V\VWHP±DEXUGHQWKDWVWUHWFKHVLWEH\RQGLWVPHDQVand, in some cases, its mandate. It offers a marked FKDQJHWRSRVWFULVLVµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶DQGUHÀHFWVWKHlessons learnt from decades of humanitarian response, as well as the necessity of building national capacity for preparedness as a fundamental part of a longer-term VWUDWHJ\WRUHGXFHSUHVVXUHRQKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFHV

7KLVVWXG\FRPHV\HDUVDIWHUKXPDQLWDULDQUHIRUPKHOSHGFKDQJHWKHIDFHRI¿QDQFLQJ,WDSSHDUVDWDWLPHwhen the international community is grappling with ever increasing humanitarian needs, set against a backdrop RIFRQWLQXLQJSUHVVXUHRQGRQRU¿QDQFLQJDQGZLWKit, demand from donors that effectiveness and value for money become central to the system. Set in this FRQWH[WSUHSDUHGQHVVLVEHLQJDGYDQFHGWKURXJKRXWWKHinternational community. It is pursued in many forums DQGDWPDQ\OHYHOVE\DJHQFLHVLQWKH¿HOGE\ZRUNLQJgroups within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and up to and beyond the IASC Principals. These credible efforts to drive forward the agenda are not a

FRPSUHKHQVLYHµVROXWLRQ¶WRDGGUHVVSUHSDUHGQHVVQHHGV±EXWQHLWKHUDUHWKH\VXSSRVHGWREH7KH\ZLOO±LWLVKRSHG±EHDFDWDO\VWIRUWKHIDUUHDFKLQJFKDQJHVWKDWare required. In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be put in place before a crisis occurs.

Humanitarian funding clearly contributes towards preparedness. However, this is predominantly either WKURXJK¿QDQFHIRUUHVSRQVHUHOHDVHGDIWHUDFULVLVRUWKHµSODQQHG¶KXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHRIFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOV,QDGGLWLRQGLVFUHWHµSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHV¶are undertaken, rather than continuing support to a comprehensive preparedness system. This is symptomatic RIDIXQGDPHQWDOÀDZLQWKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH,IZHwere to design channels of funding with a blank slate, then it is likely that funding arrangements would look quite different from those that we see today. This is not to suggest that preparedness should always be top of WKHDJHQGDZHLJKWLQJRISULRULWLHVLVDUHDOLW\LQDZRUOGwhere funding is constrained. It is not always feasible to undertake comprehensive preparedness measures for DOOULVNV0RUHRYHUULVNDQGXQFHUWDLQW\SUHVHQWVSHFL¿Fbudgetary challenges. As a basic minimum, however, it should be possible for the international system to support the creation of national systems of preparedness for the most likely crises (based on a comprehensive assessment of risk within each country).

7KLVLVQRWKRZHYHUVROHO\D¿QDQFLQJFKDOOHQJH*HWWLQJWKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHFRUUHFWLVDQLPSRUWDQWVWDUWLQJpoint, but it needs to be complemented by improved coherence of preparedness efforts through coordinated decision-making, planning and implementation. This requires a global consensus to make risk fundamental to all aid decisions, and that this translates into prioritised programming and resourcing. The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face.

In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be put in place before a crisis occurs

,QWKHFRQWH[WRI¿VFDODXVWHULW\GRQRUJRYHUQPHQWVLJQDWRULHVWRSRVWDJUHHPHQWVZLOOEHPLQGIXORIWKH¿QDQFLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKRVHFRPPLWPHQWV,QWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHQRWLRQRISUHSDUHGQHVVDVDµQRUHJUHW¶RSWLRQPXVWEHFRQYH\HG7KHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDWKXVPDUNVDFULWLFDOMXQFWXUH:LOOWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOcommunity continue to do more of the same, perhaps XQGHUDQHZEDQQHUWHUPLQRORJ\RUEX]]ZRUGRUZLOOit take a radically different approach to challenge the LQDGHTXDFLHVRIµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶FULVLVUHVSRQVH"

Key messages

Ɣ The ultimate goal should be comprehensive national systems of preparedness, capable of responding to the range of risks that countries face.

Ɣ Emergency preparedness has the potential to be WUDQVIRUPDWLYHRIIHULQJDPDUNHGFKDQJHWRH[SRVWLHDIWHUWKHHYHQWµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶

Ɣ For national and international actors, emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVSUHVHQWVWKHVSHFL¿FEXGJHWDU\FKDOOHQJHVof assessing risk and dealing with uncertainty.

How we understand emergency preparednessµ(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDLPVWREXLOGWKHUHVLOLHQFHRIVWDWHVDQGVRFLHWLHVE\VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHORFDOQDWLRQDODQGJOREDOFDSDFLW\WRPLQLPLVHORVVRIOLIHDQGOLYHOLKRRGVWRHQVXUHHIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHWRFULVHV¶

7KHDFWLYLWLHVWKDWFRPSULVHµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¶VSDQthe responsibilities of both development and humanitarian actors, as part of a portfolio approach. The suite of activities required to create and sustain a system of preparedness ZRUNLQWDQGHPDQGVXSSRUWRQHRWKHU)RUH[DPSOHHDUO\warning systems will not be effective unless they are supported by a contingency plan that clearly delineates roles and activities in the case of an early warning, or without the institutional capacity to put this in place. Similarly, pre-positioning and stockpiling are redundant unless there is a system for indicating when and how stocks will be used. As a result, the issue is not what to invest in, but rather a clear imperative to invest in the whole package.

4HEPREPAREDNESSCONTINUUM

:KHQPDGHWRµ¿W¶LQWRDQLQVWLWXWLRQDODQG¿QDQFLQJarchitecture that is bifurcated between humanitarian and GHYHORSPHQWDFWLYLWLHVWKHFRQWLQXXPEHFRPHVGLVMRLQWHGThe international community faces a challenge: to continue µIHHGLQJ¶WKHELIXUFDWHGV\VWHPRUWRDOWHUDQGWUDQVIRUPLWIRUthe better. To split preparedness activities in two would simply be to recreate the humanitarian/development divide. This is problematic because the short- and long-term aspects of preparedness are necessarily interlinked, as the concept of resilience indicates. However, to bring together preparedness activities as a discrete set of concerns risks creating (yet) another silo. This is further complicated by the uneven level of attention that is given to some types of shocks and stresses over others. For instance, while preparedness for QDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVLVZHOODUWLFXODWHGWKRXJKnot necessarily funded), there is a dearth of analysis on SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWDQGRQWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQWKHWZR

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CCA fundsAdaptation Fund, PPCR, LDCF

Flash appeals

-APPINGTHECOREFUNDINGTOOLSMECHANISMSFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9

Key messages

Ɣ Emergency preparedness activities work in tandem with one another to create a holistic system, and span what is conventionally understood to be the bifurcation between development and humanitarian action.

Ɣ There remains a lack of connection between strategic HQJDJHPHQWVZLWKIUDJLOHVWDWHVDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGrelated disaster risk.

Emergency preparedness in context: THEARCHITECTURE7KHLQWHQWLRQDOO\LOOXVWUDWLYH¿JXUHRQWKHSUHYLRXVpage indicates broad trends in the kinds of emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVWKDWHDFKRIWKHPDLQ¿QDQFLQJtools/mechanisms supports. In practice, the combination of tools and mechanisms present in each country GLIIHUVJUHDWO\$W¿UVWJODQFHWKH¿JXUHPD\LPSO\that preparedness is adequately supported by various mechanisms. In reality, not all mechanisms are present in every country, leaving gaps in the availability of funding. Moreover, not all mechanisms willingly support emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGWKRVHWKDWGRPD\VXSSRUWRQO\VSHFL¿Fsectors or types of preparedness interventions, creating a GLVMRLQWHGDQGIUDFWXUHGV\VWHP

3UMMARYOFTHEKEYlNANCINGMECHANISMS

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF): Despite guidance that states clearly that the fund does not cover preparedness, a narrow range of preparedness activities KDYHEHHQ¿QDQFHGPRVWQRWDEO\KHDOWKUHODWHGRUIRUstockpiling and warehousing.

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs): The least regulated of humanitarian funds, most ERFs do not fund emergency preparedness. Where this has occured, KRZHYHUWKLVLVKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQFRQWH[WDQGXVXDOO\limited to community level activities.

Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs): Closely connected to consolidated appeals, CHFs have funded a range of emergency preparedness activities across the PRUHµKXPDQLWDULDQ¶SDUWRIWKHFRQWLQXXPFRQWLQJHQF\UHVSRQVHSODQQLQJWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHVHPHUJHQF\services/standby arrangements, pre-positioning, information management and communication systems.

Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP): Many appeals DGGUHVVSUHSDUHGQHVVDVDWKHPHDQGRI¿FLDOJXLGDQFHnow includes preparedness as a priority. Activities ¿QDQFHGDUHVRPHZKDWEURDGHUWKDQRWKHULQVWUXPHQWVLQFOXGLQJHDUO\ZDUQLQJDQGKD]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVlegislative frameworks, inter-agency coordination, contingency/response planning, community preparedness, training opportunities and stockpiling.

UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF): Emergency preparedness features across a wide range of larger initiatives funded by the CPR TTF, including in areas of disaster risk reduction '55FRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQDQGHDUO\UHFRYHU\$FWLYLWLHV¿QDQFHGUDQJHIURPLPSURYLQJOHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUNVthrough to crisis coordination.

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR))RFXVLQJH[FOXVLYHO\RQGLVDVWHUULVN*)'55undertakes emergency preparedness activities, usually as SDUWRIDEURDGHUSDFNDJHRIZRUN7KLVLQFOXGHVKD]DUGand risk analysis, community-based preparedness, early warning systems, information management systems and legislative work.

Adaptation Fund: Preparedness activities supported by WKHIXQG±ZKHUHWKH\H[LVW±DUHSDUWRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQREMHFWLYHV7KH\DUHDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\IRUKD]DUGPDSSLQJDQGHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPVIURPQDWLRQDOdown to local levels.

Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Focusing on adaptation needs of least developed countries, the /'&)¿QDQFHVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKDQDUURZUDQJHRIDFWLYLWLHVHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPVKD]DUGrisk analysis and information/communication systems.

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR): Its work focuses on the integration of climate risk and resilience into development planning. Emergency preparedness DFWLYLWLHVDUHFKDOOHQJLQJWRGUDZRXWRIODUJHUSURMHFWVbut where they appear, they are focused on early warning, information management, countrywide planning and legislative work.

Key messages

Ɣ )LQDQFLQJDFURVVWKHµSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXXP¶QHHGVWREHFRRUGLQDWHG,QUHDOLW\ZKHQPDGHWRµ¿W¶LQWRWKHH[LVWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDODQG¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHWKHFRQWLQXXPEHFRPHVIUDFWXUHGDQGGLVMRLQWHG

Ɣ 1RQHRIWKHPHFKDQLVPVH[DPLQHGDGHTXDWHO\¿QDQFHVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFURVVWKHµSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXXP¶DQGIHZKDYHWKHQHFHVVDU\geographical reach to address priorities globally.

,ESSONSFROMlVECOUNTRY case studies+RZSUHSDUHGQHVVLV¿QDQFHGIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRXUFHVYDULHVFRQVLGHUDEO\DFURVVWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVH[DPLQHG+DLWL0\DQPDU1LJHUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQG6XGDQ,WUHÀHFWVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHFXUUHQWFRQWH[WVRIGHYHORSPHQWJRYHUQDQFHDQGULVNDQGLQHDFKFDVHWKHDLGSUR¿OHis heavily shaped by both current and past events. In VRPHFRQWH[WVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHLQYROYLQJFRQÀLFWWKHinternational community is called upon to do much PRUHWKDQLWPLJKWRWKHUZLVHGRIXO¿OOLQJWKHUROHDQGresponsibilities of national authorities that may be in one ZD\RURWKHUSDUW\WRWKDWFRQÀLFW

CERF7KHUHDUHLVRODWHGH[DPSOHVRISUHSDUHGQHVVactivities being funded, but this is largely ad hoc and KHDYLO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHLQGLYLGXDOFRQWH[W

ERFs2IWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV(5)VDUHSUHVHQWonly in Myanmar and Haiti. Evidence shows that funds have been allocated to support preparedness activities in +DLWLODUJHO\IRUFKROHUDUHODWHGSURMHFWV

CHFs7KHUHLVQR&+)LQ0\DQPDU1LJHUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVor Haiti. In Sudan, a CHF has provided preparedness ¿QDQFLQJWKURXJKPDQ\VHFWRUSULRULWLHVWKRXJKLWLVQRWlabelled as such.

Consolidated Appeal Process: Preparedness is found LQ81DSSHDOVEXWDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\ZLWKLQFRQVROLGDWHGappeals. Having an appeal that includes preparedness as a core element does not guarantee funding.

GFDRR: Funding for preparedness has been received in the Philippines and Haiti, in support of the more developmental part of the preparedness continuum.

CPR TTF: Financing for preparedness is found in four of WKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV,WLQFOXGHVDUDUHH[DPSOHRIDPHFKDQLVPIXQGLQJFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQRIZKLFKDportion is believed to be for preparedness.

&OLPDWHDGDSWDWLRQÀQDQFLQJ$GDSWDWLRQ)XQG/'&)PPCR):KHUHDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJIHDWXUHVWKHUHLVevidence that it supports the developmental aspects of HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV±WKLVLVHYLGHQWLQ1LJHUDQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV7KLVLVRQO\IRUDUHDVthat climate risk shares with risk management in general.

In-country bilateral funding (humanitarian and development): Financing from in-country donors occurs LQDOO¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVEXWLWLVKLJKO\YDULDEOHDQGKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRQWH[W

&RXQWU\VSHFLÀFÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV: Heavily GHSHQGHQWRQFRQWH[WLQVRPHFDVHVFRXQWU\VSHFL¿F

mechanisms fund emergency preparedness activities, but RQO\DVSDUWRIDZLGHUVHWRIREMHFWLYHV

Core and multi-use funding&RUHIXQGLQJLVGLI¿FXOWto track, with few institutions or agencies separating out emergency preparedness investments. Where there is evidence, preparedness is largely supported through the XVHRIH[LVWLQJKXPDQUHVRXUFHVRIWHQSDUWRIDEURDGHUprogramme of work.

The Red Cross: Both the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are heavily involved in emergency preparedness in the case study countries, PRVWRIWHQXWLOLVLQJWKH5HG&URVV1DWLRQDO6RFLHWLHVWKDWH[LVWLQHDFKFRXQWU\DVLPSOHPHQWLQJSDUWQHUV

Multilateral banks0XOWLODWHUDOEDQNV¶LQYHVWPHQWVLQrisk management for disasters tend to mirror international engagement in general. Where risk management is high on the agenda, so it is for the banks, often informing their country assistance strategies.

Private sector: Private sector investment in preparedness LVOLPLWHG±IRUYDULRXVGLIIHUHQWUHDVRQV±LQ6XGDQ0\DQPDUDQG1LJHU0RVWHYLGHQFHLVIRXQGLQWKHPhilippines and, increasingly, in Haiti.

Evidence from the case studies reveals that emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVUHJXODUO\µIDOOVWKURXJKWKHFUDFNV¶LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH±DFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHIUDJPHQWHGDLGV\VWHP7KLVUHÀHFWVDV\VWHPWKDWhas been grappling with a rapidly changing set of risks WRZKLFKLWLVH[SHFWHGWRUHVSRQGDQGRID¿QDQFLQJarchitecture that has failed to evolve at the same pace. ,QYHVWPHQWLQV\VWHPVSURFHVVHVDQGSURMHFWVIRUemergency preparedness by national and international actors occurs in discrete, concentrated efforts. Yet coverage of all the requirements falls far short of need. Inadequate HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVQRWMXVWDERXWWKHYROXPHRIIXQGLQJ$FURVVHDFKFDVHVWXG\FRQWH[WWKHUHLVDODFNRIa shared vision or plan of action that would articulate risks, needs, responsibilities, programmes and activities (with connections to national plans and systems). And, despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness still FRDOHVFHVDURXQGWKHH[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHUDWKHUWKDQWDUJHWLQJµQHHG¶RUUHVSRQGLQJWRµULVN¶

Despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness still coalesces around the existing !nancing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk’


11

1DWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVKRZHYHUDSSHDUWRKDYHDrational and logical approach to preparedness (if FRQÀLFWVLWXDWLRQVDUHH[FOXGHG,QDOORIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVH[FHSW6XGDQHYHQZKHQRYHUDOOIXQGLQJLVlow, national governments are delivering legislation and policy for creating an adequate system and processes for disaster preparedness, usually as part of a long-term set of DRR measures. However, needs obviously remain, and arguably these could be prioritised by the international system. Technical capacity-building, some of which is already under way, is needed even in the most SRVLWLYHRIFRQWH[WVLHWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDVWKHUHFHQWDQGGHYDVWDWLQJ7\SKRRQ+DL\DQKLJKOLJKWV7RDQH[WHQWDOWKRXJKWKHFRQWH[WVDUHYHU\GLIIHUHQW+DLWLDQG1LJHUare in similar need of support for long-term preparedness. In Sudan and Myanmar, there is much to be done to get HYHQWKHEDVLFVRIµSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUUHVSRQVH¶XSDQGrunning, and the reasons are largely the same in both FRQWH[WVWKRXJKLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VWKHFKDOOHQJHRIDLG¿QDQFLQJLQJHQHUDODQGWKHKHDY\IRFXVRQKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJ5HFHQWHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\KDVVRPHZD\WRJRWRSULRULWLVH¿QDQFLQJin the right places in terms of risk, need or bolstering domestic capacity.

Key messages

Ɣ Financing for emergency preparedness is complicated, fragmented and piecemeal, especially the international contribution, with an array of separate institutions, mechanisms and approaches determining which parts of the preparedness continuum are funded, and in what ways.

Ɣ 'HVSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWFKDOOHQJHVQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVappear to have a much more rational and logical DSSURDFKWR¿QDQFLQJIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGpreparedness.

Ɣ Evidence suggests that the bulk of international IXQGLQJ±ZKHUHLWLVDYDLODEOH±LVQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWKbuilding the long-term capacity of national systems of preparedness but is reinforcing a piecemeal and SURMHFWOHGDSSURDFK

4HEBUSINESSCASEFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS.IGERANDBEYONDIn a changing political and economic landscape, a risk-based approach to development and humanitarian work RIIHUVVLJQL¿FDQWSRWHQWLDOWRXVHRI¿FLDOGHYHORSPHQWassistance (ODA) to great effect. A risk-based approach DOLJQVZLWKWKHUHFHQWWUHQGLQµUHVLOLHQFH¶DQGZLWKeconomic analyses that build the evidence base for why H[DQWHLQYHVWPHQWDQGDFWLRQDUHFRVWHIIHFWLYH<HWWKLVLVQRWMXVWDQDJHQGDIRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\$more risk-informed approach to development, and the

ambition to pursue sustainable development, require national ownership and responsibility for preparedness. 7KLVQHFHVVLWDWHVLPSURYHGQDWLRQDO¿VFDOSROLF\allocations to preparedness in budgetary processes DQGLPSURYHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOcontributions required. International efforts must focus on building the capacity of national actors to prepare for all KD]DUGVQDWXUDORUPDQPDGH

#OSTBENElTANALYSISFOR.IGER

$FRVWEHQH¿WDQGFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVVDQDO\VLVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHUSURYLGHGLQGLFDWLYHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHUHLVDFOHDU¿QDQFLDOLPSHUDWLYHIRUJUHDWHUinvestment in effective preparedness in the country. The PRQHWDU\EHQH¿WVRILQYHVWLQJLQSUHSDUHGQHVVLQUHODWLRQWRGURXJKW±DVVXPLQJWKDWLVLWLPSOHPHQWHGLQDPDQQHUWKDWGHOLYHUVWKHH[SHFWHGJDLQV±FOHDUO\RXWZHLJKWKHFRVWV7KLVVXJJHVWVDFOHDU¿GXFLDU\GXW\RQWKHSDUWRIGRQRUVDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWRI1LJHU*R1WRIRFXVPRUHVXSSRUWon emergency preparedness.

7KH*R1¶V$QQXDO6XSSRUW3ODQ3ODQGH6RXWLHQ) estimates overall needs for food security and nutrition DVVLVWDQFHUHODWHGWRDOOKD]DUGVDOORFDWLQJDQDYHUDJHRIPLOOLRQSHU\HDURYHUWKHVL[\HDUVEHWZHHQDQG,QWKH3ODQGH6RXWLHQ estimated the cost of emergency preparedness at $14.1 million, equivalent WRDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHWRWDOFRVWVHVWLPDWHGIRUWKDW\HDU,QDGGLWLRQE\$SULOWKHFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVWRRGDWPLOOLRQ:LWKQHHGVLQ1LJHURQDVWDJJHULQJVFDOHWKHEHQH¿WVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVare of heightened importance.

The cost of emergency preparedness meanwhile is described in both the 3ODQGH6RXWLHQDQGD*R1ÀRRGrisk management plan, with the total estimated cost of emergency preparedness at $47.9 million per year. The FRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVZHUHLQSXWLQWRD\HDUPRGHOWRestimate the costs of emergency preparedness compared ZLWKWKHEHQH¿WVPRQHWLVHGLQWHUPVRIDYRLGHGFRVWVof aid and disaster losses. Because of the number of assumptions required in the modelling, three scenarios were modelled, varying the assumptions around the absolute level of disaster losses, the potential reduction in disaster losses and the discount rate.

7KHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVDUHSRVLWLYHDFURVVDOOVFHQDULRVIn the most conservative scenario, it is estimated that

International efforts must focus on building the capacity of national actors to prepare for all hazards, natural or man-made

12

RIEHQH¿WLVJHQHUDWHGIRUHYHU\VSHQWDQGWKLVLQFUHDVHVDVKLJKDVRIEHQH¿WIRUHYHU\VSHQWLQWKHOHDVWFRQVHUYDWLYH7KH¿QGLQJVFOHDUO\VXSSRUWfurther investment in emergency preparedness activities, DVWKHEHQH¿WVLQWHUPVRIUHGXFHGFDVHORDGVDQGGLVDVWHUlosses far outweigh the costs.

Key messages

Ɣ 7KHEHQH¿WWRFRVWUDWLRVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHUDUHYHU\SRVLWLYHUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHVFHQDULRbeing used.

Ɣ Findings support further investment in emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDVWKHEHQH¿WVIDURXWZHLJKthe costs in terms of reduced caseloads, unit costs of response and disaster losses.

Ɣ (YLGHQFHLVVWLOOODFNLQJRQWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRIemergency preparedness, and so what we know of the value of emergency preparedness represents only a fraction of what preparedness could offer.

5NDERSTANDINGWHATMAKESFOREFFECTIVElNANCINGOFEMERGENCYpreparedness7KHDVVXPSWLRQLVPLVSODFHGWKDW¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVIXQFWLRQH[DFWO\DVWKH\ZHUHGHVLJQHGWR(YLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVDQGWKHDGGLWLRQDOEDFNJURXQGSDSHUVproduced for this study reveals differences in the way that ¿QDQFLQJWRROVDQGPHFKDQLVPVRSHUDWHDWWKHFRXQWU\OHYHO7KHUHDUHDOVRLVVXHVWKDWDUHQRWVWULFWO\¿QDQFLDOEXWZKLFKimpact on adequate emergency preparedness:

Semantics'H¿QLWLRQVDQGPHDQLQJVRINH\HPHUJHQF\preparedness terms are not shared across the different actors.

Knowledge of risk7KHUHLVRIWHQDODFNRIMRLQHGXSunderstanding of all risks. Much is known, but often this NQRZOHGJHLVµSDUFHOOHGRXW¶DPRQJVWSDUWLFXODUDFWRUVwithin their own sectors.

National systems: Government frameworks and institutions for risk management are weak and lack capacity and clear policy directives.

International architecture: Emergency preparedness is either oriented towards emergencies, humanitarian DFWRUVKXPDQLWDULDQGRQRUVDQGWRDQH[WHQWKXPDQLWDULDQmechanisms, or divided into humanitarian/development µDUHDV¶ZLWKRXWDGHTXDWHFRRUGLQDWLRQ([LVWLQJFRRUGLQDWLQJstructures are struggling to address the full range of needs.

Planning: There is a lack of a systematic approach and of SODQQLQJQRWMXVWIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVEXWIRUULVNPDQDJHPHQWRYHUDOO1RFDVHVWXG\FRXQWU\DSSURDFKHVthe range of emergency preparedness activities comprehensively.

Roles and responsibilities: These are often unclear, especially amongst the international community.

International capacity: There is a lack of capacity internationally to coordinate risk management issues, especially when part of long-term development.

Key messages

Ɣ The entrenched, bifurcated donor government structure KDVFRQWULEXWHGWRHVWDEOLVKLQJDQDUWL¿FLDOGLYLGHEHWZHHQGHYHORSPHQWDQGKXPDQLWDULDQFRPPXQLWLHVERWKSURYLGHDSDUWLDOVROXWLRQWRLPSURYHG¿QDQFLQJRIemergency preparedness.

Ɣ Simply increasingly volumes of funding for SUHSDUHGQHVVZLOOQRWRYHUFRPHWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOFKDOOHQJHVLGHQWL¿HGDQG±DVWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHVVXJJHVWV±PD\DGGFRQIXVLRQWRDQalready complicated preparedness picture.

Recommendations: a set of options FORCHANGE:KLOHDQ\PHFKDQLVPFDQEHDGMXVWHGWRLQFOXGHDJUHDWHUfocus on emergency preparedness (either solely or as SDUWRIDZLGHUUDQJLQJVHULHVRIREMHFWLYHVWKLVGRHVQRWmean that all of them should be. Careful consideration is needed of the investment required to make changes to FXUUHQWPRGHOVZKLFKPHDQVPRUHWKDQMXVWµDUWL¿FLDOO\¶H[SDQGLQJDPDQGDWHRUDJHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSHWRDGGUHVVpreparedness needs. The analysis found:

Ɣ +XPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROVDUHQRWDµVLOYHUEXOOHW¶WR¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVThe CERF, ERFs, CHFs and successor to the CAP, the Strategic Response Plan, all offer varied possibilities, but also face a number of constraints to EHWWHU¿QDQFLQJ

Ɣ Climate adaptation funds offer considerable potential IRUH[SDQGLQJLQWRPRUHVSHFL¿FSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJ7KHUHDUHVKDUHGZHDNQHVVHVWRRKRZHYHUnone of the funds supports preparedness for non-FOLPDWHUHODWHGULVNVRUFRQÀLFW

In the most conservative scenario, it is estimated that $3.25 of bene!t is generated for every $1 spent, and this increases as high as $5.31 of bene!t for every $1 spent in the least conservative


13

Ɣ 7KHWZRPHFKDQLVPVZLWKDVSHFL¿FIRFXVRQULVN*)'55DQG81'3&3577)SHUIRUPVWURQJO\RQthe questions formulated by the research team to GHWHUPLQHWKHµEHVW¿W¶PHFKDQLVPIRU¿QDQFLQJWKXVZDUUDQWLQJIXUWKHUH[SORUDWLRQ

7KLVUHSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDUHEURNHQGRZQLQWRIRXUelements.

%XPANSIONWHEREITMAKESSENSE@NOREGREToptions

There is much that can be achieved within the current system WRLPSURYHWKH¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWKDWdoes not require radical overhauls of practice and policy. On balance, there is considerable potential for improving the scope of all of the core mechanisms and tools.

Ɣ Emergency Response Funds: opportunities should be PD[LPLVHGWRLQFOXGHSUHSDUHGQHVVLQWKH(5)VDVSDUWand parcel of good humanitarian practice.

Ɣ Common Humanitarian Funds: preparedness should be a fundamental part of the work of CHFs, and HVWDEOLVKHGZLWKLQHDFKQHZDQGH[LVWLQJVHWRIIXQGguidelines.

Ɣ The Central Emergency Response Fund: the inclusion of preparedness should not be inhibited where the case KDVEHHQHIIHFWLYHO\PDGHEXWWKH&(5)¶VIRFXVRQOLIHsaving response should be maintained.

Ɣ Agencies should actively utilise other resources in-country for emergency preparedness.

-AXIMISINGOPPORTUNITIESANENHANCEDsystem

,PSURYHPHQWVWRH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVDUHQRWVXI¿FLHQWWKH\ZLOOHYHQLIDOOLPSOHPHQWHGRQO\SDWFKRYHUH[LVWLQJFUDFNVLQ¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV(OHPHQWVof the current system can (and should) be pushed beyond WKHLUFXUUHQWFRPIRUW]RQHZLWKVWHSVWDNHQWRHQVXUHWKDWpreparedness becomes a core component of all relevant mechanisms managed by the international community.

Ɣ Strategic Response Plans: all plans should be multi-year, and take heed of the latest guidance to include preparedness in longer-term frameworks.

Ɣ 5LVNIRFXVHGÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV: emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGEHPDGHDQH[SOLFLWJRDORIDOOcountry programming.

Ɣ Climate change adaptation mechanisms: all climate FKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJPXVWEHLQWHJUDWHGZLWKLQDZLGHUDSSUHFLDWLRQRIULVNVLQHDFKFRXQWU\FRQWH[W

Ɣ Pilot Program for Climate ResilienceWKHH[LVWLQJentry points to fund emergency preparedness should EHPD[LPLVHGWKURXJKSURMHFWVWKDWUHODWHWRFOLPDWHservices, disaster/climate risk reduction and community preparedness.

Ɣ Least Developed Countries Fund: funding should be used to support emergency preparedness activities where they have been (or could be) included in 1DWLRQDO$GDSWDWLRQ3URJUDPPHVRI$FWLRQ1$3$V)XWXUH1$3$VVKRXOGKDYHDQREOLJDWRU\HPHUJHQF\preparedness component.

Ɣ Adaptation Fund: the already close thematic relationship between the Adaptation Fund and emergency preparedness should be built upon by making the connections systematic.

4RANSFORMATIONALCHANGESOLUTIONSBEYONDTHECURRENTSYSTEM

:KLOHWKHUHDUHDGYDQWDJHVWRHQKDQFLQJH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVWKLVUHSRUWDUJXHVWKDWEROVWHULQJH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWDQGDWWKHYHU\OHDVWDJOREDOsolution must be considered. Either an enhancement of *)'55RUWKH&3577)LVUHFRPPHQGHGH[SDQGLQJWKHUHPLWRIWKHLUZRUNLQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVRU±WKHSUHIHUUHGRSWLRQ±WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDGHGLFDWHGmechanism. The rationale for a global solution is as follows:

Ɣ Decisions to engage with a particular country are not always determined by an adequate assessment of risk RUQHHGVRPHFRXQWULHVFDQEHµOHIWEHKLQG¶

Ɣ &RXQWU\OHYHO¿QDQFLQJLVLQDGHTXDWH1RWDOOFRXQWULHVhave enough donors present in-country to adequately engage with emergency preparedness needs. Capacity to engage with donors directly, either regionally or globally, is limited in many cases.

Ɣ ([LVWLQJIXQGVZKHWKHUDWFRXQWU\OHYHOPRVWRIWHQhumanitarian, though in some cases bespoke to that FRQWH[WRUDWJOREDOOHYHOGRQRWWDUJHWSUHSDUHGQHVVVSHFL¿FDOO\

Ɣ As evidence from across the case studies reveals, funding LVµVLORHG¶ZLWKOLPLWVWRWKHIHDVLELOLW\DQGZLOOLQJQHVVRIindividual fund managers to support preparedness.

Elements of the current system can (and should) be pushed beyond their current comfort zone, with steps taken to ensure that preparedness becomes a core component of all relevant mechanisms managed by the international community

14

In essence, if all we do is improve the preparedness IRFXVRIH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVQRPDWWHUKRZJRRGWKDWLVkey questions will always remain. How will underfunded preparedness needs be met? How will priorities across countries be determined? Who will take charge of tackling WKHQHJOHFWRIFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVV"$JOREDOIXQGmeanwhile could, if designed and directed appropriately, prioritise funding across a range of countries, and PDNHGHFLVLRQVDVWRWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHFRQWH[WVIRUH[WHUQDOVXSSRUW,WFRXOGUDLVHWKHSUR¿OHRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness as an issue for donors and agencies alike, in a way that any country-based fund is simply unable to do. It could also pilot a new way of working and thinking, seeking funds drawn from both development and humanitarian funding streams, where a holistic all-risk approach to emergency preparedness is pursued.

$ONORGOVERNMENTSTHECASEFORDEVELOPMENTlNANCING

Donor governments should consider a range of actions to address the current preparedness challenges with, throughout, an emphasis on bringing development ¿QDQFLQJWREHDURQXQGHUO\LQJULVN

Ɣ Re-assess global and country programming priorities. Investment in preparedness should be based on a global assessment of risk, related to capacity and vulnerability, QHHGDQGH[SRVXUH6XFKDQDVVHVVPHQWZRXOGDOORZfor a concentration of efforts where the need is greatest.

Ɣ (QVXUHWKDWULVNLVQRWMXVWSDUWRIKXPDQLWDULDQand crisis-related structures, but also becomes the foundation for development investments.

A set of options for future funding of emergency preparedness

Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options

Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system

Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system

There is considerable potential LQPD[LPLVLQJWKHXVHRIH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVIRU¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness more effectively.

These opportunities will entail considerably more effort from the international system in order to be achieved.

This represents a considerable change in the way that emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVLV¿QDQFHGZLWKDQHZGHGLFDWHGDSSURDFKDQG¿QDQFLQJsourced beyond the system.

%ROVWHUH[LVWLQJKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVVRWKDWopportunities for funding emergency preparedness are continually sought ±LQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOHZLWKLQWKHCHFs, ERFs and CERF.

GFDRR to make preparedness a priority action within all its selected countries.

CPR TTF to prioritise preparedness within its priority countries when it makes new grants.

All agencies should investigate how they can utilise other resources for emergency preparedness where they are most appropriate.

Multi-year Strategic Response Plans (SRPs) should be obligatory across SURWUDFWHGFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHV

All new humanitarian mechanisms to include a consideration of preparedness, and this should be UHÀHFWHGLQWKHUHOHYDQWVHWXSpolicy documentation and guidelines LQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOHLQ653V

Climate change adaptation ¿QDQFLQJWREHLPSOHPHQWHGLQways which support a broader preparedness system for risk, including improvement for the PPCR, Adaptation Fund and LDCF.

6LJQL¿FDQWO\HQKDQFHHLWKHURIWKHH[LVWLQJULVNIRFXVHGJOREDOmechanisms: GFDRR or CPR TTF.

Or:

Create a new global pooled funding mechanism.

Beyond the system: enhanced support for preparedness through private sector and remittances.

Donor support for preparedness

6XSSRUWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKRXWDQGJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHWKHUROHRIGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJ


Ɣ )OH[LEOH¿QDQFLQJVKRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHGDVDPHDQVto support more tailored and adaptable preparedness interventions. Evidence from across the case studies UHYHDOVWKHQHHGWRDFFRPPRGDWHÀXFWXDWLRQVLQFRQWH[WZKHWKHUFRQGLWLRQVRIFRQÀLFWIUDJLOLW\RUULVN7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVH[DPSOHVZKHUHHOHPHQWVRISUHSDUHGQHVVDUHZRUNLQJVXFFHVVIXOO\±HJHDUO\ZDUQLQJEDVHGRQDVVHVVPHQWRIULVN±EXWZKHUHDODFNRIÀH[LELOLW\LQH[LVWLQJIXQGLQJOLPLWVDFRXQWU\¶Vability to prepare.

Ɣ Proactive internal advocacy within donor countries, institutions and multi-donor groups is required to ensure that preparedness is part of funding decisions. 9RFDOVXSSRUWFDQEHVXVWDLQHGLQEURDGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOdebates only with the backing of key donors. It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that emergency preparedness can have for their own caseloads in terms of effectiveness and HI¿FLHQF\LQFOXGLQJYDOXHIRUPRQH\DFURVVERWKhumanitarian and development departments.

Ɣ Consideration should be given to earmarking funding for emergency preparedness, whether from humanitarian or development sources. The most important advantages of earmarking are that it guarantees some level of funding and that it commits a donor to change. However, on the whole this is not recommended unless a much better global understanding of need can be articulated.

Ɣ Emergency preparedness is an inherent part of UHVLOLHQFHPDNLQJWKHUHVLOLHQFHDJHQGDRSHUDWLRQDOshould entail an adequate focus on preparedness. It is recommended that emergency preparedness be embedded into current and future indicators of what makes for a resilient system.

Key messages

Ɣ Much can be done to improve the way that the LQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP¿QDQFHVSUHSDUHGQHVVIURPµQRUHJUHW¶LQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJHVWRDQHQKDQFHGsystem, through to considerable institutional review µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOFKDQJH¶

Ɣ Incremental changes to current mechanisms will leave gaps. This report recommends the establishment of a global fund for preparedness: either an enhanced *)'55RU81'3&3577)RUDOWHUQDWLYHO\DQHZdedicated fund.

Ɣ More dedicated funding for preparedness should not UHVXOWLQWKHµH[WUDFWLRQ¶RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIURPH[LVWLQJSURFHVVHVV\VWHPVDQGDSSURDFKHV

Ɣ Donors can and should do more to address preparedness through the system and within their own spending priorities: development funding for emergency preparedness is seen as an essential way forward.

#ONCLUSIONPREPARINGFORTHEFORESEEABLEFUTURE,QPRYLQJWRZDUGVDSRVWHUDZLWKHYLGHQFHpointing towards a world in which disasters are even more IUHTXHQWWKDQWRGD\WKHFHQWUDOLW\RIµULVN¶LVEHFRPLQJDQessential component of all development and humanitarian work. Beyond the rhetoric, at some point real progress is required. This means making a decision that will cost something, either in terms of political effort, bureaucratic FKDQJHVRU¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV7LQNHULQJDURXQGWKHHGJHVZLWKH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVLVQRWHQRXJKWKHcountry case studies undertaken as part of this research have proved that. While increased support will cost in WKHLPPHGLDWHWHUP¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVactivities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response and the pressures on the humanitarian

system, while transferring responsibility to national actors. Risk therefore needs to be embedded in national and international planning and budgetary frameworks.

Cost is not limited to the way that we fund. It is also about how much is funded. Increasing the necessary commitment to emergency preparedness clearly requires a coherent business case built on solid incentives and a calculation of the return on investment, something that draws upon PHWKRGVVXFKDVFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLVHFRQRPLFVRIpreparedness and robust, clear messaging. This business FDVHVKRXOGEHWLHGGLUHFWO\WRFDOOVIRUVSHFL¿FEXGJHWVto support emergency preparedness (as well as risk management in general) from national resource allocations. Moreover, the international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable and functioning national preparedness systems. )RUH[DPSOHKRZPXFKKDVLWFRVWGHYHORSHGFRXQWU\JRYHUQPHQWVLQDWULVNDUHDVHJ-DSDQWKH86*HUPDQ\or Australia) to comprehensively prepare? How does this compare with what is being invested by developing country governments and their international partners?

In advocating for emergency preparedness, as part and parcel of a risk-based approach to international aid, DµQRUHJUHW¶QDUUDWLYHVKRXOGEHDGRSWHG(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVKDVUHOHYDQFHQRWMXVWIRUKXPDQLWDULDQV

The international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable and functioning national preparedness systems

16

In the medium to long term, it will almost certainly save PRQH\OLYHVDQGOLYHOLKRRGV7KH¿QDQFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKHUHIRUHQHHGVWREHVKRXOGHUHGE\DOO¿UVWO\E\QDWLRQDOstakeholders and governments, and supported by both international humanitarian and development actors. Taking this agenda forward will require continued efforts on the part of the IASC and engaged stakeholders to translate the recommendations of this report into action.

-OVINGTHEAGENDAFORWARDADVANCINGemergency preparedness

Ɣ Deliver the recommendations contained in this report, secure commitment on the part of representatives to formulate a plan of campaign to address the changes required, including ensuring recommendations on mechanism change feeding into all key debates.

Ɣ /HDUQLQJIURPWKHH[SHULHQFHVRIWKH3ROLWLFDOChampions for Disaster Resilience group, a high-SURÀOHFKDPSLRQshould be designated to be responsible for promoting action on preparedness.

Ɣ Reach out to the international system working on FRQÀLFW0DNHGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWKWKH'$&,QWHUQDWLRQDO1HWZRUNRQ&RQÀLFWDQG)UDJLOLW\,1&$)DQGLQÀXHQFHthe New Deal for Fragile States.

Ɣ In discussions on post-2015 development goals, communicate clear messages on the value of SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUGLVDVWHUVDQGFRQÀLFWDQGWKHlinks between the two. Ensure stronger inclusion of emergency preparedness in the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action.

Ɣ In preparation for the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, advocate for emergency preparedness to be included as a central component of one of the four thematic areas. Advocacy is needed for emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVWREHSDUWRIWKH¿QDORoad Map and Plan of Action for Post-2016.

Ɣ ,QSUHSDUDWLRQIRUWKHWKVHVVLRQConference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Lima, Peru, preparedness should be integral to actions required to support climate change adaptation across vulnerable and high-risk FRQWH[WV

Ɣ Risk needs to be embedded in international planning and budgetary frameworks. The potential FRVWEHQH¿WRILQYHVWLQJLQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVacross all sectors should be calculated, informed by a comprehensive assessment of risk, vulnerability, H[SRVXUHDQGFDSDFLW\

Agencies engaged in bilateral relationships with national governments should emphasise the importance of risk in all humanitarian and development work. Where national ÀVFDOSODQQLQJSROLF\DQGEXGJHWDU\SURFHVVHV are being crafted, preparedness for risk must be embedded.

Ensuring practical connections: RECOMMENDATIONSBEYONDTHEPURELYlNANCIAL

(IIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQW¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVQRWMXVWD¿QDQFLDOLVVXH7KHUHVHDUFKteam recommend the following supporting enhancements to the system:

Ɣ Clear guidance should be developed for the adequate FRGLQJWUDFNLQJDQGUHSRUWLQJ of investments in emergency preparedness.

Ɣ The IASC Principals should support the roll-out of the Common Framework for Emergency Preparedness and related work of the Sub-Working Group for Preparedness.

Ɣ Systematically integrate emergency preparedness within the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)PDNLQJXVHRIH[LVWLQJJXLGHOLQHVRQ'55CCA. The positive role that the Common Budgetary Framework can play in highlighting (and funding) gaps in preparedness should be investigated.

Key messages

Ɣ ,QWKHIXWXUHGLVDVWHUVZLOOEHPRUHIUHTXHQWWKDQWRGD\WKHFHQWUDOLW\RIµULVN¶LVWKXVDQHVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQWof all development and humanitarian work and its LQFOXVLRQLQWKHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDLVparamount.

Ɣ While increased support will cost in the immediate WHUP¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVKDVenormous potential to reduce the costs of response.

Ɣ A new international consensus and compact are required between national governments and the international community on the need for countries to be better prepared.

Ɣ 7KH,$6&PXVWVHL]HRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRDGYDQFHSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKDKLJKSUR¿OHFKDPSLRQUHVSRQVLEOHfor ensuring that the cause does not ‘fall off the DJHQGD¶VXSSRUWHGE\DQDSSURSULDWHDJHQF\RU IASC structure.


1. Emergency preparedness THECURRENTSTATEOFPLAY

Key messages

1. Emergency preparedness: THECURRENTSTATEOFPLAY

Ɣ7KHXOWLPDWHJRDOVKRXOGEHFRPSUHKHQVLYHQDWLRQDOV\VWHPVRISUHSDUHGQHVVFDSDEOHof responding to the range of risks they face.

ƔHumanitarians can only be effective if they are prepared. Investment in preparedness activities must come before a crisis takes hold. The current system ‘puts the cart before WKHKRUVH¶±IXQGLQJLVODUJHO\DOORFDWHGWRSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVRQO\DIWHUDGLVDVWHUstrikes.

ƔFunding for emergency preparedness is highly fragmented, with unequal and uneven coverage of the range of activities needed to develop sustainable preparedness systems.

ƔDevelopment approaches are increasingly embracing risk management as central WRSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQKXPDQLWDULDQVQHHGWRPRYHDZD\IURPEHLQJµFULVLVILJKWHUV¶WRµV\VWHPDWLFULVNPDQDJHUV¶

ƔEmergency preparedness has the potential to be transformative, offering a marked FKDQJHWRH[SRVWµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶

ƔThere remains a lack of connection between strategic engagements with fragile states DQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUULVN

1.1 IntroductionThe destruction wrought by Typhoon Haiyan and the total FRVWLQWHUPVRIVKDWWHUHGOLYHVDQG¿QDQFLDOORVVDUHcolossal. Haiyan, one of the strongest storms on record, created a devastating impact usually seen only with WVXQDPLV+DUULVµ%HIRUHDQGDIWHU¶SKRWRJUDSKVDUHVLPLODUWRWKRVHZHVDZLQ$FHKDIWHUWKH,QGLDQ2FHDQtsunami: villages wiped from the landscape, communities scattered and cargo ships piled up along the coastline %%&D$VZDVVHHQEHIRUHWKHZRUOG¶VDWWHQWLRQhas now shifted from the challenge of response to the failure to prepare, and the challenge of prevention.

That this happened in the Philippines was somewhat perverse. Disaster risk is considered as a threat to national VHFXULW\DQGLVEXLOWLQWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWplanning. Politicians are sometimes not elected if they do not give prominence to disaster in their manifestos. The JRYHUQPHQWLVLQYHVWLQJKHDYLO\LQULVNUHGXFWLRQ±FORVHWRELOOLRQD\HDU.HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJ1RWHWKDWWKHprices for this report are current, when drawn from the case

studies. Prices used in tables and graphs may be different and are marked accordingly. Other prices used may refer WRUHIHUHQFHPDWHULDOZKHUHYHUSRVVLEOHWKLVLVLQGLFDWHGLQWKHWH[W$QGSHUKDSVPRUHLPSRUWDQWGLVDVWHUULVNKDVentered civil consciousness: prevention and preparation IRUWKHUHJXODULPSDFWRIW\SKRRQVODQGVOLGHVÀRRGLQJDQGearthquakes are of central importance across society.

<HWLQWKHZHHNVDIWHUWKHGLVDVWHURI¿FLDOVDGPLWWHGWRinadequate preparedness of government systems and of logistics, communications and contingency planning, and stories circulated of the failure to convert early warning into FRPSOHWHHYDFXDWLRQ0DUVKDOO2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHUHZHUHFRQVLGHUDEOHVXFFHVVHVIRUH[DPSOHFRPPXQLW\preparedness and contingency planning, coupled with early ZDUQLQJHQDEOHGDOOUHVLGHQWVRIWKHLVODQGRI7XODQJ'L\RWWRHYDFXDWHWRVDIHW\0F(OUR\

What does it mean for the international community when a developing country with arguably one of the most advanced risk management legislative frameworks, a FRPPLWWHGJRYHUQPHQWDQGVLJQL¿FDQWQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQW

19

±RQHWKDWLVRIWHQGHHPHGDVXFFHVVVWRU\±LVXQDEOHWRcomprehensively prepare? And what does this mean for RWKHUFRQWH[WV"

A key lesson from Haiyan is that emergency preparedness requires a portfolio of actions and activities integrated into a combined system. This covers everything from risk analysis and early warning through to stockpiling and training, from ensuring that the appropriate legislative HQYLURQPHQWIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVH[LVWVWKURXJKWRcontingency planning and standby arrangements. Taken together, these activities can be conceived along a continuum, from developmental through to humanitarian action. The continuum captures everything required to HQDEOHDQHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHWRFULVLV±WRGLVDVWHUVUHODWHGWRERWKQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDQGFRQÀLFWVHHVHFWLRQV±

7KHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJV\VWHPZRUNVWRVXSSRUWresponses to such crises, through mechanisms and tools such as the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) (and now its successor the Strategic Response Plan), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs), Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and through bilateral funding from donors. In some instances, funds for response are directed towards preparedness for IXWXUHHYHQWVEXWWKLVLVODUJHO\DGKRFDQGLQVXI¿FLHQWWRaddress current preparedness needs. There is evidence to suggest that preparedness activities which require sustained, longer-term engagement in-country can be funded through mechanisms concerned with risk reduction and management, such as the Global Facility for Disaster 5HGXFWLRQDQG5HFRYHU\*)'55WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV'HYHORSPHQW3URJUDPPH81'3¶V7KHPDWLF7UXVW)XQGfor Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF), individual bilateral contributions through international development EDQNVRUQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶RZQ¿VFDOFRQWULEXWLRQVThere is even some evidence that preparedness activities (at the more developmental end of the spectrum) are being IXQGHGWKURXJKFOLPDWH¿QDQFHPHFKDQLVPV<HWQRQHRIWKHVHWRROVRUPHFKDQLVPVLVRSHUDWLQJLQH[SOLFLWVXSSRUWRIstrengthening national systems of preparedness. Gaps and VKRUWFRPLQJVH[LVWDQGWKHV\VWHPDVDZKROHODFNVWKHQHFHVVDU\SURYLVLRQVWRVXSSRUWH[DQWHLHSULRUWRDFULVLVpreparedness activities. There is also a lack of understanding of how much it would cost to create a comprehensive SUHSDUHGQHVVV\VWHPLQFRXQWU\ZKDWLWPHDQVWRXQGHUWDNHSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWERWKFRQFHSWXDOO\DQGLQSUDFWLFHhow international preparedness efforts can better support WKHVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIQDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\IRUSUHSDUHGQHVVDQGwhy funding at the humanitarian end of the preparedness continuum continues to be released mostly after a crisis has hit, as part of the response budget.

Investment in preparedness seeks to reduce what appears to be an ever increasing burden on the humanitarian system, stretching it beyond its means and in some

cases its mandate, by reducing the cost of response over WKHORQJWHUP<HWWKLVLVQRWMXVWD¿QDQFLQJFKDOOHQJH*HWWLQJWKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHFRUUHFWLVDQLPSRUWDQWstarting point, but it needs to be complemented by improved coherence of preparedness efforts through more coordinated decision-making, planning and implementation. This requires a global consensus on the need to foreground risk as a way to understand how development investment decisions should be made, and KRZRI¿FLDOGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFH2'$LVVSHQWStrengthening risk-based approaches to humanitarian and development action should translate into prioritised programming and resourcing. The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face.

1.2 Preparedness in contextRisk is becoming the new mantra of our time. The latest HYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWE\XSWRPLOOLRQH[WUHPHO\SRRUSHRSOHZLOOEHOLYLQJLQPRVWKD]DUGSURQHFRXQWULHV6KHSKHUGHWDO$QGRIWKHPRVWKD]DUGSURQHFRXQWULHVIRXU±3DNLVWDQ.HQ\D6XGDQDQG(WKLRSLD±DOVRDSSHDUDPRQJVWWKHWRSUHFLSLHQWVRIKXPDQLWDULDQIXQGLQJIRU1 Risk management is becoming central to poverty reduction efforts for development actors (ibid.), and signals the need to move DZD\IURPKXPDQLWDULDQVDVµFULVLV¿JKWHUV¶WREHLQJµV\VWHPDWLFULVNPDQDJHUV¶DFFRUGLQJWR:RUOG%DQN*URXS3UHVLGHQW-LP<RQJ.LP:RUOG%DQND&RPSOLFDWLQJmatters is the renewed evidence that climate change will DGGWRWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIULVNLQFRXQWULHVWKDWUHJXODUO\UHFHLYHKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFH,33&

7KLVVWXG\FRPHV\HDUVDIWHUKXPDQLWDULDQUHIRUPKHOSHGFKDQJHWKHIDFHRISRROHGKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJIt appears at a time when the international community is continuing to grapple with what appear to be ever

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 1. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

The ultimate goal is fully functioning national systems of preparedness, led by national actors capable of responding to the range of risks that a country may face

7KHPRVWKD]DUGSURQHFRXQWULHVDUH%DQJODGHVK'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRI&RQJR(WKLRSLD.HQ\D0DGDJDVFDU1HSDO1LJHULD3DNLVWDQ6RXWK6XGDQ6XGDQDQG8JDQGD6KHSKHUGHWDO7KHWRSUHFLSLHQWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQDLGLQZHUH3DNLVWDQ6RPDOLD:HVW%DQNDQG*D]D6WULS$IJKDQLVWDQ(WKLRSLD-DSDQ6XGDQ.HQ\D+DLWLDQG/LE\D'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHV

21

increasing humanitarian needs, set against a backdrop RIFRQWLQXLQJSUHVVXUHRQGRQRU¿QDQFLQJDQGZLWKit, demand from donors that effectiveness and value for money become central to the system (Jackson, 6HWLQWKLVFRQWH[WSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXHVWRbe advanced throughout the humanitarian community: through pillar four of the Transformative Agenda of the 81(PHUJHQF\5HOLHI&RRUGLQDWRUDQGWKH,QWHU$JHQF\6WDQGLQJ&RPPLWWHH,$6&3ULQFLSDOV,$6&the efforts of the Sub-Working Groups on Humanitarian Financing and Preparedness mandated by the IASC :RUNLQJ*URXSWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WUDWHJ\IRU'LVDVWHU5HGXFWLRQ81,6'5DQGWKH+\RJR)UDPHZRUNIRU$FWLRQ+)$DQGUHVROXWLRQVRIWKH81(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDOCouncil (ECOSOC). Key parts of the aid system are also assessing (and changing) their roles and responsibilities LQUHODWLRQWRSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKQRWDEOHH[DPSOHVEHLQJWKH812I¿FHIRUWKH&RRUGLQDWLRQRI+XPDQLWDULDQ$IIDLUV2&+$UHYLHZLQJLWVµSODFH¶LQWKLVDJHQGDVXEVWDQWLYHrevisions to the CAP guidelines and endorsement of the Common Framework for Preparedness by the IASC Principals. These institutional changes are occurring as the fall-out of the global economic crisis continues to cast DVKDGRZRYHU2'$XQGHUDQDUUDWLYHRIHI¿FLHQF\DQGcost-effectiveness.

([LVWLQJDQGFUHGLEOHLQWHUQDWLRQDOHIIRUWVWRGULYHIRUZDUGthe preparedness agenda are not a comprehensive µVROXWLRQ¶WRDGGUHVVFXUUHQWSUHSDUHGQHVVQHHGVEXWQRUDUHWKH\VXSSRVHGWREH7KH\ZLOO±LWLVKRSHG±EHDcatalyst for the far-reaching changes that are required. In many ways the reality is a simple one: in order to

be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be in place before a crisis occurs. Developing comprehensive and systemic QDWLRQDOV\VWHPVRISUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKLQDJLYHQFRQWH[Wrequires prior investment. This is standard practice in GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVVXFKDV-DSDQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZKHUH¿QDQFLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVinvolves setting aside funds to use in a crisis and, more importantly, apportioning part of the general budget IRUSUHSDUHGQHVVPHDVXUHVDVSDUWRIURXWLQH¿VFDO

SODQQLQJ$QG\HWHYHQLQGHYHORSHGFRQWH[WVFXUUHQWlevels of preparedness have been stretched in relation WRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDVWKHWRUQDGRHVWKDWVZHSWWKURXJKWKH$PHULFDQ0LGZHVWLQGHPRQVWUDWHG%%&1HZVE2)RUFRXQWULHVZLWKDKLVWRU\RIFRQÀLFWand fragility, particularly where the government is a party WRFRQÀLFWWKHSURFHVVHVDQGZLOOLQJQHVVWRHQJDJHLQFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVEHFRPHPXFKPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGand it is here that the humanitarian community has a VWURQJHUUROHWRSOD\+RZHYHUIRUERWKQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDQGFRQÀLFWLWLVXOWLPDWHO\QDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\WKDWPXVWbe strengthened to be able to take on leadership for preparedness at all levels. The end goal is a scenario where national actors call upon the international community only in rare, unforeseeable instances that outstrip national capacity to respond.

Currently, humanitarian funding does in places contribute towards building preparedness in the international system, UHDG\IRUWKHQH[WHYHQW+RZHYHUWKLVLVSUHGRPLQDQWO\HLWKHU¿QDQFHIRUKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHUHOHDVHGDIWHUDGLVDVWHUVWULNHVRUWKHµSODQQHG¶KXPDQLWDULDQassistance of consolidated appeals. This is symptomatic RIDIXQGDPHQWDOÀDZLQWKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH,IZHwere to design channels of funding with a blank slate, then it is likely that funding arrangements would look quite different from those that we see now. The current V\VWHPµSXWVWKHFDUWEHIRUHWKHKRUVH¶LQWKDWIXQGLQJis largely allocated to preparedness activities only after a disaster strikes. In addition, discrete ‘preparedness DFWLYLWLHV¶DUHXQGHUWDNHQUDWKHUWKDQFRQWLQXLQJVXSSRUWto a comprehensive preparedness system. This is not to suggest that preparedness should always be top of WKHDJHQGDZHLJKWLQJRISULRULWLHVLVDUHDOLW\LQDZRUOGwhere funding is constrained. It is not always feasible to undertake comprehensive preparedness measures for all ULVNVRUHYHQWXDOLWLHV±VRPHULVNKDVWREHERUQH,WVKRXOGhowever, as a basic minimum, be an achievable goal to support national systems of preparedness for the most likely crises (based on a comprehensive assessment of risk within HDFKFRXQWU\:KHUHFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVLVUHTXLUHGthe more immediate near-term actions for preparedness DUHOLNHO\WRRYHUODSZLWKWKRVHUHTXLUHGIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGrelated disasters (particularly for some critical life-saving sectors). For longer-term preparedness actions (e.g. HVWDEOLVKLQJDGHTXDWHOHJLVODWLRQDVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWset of actors and actions will be required.

7KHUHDUHVLJQL¿FDQWSUHVVXUHVRQWKHKXPDQLWDULDQsystem. Aid from governments reached a record high of ELOOLRQLQZDVDWWKHVDPHOHYHOLQDQGIHOOEDFNRQO\VOLJKWO\WRELOOLRQLQ'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHV$OWKRXJKIXQGLQJUHTXHVWHGWKURXJKWKH&$3IHOOE\VHYHUDOELOOLRQGROODUVLQODUJHO\GXHto the absence of mega-disasters like the Haiti earthquake RU3DNLVWDQÀRRGVXQPHWQHHGVURVHWRWKHLUKLJKHVWOHYHOIRUDGHFDGHDWQHDUO\'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHV

2WKHUH[DPSOHVLQFOXGHWKHWRUQDGRHVLQHDUO\2[IRUGDQG6FKZLUW]DQGWKHOHVVRQVIURPWKH86SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGSRVWGLVDVWHUUHFRYHU\DQG¿QDQFLQJFKDOOHQJHVLQUHJDUGVWR+XUULFDQH6DQG\VHH$EUDPVRQDQG5HGOHQHU

In order to be prepared to deal effectively with disasters or crises, preparedness measures need to be in place before a crisis occurs

22

7KLVUHDOLW\LVFRPSOLFDWHGE\DFRQWH[WRI¿VFDODXVWHULW\ZLWKGRQRUJRYHUQPHQWVXQGHULQFUHDVHGpressure to cut overseas aid in order to apportion higher proportions of revenue to address domestic challenges. As recently as April this year, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that LQWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWDLGLQKDGIDOOHQE\IURPLWV¿JXUHZKLFKLWVHOIZDVDIDOORIIURPDQGWKDWRQO\DPRGHVWUHFRYHU\ZDVOLNHO\LQ2(&'D7KLVZDVQRWDVDUHVXOWRIUHGXFHGQHHG

Within this challenging reality, the pressure to ensure greater effectiveness of aid spending presents a pivotal opportunity to ask more challenging questions of the way LQZKLFKWKHFXUUHQW¿QDQFLQJV\VWHPZRUNV+RZFDQWKHsystem be improved to enable more effective responses to FULVLVDFURVVPDQ\FRQWH[WVZKHWKHUVXGGHQRQVHWPHJD

disasters, slow-developing crises or armed and violent FRQÀLFW"2UHYHQPRUHFULWLFDOO\ZKHUHQDWXUDOKD]DUGDQGFRQÀLFWUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVRFFXUDWWKHVDPHWLPHVHH2',"

Emergency preparedness has the potential to be transformative, as a means to reshape the way the aid system approaches crises. It offers a marked change to SRVWGLVDVWHUµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶DQGUHÀHFWVWKHOHVVRQVlearnt from decades of humanitarian response. It also UHÀHFWVWKHQHFHVVLW\RIEXLOGLQJQDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\IRUpreparedness as a fundamental part of a longer-term strategy to reduce the pressures on ODA (through increased national capacity and reduced need). This study contributes to the current momentum surrounding the preparedness DJHQGDE\LQYHVWLJDWLQJWKH¿QDQFLDOSUDFWLFDOLWLHVRIemergency preparedness at a country level and by making recommendations for the humanitarian and development community to take forward.

)NFORMINGTHEPOST AGENDAGUDZVQHDUPDUNLQJ\HDUVVLQFHWKHKXPDQLWDULDQreform process began and bringing under the spotlight the progress made by donors, the IASC and the humanitarian system more broadly. In parallel, debates RQXSFRPLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHQHZDOVDUHLQWHQVLI\LQJ±WKH

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the HFA, as well as a further instalment of climate change negotiations. In the SRVWGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDDWWHQWLRQLVGUDZQWRWKHSODFHRIFRQÀLFWDQGIUDJLOLW\LQIXWXUHDJUHHPHQWVDQGthat of risk and resilience as the new discourse of the time 0HODPHG:KDWLVPRUHWKHFRQWLQXHGSUHVHQFHRIFRPSOH[FULVHVLQ1LJHU0\DQPDUDQG6XGDQ±ZKHUHFRQÀLFWDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGVLQWHUVHFW±LVSXWWLQJDGGHGpressure on development and humanitarian actors to be better prepared to respond to the multitude of crises that DULVHVHH+DUULVHWDO3

Evidence on the geography of poverty, disasters and FOLPDWHH[WUHPHVSRLQWVWRZDUGVDQLQFUHDVLQJFRPSOH[LW\RIULVNLQWKHIXWXUH6KHSKHUGHWDO±DIXWXUHLQZKLFKWKHJRDOWRHUDGLFDWHH[WUHPHSRYHUW\E\FDQRQO\FRQFHLYDEO\EHDFKLHYHGLIWKHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWgoals incorporate the management of risk into their central REMHFWLYHV$UHSRUWE\2',DQG*)'55.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQLVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHLVPXFKWREHGRQHDWleast for disaster risk. One stark piece of data is that 12 low-LQFRPHFRXQWULHVZKLFKHDFKUHFHLYHGOHVVWKDQPLOOLRQfor disaster risk reduction (DRR) over the two decades DWWKHVDPHWLPHUHFHLYHGELOOLRQRIIXQGLQJIRUGLVDVWHUUHVSRQVH±GHGLFDWHGWRUHVSRQVHfor every $1 of DRR (ibid: vi). With the latest science on FOLPDWHFKDQJHSRLQWLQJWRZDUGVDVLJQL¿FDQWLQFUHDVHLQFOLPDWHUHODWHGGLVDVWHUWUHQGV±WRZKLFKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\ZLOOLQPDQ\FDVHVEHH[SHFWHGWRUHVSRQG±change is needed, or the system will be stretched beyond ZKDWLVIHDVLEOHVHH,3&&7KHXQGHUO\LQJPHVVDJHWKHUHIRUHLVWKDWDERYHDOOHOVHVLJQL¿FDQWLPSURYHPHQWVare critical to build national capacity to mitigate, prevent, prepare for and respond to crises.

The need to ‘strengthen preparedness, and ensure a more HIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWUHVSRQVH¶KDVEHHQLQFUHDVLQJO\YRLFHGDVDFRUHPHVVDJHLQWKHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDLQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH817DVN7HDP¶VThematic Think Pieces on the role of risk and resilience LQDQHZ0'*IUDPHZRUN81,6'5DQG:027UDQVODWLQJWKLVLQWRDQ\NLQGRI¿QDORXWFRPHLVVWLOOVRPHway off. Yet the case for preparedness being part and parcel RISRVWFRPPLWPHQWVLVZLGHO\UHJDUGHGDVFRPPRQsense by large sections of the international community.4 Indeed, progress to date on preparedness by the IASC, as noted above, demonstrates an international appreciation of the need to redress prior neglect of the issue.

How can the system be improved to enable more effective responses to crisis across many contexts, whether sudden-onset mega-disasters, slow-developing crises or armed and violent con"ict?

)RXURIRXU¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVDOOEDUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDSSHDULQDUDQNHGOLVWRIWRSFRXQWULHVGHPRQVWUDWLQJKLJKOHYHOVRIIUDJLOLW\disaster risk, poverty and climate change vulnerability (Harris et al.,

$VH[SUHVVHGLQGHEDWHVDWWKH(&262&+XPDQLWDULDQ6HJPHQW*HQHYDLQ

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 1. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

23

There is still much to do. Action towards commitments in the HFA have seen the most progress in capacities to prepare for and respond to disasters, with evidence pointing towards a downward trend in mortality risk 81,6'5D<HWZLWKHFRQRPLFORVVHVWUHQGLQJXSZDUGVPRUHWKDQWULSOLQJRYHUWKHSDVW\HDUVLQVRPHFRXQWULHVWKHUHLVDIDLOXUHWRµIXOO\LQWHUQDOL]H¶WKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIEXLOGLQJQDWLRQDO'55V\VWHPV81,6'5D)RUH[DPSOHGHVSLWHWKHLQFUHDVLQJDYDLODELOLW\of risk information and knowledge, there is recurrent frustration that governments and the international aid community often still fail to act before a crisis hits (ibid.). This criticism was levelled at the international community in the wake of the drought and food crisis in WKH+RUQRI$IULFDLQZKHQLWZDVVORZWRUHVSRQG+LOOLHUDQG'HPSVH\3URJUHVVRQFRQÀLFWpreparedness is even further lacking, with debates DERXWZKDWWKLVHQWDLOVVWLOOLQWKHLULQIDQF\9DX[Dforthcoming). Meanwhile, there appears to be, more than disappointingly, a continued lack of connection between strategic engagements with fragile states and QDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUULVN7KH1HZ'HDOIRUEngagement in Fragile States,IRUH[DPSOHGRHVQRWstrongly feature links between state-building and disaster

risk, the environment or climate change, wrongly implying WKDWQDWXUDOKD]DUGVKDYHOLWWOHLPSDFWLQFRXQWULHVVXFKDV6RPDOLD3DNLVWDQRU1LJHU

,QWKHFRQWH[WRI¿VFDODXVWHULW\GRQRUJRYHUQPHQWVLJQDWRULHVWRSRVWDJUHHPHQWVZLOOEHPLQGIXORIWKH¿QDQFLDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKRVHFRPPLWPHQWV,QWKHVHcircumstances, the notion of preparedness as a ‘no UHJUHW¶RSWLRQPXVWEHFRQYH\HGµ«PHDVXUHVWKDWEXLOGFDSDFLW\DQGGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVV«KDYHQRQHJDWLYHeffect even if the worst forecasts are not realised (either because the cost is very low or because they will build UHVLOLHQFH¶+LOOLHUDQG'HPSVH\7KHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDWKXVPDUNVDFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHWill the international community continue to do more of the same, perhaps under a new banner, terminology or EX]]ZRUGRUZLOOLWWDNHDUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKWRFKDOOHQJHWKHLQDGHTXDFLHVRIµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶FULVLVresponse?

Above all else, signi!cant improvements are critical to build national capacity to mitigate, prevent, prepare for and respond to crises

7KH1HZ'HDOLVWKHODWHVWDWWHPSWE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WRprovide a partnership framework for assisting countries to transition out of fragility. Developed through the International Dialogue for 3HDFHEXLOGLQJDQG6WDWHEXLOGLQJWKH1HZ'HDOLVVWUXFWXUHGWRGHOLYHUthree inter-connected elements: peace-building and state-building goals, national-led inclusive processes, and partnership and trust between national and international actors (see www.newdeal4peace.org for more details).

http://www.newdeal4peace.org

http://www.newdeal4peace.org

2. How we understand emergency preparedness

Key messages

Ɣ(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVZRUNLQWDQGHPWRFUHDWHDKROLVWLFV\VWHPDQG span what is conventionally understood to be the bifurcation between development and humanitarian action.

Ɣ)LQDQFLQJDFURVVWKHµSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXXP¶WKHUHIRUHQHHGVWREHFRRUGLQDWHG,QUHDOLW\ZKHQPDGHWRµILW¶LQWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGILQDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHWKHFRQWLQXXPEHFRPHVIUDFWXUHGDQGGLVMRLQWHG

Ɣ7KHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\IDFHVDFKDOOHQJHWRFRQWLQXHµIHHGLQJ¶WKHELIXUFDWHGsystem or to alter and transform it for the better.

Ɣ(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVUHJXODUO\IDOOµWKURXJKWKHFUDFNV¶LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOfinancing architecture.

Ɣ7KHV\VWHPKDVEHHQJUDSSOLQJZLWKDUDSLGO\FKDQJLQJVHWRIULVNVDQGWKHILQDQFLQJarchitecture has failed to evolve at the same pace to support these demands.

Ɣ8QHYHQOHYHOVRIDWWHQWLRQDUHSDLGWRGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIVKRFNVDQGVWUHVVHVDQGWKHUHis a dearth of analysis, practice and resourcing on preparedness for conflict and its links ZLWKQDWXUDOKD]DUGV

Ɣ7KHµLGHDOVFHQDULR¶LQYROYHVQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVHQDFWLQJEXGJHWDU\PHDVXUHV to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk. Of the five case studies, the Philippines goes furthest towards this goal.

2. How we understand emergency preparedness

7HATISEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS‘Emergency preparedness aims to build the resilience RIVWDWHVDQGVRFLHWLHVE\VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHORFDOnational and global capacity to minimise loss of life DQGOLYHOLKRRGVWRHQVXUHHIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVH to crises.’

7KHGH¿QLWLRQDGRSWHGIRUWKLVUHSRUWDERYHLVLQIRUPHGE\WKH¿QGLQJVRIWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHVDQGVHHNVWREHWWHUUHÀHFWWKHQDWXUDOKD]DUGDQGFRQÀLFWGLPHQVLRQVof preparedness for response.6,WDOVRUHÀHFWVWKH

FHQWUDOLW\RISUHSDUHGQHVVLQWKH,$6&¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQof resilience, as one of four critical areas of work (IASC, 7KLVUHVHDUFKHQGRUVHVFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVRIdisasters as the product of human decision-making and DFWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVVHH:LVQHUHWDOWKRXJKWKHWHUPµQDWXUDOKD]DUGV¶LVXVHGKHUHWRGLIIHUHQWLDWHQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVIURPFRQÀLFWUHODWHGGLVDVWHUV'H¿QLWLRQVRIUHODWHGWHUPVFDQEHIRXQGLQ$QQH[ZKLOHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIµSUHSDUHGQHVV¶WRother terms is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

$PDWUL[RIDFWLYLWLHVWKDWFRPSULVHµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¶KDVEHHQFUHDWHGIRUWKLVUHSRUW,WUHÀHFWVWKHIXOOVXLWHof activities required to support a sustainable system of preparedness, which span the responsibilities of both 2WKHUW\SHVRIFULVLVDUHFDSWXUHGZLWKLQWKLVGH¿QLWLRQEXWDUHQRWWKH

focus of this study.

27

development and humanitarian actors (see Table 2.1).7 This PDWUL[ZDVXVHGWRIUDPHWKHFDVHVWXG\UHVHDUFKZKLFKenabled cross-country comparisons to take place (in spite of FRQWH[WXDOYDULDWLRQVLQWHUPLQRORJ\DQGSURYLGHGDPHDQVWRVLWXDWHWKHFRXQWU\¿QGLQJVZLWKLQJOREDOWUHQGV

Importantly, though activities are listed individually in the PDWUL[SUHSDUHGQHVVLQWHUYHQWLRQVDUHSDUWRIDSRUWIROLRapproach. The suite of activities required to create and sustain a preparedness system work in tandem and support RQHRWKHU)RUH[DPSOHHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPVZLOOQRWEHeffective unless they are supported by a contingency plan that clearly delineates roles and activities in the case of an early warning, or without the institutional capacity to put this in place. Similarly, pre-positioning and stockpiling are somewhat redundant unless there is a clear system for indicating when and how those stocks will be used and methods for deployment, and with positioning based upon clear risk assessments. As a result, the issue is not what to invest in, but rather a clear imperative to invest in the whole package of necessary activities. In short, emergency preparedness requires a holistic approach.

8QGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWSUHSDUHGQHVVLVDQGZKDWLWPHDQVLVsomewhat limited in the absence of a country, sectoral or FULVLVFRQWH[W:KHQDSSO\LQJWKHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[LQSUDFWLFHWKHH[SHULHQFHVRI81'3DQGWKH%XUHDXIRU&ULVLV3UHYHQWLRQDQG5HFRYHU\%&35±ZKLFK

used it to evaluate the preparedness content of its global '55SRUWIROLR±GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWIXUWKHUTXDOL¿FDWLRQwas needed to distinguish preparedness categories from larger categories of DRR.9 Furthermore, the research LGHQWL¿HGGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHZD\VLQZKLFKSUHSDUHGQHVVLVFRQFHLYHGDFURVVWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV7KHVHUHÀHFWWKHGLYHUVLW\RIGHYHORSPHQWDQGKXPDQLWDULDQFKDOOHQJHVLQHDFKFRQWH[WLQGLYLGXDORUJDQLVDWLRQDO

RISK-INFORMED DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES

RISK MANAGEMENT

RISK REDUCTION

PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

RESILIENCE: AN OUTCOME OF

AN ONGOING PROCESS

PREPAREDNESS

RESPONSE

RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

&IGURE5NDERSTANDINGRISKANDTHEPLACEOFPREPAREDNESS

The suite of activities required to create and sustain a preparedness system work in tandem and support one other

7 Drawn from research undertaken by the IASC Sub-Working Group (SWG) on Preparedness (Lawry-White, 2012). It also ďƌŽĂĚůǇĂůŝŐŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƟƚƵƚĞ‘preparedness’ as considered by IASC members, UNISDR and ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ/ŶŝƟĂƟǀĞƐ;<ĞůůĞƩĂŶĚ^ǁĞĞŶĞǇ ϮϬϭϭͿ

dŚĞƌĞůĂƟŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶƉŚĂƐĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ;ƐĞĞ<ĞůůĞƩand Sweeney, 2011).

9&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůĂŶĚůĞŐŝƐůĂƟǀĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂůůŽĐĂƟŽŶĂŶĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 2. HOW WE UNDERSTAND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

29

4ABLE%MERGENCYPREPAREDNESSMATRIXCATEGORIESANDACTIVITIES

Categories Activities Scale

Hazard/risk analysis and early warning

• Early warning systems +D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLV

Comm

unity

, sub

-nat

ional,

nat

ional,

regio

nal a

nd in

tern

ation

al

Institutional and legislative frameworks

• Institutional and legislative frameworks, resource allocation and funding mechanisms• Institutional arrangements: national platform, national disaster management authority1DWLRQDOSODQRIDFWLRQ• Informal local through to international agreements

Resource allocation and funding

• Risk pooling mechanisms $JHQF\IXQGLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV±LQFOXGLQJULVNSRROLQJPHFKDQLVPVH[WHUQDO

and core emergency programme budgets (internal)

Crisis coordination • Government coordination mechanisms• Leadership structures (including between different scales, locations and sectors)• Inter-agency coordination &OXVWHUVHFWRUHVWDEOLVKHGFRQWH[WXDOVWDQGDUGV

Information management and communication

• Information management systems • Communication systems • Cluster/sector information management systems

Contingency/ preparedness and response planning

• Contingency/preparedness and response planning

Training and exercises

• Simulations, drills • Accredited training opportunities 6SHFL¿FFRXQWU\FRQWH[WWUDLQLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHV

Emergency services/standby arrangements and prepositioning

• Stockpiling • Civil protection, emergency services, search and rescue• Contingency partnership agreements

framings of preparedness in relation to their own mandates, DQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VQDWXUDOKD]DUGDQGRUFRQÀLFWSUR¿OH,QVRPHH[DPSOHVVXFKDV86$,'LQ0\DQPDUWKHWHUPVµSUHSDUHGQHVV¶DQGµ'55¶ZHUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\3HWHUVIRUWKFRPLQJ,QRWKHUFDVHVVXFKDVZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRQJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQLVDWLRQV1*2VLQWKHPhilippines, there was sometimes no distinction between humanitarian action and activities that this report would term ¶HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¶.HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJ

4HEPREPAREDNESSCONTINUUM$FURVVWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVGRQRUVSROLF\PDNHUVDQGpractitioners described a suite of preparedness activities that make up a complete picture of preparedness. 7KHVHUDQJHGIURPPRUHµGHYHORSPHQWDO¶DFWLYLWLHVsuch as support for establishing an adequate national policy framework for preparedness, through to more µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶UHVSRQVHVHJVWRFNSLOLQJRIJRRGVLQpreparation for rapid response. In reality, preparedness is best considered as a continuum with a natural alignment DWHDFKHQGZLWKWKHµGHYHORSPHQW¶DQGµKXPDQLWDULDQ¶arenas.

,ŽƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů&ĞĚĞƌĂƟŽŶŽĨZĞĚƌŽƐƐĂŶĚZĞĚƌĞƐĐĞŶƚ^ŽĐŝĞƟĞƐ;/&ZͿhEK,ĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůCouncil of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).

The notion of a continuum is useful when considering the range of activities required to create a strong preparedness system. Action is required over both the long term (e.g. appropriate legislation and disaster management law) and the near term, in relation to building capacity to respond to an imminent crisis or disaster event.

:KHQPDGHWRµ¿W¶LQWRWKHELIXUFDWHGKXPDQLWDULDQGHYHORSPHQWLQVWLWXWLRQDODQG¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHWKHFRQWLQXXPEHFRPHVGLVMRLQWHG$VHYLGHQFHGWKURXJKRXWWKLVUHSRUWWKHPDMRULW\RIIXQGLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVactivities derives from humanitarian channels, which do not align with the full suite of preparedness activities UHTXLUHGWRFUHDWHDFRPSOHWHSUHSDUHGQHVVµSDFNDJH¶in-country. This reality is well recognised. In a recent International Dialogue on Strengthening Partnership in Disaster Response, it was observed that ‘the disaster risk reduction and humanitarian agendas could usefully EHPRUHHQJDJHGZLWKHDFKRWKHU«WKHSURFHVVRIbuilding trust with national authorities, strengthening national capacities and embedding different ways of working in preparedness and contingency plans needs to take place as part of longer term investments in disaster SUHSDUHGQHVV¶+DUYH\DQG+DUPHU

The current bifurcation presents many challenges for ¿QDQFLQJSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\±QRWMXVWLQWHUPVRIYROXPHVVHTXHQFLQJDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\

but also in terms of who is best placed to take on the preparedness activities required to create a strong system. The international community faces a challenge: to continue µIHHGLQJ¶WKHELIXUFDWHGV\VWHPRUWRDOWHUDQGWUDQVIRUPLWfor the better. To split preparedness activities in two would simply be to recreate the humanitarian/development divide. This is problematic because the short- and long-term aspects of preparedness are necessarily interlinked, as the UHVLOLHQFHIUDPHZRUNLQGLFDWHVVHH+DUULV+RZHYHUto bring together preparedness activities as a discrete set of concerns risks creating (yet) another silo.

(YLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHVUHYHDOVWKDWemergency preparedness activities regularly ‘fall through WKHFUDFNV¶LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH±Dconsequence of the fragmented aid system. This also UHÀHFWVWKHSDWWHUQHGKLVWRU\RIDV\VWHPWKDWKDVEHHQgrappling with a rapidly changing set of risks to which it is H[SHFWHGWRUHVSRQGDQGRID¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHWKDWhas failed to evolve at the same pace to support those demands. We have also witnessed an uneven level of attention being given to some types of shocks and stresses RYHURWKHUV7KXVZKLOHSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGrelated disasters is becoming increasingly well articulated WKDQNVWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOHIIRUWVRI81,6'5*)'55DQGothers, there is a dearth of analysis on preparedness for FRQÀLFWDQGRQWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQWKHWZR

2.3 Emergency preparedness ANDCONmICT,QFRQWUDVWZLWKQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVUHPDLQVLQLWVLQIDQF\LQWHUPVRIcomprehensive development of the concept, operational activities and programming on the ground. There are no GHGLFDWHG¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVIRUSUHSDULQJIRUFRQÀLFWMXVWDVWKHUHDUHQRPHFKDQLVPVVROHO\GHGLFDWHGWR

Deve

lopm

ent

Hum

anita

rian

resp

onse

Trai

ning

, ex

erci

ses

&

sim

ulat

ions

Inst

itutio

nal

& le

gisl

ativ

e fra

mew

orks

Reso

urce

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loca

tion

&

fund

ing

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rd/r

isk

anal

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ly

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ning

sys

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man

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spon

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genc

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&

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ng

Figure 2.2: Emergency preparedness continuum

In reality preparedness is best considered as a continuum with a natural alignment at each end with the ‘development’ and ‘humanitarian’ arenas


31

4ABLE%MERGENCY0REPAREDNESS-ATRIXADAPTEDFORCONmICT

Categories Activities Scale

Hazard/risk analysis and early warning

• Early warning systems: e.g. reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG)+D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVVFHQDULRSODQQLQJFRQÀLFWDQDO\VLVOHGPDLQO\E\GRQRU

groups)• Monitoring of potential emergency situations by aid agencies such as OCHA, 81'381+&581,&()DQG:)3

6FDOH

ZLOOEHKLJK

O\YDULDEOH

GHSHQGLQ

JRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFR

QÀLFWDQGWKHFRQWH[WInstitutional and

legislative frameworks • Agreements especially by national authorities to respect international KXPDQLWDULDQODZ,+/HJFLYLOLDQVLQFRQÀLFW,&5&PLJUDWLRQ81+&56*%9LQFDVHRIFRQÀLFW81,&()

6XSSRUWWRSROLFHMXVWLFHV\VWHPHWFLQDQWLFLSDWLRQRIZLGHVSUHDGYLROHQFHHJDURXQGHOHFWLRQV81'3GRQRUV

Resource allocation and funding

%&35ZKLFKDGPLQLVWHUVWKH&3577)KDVDVSHFL¿FPDQGDWHIRUFRQÀLFW'55IXQGVIRFXVRQQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUV

Crisis coordination • Informal security meetings of agencies, ambassadors and donors at different OHYHOV81&RXQWU\7HDP

1RVSHFLDOPHFKDQLVPVIRULQWHUDJHQF\FRRUGLQDWLRQRUFOXVWHUVHWFEXWµFRQÀLFWVHQVLWLYLW\¶PD\EHLQWURGXFHGLQDQ\DOOPHFKDQLVPV

Information management and communication

0RQLWRULQJRIDFWXDOFRQÀLFWRXWEUHDNVHJ2&+$PDSSLQJLQ6RXWK6XGDQ• Informal security meetings as above, but effectiveness may be reduced by limited

publication of results

Contingency/ preparedness and response planning

• Contingency planning related mainly to anticipated violence (especially around HOHFWLRQVDQGPLJUDWLRQVSUHGLFWHGWRRFFXUIROORZLQJFRQÀLFWH[DPSOHVIURP81,&()DQG81+&5

• Focus on prevention rather than preparedness in peace-buildingµ5HVLOLHQFH¶HJDWFRPPXQLW\OHYHOLVSRRUO\DUWLFXODWHGLQUHODWLRQWRFRQÀLFWLW

might take the form of self-defence

Training and exercises 81+&5FRQGXFWVWUDLQLQJDWJOREDOOHYHOXVLQJVLPXODWLRQVRIDQWLFLSDWHGPLJUDWLRQV• Security services may be trained in crisis response

Emergency services/ standby arrangements and prepositioning

• Stockpiling, evidence mainly relating to migrations3ROLFHSUHSDUHGIRUYLROHQWRXWEUHDNVWKLVPD\EHOLQNHGWRVHFXULW\VHFWRUUHIRUPand/or peace-building

SUHSDULQJIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGV([FHSWIRUWKH81'3&3577)±DQGKHUHRQO\WRDOLPLWHGH[WHQWVHH9DX[EIRUWKFRPLQJ±WKH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVUHYLHZHGLQWKLVVWXG\HLWKHUGRQRWFRQVLGHUFRQÀLFW*)'55DQGWKHadaptation mechanisms) or are focused only on the more

µKXPDQLWDULDQ¶VHWRIDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXXP(the four humanitarian mechanisms/tools). There is still work to do on establishing a clearly articulated or agreed upon XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFW¶:KDWZHNQRZLVWKDWDJHQFLHVXVHWRDQH[WHQWDVHSDUDWHVHWRIterms for similar types of activities being undertaken (see the DGDSWHGSUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[7DEOH

(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWLVIUHTXHQWO\DEVRUEHGLQWRZLGHUSURFHVVHV)RUH[DPSOHFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQ

,QVXFKFDVHVWKHWHUPµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFW¶PD\QRWEHXVHGEHFDXVHSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUIRUPVRIYLROHQFHDQGFRQÀLFWmight be regarded as a core activity that continues at all times and PD\QRWEHUHODWHGWRVSHFL¿FHYHQWV

32

peace-building and security sector reform activities may, in connection with other activities, constitute elements of HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWVXFKDVFRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJWUDLQLQJRISROLFHIRUFHVHWF9DX[Dforthcoming).11,QWKLVVHQVHFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVLVUHSUHVHQWHGLQPDQ\PHFKDQLVPV)RUH[DPSOHFRQVROLGDWHGappeals often incorporate long-term international engagement LQFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHVZKHUHFRQÀLFWGRPLQDWHVWKHhumanitarian agenda and where a focus on preparedness is QRWXQFRPPRQ(LJKWRIWKHVL[WHHQDSSHDOVLQDOOEXWRQHRIWKHPDFRPSOH[HPHUJHQF\PHQWLRQSUHSDUHGQHVVDVDNH\IRFXV2&+$D

,QUHODWLRQWRSHDFHEXLOGLQJYLROHQWFRQÀLFWLVDOZD\Vapproached as preventable and hence the language focuses on prevention, though there may be elements of SUHSDUHGQHVVDVGH¿QHGLQWKHPDWUL[$VDQRWKHUH[DPSOHstrengthening the security services is often presented as a ZD\RIUHGXFLQJYLROHQFHRUFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQEXWFRXOGEHSUHVHQWHGDVDIRUPRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFW'LVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWDFWLYLWLHVLVYHU\GLI¿FXOWDQGcan become a matter of semantics, and it is consequently HYHQPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRWUDFNIXQGLQJVRXUFHV7KHH[FHSWLRQVare events that have clearly been predicted and in which the international community is active, such as critical elections and referendums, where analysis indicates a high chance of FRQÀLFWDQGYLROHQFHIRUH[DPSOHVWDQGDORQHSUHSDUHGQHVVSURMHFWVIRUWKH6XGDQLQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXPLQWKH.HQ\DQHOHFWLRQVLQDQGWKHSHULRGSULRUWRWKH,UDTFRQÀLFWLQ9DX[DIRUWKFRPLQJ

7KHSROLWLFDODQGFRQÀLFWFRQWH[WZLOOGHWHUPLQHDQGVKDSHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSUHSDUHGQHVVPHDVXUHVFDQEHenacted in-country, and the way in which the international FRPPXQLW\HQJDJHVZLWKQDWLRQDOSOD\HUV$V1LJHU¶VKLVWRU\H[HPSOL¿HVLWKDVQRWDOZD\VEHHQSRVVLEOHWRHQJDJHin conversations with government on hunger or crisis. In FRXQWULHVZKHUHWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVSDUW\WRDFRQÀLFWRULVXQZLOOLQJRUXQDEOHWRHQJDJHRSHQO\LQGLDORJXHRQFRQÀLFWpreparedness, the use of alternative language may be HPSOR\HG)RUH[DPSOHWKHWHUPµFRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJ¶LVPRUHGLVFUHHWWKDQµFRQÀLFWDQDO\VLV¶HVSHFLDOO\LQFRQWH[WVZKHUHWKHSUHVHQFHRIFHUWDLQIRUPVRIµFRQÀLFW¶DUHGHQLHGor are too sensitive to engage with because of possible repercussions.12 Thus preparedness activities do not occur in a political vacuum. Furthermore, donor funding is shaped E\SROLWLFDOSUHIHUHQFHVJRYHUQPHQWUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFLWL]HQSUHSDUHGQHVVLVLQÀXHQFHGE\QDWLRQDOSROLWLFVDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\FDQHQJDJHLQGLDORJXHDERXWFHUWDLQW\SHVRIULVNLVLQÀXHQFHGE\WKHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W

While recognising the challenge of incorporating SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUERWKQDWXUDOGLVDVWHUDQGFRQÀLFWLQWRDVLQJOHPHFKDQLVPVHH.HOOHWWDQG6ZHHQH\WKHtwo remain closely linked throughout the recommendations FRQWDLQHGLQWKLVUHSRUW7KHULVNFRQWH[WVRIWKHFRXQWU\FDVH

studies demonstrate strong interlinkages (both conceptually and in practice) and the activities pursued on the ground are often the same at the humanitarian end of the continuum from a sectoral perspective (i.e. in preparation for a near-WHUPUHVSRQVH.HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJ3HWHUVforthcoming). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that a ODFNRISUHSDUHGQHVVIRUWKHLPSDFWVRIQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVFDQH[DFHUEDWHSROLWLFDODQGVRFLHWDOVWUHVVRUVZKLFKFDQ±LIQRWPDQDJHGHIIHFWLYHO\±LQFUHDVHWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUFRQÀLFWVHH+DUULVHWDO7KXVZKLOHWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP±LQFOXGLQJWKH,$6&±KDVFUHDWHGmeans to compartmentalise how it deals with different risk IDFWRUVLQUHDOLW\QDWXUDOGLVDVWHUVDQGFRQÀLFWDUHQRWVRneatly segregated.

2.4 International support: THEIDEALSCENARIOThe ideal scenario globally would be a situation where national governments are able to enact the budgetary measures required to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk. Of the case study countries, the Philippines goes furthest towards this idea, ZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWEHLQJDPDMRUFRQWULEXWRULQWHUPVRIYROXPHVRI¿QDQFLQJIRU'55*RYHUQPHQWVSHQGLQJKDVEHHQRQDYHUDJHFORVHWRPLOOLRQSHU\HDUFRQWUDVWLQJZLWKMXVWPLOOLRQIURPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL<HWWKH3KLOLSSLQHVHVSHFLDOO\LQWHUPVRIVSHFLDOLVHGFDSDFLW\FDQVWLOOEHQH¿Wfrom further support from the international community. So what would an idea scenario look like?

Firstly, a blank slate is imagined, devoid of the current ¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQVWUDLQWV,IZHZHUHto create an international aid system starting from scratch, the likelihood is that it would look quite different from what

The ideal scenario globally would be a situation where national governments are able to enact the budgetary measures required to support systems of preparedness, based on a holistic understanding of risk

7KHDXWKRUVDUHQRWLPSO\LQJWKDWFRQÀLFWDQDO\VLVLVV\QRQ\PRXVZLWKcontingency planning, but found evidence that contingency planning FDQEHXVHGDVDPHDQVIRUHOHPHQWVRIFRQÀLFWDQDO\VLVWRWDNHplace.


33

Piec

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of ri

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OF E

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ch

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erge

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not

bas

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n a

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al p

riorit

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of n

eed

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re to

lear

n le

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s to

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prov

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ncy

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ear r

oles

and

re

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co

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n m

echa

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e no

t inc

lusi

ve,

invo

lvin

g al

l act

ors

in a

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en c

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ombi

ned

plan

of

actio

n: p

lans

do

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coor

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te a

ctio

n ac

ross

diff

eren

t ac

tors

or s

ecto

rs

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rDi

ffere

nt co

ncep

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emer

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y pre

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s.My

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erge

ncy p

repa

redn

ess a

nd

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used

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chan

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ly.Su

dan

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d artic

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n of r

isk,

linke

d to l

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d inc

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pine

sAg

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s uns

ure w

ho

is re

spon

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focal

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mar

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ppro

ach.

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gnitio

n of r

isk ha

s not

led

to vis

ion or

plan

.Su

dan

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genc

y pre

pare

dnes

s is

by in

dividu

al ag

encie

s, no

t con

solid

ated.

Philip

pine

sMe

chan

isms a

vaila

ble fo

r eme

rgen

cy

prep

ared

ness

cann

ot fun

d the

rang

e of

activ

ities n

eede

d. Ni

ger

Very

few do

nors

resid

ent th

at ha

ve fu

nded

risk.

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nTh

e dom

inant

huma

nitar

ian

focus

crow

ds ou

t eme

rgen

cy

prep

ared

ness

.

Suda

n Ri

sk as

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ments

larg

ely by

ind

ividu

al ag

encie

s, no

t con

solid

ated.

Mya

nmar

Ag

encie

s ass

ess r

isk in

their

own

‘secto

r’ and

prog

ramm

e acc

ordin

gly.No

exist

ing m

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nism

or ch

anne

l of

finan

cing e

merg

ency

prep

ared

-ne

ss is

base

d sole

ly on

a glo

bal

asse

ssme

nt of

need

.

Nige

r St

ill lac

k of p

rogr

ess o

n inte

grati

ng

risks

beyo

nd fo

od se

curity

into

Disp

ositif

, des

pite r

ecur

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flood

s, dr

ough

ts an

d pop

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n mov

emen

t.Su

dan/

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nmar

Lack

of ac

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n con

flict p

repa

red-

ness

desp

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evale

nce.

Fund

ing

avai

labl

e in

-cou

ntry

doe

s no

t ad

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tely

mat

ch n

eeds

Failu

re to

arti

cula

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a vi

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of e

mer

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t be

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red

unde

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ndin

g

&IGURE4HEIDEALSCENARIO

34

4ABLE&RAMEWORKOFQUESTIONS

ComprehensivenessAre funding decisions based on a detailed understanding of all risks?

Are funding decisions based on a global assessment of priority countries?

Long-term plans of action and comparative advantage

Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan RIDFWLRQZLWKGH¿QHGUROHVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV"

Is funding available to a range of necessary actors?

Is the timeframe for emergency preparedness funding proportional to needs?

National actors and processes

Does funding for emergency preparedness align with government plans and national stakeholder priorities?

Do preparedness measures target a range of requirements at community, sub-regional and national levels?

Strong donorship

Does the mechanism have strong monitoring and evaluation component for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?

Can the fund receive funds from a range of sources?

Feasibility ,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWSROLWLFDOVXSSRUWEHKLQGWKHLQFOXVLRQRUH[SDQVLRQRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness in the fund?

Administration 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHWKHUHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFRVWVLQH[SDQGLQJZRUNLQHPHUJHQF\preparedness?

Visibility 'RHVWKHPHFKDQLVPKDYHDVXI¿FLHQWHQRXJKSUR¿OHWRUDLVHWKHLPSRUWDQFH of preparedness and drive the agenda forward?


we see today, unconstrained by politicised historical ties and the gradual evolution of sectoral siloes across linked SKHQRPHQDVXFKDVQDWXUDOKD]DUGDQGPDQPDGHGLVDVWHUVZLWKFRQÀLFWDQGIUDJLOLW\)LJXUHUHSUHVHQWVthese tensions and challenges, faced in practice as evidenced in the case studies.

6HFRQGO\GUDZLQJRQWKHHYLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFRXQWU\case studies, the research team has generated a set of questions that represent the necessary criteria for HQDEOLQJHIIHFWLYH¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV

(Table 2.3). These questions highlight a wide range of critical issues that must be considered in order to GHWHUPLQHZKDWLVUHTXLUHGWRLPSURYHWKH¿QDQFLQJRIemergency preparedness.

6HFWLRQVDQGH[DPLQH¿UVWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOarchitecture of funding mechanisms for emergency preparedness, then the practical lessons drawn from the country case studies (from which the framework of questions derives).

3. Emergency preparedness in context

THEARCHITECTURE

Key messages

Ɣ+XPDQLWDULDQPHFKDQLVPVWKH&(5)&$3&+)VDQG(5)VKDYHDOOIXQGHGHOHPHQWVof emergency preparedness, sometimes despite their limited mandates.

ƔRisk-focused mechanisms (GFDRR and CPR TTF) and adaptation mechanisms (PPCR, LDCF and Adaptation Fund) have also all funded emergency preparedness, but always within the limitations of their mandates.

ƔEstimating precise levels of emergency preparedness financing across every mechanism DQGWRROH[DPLQHGLVFKDOOHQJLQJEHFDXVHSUHSDUHGQHVVLVRIWHQQRWFRGHGVHSDUDWHO\and can be subsumed into broader programmes of action, or data is not openly accessible.

Ɣ1RQHRIWKHPHFKDQLVPVH[DPLQHGDGHTXDWHO\ILQDQFHVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV DFURVVWKHµSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQXXP¶DQGIHZKDYHWKHQHFHVVDU\JHRJUDSKLFDOUHDFK to address priorities globally

3. Emergency preparedness in context: THEARCHITECTURE

)NTRODUCINGTHElNANCINGARCHITECTURE,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHH[DPLQHWKHPDLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJmechanisms in detail, dividing them into three broad FDWHJRULHVKXPDQLWDULDQULVNUHODWHGDQGFOLPDWH¿QDQFH$IWHULQWURGXFLQJHDFKZHH[SORUHWKHUDQJHRIFRQWH[WVLQwhich these mechanisms do (or do not fund) emergency preparedness. We highlight the policy guidelines of the funds, which lead to the particular funding choices made. Where possible, the way in which the various mechanisms fund different countries across different preparedness DFWLYLWLHVLVH[DPLQHG

Figure 3.1, which is intentionally illustrative, indicates broad trends in the kinds of emergency preparedness DFWLYLWLHVWKDWHDFKRIWKHPDLQ¿QDQFLQJWRROVmechanisms supports, using consolidated evidence IURPWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHVVHH)LJXUH$VWKHLQGLYLGXDOFRXQWU\¿JXUHV)LJXUH±)LJXUHGHPRQVWUDWHLQSUDFWLFHWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIWRROV

and mechanisms actually present in each country GLIIHUVJUHDWO\$W¿UVWJODQFHWKH¿JXUHVPD\LPSO\that preparedness is adequately supported by various mechanisms. In reality, not all mechanisms are present in every country, leaving gaps in the availability of funding for preparedness. Moreover, not all mechanisms willingly support emergency preparedness, and those that do may VXSSRUWRQO\VSHFL¿FVHFWRUVRUW\SHVRISUHSDUHGQHVVLQWHUYHQWLRQVOHDYLQJJDSVLQWKHV\VWHP%R[provides a brief outline of the main international public ¿QDQFLQJWRROVDQGPHFKDQLVPVGLVFXVVHGWKURXJKRXWWKLVUHSRUW7KHVHDUHDEULGJHGVXPPDULHVRIWKHPHFKDQLVPV¶own descriptions of their roles and remits.13

13 Further information can be found on their individual websites.

37

Hum

anita

rian

resp

onse

Deve

lopm

ent Legislation

policyCrisis

coordination Training Contingencyplanning



Informationsystems

Framework& planning


Stockpiling

Bilateral humanitarian

Consolidated appeals

CHF

ERF

CERF

GFDRR

UNDP CPR TTF

Bilateral development

National government

CCA fundsAdaptation Fund, PPCR, LDCF

Flash appeals

"OX4HECOREINTERNATIONALFUNDINGTOOLSANDMECHANISMS

&IGURE-APPINGTHECOREFUNDINGTOOLSMECHANISMSFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

Humanitarian mechanisms

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF): A KXPDQLWDULDQIXQGVHWXSE\WKH81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\LQWRHQDEOHPRUHWLPHO\DQGUHOLDEOHKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFH7KH&(5)¶VREMHFWLYHVDUHWRSURPRWHHDUO\action and response to reduce loss of life, enhance response to time-critical requirements and strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises. 7KH&(5)KDVDJUDQWIDFLOLW\RIPLOOLRQDQGDORDQIDFLOLW\RIPLOOLRQWKHIRUPHUKDVWZRZLQGRZVRQHIRUrapid response and one for underfunded emergencies. In FRXQWULHVUHFHLYHG&(5)IXQGLQJLQWKH¿JXUHLVFRXQWULHV

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs): Established in FRXQWULHVVLQFH(5)VSURYLGH1*2VDQG81DJHQFLHVZLWKUDSLGDQGÀH[LEOHIXQGLQJWRDGGUHVVFULWLFDOgaps in humanitarian emergencies. ERFs, also known as Humanitarian Response Funds (HRFs) in some countries, are usually established to meet unforeseen needs not included in the CAP or similar concerted humanitarian DFWLRQSODQV(5)VSUHGRPLQDQWO\IXQG1*2VDQGDFWLYHO\VXSSRUWORFDO1*2FDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJ7KH\DUHXVXDOO\UHODWLYHO\VPDOOGLVEXUVLQJOHVVWKDQPLOOLRQLQWRWDOSHU\HDUDQGSURYLGHVPDOOWRPHGLXPVL]HGJUDQWV

Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs): Country-based pooled funds that provide early and predictable IXQGLQJWR1*2VDQG81DJHQFLHVIRUWKHLUUHVSRQVHVWRcritical humanitarian needs. CHFs look ahead to future KXPDQLWDULDQQHHGVDQGIXQGSULRULW\OLIHVDYLQJSURMHFWVLGHQWL¿HGLQD&$3RUVLPLODUKXPDQLWDULDQDFWLRQSODQ7KH\DUHFXUUHQWO\SUHVHQWLQ¿YHFRXQWULHVZLWKRQJRLQJlarge humanitarian operations: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and the Central African Republic.

Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP))URPthe CAP is being replaced with the Strategic Response 3ODQVHH%R[EXWLVDVVHVVHGLQWKLVUHSRUWRQLWVhistorical role as one of the principal international funding PHFKDQLVPV7KH&$3ZDVQRWDSRROHG¿QDQFLQJmechanism but a programme cycle for aid organisations to plan, coordinate, fund and implement humanitarian UHVSRQVHSDUWQHUVDFURVVWKHKXPDQLWDULDQVSHFWUXPdrew up a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and an appeal for funds. Consolidated appeals presented a snapshot of humanitarian situations, resource requirements DQGUHVSRQVHSODQVIRUWKH\HDUDKHDG,QWKHUHZHUHFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVLQFRXQWULHV

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 3. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN CONTEXT: THE ARCHITECTURE

39

5LVNIRFXVHGÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)*)'55¶VPLVVLRQLVWRDVVLVWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVWRUHGXFHWKHLUYXOQHUDELOLW\WRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVby mainstreaming DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA). Based within the World Bank, it provides grants and technical assistance to leverage larger investments in disaster risk management (DRM). GFDRR structures LWVZRUNDORQJ¿YHµWKHPDWLFSLOODUV¶ULVNLGHQWL¿FDWLRQULVNUHGXFWLRQSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLDOSURWHFWLRQDQGresilient reconstruction. It has funded activities in 49 countries to date.

UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP CPR TTF)(VWDEOLVKHGLQWKHCPR TTF is managed by the Bureau of Crisis Prevention DQG5HFRYHU\%&35DW81'37KHIXQGZDVGHVLJQHGDVDµIDVWÀH[LEOHIXQGLQJPHFKDQLVP«WRUHVSRQGHIIHFWLYHO\WRFULVLVSUHYHQWLRQDQGUHFRYHU\QHHGV¶,WDOORZVIRUXQHDUPDUNHGÀH[LEOHWKHPDWLFDOO\HDUPDUNHGDQGFRXQWU\HDUPDUNHG¿QDQFLQJRIFULVLVUHODWHGLVVXHV7KH&3577)¶VEURDGWKHPHVLQFOXGHFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQand recovery, DRR, early recovery, gender equality DQGZRPHQ¶VHPSRZHUPHQWLQFULVLVDQGSROLF\DQGprogramme support.

&OLPDWHDGDSWDWLRQÀQDQFLQJ

Adaptation Fund: The Adaptation Fund has the overall REMHFWLYHRIUHGXFLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGLQFUHDVLQJDGDSWLYHcapacity to respond to the impacts of climate change. It operates in countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate FKDQJH,WKDVIXQGHGSURMHFWVLQFRXQWULHVWRGDWH

Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Established under the Climate Convention, the LDCF is managed by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). It is designed to meet the needs of least developed countries (LDCs) by ¿QDQFLQJWKHSUHSDUDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI1DWLRQDO$GDSWDWLRQ3URJUDPPHVRI$FWLRQ1$3$VWKHURDGPDSIRUDFRXQWU\¶VSULRULW\DFWLRQVRQDGDSWDWLRQ7KH/'&)focuses on sectors that are central to development DQGOLYHOLKRRGV8SWR-XQHLWKDGRSHUDWHGLQcountries.

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR): The PPCR is a targeted programme of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), one of two funds within the framework of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs).14 The PPCR is aimed at MXPSVWDUWLQJµFOLPDWHVPDUW¶GHYHORSPHQWE\SLORWLQJDQGdemonstrating ways to integrate climate risk and resilience LQWRSODQQLQJ1LQHFRXQWULHVDQGWZRUHJLRQVKDYHEHHQselected for this pilot programme.

Bilateral donors

In addition to the core mechanisms described, donors have GLUHFWURXWHVIRUIXQGLQJSURMHFWVLQUHFLSLHQWFRXQWULHV$VWKHVHDUHFRQWH[WXDOO\VSHFL¿FWKHFDVHVWXGLHVEHVWGHVFULEHKRZGRQRUV¿QDQFHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVGLUHFWO\LQDVSHFL¿FFRXQWU\,OOXVWUDWLYHH[DPSOHVDUHprovided throughout this report, and we have delineated this where possible by highlighting how donors fund directly WKURXJKERWKWKHLUKXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJVWUHDPV1RWHWKDWDOWKRXJKZHFRQVLGHUWKHLPSRUWDQFHof donor funding throughout this report, we do not, in this VHFWLRQFRQVLGHUWKHZD\WKDW¿QDQFLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVRSHUDWHVJOREDOO\WKHFRPSOH[LW\DQGGLYHUVLW\RIGRQRUapproaches prohibits this. However, we do analyse this within each of the case study countries (see Section 4).)

14 The CIF comprises the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The PPCR sits under the SCF, along with two RWKHU¿QDQFLQJZLQGRZVWKH)RUHVW,QYHVWPHQW3URJUDPPH),3DQGWKH3URJUDPIRU6FDOLQJ8S5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\LQ/RZ,QFRPH&RXQWULHV65(3%RWKWKH&7)DQGWKH65(3¿QDQFHORZFDUERQclean technology and development. The FIP supports developing country efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and promotes sustainable forest management that leads to reductions in emissions and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+).

(UMANITARIANMECHANISMSTOOLS

Central Emergency Response Fund

7KH&(5)LVWKHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJLQVWUXPHQWZLWKWKHPRVWFOHDUO\GH¿QHGUROHDQGOLPLWV(VWDEOLVKHGLQWR‘enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance WRWKRVHDIIHFWHGE\QDWXUDOGLVDVWHUVDQGDUPHGFRQÀLFWV¶

2&+$ELWZRUNVWKURXJKWZRµZLQGRZV¶WKH5DSLG5HVSRQVH:LQGRZ55:DQG8QGHU)XQGHG(PHUJHQFLHV8)(:LQGRZHDFKZLWKVHSDUDWHJXLGDQFHIRUDSSO\LQJagencies and allocation. The CERF, with its global reach, LVWKHRQO\RQHRIWKHKXPDQLWDULDQLQVWUXPHQWVH[DPLQHGhere that can operate in countries with no standing 2&+$SUHVHQFH:KHWKHUWKURXJKWKH55:RU8)(WKH&(5)¶Vµ/LIH6DYLQJ&ULWHULD¶DSSO\UHTXLULQJDSSOLFDQWVWRGHPRQVWUDWHDGLUHFWOLIHVDYLQJDSSOLFDWLRQIRUDOOSURMHFWVThe stance on preparedness is very clear, it being one of the LVVXHVQRWLQFOXGHGDVHOLJLEOHIRUVXSSRUW2&+$D

‘ :KLOHWKH&(5)GRHVQRWIXQGSUHSDUHGQHVVWKH6HFUHWDULDWLVFORVHO\IROORZLQJWKHGHEDWHZKLFKLVFXUUHQWO\RQJRLQJZLWKLQWKHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJVSKHUHDLPHGDWHQKDQFLQJVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJIRUWKHpreparedness activities. Regardless of the direction

Country Total CERF contribution15

Projects with likely emergency preparedness components

Nepal • Trained water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), nutrition and health cluster members on humanitarian preparedness and response.

:+2DQG0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWKDQG3RSXODWLRQ0R+3SURFXUHGVWRFNSLOHVVWUHQJWKHQHGHDUO\ZDUQLQJDQGUHSRUWLQJV\VWHPVLPSURYHGHDUO\GLDJQRVLV of health-, nutrition- and WASH-related ailments.

• Agriculture: improved food security and long-term resilience.

Djibouti • Hygiene promotion campaigning.• Meeting of WASH cluster to improve overall coordination and emergency

preparedness.

Afghanistan • Protection cluster engaged village leaders in community-based preparedness activities.

Chad • WASH cluster increased hygiene and sanitation sensitisation through radio messages during a cholera epidemic.

• Training for communities and heads of health centres.• 249 community workers trained in cholera prevention.

Niger :$6+SURMHFWSURYLGHGWUHDWPHQWDQGGLVLQIHFWLRQRIZDWHUVRXUFHVLQKRXVHKROGVat risk of cholera contamination in order to prevent a future outbreak.

Philippines • Livelihood support reduced vulnerability and strengthened resilience to shocks.

Sudan :DUHKRXVHVSDFHWRDFFRPPRGDWHDQGH[SDQGVXSSOLHVDVSDUWRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness.

South Sudan :$6+SURMHFWK\JLHQHSURPRWLRQPHVVDJHVIRFXVHGRQHIIHFWLYHZDWHUWUHDWPHQWand storage.

0XOWLVHFWRUSURMHFWLQFUHDVHGZDWHUVXSSO\FXUEHGWKHVSUHDGRIZDWHUERUQHGLVHDVHVSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUSRWHQWLDODFXWHZDWHU\GLDUUKRHD$:'FKROHUDoutbreak.

Zimbabwe • Rapid health assessment on preparedness and response capacity in two districts.VFKRROVFOLQLFVDQGWKHLUFRPPXQLWLHVZHUHUHDFKHGZLWK:$6+IDFLOLWLHV

and hygiene promotion messages.

4ABLE#%2&CONTRIBUTIONSTOARANGEOFCOUNTRIESWITHIDENTIlABLEELEMENTS OFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

2IZKLFKHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDUHDSDUWWKRXJKWKHVSHFL¿FYDOXHVFDQQRWEHH[WUDFWHGZLWKRXWIXUWKHUDQDO\VLV

RIWKHGLVFXVVLRQDQGQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHXVHIXOQHVVRISUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIKXPDQLWDULDQFULVLVWKH6HFUHWDULDWUHPDLQVFRQYLQFHGWKDWSUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDWWKLVVWDJHZLWKLQWKH&(5)/LIH6DYLQJ&ULWHULDDVLWLVQRWSDUWRI&(5)PDQGDWHDQGDOWHUQDWLYHVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJVKRXOGEHSXUVXHG¶

1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKH&(5)JXLGDQFHDQDUURZUDQJHRIpreparedness activities has been funded. In keeping with other humanitarian instruments, these tend to be focused on community-level activities (notably training for health workers and hygiene promotion), stockpiling and warehousing

7D\ORUDQG&RXWXUHIRUWKFRPLQJ7RWDOSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJLVDFKDOOHQJHWRWUDFNEXWDFWLYLWLHVRXWOLQHGLQSURMHFWGRFXPHQWDWLRQVXJJHVWWKDWRI&(5)DOORFDWLRQVLQDFWLYLWLHVLQQLQHFRXQWULHVLQFOXGHGHOHPHQWVRIpreparedness (ibid.).

Emergency Response Funds

Emergency Response Funds have been the least µUHJXODWHG¶RIWKHKXPDQLWDULDQIXQGVWRGDWH7D\ORUDQG


41

16 In reference to Indonesia: ‘Like many ERF/HRF mechanisms the level RIVWDIIDYDLODEOHLVLQDGHTXDWHWRPHHWWKHH[WHQWRIWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDWDUHLQYROYHG¶2&+$D

17 In reference to Colombia: ‘ERF Colombia was initially supported by 1RUZD\6ZHGHQDQG6SDLQ7KHVHWKUHHGRQRUVFRQWLQXHWREHLWVgreatest supporters. While only one new donor (San Marino) has EHHQLGHQWL¿HGLQWKHVKRUWWHUP2&+$KDVH[SUHVVHGLWVGHVLUHWRLQFUHDVHGRQRUVKLSDQGGRXEOHWKHDPRXQWRIWKH)XQG¶LELG

&RXWXUHIRUWKFRPLQJ8QOLNH&+)VZKLFKDUHacknowledged as requiring a critical mass of funding, management and advisory capacity and a CAP or similar appeal, ERFs have been created in a range of different ZD\VLQDUDQJHRIGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WV7KHLQLWLDWLYHWRVHWup an ERF can come from a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) looking for a mechanism through which to fund under-served priorities or from a prominent donor looking to create a useful disbursement channel in the aftermath RIDFULVLV(5)VYDU\JUHDWO\LQWHUPVRIVFDOHPDQ\RIWKHVPDOOHUIXQGVDUHVHHQDVKDYLQJLQVXI¿FLHQWmanagement capacity16 and a narrow donor base.17

The Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) is DQRXWOLHUJHQHUDOO\GHVFULEHGDVDµK\EULG¶¿QDQFLQJinstrument, having many of the attributes of a CHF (scale, well-developed allocation and disbursement procedures, and a strong advisory board). The stance of the Ethiopian government and its reluctance to see a standing humanitarian appeal (CAP or similar) established mean that the HRF is likely to remain. In keeping with ERFs, the Ethiopia Fund is characterised as an ERF on the basis of ZKDWLWODFNVDMRLQWO\FRQVWUXFWHG&$3RUVLPLODUDSSHDODQG¿[HGRUVWDQGDUGDOORFDWLRQURXQGV

7KHUHDUHH[DPSOHVRI(5)VEHLQJXVHGWRIXQGpreparedness activities. As a rule, however, these activities are not prioritised and constitute a relatively small SURSRUWLRQRIZKDWDUHVPDOOYROXPHVWREHJLQZLWK&RQWH[WSOD\VDVLJQL¿FDQWSDUWLQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSUHSDUHGQHVVLVIXQGHGLQ(5)VEXWPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWIDFWRUVDSSHDUWREHthe nature of the funds and the amount of funding available. Where emergency preparedness is included, activities are largely at the community level, and do not address legislation, national standards, international and regional agreements, resource allocation, coordination or information management systems.

Funding levels for emergency preparedness (as a SURSRUWLRQRIRYHUDOOH[SHQGLWXUHDUHORZIRUWKHFRXQWULHVWKDWUHOHDVHGDQQXDOUHSRUWVLQDWRWDORIPLOOLRQZDVUHFHLYHG2IWKLVRQO\PLOOLRQLVestimated to have been spent on emergency preparedness.

Common Humanitarian Funds

There is no single document that puts forward a policy stance on the relationship of CHFs with emergency preparedness. At the country level, guidance is not

standard and individual guidelines tend not to address SUHSDUHGQHVVGLUHFWO\7KHVSHFL¿FUXOHVRIHDFKIXQGDUHWKHUHIRUHRISULPHLPSRUWDQFH,Q6RPDOLDIRUH[DPSOHguidelines for standard allocations make no reference to SUHSDUHGQHVVIXQGLQJ2&+$F)RUWKHHPHUJHQF\UHVHUYHRIWKLVSDUWLFXODUIXQGDSSUR[LPDWHO\UHWDLQHGannually for unforeseen emergencies), funding for SUHSDUHGQHVVLVVSHFL¿FDOO\H[FOXGHG

All CHFs operate within CAPs or similar appeal frameworks DQG&$3VGH¿QHRUVKRXOGGH¿QHSULRULWLHVZLWKLQDFRXQWU\FRQWH[W7KHPDMRULW\RI&+)VPDNHWZRVWDQGDUGallocations per year, theoretically taking a snapshot of current priorities at the time of each allocation. Although allocation processes vary slightly by country, most rely KHDYLO\RQFOXVWHUVWREULQJWRJHWKHUSDUWQHUVDQGUH¿QHpriorities, on a part-consensual, part-competitive basis.

A lack of disaggregated data within a CHF contribution to its respective CAP makes tracking of emergency preparedness YHU\FKDOOHQJLQJ7KHDQQXDOUHSRUWVVXJJHVWWKDWDOLPLWHGUDQJHRIDFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[are funded from CHFs. As with the ERFs, attention is predominantly to contingency/preparedness and response SODQQLQJLQFOXGLQJFRPPXQLW\SUHSDUHGQHVVWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHVVSHFL¿FWRHDFKFRQWH[WHPHUJHQF\VHUYLFHVstandby arrangements and pre-positioning (predominantly WKURXJKVWRFNSLOLQJDQGLQIRUPDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWDQGcommunication systems.

Suggested volumes of emergency preparedness in each FRXQWU\DVLQGLFDWHGLQWKHUHSRUWVDUHDVIROORZV&HQWUDO$IULFDQ5HSXEOLFPLOOLRQPD[LPXP6RPDOLDPLOOLRQHVWLPDWH6RXWK6XGDQQR¿JXUHDOWKRXJKWKUHHFOXVWHUVUHSRUWVRPHSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHV6XGDQQRFOHDUGDWD'5&QRFOHDUGDWD

+RZHYHUWKHODUJHVWDOORFDWLRQXQGHUWKHµPXOWLVHFWRUDO¶FDWHJRU\ZDVWKHSURYLVLRQRIPLOOLRQWR81,&()¶VRapid Response to the Movement of Populations (RRMP) SURMHFWLQ(DVWHUQ'5&,QUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHKLJKO\YRODWLOHVHFXULW\FRQWH[WLQWKHHDVWRIWKHFRXQWU\WKH5503SUHSRVLWLRQVLPSOHPHQWLQJSDUWQHUV¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVand supplies to enable a rapid humanitarian response to population movements (either displacements or returns) after assessments by partners. It provides emergency non-food items, water and sanitation, and/or emergency education services to the most affected communities -3)8/LVWHGDVDUHVSRQVHSURMHFWWKH5503LVDOVRDQH[DPSOHRIDFOHDUO\WDUJHWHGSUHSDUHGQHVVmechanism.

Consolidated Appeal Process

7KH&$3LVQRWDSRROHG¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVP,WLVDWRROWREULQJDLGDJHQFLHVWRJHWKHUWRMRLQWO\SODQFRRUGLQDWHimplement and monitor response to natural disasters and

42

FRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHV+RZHYHUJLYHQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH&$3LQSUHSDULQJFRVWHGSURMHFWVDQGDSSHDOLQJIRUWKHIXQGLQJRIWKHVHSURMHFWVLWLVLQFOXGHGLQRXUDQDO\VLVRIWKHRSWLRQVRILPSURYHG¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV)RUPRVWFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHVDQDQQXDOappeal is launched at the end of each year, covering the humanitarian needs of the coming year, based upon the CHAP, which provides a foundation of common analysis, needs assessment, scenario planning, etc.19

&$3VKDYHVKRZQÀH[LELOLW\LQDGDSWLQJWRKXPDQLWDULDQtrends, and many of them address preparedness in elements or as a theme. CAP guidelines include pre-disaster planning, which in turn includes crisis monitoring and preparation for emergency relief management as a potential area of focus. Furthermore, guidelines include assessments to determine the scope of the emergency or potential emergencies. Based on the scope of the activities listed in the mid-year reviews, the most recent &$3VVHHPWREHHIIHFWLYHDWIXO¿OOLQJWKHVHJXLGHOLQHVCAPs contain a somewhat broader range of emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDFURVVWKHPDWUL[WKDQPDQ\individual instruments. These have included early warning DQGKD]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVOHJLVODWLYHIUDPHZRUNVLQWHUagency coordination, contingency/preparedness and response planning (including community preparedness), training opportunities and stockpiling/pre-positioning.

Preparedness components most frequently referenced by country reviews were contingency preparedness and response planning, capacity-building (including training opportunities) and stockpiling/pre-positioning, including YDFFLQDWLRQVDQGLPPXQLVDWLRQV,QVHYHQFRXQWULHVreported preparedness activities attributed to contingency/preparedness and response planning. The categories for training opportunities and stockpiling/pre-positioning were ERWKHYLGHQWLQ¿YHFRXQWULHV

0RVWSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJDUWLFXODWHGE\WKH&$3LVKRZHYHUGLI¿FXOWWRGLVDJJUHJDWH,QPRVWFDVHVLWLVRQO\SRVVLEOHWRWUDFNSUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHVWR&$3GRFXPHQWVDQGUHSRUWV±KRZHYHUWKHGLYHUVLW\of emergency preparedness activities and their reach DFURVVGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WVDUHYHU\LPSRUWDQW)RUH[DPSOH6XGDQ¶V&$32&+$GKDGDVSHFL¿FVHFWLRQon preparedness, with a clear requirement of $13.2 PLOOLRQ,QRWKHUH[DPSOHVIURP&$3GRFXPHQWV

Ɣ ,Q$IJKDQLVWDQWKH&$3LQFOXGHGÀRRGSUHSDUHGQHVVworkshops, pre-positioning of health supplies and the establishment of emergency health teams. It DOVRFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRID1DWLRQDOContingency Plan and inter-agency contingency plans IRUFRQÀLFWÀRRGVODQGVOLGHVDQGHDUWKTXDNHV

Ɣ ,Q'MLERXWLWKH&$3JDYHVXSSRUWWRWKH:$6+FOXVWHUfor planning in emergency preparedness and response.

Ɣ In Chad, the CAP helped to develop local support through contingency plans for natural disasters and, in the health sector, supported the procurement of 22 cholera kits to be provided to high-risk health districts.

Ɣ ,Q.HQ\DRISURMHFWVIXQGHGYLDWKH&$3incorporated early recovery and DRR components 2&+$H7KHVHLQFOXGHGUDLQDVVHVVPHQWVfor food security, the drafting of a law for DRM and the training of government staff in every county.

Ɣ ,Q6RXWK6XGDQWKH&$3LQFOXGHGDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWof preparedness. This included the pre-positioning of VXSSOLHVLQUHJLRQVOLNHO\WREHFXWRIIE\UDLQVÀRRGLQJand a revision of the South Sudan Humanitarian Contingency Plan to ensure that preparedness plans DGGUHVVHGSRWHQWLDOIDOORXWIURPERUGHUFRQÀLFW with Sudan.

Ɣ ,Q6RPDOLDWKH&$3KDGDVLJQL¿FDQWHPSKDVLVRQpreparedness, including AWD, cholera prevention and SUHSDUHGQHVVLQKLJKULVNDUHDVWUDLQLQJLQGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVRIWHDFKHUVDQGIDFLOLWDWRUVWUDLQLQJLQ'55IRUFRPPXQLW\HGXFDWLRQFRPPLWWHHVDQGFRQWLQJHQF\SODQVIRUGLVWUDFWVincluding the provision of early warning action systems.

:KLOHFOHDUO\¿WWLQJZLWKLQWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[LWLVDJDLQZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKLVLVSUHSDUHGQHVVLQDYHU\QDUURZVHQVH±preparedness for the international system to respond with a narrow range of activities and a limited geographical area against a clearly VSHFL¿HGDQGYHU\SUHGLFWDEOHVHWRIULVNV7KLVPDNHVLWVLPLODUWRWKH6XGDQUHIHUHQGXPSURMHFWGHVFULEHGHDUOLHU

,QDGGLWLRQWRFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVWKH81DOVRFRRUGLQDWHGWKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIÀDVKDSSHDOVWRSURYLGHUDSLGIXQGLQJIRUWKUHHWRVL[PRQWKVDIWHUDFULVLV7KHUHZDVMXVWRQHRIWKHVHLQIRUIRRGLQVHFXULW\LQ/HVRWKR)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVUHSRUWÀDVKDSSHDOVDUHODUJHO\LUUHOHYDQWIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWKHIRFXVLVtherefore on consolidated appeals. However in Section 4 of the report ZKHUHZHDQDO\VH¿QDQFLQJDFURVVDUDQJHRIFRXQWULHVZHLQFOXGHÀDVKDSSHDOVZKHUHDSSURSULDWHDVHOHPHQWVRIWKHRYHUDOOIXQGLQJFRQWH[W

Box 3.2: FRom ConsolIDAtED APPEAl PRoCEss to tHE stRAtEgIC REsPonsE PlAn

'XULQJWKH¿QDOLVDWLRQRIWKLVUHSRUWQHZJXLGDQFHwas released by the IASC that replaced the CAP with the Strategic Response Plan (SRP). Effective from 653VUHSODFHWKHSUHSDUDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQof the traditional CAP document. They are designed WREHVLPLODUWRWKH&$3ZLWKPDQ\H[LVWLQJIHDWXUHVretained or enhanced. Key elements include a +XPDQLWDULDQ1HHGV2YHUYLHZ&RXQWU\6WUDWHJ\ and Cluster Plans.

1RWHWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVUHSRUWWKH&$3is referred to throughout until the recommendations section, when the latest guidance on Strategic Response Plans is used.


43

Ɣ The CAP in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) included the training of community members and health providers in emergency preparedness and the VWUHQJWKHQLQJRI:$6+FOXVWHUSDUWQHUV¶FDSDFLW\IRUpreparedness.

Ɣ In Yemen, funding via the CAP was allocated to contingency plans at national level and within FRQÀLFWDUHDVOHDGLQJWRQHZSURJUDPPLQJVHFWRUDOpreparedness and response plans and stockpiling of critical supplies.

Ɣ ,Q=LPEDEZHWKH:$6+VHFWRUUHSRUWHGPLOOLRQIRUµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGUHVSRQVH¶LQFOXGLQJassessment of typhoid risk factors and outbreak preparedness. The protection cluster focused on WKHPDWLFSUHSDUHGQHVVFRQWLQJHQF\SODQVHDUO\ZDUQLQJLQGLFDWRUVWUDLQLQJLQ'55DQGGLVWULFWOHYHODRR workshops.

2ISK RELATEDMECHANISMS

5.$04HEMATIC4RUST&UNDFOR#RISISPrevention and Recovery

Managed by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery %&35ZLWKLQ81'3WKH&3577)KDVDEURDGUHPLWLQpreventing and recovering from crisis, focusing largely on a group of priority countries agreed in advance of the XSFRPLQJ\HDU9DX[EIRUWKFRPLQJ(PHUJHQF\preparedness features across a wide range of initiatives within reports from the CPR TTF, including in areas of '55FRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQDQGHDUO\UHFRYHU\LELG:KHUHthe CPR TTF funds emergency preparedness activities, WKH\DUHRIWHQERXQGXSZLWKWKHVHµODUJHU¶DUHDVDQGUDUHO\DUWLFXODWHGDVVHSDUDWHSURMHFWV,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKLVwas not so typical in the early years of CPR TTF funding, ZKHUH¿QDQFLQJZDVRIWHQJUDQWHGIRUVWDQGDORQHSURMHFWVVSHFL¿FDOO\IRUGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVV Most of the funds DUHXWLOLVHGGLUHFWO\E\81'3FRXQWU\RI¿FHVEXWWKH\FRXOGbe more widely used with appropriate strengthening of policy and guidelines.

The geographic range of the CPR TTF is almost unlimited (ibid.). It is a global fund without restriction beyond 81'3¶VRZQIRFXVDQGPDQGDWHDQG&3577)IXQGLQJKDVEHHQXVHGDFURVVDGLYHUVHJURXSRIFRQÀLFWDQGGLVDVWHUDIIHFWHGFRXQWULHV7KHWRSFRXQWULHVE\H[SHQGLWXUHLQZHUHLQGHFUHDVLQJRUGHUWKH

OPT, Haiti, DRC, Somalia, Pakistan, Liberia, Sri Lanka, 1HSDO&KDG6XGDQ1LJHU7LPRU/HVWH<HPHQ&WHG¶,YRLUHDQG/HEDQRQ21 The CPR TTF covers a wide UDQJHRIFRXQWULHVWKHUHSRUWVWDWHVWKDW81'3KHOSHGJRYHUQPHQWVWRHVWDEOLVKFRPSUHKHQVLYH'55SURJUDPPHV$FWLYLW\PD\FRQWLQXHRYHUORQJSHULRGV¿YHyears plus) but may be supported by different funding sources during that time. The CPR TTF typically helps in WKHHDUO\VWDJHVDIWHUDFULVLVZKHUHLQ81'3PD\WKHQseek to attract longer-term funding from donors.

Despite the availability of overall data on recipient volumes, disaggregation of emergency preparedness is not possible with openly accessible material. This is in part due to the integration of preparedness into larger LQLWLDWLYHVDVDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHG)RUH[DPSOHDOWKRXJKWKHUHLVEUHDNGRZQE\µZLQGRZ¶IRULWRQO\FDSWXUHVbroad overall funding (Table 3.2).

4ABLE%XPENDITURESOFTHE5.$0#0244&

CPR TTF window Expenditure ($ millions)

&RQÁLFWSUHYHQWLRQDQGUHFRYHU\ Disaster risk reduction and recovery

13.4

Early recovery 21.7Gender equality Policy and programme support Total 111.3322

6RXUFH81'3%&35$QQXDO5HSRUWFXUUHQWSULFHV 81'3

'LOBAL&ACILITYFOR$ISASTER2EDUCTION AND2ECOVERY'&$22

(VWDEOLVKHGLQ*)'55LVDSDUWQHUVKLSRIcountries and eight international organisations committed to helping developing countries reduce their vulnerability WRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDQGDGDSWWRFOLPDWHFKDQJH,WZRUNVto mainstream DRR and CCA into country development strategies by supporting country-led and managed LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH+)$+LOOIRUWKFRPLQJ

GFDRR is responsible for allocating funds entrusted to it in line with geographic and thematic priorities set by its donors and partners. In any given country, it adopts a number of criteria to help in allocating resources, including HVWDEOLVKHGYXOQHUDELOLW\LQGLFDWRUVSDVWHYDOXDWLRQRILPSDFWWKHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WLQFOXGLQJH[LVWLQJUHODWLRQV

'LVFXVVLRQZLWKVHQLRU%&35VWDIIPHPEHU6HSWHPEHU7KHOLVWRIWRSFRXQWULHVFKDQJHVUDSLGO\RIWHQWRUHÀHFWPRVWXUJHQW

UHFRYHU\FRQWH[WV+DLWLZDVWKHELJJHVWUHFLSLHQWLQDQG([FOXGLQJFRUHIXQGVDOORFDWHGE\81'3WRFULVLVWHUPHGµWDUJHWHG

UHVRXUFHVDWWKH&RUH¶RUPRUHXVXDOO\ZLWKLQ81'375$&IXQGV7KLVLVVHWDWRI81'3¶VFRUHSURJUDPPHUHVRXUFHVLQWHQGHGIRUFULVLVERWKFRQÀLFWDQGGLVDVWHUUHODWHG

44

ZLWKJRYHUQPHQWVDQGGRQRUSULRULWLHV7KHUHDUHDOVRcriteria for determining in which country funding is granted. To date it has funded activities in 49 disaster-prone countries, selected through its eligibility criteria (risk and vulnerability indicators with consideration of geographical UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ*)'55D

GFDRR has prepared comprehensive programmes of VXSSRUWLQ'50IRUSULRULW\FRXQWULHV23 11 donor-HDUPDUNHGFRXQWULHV*)'55DQGWKH$IULFDQ&DULEEHDQ3DFL¿F(XURSHDQ8QLRQ$&3(8SURJUDPPHFRXQWULHV*)'55D&RUHSULRULW\FRXQWULHVDUH¿QDQFHGSULPDULO\WKURXJKWKHPXOWLGRQRUWUXVWIXQGQRQFRUHFRXQWULHVWKDWDUHHDUPDUNHGE\VSHFL¿FGRQRUVDUH¿QDQFHGprimarily through three single-donor trust funds (Australia, 6SDLQDQG-DSDQDQGRWKHUFRXQWULHVDUH¿QDQFHGZLWKÀH[LEOHIXQGVRUVSHFLDOLQLWLDWLYHVVXFKDVWKH$&3(8SURJUDPPH*)'55E&XUUHQWO\RIIXQGLQJLV

LQYHVWHGLQSULRULW\FRXQWULHVZLWKWKHUHPDLQLQJXVHGÀH[LEO\DFURVVDOOFRXQWULHV,Q¿QDQFLDO\HDU*)'55DSSURYHGSURMHFWVZRUWKPLOOLRQDQGGLVEXUVHGDWRWDORIPLOOLRQWKURXJKLWVWUXVWIXQGWRVXSSRUWWKH

4ABLE'&$22 FUNDEDEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSINTERVENTIONS

Project description Country Estimated emergency preparedness value

Activities GFDRR pillar

Technical and advisory support to ‘Managing 1DWXUDO+D]DUGV¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHVIRUHFDVWLQJDQGearly warning. &RPPXQLW\EDVHGSUHSDUHGQHVVWDUJHWLQJmost vulnerable communities.

9LHWQDP 8QNQRZQ +D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVand early warningContingency/preparedness and response planning

Risk LGHQWL¿FDWLRQpreparedness

Support establishment of early warning system (EWS), technical support and capacity development. Support establishment of information management system across institutions.

Lesotho PLOOLRQ +D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVand early warningInstitutional and legislative frameworks

Risk LGHQWL¿FDWLRQpreparedness

Support preparedness and response capacity. Priorities include local contingency and HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVSODQVOLQNLQJSODQVWRHDUO\ZDUQLQJFRPPXQLW\EDVHGSUHSDUHGQHVVLQFOXGLQJGULOOVDQGVLPXODWLRQH[HUFLVHV

Burkina Faso

1RGDWD Contingency/preparedness and response planning7UDLQLQJDQGH[HUFLVHV

Risk ,GHQWL¿FDWLRQpreparedness

'HYHORSDZHDWKHUEDVHGLQGH[IRUWULJJHULQJHPHUJHQF\¿QDQFLQJ/($3WRVWUHQJWKHQWKH3URGXFWLYH6DIHW\1HW3URJUDPPH

Ethiopia PLOOLRQ +D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVInformation management systemsFunding mechanisms

Preparedness

Improve preparedness by modernising the evacuation shelter network and engaging communities in mapping and emergency planning.

Haiti PLOOLRQ Contingency and preparednessEmergency services/standby arrangements

Risk LGHQWL¿FDWLRQpreparedness, risk reduction

Master Plan for Flood Management in Metro Manila, identifying investments to protect UHVLGHQWVIURPÀRRGVZLWKXSWRD\HDUUHWXUQperiod.

Philippines PLOOLRQ +D]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVInstitutional frameworks

Risk LGHQWL¿FDWLRQrisk reduction

6RXUFH+LOOIRUWKFRPLQJ

$WLWV¿IWKPHHWLQJLQ&RSHQKDJHQWKH*)'55&RQVXOWDWLYHGroup asked the secretariat to focus on priority countries to increase LPSDFW7KLVOHGWRDSULRULWLVDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQVLQFRUHFRXQWULHV%XUNLQD)DVR'MLERXWL(WKLRSLD*KDQD+DLWL,QGRQHVLD.\UJ\]5HSXEOLF0DGDJDVFDU0DODZL0DOL0DUVKDOO,VODQGV0R]DPELTXH1HSDO3DQDPD3DSXD1HZ*XLQHD6HQHJDO6RORPRQLVODQGV7RJR9LHWQDPDQG5HSXEOLFRI<HPHQ7KHFRXQWULHVZHUHVHOHFWHGGXHWRWKHLUKLJKYXOQHUDELOLW\WRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDQGORZHFRQRPLFresilience to cope with disaster impacts, including anticipated climate change and variability. Two thirds are least developed countries /'&VDQGDUHKLJKO\LQGHEWHGSRRUFRXQWULHVQLQHDUHLQ$IULFDDQGVHYHUDORWKHUVDUHVPDOOLVODQGVWDWHVDWKLJKULVN7KHVHFRXQWULHVZLOOUHFHLYHRIDYDLODEOHIXQGVZKLOHZLOOEHPDGHDYDLODEOHIRUÀH[LEOHKLJKLPSDFWJUDQWVVXFKDVWKRVHWKDWFDWDO\VHincreased investment programmes and integration of DRR and CCA in any disaster-prone country.


integration of DRM in development, providing targeted grant ¿QDQFLQJNQRZOHGJHSURGXFWVDQGWHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHWRGLVDVWHUSURQHFRXQWULHV*)'55D,PSOHPHQWDWLRQLVlargely by the World Bank and by national governments.

*)'55VWUXFWXUHVLWVZRUNWKURXJK¿YHSLOODUVULVNLGHQWL¿FDWLRQULVNUHGXFWLRQSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLDOprotection and resilient reconstruction. Of these, the SUHSDUHGQHVVSLOODULVFOHDUO\UHOHYDQWIRUWKLVH[HUFLVHDVDUHDOPRVWDOORIWKHHOHPHQWVRIWKHµULVNLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ¶SDFNDJHµXQGHUVWDQGLQJKD]DUGVH[SRVXUHDQGYXOQHUDELOLW\¶*)'55E7KHUHDUHFOHDUH[DPSOHVRI¿QDQFLQJIRUemergency preparedness, although costs are often unknown, usually due to a lack of disaggregated data. Some of the DFFHVVLEOHH[DPSOHVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWDVHOHFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQa comprehensive list, are indicated in Table 3.3.

The latest strategy and workplan of GFDRR has increased the prominence of preparedness, with a commitment to strengthen ‘national and local agencies and civil society organisations (CSOs) in a minimum of 23 partner FRXQWULHV«WRSURYLGHEHWWHUHDUO\ZDUQLQJDQGUHVSRQVHPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\ZKHQGLVDVWHUVRFFXU¶*)'55E23).24 The mechanism does not appear to fund outside of its mandate or areas of specialisation. It funds the largely development-based aspects of preparedness and does QRWIXQGSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFW

#LIMATElNANCEMECHANISMS

Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund was established with the overall REMHFWLYHRIµUHGXFLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGLQFUHDVH>LQJ@DGDSWLYHcapacity to respond to the impacts of climate change, including YDULDELOLW\DWWKHORFDODQGQDWLRQDOOHYHOV¶$GDSWDWLRQ)XQG%RDUG7KLVLVGRQHWKURXJK¿QDQFLQJWKHWRWDOFRVWV(as opposed to only incremental or additional adaptation costs) RIFOLPDWHFKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQSURMHFWVDQGSURJUDPPHV26 Of the indicative set of four activities to be supported by the $GDSWDWLRQ)XQGVLQFHLWVHVWDEOLVKPHQWLQ81)&&&WKUHHDUHDOLJQHGWRHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVKD]DUGand risk analysis and early warning, particularly around YHFWRUGLVHDVHVDIIHFWHGE\FOLPDWHFKDQJHLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGlegislative frameworks for integrating climate risks, particularly WRH[WUHPHZHDWKHUHYHQWVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWcommunication for information networks at national and regional levels and contingency/preparedness planning for H[WUHPHZHDWKHUHYHQWV277KLVSUHOLPLQDU\OLVWRIµIXQGDEOH¶adaptation activities was established under the Marrakesh $FFRUGVLQDVDJXLGHIRUDGDSWDWLRQSURMHFWVWKDWFRXOGEHDSSURYHGXQGHUDQ\RIWKHPHFKDQLVPVRIWKH81)UDPHZRUN&RQYHQWLRQRQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH81)&&&7KHlist also reveals how the relationship between resilience and preparedness has been established since the early stages of WKHDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFHGHEDWH

)URPDSUHOLPLQDU\UHYLHZRIWKHSURMHFWVDSSURYHGE\WKH$GDSWDWLRQ)XQGLQFOXGHDWOHDVWRQHemergency preparedness activity in their climate change DGDSWDWLRQREMHFWLYHV The total approved budget for DOOSURMHFWVZDVPLOOLRQRIZKLFKSURMHFWVLQFOXGLQJemergency preparedness activities represent $113 million.29 8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKHWRWDOYDOXHRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVchallenged by the lack of disaggregation of activities within WKHPLOOLRQZRUWKRISURMHFWV2IWKLVJURXSSURMHFWVDUHUHFHLYLQJ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPV(:6PDLQO\IRUFOLPDWHUHODWHGKD]DUGVVXFKDVGURXJKWVDQGÀRRGVLQFOXGLQJFRDVWDOLQODQGDQGJODFLDOW\SHV6HYHQRIWKHSURMHFWVDOVRLQFOXGHWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VK\GURPHWHRURORJLFDOQHWZRUNat both national and sub-national levels, and in all cases WKH\DUHOLQNHGWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRUH[SDQVLRQRI(:6Four also include preparedness planning activities at the FRPPXQLW\OHYHOPDLQO\IRUWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQDQGSDUWLFLSDWRU\PRQLWRULQJRIORFDOOHYHOKD]DUGV$OWKRXJKDGDSWDWLRQQRUPDOO\UHTXLUHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIRUVSHFL¿FVXSSRUWto, national planning and institutional frameworks, there was no strong indication that such processes included emergency preparedness, and so no support for FRRUGLQDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVZDVLGHQWL¿HG)LQDOO\QRVSHFL¿FSUHSDUHGQHVVWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHVRUHPHUJHQF\VHUYLFHVZHUHHYLGHQWLQGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHSURMHFWV

24 It is worth noting that a reported strength of GFDRR is its ability to leverage funds from wider resources available within the World %DQN2QHH[DPSOHLVLWVZRUNLQK\GURPHWVHUYLFHVZKHUHLWKDVmanaged to leverage further funds from PPCR and from both the International Development Association (IDA) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), amongst others *)'55XQSXEOLVKHGQRWH

1RWHWKDWWKLVGRHVQRWHTXDWHWRµQRWIXQGLQJIRUFRXQWULHVLQFRQÀLFW¶:KLOH*)'55¶VIRFXVLVRQ'50VRPHRILWVSULRULW\FRXQWULHVVXFKDV3DNLVWDQDQG<HPHQDUHDIIHFWHGE\FRQÀLFW

$FRQFUHWHDGDSWDWLRQSURMHFWLVGH¿QHGDVDVHWRIDFWLYLWLHVDLPHGat addressing the adverse impacts of and risks posed by climate change. The activities should aim to produce visible and tangible results on the ground by reducing vulnerability and increasing the adaptive capacity of human and natural systems to respond to the impacts of climate change, including climate variability (Adaptation )XQG%RDUG

27 The fourth one is generic: ‘Starting to implement adaptation activities SURPSWO\ZKHUHVXI¿FLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQLVDYDLODEOHWRZDUUDQWVXFKactivities, inter alia, in the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and integrated FRDVWDO]RQHPDQDJHPHQW¶81)&&&

,QWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH$GDSWDWLRQ)XQGKDV¿QDQFHGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLWKDVEHHQLQWKHIRUPRI(:6These include: Argentina, the Cook Islands, Ecuador, Eritrea, Georgia, /HEDQRQ0DGDJDVFDU0DXULWLXV3DNLVWDQ3DSXD1HZ*XLQHD6UL/DQNDDQG8UXJXD\,Q&RORPELDWKH)XQGKDV¿QDQFHG(:6DQGULVNDQDO\VLVDQGLQ+RQGXUDVDQG7DQ]DQLDULVNDQDO\VLVDORQH

7KLV¿JXUHUHÀHFWVWKHDOORFDWHGWRSURMHFWVZLWKHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVSURMHFWV,WGRHVQRWUHSUHVHQWWKHDPRXQWIRUVSHFL¿FDFWLYLWLHV

,EAST$EVELOPED#OUNTRIES&UND,$#&

7KH/'&)LVDPXOWLODWHUDOIXQGXQGHUWKH81)&&&HVWDEOLVKHGLQWRUHVSRQGWRWKHDGDSWDWLRQQHHGVRIOHDVWGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV&DUDYDQLDQG1DNKRRGDIRUWKFRPLQJ,WIRFXVHVRQUHGXFLQJWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\of sectors and resources that are central to development DQGOLYHOLKRRGVVXFKDVµZDWHUDJULFXOWXUHDQGIRRGVHFXULW\KHDOWKGLVDVWHUULVNPDQDJHPHQWDQGSUHYHQWLRQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGIUDJLOHHFRV\VWHPV¶LELG.H\OLPLWDWLRQVof the LDCF in terms of emergency preparedness are WKHUHIRUHUHODWLYHO\VHOIHYLGHQWIXQGLQJJRHVRQO\WR/'&VLWLVOLPLWHGWRQDWXUDOKD]DUGVLHQRWFRQÀLFWDQGZLWKLQWKRVHQDWXUDOKD]DUGVLWVIRFXVLVRQFOLPDWHULVNV 81)&&&

7KDWVDLGWKHUHLVHYLGHQFHRI¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV6LQFHWKH)XQG¶VLQFHSWLRQLQSURMHFWVKDYHEHHQFUHDWHGRIZKLFKKDYHLQFOXGHGSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHV7KHVHDFFRXQWIRUPLOOLRQRIWKHWRWDO/'&)DOORFDWLRQ&DUDYDQLDQG1DNKRRGDIRUWKFRPLQJ$IXUWKHUSURMHFWVKDYHHPHUJHQF\preparedness as a secondary or supporting activity HTXLYDOHQWWRPLOOLRQ)LIWHHQRIWKHSURMHFWVthat include emergency preparedness cover more than one FRPSRQHQWRIWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[LQFOXGH(:6IURPWKHORFDOWRWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOVZKLOHSURMHFWVFRYHUKD]DUGand risk analysis. These components are also complemented by information and communication systems, and community SUHSDUHGQHVVLELG±7DEOH

7KLVOLVWLVGHULYHGIURPDGHWDLOHGUHYLHZRIIXQGLQJUHSRUWVDFURVVWKHrange of LDCF recipients.

4ABLE2ECIPIENTSOFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSlNANCINGTHOUGHTHE,$#&

Recipient country Approved amount ($ millions) for emergency preparedness activities

Bhutan 14.94Burundi Afghanistan Gambia Zambia Angola Samoa Nepal Sudan Lao PDR Timor-Leste Maldives Tuvalu Benin Burkina Faso Ethiopia Malawi São Tomé and Príncipe Sierra Leone Tanzania Uganda Rwanda 3.16Kiribati Liberia Haiti 2.73Vanuatu Lesotho

6RXUFH&OLPDWH)XQGV8SGDWHPLOOLRQVFXUUHQWGDWDEDVHVHDUFKHGLQ6HSWHPEHUVHHZZZFOLPDWHIXQGVXSGDWHRUJ

"/8-!,!7)3.!0!

0DODZL¶V1DWLRQDO$GDSWDWLRQ3URJUDPPHRI$FWLRQ1$3$SURYLGHVDXVHIXOH[DPSOHRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHof emergency preparedness activities related to the LDCF. During its development, 31 adaptation options IURPHLJKWVHFWRUVZHUHLGHQWL¿HGWRDGGUHVVXUJHQWadaptation needs, with an emphasis on vulnerable rural communities. The 31 options were ranked using a multi-FULWHULDDQDO\VLVDQGDVKRUWOLVWRISULRULW\DGDSWDWLRQoptions was developed. These were further ranked and SULRULWLVHGWRSURGXFHDOLVWRI¿YHWRSSULRULW\DFWLRQV

Ɣ improving community resilience to climate change through the development of sustainable rural livelihoods

Ɣ UHVWRULQJIRUHVWVLQWKHFDWFKPHQWVRIWKH8SSHUDQG/RZHU6KLUH9DOOH\VWRUHGXFHVLOWLQJDQGDVVRFLDWHGZDWHUÀRZSUREOHPV

Ɣ improving agricultural production under erratic rains and changing climatic conditions

Ɣ LPSURYLQJ0DODZL¶VSUHSDUHGQHVVWRFRSHZLWKGURXJKWVDQGÀRRGVDQG

Ɣ improving climate monitoring to enhance the FRXQWU\¶VHDUO\ZDUQLQJFDSDELOLW\DQGGHFLVLRQmaking.

6RXUFH&DUDYDQLDQG1DNKRRGD

46 DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 3. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN CONTEXT: THE ARCHITECTURE

47

4ABLE%MERGENCYPREPAREDNESSACTIVITIESIDENTIlEDWITHIN00#2lNANCING

Country Project description 7\SHRIÀQDQFH Amount approved($ millions)

Niger 3URMHFWIRUWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIFOLPDWHIRUHFDVWLQJV\VWHPVand operationalisation of EWS

Grant and concessional loan

Cambodia Climate risk management and rehabilitation of small- and medium-scale irrigation schemes in the Tonle Sap Basin

3URMHFWSUHSDUDWLRQgrant

Cambodia (QKDQFHPHQWRIÀRRGDQGGURXJKWPDQDJHPHQW in Pursat Province

Grant and concessional loan

9.96

Dominica 'LVDVWHUYXOQHUDELOLW\UHGXFWLRQSURMHFW 3URMHFWSUHSDUDWLRQgrant

Grenada 'LVDVWHUYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGFOLPDWHULVNUHGXFWLRQSURMHFW Concessional loan Jamaica Improving climate data and information management Grant Mozambique Climate resilience: transforming hydro-meteorological

servicesGrant

Nepal %XLOGLQJUHVLOLHQFHWRFOLPDWHUHODWHGKD]DUGV Grant and concessional loan

31

3DFLÀFregion

Identifying and implementing practical climate change DGDSWDWLRQDQGUHODWHG'55NQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFH


3DFLÀFregion

Mainstreaming CCA and related DRR 3URMHFWSUHSDUDWLRQgrant

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

'LVDVWHUYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGFOLPDWHULVNUHGXFWLRQSURMHFW Grant/concessional loan

Tajikistan Improvement of weather, climate and hydrological delivery SURMHFW

Grant 7.2

Yemen Climate information system and PPCR programme coordination


Total to date $77.7

2QHSDUWLFXODUO\LQWHUHVWLQJDVSHFWRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJWKURXJKWKH/'&)DQGDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJLQJHQHUDOLVWKDWIXQGLQJDSSHDUVWREHPRUHµEDODQFHG¶DFURVVdifferent recipient countries, with far fewer differences LQYROXPHWKDQIRURWKHU¿QDQFLQJVXFKDV'557KLVindicates one of the strengths of global mechanisms in being able (at least theoretically) to view the landscape RIQHHGJOREDOO\DQGWR¿QDQFHDSSURSULDWHO\UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJGULYHQE\WKHGHPDQGVRIDVLQJOHFRXQWU\FRQWH[WVHH.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL

Pilot Program on Climate Resilience 00#2

The PPCR is a targeted programme of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), one of two funds within the framework of WKH&OLPDWH,QYHVWPHQW)XQGV&,)V7KH¿QDQFLQJZLQGRZLVDLPHGDWMXPSVWDUWLQJµFOLPDWHVPDUW¶GHYHORSPHQWE\piloting and demonstrating ways to integrate climate risk and UHVLOLHQFHLQWRFRXQWULHV¶FRUHGHYHORSPHQWSODQQLQJ7KHPPCR supports funding for activities that address climate resilience, especially technical assistance to support its integration into national and sectoral development plans. 7KHIRFXVLVRQSLORWLQJSURMHFWVWKDWLQWHJUDWHFOLPDWHrisk and resilience into core development planning, while

6RXUFH+LOO0IRUWKFRPLQJ)LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG33&5PLOOLRQVFXUUHQWSULFHV

http://www.climateinvestmentfunds/cif/node/3

http://www.climateinvestmentfunds/cif/node/3

complementing other ongoing activities of the CIFs, thus leading to increased awareness of the potential impact of climate change, improved coordination for climate resilience and scaled-up investment for broader LQYHVWPHQWV&,)7KHRYHUDOOJRDORIWKHIXQGLVWKHUHIRUHWROHYHUDJHDGGLWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJIURPERWKnational and international sources, which determines its available funding.

1LQHFRXQWULHVDQGWZRUHJLRQVZHUHVHOHFWHGWRparticipate in the pilot programme. Selection was based RQDUDQJHRIFOLPDWHUHODWHGQDWXUDOKD]DUGW\SHVlevels of country vulnerability, country eligibility, country GLVWULEXWLRQFRKHUHQFHZLWKH[LVWLQJDGDSWDWLRQIXQGLQJand value added, replicability, sustainability, scalability and development impact, and the potential to implement rapid UHVXOWV&,)7KHFRXQWULHVDUH%DQJODGHVK%ROLYLD&DPERGLD0R]DPELTXH1HSDO1LJHU7DMLNLVWDQ<HPHQDQG=DPELD7KH&DULEEHDQUHJLRQFRPSULVHV*UHQDGD

+DLWL6W9LQFHQWDQGWKH*UHQDGLQHVDQG6DLQW/XFLDWKH3DFL¿FUHJLRQFRPSULVHV3DSXD1HZ*XLQHD6DPRDDQG7RQJD33&5(DFKFRXQWU\LVDEOHWRUHFHLYHLQYHVWPHQWVRIXSWRPLOOLRQ31

33&5¿QDQFHLQFOXGHVJUDQW¿QDQFHXSWRPLOOLRQWRSUHSDUHDFRXQWU\¶V6WUDWHJLF3URJUDPPHIRU&OLPDWH5HVLOLHQFHLQSKDVHRQHSUHSDUDWLRQJUDQWVHVWLPDWHGPLOOLRQIRUGHWDLOHGSUHSDUDWLRQRIDFWLYLWLHVLQSKDVHWZRDQG¿QDOO\ERWKJUDQWVDQGFRQFHVVLRQDOORDQVWR¿QDQFHWKHDGGLWLRQDOFRVWVQHFHVVDU\WRPDNHDSURMHFWclimate-resilient.


49

4. How emergency preparedness is funded

LESSONSFROMlVECOUNTRYCASESTUDIES

Ɣ)LQDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVFRPSOLFDWHGIUDJPHQWHGDQGSLHFHPHDOHVSHFLDOO\the international contribution, with an array of separate institutions, mechanisms and approaches determining which parts of the preparedness continuum are funded, and in what ways.

Ɣ'HVSLWHVLJQLILFDQWFKDOOHQJHVQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDSSHDUWRKDYHDPXFKPRUHUDWLRQDO DQGORJLFDODSSURDFKWRILQDQFLQJIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGSUHSDUHGQHVV

Ɣ&DVHVWXG\HYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWYROXPHVRIILQDQFLQJDUHFRQVLGHUDEO\EHORZUHTXLUHPHQWVH[FHSWDUJXDEO\LQWKHFDVHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV

Ɣ)LQDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIDLOVWRWDUJHWQHHGRUEHUHVSRQGHQWWRULVN:KDWILQDQFLQJH[LVWVPRVWO\IROORZVWKHIUDJPHQWHGQDWXUHRIWKHH[LVWLQJILQDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUH

Ɣ(YLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHEXONRILQWHUQDWLRQDOIXQGLQJ±ZKHUHLWLVDYDLODEOH±LVQRWconcerned with building the long-term capacity of national systems of preparedness but is UHLQIRUFLQJDSLHFHPHDODQGSURMHFWOHGDSSURDFK

Ɣ)RUQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVSUHVHQWVWKHVSHFLILFEXGJHWDU\challenge of assessing risk and dealing with uncertainty.

Ɣ7KHFDVHVWXGLHVUHYHDOKXJHSRWHQWLDOIRUJURZWKLQSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVJLYHQWKHincreasing interest in disaster risk in general and its impact on sustainable economic development.

Key messages

4. How emergency preparedness is funded: LESSONSFROMlVECOUNTRYCASESTUDIES

7KLVVHFWLRQRXWOLQHVWKHIXQGLQJSUR¿OHRIHDFKRIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVWKH3KLOLSSLQHV1LJHU6XGDQ0\DQPDUDQG+DLWL7KH¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVV\VWHPVfrom national government resources is highlighted, before WXUQLQJWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUFKLWHFWXUHDQGLWV¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV7KHDQDO\VLVH[SORUHVWKHNH\¿QDQFLQJRSWLRQVdescribed in Section 3: the humanitarian mechanisms (CERF, ERFs, CHFs, CAP), the risk-focused mechanisms (GFDRR and CPR TTF), the climate funds (Adaptation Fund, LDCF, 33&5DQG¿QDOO\ELODWHUDOGRQRUIXQGVKXPDQLWDULDQDQG

development). Other sources of emergency preparedness ¿QDQFLQJDUHWKHQFRQVLGHUHGFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FPHFKDQLVPVcore and multi-use funding, the Red Cross, multilateral banks and the private sector. The section ends with a summary of WKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJDVevidenced by the case studies.

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 4. HOW EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IS FUNDED: LESSONS FROM FIVE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

-APPINGTHEFUNDINGSOURCES lVECOUNTRYCASESTUDIES

(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVQRWMXVWDPDWWHUIRUWKHinternational community: a diverse range of actors in each country funds it formally and informally, knowingly and unknowingly. Evidence tells us that emergency preparedness may not be described as such in many FDVHVLQ1LJHUPDQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDO1*2VUHSRUWundertaking emergency preparedness activities but rarely formulate them as being distinct from their humanitarian programming. This partly informs how funding for emergency preparedness activities originates from a variety of different sources. These range from global pooled funding mechanisms involving international GRQRUVDQG81DJHQFLHVWKURXJKWRQDWLRQDOV\VWHPVRISUHSDUHGQHVVLQYROYLQJVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HG

businesses taking initiatives to prepare for local-level risk, DQG1*2VXVLQJH[LVWLQJKXPDQUHVRXUFHVWRSULRULWLVHemergency preparedness activities.

,QGHSWKUHVHDUFKLQ+DLWL0\DQPDU6XGDQ1LJHUDQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHVUHYHDOVWKLVFRPSOH[LW\RI¿QDQFLQJ$VDQillustration and by way of comparison, a mapping of the main international channels of emergency preparedness ¿QDQFLQJDQGQDWLRQDO¿VFDOFRQWULEXWLRQVLQHDFKFRXQWU\LVVKRZQLQ)LJXUHV±LQUHODWLRQWRWKHGLIIHUHQWpreparedness activities they fund.32

ERF

CERF

Flash appeals

Bilateral humanitarian funding

Legislationpolicy

Crisis coordination

Training

Contingencyplanning



Informationsystems

Framework& planning


Riskassessments

Stockpiling

IFRC Annual Appeal

Bilateral In-country humanitarian: Norway

Livelihoods & Food Security Trust Fund

National government

National government

Agency core funding

Japan’s Fast-Start Climate Initiative

Deve

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Crisis coordination

Training

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Riskassessment Stockpiling

Framework& planning

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World Bank

Bilateral in-country developmentJapan, for agriculture sector

National government

Humanitarian workplan

Japan’s Fast-Start Climate Initiative

Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and IFRC loan facility

CERF

CHF

Legislationpolicy

Crisis coordination

Training

Contingencyplanning




Riskassessment

StockpilingFramework& planning

Informationsystems

Private sector

Haiti Action Plan

World BankHealth and general preparedness

CERFPreparedness component: cholera

Haiti Reconstruction Fund

Flash appeals

Bilateral in-country humanitarian Mostly ECHO, some OFDA

Emergency Response and Relief Fundpreparedness component: cholera-related

UNDP CPR TTR and core resources

National government

LDCFAgricultural sector preparedness

GFDRR

Private sector

Deve

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&IGURE&INANCINGMECHANISMSANDTOOLSFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSIN(AITI

&IGURE&INANCINGMECHANISMSANDTOOLSFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSIN3UDAN

CERF

Consolidated appeal

UNDP CPR TTF and core resources

PPCR

Core/multi-use agency funding

Bilateral in-country mixed development / humanitarian: SDC/EC

LDCF

Hum

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rian

resp

onse

Legislationpolicy

Crisis coordination

Training

Contingencyplanning



Informationsystems

Framework& planning


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National government National government

Bilateral humanitarian AusaAID, USAID, DIPECHO

Deve

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resp

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Private sectorPrivate sector

Special Climate Change Fund

GFDRR

Flash appeal

ICRC core resources

CERFPreparedness components: national capacity on disaster prepardredness

Core/multi-use agency funding

Consolidated appealOCHA coordination

World Bank

German InternationalClimate Initiative

Legislationpolicy

Crisis coordination

Training

Contingencyplanning



Informationsystems

Framework& planning


Riskassessment

Stockpiling

Bilateral in-country development: Japan

National government

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4.2 Emergency preparedness in case STUDYCOUNTRIESNATIONALlNANCINGThe case study countries all have very different capacities DQGOHYHOVRI¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV(FRQRPLFOHYHOVJLYHXVVRPHLQGLFDWLRQDVDSUR[\RIhow likely it is that governments have both the capacity to manage risk and the funding to undertake that management.337KH:RUOG%DQNFODVVHVWKUHHRIWKH¿YHcountries as low-income and two as lower-middle-income :RUOG%DQNE$YHUDJHSHUFDSLWDJRYHUQPHQWrevenues34YDU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\IURPFRXQWU\WRFRXQWU\,Q1LJHUDQG0\DQPDUWKH\DUHDPRQJVWWKHORZHVWLQWKHZRUOGSXWWLQJWKHVHFRXQWULHVRQDOLVWRIMXVWWKDWKDYHUHYHQXHVRIOHVVWKDQSHUFDSLWD.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL2QWKLVLQGLFDWRU0\DQPDULVWKHSRRUHVWFRXQWU\LQ6RXWK(DVW$VLDKRZHYHULWVRYHUDOODYDLODEOHrevenue is still greater than that of Haiti, the poorest FRXQWU\LQWKHZHVWHUQKHPLVSKHUH:RUOG%DQNF

4ABLE%CONOMICINDICATORSFROMTHElVEcase study countries

Income status Average government UHYHQXHV per capita ($)

Niger Low 43.69Myanmar Low Sudan Lower-middle 269.63Haiti Low Philippines Lower-middle 416.42

The Philippines hosts the most advanced risk PDQDJHPHQWRIWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVDQGWKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVof disaster risk is high across civil society. The government is very committed to preparedness, in particular through WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH'LVDVWHU5LVN5HGXFWLRQDQG0DQDJHPHQW'550$FW2YHUDOOLWLVWKHPDMRUFRQWULEXWRULQWHUPVRIYROXPHRI¿QDQFLQJIRU'55spending up to $1 billion each year. Financing, especially IRUNH\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQVWLWXWLRQV±HDUO\ZDUQLQJKD]DUGrisk analysis and building local government capacity

±ZDVDPLQLPXPRIPLOOLRQFRPELQHGRYHUWKH\HDUV.HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJH[FHHGLQJ¿QDQFLQJYROXPHVIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVThe government is also particularly strong in the area of health preparedness, and has a dedicated specialist WHDPWKDW¿QDQFHVVSHFL¿FSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVIRUthe sector (ibid.: 24). The targeting of resources towards ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWXQLWV/*8VPRVWLQQHHGRIVXSSRUWremains an issue, as does the overall coherence of actions between international and national actors for risk PDQDJHPHQW3UHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFW±QDPHO\LQWKHLVODQGRI0LQGDQDR±LVQRWFOHDUO\DUWLFXODWHGDQGLVSDUWof a separate process to DRM. However, government agencies responsible for elements of the DRRM Act LQFOXGLQJHOHPHQWVRISUHSDUHGQHVVGRH[WHQGWKHLUVXSSRUWWRFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGSRSXODWLRQV

In Niger, national and international action has traditionally EHHQFRQFHQWUDWHGRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VODUJHVWULVNQDPHO\IRRGLQVHFXULW\ZKLFKLVUHODWHGODUJHO\WRWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHof drought. In recent years, broader DRM has been progressively incorporated into sectoral and national policies, strategies and plans. This evolution also led to the government establishing a risk management system called/H'LVSRVLWLI1DWLRQDOGH3UpYHQWLRQHW*HVWLRQGHV&ULVHV$OLPHQWDLUHVDX1LJHUWKH'LVSRVLWLILQThis system initially aimed to prepare and respond to food security-related crises, but over time has evolved to be responsible for a wider portfolio of risk. Despite national policy commitments, there is little national funding for preparedness, even at a central level, where key LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHODUJHO\GRQRUIXQGHG:KDW¿QDQFLQJH[LVWVfor emergency preparedness is focused on supporting the Dispositif, including early warning systems, as well as the 1DWLRQDO0DUNHW,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHP6,0$%HWZHHQ-XQHDQG1RYHPEHUWKH'LVSRVLWLI¶VSODQQHGH[SHQGLWXUHVZHUHHVWLPDWHGDW)&)$ELOOLRQmillion), of which the national government was to provide WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8DQGRWKHUSDUWQHUV.H\DUHDVVXFKDVKHDOWKHPHUJHQF\FDSDFLW\DQGactivities such as pre-positioning of food and non-food items 1),VDUHFRQVLVWHQWO\XQGHUIXQGHG)LQDQFLQJEH\RQGWKHFDSLWDO1LDPH\LVUHSRUWHGO\QRQH[LVWHQWZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQbeing relatively small levels of funding for international DFWRUV5RELWDLOOHHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ

In Myanmar, emergency preparedness is a relatively new concept, and is commonly embedded within DRR/'50¿QDQFLQJDQGSROLF\DUFKLWHFWXUH1HZHQJDJHPHQWwith the international community is helping to prioritise risk within government policy, with the development of the national Myanmar Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction (MAPDRR) and the development of the Myanmar Peace Centre, two important achievements. However, QDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJLVZHDNDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VQDWLRQDOEXGJHWDU\V\VWHPVUHTXLUHVLJQL¿FDQWVWUHQJWKHQLQJ:KLOHprogress has been made, with 21 priorities under the

33 That said, due to the lack of precise coding and tracking of HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQQDWLRQDO¿VFDOV\VWHPVWKHFRVWRISUHSDUHGQHVVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPDWUL[LVRIWHQQRWLGHQWL¿DEOH,QPDQ\SODFHVRQO\WKHSULFHRISURMHFWVH[LVWVZKLFKLVLQGLFDWLYHEXWby no means comprehensive of the total cost of preparedness needs.

34 The methodology for this calculation can be found in Kellett and &DUDYDQL

6RXUFHVLQFRPHVWDWXVIURP:RUOG%DQNFDYHUDJHgovernment revenues from a methodology developed in Kellett and 6SDUNV1RWHWKDWWKHQHJDWLYH¿JXUHIRU+DLWLLVGXHWRWKHdeduction of international aid from overall government revenues.

0$3'55IRUH[DPSOHIXQGLQJLVOLPLWHGDQGWUDFNLQJRIQDWLRQDOH[SHQGLWXUHLVDWEHVWLQFRPSOHWH7KXVIDUthe government has focused its attention on establishing the national policy environment, structures for DRR and support to ongoing peace processes. Translating these initiatives into a fully funded and functioning preparedness architecture remains some way off. International funding is primarily humanitarian, with small, inconsistent portions of funding for preparedness, released as part of broader risk reduction components of crisis response. There is a strong commitment by national and international actors to invest more in emergency preparedness, but this is FRQVWUDLQHGE\WKH¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHUHODWLYHO\VPDOOdonor base and the challenges of spending funds in a GLI¿FXOWJRYHUQDQFHFRQWH[W

In HaitiWKHUHVSRQVHWRWKHHDUWKTXDNHKDVJHQHUDWHG¿QDQFLDODQGWHFKQLFDOUHVRXUFHVIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness and has also increased general awareness of the importance of other types of risk beyond the seismic, ZKLFKDUHVLJQL¿FDQWLQW\SHDQGVFDOHDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\This has spurred a heightened engagement with and strengthening of Haitian stakeholders, particularly in the FRQWH[WRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQSURFHVVWKDWDLPVWRWUDQVIHUresponsibilities, systems and capacities to the national government. Disaster risk has become a priority and is likely to play a key role in future development. Legal provisions for GLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVKDYHEHHQLQHIIHFWVLQFHWKHVand the country has had a national disaster management V\VWHPIRUPRUHWKDQDGHFDGH)DQHWDOforthcoming). However, there are concerns that humanitarian funding is being reduced too quickly, while national preparedness and response capacities remain fragile. The Department of Civil Protection (the lead agency for DRM), ZKLFKVLWVZLWKLQWKH0LQLVWU\RI,QWHULRUHVWDEOLVKHGD1DWLRQDO6\VWHPIRU5LVNDQG'LVDVWHU0DQDJHPHQWLQZKLFKLQFOXGHGD1DWLRQDO(PHUJHQF\2SHUDWLRQV&HQWUH&281

0XFKRIWKLVVWUXFWXUHZDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\XQGHUUHVRXUFHG7KHgovernment has now begun to prioritise resources for DRM, ZLWKLWVEXGJHWDOORFDWLQJPLOOLRQWRWKHMinistries of Interior and Environment, with $2.3 million from its own resources.

In SudanGHFDGHVRIFRQÀLFWDFURVVDQXPEHURIDUHDVZLWKVRPHFRQÀLFWVVWLOORQJRLQJKDYHUHVXOWHGLQQDWLRQDOand international actors focusing on large-scale response year on year. Financing for emergency preparedness from government resources is at best modest, but the sense LQFRXQWU\LVWKDWWKHUHLVDVORZPRYHWRZDUGVH[DQWHULVNmanagement (i.e. before the event). This is made problematic by at least eight different government agencies or ministries having a mandate for aspects of preparedness. There is no clear understanding of responsibility across different elements of the preparedness system or how the work of the various agencies interconnects. What appears relatively clear is that funds for all preparedness activities are limited. Crisis response drives the bulk of government funding (including DVLJQL¿FDQWIRFXVRQDUHDVRIFRQÀLFWDQGZKLOHDQHFGRWDOevidence suggests that elements of that response may LQFOXGHSUHSDUHGQHVV+RFNOH\IRUWKFRPLQJWKHUHLVOLWWOHFRQ¿UPHGGDWDWRVXEVWDQWLDWHWKLV

$VWKHFDVHVWXGLHVUHYHDOSXEOLF¿QDQFLDOPDQDJHPHQWLVODFNLQJDFURVVWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVDUJXDEO\ZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV3RRU¿VFDOPDQDJHPHQWundermines the ability of governments to ensure that the necessary budgetary processes are in place to apportion funds to support preparedness systems. Creating regular ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVUHTXLUHVeffective national budgetary systems and processes. %R[SURYLGHVVXJJHVWLRQVIRUKRZWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOcommunity can support improved methods to code and track budgetary processes.

Box 4.1: ImPRovIng mEtHoDs to CoDE AnD tRACK BuDgEtARy PRoCEssEs

1DWLRQDOEXGJHWDU\DOORFDWLRQVLQVXSSRUWRISUHSDUHGQHVVDUHFULWLFDOIRUVXVWDLQHG¿QDQFLQJDQGDOVRKHOSGHWHUPLQHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVFDWHUHGIRU¿QDQFLDOO\DQGLQSROLF\DFWLRQ7KHIDFWWKDWFRXQWULHVHQGRUVHGWKH+\RJR)UDPHZRUNIRU$FWLRQVWDQGVDVWHVWDPHQWWRQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶understanding of the importance of adopting risk-LQIRUPHGDSSURDFKHVWRGHYHORSPHQW816,'5<HWZKLOHQRHTXLYDOHQWH[LVWVIRUFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVV±DVLJQL¿FDQWJDSWREHDGGUHVVHG±WKHUHUHPDLQJDSVLQRXUNQRZOHGJHRIERWKFRQÀLFWDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGSUHSDUHGQHVVVSHQGLQJ,QIUDJLOHDQGFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGFRQWH[WVZKHUHSXEOLF¿QDQFLDOPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPVDUHZHDNRUVRPHWLPHVQRQH[LVWHQWWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJKRZWRVWUHQJWKHQ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUW

WRSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLRQVZLOOEHTXLWHGLIIHUHQW±DVLQthe case of Myanmar. The international community can help in supporting improved methods to code and track QDWLRQDO¿VFDOSROLF\DQGEXGJHWDU\SURFHVVHVLQWKLVregard.

7KHUHLVRIWHQDVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQhow domestic funding is structured, governed and delivered compared with international funding. A preliminary analysis of the linkages between emergency preparedness and national policy (e.g. national GHYHORSPHQWSODQVDQGH[SHQGLWXUHHJ0HGLXP7HUP([SHQGLWXUH)UDPHZRUN07()DQGWKHDQQXDOEXGJHWneed to be undertaken. This will provide an indication of the national prioritisation of emergency preparedness in


WHUPVRISROLF\DQGH[SHQGLWXUH6XFKDQDO\VLVVKRXOGbe completed through a review of national planning documents.

The domestic funding modalities for emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVZRXOGQHHGWREHH[DPLQHGWZRPDLQFKDQQHOVDUHWKHQDWLRQDOEXGJHWDQGH[WUDEXGJHWDU\funds. There may be one or more national emergency response funds, supported by national legislation, which VKRXOGEHH[DPLQHG,QDGGLWLRQWKHQDWLRQDOEXGJHWmay have an emergency fund that any emergency preparedness response can draw on (this may be a component of the contingency fund).

7KHJRYHUQDQFHRIH[SHQGLWXUHVKRXOGEHDQDO\VHGHJWKHUROHVSOD\HGE\PLQLVWULHVRI¿QDQFHDQGSODQQLQJDQGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVXQLWVZLWKLQVHFWRUPLQLVWULHValso the relationship between national and sub-national

agencies. There is often a central administrative unit responsible for national crisis management, and its location within government should be documented, as this often reveals national policy priorities. Whether it resides within central government, such as in the prime PLQLVWHU¶VRI¿FHRULVSRVLWLRQHGLQDOLQHPLQLVWU\HJWKHenvironment ministry, or is a government agency, is likely WRLQÀXHQFHIXQGLQJDOORFDWLRQV

&RRUGLQDWLRQPHFKDQLVPVWKDWH[LVWEHWZHHQQDWLRQDOand international agencies and national emergency preparedness coordination structures (and their VXSSRUWLQJVHFUHWDULDWVVKRXOGKDYHD¿QDQFLDOµIRRWSULQW¶that can be traced and analysed. Such coordination can involve a large number of disparate parts of the government administration (e.g. ministries of home affairs, defence, health), raising an obvious challenge to securing an effective emergency preparedness response.

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(OWTHEINTERNATIONALFUNDINGARCHITECTUREWORKSINTHECASESTUDYcountries +RZSUHSDUHGQHVVLV¿QDQFHGIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRXUFHVYDULHVFRQVLGHUDEO\DFURVVWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVH[DPLQHG,WUHÀHFWVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHFXUUHQWFRQWH[WRIGHYHORSPHQWJRYHUQDQFHDQGULVNDQGLQHDFKFDVHWKHDLGSUR¿OH36 is heavily shaped by both current and past events. In VRPHFRQWH[WVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHLQYROYLQJFRQÀLFWWKHinternational community is called upon to do much

PRUHWKDQLWPLJKWRWKHUZLVHGRIXO¿OOLQJWKHUROHDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIQDWLRQDODXWKRULWLHVWKDWPD\QRWH[LVWRUPD\EHDSDUW\WRWKDWFRQÀLFW

36 It should be noted that not all engagement of the international FRPPXQLW\LQDFRQWH[WLVQHFHVVDULO\SLFNHGXSE\WUDGLWLRQDOPHWKRGVRIWUDFNLQJDLGH[SHQGLWXUHV&RQWULEXWLRQVWR81SHDFHNHHSLQJPLVVLRQVDUHIRUH[DPSOHODUJHO\RXWVLGHRIODA. While troop contingents themselves are often made up of GHYHORSLQJQDWLRQDUPLHV¿QDQFLQJLVWKURXJKDVVHVVPHQWDQGODUJHO\WKHUHIRUHIURPGHYHORSHGQDWLRQV7KHYROXPHRIH[SHQGLWXUHRQWKHVHPLVVLRQVFDQEHVLJQL¿FDQW,QH[SHQGLWXUHVRQPXOWLODWHUDOSHDFHNHHSLQJRSHUDWLRQVUHDFKHGMXVWXQGHUELOOLRQZLWKELOOLRQEHLQJVSHQWRQ81PLVVLRQV'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHV

For both Myanmar and Sudan, preparing to respond in FRPSOH[ULVNHQYLURQPHQWVLVFRPSOLFDWHGE\EURDGHUpolitical conditions and international relations. Sanctions and restrictions on spending shape the volume and timing of ODA that is provided. However, Myanmar is also undergoing rapid change. The country is opening up, sanctions are being lifted or revised, and the need for preparedness is becoming increasingly self-evident in view RIUHFHQWQDWXUDODQGFRQÀLFWUHODWHGHPHUJHQFLHV,Q+DLWLGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFHVSLNHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQZKHQfunds pouring into earthquake response and reconstruction UHDFKHGPRUHWKDQELOOLRQD¿JXUHXVXDOO\RQO\VHHQLQSRVWFRQÀLFWVWDWHEXLOGLQJVXFKDVLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGbefore that in Iraq.37)RUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQG1LJHU2'$RYHUDGHFDGHKDVEHHQUHODWLYHO\VWDEOHWKHSHDNWR1LJHULQZDVODUJHO\DFFRXQWHGIRUE\DOPRVWELOOLRQRIdebt forgiveness (see Table 4.2).

While donor coding and tracking of preparedness remain poor, it is impossible to know from global datasets how much of a priority emergency preparedness has been for donors (regardless of the mechanisms they might use). $XVHIXOSUR[\RILQHDFKRIRXU¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVFDQEHdrawn from data from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). While this data is not a complete representation of emergency preparedness, since it focuses on natural disasters only and moves beyond preparedness to prevention, it provides us with an indication of how SUHYDOHQWH[DQWHLQYHVWPHQWLQULVNLVDFURVVHDFKFRQWH[WPerhaps unsurprisingly, given what the case studies have told us, Haiti and the Philippines have seen the most IXQGLQJ1LJHU0\DQPDUDQG6XGDQKDYHVHHQOLWWOHVLQFH2(&''$&UHFRUGLQJEHJDQLQ

2XWOLQHGEHORZLVDVQDSVKRWRIWKHIXQGLQJSUR¿OHLQHDFKRIWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV

Traditionally the PhilippinesKDVEHHQDVLJQL¿FDQWrecipient of ODA, largely from development funds rather WKDQKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFH2YHUWKH\HDUVWRLWreceived $13.4 billion of ODA from a variety of donors, up WRELOOLRQSHU\HDU$OPRVWELOOLRQRIWKLVZDVLQWKHform of loans, the bulk of which came from the Japanese government ($7.2 billion). Humanitarian assistance PHDQZKLOHDPRXQWHGWRMXVWPLOOLRQRYHUWKHGHFDGHUDWKHUDVPDOO¿JXUHFRQVLGHULQJWKHPDQ\FULVHVWKHFRXQWU\KDVIDFHG2IWKLVKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPLOOLRQFDPHLQDVLQJOH\HDUODUJHO\LQUHVSRQVHWRTyphoon Ketsana. That year, the proportion of international KXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJSHDNHGDWMXVWRYHURI2'$RYHUWKHGHFDGHWKHSURSRUWLRQZDVMXVWWKRXJKLIORDQVDUHIDFWRUHGRXWWKHSURSRUWLRQLQFUHDVHVWRMXVWRYHU7KHinternational community has placed disaster risk at the heart of much of its work in the country, and there is evidence of multiple preparedness activities under way (usually within a larger programme of action), which are considerable in both scale and scope.

NigerKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQDVLJQL¿FDQWEHQH¿FLDU\RI2'$UHFHLYLQJELOOLRQRYHUWKHGHFDGH7KHWRWDOYROXPHRIDVVLVWDQFHLQFUHDVHGIURPPLOOLRQLQWRPLOOLRQLQIDOOLQJEDFNVOLJKWO\LQ:KLOHWKHVKDUHRIKXPDQLWDULDQDLGWR1LJHUZDVORZLQWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHGHFDGHLQDQGLQLWLQFUHDVHGFRQWLQXDOO\WKHUHDIWHUUHDFKLQJLQPDNLQJ1LJHUWKHWKODUJHVWUHFLSLHQWRIRI¿FLDOKXPDQLWDULDQDLGWKDW\HDU'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHVE6LQFHWKHQKXPDQLWDULDQDLGKDVUHSUHVHQWHGDconsiderable part of the total ODA received by the country, UHÀHFWLQJWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWof the many crises it faces. This has also led to continued support for government risk management structures, by KXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJ

In Myanmar, it is widely anticipated that if the economic DQGSROLWLFDOUHIRUPVWKDWVWDUWHGLQFRQWLQXHDQGUHVXOWLQVXEVWDQWLDOSURJUHVVWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLFIXWXUHFRXOGmirror that of its Asian neighbours over the long term. The current transition, characterised by political and economic liberalisation, has also raised hopes of a better future and of increased international support, accompanied by the lifting RIFXUUHQWUHVWULFWLRQVDQGVDQFWLRQVVHHIRUH[DPSOH2(&'E7KLVWUDQVLWLRQLVOLNHO\WREHFKDOOHQJLQJwith continued support required for some decades into the IXWXUH7KHGDWDUHÀHFWVWKHSDVWUHODWLRQVKLSFOHDUO\ZLWKWKHPDMRULW\RILQWHUQDWLRQDODLGEHWZHHQDQGJUDQWHGIRUKXPDQLWDULDQUHOLHI7KLVLQFUHDVHGIURPPLOOLRQLQWRPLOOLRQLQDQGSHDNHGDWPLOOLRQLQUHODWHGWRUHOLHIDQGUHFRYHU\DIWHU&\FORQH1DUJLV,QLWVUHQHZHGHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIMyanmar (GoM), the international community is supporting the formalisation of the policy architecture for national risk management more broadly. Yet international politics still VKDSHVGRQRUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGWKHDELOLW\RIRSHUDWLRQDOagencies in-country to persuade donors to prioritise risk DSSHDUVZHDN$WWKHWLPHRIUHVHDUFKIRUH[DPSOHinternational agencies were struggling to obtain funding IRUSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWUHODWHGSRSXODWLRQPRYHPHQWand for a response anticipated in lieu of the upcoming rainy season. Response still dominates the international FRPPXQLW\¶VHQJDJHPHQWLQWKHFRXQWU\DQGIXQGLQJIRUERWKFRQÀLFWDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVLVH[SRVW(i.e. after the event).

In Sudan¿QDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHIURPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOcommunity continues to be primarily humanitarian,39 DFFRXQWLQJIRUPRUHWKDQRI2'$RYHU\HDUVRQO\

37 OECD DAC data.7KHDQDO\VLVLQWKLVVXEVHFWLRQLVGUDZQIURPFDVHVWXG\GDWD*+$

programme data and author analysis of OECD DAC data.,QDGGLWLRQWR2'$¿QDQFLQJ6XGDQKDVUHFHLYHGDKXJHLQYHVWPHQW

IURPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\UHODWLQJWRSHDFHNHHSLQJ,QIRUH[DPSOHWKHFRVWVRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV0LVVLRQIRU6XGDQ810,6DQGWKHK\EULGPLVVLRQIRU'DUIXU81$0,'KDGDFRPELQHGEXGJHWRIPRUHWKDQELOOLRQVHH'HYHORSPHQW,QLWLDWLYHV


2IÀFLDOGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFH $ millions

Development FRPSRQHQW $ millions

Humanitarian DLG $ millions

Proportion of ODA as humanitarian aid

Niger Sudan 16,496.3 Haiti Philippines 13,474.2 447.4 Myanmar 2,699.1

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Somalia has a higher proportion. This is directly related to the large scale of long-term humanitarian need, with the LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\XVLQJ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDQGtools for obtaining, prioritising and managing the considerable YROXPHVRIDVVLVWDQFH7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQVDQG3DUWQHU:RUN3ODQIRUH[DPSOHDSSHDOHGIRURYHUPLOOLRQWRLPSOHPHQWSURMHFWV7KHREMHFWLYHVRIWKH:RUN3ODQinclude building the capacity of national actors to address humanitarian needs in Sudan, a prerequisite for the transition to recovery and development. This is complemented by WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH)UDPHZRUN81'$)ZKLFKKDVDSURSRVHGEXGJHWRImillion. The last two years have seen a decrease in the funds available for humanitarian interventions, with the Work Plan UHFHLYLQJPLOOLRQLQDQGPLOOLRQLQ7KLVGRZQZDUGWUDMHFWRU\LVOLNHO\WRFRQWLQXHDVGRQRUVVKLIW

DWWHQWLRQDZD\IURP6XGDQ+RFNOH\IRUWKFRPLQJboth increasing the challenges of delivering humanitarian assistance and forcing a focus on transition.

In Haiti, overall funding from the OECD DAC countries increased (albeit gradually) from very low levels throughout WKHGHFDGHEHIRUHWKHHDUWKTXDNH7KLVZDVLQSDUWdue to response and reconstruction related to the series of F\FORQHVDQGFRQVLGHUDEOHÀRRGLQJLQERWKDQG'HVSLWHVLJQL¿FDQWRQJRLQJQDWXUDODQGPDQPDGHULVNVWKHDOPRVWXQSUHFHGHQWHG¿QDQFLQJIROORZLQJWKHHDUWKTXDNHLQFOXGHGPRUHWKDQELOOLRQIRUKXPDQLWDULDQresponse alone. The scale and impact of the earthquake has prompted considerable attention from the international community to all aspects of risk management in Haiti.

4HEMECHANISMSINDETAIL

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

There are isolated examples of preparedness activities EHLQJIXQGHGEXWWKLVLVODUJHO\DGKRFDQGKHDYLO\dependent on the individual context.

7KHH[SHULHQFHLQ1LJHULVVRPHZKDWW\SLFDODFURVVRXU¿YHFDVHVWXGLHV7KH&(5)LVDQLPSRUWDQWUHVRXUFHIRUKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHDQGWKHUHLVVRPH±WKRXJKOLPLWHG±HYLGHQFHWKDWLWKDVIXQGHGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV,QWKH&(5)FKDQQHOOHGPLOOLRQRIKXPDQLWDULDQDLG2&+$I'HVSLWHPDQ\LQGLYLGXDOVLQFRXQWU\VWDWLQJthat CERF funding has not been used for preparedness, nor even considered as a possible vehicle, an analysis of SURMHFWVVKRZVWKDWVRPHGRLQFOXGHSUHSDUHGQHVVDVGH¿QHGE\WKHPDWUL[DSSOLHGWKURXJKRXWWKLVUHVHDUFK)RUH[DPSOHWKH&(5)KDVJLYHQPLOOLRQWR81+&5WRSURYLGHSURWHFWLRQDQGUHOLHIIRUSHRSOHSDUWRIthese funds has been used to build the capacity of local authorities to respond to the needs of refugees, an element RISUHSDUHGQHVVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPDWUL[7KH&(5)KDVDOVRSURYLGHGPLOOLRQWR:+2DQG81,&()WRVXSSRUWgovernment efforts to prevent cholera and treat victims by, amongst other things, strengthening disease surveillance throughout the country. Similar evidence can be found LQ+DLWLZKHUHLQDQGWKH&(5)FRQWULEXWHGVHYHUDOPLOOLRQGROODUVIRUSURMHFWVWKDWPL[UHVSRQVHpreparedness and prevention in relation to cholera, with WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQIRU0LJUDWLRQ,2081,&()DQGWKH81)RRGDQG$JULFXOWXUH2UJDQL]DWLRQ)$2LPSOHPHQWLQJVHH2&+$E

Myanmar has received funding from the CERF each year VLQFHWKURXJKRQHRUERWKRILWV5DSLG5HVSRQVHDQG8QGHUIXQGHG(PHUJHQFLHVSURYLVLRQV$WRWDORIPLOOLRQKDVEHHQDOORFDWHGZLWKSHDNVLQPLOOLRQDIWHU&\FORQH1DUJLVDQGLQPLOOLRQLQUHVSRQVHWR&\FORQH*LULDQGZLGHVSUHDGÀRRGLQJparticularly in Rakhine Statet. However, there was minimal evidence of CERF funding for preparedness, apart from relatively minor funding for health sector preparedness WKURXJKWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV3RSXODWLRQ)XQG81)3$VHH3HWHUVIRUWKFRPLQJ

It is a similar story in the Philippines. While the country KDVUHJXODUO\UHFHLYHGIXQGLQJIURPWKH&(5)±PRUHWKDQPLOOLRQRYHUWKHSDVWVHYHQ\HDUV±DQDO\VLVUHYHDOVYHU\OLWWOHH[SHQGLWXUHRQSUHSDUHGQHVV2QO\WZRRXWRISURMHFWVZHUHLGHQWL¿HGDVKDYLQJSDUWLDOSUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHV±WZRYHU\VLPLODU:RUOG)RRG3URJUDPPH:)3SURMHFWVXQGHUWDNLQJGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGDUHDVRI0LQGDQDR.HOOHWWforthcoming).

6XGDQ¶V&(5)DOORFDWLRQPLUURUVWKHFRXQWU\¶VRYHUDOOpreoccupation with managing the sustained humanitarian

VLWXDWLRQ,Q-DQXDU\6XGDQUHFHLYHGPLOOLRQIURPWKH&(5)WKLVIROORZHGDPLOOLRQDOORFDWLRQLQWKHprevious year that was directed to underfunded priorities ZLWKLQWKH:RUN3ODQ1RHYLGHQFHZDVIRXQGRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQDQ\RIWKHVHSURMHFWV

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs)

2IWKHÀYHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV(5)VDUHSUHVHQWRQO\in Myanmar and Haiti. Evidence shows that funds have been allocated to support preparedness activities in +DLWLODUJHO\IRUFKROHUDUHODWHGSURMHFWV

The Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQDQGZDVDQHVVHQWLDOWRROWRNLFNVWDUWFULWLFDODFWLYLWLHVLQWKHKXUULFDQHVHDVRQ(OCHA, undated a). The budget dramatically increased IROORZLQJWKHHDUWKTXDNHH[FHHGLQJPLOOLRQDQH[FHSWLRQDODPRXQWIRUDQ(5)WKHRQO\IXQGZLWKKLJKHUYROXPHVRIIXQGVEHLQJ(WKLRSLD¶VVHH2&+$F6LQFHLWVLQFHSWLRQWKH(55)LQ+DLWLKDVIXQGHGSURMHFWV,QDQGDSRUWLRQRIIXQGVZDVallocated to cholera prevention and epidemiological VXUYHLOODQFH7KURXJKDGHWDLOHGH[DPLQDWLRQRISURMHFWV(5)FRQWULEXWLRQVKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGDVVXSSRUWLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVLQ2&+$J7HQRIWKHVHZHUHWRVXSSRUWFKROHUDIRUH[DPSOHJUDQWHGWR$0857WRXQGHUWDNHSUHYHQWLRQDQGSUHSDUHGQHVVLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQWKHPXQLFLSDOLWLHVRI1:$UWLERQLWH7HUUH1HXYHDQG$QVH5RXJHDQGfor Mercy Corps for similar work on the Central Plateau. $QRWHZRUWK\SURMHFWLVWKHIXQGLQJRI,QWHUQHZVWRUXQD&'$&QHWZRUNLQ+DLWL&'$&WKLVLVRQHRIWKH¿UVWH[DPSOHVRIEXLOGLQJXSFRPPXQLFDWLRQQHWZRUNVIRUboth humanitarian response and preparedness, and was targeted to reduce the ‘vulnerability of cholera-affected and at-risk communities and to increase community UHVLOLHQFHDQGGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVV¶2&+$J

6LQFHWKH0\DQPDU(5)ZKLFKLVFDOOHGWKH+XPDQLWDULDQ0XOWL6WDNHKROGHU)XQG+06)VHH2&+$XQGDWHGEKDVDOORFDWHGPLOOLRQWRQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDO1*2VIRUZRUNLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGareas and with internally displaced persons (IDPs). On LQYHVWLJDWLRQLWGRHVQRWDSSHDUWKDWDQ\SURMHFWVIXQGHGLQFOXGHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVFRPSRQHQWV,QIRUH[DPSOHWKHWRWDOIXQGLQJZDVPLOOLRQDOOIRUemergency response.

1RWHWKDWRYHUDOOIXQGLQJYROXPHVWKDWDPHFKDQLVPPD\SURYLGHWRDFRXQWU\DQGLQGLFDWHGLQWKLVVHFWLRQDUHQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHÀHFWLYHRIVWURQJ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRSUHSDUHGQHVV,GHQWLI\LQJVSHQGLQJRQSUHSDUHGQHVVUHTXLUHVLQDOO¿YHFRXQWULHVPDQXDOWUDFNLQJDQGcoding of activities.


61

Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs)

7KHUHLVQR&+)LQ0\DQPDU1LJHUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVRU+DLWL,Q6XGDQD&+)KDVSURYLGHGSUHSDUHGQHVVÀQDQFLQJWKURXJKPDQ\RILWVVHFWRUSULRULWLHVWKRXJKLWLVQRWODEHOOHGDVVXFKDQGLVWKHUHIRUHGLIÀFXOWWRWUDFN

6XGDQ¶V&+)KDVEHHQVXSSRUWLQJKXPDQLWDULDQQHHGVVLQFHDQGE\WKHHQGRILWKDGFRQWULEXWHGELOOLRQWRµVXSSRUWWKHKLJKHVWSULRULWLHVRIWKH81DQG3DUWQHUVWork Plan, directly reaching people who are most in need throughout the country and covering critical humanitarian JDSV¶2&+$K$QDQDO\VLVRIWKHPRVWUHFHQW\HDUVRIWKH&+)UHYHDOVDPL[HGSLFWXUHIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7KH&+)LVXVHGWR¿QDQFHRIWKHWork Plan, which includes special allocations of seeds, WRROVOLYHVWRFNYDFFLQHVDQGGUXJV1),VDQGHPHUJHQF\VKHOWHUDQGRIUHDG\WRXVHWKHUDSHXWLFIRRG+RFNOH\IRUWKFRPLQJ6LPLODUO\WKH&+)UHSRUWVWDWHVWKDWWZRsectors have a particular focus on prioritising CHF funds for SUHSDUHGQHVVKHDOWKDQGQXWULWLRQ2&+$KThe full list of emergency preparedness activities and the sectors in which they are found is as follows:

Ɣ strengthening capacity of national actors (coordination and common services)

Ɣ strengthening coordination and capacity of state and non-state actors for effective and timely response (food security and livelihoods)

Ɣ improved emergency preparedness, risk reduction, disease surveillance (health)

Ɣ predictable logistical response (logistics and emergency telecommunications)

Ɣ core pipeline stocks (non-food items and emergency shelter)

Ɣ national capacity and core pipeline stocks (nutrition)

Ɣ early warning mechanisms (protection)

Ɣ disaster preparedness through building capacity (water, sanitation and hygiene).

CHF sector priorities are found in eight of 13 sectors in Sudan, though deepening the analysis by trying to track SUHSDUHGQHVVLVPDGHGLI¿FXOWEHFDXVHWKHWHUPLWVHOILVQRWused. Sectors where emergency preparedness cannot be discerned are basic infrastructure, education, mine action, refugee/multi-sector, and returns and early reintegration.

UN Appeals Process

3UHSDUHGQHVVLVIRXQGZLWKLQRUJDQLVHGDSSHDOVEXWthe extent depends on the kind of appeal – consolidated RUÁDVK²DQGIRUWKHIRUPHURQKRZPXFKLPSRUWDQFHis given to emergency preparedness inside the CHAP. Having an appeal that includes preparedness as a core element does not guarantee funding.

Evidence on the use of appeals for emergency preparedness is largely determined by what kind of appeal has been used in HDFKRIWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FRQWH[WVDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHhumanitarian community has made preparedness a priority. Consolidated appeals have some evidence of preparedness EHLQJIXQGHGÀDVKDSSHDOVKDYHOLWWOHRUQRHYLGHQFHRIthis happening. In regards to the case studies, four have consolidated appeals (Haiti, the Philippines (for Mindanao), 6XGDQDQG1LJHU2QO\WKH3KLOLSSLQHVKDVUHJXODUÀDVKappeals, driven by the need to respond almost every year to F\FORQHVVXFKDV&\FORQH1DUJLVLQ+DLWLKDVDOVRKDGDÀDVKDSSHDOIROORZLQJWKHHDUWKTXDNHLQ

Levels of commitment to emergency preparedness, even LQFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVDUHYDULDEOHDFURVVFRQWH[WV7KHVWURQJHVWHYLGHQFHLVIRXQGLQ1LJHU+HUHSUHSDUHGQHVVLVFHQWUDODVRQHRIWKUHHSLOODUVXQGHUDµUHVLOLHQFH¶REMHFWLYHZLWKLQWKH&+$32ISURMHFWVLQWKHPRVWUHFHQWDSSHDOKDYHVRPHHOHPHQWRISUHSDUHGQHVVRIWKHVHFRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJDQGWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHVDFFRXQWIRUDSSUR[LPDWHO\RQHWKLUGIROORZHGE\KD]DUG

ULVNDQDO\VLVDQGHDUO\ZDUQLQJZLWKHDFK:Hestimate that close to $14 million has been raised for SUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKWKH&$37RDOHVVHUH[WHQWLQWKHSudan Work Plan, elements of preparedness can also EHIRXQG7KURXJKDPDQXDOWUDFNLQJRIWKHDSSHDORISURMHFWVZHUHIRXQGWRKDYHDQHOHPHQWRISUHSDUHGQHVV7KHYDOXHRIWKHVHSURMHFWVZDVPLOOLRQWKHDOORFDWLRQIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVLVHVWLPDWHGDWRIWKHRYHUDOOUHTXHVWHGYROXPHDSSUR[LPDWHO\PLOOLRQ±KDUGO\DVLJQL¿FDQWYROXPHJLYHQWKHSUHGLFWHGQHHGV

7KHDSSHDOVFRQWH[WLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVLVFRPSOLFDWHGE\WKHPL[RIFRQVROLGDWHGDQGÀDVKDSSHDOV0LQGDQDRLVDfocus for consolidated yearly appeals, but is increasingly EHLQJFRPSOHPHQWHGE\XUJHQWÀDVKDSSHDOVGXHWRcyclones, in recent years focusing on the same area. Overall there have been only minimal attempts to use WKHDSSHDOVSURFHVVWRREWDLQSUHSDUHGQHVVIXQGVWKRVHthat have succeeded have been largely for humanitarian FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGORJLVWLFV)RUH[DPSOHVLQFHWKHUHKDYHEHHQVL[81DSSHDOVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVZLWKFRQÀLFWin Mindanao or typhoon response usually being the focus, ZLWK¿QDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIPLOOLRQGUDZQIURPSURMHFWV$GHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVUHYHDOVWKDWRQO\RIWKHVH

Humanitarian donors appear unwilling to prioritise emergency preparedness activities in the context of limited overall humanitarian resources for action plans and appeals

62

SURMHFWVKDYHDWOHDVWDSDUWLDOREMHFWLYHRISUHSDUHGQHVV¿YHRIZKLFKZHUHIXQGHGWKUHHIRU812&+$RQHIRU:)3and one for Plan International. All of these came from the FRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOIRU0LQGDQDR$VRI-XO\QRQHRIWKHSURMHFWVZLWKSUHSDUHGQHVVFRPSRQHQWVKDGEHHQfunded. The total amount requested through appeals for HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVZDVPLOOLRQRIWKHWRWDOrequested), with $2.7 million of that funded.

7KHDQGDSSHDOVIRU+DLWLKDYHDOOLQFOXGHGREMHFWLYHVRQSUHSDUHGQHVV2&+$EL41 7KH+DLWL$FWLRQ3ODQ+$3KDVDQREMHFWLYHWRVKLIWhumanitarian response plans and coordination away from the international community to the Haitian government. It is anticipated that moving humanitarian coordination mechanisms to national structures and promoting increased response capacities will support government leadership in responding to future disasters. The mid-term review of the HAP stated that a Coordination Transition Plan, detailing the transfer of humanitarian coordination structures to QDWLRQDOFRXQWHUSDUWVZDVFRPSOHWHGLQWKH¿UVWTXDUWHURIDQGZDVDZDLWLQJDSSURYDO$WRWDORIPLOOLRQwould be required to implement this plan, though the only FRVWVLQFOXGHGLQWKH+$3ZHUHIRUWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIthe remaining coordination clusters not yet handed over WRWKHJRYHUQPHQWPLOOLRQZDVUHTXHVWHGZKLFKZDV¿QDQFHGDVRI6HSWHPEHUDFFRUGLQJWR2&+$¶V)LQDQFLDO7UDFNLQJ6HUYLFH)767KHUHYLVHG+$3also references the national strategy and contingency plan prepared by the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) and the role of international humanitarian actors supporting it, OLVWLQJVL[HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVSURMHFWV+RZHYHUWKHVHSURMHFWVKDYHUHFHLYHGYHU\OLWWOH¿QDQFLQJ2&+$G,WLVUDUHWKDW&$3+$3VDUHIXOO\IXQGHGEXW+DLWLDSSHDOVLQUHFHQW\HDUVKDYHIDOOHQVLJQL¿FDQWO\EHORZJOREDODYHUDJHVIXQGHGLQWKHDSSHDOZDVIXQGHGDVRI6HSWHPEHU7KHSURMHFWVXQGHUWKHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHKDGUHFHLYHGRQO\RIWKHUHTXHVWHGPLOOLRQIXQGLQJDVRI6HSWHPEHUHumanitarian donors appear unwilling to prioritise emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIOLPLWHGRYHUDOOhumanitarian resources for action plans and appeals.

Similarly, in Myanmar, collective appeals have been put in SODFHWRPRELOLVHUHVRXUFHV)RUH[DPSOHLQUHVSRQVHWRFULVHVVXFKDV&\FORQH1DUJLVLQDQGWKHYLROHQFHLQ5DNKLQHLQLPPHGLDWHDSSHDOVZHUHODXQFKHG±WKHIRUPHUDIRUPDOÀDVKDSSHDODQGWKHODWWHUDQDSSHDORUJDQLVHGE\WKH81EXWQRWDIRUPDOSDUWRIWKH&$3process. Perhaps surprisingly (in comparison with evidence IURPRWKHUÀDVKDSSHDOVERWKDSSHDOVZHUHXVHGWRarticulate emergency preparedness, albeit in only a few SURMHFWV2&+$¶V)76UHSRUWVWKDWLQWZRSURMHFWVWKDWhad preparedness components were actually overfunded: D0HUOLQKHDOWKVHFWRUµ'55DQGSUHSDUHGQHVV¶SURMHFWIRUPLOOLRQDQGDSURMHFWIRUWKH1*20DOWHVHUInternational for ‘disaster preparedness in the cyclone-

DIIHFWHGUHJLRQ¶7KHDSSHDOSURMHFWIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness was also for Malteser International, directed to µLPSURYHGEDVLFLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVV¶IRUthe population in Rakhine.

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

Funding for preparedness has been received in the 3KLOLSSLQHVDQG+DLWLIRUWKHPRUHGHYHORSPHQWDO part of the preparedness continuum.42

2QO\WZRRIWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVVHOHFWHGIRUWKLVUHVHDUFKare GFDRR priority countries: Haiti (a GFDRR priority) and the Philippines (a country selected by donors as WKHLUSULRULW\*LYHQWKDW*)'55¶VPDQGDWHUHDFKHVbeyond preparedness into a range of disaster risk-focused ¿QDQFLQJLQLWLDWLYHVLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWRVHHDUDQJHRIULVNUHODWHGSURMHFWVEHLQJXQGHUWDNHQZLWK¿QDQFLQJIURPthe facility where preparedness is a component of larger REMHFWLYHV*)'55D

,QWKH3KLOLSSLQHV*)'55KDVIXQGHG¿YHSURMHFWVWRGDWH7ZRRIWKHVH±VXSSRUWIRU3RVW'LVDVWHU1HHGV$VVHVVPHQWV3'1$VLQWKHW\SKRRQVHDVRQDQGDSURMHFWWRVXSSRUWKLJKULVNORFDOJRYHUQPHQW±KDYHEHHQcompleted. Three were ongoing at the time of writing: support to the Philippines disaster risk management DJHQGDPLOOLRQUHGXFLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\WRÀRRGLQJLQ0HWUR0DQLODPLOOLRQDQGµ&LW\7R&LW\¶ZKLFKsupports the sharing of government capacity to manage QDWXUDOGLVDVWHUULVNVPLOOLRQ2IWKHVHRQO\WKH¿UVWSURMHFWVXSSRUWLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶V'55DJHQGDKDVH[SOLFLWemergency preparedness components, which take the form of long-term capacity-building of government for response.

,Q+DLWL*)'55F*)'55KDV¿QDQFHGQLQHSURMHFWVDOOEXWRQHRIWKHVHDQHHGVDVVHVVPHQWIROORZLQJWKHIRXUKXUULFDQHVRIFDPHDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNHRI-DQXDU\2IWKHQLQHSURMHFWVWZRwere needs assessments and three were largely sector-VSHFL¿FULVNUHGXFWLRQSURMHFWVKHDOWKLQIUDVWUXFWXUHhousing and cholera prevention43). The remaining four SURMHFWVLQFOXGHHOHPHQWVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVRQHVSHFL¿FDOO\RQPXOWLKD]DUGDVVHVVPHQWVmillion) and three for a range of institutional capacity-building (of which certain elements appear to be for SUHSDUHGQHVV7KHVHSURMHFWVWRWDOPLOOLRQKRZHYHU

,QWKHDQG&$3VQRLQGLFDWLRQZDVJLYHQRIZKLFKSURMHFWVLQWKHDSSHDOZHUHPHDQWWRDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHRUKRZ5DWKHUWKHSURMHFWVZHUHRUJDQLVHGE\µFOXVWHU¶WKH81OHGFRRUGLQDWLRQmechanism based on humanitarian sectors).

7KHRQO\UHSRUWHG*)'55SURMHFWWKDWFRYHUHG6XGDQZDVDZRUNVKRSWKDWORRNHGDWFOLPDWHULVNIRUWKH+RUQRI$IULFD,Q1LJHUWKHRQO\*)'55SURMHFWWRGDWHKDVEHHQDUHJLRQDOSURMHFWFRYHULQJZRUNVKRSVIRUFOLPDWHH[WUHPHV

(OHPHQWVRIWKLVFKROHUDSURMHFWDUHOLNHO\WREHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWSURMHFWGHVFULSWLRQV


63

the proportion of preparedness spend could not be determined due to lack of access to an itemised budget.

UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF)

)LQDQFLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVLVIRXQGLQIRXURIWKHÀYHcase study countries. It includes a rare example of a PHFKDQLVPIXQGLQJFRQÁLFWSUHYHQWLRQRIZKLFKDportion is likely to be for preparedness.

The CPR TTF has been used in all of the case study FRXQWULHVDSDUWIURP6XGDQLQUHFHQW\HDUV,QIRUH[DPSOH&3577)IXQGLQJZDVUHFHLYHGIRUWKHPhilippines, Myanmar and Haiti, in each case for disaster-UHODWHGSURMHFWV+DLWLZDVWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUPVRIYROXPHZLWKFORVHWRPLOOLRQLQWKUHHSURMHFWVIXQGHGE\WKH77)WKHPDMRULW\RIWKLV¿QDQFLQJZDVIRUHDUO\UHFRYHU\SURJUDPPHVVHH81'3DLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHHDUWKTXDNH(DUO\UHFRYHU\H[SHQGLWXUHWKURXJKWKH77)DOVRDFFRXQWHGIRUWKHEXONRI¿QDQFLQJLQWRERWKWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQG0\DQPDU,WDSSHDUVXQOLNHO\IURPWKHSURMHFWGHVFULSWLRQVWKDWFRXOGEHDFFHVVHGWKDWDQ\VLJQL¿FDQWSURSRUWLRQ±LIDQ\±RIWKLVHDUO\UHFRYHU\H[SHQGLWXUHZDVfor emergency preparedness.

1LJHUSURYLGHVDQLQWHUHVWLQJFDVHZKHUH&3577)IXQGLQJcombines risk management for different types of risk. In PLOOLRQZDVFRPPLWWHGE\81'3WRFRQÀLFWprevention, of which a component was likely to be for SUHSDUHGQHVV2IWKLVFDPHIURPWKH77)GLUHFWO\This funding in part has supported two specialists focusing RQDPL[RIFULVLVSUHYHQWLRQDQGUHFRYHU\PRYLQJEH\RQGFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQWRVXSSRUWQDWLRQDODFWLRQRQWKH'LVSRVLWLIand implementation of the HFA.

,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW81'3DOVRPDQDJHVLWVRZQcore resources44 allocated to crisis, through the same management structures and decision-making processes as the TTF. While not formally considered to be part of the TTF, WKHVHFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDV81'3¶VRZQFRUHUHVRXUFHVWRWKHIXQG)RUWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVLQWKHVHUHVRXUFHVZRXOGDGGDQH[WUDPLOOLRQIRUFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQUHFRYHU\LQ1LJHUDQGIRUWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQG0\DQPDUUHVSHFWLYHO\IRUµUHVSRQVH¶DQG$219,432 for DRR in Haiti. Often programmes funded by 81'3DQGPDQDJHGE\%&35LQFOXGH¿QDQFLQJIURPERWKWKHVHµFRUHUHVRXUFHV¶DQGWKH77)IRUH[DPSOHWKH1LJHUFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQSURMHFWPHQWLRQHGDERYHLVDVLQJOHSURMHFW¿QDQFHGE\ERWKVRXUFHV

Table 4.3 highlights the scope of both of these funding VRXUFHVPDQDJHGWRJHWKHUE\%&351RWHWKDWDVindicated above) not all these volumes are for emergency preparedness.

&OLPDWHDGDSWDWLRQÀQDQFLQJ$GDSWDWLRQIXQG/'&)33&545

:KHUHDGDSWDWLRQÀQDQFLQJIHDWXUHVLQDFRXQWU\WKHUHis evidence that it supports the more developmental aspects of emergency preparedness – this is particularly evident in Niger and to a lesser extent in the Philippines. 7KLVÀQDQFLQJGRHVQRWVXSSRUWWKHIXOOUDQJHRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVUHTXLUHGRQO\WKRVHDUHDVWKDWclimate risks share with risk management in general.

Financing for climate change-related activities has RFFXUUHGLQDOO¿YHRIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV7KHPhilippines has seen by far the highest volumes of ¿QDQFLQJZLWKPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQVLQFHZKLOH1LJHUKDVDOVRUHFHLYHGPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQ

,QWKH3KLOLSSLQHVPLOOLRQRI¿QDQFLQJKDVEHHQIRUFOLPDWHµPLWLJDWLRQ¶,3&&ZLWKQRSURMHFWVLGHQWL¿DEO\UHODWHGWRHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV2IWKHPLOOLRQDSSURYHGVLQFHIRUDGDSWDWLRQRUµPXOWLSOHIRFL¶WKHWZREURDGDUHDVRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJZKHUHSUHSDUHGQHVV

4ABLE%XPENDITURESMANAGEDBY"#02FROMTHE#0244&ANDCRISIS RELATEDCORERESOURCES

CPR TTF Core resources Total &RQÁLFW Disaster &RQÁLFW Disaster Niger Myanmar Haiti 219,432 Philippines 66,429 66,429 Sudan

7KHVHDUHWHUPHG75$&RUVRPHWLPHV75$&µ75$&¶VWDQGLQJIRUµ7DUJHWHG5HVRXUFHVDWWKH&RUH¶,QWRWDORI81'3¶VFRUHIXQGLQJLVDOORFDWHGWRFULVLV

1RWHWKDWLQWKLVVHFWLRQZHDOVRLQFOXGHDQDQDO\VLVRIRWKHUVRXUFHVRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJEH\RQGWKHFRUHPHFKDQLVPVEHLQJH[DPLQHG

6RXUFH9DX[7EIRUWKFRPLQJ)LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG81'3&3577)FXUUHQW

64

activities may be captured), only marginal investments in preparedness can be discerned. Two of these are funded by *HUPDQ\¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO&OLPDWH,QLWLDWLYH,.,7KH¿UVWLVDPLOOLRQSURMHFWHQWLWOHGµ$GDSWLQJ&OLPDWH&KDQJHDQG&RQVHUYLQJ%LRORJLFDO'LYHUVLW\¶*,=DQGWKHVHFRQGLVDPLOOLRQSURMHFWVXSSRUWLQJWKH3KLOLSSLQHVClimate Change Commission in implementing a national FOLPDWHVWUDWHJ\$WKLUGSURMHFWIRUµFOLPDWHFKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQ¶to a value of $4.97milllion is funded by the Special Climate Change Fund (SSCF). There are considerable efforts under way in the Philippines to integrate CCA and DRM, so it is anticipated that adaptation funding will have some impact RQEURDGHUULVNPDQDJHPHQWVSHFL¿FDOO\LQUHJDUGVWRinstitutional development and risk management, including risk DVVHVVPHQWV+RZHYHUJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVVWDWHWKDWWKLVLVvery much a work in progress.46

1LJHU¶VPLOOLRQRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJH[FHSWIRUmillion, is solely dedicated towards adaptation. The PPCR KDVIXQGHGMXVWRYHUPLOOLRQRIWKLVDQGWKH/'&)KDVFRQWULEXWHGDQRWKHUPLOOLRQ'HVFULSWLRQVRIWKHWZRODUJHVWSURMHFWV±ERWKIRUWKHµ1LJHU&RPPXQLW\$FWLRQ3URMHFWIRU&OLPDWH5HVLOLHQFH¶±LQFOXGHODQJXDJHUHIHUULQJto ‘mainstreaming climate resilience into development VWUDWHJLHVDWQDWLRQDODQGORFDOOHYHOV¶ZLWKH[SHFWDWLRQVof risk assessment and preparedness being included. ,QDGGLWLRQZLWKLQRWKHUSURMHFWVUHIHUHQFHVDUHPDGHWRµSULYDWHVHFWRULQYHVWPHQWWREXLOGFOLPDWHUHVLOLHQFH¶DQGµLPSOHPHQWLQJ1DWLRQDO$GDSWDWLRQ3URJUDPPHRI$FWLRQ1$3$47SULRULW\LQWHUYHQWLRQV¶1RWDOOSURMHFWGHVFULSWLRQVDUHWKLVDPELJXRXVVRPHSURMHFWVDUHFOHDUO\ZLWKLQWKHbounds of emergency preparedness. Three for ‘climate IRUHFDVWLQJDQGWKHRSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPV¶WRWDOOLQJPLOOLRQZHUHDOOIXQGHGE\WKHPPCR.,QDGGLWLRQPLOOLRQRI/'&)IXQGLQJZDVXVHGIRUµFRPPXQLW\EDVHGDGDSWDWLRQ¶LQFOXGLQJVRPHcommunity-related emergency preparedness activities.

6XGDQ¶VPLOOLRQRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJLVODUJHO\DFFRXQWHGIRUE\VHYHQDGDSWDWLRQSURMHFWVWRWDOOLQJMXVWXQGHUPLOOLRQ2IWKHVHWKHPDMRULW\LVIRUHQHUJ\DQGZDWHUUHVRXUFHV2QHSURMHFWWRWKHYDOXHRIPLOOLRQLVIXQGHGE\-DSDQ¶V)DVW6WDUW)LQDQFHLQLWLDWLYHZKLFKwhile not one of our three global mechanisms, is still worth considering. It is termed as a ‘countermeasure through IRRGDLGLQFROODERUDWLRQZLWK:)3¶DQGLVFDWHJRULVHGDVµSUHYHQWLRQRIGLVDVWHUDQGUHKDELOLWDWLRQ¶

9ROXPHVRIFOLPDWH¿QDQFLQJWR0\DQPDUDQG+DLWLDUHUHODWLYHO\VPDOODWPLOOLRQDQGPLOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\RIZKLFKPLOOLRQIRU0\DQPDULVIRUDGDSWDWLRQDQGPLOOLRQIRU+DLWL49,Q0\DQPDUDVPDOOSURMHFWIRUµWUDLQLQJRQ'55XWLOL]LQJPRELOHZDWHUNQRZOHGJH¶LVWKHRQO\OLNHO\SUHSDUHGQHVVSURMHFWIXQGHGE\-DSDQ¶V)DVWStart Finance.,Q+DLWLWKUHH/'&)SURMHFWVUHFHLYHMXVWRYHUPLOOLRQRQHRIWKRVH±PIRU)$2IRUµUHGXFLQJGLVDVWHUULVNLQDJULFXOWXUH¶±VSHDNVWRSUHSDUHGQHVVLQLWVfourth focus area, ‘strengthening of local institutions and

6RXUFH&OLPDWH)XQGV8SGDWHDFFHVVHG$XJXVW

)URPLQWHUYLHZVZLWKERWKWKH3KLOLSSLQHV+HDGRIWKH2I¿FHRI&LYLODefense (the body responsible for guiding disaster risk management in the Philippines) and the deputy head of the Climate Commission .HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJ

1RWHWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVVWXG\2',FRQVLGHUVWKHFUHDWLRQRID1$3$DVEHLQJHTXLYDOHQWWRWKHµOHJLVODWLYHDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN¶HOHPHQWVZLWKLQWKHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[JXLGLQJWKLVUHVHDUFK$QLQYHVWPHQWLQFUHDWLQJD1$3$LVWKHUHIRUHLQSDUW±JLYHQWKHFURVVRYHURI1$3$VLQWR'55LQJHQHUDO±considered an investment in emergency preparedness.

$GGLWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJIRUWKHVHSURMHFWVFDPHIURPWKH$IULFDQDevelopment Bank (AfDB). Developed and supported by the $I'%WKH$IULFDQ8QLRQDQGWKH81(FRQRPLF&RPPLVVLRQIRU$IULFD81(&$WKH&OLPDWHIRU'HYHORSPHQWLQ$IULFD3URJUDPPH&OLP'HY$IULFDLQ1LJHUµDLPVDWFRQVWUXFWLQJDVROLGIRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHUHVSRQVHWRFOLPDWHFKDQJH¶7KH$I'%GHYHORSHGWKLVIXQGto support the ClimDev-Africa programme related to the generation and dissemination of reliable climate information, the integration of climate change information into development programmes and the implementation of pilot adaptation practices.

$ millions

0 50 100

Adaptation

Sudan

Phillipines

Niger

Myanmar

Haiti

Multiple fociMitigation – general

Mitigation – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

150 200 250 300 350 400 450

&IGURE#LIMATElNANCINGINTHElVECASESTUDYCOUNTRIES


associations to encourage awareness and dissemination of ULVNPDQDJHPHQW¶*()

In summary, of the three selected adaptation mechanisms, RQO\WZRIXQGLQDOO¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV33&5DQGthe LDCF. There is no discernible pattern in support RISUHSDUHGQHVVLQWKLVRURWKHUDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJwhich comes from a variety of global- and country-level mechanisms. Furthermore, the lack of integration of FOLPDWHDGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJZLWKDFWLYLWLHVIXQGHGWKURXJKDRM risk mechanisms was highlighted as an issue in several of the case studies, especially for the Philippines, 1LJHUDQG+DLWL

In-country bilateral: humanitarian and development funding

)LQDQFLQJIURPLQFRXQWU\GRQRUVRFFXUVLQDOOÀYHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVEXWLWLVKLJKO\YDULDEOHDQGhighly dependent on the context.

%LODWHUDOLQFRXQWU\¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVfrom donor countries is heavily shaped by the country FRQWH[WLQFOXGLQJDPRQJVWRWKHULVVXHVWKHULVNFRQWH[Wpolitical and economic status, governance arrangements, FRQGLWLRQVRIFRQÀLFWSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\DQGFUXFLDOO\WKHhistorical and political relations between the donor, the international community and recipient country governments.

%LODWHUDO¿QDQFLQJZKLFKH[FOXGHVDOOIXQGLQJWKDWJRHVthrough one of the global or country mechanisms/tools GLVFXVVHGDERYHRFFXUVLQHDFKRIWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVWKRXJKWRVLJQL¿FDQWO\YDU\LQJGHJUHHVDQGIRUDvariety of emergency preparedness purposes.

Donor representation within each country is key to understanding bilateral contributions from development DQGKXPDQLWDULDQIXQGLQJ*OREDOSRROHG¿QDQFLQJmechanisms, such as those discussed in this study, allow many non-resident donors to prioritise funding IRUVSHFL¿FWKHPHVRUVHFWRUVZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\EHLQJSUHVHQWLQWKHUHFLSLHQWFRXQWU\±WKLVLVRQHRIWKHarguments for pooled mechanisms in general. However, broadly speaking, most donor countries undertake a large proportion of their development programming at a country level. This is an important distinction if the argument is put forward for more donors to fund emergency preparedness in greater quantities and in more countries with GHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJ6LPSO\SXWWKHUHZRXOGQHHGWRbe more resident donors, which would be a considerable challenge to achieve, or alternatively a better division of labour (thematically and in-country) (see OECD DAC, DQG

Global data on the number of donors to each country (see 7DEOHGRHVQRWWHOOXVLIWKRVHGRQRUVDUHUHVLGHQW±however, it does suggest how much reliance a country may have on a particular set of donor partners. The data tells us WKDWWKH3KLOLSSLQHVIRUH[DPSOHKDVDUDWKHUQDUURZRYHUDOOGRQRUEDVHIRU2'$2IWKH'$&GRQRUJRYHUQPHQWV¿YHWKH86-DSDQ$XVWUDOLD*HUPDQ\DQGWKH(8DFFRXQWHGIRUELOOLRQRIJUDQW2'$EHWZHHQDQGRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VWRWDO7KHWRSGRQRUVDFFRXQWHGIRUPRUHWKDQ7KHRWKHUFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVDSSHDUWRKDYHDZLGHUGRQRUEDVH&HUWDLQO\IRU1LJHU6XGDQDQG+DLWLWKHUHJXODUSUHVHQFHRIFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVLQSDUWH[SODLQVthis, giving donor nations without in-country representation

49 In both cases, tracking what elements of emergency preparedness DUH¿QDQFHGLVDFKDOOHQJH

1RWHWKDWDOWKRXJKQRQHRIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVLVFXUUHQWO\UHFHLYLQJVXSSRUWIURPWKH$GDSWDWLRQ)XQGDSURMHFWLQ0\DQPDUhas been recommended but has not yet been approved. It was formulated by a multilateral implementing agency (Adaptation Fund %RDUGD$WSUHVHQWRQO\RI$GDSWDWLRQ)XQG¿QDQFLQJcan be channelled through multilateral agencies, and all available IXQGVKDYHDOUHDG\EHHQSURJUDPPHG7UXMLOORDQG1DNKRRGD

µ5HVLGHQWGRQRUV¶LVDWHUPXVHGWRGHVFULEHGRQRUVWKDWKDYHDSUHVHQFHLQFRXQWU\µ1RQUHVLGHQWGRQRUV¶UHIHUVWRWKRVHWKDWGRQRW

HaitiMyanmar NigerPhilippines Sudan

0 50 100$ millions

150 200 250

Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)

MDG Achievement Fund

Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)

Japan’s Fast-Start Finance

Germany’s International Climate Initiative

GEF Trust Fund (GEF 5)

&IGURE!DAPTATIONlNANCINGTOTHElVECASESTUDYCOUNTRIES BYlNANCINGSOURCE

6RXUFH&OLPDWH)XQGV8SGDWHFXUUHQWSULFHVDFFHVVHG$XJXVW

66

a conduit for both prioritisation and funding of humanitarian QHHGV7KHGDWDKLJKOLJKWVWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQrecipient countries. However, this is not necessarily a suitable indicator for the range of donor options for emergency preparedness, and data at a global level is not comprehensive. A more useful indicator would be to look at how many donors have funded preparedness activities. In a recent study, ODI has highlighted how some countries have very few donors in disaster risk-related activities, even over DORQJSHULRGWKH3KLOLSSLQHVKDVKDG+DLWLDQG1LJHUMXVWVL[RYHU\HDUV.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL

Given the challenges within the global data, our analysis relies more heavily on the case studies for a clearer picture of how donors use bilateral funding in-country for emergency preparedness. The Philippines has the most ELODWHUDOGRQRU¿QDQFLQJLQWHUPVRIYROXPHWKDWFDQEHWUDFNHG2IWKHPLOOLRQRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIXQGLQJFXUUHQWO\XQGHUZD\PLOOLRQFRPHVdirectly from donors in-country. This is split broadly into two distinct channels: Japanese development funding for long-term early warning infrastructure and related institutional development, and the remaining donors PRVWSURPLQHQWO\$XVWUDOLDDQGWKH86IXQGLQJODUJHO\humanitarian coordination and preparedness for response.

In Myanmar, preparedness features strongly for a IHZGRQRUVHVSHFLDOO\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V+XPDQLWDULDQ$LG'HSDUWPHQW',3(&+286$,'DQG$XV$,'KRZHYHUIRUPRVWGRQRUVH[FHSW',3(&+2there is no disaggregation of funding for preparedness from larger DRR programmes. Bilateral funding is largely humanitarian in origin, triggered after a crisis VWULNHV',3(&+2¶VGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVSURJUDPPHis the primary donor for DRR, under which emergency preparedness activities often fall. These funds are FKDQQHOOHGWRRSHUDWLRQDO81DQGQRQJRYHUQPHQWDODJHQFLHV,Q',3(&+2IXQGLQJLQ0\DQPDUUHDFKHG¼PLOOLRQ,QWKH(&¶VKXPDQLWDULDQaid to Myanmar reached €24.7 million, and emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVUHFHLYHG¼PLOOLRQWKURXJK',3(&+2'HVSLWHWKHULVNFRQWH[WWKHUHLVQRHTXLYDOHQWDSSURDFK

WRIXQGLQJSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWUHODWHGHPHUJHQFLHV'RQRUSUHVHQFH±LIDQ\±LVPLQLPDOLQ<DQJRQDQGLQFUHDVLQJO\PLQRULQWKHFDSLWDO1D\S\LGDZ

,Q1LJHUGRQRUIXQGLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVLVSULPDULO\humanitarian in origin and is generated by the CAP. )XQGLQJLVODUJHO\QRWLQFRXQWU\ZKLFKLQSDUWUHÀHFWVWKHsmall number of donors that are resident in the country DQGWKHIHZDYHQXHVIRUGRQRU¿QDQFLQJDWFRXQWU\OHYHO2YHUD\HDUSHULRGRQO\VL[GRQRUVKDYHFRQWULEXWHGDQ\PRQH\DWDOO.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL+RZHYHUWKH(&¶VVXSSRUWWRWKH'LVSRVLWLIWKHPDLQJRYHUQPHQWDOULVNPDQDJHPHQWERG\LVDUDUHH[DPSOHof development funding for the main institutions for preparedness. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) also supports the Dispositif to prevent DQGPDQDJHFULVLVGRLQJVRZLWKDPL[RIKXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJ

In Sudan, almost all funding clearly targeted to SUHSDUHGQHVVZKDWOLWWOHH[LVWVFRPHVWKURXJKWKHconsolidated appeal. Only one donor, Japan, has contributed funds to preparedness outside of the CAP, WKURXJKDQXPEHURIDJULFXOWXUDOSURMHFWVZLWK)$2LQWKH%OXH1LOHDQG6RXWK.RUGRIDQUHJLRQV,QERWKFDVHVWKLVZDVGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFH

)RU+DLWLWKHPDMRUGRQRUVDUHWKH86WKH(&DQG&DQDGD%RWKWKH86DQGWKH(&KDYHHPSKDVLVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHof DRR within their approaches, and have funded directly WRSDUWQHUV,Q+DLWLDVVLVWDQFHWR'55IURPWKH2I¿FHRI86)RUHLJQ'LVDVWHU$VVLVWDQFH2)'$KDVEHHQoverwhelmingly in the form of programmes that integrate ULVNZLWKLQGLVDVWHUUHVSRQVH([DPSOHVLQFOXGHFKROHUDprevention and reinforced shelters, as opposed to stand-DORQH'55LQWHUYHQWLRQV,QPLOOLRQRIGLVDVWHUDVVLVWDQFHWR+DLWLLQWHJUDWHG'55E\FRQWUDVWRQO\

4ABLE$ONORSTOCASESTUDYCOUNTRIESIN

6RXUFH%DVHGRQ2(&''$&DFFHVVHG$XJXVW1RWHWKDWQXPEHURIGRQRUVLQFOXGHVLQVWLWXWLRQVDVZHOODVGRQRUFRXQWULHV

Volume of ODA ($ millions)

Number of donors

Volume of funding from the top ÀYHGRQRUVPLOOLRQV

9ROXPHRIWRSÀYHGRQRUV% of total

Niger 437.4 Sudan 41 Haiti 36 1,199.4 Philippines 44 769.7 Myanmar 36 226.4

0RVWELODWHUDOGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVZHKDYHWUDFHGWKURXJKWKHFRXQWU\VWXGLHVKDVEHHQFRQ¿QHGWRHLWKHUEURDGULVNUHGXFWLRQDFWLYLWLHVLQµGHYHORSPHQWVHFWRUV¶VXFKDVagriculture or to technical elements of early warning.


67

ZDVIRUVWDQGDORQH'55SURMHFWV86$,'(&+2KDVSURYLGHG¼PLOOLRQIRU'55SURMHFWVIURPWR(&+2(&+2¶V¿QDQFLQJWR'55LQ+DLWLUHSUHVHQWHGRILWVWRWDOIXQGLQJLQDQGLQLQ¼PLOOLRQZDVSODQQHGIRUVSHFL¿FGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVSURMHFWV(&+2IXQGHG'55SURMHFWVWKDWhave included emergency preparedness also involve working in close collaboration with the national system of DRM and reinforcing government capacities to respond to emergencies (ibid.).

/THERSOURCESOFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSlNANCING

7KHFDVHVWXGLHVDOVRUHYHDOHGRWKHUVLJQL¿FDQWLQYHVWPHQWVLQSUHSDUHGQHVVZKLFKJREH\RQGWKH¿QDQFLQJmechanisms and channels being investigated in detail KHUH7KHVHDGGLWLRQDOVRXUFHVRI¿QDQFHDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUunderstanding the full picture at a country level.

&RXQWU\VSHFLÀFÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV

+HDYLO\GHSHQGHQWRQFRQWH[WLQVRPHFDVHVFRXQWU\VSHFLÀFPHFKDQLVPVIXQGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVEXWRQO\DVSDUWRIODUJHURUZLGHUREMHFWLYHV

$FFRUGLQJWRWKHHYLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FPHFKDQLVPVGRQRWH[LVWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVRU1LJHU,QWKHRWKHUWKUHHFRXQWULHVVSHFL¿F¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVGRH[LVWLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHSDUWLFXODUFRQWH[W

In Myanmar the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) a multi-donor trust fund established in LQFOXGHVWKUHHSURMHFWVWKDWKDYHDQHOHPHQWof preparedness, protecting livelihoods from the impact of disaster. At the more developmental end of the preparedness continuum, these activities can be considered to be supporting preparedness more broadly: ‘Civil society led community based livelihood UHVRXUFHVGHYHORSPHQW¶SURMHFWVZLWKDPLOOLRQEXGJHWLPSOHPHQWHGE\$FWLRQ$LGµ&RPPXQLW\LQLWLDWHGOLYHOLKRRGVDQGSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQSURMHFWV¶DSURMHFWZLWKDPLOOLRQEXGJHWLPSOHPHQWHGE\WKH$GYHQWLVW'HYHORSPHQWDQG5HOLHI$JHQF\$'5$µ5HGXFLQJ5LVNVand Improving Livelihoods in the Rice Environments, a SURMHFWZLWKDEXGJHWRIPLOOLRQLPSOHPHQWHGE\WKHInternational Rice Research Institute. In-country, many believe that LIFT could go much further to incorporate preparedness into its investment decisions.

6LQFHDQGWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH&RPSUHKHQVLYH3HDFHAgreement (CPA), Sudan has had many mechanisms VSHFL¿FWRWKHFRXQWU\7ZRRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDUHWKHMulti-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) administered by the World

Bank and the Darfur Community Peace and Stabilisation )XQG'&36)DGPLQLVWHUHGE\81'32IWKHPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQFRPPLWWHGWRWKH0'7)VLQFHWZRthirds of which has come from the Sudanese government 6XGDQ0'7)1QRSURMHFWKDVHLWKHUIRFXVHGon emergency preparedness or has had preparedness activities as a component. The DCPSF is, in terms of PDQGDWHFORVHUWRSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKLWVRYHUDOOREMHFWLYHbeing to ‘promote peace building and reconciliation in Darfur through the implementation of community-based UHFRYHU\DQGGHYHORSPHQWDFWLYLWLHV¶81'3XQGDWHGD+RZHYHUPRUHFDUHIXOLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWRVSHFL¿FSURMHFWVundertaken through its funding reveals negligible amounts IRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQVFund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development LQ'DUIXU81')ZDVFUHDWHGLQ0D\WRVXSSRUWthe implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS), the development tool intended to ‘move Darfur RXWRIDF\FOHRIFRQÀLFWDQGSRYHUW\WRZDUGVDVWDEOHDQGSURVSHURXVIXWXUH¶81'3XQGDWHGE,WVIRFXVLVRQUHGXFLQJFRQÀLFWWRµUHVWRUHSHDFHVHFXULW\DQGVRFLDOVWDELOLW\¶7KHUHDUHDOVRUHIHUHQFHVWRµLPSURYHGJRYHUQPHQWIXQFWLRQDOLW\¶DQGVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIFLYLODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ±KRZHYHUZKHWKHUWKLVLVWRPDQDJHULVNLVas yet unknown.

7KH-DQXDU\HDUWKTXDNHLQ+DLWLSURPSWHGDVXEVWDQWLDOresponse, followed almost immediately by a considerable volume of funds for reconstruction. Part of this was channelled through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), set up by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World %DQNDQGWKH81LQVXSSRUWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V$FWLRQ3ODQIRUWKH5HFRYHU\DQG'HYHORSPHQWRI+DLWL7RGDWHmillion has been committed to the fund, making it the largest VLQJOHVRXUFHRI¿QDQFHIRUUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ6LQFHLWVLQFHSWLRQLWKDVIXQGHGDQXPEHURISURMHFWVLQZKLFKHPHUJHQF\preparedness is a partial component. These are all DRR SURJUDPPHVDQGLQFOXGHWKH+5)¶VFRQWULEXWLRQRIPLOOLRQtowards multi-sector risk reduction and $14 million for ‘natural GLVDVWHUPLWLJDWLRQ¶7KHIXQGLVDOVR¿QDQFLQJDVRPHZKDWXQUHDOLVWLFDOO\WLWOHGµHDUWKTXDNHSUHYHQWLRQSODQ¶IRUWKHQRUWKRIWKHFRXQWU\+5)ZLWKPLOOLRQ2QHSURMHFWstands out as particularly important for preparedness: a $2 PLOOLRQµFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJIRU'50SURMHFW¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHVsupporting the Civil Protection Department (CPD). This SURMHFWLVODUJHO\DERXWFULVLVFRRUGLQDWLRQ

81')7250DUFKS

Core and multi-use funding54

Core funding allocated directly to emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVLVGLIÀFXOWWRWUDFNZLWKIHZLQVWLWXWLRQVor agencies separating out such investments from WKHUHVWRIWKHLUZRUN:KHUHWKHUHLVHYLGHQFHLWLVlargely through the use of existing human resources IRUSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKPD\RIWHQE\SDUWRIa larger programme.

All of the case studies report on at least some use of H[LVWLQJUHVRXUFHVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVRIWHQWKHVHUHVRXUFHVDUHµKXPDQ¶ZLWKVWDIIGUDZQfrom other functions to undertake preparedness plans. Evidence suggests that this human resource capacity comes either from core resources i.e. staff retained to manage overall operations, or alternatively from staff GUDZQLQWRSUHSDUHGQHVVIURPRWKHUSURMHFWDFWLYLWLHVIn Myanmar, this was evident when impending natural KD]DUGUHODWHGULVNVZHUHLGHQWL¿HGWKURXJKHDUO\ZDUQLQJIt should be noted that the case studies suggest that institutions and agencies do not necessarily separate out µGXWLHVLQWKHDUHDRISUHSDUHGQHVV¶IURPRWKHUDFWLYLWLHV

In the Philippines, several agencies and institutions UHSRUWXQGHUWDNLQJSUHSDUHGQHVVZRUNE\XWLOLVLQJH[LVWLQJhuman resources. These largely take the form of technical support to government in and around coordination FDSDFLW\RUIRUVXSSRUWLQJWKHLURZQUHVSRQVHDFWLYLWLHVWKH\DUHQRWVXEVWDQWLDOLQWHUPVRI¿QDQFLDOYROXPH)RUH[DPSOH,20UXQVWUDLQLQJVIRUFDPSPDQDJHPHQWthroughout the year, continually updating its own and government staff skills. Plan International has elements RISUHSDUHGQHVVLQWHJUDWHGLQWRPXFKRILWVZRUN81'3DQGWKH:RUOG%DQNH[WHQGWKHLUWHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWWRgovernment for improving risk management, beyond VSHFL¿FSURJUDPPHVDQGSURMHFWV

A similar picture is found in Myanmar, Haiti and Sudan, WKRXJKWRDOHVVHUH[WHQW7KH1LJHUFDVHVWXG\IRXQGPRUHHYLGHQFHRIH[LVWLQJUHVRXUFHVEHLQJDSSOLHGVSHFL¿FDOO\WRHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKLQWKH1*2community while implementing largely humanitarian SURJUDPPHVDQGSURMHFWV7KHFDVHVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHYROXPHRIWKLV¿QDQFLQJIURPFRUHUHVRXUFHVLVµFRQVLGHUDEOH¶,Q1LJHUPDQ\1*2VUHSRUWXVLQJWKHVDPHfunding lines and staff to conduct preparedness activities, DVDZD\WRLPSURYHWKHLUUHVSRQVHWLPHDQGHI¿FLHQF\It was strongly suggested by several organisations that preparedness (for them at least) was an essential part of µJRRG¶KXPDQLWDULDQDLGDQGQRWGLYLVLEOHIURPWKDWDLG

The Red Cross

Both the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red &URVV,&5&IHDWXUHLQWKHFDVHVWXGLHVDQG5HGCross National Societies exist in each country.

IFRC:7KH,)5&SODFHVVLJQL¿FDQWHPSKDVLVRQGLVDVWHUpreparedness as part of its overall work in ‘disaster PDQDJHPHQW¶,WULQJIHQFHVRIHDFKDSSHDOEXGJHWIRUµUHVLOLHQFHEXLOGLQJ¶PHDVXUHVWRµHQVXUHWKDWWKHoperation includes enough investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction to help keep communities VDIHDQGUHVLOLHQWLQWKHIXWXUH¶ZKLOHDOVRVWUHQJWKHQLQJQDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\,)5&

As a rule, the IFRC does not break down the amount of DFWXDOPRQH\VSHQWRQGLVDVWHUSUHSDUHGQHVVJOREDOO\LWVUHSRUWIRUH[DPSOHVKRZVPLOOLRQGLYLGHGLQWRSHUFHQWDJHVIRULWVGHYHORSPHQWSURJUDPPHGLVDVWHUUHVSRQVHSURJUDPPHVRWKHUSURMHFWVDQGVXSSOHPHQWDU\VHUYLFHV

The Red Cross movement as a whole is seen as a key actor LQ+DLWLDQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQGSHUKDSVWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWLQ1LJHUDQG0\DQPDUWKRXJKLQWKHODWWHULWVUROHLVJURZLQJfast). In all four cases, disaster preparedness strategies H[LVWWKDWOLQNWRJHWKHU5HG&URVV1DWLRQDO6RFLHWLHVZLWKWKH,)5&DQGWKH1DWLRQDO6RFLHWLHVRIUHVLGHQWGRQRUVIdentifying the amount of money spent on preparedness is made challenging by the many routes in which funding can ÀRZZLWKLQWKH,)5&V\VWHPZLWKLQGLYLGXDOVRFLHWLHVDEOHWRact as donor, recipient and implementer of funding.

,Q+DLWLLQIRUH[DPSOH(&+2IXQGHG)UHQFK*HUPDQand Spanish Red Cross societies as well as the IFRC itself WRZRUNRQSURMHFWVWKDWLQFOXGHGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHV/X[HPERXUJ¿QDQFHGLWVRZQ5HG&URVVVRFLHW\WRGRWKHVDPHLQ,WLVKLJKO\OLNHO\WKDWWKH+DLWLDQ5HG&URVVSOD\HGDNH\UROHLQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKHVHSURMHFWV$similar pattern is found in the Philippines, where the IFRC DQGVL[YLVLWLQJ1DWLRQDO6RFLHWLHVDUHIXQGLQJWKH3KLOLSSLQHV5HG&URVVWRµVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHGXFHWKHLPSDFWRIGLVDVWHUV¶3KLOLSSLQHV5HG&URVV6WUDWHJLF3ODQ

ICRC: The ICRC has an annual budget of $1 billion H[FOXVLYHO\IRUKXPDQLWDULDQSXUSRVHV,WGRHVQRWWUDFNH[DFWYDOXHVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWKRXJKfunding is likely to be spread across its four standard programming areas: protection, assistance, prevention DQGFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK1DWLRQDO6RFLHWLHV,WVDQQXDOreport suggests that preparedness is part and parcel of delivering on its humanitarian mandate and a foundation of its work within the global Red Cross movement, HQKDQFLQJµSUHSDUHGQHVVDQGUHVSRQVHE\RSWLPL]LQJcomplementarity and strengthening the global Movement QHWZRUN¶,&5&7KHUHSRUWJRHVIXUWKHU

1RWHWKDWZHXVHWKHWHUPµFRUHDQGPXOWLXVH¶WRLQGLFDWHWKHXVDJHRIIXQGLQJIRUµFRUH¶DFWLYLWLHVRIDQDJHQF\VHWDVLGHIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness, as well as the provision of resources from other activities undertaken by an agency.

1RWHWKDWLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRVWDWHH[DFWO\ZKDWWKDWPHDQVLQWHUPVRI¿QDQFLDOYDOXHGXHWRWKHODFNRILQGLYLGXDOWLPHUHFRUGVIRUSHUVRQQHODFWLYLW\6HH1LJHUFDVHVWXG\5RELWDLOOHHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ


69

stating that the ICRC supports emergency preparedness FDSDFLWLHVRILWV1DWLRQDO6RFLHW\SDUWQHUVLQPDQ\FRXQWULHVLELGWRHQDEOHWKHPµWRPHHWWKHVSHFL¿FQHHGVRIZRPHQLQVLWXDWLRQVRIDUPHGFRQÀLFWRULQWHUQDOYLROHQFH¶)LQDOO\LWXQGHUVWDQGVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVas part of attempts to prevent displacement, alleviate the effects of displacement and ease return or relocation LELG3HUKDSVVXUSULVLQJO\JLYHQLWVFRQÀLFWIRFXVHGmandate, it also makes reference to strengthening the disaster preparedness of its member societies, such as in the Middle East. (ibid.: 369).

The clearest evidence of emergency preparedness from the case studies is drawn from the Philippines. Here the ,&5&UHSRUWHGH[SHQGLWXUHRIPLOOLRQLQDQGIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVODUJHO\WDUJHWLQJWKHFRQÀLFWaffected population of Mindanao. In addition, the ICRC released stocks and supplied its own staff to assist when 7\SKRRQ%RSKDVWUXFNWKHFRXQWU\LQ

Multilateral banks

Multilateral banks’ investments in risk management for disasters tend to mirror international engagement in general. Where risk management is high on the DJHQGDLWLVDOVRIRUWKHEDQNVRIWHQLQIRUPLQJWKHLUcountry assistance strategies.

7KHLQYROYHPHQWRIPXOWLODWHUDOEDQNVLQWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FRQWH[WVPLUURUVYHU\FORVHO\JHQHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOengagement in emergency preparedness. Where risk is high on the agenda for international and national communities, it is also so for the banks, as can be seen in WKH3KLOLSSLQHV+DLWLDQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQW1LJHU:KHUHthe relationship between the international community and a country has changed, so does the work of the banks. This can be seen politically in the opening up of Myanmar to the international community in general, and also in relation WRULVNVXFKDVWKHPDVVLYHLPSDFWRI+DLWL¶VHDUWKTXDNHand the sudden surge in international support. The type of emergency preparedness activities funded depends largely RQWKHFRQWH[W

Bank strategies have a very clear focus on disaster risk in the Philippines. Both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have substantial risk programming LQWKHFRXQWU\7KH:RUOG%DQNKDVLQLWLDWLYHVXQGHUZD\LQWKHDUHDRI'55DPL[RIERWKVWDQGDORQHFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJprogrammes and programmes with a heavy risk-related cross-cutting element. Four of these are for the Philippines alone, the rest being regional. One of the country-level programmes is implemented through GFDRR funding. The three remaining programmes are:

Ɣ &DSDFLW\%XLOGLQJ3RVW'LVDVWHU1HHGV$VVHVVPHQW3'1$DQG7UDQVSDUHQW0RQLWRULQJRI'LVDVWHU5HODWHG([SHQGLWXUHV±

Ɣ 5HGXFLQJ9XOQHUDELOLW\WR)ORRGLQJLQ0HWUR0DQLOD±$1.6 million

Ɣ 'Supporting Local Government Capacity to Manage 1DWXUDO'LVDVWHU5LVNVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV±PLOOLRQ

There are elements of preparedness within each of these (especially in the building of long-term national response capacity).

,Q1LJHUERWK:RUOG%DQNDQG$IULFDQ'HYHORSPHQW%DQN$I'%VWUDWHJ\SDSHUVDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\UHFRJQLVHWKDWWKHFRXQWU\LVVHULRXVO\FKDOOHQJHGE\GURXJKWDQGÀRRGDQGERWKEDQNVVWDWHWKHVHDVSULRULW\LVVXHVWREHDGGUHVVHG:RUOG%DQNG$I'%D7KH$I'%FXUUHQWO\KDVWZRSURMHFWVXQGHUway, one focusing on economic development and the other RQXWLOLVDWLRQRIZDWHUUHVRXUFHVQHLWKHUDSSHDUVWRLQFOXGHany emergency preparedness activities. The World Bank has SURMHFWVXQGHUZD\WKHPDMRULW\GRQRWIHDWXUHULVNEXWLQVWHDGGHDOZLWKµFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQGJURZWK¶+,9$,'Vthe transport sector and support to national statistics.

,Q+DLWLWKH:RUOG%DQNKDVRQJRLQJSURMHFWVDOOEXWVL[RIZKLFKVWDUWHGDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNH7ZRSURMHFWVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7KH¿UVWLVDPLOOLRQµ&KROHUD(PHUJHQF\5HVSRQVH3URMHFW¶ZKLFKKDVDVXEFRPSRQHQWRIµVWUHQJWKHQLQJJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDSDFLW\WRPDQDJHDQGUHVSRQGWRRXWEUHDNV¶:RUOG%DQNH,QDGGLWLRQD'50DQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQSURMHFW:RUOG%DQNILVHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWWKUHHRILWV¿YHFRPSRQHQWVDUHNH\±QDWXUDOKD]DUGULVNDVVHVVPHQWPDLQVWUHDPHGLQOLQHPLQLVWULHVVWUHQJWKHQLQJFLYLOSURWHFWLRQDQGLPSURYLQJFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGLPSURYLQJUDSLGresponse and recovery coordination. Given that the total EXGJHWRIWKLVSURMHFWLVPLOOLRQWKHLQYHVWPHQWLQSUHSDUHGQHVVLVOLNHO\WREHFRQVLGHUDEOH7KH,'%KDV¿YHSURMHFWVXQGHUZD\LQWKHFRXQWU\WRDYDOXHRIFORVHWRPLOOLRQQRQHRIWKHVHLQFRUSRUDWHSUHSDUHGQHVV

In Sudan, the development banks mirror the minimal focus on emergency preparedness from other mechanisms and VRXUFHV7KH:RUOG%DQN¶VFXUUHQWSRUWIROLRRXWVLGHRIWKH0'7)DGPLQLVWHUHGSURMHFWVFRQVLVWVRIVL[SURMHFWV7KHVH

1RWHWKDWLQWKLVVHFWLRQZHPDNHDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH:RUOG%DQNDQG*)'55WKHODWWHUEHLQJD¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPPDQDJHGE\DVHFUHWDULDWEDVHGZLWKLQWKH%DQN,QWKLVVHFWLRQWKH¿QDQFLQJdescribed relates to funding through the World Bank, outside of GFDRR contributions.

+RZHYHUQRQHRIWKHPWDUJHWSUHSDUHGQHVVDORQHDQGLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRH[WUDFWWKHH[DFWIXQGLQJOHYHOVDWOHDVWQRWXQWLOSURMHFWFRPSOHWLRQZKHQDOLQHE\OLQHH[SHQGLWXUHDQDO\VLVFDQWDNHSODFH

2QHSURMHFWKDVSUHSDUDWRU\HOHPHQWVZLWKLQLWKRZHYHUZKLFKFDQbe found after considerable investigation: ‘agricultural/food security preparedness through preparation of local cereal banks and animal IRGGHUEDQNV¶SDUWRIDPLOOLRQSURMHFW7KLVLVSDUWRIWKH1LJHU6HFRQG)RRG6HFXULW\6XSSRUW3URMHFWVHH:RUOG%DQNHIRUPRUHGHWDLOV1RWHWKDWWKH%DQN¶VVWUDWHJ\GRHVWDONRIVXSSRUWLQJmore risk-related programmes in the future, including early detection of locust populations and supporting food security and the Dispositif.

http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P123567/niger-second-emergency-food-security-support-project?lang=en&tab=overview

FRYHUKHDOWKHGXFDWLRQDQGOLYHOLKRRGV:RUOG%DQNJbut none relates directly to emergency preparedness. 6LPLODUO\WKH$I'%KDVWZRRQJRLQJSURMHFWVLQWKHFRXQWU\ERWKUHODWHGWRGHEWPDQDJHPHQW$I'%E

,Q0\DQPDUFRQGLWLRQVKDYHRQO\MXVWPDGHLWSRVVLEOHfor development banks to consider operating in the future. The World Bank is in the process of setting out its future re-engagement with the country. This includes a focus on VXSSRUWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWVWRWUDQVIRUPLQVWLWXWLRQVEXLOGLQJFRQ¿GHQFHLQUHIRUPDQGSUHSDULQJIRUDSRVVLEOHUHVXPSWLRQRIDIXOOFRXQWU\SURJUDPPH3HWHUVforthcoming). At the time of writing, the World Bank was conducting missions in Myanmar, though it is clear that there is a long way to go before the systems and processes are in place that would allow in-country funding and ¿QDQFLDOLQYHVWPHQW6LPLODUO\WKH$'%KDVQRWDSSURYHGDQ\ORDQVLQ0\DQPDUVLQFHEXWDUHVXPSWLRQof engagement is anticipated with the development of DQ$'%URDGPDSLQ$'%7KLVVHWVRXWDrange of activities, including the current interim country SDUWQHUVKLSVWUDWHJ\IRUWHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHand assessments of key economic sectors.

Private sector

Private sector investment in preparedness is limited ²IRUYDULRXVGLIIHUHQWUHDVRQV²LQ6XGDQ0\DQPDUDQG1LJHUDQGRQO\LVRODWHGH[DPSOHVZHUHLGHQWLÀHG0RVWHYLGHQFHLVIRXQGLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQGLQFUHDVLQJO\LQ+DLWL

3ULYDWHVHFWRULQYHVWPHQWLVPL[HGDFURVVWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHV,Q1LJHUDQG6XGDQLWEDUHO\UHJLVWHUV There DUHKRZHYHULQGLYLGXDOH[DPSOHVLQ0\DQPDUDQGVLJQL¿FDQWLQYHVWPHQWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQGWRDJURZLQJH[WHQWLQ+DLWL7KHHYLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVsuggests that the level of engagement with preparedness issues is correlated with the level of consciousness of risk across civil society.

Disaster risk consciousness within Filipino society is high .HOOHWWIRUWKFRPLQJDQGLWLVSHUKDSVXQVXUSULVLQJWKDWWKHSULYDWHVHFWRULVDOVRDVLJQL¿FDQWDQGLQÀXHQWLDOactor, contributing considerably to response activities and increasingly to preparedness. The case study revealed VHYHUDOH[DPSOHVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWRQO\DSRUWLRQRISULYDWHsector investment. Yum, a restaurant chain, has contributed WRD:)3HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJSURMHFWWKH&RUSRUDWH'LVDVWHU5HVSRQVH1HWZRUNLVLPSOHPHQWLQJORFDOSUHSDUHGQHVVSURMHFWVZRUWKMXVWXQGHUIXQGHGE\HLJKWGLIIHUHQWFRPSDQLHVRUFRUSRUDWLRQVDQG3KLOLSSLQH%XVLQHVVIRU6RFLDO3URJUHVV(PBSP) is implementing community preparedness to DYDOXHRIPLOOLRQZLWKIXQGLQJIURPDUDQJHRIinstitutional and private sector sources.

Private sector support is bolstered by government legislation. 7KH1DWLRQDO'LVDVWHU5LVN5HGXFWLRQDQG0DQDJHPHQW3ODQ1'5503DQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHV'HYHORSPHQW3ODQ3'3QDPHµ,QGXVWU\DQG6HUYLFHV¶DVDVSHFL¿FDUHDRIIRFXVwith the requirement to ‘Assess the level of DRR awareness and activities among the private sector and disseminate materials on DRR to ensure their support, participation and FRRSHUDWLRQ¶ Similar encouragement to formalise the role of the private sector in risk management is seen in Haiti. In WKH8.IXQGHGDIRUZDUGORRNLQJUHYLHZRIWKHHDUWKTXDNHUHVSRQVHVSHFL¿FDOO\WRH[SORUHVWUDWHJLHVfor integrating the private sector into the Haiti Earthquake 3UHSDUHGQHVV3ODQDVDSRWHQWLDO¿UVWUHVSRQGHU61

3UHSDULQJIRUFRQÀLFWDFFRUGLQJWRWKHFDVHVWXG\evidence, is barely articulated by the private sector, DOWKRXJKWKLVGRHVQRWH[FOXGHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWHYLGHQFHFRXOGEHH[WUDFWHGIURPDPRUHGHWDLOHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\7KHPhilippines was the one case where the private sector did appear to be involved in emergency preparedness for FRQÀLFWLQ0LQGDQDRZLWKEXVLQHVVDVVRFLDWLRQVDQGWKH3%63LQYROYHGLQµFRQÀLFWPDQDJHPHQW¶5RRG62

6RPHRI+DLWL¶VODUJHVWFRPSDQLHVKDYHWDNHQXSGLVDVWHUpreparedness very seriously, both in terms of their own preparedness (i.e. contingency plans for operations and DVVHWVDQGLQWKHVHUYLFHVWKH\SURYLGH±IRUH[DPSOHthe mobile communications company Digicel distributes GLVDVWHUDOHUWVYLD606$VHDUO\DVDSULYDWHVHFWRUcoalition, the Alliance for Risk Management and Business &RQWLQXLW\$*(5&$ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKDPHPEHUnetwork including companies such as Digicel, Comme Il )DXW81,%$1.5HER1DVVDDQG$,&LQVXUDQFH$QXPEHURI$*(5&$¶VPHPEHUVKDYHIDFLOLWDWHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWof preparedness teams within companies, as well as the improvement of delivery mechanisms and the development RIDVWUDWHJLFSODQWRHQJDJHVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGenterprises (SMEs) in preparedness.

7KHPHWKRGRORJLFDOFKDOOHQJHVRIWUDFLQJDQGWUDFNLQJSULYDWHVSHQGLQJRQSUHSDUHGQHVVLPSHGHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKZHFDQestablish the level of investment coming from the private sector. Anecdotal evidence suggests that private sector involvement in SUHSDUHGQHVVLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\JUHDWHUWKDQWKHFDVHVWXGLHVKDYHuncovered, partly due to simple under-reporting and partly because FRPSDQLHVPD\QRWXVHWKHWHUPµSUHSDUHGQHVV¶LQWKHVDPHway that the study has done. The lack of any central source of information (either national or international) for understanding the IXOOFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHSULYDWHVHFWRULQDQ\RIWKH¿YHFRXQWULHVDGGVto this challenge, and tracking therefore remains ad hoc at best. :KHUHSRVVLEOHDGGLWLRQDOGHWDLOLVSURYLGHGLQHDFKRIWKH¿YH case studies.

6HHDQQH[RI3'3FRQFHUQLQJUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH1'5503 (PDP, undated).

1R¿QDOUHSRUWIRUWKLVSURMHFWLV\HWDYDLODEOH62 Disaggregating emergency preparedness within the set of activities

WKDWDUHUHJDUGHGDµFRQÀLFWPDQDJHPHQW¶KDVQRWEHHQSRVVLEOHwithin the frame of this study.


71

Evidence from the other countries reveals little private sector engagement with preparedness issues.63 In 0\DQPDURQO\DIHZPLQRUH[DPSOHVRISULYDWH¿QDQFLDOsupport to response and recovery or reconstruction ZHUHLGHQWL¿HG64)RUH[DPSOH6HUJH3XQ$VVRFLDWHVRISingapore, one of the largest foreign companies present in the country, assisted with response and built a model YLOODJHIROORZLQJ&\FORQH1DUJLV$UHSRUWE\7URFDLUHGLVFXVVHVWKHUROHRI0\DQPDU¶VSULYDWHVHFWRULQhumanitarian response, largely through the philanthropic ZRUNRIFRPSDQLHVLQUHVSRQGLQJWR&\FORQH1DUJLV,Wmay be reasonable to consider that under likely improved conditions for private business, current support for response may venture into preparedness, something that Trocaire anticipates in recommending public-private partnerships (PPPs) for DRR.66

In summary, private sector engagement with preparedness varies considerably. Only in the Philippines and Haiti has the level of risk consciousness in civil society prompted national private sector involvement. In the Philippines this has evolved over several decades, while in Haiti it was largely a spontaneous reaction to the shock of WKHHDUWKTXDNH(YLGHQFHIURPWKHFDVHVWXGLHVdoes suggest potential for growth, especially given the increasing interest in disaster risk in general and its impact on economic development and growth.67 The role of international corporations needs further investigation. While the case studies suggest that this is limited to a few cases in Haiti, Myanmar and the Philippines (at least LQWHUPVRI¿QDQFLQJDFWXDOSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDUHconsiderably under-reported.69

6HHFDVHVWXGLHVIRU0\DQPDU3HWHUV6XGDQ+RFNOH\DQG1LJHU5RELWDLOOHHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ

64 It should be noted that the lack of data available in Myanmar does not negate the likelihood of business investment in preparedness nationally, especially through informal or small community-based enterprises. This is anecdotally reported in the case study, but data is lacking on its scale.

6HHIRUH[DPSOH3Z&¶VUHSRUWRIµVLJQL¿FDQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQ0\DQPDU¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOODQGVFDSHZKLFKKDYHUHVXOWHGLQRSWLPLVPIURPWKHJOREDOEXVLQHVVFRPPXQLW\¶3Z&

66 The leveraging of PPPs has also been considered by at least one RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VPDLQGRQRUV86$,'86$,'LVSURPRWLQJ333Vthrough its latest Global Development Alliance (GDA) Annual Programme Statement (APS) call, with up to $1 million available for HDFKFROODERUDWLRQ,QRQHRIWKHIXQGLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRFXVHVRQ'55DQGSUHSDUHGQHVVLQ0\DQPDU7KDLODQGDQG9LHWQDPZLWKSULYDWHIXQGLQJWRDWOHDVWPDWFK86$,'FRQWULEXWLRQV

,Q+DLWLDQGLQFRPSDUDEOHFDVHVEH\RQGWKH¿YHFDVHVWXG\countries, the potential for disasters to undermine the economic growth of a country is helping make the case for the need to more proactively consider risk management as a factor affecting economic JURZWK$VDQH[DPSOHLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH+DLWLHDUWKTXDNHWKH3RVW(DUWKTXDNH'LVDVWHU1HHGV$VVHVVPHQWDQGWKH$FWLRQ3ODQIRU1DWLRQDO5HFRYHU\DQG'HYHORSPHQWRI+DLWLLQFOXGHG'50as a cross-cutting priority for both the public and private sectors. In addition to managing and reducing risk, DRM was presented as an opportunity to support decentralisation, strengthen civil society and promote CSR and innovation in the private sector. As noted by GFDRR, the inclusion of DRM in these plans and strategies demonstrates a consensus within the Government of Haiti and its partners on the importance of integrating DRM ‘as a core component RIVXVWDLQDEOHSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK¶:RUOG%DQNDQG*)'55

)RUH[DPSOHZKLOHZHQRWHWKDWPRUHWKDQELOOLRQRISULYDWHfunding arrived in Haiti in the post-earthquake period (much of which came from private sector companies, corporations or foundations), DFFRXQWLQJIRURQHWKLUGRIKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJWKDW\HDU2&+$)76ZHDUHXQDEOHWRWUDFNKRZÀH[LEOHWKHXVHRIWKLVIXQGLQJZDVi.e. whether it was also directed to preparedness activities.

6HH.HQWDQG%XUNH7KLVUHSRUWRXWOLQHVWKHFXUUHQWVFDOHRIprivate sector involvement in humanitarian response, preparedness DQG'55LWVHHVSUHSDUHGQHVVDVD\HWXQGH¿QHGUROHIRUWKHSULYDWHsector, but one likely to see growth.

"OX0HILIPPINESPRIVATESECTORANDPREPAREDNESSGROWINGANDSHAREDEXPERIENCES

Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is the FRXQWU\¶VµODUJHVWEXVLQHVVOHGVRFLDOGHYHORSPHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶,WZRUNVZLWKLWVPHPEHUFRPSDQLHVto integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) into WKHLUFRUHZRUNDQGH[DPLQHVWKHLPSDFWRIEXVLQHVVRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VJURZWK,WDOVRKDVDSKLODQWKURSLFZLQJLQLWUHSRUWHGJLYLQJVXSSRUWWRPRUHWKDQmillion people, both from its members and from other sources. Its work on preparedness comes as part of a DRR/CCA agenda.

7KH&RUSRUDWH1HWZRUNIRU'LVDVWHU5HVSRQVHLVVLPLODUto the PBSP, and focuses on disasters in particular. $JDLQVSRQVRUHGE\DPL[RIPHPEHUDQGH[WHUQDOcontributions, it works in areas from disaster response WRSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKDSDUWLFXODUIRFXVRQWKHFRXQWU\¶Vmost vulnerable areas.

One of the most promising public-private sector partnerships for emergency preparedness (and indeed for a wide range of risk-related activities) is the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF). 6HWXSDIWHUWKHW\SKRRQVHDVRQWKH3'5)LVYHQWXULQJEH\RQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQLQWRH[DQWHLQLWLDWLYHVsuch as using mobile phone company installations to install rain gauges for monitoring purposes.

7KH)LOLSLQRSULYDWHVHFWRULVDOVRH[SDQGLQJLWVLQÀXHQFHDQGVKDULQJLWVH[SHUWLVHEH\RQGLWVRZQERUGHUV,QHDUO\603ULPH+ROGLQJVWKHFRXQWU\¶VODUJHVWFKDLQRIVKRSSLQJPDOOVEHFDPH DPHPEHURI81,6'5¶V3ULYDWH6HFWRU$GYLVRU\*URXSVHH81,6'5E

72

4ABLE/VERVIEWOFTHESCALEANDSCOPEOFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSlNANCING in case study countries

Key1R¿OOLQGLFDWHVQRPHFKDQLVPWRROSUHVHQWRUXVHGOLJKWJUH\LQGLFDWHVPLQLPDOHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQFOXGHGLQWKHPHFKDQLVPWRROGDUNHUJUH\LQGLFDWHVPRUHVXEVWDQWLYH¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7KHHVWLPDWHGYDOXHRI


Humanitarian funding mechanism/tool Direct donor funding Risk-focused mechanisms Climate adaptation mechanismsCERF CAP CHF ERF Bilateral donor –

humanitarianBilateral donor – development

GFDRR CPR TTF LDCF Adaptation Fund

Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience

Haiti ,QERWKDQGWKHCERF contributed several PLOOLRQGROODUVIRUSURMHFWVWKDWPL[HGUHVSRQVHSUHSDUHGQHVVand presentation in relation to cholera.Value a proportion of $1.9 million

The CAP included preparedness as a key issue LQDQG%XWfunding for preparedness remains limited. Estimated maximum $2 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW (5)SURMHFWVVSHFL¿FDOO\LGHQWL¿HGDVhaving preparedness FRPSRQHQWVLQTen of these were for cholera. One stand-out SURMHFWLVWKHIXQGLQJ of a CDAC network in Haiti.Estimated value a portion of $3.5 million

Substantial attention to ZLGHU'55IURP86$,'and ECHO over a long period.Total value to preparedness GLI¿FXOWWRWUDFNPLOOLRQIURP(&+2IURP86$,'minimum values in recent years

1RQHWUDFNHG 1LQHSURMHFWVIXQGHGHLJKWDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNH)RXUSURMHFWVcontain elements of preparedness.Value a proportion of $3.2 million

$3.9 million for early recovery, unlikely to have preparedness component. IRU'55for co-managed core resources.Value a proportion of $0.2 million

7KUHHSURMHFWVIXQGHGWRthe value of $6.4 million. 2QHSURMHFWLQSDUWLFXODUreferences ‘reducing GLVDVWHUULVNLQDJULFXOWXUH¶valued at $2.7 million and implemented by FAO.Value a proportion of $2.7 million.

1RIXQGLQJ 2QHSURMHFWPLOOLRQWRdesign a national programme IRUFOLPDWHUHVLOLHQFH1RFOHDUemergency preparedness component

Philippines 2QO\WZRRISURMHFWV(for WFP) have had partial SUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHVValue a proportion of $2.7 million over two years

6LQFHWKHUHKDYHEHHQVL[81FRQVROLGDWHGRUÀDVKappeals, with $394.9 million IURPSURMHFWVRIZKLFKonly 11 have had a partial SUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHTotal funded $2.7 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW 1R(5)SUHVHQW 0RVWO\$XVWUDOLDDQG8QLWHGStates, funding largely humanitarian coordination and preparedness for response.Value: $29.6 million

Japanese development funding for long-term early warning infrastructure and institutional development. Value: $35.3 million

GFDRR has funded ¿YHSURMHFWVWRGDWHA ‘support to the DRM DJHQGD¶SURMHFWZLOOlikely have emergency preparedness components.Value a proportion of $2.7 million

$66,429 from co-managed core resources, for µUHVSRQVH¶1RHPHUJHQF\preparedness IXQGLQJLGHQWL¿HG

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

Niger Provided $1 million to WHO and 81,&()WRSUHYHQWFKROHUDDQGWUHDWYLFWLPV81+5&UHFHLYHG$2 million for IDPs.3UHSDUHGQHVVFRPSRQHQWVH[LVWbut remain hidden and rare. Emergency preparedness a proportion of $3 million

Preparedness is central to the CAP, one of three pillars XQGHUDUHVLOLHQFHµREMHFWLYH¶2ISURMHFWVLQWKHPRVWUHFHQWDSSHDOKDYHVRPHpreparedness element. Emergency preparedness funding estimated at $14 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW 1R(5)SUHVHQW A part-humanitarian, part-development SDC support SURMHFWWRWKH'LVSRVLWLI

Both the EC and SDC support the Dispositif.Total value: around $16 million

1RWDSULRULW\FRXQWU\ ±QRIXQGLQJ

$2.1 million for FRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQ(of which IURPCPR funds, the UHVWIURP81'3core funding). Value a proportion of $2.1 million

)RXUSURMHFWVVLQFHThe most likely inclusion of emergency preparedness LVWKURXJKPLOOLRQWR81'3IRUµVFDOLQJup community-based DGDSWDWLRQ¶Value a proportion of $3.75 million

1RIXQGLQJ 'HOLYHUHGPLOOLRQLQDQG3UHSDUHGQHVVactivities are seen in three FOLPDWHIRUHFDVWLQJSURMHFWVZRUWKPLOOLRQ(PHUJHQF\preparedness components in the UHPDLQGHU±ZDWHUUHVRXUFHVDQGFRPPXQLW\DFWLRQ±YHU\GLI¿FXOWto track.Value a considerable part of $13.5 million

Myanmar Minor preparedness funding, IRU81)3$IRUKHDOWKUHODWHGpreparedness.Value unknown.

7KHSRVW1DUJLVDSSHDOZDVWKHRQO\RI¿FLDO&$3±DÀDVKappeal. 7ZRSURMHFWVIRUµ'55DQGSUHSDUHGQHVV¶DUHWUDFHDEOHValue $4.5 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW $OORFDWHGPLOOLRQto national and LQWHUQDWLRQDO1*2VLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGDUHDVand with IDPs. No evidence of emergency preparedness activities

Preparedness features strongly for a few donors, HVSHFLDOO\(&+286$,'$XV$,'KRZHYHUIRUPRVWH[FHSW(&+2WKHUHLVQRdisaggregation from larger DRR programmes.Known value: $3.15 million over two years

1R¿QDQFLQJdiscovered


IRUearly recovery unlikely to have preparedness components, IRUresponse.No emergency preparedness funding LGHQWLÀHG

2QHSURMHFWVROHO\WRGHYHORSWKH1$3$1RHPHUJHQF\preparedness components

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

Sudan Funding allocated often for underfunded priorities within the Work Plan. No evidence of emergency preparedness in any of these projects

:RUN3ODQLVDSSHDOLQJIRURYHUPLOOLRQWRLPSOHPHQWSURMHFWVLWLVHVWLPDWHGDERXWRIWKLVoverall requested volume. Value through the CAP estimated at $3 million.

7KH&+)XVHGWR¿QDQFHRIWKH:RUNPlan, includes references to preparedness in WKHPDMRULW\RIsector priorities.Value impossible to gauge

1R(5)SUHVHQW 1R¿QDQFLQJGLVFRYHUHG Japan funded FAO for agricultural preparedness in %OXH1LOHDQG6RXWKKordofan regions.1RWRWDOÀJXUHfor preparedness available


1RUHFHQWIXQGLQJ 7KUHHSURMHFWV¿QDQFHGWRDYDOXHRIMXVWRYHUPLOOLRQNo obvious emergency preparedness components

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

73

HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUHDFKPHFKDQLVPLQHDFKFDVHVWXG\LVLQGLFDWHGLQEROG:KHUHWKHH[DFWSUHSDUHGQHVVYDOXH LVQRWNQRZQWKLVPD\EHLQGLFDWHGDVµYDOXHSDUWRI[PLOOLRQ¶

KWWSZZZXQRFKDRUJURDSDERXWXVRFKDDVLDDQGSDFL¿FP\DQPDUP\DQPDUHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHIXQG

Humanitarian funding mechanism/tool Direct donor funding Risk-focused mechanisms Climate adaptation mechanismsCERF CAP CHF ERF Bilateral donor –



Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience

Haiti ,QERWKDQGWKHCERF contributed several PLOOLRQGROODUVIRUSURMHFWVWKDWPL[HGUHVSRQVHSUHSDUHGQHVVand presentation in relation to cholera.Value a proportion of $1.9 million

The CAP included preparedness as a key issue LQDQG%XWfunding for preparedness remains limited. Estimated maximum $2 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW (5)SURMHFWVVSHFL¿FDOO\LGHQWL¿HGDVhaving preparedness FRPSRQHQWVLQTen of these were for cholera. One stand-out SURMHFWLVWKHIXQGLQJ of a CDAC network in Haiti.Estimated value a portion of $3.5 million

Substantial attention to ZLGHU'55IURP86$,'and ECHO over a long period.Total value to preparedness GLI¿FXOWWRWUDFNPLOOLRQIURP(&+2IURP86$,'minimum values in recent years

1RQHWUDFNHG 1LQHSURMHFWVIXQGHGHLJKWDIWHUWKHHDUWKTXDNH)RXUSURMHFWVcontain elements of preparedness.Value a proportion of $3.2 million

$3.9 million for early recovery, unlikely to have preparedness component. IRU'55for co-managed core resources.Value a proportion of $0.2 million

7KUHHSURMHFWVIXQGHGWRthe value of $6.4 million. 2QHSURMHFWLQSDUWLFXODUreferences ‘reducing GLVDVWHUULVNLQDJULFXOWXUH¶valued at $2.7 million and implemented by FAO.Value a proportion of $2.7 million.

1RIXQGLQJ 2QHSURMHFWPLOOLRQWRdesign a national programme IRUFOLPDWHUHVLOLHQFH1RFOHDUemergency preparedness component

Philippines 2QO\WZRRISURMHFWV(for WFP) have had partial SUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHVValue a proportion of $2.7 million over two years

6LQFHWKHUHKDYHEHHQVL[81FRQVROLGDWHGRUÀDVKappeals, with $394.9 million IURPSURMHFWVRIZKLFKonly 11 have had a partial SUHSDUHGQHVVREMHFWLYHTotal funded $2.7 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW 1R(5)SUHVHQW 0RVWO\$XVWUDOLDDQG8QLWHGStates, funding largely humanitarian coordination and preparedness for response.Value: $29.6 million

Japanese development funding for long-term early warning infrastructure and institutional development. Value: $35.3 million

GFDRR has funded ¿YHSURMHFWVWRGDWHA ‘support to the DRM DJHQGD¶SURMHFWZLOOlikely have emergency preparedness components.Value a proportion of $2.7 million

$66,429 from co-managed core resources, for µUHVSRQVH¶1RHPHUJHQF\preparedness IXQGLQJLGHQWL¿HG

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

Niger Provided $1 million to WHO and 81,&()WRSUHYHQWFKROHUDDQGWUHDWYLFWLPV81+5&UHFHLYHG$2 million for IDPs.3UHSDUHGQHVVFRPSRQHQWVH[LVWbut remain hidden and rare. Emergency preparedness a proportion of $3 million

Preparedness is central to the CAP, one of three pillars XQGHUDUHVLOLHQFHµREMHFWLYH¶2ISURMHFWVLQWKHPRVWUHFHQWDSSHDOKDYHVRPHpreparedness element. Emergency preparedness funding estimated at $14 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW 1R(5)SUHVHQW A part-humanitarian, part-development SDC support SURMHFWWRWKH'LVSRVLWLI

Both the EC and SDC support the Dispositif.Total value: around $16 million


$2.1 million for FRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQ(of which IURPCPR funds, the UHVWIURP81'3core funding). Value a proportion of $2.1 million

)RXUSURMHFWVVLQFHThe most likely inclusion of emergency preparedness LVWKURXJKPLOOLRQWR81'3IRUµVFDOLQJup community-based DGDSWDWLRQ¶Value a proportion of $3.75 million

1RIXQGLQJ 'HOLYHUHGPLOOLRQLQDQG3UHSDUHGQHVVactivities are seen in three FOLPDWHIRUHFDVWLQJSURMHFWVZRUWKPLOOLRQ(PHUJHQF\preparedness components in the UHPDLQGHU±ZDWHUUHVRXUFHVDQGFRPPXQLW\DFWLRQ±YHU\GLI¿FXOWto track.Value a considerable part of $13.5 million

Myanmar Minor preparedness funding, IRU81)3$IRUKHDOWKUHODWHGpreparedness.Value unknown.

7KHSRVW1DUJLVDSSHDOZDVWKHRQO\RI¿FLDO&$3±DÀDVKappeal. 7ZRSURMHFWVIRUµ'55DQGSUHSDUHGQHVV¶DUHWUDFHDEOHValue $4.5 million

1R&+)SUHVHQW $OORFDWHGPLOOLRQto national and LQWHUQDWLRQDO1*2VLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGDUHDVand with IDPs. No evidence of emergency preparedness activities

Preparedness features strongly for a few donors, HVSHFLDOO\(&+286$,'$XV$,'KRZHYHUIRUPRVWH[FHSW(&+2WKHUHLVQRdisaggregation from larger DRR programmes.Known value: $3.15 million over two years

1R¿QDQFLQJdiscovered


IRUearly recovery unlikely to have preparedness components, IRUresponse.No emergency preparedness funding LGHQWLÀHG

2QHSURMHFWVROHO\WRGHYHORSWKH1$3$1RHPHUJHQF\preparedness components

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

Sudan Funding allocated often for underfunded priorities within the Work Plan. No evidence of emergency preparedness in any of these projects

:RUN3ODQLVDSSHDOLQJIRURYHUPLOOLRQWRLPSOHPHQWSURMHFWVLWLVHVWLPDWHGDERXWRIWKLVoverall requested volume. Value through the CAP estimated at $3 million.

7KH&+)XVHGWR¿QDQFHRIWKH:RUNPlan, includes references to preparedness in WKHPDMRULW\RIsector priorities.Value impossible to gauge

1R(5)SUHVHQW 1R¿QDQFLQJGLVFRYHUHG Japan funded FAO for agricultural preparedness in %OXH1LOHDQG6RXWKKordofan regions.1RWRWDOÀJXUHfor preparedness available


1RUHFHQWIXQGLQJ 7KUHHSURMHFWV¿QDQFHGWRDYDOXHRIMXVWRYHUPLOOLRQNo obvious emergency preparedness components

1RIXQGLQJ 1RIXQGLQJ

74

Despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness (or rather the persistent lack of it) still coalesces around the existing !nancing architecture rather than targeting ‘need’ or responding to ‘risk'

3UMMARYTHECURRENTSTATEOFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSlNANCINGThis research suggests that investment in systems, SURFHVVHVDQGSURMHFWVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVby the national and international community occurs in discrete, concentrated efforts. Yet coverage of all the requirements (geographical, sectoral and temporal) falls far short of need. Critically, from an international perspective, a coherent or coordinated approach across humanitarian and development action from the international community is consistently lacking. Inadequate emergency preparedness is therefore not MXVWDERXWWKHYROXPHRIIXQGLQJ$FURVVHDFKRIWKH¿YHFRQWH[WVWKHUHVHDUFKWHDPQRWHGWKHODFNRIDVKDUHGvision or shared plan of action that would articulate risks, needs, responsibilities, programmes and activities (with connections to national plans and systems). And, despite the evident need, attention to emergency preparedness (or rather the persistent lack of it) still coalesces around WKHH[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHUDWKHUWKDQWDUJHWLQJµQHHG¶RUUHVSRQGLQJWRµULVN¶71

In fact, all of the mechanisms and channels analysed here fund at least some part of the emergency preparedness PDWUL[+XPDQLWDULDQIXQGLQJPHFKDQLVPVSOD\DFRQVLGHUDEOHUROHLQVRPHFDVHVGHVSLWHWKHLUPDQGDWHanecdotal evidence suggests this is in part due to the DEVHQFHRIRWKHUFKDQQHOVRI¿QDQFH:HKDYHWUDFNHGelements of preparedness in the CHFs, ERFs and even the CERF, as well through consolidated appeals. In JHQHUDO¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVFRPHVlargely from humanitarian sources (mechanisms and donors) and there is evidence that the apparent logic and rationale for investing in emergency preparedness LVLQSDUWFURZGHGRXWE\WKHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJarchitecture, which inhibits more proactive and sustained SUHSDUHGQHVVHIIRUWV7KHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQW¿QDQFLQJ(in terms of volume) is for support to ‘preparedness for UHVSRQVH¶DFWLYLWLHVZLWKDIRFXVRQFRRUGLQDWLRQERWKnational and international), logistics, training and pre-positioning. The evidence from the case studies is that the EXONRIIXQGLQJIRUWKHVHDFWLYLWLHV±ZKHUHLWLVDYDLODEOH

±LVQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWKEXLOGLQJWKHORQJWHUPFDSDFLW\RIQDWLRQDODFWRUVZKLFKUHÀHFWVWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHmechanisms.

The risk-focused mechanisms we have analysed in some GHWDLO±*)'55DQGWKH81'3&3577)±IXQGDFWLYLWLHVin the case study countries that are priorities for their LQWHUYHQWLRQDQGWKLV¿QDQFLQJLVPRUHOLNHO\WRJRWRZDUGVlonger-term preparedness activities, usually as part of a larger package of work and usually focused on natural disasters. There is some evidence that development money for emergency preparedness direct from donors is encompassed within broader DRR or climate-related goals, or sometimes for resilience or poverty reduction. Where we can identify development money from larger initiatives, we see that it goes primarily towards longer-term DRR initiatives, largely attached to legislation, institution-building and key technical areas such as early warning and risk assessment. Climate adaptation ¿QDQFLQJDWOHDVWLQWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVFRQQHFWVZLWKHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVH[FOXVLYHO\ZKHUHFOLPDWHULVNPHHWV'50ZLWKVKDUHGREMHFWLYHVODUJHO\WRZDUGVthe development end of the preparedness continuum.72

A key issue for attracting emergency preparedness ¿QDQFLQJLQHDFKRIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVLVWKHavailability of in-country donors, especially worrying for FRXQWULHVWKDWKDYHOLWWOHSUR¿OHRUODFN¿QDQFLQJWRROVDQGmechanisms that can engage donors beyond the country itself. There is also some evidence of donor fragmentation, ZKLFKLVH[DFHUEDWHGE\DODFNRIIXQGLQJFRRUGLQDWLRQIRUULVNPDQDJHPHQWDFURVVHDFKFRQWH[W2QEDODQFHPRVWGRQRUV¶IXQGLQJRISUHSDUHGQHVVDSSHDUVWRFRPHWKURXJKconsolidated appeals, which represent both a long-term HQJDJHPHQWZLWKFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHVDQGDWRROIRUnon-resident donors to fund preparedness activities. However, even when the CAP has an overall target or JRDORISUHSDUHGQHVVVXFKDVLQ1LJHUDFWXDOIXQGLQJOHYHOVDUHUHODWLYHO\ORZ±DQDUWLFXODWLRQRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness needs is no guarantee that funding will come. There appears to be a gap between country-level prioritisation of emergency preparedness and donor engagement. On the other hand, there is evidence that multilateral development banks can act as substantial GRQRUVWKHPVHOYHVZKHQµULVN¶LVSXWDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHLU

71 In addition, resources for emergency preparedness are sometimes µKLGGHQ¶E\WKHZD\LWLVGH¿QHGDQGPDQDJHGWKHUHLVIRUH[DPSOHevidence of a key role being played in agencies providing other resources (such as core funding, humanitarian or risk-related programming) towards emergency preparedness, without it being LGHQWL¿HGDVVXFK,WLVDOVRLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWWKHODFNRIVKDUHGsemantics, coding and reporting of emergency preparedness has been shown throughout the case studies to considerably inhibit our XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDOOWKDWLV¿QDQFHG

72 Perhaps unsurprisingly, evidence from the case studies shows that, GHVSLWHKDYLQJWKLVVKDUHGULVNDJHQGD¿QDQFLQJIRU&&$DQG'55is often segregated, with largely separate agencies, either national or international, involved.


An articulation of emergency preparedness needs is no guarantee that funding will come. There appears to be a gap between country-level prioritisation of emergency preparedness and donor engagement

country strategies. Given that banks respond to a great H[WHQWWRDFRXQWU\¶VRZQSULRULWLHVWKLVKDSSHQVQDWXUDOO\when a country itself has a high consciousness of risk, such as in the Philippines.

)RUFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKHSLFWXUHLVYHU\PL[HGDFURVVWKHGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WVZLWKWKLVEHLQJODUJHO\DVHFRQGDU\FRQFHUQLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VGHSHQGLQJRQWKHFRQWH[W,Qthe Philippines, agencies (both national and international) direct their disaster-related resources towards preparing IRUFRQÀLFWLQ0LQGDQDR,Q0\DQPDUWKHOLWWOHFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKDWH[LVWVLVIRFXVHGDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\on food and non-food items. There is little segregation of FRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVIURPRYHUDOOIRRGVHFXULW\QHHGVLQ1LJHU,Q6XGDQFRQÀLFWLVWKHPDMRULVVXHDQGUHVSRQVHdominates. Although in some ways it is secondary to other REMHFWLYHVSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWLVQRWQRQH[LVWHQWWKHFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOLQ6XGDQIRUH[DPSOHZKLFKEDUHO\PHQWLRQVSUHSDUHGQHVVVSHFL¿FDOO\DUWLFXODWHVemergency preparedness activities that are clearly in UHVSRQVHWRSUHGLFWHGFRQÀLFW

1DWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDSSHDUWRKDYHDUDWLRQDODQGORJLFDODSSURDFKWR¿QDQFLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVLIZHH[FOXGHFRQÀLFWVLWXDWLRQV,QDOORIWKHFDVHVWXGLHVHYHQWKRXJKRYHUDOOIXQGLQJLVORZH[FHSWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWRDQH[WHQWFLYLOVRFLHW\DUHXQL¿HGE\delivering legislation and policy for creating an adequate system and processes for disaster preparedness, usually as part of a long-term set of DRR measures. However, needs obviously remain at a country level, and arguably these could be prioritised by the international system. Long-term technical capacity-building, some of which is already under ZD\LVQHHGHGHYHQLQWKHPRVWSRVLWLYHRIFRQWH[WV±WKH3KLOLSSLQHV±DVWKHUHFHQWGHYDVWDWLQJ7\SKRRQ+DL\DQKLJKOLJKWV7RDQH[WHQWDOWKRXJKWKHFRQWH[WVDUHYHU\GLIIHUHQW+DLWLDQG1LJHUDUHLQVLPLODUQHHGRIVXSSRUWIRUlong-term preparedness. In Sudan and Myanmar, there is much to be done to get even the basics of ‘preparedness IRUUHVSRQVH¶XSDQGUXQQLQJDQGWKHUHDVRQVDUHODUJHO\WKHVDPHLQERWKFRQWH[WVWKRXJKLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VWKH

FKDOOHQJHRIDLG¿QDQFLQJLQJHQHUDODQGWKHKHDY\IRFXVRQKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJ5HFHQWHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWthe international community has some way to go to prioritise ¿QDQFLQJLQWKHULJKWSODFHVLQWHUPVRIULVNQHHGRUGRPHVWLFFDSDFLW\VHH.HOOHWWDQG&DUDYDQL

,QVXPPDU\WKHHYLGHQFHIURPDOO¿YHFDVHVWXG\countries suggests that emergency preparedness is LQDGHTXDWHUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHFRQWH[W7KHUHLVXQHTXDOattention across the range of activities, with an abundance RIDFWRUVZRUNLQJRQVRPHDFWLYLWLHVDQGVLJQL¿FDQWJDSVin others. This is not to suggest that there should be equal weighting across all activities, but that weighting should be appropriate to the nature and scale of that activity. Overall, WKH¿QDQFLQJSLFWXUHIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVboth unnecessarily complicated and piecemeal at best, a VLWXDWLRQWKDWLVH[DFHUEDWHGUDWKHUWKDQFRPEDWHGE\WKHinternational aid architecture. Where noteworthy actions have taken place, they have not added the value that they potentially could have done, had a stronger systematic approach to preparedness been adopted by all actors engaged in high-risk areas.

4HEBUSINESSCASEFOR emergency preparedness

.IGERANDBEYOND

Key messages

Ɣ,Q1LJHUWKHPRQHWDU\EHQHILWVRILQYHVWLQJLQSUHSDUHGQHVVLQUHODWLRQWRGURXJKWFOHDUO\RXWZHLJKWKHFRVWVWKLVVXJJHVWVDILGXFLDU\GXW\RQWKHSDUWRIGRQRUVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW to focus more support on emergency preparedness.

Ɣ7KHEHQHILWWRFRVWUDWLRVIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHUDUHSRVLWLYHDFURVVDOOVFHQDULRVUDQJLQJIURPRIEHQHILWJHQHUDWHGIRUHYHU\VSHQWRQFRQVHUYDWLYHHVWLPDWHVXSWRIRUHYHU\VSHQW

Ɣ)LQGLQJVVXSSRUWIXUWKHULQYHVWPHQWLQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDVWKHEHQHILWVIDUoutweigh the costs in terms of reduced caseloads, unit cost of response and disaster losses.

Ɣ7KHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\KDVDVWURQJHUUROHWRSOD\WRVXSSRUWV\VWHPVRISUHSDUHGQHVVIRUconflict, even in the most challenging of working environments. To date, conflict preparedness (as a concept, and in practice) has been neglected.

Ɣ&KDQJHZLOOFRVWPLQRUDGMXVWPHQWVWRH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVZLOOQRWEHHQRXJKWRDGHTXDWHO\support preparedness on a global scale.

Ɣ(YLGHQFHLVODFNLQJRQWKHFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGVRZKDWZHNQRZof the value of preparedness is only a fraction of what it could offer.

4HEBUSINESSCASEFOR emergency preparedness: .IGERANDBEYOND

4HECOSTSANDBENElTSOFemergency preparednessIt is increasingly being recognised that, in a changing political and economic landscape, a risk-based approach WRGHYHORSPHQWDQGKXPDQLWDULDQZRUNRIIHUVPD[LPXPpotential to use ODA to great effect (see Mitchell et al., $ULVNEDVHGDSSURDFKDOLJQVZLWKWKHUHFHQWWUHQGLQµUHVLOLHQFH¶+DUULVDQGHFRQRPLFDQDO\VHVWKDWEXLOGWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHIRUZK\H[DQWHLQYHVWPHQWDQGDFWLRQDUHFRVWHIIHFWLYH&DERW9HQWRQHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ0HFKOHUIRUWKFRPLQJ<HWWKLVLVQRWMXVWDQDJHQGDIRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\$PRUHrisk-informed approach to development, and the ambition WRSXUVXHDVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWWUDMHFWRU\UHTXLUHnational ownership and responsibility for preparedness DFWLRQV7KLVQHFHVVLWDWHVLPSURYHGQDWLRQDO¿VFDOSROLF\

allocations to preparedness in budgetary processes DQGLPSURYHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOcontributions required to address in-country preparedness needs.

The national landscape must be at the forefront of all international efforts to build the capacity to respond to ERWKQDWXUDOKD]DUGVDQGPDQPDGHFULVHVZLWKLQDQ\FRXQWU\FRQWH[W:KHUHWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\KDVa stronger role to play is in better understanding what FRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVFDQHQWDLODQGWRVXSSRUWQDWLRQDOV\VWHPVWRVWUHQJWKHQSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWHYHQLQthe most challenging of working environments.

(YLGHQFHRQWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness is lacking in relation to other interventions, thus what we know of the value of emergency preparedness is only a fraction of what preparedness

79

could offer. Moreover, challenges abound in coding and quantifying emergency preparedness, inhibiting WKHJHQHUDWLRQRIUHOLDEOHDQGTXDQWL¿DEOHHYLGHQFHRQSUHSDUHGQHVVVSHQGLQJLQLQGLYLGXDOFRQWH[WVVHH%LUGHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ<HWWKHUHLVJURZLQJinteresting in providing quantitative evidence to back up what humanitarians have argued for decades in relation to preparedness and broader risk-based approaches to development. Decision-makers and donors are LQFUHDVLQJO\EHFRPLQJLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHµEXVLQHVVFDVH¶IRUinvesting in disaster risk management. There is a small EXWJURZLQJWUHQGIRUXVLQJFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLV&%$DVDWRROIRUFRPSDULQJWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRILQWHUYHQWLRQVin order to make this case. Yet emergency preparedness, as one critical element of risk management contributing to UHGXFLQJULVNKDVQRWSUHYLRXVO\EHHQVWXGLHGVSHFL¿FDOO\in this regard.

"OX2ESEARCHINTOTHECOSTBENElTS of emergency preparedness

A background paper for this report suggests that WKHHFRQRPLFFDVHIRU'50±ZKLFKLQFRUSRUDWHVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUQDWXUDOKD]DUGV±LVVWURQJDQGWKDWWKHEHQH¿WVRILQYHVWLQJLQ'50RXWZHLJKWKHFRVWVRIGRLQJVR±RQDYHUDJHE\IRXUtimes the cost in terms of avoided and reduced losses VHH0HFKOHUIRUWKFRPLQJ

0HFKOHU¶VSDSHUKLJKOLJKWVKRZSUHSDUHGQHVVKDVLQFUHDVLQJO\EHHQWDFNOHGZLWKRXWRIWKHprominent studies it reviewed having a preparedness FRPSRQHQW1LQHRIWKHVHFRYHUHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHpreparedness in terms of considering the returns to land use and evacuation planning, training and capacity-building, early warning, shelters and the provision of emergency kits. Also, three studies cover systemic preparedness interventions, such as the HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIZRPHQ¶VVHOIKHOSJURXSV2YHUDOOthe preparedness studies seem to offer substantial QHWEHQH¿WVDFURVVGLIIHUHQWHYDOXDWLRQVKD]DUGVDQGORFDWLRQV:KLOHVRPHLQWHUYHQWLRQVH[KLELWEHQH¿Wcost ratios of less than 1 (i.e. interventions were not considered cost-HI¿FLHQWPDQ\WLPHVWKHVHUDWLRVDUHSRVLWLYHDQGan upper value of 4 for the best estimates per study seems a reasonable number for this set of studies. 9DULDWLRQLVKLJKKRZHYHUDQGWKHJDLQVIURPSUHSDUHGQHVVPD\RIWHQHYHQRXWZHLJKEHQH¿WVIURPH[SRVXUHPRGL¿FDWLRQ73 ZLWKUDQJHVRIEHQH¿WVto-cost ratio estimates from early warning of up WRDQGSUHSDUHGQHVVLQWHUPVRISODQQLQJDQGenhancing resilience) of up to 24.

%MERGENCYPREPAREDNESSIN.IGERACOST BENElTANALYSISAs part of this research, a detailed investigation was FDUULHGRXWLQWRWKHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHU&DERW9HQWRQHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ7KH¿QGLQJVSURYLGHLQGLFDWLYHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHUHLVDFOHDU¿QDQFLDOLPSHUDWLYHIRUJUHDWHULQYHVWPHQWin effective preparedness in the country. The monetary EHQH¿WVRILQYHVWLQJLQSUHSDUHGQHVVLQUHODWLRQWRGURXJKW±DVVXPLQJWKDWLVLWLPSOHPHQWHGLQDPDQQHUWKDWGHOLYHUVWKHH[SHFWHGJDLQV±FOHDUO\RXWZHLJKWKHFRVWV7KLVVXJJHVWVDFOHDU¿GXFLDU\GXW\RQWKHSDUWRIGRQRUVDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWRI1LJHU*R1WRIRFXVPRUHVXSSRUWon emergency preparedness.

4HECOSTOFSUPPORT

7KH*R1¶V$QQXDO6XSSRUW3ODQ3ODQGH6RXWLHQ) estimates overall needs for food security and nutrition DVVLVWDQFHUHODWHGWRDOOKD]DUGV,WKDVDOORFDWHGDQDYHUDJHRIPLOOLRQSHU\HDURYHUWKHVL[\HDUVEHWZHHQDQG,QWKH6XSSRUW3ODQestimated the cost of emergency preparedness at $14.1 PLOOLRQHTXLYDOHQWWRDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHWRWDOFRVWVHVWLPDWHGIRUWKDW\HDU,QDGGLWLRQLQ1RYHPEHUWKHFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVWRRGDWPLOOLRQ%\WKHWLPHRILWVUHYLVLRQLQ$SULOQHHGVKDGUHDFKHGDWRWDORIPLOOLRQ:LWKQHHGVLQ1LJHURQDVWDJJHULQJVFDOHWKHEHQH¿WVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDUHRIKHLJKWHQHGimportance, and have been articulated as:

Ɣ reduced unit cost of response

Ɣ reduced caseloads and

Ɣ reduced losses.

Reduced unit cost of response

The cost of humanitarian response is likely to decrease if emergency preparedness measures are in place and IXQFWLRQLQJZHOO7KLVLVIRUDYDULHW\RIUHDVRQV±IRUH[DPSOHFRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJFDQDOORZIRUSUH

The cost of humanitarian response is likely to decrease if emergency preparedness measures are in place and functioning well

$GDSWHGIURP,3&&H[SRVXUHPRGL¿FDWLRQUHIHUVKHUHWRµWKHSUHVHQFHRISHRSOHOLYHOLKRRGVHQYLURQPHQWDOVHUYLFHVDQGUHVRXUFHVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRUHFRQRPLFVRFLDORUFXOWXUDODVVHWVLQSODFHVWKDWFRXOGEHDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWHG¶

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 5. THE BUSINESS CASE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: NIGER AND BEYOND

positioning of stocks, leading to a reduction in last-minute transport costs, and sourcing of supplies can be pre-DUUDQJHGDWORZHUSULFHSRLQWV:)31LJHUHVWLPDWHVWKDWpre-planning in response to drought could reduce aid FRVWVIRRGDQGQRQIRRGDLGWRRIWKHFRVWXQGHUa scenario without any pre-planning, based largely on reduced costs of cereal prices and transport costs (Ballo DQG%DXHU7KHVHVDYLQJVDUHDOVRDSSOLFDEOHIRUÀRRGLQJDQGFRQÀLFWDVWKHVDYLQJVRQSUHSODQQLQJDSSO\to food and non-food aid in any emergency as it arises.74 This would suggest that the cost of humanitarian response could decrease from an average annual estimate of $217 million under the 3ODQGH6RXWLHQ to an annual average of $193 million.

Reduced caseloads

(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVDOVRH[SHFWHGWROHDGWRa reduction in caseloads, by facilitating early response before asset depletion has taken hold. This will be WUXHHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIGURXJKWDVVORZRQVHWdisasters present a greater opportunity to intervene before DFULVLVVWDJHKDVEHHQUHDFKHG,QWKHFDVHRIÀRRGVRUFRQÀLFWZKLOHWKHUHGXFWLRQLQFDVHORDGVPD\QRWEHDVpronounced, emergency preparedness measures such as evacuation plans and early warning should facilitate a decrease in loss of lives and assets.

%DOORDQG%DXHUXVHWKH+RXVHKROG(FRQRP\Approach to model the reduction in caseloads that could RFFXUZLWKDQHDUO\UHVSRQVHWRGURXJKWLQ1LJHU7KHmodelling suggests that caseloads from an early response WRDKLJKPDJQLWXGHGURXJKWDUHRIWKHFDVHORDGVXQGHUDODWHUHVSRQVH&DERW9HQWRQDQG&RXOWHUApplying this potential reduction to the cost of response as a result of preparedness is not straightforward, however. The 3ODQGH6RXWLHQ provides an aggregate cost of response for all events. However, it is unlikely that this level of reduction could be achieved for rapid-onset events such DVÀRRGVDQGFRQÀLFW±WKHUHGXFWLRQVDUHOLNHO\WREHPXFKVPDOOHUEXWGDWDGRHVQRWH[LVWWRTXDQWLI\WKHP$SSO\LQJDUHGXFWLRQLQFDVHORDGVWRWKHFRVWEHQH¿W¿JXUHVLGHQWL¿HGsuggests that humanitarian response costs would decrease HYHQIXUWKHUWRDQDYHUDJHDQQXDOFRVWRIPLOOLRQDWRWDOreduction in humanitarian response costs of $119 million.

Reduced losses

Emergency preparedness aims to reduce losses due WRWKHLPSDFWRIFULVLV±HDUO\ZDUQLQJDQGFRQWLQJHQF\planning, for instance, can reduce losses associated with lost lives, assets and livelihoods. Because data on reduced losses with preparedness measures is not available with any certainty, the analysis looks at WKUHHSRWHQWLDOVFHQDULRV8QGHUWKHPRVWFRQVHUYDWLYHDVVXPSWLRQORVVHVDUHHVWLPDWHGWRGHFUHDVHE\DVHFRQGVFHQDULRFRQVLGHUVDUHGXFWLRQLQORVVHVDQGDWKLUGVFHQDULRFRQVLGHUVDUHGXFWLRQLQORVVHVThese percentages were chosen as illustrations, but are considered to be conservative.

Estimated average annualised losses in crop production alone are $44 million per year. Emergency preparedness DFWLYLWLHVKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWRUHGXFHWKHVHORVVHV±IRUH[DPSOHEHWWHUHDUO\ZDUQLQJDQGFRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJcan allow farmers to harvest crops early, or ensure that grains are stored (and protected) in food stores. 5HGXFWLRQVRIORVVHVDUHHVWLPDWHGLQ7DEOH

4ABLE%STIMATEDREDUCTIONINLOSSES and value of reduction

Estimated reduction in losses

Value of reduction

$4m

P

$12m

Costs

The cost of emergency preparedness measures is described in two plans: the 3ODQGH6RXWLHQ (estimated DW)&)$ELOOLRQRUPLOOLRQDQGD*R1ÀRRGULVNPDQDJHPHQWSODQHVWLPDWHGDW)&)$ELOOLRQRUPLOOLRQIRUWKUHH\HDUVHTXLYDOHQWWRmillion per year). The total estimated cost of emergency preparedness is therefore $47.9 million per year.

"ENElT TO COSTRATIO

7KHFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WVRXWOLQHGDERYHZHUHLQSXWLQWRD\HDUPRGHOWRHVWLPDWHWKHFRVWVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDVFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHEHQH¿WVPRQHWLVHGin terms of avoided costs of aid and disaster losses. Because of the number of assumptions required in the modelling, three scenarios were modelled, varying the assumptions around the absolute level of disaster losses, the potential reduction in disaster losses and the discount rate.7DEOHVXPPDULVHVWKHWKUHHscenarios modelled, ranging from the most conservative assumptions to the least conservative.

7KHEHQH¿WWRFRVWUDWLR%&5IRUHDFKRIWKHVHVFHQDULRVLVSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOH

The BCRs are positive across all scenarios. In the most FRQVHUYDWLYHVFHQDULRLWLVHVWLPDWHGWKDWRIEHQH¿Wis generated for every $1 spent, and this increases as high

:KLOHWKLVZDVQRWVSHFL¿FDOO\H[SORUHGLQ%DOORDQG%DXHU:)3GLGDVLPLODUDQDO\VLVLQ0R]DPELTXHIRUERWKÀRRGLQJDQGdrought, and found that similar levels of savings in unit cost were achieved.

7KHGLVFRXQWUDWHLVXVHGWRUHÀHFWWKHWLPHYDOXHRIPRQH\,Qother words, a dollar today is considered more valuable than a dollar tomorrow, because it can be put towards productive purposes LPPHGLDWHO\$GLVFRXQWUDWHLVW\SLFDOIRUPRVWGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVDQGLVXVHGKHUH

DVRIEHQH¿WIRUHYHU\VSHQWLQ6FHQDULRLQWKHOHDVWFRQVHUYDWLYH7KH¿QGLQJVFOHDUO\VXSSRUWWKHFDVHIRUinvestment in emergency preparedness activities, as the EHQH¿WVLQWHUPVRIUHGXFHGFDVHORDGVDQGGLVDVWHUORVVHVIDUoutweigh the costs.

%FFECTIVENESSANALYSISFORemergency preparedness in niger Cost-effectiveness analysis is used to assess the cost of various measures to achieve a given outcome. However, in this analysis, the aim is not to weigh up different components RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLWZRXOGQRWEHDSSURSULDWHWRinvest in some measures and not others, as preparedness measures are inter-related and designed to work together. +DYLQJDQH[WHQVLYHHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPIRUH[DPSOHwill be of marginal use if governments and communities do not have the capacity to act on information. In the case RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWKHREMHFWLYHLVWRUHGXFHWKHcost of recovery per person (in other words, the cost per person to return them to a pre-disaster state). Here, this cost LVFRPSDUHGIRUWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDO±LHODWHKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVH±DQGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV

$ROUGHTANDmOODS

The Economics of Early Response and Resilience (TEERR) UHSRUWVRQ1LJHUFRQGXFWHGH[WHQVLYHPRGHOOLQJEDVHGRQSUREDELOLVWLFKD]DUGDVVHVVPHQWIRUGURXJKWDQGXVLQJthe Household Economy Approach dataset (see Ballo and %DXHU7KH:)3UHVHDUFKIRXQGWKDWWKHDYHUDJHFRVWRIUHVSRQVHSHUSHUVRQXQGHUWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDO±ODWHhumanitarian response with no emergency preparedness ±ZDVEHWZHHQDQG%\FRPSDULVRQXQGHUHDUO\response, including early procurement and pre-positioning of supplies, WFP estimated that the cost of humanitarian response would be $41 per person. Furthermore, the modelling estimated that caseloads would decrease by half, UHGXFLQJWKHFRVWRIUHVSRQVHWRHIIHFWLYHO\SHUSHUVRQ76 This implies an average annualised cost per person of

EHWZHHQDQGXQGHUWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDODVFRPSDUHGwith $7 per person under early response/emergency preparedness.77

Emergency preparedness does not eliminate the need for KXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHEXWLWGRHVVLJQL¿FDQWO\UHGXFHit. When its cost is combined with the residual need for

Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3Disaster losses

P±annualised crop losses

P±doubling of losses

P±tripling of losses

Reduction in losses

P P P

Discount rate

4ABLE-ODELLINGSCENARIOS

7KHVHFRVWVVSHFL¿FDOO\UHODWHWRKLJKDQGPHGLXPPDJQLWXGHdroughts, which have a return period of once every three years in 1LJHU

7KHVH¿JXUHVUHIHUSXUHO\WRKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHFRVWVDQGGRnot include losses. Clearly savings would also include a reduction in losses, though data in this regard is weak and therefore cannot be included in this analysis

5HGXFWLRQLQFDVHORDGVLQGURXJKWHVWLPDWHGDW5HGXFWLRQLQFDVHORDGVLQÀRRGHVWLPDWHGDW

4ABLE3UMMARYCOST EFFECTIVENESSANALYSISFORDROUGHTSANDmOODS

Cost per person affected Drought FloodCounterfactual: late humanitarian response

a. Aid costs $92 $46

b. Annualised $9

Late: total cost per person $9Emergency preparedness/early responsea. Aid costs $41 $23b. Adjusted for reduction

in caseloads $2379

c. Annualised $7 d. Cost of emergency

preparedness ±

Early: total cost per person (c+d) ±

4ABLE"ENElT TO COSTRATIO

Scenario BCR

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 5. THE BUSINESS CASE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: NIGER AND BEYOND

humanitarian response, the total cost is between $19 and SHUSHUVRQSHU\HDU$WWKHKLJKHQGWKLVVXJJHVWVthat an emergency preparedness scenario would cost half that of late humanitarian response. At the low end, costs of emergency preparedness are slightly lower than the counterfactual.

7KHFRVWRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHUDVcontained in the3ODQGH6RXWLHQ, is between $12 and $21 per person per year. This amount needs to be invested every year, regardless of whether a drought takes place, to ensure that the systems and capacity are ready when a crisis strikes.

)ORRGVRFFXUPRUHRUOHVVHYHU\RWKHU\HDULQ1LJHUEXWPHGLXPPDJQLWXGHÀRRGVWKDWUHTXLUHPRUHFRQVLVWHQWKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVHRFFXURQDYHUDJHRQFHHYHU\¿YHyears.'HVSLWHWKHLUSUHYDOHQFHGDWDRQÀRRGVLVIDUmore limited, though the government assessment of the ÀRRGVSURYLGHVVRPHXVHIXOGDWD7KLVLVXVHGWRannualise the estimated cost of response. The indicative estimate used here shows the cost of response at EHWZHHQDQGSHUSHUVRQ%\ZD\RIFRPSDULVRQWKHFRVWRIUHVSRQVHSHUSHUVRQDIIHFWHGLQWKHÀRRGV±DRQHLQ\HDUHYHQW±ZDVSHUSHUVRQ very much in line with these estimates.

8QGHUDQHDUO\UHVSRQVHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVVFHQDULRFRVWVZRXOGEHUHGXFHGE\DSSUR[LPDWHO\KDOIWRbetween $23 and $27 per person. However, caseloads are less likely to decrease in a rapid-onset event as compared ZLWKDVORZRQVHWHYHQWZKHUHWKHUHLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUHlead time to act to reduce caseloads. Therefore, it is DVVXPHGWKDWFDVHORDGVXQGHUÀRRGLQJDUHQRWDIIHFWHGE\early response/emergency preparedness.

#OST EFFECTIVENESSANALYSISTHECAVEATS

7KH¿QGLQJVIRUÀRRGVVXJJHVWWKDWHPHUJHQF\preparedness is not more cost-effective than the counterfactual. However, this is based purely on FRPSDULQJDLGFRVWVZLWKHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVFRVWVand emergency preparedness costs are estimated on the EDVLVRIWKHÀRRGUHVSRQVHSODQIRUFRQWLQJHQF\PHDVXUHVIRUDRQHLQ\HDUÀRRGDQGWKHUHIRUHDUHOLNHO\WREHout of proportion to the kinds of measures necessary for a RQHLQ¿YH\HDUÀRRG)XUWKHUWRWKLVWKLVDQDO\VLVZDVQRWable to account for potential losses, or for losses avoided under emergency preparedness, which are likely to be VLJQL¿FDQW

The effectiveness of an emergency preparedness plan will depend on the degree to which these various criteria are properly assessed and incorporated. For H[DPSOHZKLOHWKHTXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVVXJJHVWVWKDWemergency preparedness is more cost-effective than the current approach, this conclusion relies heavily upon the assumption that emergency preparedness measures will EH¿WIRUSXUSRVHDQGKHQFHHIIHFWLYHDWGHOLYHULQJJDLQVAn emergency preparedness plan that is not carefully designed, or does not account for the various criteria listed above, may fail to deliver outcomes, and hence ultimately EHPRUHH[SHQVLYHWKDQµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶

3HUVRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQE\&RXUWHQD\&DERW9HQWRQ:)3 2FWREHU

7RWDODLGFRVWVRIDSSUR[LPDWHO\PGLYLGHGE\ people affected.

Emergency preparedness does not eliminate the need for humanitarian response, but it does signi!cantly reduce it

5NDERSTANDINGWHATMAKESFOREFFECTIVElNANCINGOF

emergency preparedness

Key messages

Ɣ+XPDQLWDULDQILQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROVDUHQRWDµVLOYHUEXOOHW¶WRILQDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness. The CERF, ERFs, CHFs and CAP offer varied possibilities, but also have a number of constraints to better financing.

Ɣ&OLPDWHDGDSWDWLRQIXQGVDOVRRIIHUFRQVLGHUDEOHSRWHQWLDOIRUH[SDQGLQJLQWRPRUHVSHFLILFSUHSDUHGQHVVfinancing. There are shared weaknesses too, however: none of the funds supports preparedness for non-climate-related risks or conflict.

Ɣ7KHWZRPHFKDQLVPVZLWKDVSHFLILFIRFXVRQULVN*)'55DQG81'3&3577)SHUIRUPVWURQJO\ LQWKHIUDPHZRUNTXHVWLRQVZDUUDQWLQJIXUWKHUH[SORUDWLRQ

ƔThe entrenched, bifurcated donor government structure has contributed to establishing an artificial GLYLGHEHWZHHQGHYHORSPHQWDQGKXPDQLWDULDQFRPPXQLWLHVERWKSURYLGHDSDUWLDOVROXWLRQWRLPSURYHGfinancing of emergency preparedness.

Ɣ8QOHVVFRXQWU\EDVHGIXQGLQJLVDOORFDWHGXVLQJDWDLORUHGSHUFHQWDJHUHODWLYHWRLQFRXQWU\QHHGVHDUPDUNLQJRIIXQGVLVDVRPHZKDWDUELWUDU\H[HUFLVH

ƔSimply increasingly volumes of funding for preparedness will not overcome the non-financial challenges LGHQWLILHGDQG±DVWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHVVXJJHVWV±PD\DGGFRQIXVLRQWRDQDOUHDG\complicated preparedness picture.

5NDERSTANDINGWHATMAKESFOREFFECTIVElNANCINGOFEMERGENCYpreparedness

"/8-%4(/$/,/')#!,!002/!#(&/2$%4%2-).).'4(%@"%34&)4-%#(!.)3-

7KHPHWKRGRORJLFDODSSURDFKIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHµEHVW¿W¶mechanism involved i). detailed analysis of the case studies (Section 4), ii). research into emergency preparedness ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVEH\RQGWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV6HFWLRQVDQGLLL,GHQWL¿FDWLRQRIDVHWRINH\GHWHUPLQLQJTXHVWLRQVIRUHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWHPHUJHQF\preparedness.

7KH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVZHUHDQDO\VHGLQGHWDLOWRFRPHXSZLWKDFRPSUHKHQVLYHOLVWRIFULWHULDLGHQWL¿HGDVHQDEOLQJHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV

The importance of each criterion to each country was then FRQVLGHUHGLQGLFDWLQJWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHFRXQWULHVPHHWthat criterion. Each of these was then ranked by the overall importance given to them by the full range of case studies.

$VQRWDOOFULWHULDH[DPLQHGDUHVHHQDVHVVHQWLDOIRUHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQW¿QDQFLQJRISUHSDUHGQHVVRUDWOHDVWQRWIRUWKH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVWKHPVHOYHVHDFKZDVFORVHO\

H[DPLQHGDQGDGHFLVLRQZDVPDGHRQZKDWZDV DSSURSULDWHWREHLQFOXGHGDVNH\TXHVWLRQVVSHFL¿FDOO\IRU¿QDQFLQJ7KHVHTXHVWLRQVZHUHWKHQEURXJKWWRJHWKHULQWR a framework of questions, as indicated in Table 2.3.

The questions were then used to analyse each of the core PHFKDQLVPVDQGFKDQQHOVRI¿QDQFLQJLQRUGHUWRLGHQWLI\WKHµEHVW¿W¶PHFKDQLVPIRU¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV(see Table 6.1).

Answers to these questions were then considered in the OLJKWRIDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIFRUHPHFKDQLVPVEH\RQGFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVDQGWKHFXUUHQWFRQWH[WRISUHSDUHGQHVVpolicy debate, to come up with a set of options for improved emergency preparedness (see Section 7).

For further details of the methodology used in this report, LQFOXGLQJWKHFULWHULDIRUHIIHFWLYHHI¿FLHQWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHFULWHULDDFURVVFRQWH[WVDQGWKHDSSURSULDWHRIFULWHULDWR¿QDQFLQJVHHWKHEDFNJURXQGGRFXPHQWV

)DENTIFYINGTHE@BESTlTMECHANISMFORlNANCINGEMERGENCYpreparedness Section 4 demonstrates the clear need to reconsider or re-imagine the design of the current funding system in order WRHIIHFWLYHO\¿QDQFHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV6HFWLRQmakes it clear that there is a business case to be made for investment in emergency preparedness. This section uses the framework of questions (Table 2.3) and the ideal scenario (Figure 2.3) introduced earlier to consider the current ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVLQGHWDLO7KHSXUSRVHLVWRLGHQWLI\WKHµEHVW¿W¶WRROVPHFKDQLVPVPHDQLQJWKRVHWKDWFRXOGEHWDUJHWHGWRVWUHQJWKHQWKH¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWSURYLGHGIRUemergency preparedness, now and in the future.

7KHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVIXQFWLRQH[DFWO\DVWKH\ZHUHGHVLJQHGWRLVPLVSODFHGDVWKHevidence from the country case study shows. The analysis conducted investigated not only the mandate of the most viable mechanisms and tools, but also the way they play RXWLQSUDFWLFH(YLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVDQGthe background papers (including comparative cases) UHYHDOVGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHZD\WKDW¿QDQFLQJWRROVDQGmechanisms operate at the country level. Thus Table 6.1 DQGWKHGLVFXVVLRQEHORZDUHQRWDµWHVW¶LQGHHGPDQ\of the mechanisms considered were not designed to fund emergency preparedness. What the analysis represents is a GHWDLOHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHµEHVW¿W¶PHFKDQLVPIRU¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVEDVHGRQZKDWDOUHDG\H[LVWV

Table 6.1 provides a snapshot of that analysis, which has EHHQYHUL¿HGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOH[SHUWVDQGWRWKHH[WHQWpossible, by representatives from each of the mechanisms themselves.

7HATDOESTHISTELLUSABOUTEXISTINGlNANCINGMECHANISMS$QDO\VLVRIWKH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDJDLQVWWKHIUDPHZRUNUHYHDOVFHUWDLQSDWWHUQVWKDWGHVHUYHIXUWKHUH[SORUDWLRQ

7KHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROVDQDO\VHGoffer varied possibilities for, but also a number of constraints WREHWWHU¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV(5)Vhave the weakest potential for addressing the current global SUHSDUHGQHVVJDSDQGWKHZHDNHVWSRVVLELOLW\IRUH[SDQVLRQWRGRVREHLQJVLJQL¿FDQWO\OLPLWHGE\WKHUDQJHRIDFWRUVWKDWWKH\FDQ¿QDQFH7KH&(5)RIIHUVPXFKLQWHUPVRILWVRZQSUR¿OHDQGLQWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIUDLVLQJWKHSUR¿OHRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness, a key condition that appeared repeatedly throughout the case studies and in prior evidence (see Kellett DQG6ZHHQH\+RZHYHULWLVZHDNRQDGGUHVVLQJmany of the questions, especially those focused on national actors and processes, and on being connected to long-term plans and comparative advantage.

The CAP and the CHFs appear to offer much more potential. Although different in form (the CHF being a funding mechanism administered in-country and the CAP largely a strategic planning and coordination tool for humanitarian interventions), they share many positive conditions for emergency preparedness. They are both strong in areas of common plans of action and reasonably strong in both accessibility to actors and in several preconditions important to national actors and processes. However, they also have weaknesses that are shared with both the CERF and the ERFs. These relate to the constraints of being country-based humanitarian mechanisms, which limit their ability to be used as strategic tools to address global priority needs EH\RQGWKHVSHFL¿FFRXQWU\LQZKLFKWKH\DUHHVWDEOLVKHG(noting, of course, that they are present in only very few of WKRVHFRXQWULHVWKDWUHTXLUHSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFH$OOIRXUPHFKDQLVPVIDLOVLJQL¿FDQWO\RQWKLVWHVW0RUHRYHUWKHFRVWSROLWLFDODQG¿QDQFLDORIH[SDQVLRQLQWRDEURDGHUUDQJHRIcountries arguably calls all these mechanisms into question as feasible options for addressing the needed global reach for preparedness.

Climate adaptation funds also offer considerable potential IRUH[SDQGLQJLQWRPRUHVSHFL¿F¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDWOHDVWRQWKHIDFHRILW7KHWKUHHH[DPLQHGmost directly in this report, the LDCF, Adaptation Fund and PPCR, have considerable strengths. These are especially noticeable in the areas of accessibility to actors and multi-year funding, as well as support to national actors and processes. There are also shared weaknesses, however. 1RQHRIWKHIXQGVLVIRFXVHGRQQRQFOLPDWHUHODWHGULVNVRURQSUHSDULQJIRUFRQÀLFWDQGWKHOHYHORILQWHJUDWLRQZLWKDRR processes, actors and planning is decidedly low. One RIWKHNH\GUDZEDFNVLVWKHVLJQL¿FDQWFRVWLQYROYHGLQchanging what are very clearly climate-based mechanisms to focus attention much more obviously on the range of emergency preparedness needs. Moreover, they are almost entirely devoid of links with humanitarian actors. While three mechanisms are considered here, there are others that could warrant further attention, such as the Green Climate Fund, as a potential channel of funds.

7KHWZRPHFKDQLVPVZLWKDVSHFL¿FIRFXVRQULVN*)'55and the CPR TTF) have some similarities and some key differences. The main difference is that GFDRR focuses on DRR alone, while the CPR TTF looks at a wider range

)RUH[DPSOHWKH&(5)KDVIXQGHGDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKDSSHDUZLWKLQWKHPDWUL[RIDFWLYLWLHVWREHUHJDUGHGDVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVVHH7D\ORUDQG&RXWXUHIRUWKFRPLQJ

,QWKHFRQFOXGLQJVHFWLRQVZHFRQVLGHUWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIWKHmechanisms, with changes to their current form, and, discuss ZKHWKHUµEHVW¿W¶LVVXI¿FLHQWRUZKHWKHUµWUDQVIRUPDWLYH¶DGMXVWPHQWVWRWKHFXUUHQW¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHDUHUHTXLUHG

7KLVWDEOHDQGLWVTXDOLWDWLYHFRPPHQWVKDYHEHHQSUHSDUHGLQFROODERUDWLRQZLWKVHYHUDOH[SHUWVLQWKHDSSURSULDWHIXQGLQJFKDQQHO.DPDO.LVKRUH%&3577)'DQLHO.XOO*)'556PLWD1DNKRRGD(Climate Adaptation Funds), Lisa Doughten (CERF), Shoko Arakaki (CHF, ERF).

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 6. UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES FOR EFFFECTIVE FINANCING OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

of risks. This difference informs some of the key variations that each fund has in relation to the questions in the framework. GFDRR is strong in areas of multi-year funding, alignment with government plans and priorities, and to an H[WHQWLQWKHDUHDRIKDYLQJDSULRULWLVHGVHWRIFRXQWULHVIRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQ,WDOVREHQH¿WVIURPDUHDVRQDEO\KLJKSUR¿OHLQDQGEH\RQGWKH'55FRPPXQLW\7KH&3577)performs even more strongly than GFDRR overall. It is strong in the framework questions related to supporting long-term plans of action and comparative advantage, and equally so in demonstrating its links to national actors DQGSURFHVVHV8QOLNH*)'55LWDOVRKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRIRFXVRQDUDQJHRIPDQPDGHDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGdisasters. Where it has weaknesses, it is largely because at present it is a reactive fund, responding to demand, rather than looking at the wider picture of global need for preparedness. It also arguably (at least in comparison with *)'55DUJXDEO\KDVDORZHUSUR¿OH

Finally, direct donor funding is considered, in this case OLPLWHGVSHFL¿FDOO\WRIXQGLQJWKDWLVJUDQWHGELODWHUDOO\at a country level to a range of actors, from donors to 81DJHQFLHV1*2VDQGJRYHUQPHQWVDQGGUDZQIURPhumanitarian and development sources. One of the key ¿QGLQJVIURPSKDVHRQHRIWKLVUHVHDUFK.HOOHWWDQG6ZHHQH\ZDVWKHHQWUHQFKHGQDWXUHDQGVWUHQJWKof the bifurcated donor government structure, which KDVFRQWULEXWHGWRHVWDEOLVKLQJDQDUWL¿FLDOGLYLGHLQWRwhich emergency preparedness has often fallen. While the evidence from the case studies shows some hope IRUMRLQHGXSLQWHUYHQWLRQVLQWKHDUHDRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness, the picture is still largely divided into these two donor communities, development and humanitarian.

,WLVZRUWKH[DPLQLQJKRZHYHUKRZHDFKRIWKHVHWZRcommunities could be at least a partial solution to improved ¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV%RWKDUHUHODWLYHO\strong compared with other solutions discussed. Both UHTXLUHPLQLPDOREYLRXVFRVWVWRH[SDQGLQWRPRUHIXQGLQJfor emergency preparedness, and both can fund from government down to community actors. Humanitarian funding is slightly weaker than development funding on a number of key issues around sustainability of funding. This is especially the case for multi-year funding (or lack thereof) and alignment with government processes and priorities. It is also arguably the case in the area of accessibility to key implementing DFWRUVZLWKKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPRUHXQOLNHO\WRIXQGgovernment actors (for many legitimate reasons, particularly LQUHODWLRQWRZRUNLQJLQIUDJLOHDQGFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGFRQWH[WVAlthough overall development funding decided upon in-

FRXQWU\KDVFOHDUSRWHQWLDOIRUH[SDQVLRQLQWRRUEROVWHULQJRIemergency preparedness, this would only service countries where donors are present and there is a wider political commitment for a donor country to support a state and its FLWL]HQV7KXVZKLOHELODWHUDOIXQGLQJLVSDUWLFXODUO\VWURQJin addressing the framework questions related to country planning and programming, in-country donors cannot (rather obviously) look at the global picture of needs. There remains a need to channel funding based on an overall assessment of priority countries.

)LQDOO\DFURVVWKH¿YHFRXQWU\FDVHVWXGLHVFRQFHUQVwere raised about rhetoric on funding for preparedness not translating into its actual availability. Earmarking funds, namely a percentage of bilateral funds, was often cited as necessary to ensuring that rhetoric on funding was translated into reality. However evidence suggests that this ZRXOGEHDVRPHZKDWDUELWUDU\H[HUFLVHXQOHVVFRXQWU\based funding was allocated a tailored percentage to suit in-country needs. Simply getting more funds for preparedness ZLOOQRWKHOSRYHUFRPHWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOFKDOOHQJHVWKDWKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGDQGLQIDFW±DVLQWKHFDVHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV±PD\VHUYHWRDGGFRQIXVLRQWRDQDOUHDG\complicated preparedness picture.

.ON lNANCIALISSUESFOREFFECTIVEANDEFlCIENTEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS7KHUHDUHDOVRLVVXHVWKDWDUHQRWVWULFWO\¿QDQFLDOZKLFKimpact on adequate emergency preparedness. All of the QRQ¿QDQFLDOLVVXHVRXWOLQHGLQ7DEOHZHUHGHWHFWHGacross some or all of the case study countries. Some of WKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOLVVXHVKDYHDOUHDG\EHHQLQWURGXFHGHVSHFLDOO\ZKHUHWKH\KDYHDQLPSDFWRQ¿QDQFLQJLWVHOIThis should not imply that little is being done to address these challenges, but rather that there remain key LVVXHVVRPHRIWKHVHFRXOGEHDGGUHVVHGLQSDUWWKURXJK¿QDQFLQJHIIHFWLYHO\LQFHQWLYLVLQJJRRGSUDFWLFH

7DNLQJDFORVHUORRNDWWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOLVVXHVDIIHFWLQJFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKH\DUHVRPHZKDWUXGLPHQWDU\with a lack of clear or common understanding about what preparedness entails. In adapting the activities RXWOLQHGLQWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[IRUFRQÀLFW7DEOHWKHDFWLYLWLHVDWWKHPRUHµGHYHORSPHQWDO¶HQGRIWKHpreparedness continuum (Figure 2.2) look quite different, involving different sets of actors and types of engagement. ,QWKHVHDUHDVKD]DUGULVNDQDO\VLVLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGlegislative frameworks, coordination) the international FRPPXQLW\LVOLNHO\WRSOD\DPXFKVWURQJHUUROHLQFRQÀLFWpreparedness than in disaster preparedness (where, under stable conditions, the government should take the lead). Yet in the future this may also require consideration of different ZD\VRIHQJDJLQJVHH%R[

$OWKRXJKLWLVUHFRJQLVHGWKDWRQPDQ\RFFDVLRQVWKLVPD\EHintentional, as a matter of humanitarian ne utrality.

'RQRUVKDYHRWKHUFKDQQHOVDQGURXWHVIRUVXSSRUWLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness beyond bilateral in-country funding. The recommendations section considers how emergency preparedness can be supported in a range of ways by donor governments.

1RWHWKDWWKLVUHIHUVWRFRQVROLGDWHGDSSHDOVQRWÀDVKDSSHDOVWKHODWWHUKDYLQJOLWWOHWUDFWLRQIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV


4ABLE#URRENTFUNDINGTOOLSANDMECHANISMSMEASUREDAGAINSTTHEFRAMEWORKOFQUESTIONS

Humanitarian funding mechanism/tool In-country donor funding 5LVNIRFXVHGÀQDQFLQJ Climate adaptation mechanisms Framework

questionCERF CAP CHF ERF Bilateral donor –



PPCR

Comprehen-siveness of decisions

Are funding decisions based on a detailed understanding o f all risks?

The CERF is demand-driven, based on humanitarian requirements and SULRULWLHVLGHQWL¿HGE\the HCT. Activities are prioritised taking into consideration the &(5)¶VOLIHVDYLQJcriteria. An analysis of short-term risks is undertaken and informs decisions.

This is possible. This is possible. The ERF is a short-term, response-driven fund. Risks are FRQVLGHUHGWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQWat the time of development of the CHF allocation strategy papers. However, there is no structured risk management framework.

Evidence to date suggests that this is rarely the case, with decisions based on a combination of factors including QHHGPHGLDSUR¿OHpolitical position, historical ties, etc.

Evidence to date suggests that this rarely happens. Funding is siloed across risk where it H[LVWV

8QGHUVWDQGLQJRIULVNis focused on natural KD]DUGV7KHIXQGFDQZRUNLQFRQWH[WVRIFRQÀLFWEXWGRHVnot ‘prepare for FRQÀLFW¶

Partially yes, as priority is given to a set of countries based on level of risk, need for support and likelihood of success. However, demand-driven nature goes against this.

8QGHUVWDQGLQJof risk is focused on climatic risk. 1RLQFOXVLRQRInon-climatic risk LQFOXGLQJFRQÀLFW

8QGHUVWDQGLQJof risk is focused on climatic risk. 1RLQFOXVLRQof non-climatic risk (including FRQÀLFW



1RWEDVHGRQSULRULWLHVfor emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVhowever, the CERF UHIHUVWR2&+$¶VGlobal Focus Model when deliberating on allocations, particularly LQWKH8QGHUIXQGHGEmergencies analysis.

1RRQO\EDVHGRQwhere the CAP FXUUHQWO\H[LVWV

1RRQO\EDVHGRQZKHUH&+)VH[LVW

1RRQO\EDVHGRQZKHUH(5)VH[LVW

1$DVLQWKLVFDVHwe are talking of how donors operate LQHDFKFRQWH[W


FRXQWULHVDUHprioritised by GFDRR, 11 are earmarked by donors.

Funding is limited WRDERXWSULRULW\countries agreed XSRQZLWK81'3EXUHDX[DQGEDVHGRQassessment of risk.

1R±HTXDOdistribution of ¿QDQFHWRDOOLDCs.

)LUVWFRPH¿UVWserved.

Pilot programme working in sub-set of FRXQWULHVLGHQWL¿HGWKURXJKH[SHUWreview.

Supporting long-term plans of action and comparative advantage

Are funding decisions based on a common plan of action with GH¿QHGUROHVDQGresponsibilities?

1RWKH&(5)LVODUJHO\not funding emergency preparedness. However, it has allocated limited funding for early action when a common plan of DFWLRQH[LVWV

Yes, this is possible within the CAP, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.

Yes, this is possible, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.

1R7KDWVDLG(5)IXQGLQJdecisions should be aligned with cluster priorities and overall humanitarian plans (i.e. CHAP).

This is possible, but limited in practice by differences in humanitarian/international focus.

1RWFXUUHQWO\EXWpotentially possible within current FRQWH[W

1RWFXUUHQWO\EXWpotentially possible ZLWKLQFXUUHQWFRQWH[W


Potentially possible but somewhat limited by lack of integration between climate and DRR work.




81RQO\ 81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V

81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V

81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V,1*2VDQG1*2VDFFHVVIXQGVWKURXJKD81DJHQF\WKDWDVVXPHV¿QDQFLDODQGprogrammatic responsibility.

All possible, but emphasis towards international system.

All recipients possible.

Focus is on government and World Bank implementation. With government endorsement other DFWRUVFDQDFFHVVhowever, it is not common practice.

All recipients possible EXWLQSUDFWLFH81'3&RXQWU\2I¿FHVKDYHbeen the common recipients of funding.

Work through GEF implementing HQWLWLHV81(381'3:RUOGBank, etc.), which pass funding to H[HFXWLQJHQWLWLHV(government, etc.).

Work through multilateral or national implementing HQWLWLHVWKH\in turn pass funding to GLYHUVHH[HFXWLQJentities.

Programmes coordinated through PLQLVWU\RI¿QDQFHimplemented by WKH0'%VIXQGLQJcan be channelled through a number of entities including government, the private sector, SRWHQWLDOO\1*2V


1RVLQJOHFULVLVUHODWHGfunding.

1REXWLQUHDOLW\WKHVDPHSURMHFWVRUsimilar) can appear year on year.

1RWH[SOLFLWO\EXWevidence suggests WKDWVRPHSURMHFWVDUHfunded year on year.

1RYHU\VKRUWWHUP Funding can stretch beyond one year in some cases, but often demands that new decisions are made each year.

Funding is usually multi-year.

Funding can be multi-year.

Funding can be multi-year (typically three years but sometimes more).

Potentially possible within FXUUHQWFRQWH[W


Potentially possible within current FRQWH[W

91

Weak evidence /DFNVFRPSHOOLQJDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ

Key Strong evidence 3RVLWLYHO\DQVZHUVWKHTXHVWLRQ





PPCR

Comprehen-siveness of decisions

Are funding decisions based on a detailed understanding o f all risks?

The CERF is demand-driven, based on humanitarian requirements and SULRULWLHVLGHQWL¿HGE\the HCT. Activities are prioritised taking into consideration the &(5)¶VOLIHVDYLQJcriteria. An analysis of short-term risks is undertaken and informs decisions.

This is possible. This is possible. The ERF is a short-term, response-driven fund. Risks are FRQVLGHUHGWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQWat the time of development of the CHF allocation strategy papers. However, there is no structured risk management framework.

Evidence to date suggests that this is rarely the case, with decisions based on a combination of factors including QHHGPHGLDSUR¿OHpolitical position, historical ties, etc.

Evidence to date suggests that this rarely happens. Funding is siloed across risk where it H[LVWV

8QGHUVWDQGLQJRIULVNis focused on natural KD]DUGV7KHIXQGFDQZRUNLQFRQWH[WVRIFRQÀLFWEXWGRHVnot ‘prepare for FRQÀLFW¶

Partially yes, as priority is given to a set of countries based on level of risk, need for support and likelihood of success. However, demand-driven nature goes against this.


8QGHUVWDQGLQJof risk is focused on climatic risk. 1RLQFOXVLRQof non-climatic risk (including FRQÀLFW



1RWEDVHGRQSULRULWLHVfor emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVhowever, the CERF UHIHUVWR2&+$¶VGlobal Focus Model when deliberating on allocations, particularly LQWKH8QGHUIXQGHGEmergencies analysis.

1RRQO\EDVHGRQwhere the CAP FXUUHQWO\H[LVWV

1RRQO\EDVHGRQZKHUH&+)VH[LVW

1RRQO\EDVHGRQZKHUH(5)VH[LVW



FRXQWULHVDUHprioritised by GFDRR, 11 are earmarked by donors.

Funding is limited WRDERXWSULRULW\countries agreed XSRQZLWK81'3EXUHDX[DQGEDVHGRQassessment of risk.

1R±HTXDOdistribution of ¿QDQFHWRDOOLDCs.

)LUVWFRPH¿UVWserved.

Pilot programme working in sub-set of FRXQWULHVLGHQWL¿HGWKURXJKH[SHUWreview.

Supporting long-term plans of action and comparative advantage

Are funding decisions based on a common plan of action with GH¿QHGUROHVDQGresponsibilities?

1RWKH&(5)LVODUJHO\not funding emergency preparedness. However, it has allocated limited funding for early action when a common plan of DFWLRQH[LVWV

Yes, this is possible within the CAP, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.

Yes, this is possible, and it also requires detailed planning/roles and responsibilities.

1R7KDWVDLG(5)IXQGLQJdecisions should be aligned with cluster priorities and overall humanitarian plans (i.e. CHAP).

This is possible, but limited in practice by differences in humanitarian/international focus.

1RWFXUUHQWO\EXWpotentially possible within current FRQWH[W







81RQO\ 81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V

81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V

81,1*2VQDWLRQDO1*2V,1*2VDQG1*2VDFFHVVIXQGVWKURXJKD81DJHQF\WKDWDVVXPHV¿QDQFLDODQGprogrammatic responsibility.

All possible, but emphasis towards international system.

All recipients possible.

Focus is on government and World Bank implementation. With government endorsement other DFWRUVFDQDFFHVVhowever, it is not common practice.

All recipients possible EXWLQSUDFWLFH81'3&RXQWU\2I¿FHVKDYHbeen the common recipients of funding.

Work through GEF implementing HQWLWLHV81(381'3:RUOGBank, etc.), which pass funding to H[HFXWLQJHQWLWLHV(government, etc.).

Work through multilateral or national implementing HQWLWLHVWKH\in turn pass funding to GLYHUVHH[HFXWLQJentities.

Programmes coordinated through PLQLVWU\RI¿QDQFHimplemented by WKH0'%VIXQGLQJcan be channelled through a number of entities including government, the private sector, SRWHQWLDOO\1*2V


1RVLQJOHFULVLVUHODWHGfunding.

1REXWLQUHDOLW\WKHVDPHSURMHFWVRUsimilar) can appear year on year.

1RWH[SOLFLWO\EXWevidence suggests WKDWVRPHSURMHFWVDUHfunded year on year.

1RYHU\VKRUWWHUP Funding can stretch beyond one year in some cases, but often demands that new decisions are made each year.

Funding is usually multi-year.

Funding can be multi-year.

Funding can be multi-year (typically three years but sometimes more).




Continued

92 DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 6. UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES FOR EFFFECTIVE FINANCING OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS





PPCR



1RUHVSRQVHGULYHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\IRFXVHGon the limited occasions the CERF has funded early action, it has taken into consideration government and national plans.

7KLVLVFRQWH[Wdependent, but can align.

7KLVLVFRQWH[Wdependent but can align WRDQH[WHQW±WKRXJKfunding does not go directly to government.

1RUHVSRQVHIRFXVHG+RZHYHU&+)DOORFDWLRQV±LQJHQHUDO±are aligned to the CAP, which provides a link to national priorities.

&RQWH[WGHSHQGHQWbut on balance funding is much less likely to be tied to government priorities than development funding.

Development funding is more likely to be tied directly to government plans and priorities.

Yes. 81'3FDQQRWVSHQGany of these resources without government DSSURYDOLQPRVWcases support follows a national strategy, or can provide support for its development

It should, as funding is directed to an adaptation programme developed with stakeholder input.


It should, as funding is directed to an adaptation programme developed with the lead ministry, usually the Ministry of Finance.


1$ Where preparedness LVLGHQWL¿HGDVDNH\REMHFWLYHSURMHFWVFDQH[LVWDWDQ\OHYHO0DQ\&$3SURMHFWVare already focused on community work.

Where preparedness LVLGHQWL¿HGDVDNH\REMHFWLYHSURMHFWVFDQH[LVWDWDQ\OHYHO

1R This is possible. This is possible. GFDRR is largely not funding preparedness at local levels.

This is possible. Historically, support has included a range of activities from community to national levels.

It should, but may not in all cases.

Yes/usually. Yes/usually.

Strong donorship

Does the mechanism have strong M&E for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?

Limited to intervention-based M&E, including the annual RC/HC reports and annual independent review in multiple countries, based on the Performance and Accountability Framework.

Mid-year review acts as DQ0(µZLQGRZ¶

1R 1RDOWKRXJKWKHTXDOLW\RIM&E systems varies across countries).

Potentially yes. Potentially yes. Limited to date, but planned evaluations in preparation.

A multi-year results framework is adopted, which is compiled and published annually.

Yes. Yes. Yes.


Yes, from almost any source.

Donors only. Donors only. Governments, the private sector as well as individuals can contribute funding to an ERF.

1R¿[HGE\government.


Potentially yes, but in practice none to date.

Yes, but in practice this has been very rare.

Potentially. Yes. Potentially.

Administration 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHthere administration FRVWVLQH[SDQGLQJwork in emergency preparedness?

An additional SUHSDUHGQHVVµZLQGRZ¶for the CERF would not necessarily be particularly costly (but would require DGGLWLRQDOVWDI¿QJLQWKHCERF secretariat). It remains unclear as to whether a GA resolution would be needed to amend the focus of the fund.

'LI¿FXOWWRGHWHUPLQHgiven that they are GULYHQE\FRPSOH[emergencies, but unlikely to be easily or cheaply replicated.

6LJQL¿FDQWFRVWVCountry HCT would need to approach OCHA, making the case. Would need to demonstrate the need, and likely donor support. CAP needs to be in place.

5HDVRQDEO\VLJQL¿FDQWFRVWVHCT needs to approach OCHA and make the case. Would QHHGWRPDNHWKHVSHFL¿FFDVHfor the ERF.

&RVWVRIH[SDQGLQJwork in emergency preparedness minimal.


Relatively low, H[SDQGLQJEH\RQGcurrent priority countries.


Substantial (this is not an emergency preparedness fund by design/REMHFWLYH

6LJQL¿FDQWWKLVLVnot an emergency preparedness fund by design/REMHFWLYH

6LJQL¿FDQWWKLVLVnot an emergency preparedness fund E\GHVLJQREMHFWLYH

Feasibility ,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWpolitical support behind the inclusion (or H[SDQVLRQRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness in the fund?

Independent CERF evaluations have raised the question of the place of emergency preparedness in the &(5)DWSUHVHQWemergency preparedness is deliberately not included.

The CAP is already stretching to incorporate enhanced preparedness, an evolution of the last few years.

CHFs are relatively large, and have support in each country FRQWH[W([SDQVLRQto fund emergency preparedness has to EHSODFHG¿UPO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH&$3Vwhich the funds support.

'HVLUHIRUH[SDQVLRQRI(5)VLQevaluations appears to emanate from a recognition that the activities are underfunded in general, rather than from any UHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQWKDW(5)¶VFDQRUVKRXOGH[SDQG

Growing support following increased evidence on the cost-effectiveness and improved response as a result of emergency preparedness.

Growing realisation of the place of risk and preparedness in mainstay development programming.

GFDRR donors have asked the fund to focus its DWWHQWLRQRQH[LVWLQJpriority countries and activities.

1RVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHdiscovered supporting (or not) enhanced work in emergency preparedness (but *$UHVROXWLRQGRHVPDQGDWH81'3for work on disaster preparedness at a country level.)

Minimal. Minimal. Minimal.

Visibility Does the mechanism have a high enough SUR¿OHWRSXVKpreparedness forward?

+LJKSUR¿OHFRQQHFWHGto media around crisis and with a yearly donor conference.

+LJKSUR¿OHFRQQHFWHGto media around crisis, and with a launch and mid-year review, which enhance attention.

3UR¿OHRQO\ZLWKLQcountries where they H[LVW

3UR¿OHRQO\ZLWKLQFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH\H[LVWEXWVHWXSafter large disasters with global visibility.

Humanitarian donor funding often has KLJKHUSUR¿OHWKDQdevelopment.

+LJKSUR¿OHalthough many competing priorities.

Reasonably high SUR¿OH

*HQHUDOO\ORZSUR¿OH Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but LWLVDKLJKSUR¿OHnorm-setting space.

Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but it is a KLJKSUR¿OHQRUPsetting space.

Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but it has relatively high capitalisation and substantial resources per programme.

93





PPCR



1RUHVSRQVHGULYHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\IRFXVHGon the limited occasions the CERF has funded early action, it has taken into consideration government and national plans.

7KLVLVFRQWH[Wdependent, but can align.

7KLVLVFRQWH[Wdependent but can align WRDQH[WHQW±WKRXJKfunding does not go directly to government.

1RUHVSRQVHIRFXVHG+RZHYHU&+)DOORFDWLRQV±LQJHQHUDO±are aligned to the CAP, which provides a link to national priorities.

&RQWH[WGHSHQGHQWbut on balance funding is much less likely to be tied to government priorities than development funding.

Development funding is more likely to be tied directly to government plans and priorities.

Yes. 81'3FDQQRWVSHQGany of these resources without government DSSURYDOLQPRVWcases support follows a national strategy, or can provide support for its development



It should, as funding is directed to an adaptation programme developed with the lead ministry, usually the Ministry of Finance.


1$ Where preparedness LVLGHQWL¿HGDVDNH\REMHFWLYHSURMHFWVFDQH[LVWDWDQ\OHYHO0DQ\&$3SURMHFWVare already focused on community work.

Where preparedness LVLGHQWL¿HGDVDNH\REMHFWLYHSURMHFWVFDQH[LVWDWDQ\OHYHO

1R This is possible. This is possible. GFDRR is largely not funding preparedness at local levels.

This is possible. Historically, support has included a range of activities from community to national levels.

It should, but may not in all cases.

Yes/usually. Yes/usually.

Strong donorship

Does the mechanism have strong M&E for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?

Limited to intervention-based M&E, including the annual RC/HC reports and annual independent review in multiple countries, based on the Performance and Accountability Framework.

Mid-year review acts as DQ0(µZLQGRZ¶

1R 1RDOWKRXJKWKHTXDOLW\RIM&E systems varies across countries).

Potentially yes. Potentially yes. Limited to date, but planned evaluations in preparation.

A multi-year results framework is adopted, which is compiled and published annually.

Yes. Yes. Yes.


Yes, from almost any source.

Donors only. Donors only. Governments, the private sector as well as individuals can contribute funding to an ERF.



Potentially yes, but in practice none to date.


Potentially. Yes. Potentially.

Administration 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHthere administration FRVWVLQH[SDQGLQJwork in emergency preparedness?

An additional SUHSDUHGQHVVµZLQGRZ¶for the CERF would not necessarily be particularly costly (but would require DGGLWLRQDOVWDI¿QJLQWKHCERF secretariat). It remains unclear as to whether a GA resolution would be needed to amend the focus of the fund.

'LI¿FXOWWRGHWHUPLQHgiven that they are GULYHQE\FRPSOH[emergencies, but unlikely to be easily or cheaply replicated.

6LJQL¿FDQWFRVWVCountry HCT would need to approach OCHA, making the case. Would need to demonstrate the need, and likely donor support. CAP needs to be in place.

5HDVRQDEO\VLJQL¿FDQWFRVWVHCT needs to approach OCHA and make the case. Would QHHGWRPDNHWKHVSHFL¿FFDVHfor the ERF.



Relatively low, H[SDQGLQJEH\RQGcurrent priority countries.


Substantial (this is not an emergency preparedness fund by design/REMHFWLYH

6LJQL¿FDQWWKLVLVnot an emergency preparedness fund by design/REMHFWLYH

6LJQL¿FDQWWKLVLVnot an emergency preparedness fund E\GHVLJQREMHFWLYH

Feasibility ,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWpolitical support behind the inclusion (or H[SDQVLRQRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness in the fund?

Independent CERF evaluations have raised the question of the place of emergency preparedness in the &(5)DWSUHVHQWemergency preparedness is deliberately not included.

The CAP is already stretching to incorporate enhanced preparedness, an evolution of the last few years.

CHFs are relatively large, and have support in each country FRQWH[W([SDQVLRQto fund emergency preparedness has to EHSODFHG¿UPO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH&$3Vwhich the funds support.

'HVLUHIRUH[SDQVLRQRI(5)VLQevaluations appears to emanate from a recognition that the activities are underfunded in general, rather than from any UHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQWKDW(5)¶VFDQRUVKRXOGH[SDQG

Growing support following increased evidence on the cost-effectiveness and improved response as a result of emergency preparedness.

Growing realisation of the place of risk and preparedness in mainstay development programming.

GFDRR donors have asked the fund to focus its DWWHQWLRQRQH[LVWLQJpriority countries and activities.

1RVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHdiscovered supporting (or not) enhanced work in emergency preparedness (but *$UHVROXWLRQGRHVPDQGDWH81'3for work on disaster preparedness at a country level.)

Minimal. Minimal. Minimal.

Visibility Does the mechanism have a high enough SUR¿OHWRSXVKpreparedness forward?

+LJKSUR¿OHFRQQHFWHGto media around crisis and with a yearly donor conference.

+LJKSUR¿OHFRQQHFWHGto media around crisis, and with a launch and mid-year review, which enhance attention.

3UR¿OHRQO\ZLWKLQcountries where they H[LVW

3UR¿OHRQO\ZLWKLQFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH\H[LVWEXWVHWXSafter large disasters with global visibility.

Humanitarian donor funding often has KLJKHUSUR¿OHWKDQdevelopment.

+LJKSUR¿OHalthough many competing priorities.

Reasonably high SUR¿OH

*HQHUDOO\ORZSUR¿OH Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but LWLVDKLJKSUR¿OHnorm-setting space.

Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but it is a KLJKSUR¿OHQRUPsetting space.

Potentially (though unlikely): it is not a DRR fund, but it has relatively high capitalisation and substantial resources per programme.

Weak evidence /DFNVFRPSHOOLQJDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ

Key Strong evidence 3RVLWLYHO\DQVZHUVWKHTXHVWLRQ

94

1RQÀQDQFLDOLVVXHVIRUemergency preparedness

Some examples from the case studies

Semantics'H¿QLWLRQVDQGmeanings of key emergency preparedness terms are not shared across the different actors.

,Q1LJHUYHU\GLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWLRQVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVH[LVWIURPQDUURZµKXPDQLWDULDQ¶WKURXJKWRORQJWHUPFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJ

,Q0\DQPDUVRPHGRQRUDJHQFLHVXVHµHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¶DQGµ'55¶interchangeably.

In Sudan, the preponderance of humanitarian response means that there is little LQFHQWLYHIRUKLJKOLJKWLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDVDUHVXOWDQ\DFWLYLWLHVWKDWGRH[LVWDUHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRKXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUYHQWLRQV

Knowledge of risk: There is often DODFNRIMRLQHGXSXQGHUVWDQGLQJof all risks. Much is known, but often this knowledge is ‘parcelled RXW¶DPRQJVWSDUWLFXODUDFWRUVwithin their own sectors.

In Sudan, humanitarian response has dominated engagement (and still does) by ERWKQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUV±FRPELQHGULVNDVVHVVPHQWVKDYHODUJHO\not been undertaken.

,Q0\DQPDUWKHµSUHSDUHGQHVVJDS¶LVODUJHO\EHFDXVHDJHQFLHVDGGUHVVULVNfrom their own perspectives and implement accordingly. Little brings them together.

National systems: Government frameworks and institutions for risk management are weak, lack capacity and lack clear policy directives.

In Haiti, parts of the preparedness system still lack legal status.

,Q1LJHUWKHULVNPDQDJHPHQWVWUXFWXUHVRIJRYHUQPHQWDUHDOPRVWQRQH[LVWHQWbeyond the capital.

,Q6XGDQDWOHDVWGLIIHUHQWJRYHUQPHQWDJHQFLHVKDYHVRPHSUHSDUHGQHVVresponsibility, without any single one being clearly in charge.

International architecture: Emergency preparedness is either oriented towards emergencies, humanitarian actors, humanitarian GRQRUVDQGWRDQH[WHQWhumanitarian mechanisms, or divided into humanitarian/GHYHORSPHQWµDUHDV¶ZLWKRXWDGHTXDWHFRRUGLQDWLRQ([LVWLQJcoordinating structures currently struggle to address the full range of needs.

In Haiti, development donors remain reluctant to fund preparedness, seeing it as a humanitarian issue, even when this means the capacity-building of national institutions.

In the Philippines, preparedness is largely split into two broad categories: response preparedness targeting crisis coordination structures (funded by humanitarian sources) and investments in early warning systems (funded by development).

,Q6XGDQRQO\RQHGRQRUKDV¿QDQFHGHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVRXW RIDGHYHORSPHQWIXQGDJHQFLHVDUHIRUFHGLQWRWU\LQJWRLQFRUSRUDWHORQJHUWHUPpreparedness such as capacity-building and early warning into one-year cycles of humanitarian funding.

Roles and responsibilities: These are often unclear, especially within the international community.

In the Philippines, several key international agencies admitted to not knowing who was responsible for emergency preparedness.

In Sudan, there is no single focal point for emergency preparedness within WKH81V\VWHPIRUH[DPSOHHDUO\ZDUQLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDFURVVDJHQFLHV is not coordinated.

4ABLE.ON lNANCIALISSUESAFFECTINGEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS


"OX.ON lNANCIALCHALLENGESPREPAREDNESSINCONmICTCONTEXTS

'H¿QLQJDQGRSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWUHTXLUHVFRQFHUWHGDWWHQWLRQWRWKHQXDQFHVRIHDFKFRQÀLFWDQGULVNFRQWH[W,QVRPHFRQWH[WVit may not be possible to hold such a conversation RYHUWO\LQRWKHUVLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVZLOOKDYHDMREWRdo in negotiating the way for such dialogue to happen. (YLGHQFHIURPDFURVV+DLWL0\DQPDU6XGDQDQG1LJHUVXSSOHPHQWHGE\EDFNJURXQGSDSHUVH[SORULQJ6RXWK6XGDQ.HQ\DDQGRWKHUFDVHORDGV9DX[DVKRZVWKDWSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWLVODUJHO\LQLWVinfancy, at least in terms of a comprehensive approach. 1RQHWKHOHVVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRFRQFHLYHRIDVHWRIDFWLYLWLHV±EDVHGRQWKHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVPDWUL[GHYHORSHGIRUWKLVUHSRUW7DEOH±ZKLFKVXSSRUWQDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\LQFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVV7KLVmay require working in quite different ways to those currently adopted.

7ZRH[DPSOHVDUHµEURNHUDJH¶DQGµHQWUXVWPHQW¶VHH$OORXFKHDQG/LQG,QWKHIRUPHUSUHSDUHGQHVVcould be enacted through strengthening national capacity WKURXJKµEURNHUDJH>WKDW@LQYROYHVDFWLRQVWREXLOGDshared understanding amongst actors whose interest PD\YDU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\DQGZKRVHFDSDFLW\WRDFWLQ

VXSSRUWRIWKHVHLQWHUHVWVPD\EHXQHTXDO¶LELG6XFKFRQFHSWVVXSSRUWWKHLGHDRI¿QGLQJSDWKZD\VWRworking even in situations characterised by fragmented authority ‘where power is mediated through local SURFHVVHVWRUHFRQFLOHWKHLQWHUHVWVRIGLIIHUHQWDFWRUV¶LELG(PHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWZRXOGORRNquite different to the activities currently conceived by the humanitarian actor used to dealing with crisis response. Relatedly, calls have been made to identify new and innovative ways to operationalise DRM in fragile and FRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGVWDWHVWRFKDOOHQJHWKHSUHGRPLQDQWO\state-centric approaches currently in place (see Harris HWDO

Similar applications can be made for the term µHQWUXVWPHQW¶ZKHUHE\GHFLVLRQVDQGSRZHUDUHEURXJKWcloser to the population through the use of local actors and structures. This would represent a marked difference from the way that actors operate today, and could help address the criticism that ‘aid stakeholders have tinkered at the edges when what is needed is a wholesale UHLQYHQWLRQRIGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHVH>IUDJLOHDQGFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHG@FRQWH[WV¶LELG

6RXUFH3HWHUVIRUWKFRPLQJ6XGDQ+RFNOH\IRUWKFRPLQJDQG1LJHU5RELWDLOOHHWDOIRUWKFRPLQJ

International capacity: There is a lack of capacity internationally to coordinate risk management issues, especially when part of long-term development.

9HU\IHZRIWKHFDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHVKDYHWKHQHFHVVDU\µFHQWUDO¶FDSDFLW\WRFRRUGLQDWHZRUNDFURVVULVN7KLVLVIRUH[DPSOHDQLVVXHLQVRPHRIWKH5HVLGHQW&RRUGLQDWRUV¶RI¿FHV

Planning: There is a lack of a systematic approach and SODQQLQJQRWMXVWIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness, but for risk PDQDJHPHQWRYHUDOO1RFDVHstudy country approached the range of emergency preparedness activities comprehensively.

0\DQPDUKDVDODUJHO\SLHFHPHDOSURMHFWEDVHGDSSURDFK

In Haiti, recognition of the importance of emergency preparedness has not led to a clear vision or plan of action.

,Q6XGDQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVXQGHUWDNHQE\LQGLYLGXDODJHQFLHVQRFRQVROLGDWHGSODQVH[LVW

Tracking and reporting: There is poor tracking of emergency preparedness, in itself a consequence of the many approaches, the different semantics and the inability to disaggregate emergency preparedness from larger programmes, etc.

,Q1LJHURI&$3SURMHFWVLQKDGDWOHDVWRQHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLW\±\HWRQO\RQHSURMHFWKDGµSUHSDUHGQHVV¶LQLWVWLWOH

,Q0\DQPDUDQG1LJHUPDQ\DJHQFLHVFRQVLGHUHGSUHSDUHGQHVVDVVRPHWKLQJindistinguishable from response, and therefore did not track it separately.

97

7. Recommendations ASETOFOPTIONSFORCHANGE

Ɣ0XFKFDQEHGRQHWRLPSURYHWKHZD\WKDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHPILQDQFHVSUHSDUHGQHVVIURP µQRUHJUHW¶LQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJHVWRDQHQKDQFHGV\VWHPWKURXJKWRFRQVLGHUDEOHLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHYLHZµWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOFKDQJH¶

Ɣ*LYHQWKHFRVWEHQHILWHYLGHQFHIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVJRYHUQPHQWVDQGGRQRUVKDYHDGXW\to consider greater integration of options to improve the current system of financing.

Ɣ,QFUHPHQWDOFKDQJHVWRFXUUHQWPHFKDQLVPVZLOOOHDYHJDSV7KLVUHSRUWUHFRPPHQGVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDJOREDOIXQGIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVHLWKHUDQHQKDQFHG*)'55RU81'3&3577) or alternatively a new dedicated fund.

Ɣ0RUHGHGLFDWHGIXQGLQJIRUSUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGQRWUHVXOWLQWKHµH[WUDFWLRQ¶RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIURPH[LVWLQJSURFHVVHVV\VWHPVDQGDSSURDFKHV

Ɣ'RQRUVFDQDQGVKRXOGGRPRUHWRDGGUHVVSUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKWKHV\VWHPDQGZLWKLQWKHLU own spending priorities: development funding for emergency preparedness is seen as an essential way forward.

Key messages

7. Recommendations: ASETOFOPTIONSFORCHANGE

!SETOFOPTIONSFROMBEYONDBUSINESSASUSUALTHROUGHTOTRANSFORMATIONALCHANGEThe recommendations start from the premise that H[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDQGFKDQQHOVRUÀRZVRI¿QDQFHVKRXOGEHVWUHQJWKHQHGLQVXSSRUWof emergency preparedness, where appropriate and where they can add value. Table 7.1 summarises this UHSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVEURNHQGRZQLQWRIRXULQWHUrelated parts. The three options are underpinned by enhanced support by donor governments for emergency preparedness:

7KLVVHFWLRQDGRSWVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶DVGHVFULEHGE\7DQQHUDQG%DKDGXUµ7UDQVIRUPDWLRQLVcommonly interpreted as radical change requiring innovation and testing of new approaches. This entails the generation/use of new NQRZOHGJHDQGDPDUNHGO\GLIIHUHQWZD\RIGRLQJWKLQJV¶

Ɣ ([SDQVLRQZKHUHLWPDNHVVHQVHµQRUHJUHW¶RSWLRQV

Ɣ 0D[LPLVLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQHQKDQFHGV\VWHP

Ɣ Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system

Ɣ Donor governments: the case for development ¿QDQFLQJ

:KLOHDQ\PHFKDQLVPFDQEHDGMXVWHGWRLQFOXGHDJUHDWHUfocus on emergency preparedness (either solely or as part RIDZLGHUUDQJLQJVHULHVRIREMHFWLYHVWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWDOORIWKHPVKRXOGEHH[SDQGHG$EDODQFHQHHGVWREHVWUXFNEHWZHHQDFKLHYLQJWKH¿QDQFLQJQHHGHGIRUpreparedness and recognising what is practical and feasible ZLWKLQWKHH[LVWLQJFRQWH[W7KLVPHDQVWDNLQJFDUHIXOconsideration of the investment required to make changes to FXUUHQWPRGHOVDQGQRWµDUWL¿FLDOO\¶H[SDQGLQJDPDQGDWHRUa geographical scope to address preparedness needs.

99

4ABLE!SETOFOPTIONSFORFUTUREFUNDINGOFEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

Expansion where it makes sense: ‘no regret’ options

Maximising opportunities: an enhanced system

Transformational change: solutions beyond the current system

There is considerable potential LQPD[LPLVLQJWKHXVHRIH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVIRU¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness more effectively (see section 7.2).

These opportunities will entail considerably more effort from the international system in order to be achieved (see section 7.3).

This represents a considerable change in the way that emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVLV¿QDQFHGZLWKDQHZGHGLFDWHGDSSURDFKDQG¿QDQFLQJsourced beyond the system (see VHFWLRQV±

%ROVWHUH[LVWLQJKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVVRWKDWopportunities for funding emergency preparedness are continually sought ±LQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOHZLWKLQWKHCHFs, ERFs and the CERF.

GFDRR to make preparedness a priority action within all its selected countries.

CPR TTF to prioritise preparedness within its priority countries when it makes new grants.

All agencies should investigate how they can utilise other resources for emergency preparedness where they are most appropriate.

Multi-year Strategic Response Plans (SRPs) should be obligatory across SURWUDFWHGFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHV

All new humanitarian mechanisms to include a consideration of preparedness, and this should be UHÀHFWHGLQWKHUHOHYDQWVHWXSpolicy documentation and guidelines LQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOH653V

Climate change adaptation ¿QDQFLQJWREHLPSOHPHQWHGLQways which support a broader preparedness system for risk, including improvement for the PPCR, Adaptation Fund and LDCF.

6LJQL¿FDQWO\HQKDQFHHLWKHURIWKHH[LVWLQJULVNIRFXVHGJOREDOmechanisms: GFDRR or CPR TTF.

Or:

Create a new global pooled funding mechanism.

Beyond the system: enhanced support for preparedness through private sector and remittances VHH$QQH[

Donor support for preparedness

6XSSRUWSUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKRXWDQGJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHWKHUROHRIGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJVHHVHFWLRQ

%XPANSIONWHEREITMAKESSENSE@NOREGRETOPTIONSThere is much that can be achieved within the current V\VWHPWRLPSURYHWKH¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness that does not require radical overhauls of practice and policy. On balance, there is considerable potential in improving the scope of all of the core PHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROV7KHµQRUHJUHW¶UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVoutlined below draw on analysis of what makes for HIIHFWLYH¿QDQFLQJVHH6HFWLRQ

Common Humanitarian Funds: advocacy to encourage greater consideration of emergency preparedness in CHFs and any forthcoming guidelines.

In some ways the CHFs have considerable strengths for H[SDQGLQJLQWRPRUHZRUNLQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVthey are a tool for looking ahead (before the humanitarian QHHGDFWXDOO\DULVHVWKH\FDQORRNWRDGGUHVVDUDQJHRIULVNVDQGWKH\DUHEDVHGRQDFRQVXOWDWLYHSURFHVVWRreach an agreed set of interventions. Their weakness in FRPSDULVRQZLWKWKH&$3LVWKDWWKHLUµSUR¿OH¶LVODUJHO\restricted to the country concerned.

7KLVUHSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQLVWKDWWKH&+)VVKRXOGfollow the preparedness developments of the CAP (and now its Strategic Response Plan replacement) more H[SOLFLWO\DQGHQVXUHWKDWDGHTXDWHDWWHQWLRQLVSODFHGon building capacity for preparedness within national and international actors. Practically, this means that each CHF should have an inbuilt demand for Humanitarian Country

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 7. RECOMMENDATIONS: A SET OF OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

7HDPV+&7VWRH[DPLQHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVneed and ensure that it is a core part of all consultation/SULRULWLVDWLRQH[HUFLVHVERWKZLWKLQDQGEHWZHHQFOXVWHUVVHFWRUV8QOHVVSUHSDUHGQHVVLVPDGHDFOHDUresponsibility for CHFs, then the work of the HCT in this area will remain ad hoc and dependent solely on WKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHKXPDQLWDULDQDSSHDO6RXWK6XGDQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRDOORFDWHPLOOLRQRI&+)PRQH\WRDPL[of both humanitarian aid and emergency preparedness is DSRVLWLYHH[DPSOH2&+$HWKDWFRXOGEHIROORZHGDFURVVDOOH[LVWLQJDQGIXWXUH&+)V

Emergency Response Funds: opportunities should be maximised to include preparedness in the ERFs as part and parcel of good humanitarian practice.

Where it is deemed plausible and of need, ERFs should LQFOXGHSUHSDUHGQHVVDFWLYLWLHVUHOHYDQWWRWKHFRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKH\RSHUDWHWKHVHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVDUHOLNHO\WRbe focused on the immediate requirements for improving emergency response. However, beyond their current role ERFs in particular have, at present, few plus points IRUH[SDQGLQJJUHDWO\LQWRPRUHIXQGLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness: they are not well designed to answer the TXHVWLRQVLGHQWL¿HGIRUHIIHFWLYHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJQRUIRUDQH[SDQVLRQWRGRVR

The research undertaken for this report indicates that (5)VDUHWKHOHDVWµUHJXODWHG¶RIWKHKXPDQLWDULDQIXQGV7D\ORUDQG&RXWXUHIRUWKFRPLQJDQGDUHKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKH\DUHFUHDWHG7RPD[LPLVHWKHUHODWLYHO\IHZDSSURSULDWHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWthe ERFs present, strong leadership by the relevant ERF lead agency, and further consideration of the place of preparedness in policy guidance, are required to support increased incorporation of emergency preparedness.

The Central Emergency Response Fund: do not inhibit the inclusion of preparedness where the case has EHHQHIIHFWLYHO\PDGHEXWPDLQWDLQWKH&(5)·VIRFXVon life-saving response.

The CERF is strong in answering a number of the IUDPHZRUNTXHVWLRQVVHH7DEOHIRUH[DPSOHWKRVHUHODWHGWRWKHKLJKSUR¿OHDQG\HDUO\GRQRUFRQIHUHQFHWKDWprovides for a dedicated focus of funds. It is weaker on a QXPEHURIFULWLFDODUHDVVXFKDVH[SOLFLWSROLF\VXSSRUWfor preparedness), and changes required to address WKHVHZRXOGLQYROYHVLJQL¿FDQWSROLWLFDODQGOHDGHUVKLSsupport and a change in mandate. Such a change would QHFHVVLWDWHRYHUFRPLQJVLJQL¿FDQWEDUULHUVLQFOXGLQJthe need for a General Assembly resolution to change WKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKH&(5)WRLQFOXGHIRUH[DPSOHDµSUHSDUHGQHVVZLQGRZ¶

Yet, while preparedness is regarded as ineligible for &(5)VXSSRUW2&+$DHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWthis is interpreted variably in practice. In light of the

¿QGLQJVRIWKH¿YH\HDUHYDOXDWLRQ2&+$FLWmay be reasonable in some instances to further embed emergency preparedness more institutionally within the &(5)3RVLWLYHH[DPSOHVRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVbeing successfully included in CERF applications should be replicated. These include where:

Ɣ the CERF has been directed to priority response SURMHFWVRIZKLFKDSURSRUWLRQWKDWZDVGHHPHGreasonable was directed to preparedness

Ɣ WKHDSSO\LQJDJHQF\SRVVLEO\LQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKHHumanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC)) has VXFFHVVIXOO\PDGHDFDVHWKDWWKHSURMHFWPHHWVWKHlife-saving criteria.

5LVNIRFXVHGÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVPDNHemergency preparedness an explicit goal of country programming.

%RWKRIWKHULVNIRFXVHG¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV*)'55and the CPR TTF) performed well in the analysis and are, in different ways, well placed to enhance their role RI¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7KLVLVLQSDUWEHFDXVHWKH\DOUHDG\IRFXVWKHLUDWWHQWLRQRQ¿QDQFLQJbefore crisis. They do this in different ways, however, as the earlier analysis highlighted, with GFDRR focused on broader DRR and the CPR TTF focused on preventing FULVLVIURPERWKFRQÀLFWDQGQDWXUDOKD]DUGV

7KHµQRUHJUHW¶UHFRPPHQGDWLRQIRUWKHVHIXQGVLVWKDWERWKJLYHVSHFL¿FDQGGHGLFDWHGDWWHQWLRQWRHPHUJHQF\preparedness (in line with their current mandate). For both mechanisms, this means making preparedness a priority action in each of their focus countries, as well as ensuring that it is included within all future country priorities. For GFDRR the focus should remain on disaster risk, given its TXLWHVSHFL¿FPDQGDWHZKHUHWKHFRVWLQPDQ\ZD\VRILQFOXGLQJSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUFRQÀLFWLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHWRRsubstantial. It should, however, place greater emphasis on FDVHVZKHUHQDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUULVNUHTXLUHVSUHSDUHGQHVVLQIUDJLOHDQGFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGVWDWHVFor the CPR TTF, dedicated attention to emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGFXWDFURVVERWKGLVDVWHUDQGFRQÀLFWULVNZKHUHWKH\H[LVWLQWKHVDPHFRXQWU\FRQWH[W

Dedicated attention to emergency preparedness should cut across both disaster and con"ict risk where they exist in the same country context

Agencies should deliberately utilise other resources in-country for emergency preparedness.

(YLGHQFHIURPWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVVXJJHVWVWKDWH[LVWLQJresources available in-country also fund emergency preparedness across a range of agencies. This includes the use of core resources and those drawn from humanitarian programming as well as broader risk-UHODWHGDFWLYLWLHVVXFKDV'55DQGFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQIn many cases, emergency preparedness activities (such as stockpiling and risk assessment) are undertaken using these resources, though these are rarely termed µSUHSDUHGQHVV¶

7KHµQRUHJUHW¶UHFRPPHQGDWLRQKHUHLVWKDWDOOimplementing agencies and organisations should analyse KRZEHVWH[LVWLQJDQGFRUHUHVRXUFHVFDQEHXVHGWRGHOLYHUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV7RWKHH[WHQWSRVVLEOHthis should address needs within that country in a systematic and coordinated manner. In addition, agencies should actively ensure that emergency preparedness features more heavily in their core funding, becoming an essential part of all relevant activities.

7.3 maximising opportunities: ANENHANCEDSYSTEMThe improvements indicated above, while useful in WKHPVHOYHVDUHYHU\OLPLWHGWKH\ZLOOHYHQLIDOODUHLPSOHPHQWHGRQO\SDWFKRYHUH[LVWLQJFUDFNVLQ¿QDQFLQJfor emergency preparedness. Elements of the current system can (and should) be pushed beyond their FXUUHQWFRPIRUW]RQHZLWKVWHSVWDNHQWRHQVXUHWKDWpreparedness becomes a core component of all relevant mechanisms managed by the international community.

Strategic Response Plans: all plans should become PXOWL\HDUDQGWDNHKHHGRIWKHODWHVWJXLGDQFHto include preparedness in longer-term planning frameworks.

The predecessor of the Strategic Response Plans, the CAP, has already seen some considerable improvement in its ability to articulate the need for emergency preparedness. During phase one of this research SURMHFWHYLGHQFHIRXQGWKDWWKH&$3ZDVEHLQJXVHGfor emergency preparedness despite the absence of FOHDUSROLF\.HOOHWWDQG6ZHHQH\7KHPRVWrecent guidance for the CAP has gone beyond previous considerations of preparedness, where it was largely SHUPLWWHGEXWQRWDGYHUWLVHGIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDVNLQJWKDW+&7VH[SOLFLWO\LQFOXGHSUHSDUHGQHVVLQWKHLUSODQV7KHguidance went further to outline the kind of preparedness WKDWFDQEHDUWLFXODWHGZLWKLQWKH&$3±µSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUUHVSRQVH¶ZLWKVSHFL¿FDFWLYLWLHVEHLQJWKRVHFORVHVWWRhumanitarian response within the preparedness continuum

(Figure 2.2). It included many activities focused on preparing the international community to respond, but also on national capacity to manage response. Preparedness is an obvious responsibility both within and between clusters, according to this latest guidance.

,QDGGLWLRQWKHUHKDVEHHQH[SHULPHQWDWLRQZLWKPXOWLyear funding, with several HCTs adopting a framework for ORQJHUWHUPSODQQLQJRIWHQXVLQJFRPPXQLW\µUHVLOLHQFH¶as a hook upon which to hang these various longer-term initiatives. To date, the OPT, Kenya and Somalia have all used elements of multi-year programmes of work (OCHA, M7KHUHLVPXFKWKDWLVSRVLWLYHIRUHPHUJHQF\preparedness in multi-year humanitarian planning: funding for priorities beyond one-year boundaries, building national capacity as an increasing priority and building resilience as a key area of work. The multi-year CAP has ‘multi-year targets for a wider range of humanitarian DFWLRQVLQFOXGHVPRUHHDUO\UHFRYHU\DFWLRQVDQGVRFLDOVHUYLFHVLGHQWL¿HVVSHFL¿FLQWHUYHQWLRQVWRGHYHORSnational and local capacities for emergency preparedness DQGUHVSRQVHDQGIRFXVHVPRUHRQEXLOGLQJWKHUHVLOLHQFHof affected populations so as to work towards a gradual GUDZGRZQRIKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFH¶LELG$OORIthese help shift the burden from humanitarian assistance towards investments in risk management before crises occur. It is welcome that the guidance document for the Strategic Response Plans takes this a step forward by providing systematic guidance on how to plan and manage a multi-year programme.

The recommendation is that multi-year plans become the QRUPUDWKHUWKDQWKHH[FHSWLRQHVSHFLDOO\LQFRPSOH[emergencies. The argument is that these plans in WKHPVHOYHVDUHWRROVIRUH[DPLQLQJWKH\HDUDKHDGDQGby their very nature go beyond response into planned

µ>1@HHGVDVVHVVPHQWDQGULVNDQDO\VLVFOXVWHUDQGLQWHUFOXVWHUHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHSODQQLQJFRPPXQLW\SUHSDUHGQHVVLQFOXGLQJHDUO\ZDUQLQJVWRFNSLOLQJRIPDWHULDOVQHHGHGIRUHDUO\UHVSRQVHimproved communications systems for early warning and early UHVSRQVHLPSURYHGORJLVWLFVFDSDFLW\WRVXSSRUWHDUO\DFWLRQWUDLQLQJVLPXODWLRQH[HUFLVHVDQGGULOOVZLWKQDWLRQDORUORFDOFRXQWHUSDUWVWRLPSURYHFRRUGLQDWLRQVSHHGDQGTXDOLW\RIUHVSRQVHDQGLQFUHDVLQJJRYHUQPHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZWRPDQDJHWKHLQÀX[RILQWHUQDWLRQDODVVLVWDQFH¶2&+$M

It is welcome that the guidance document for the Strategic Response Plans takes this a step forward by providing systematic guidance on how to plan and manage a multi-year programme


humanitarian interventions. There is arguably no reason for all plans not to be multi-year. Increasingly, the emphasis needs to be on why HCTs are not looking at supporting longer-term solutions and are not increasingly prioritising sustainable funding, national capacity and community preparedness, all leading towards the eventual drawdown of humanitarian assistance. The factors highlighted by the latest guidance offer no deterrent to such planning in year-upon-year humanitarian LQWHUYHQWLRQVLQWKHVDPHFRQWH[W

Climate change adaptation mechanisms: climate FKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQÀQDQFLQJPXVWEHLQWHJUDWHGZLWKLQa wider appreciation of risks in each country context. This recommendation needs to be applied beyond the three mechanisms examined closely in this report.

On the surface, climate adaptation funding appears to offer SRWHQWLDOIRULQFUHDVHG¿QDQFLQJRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVIRUVRPHDVSHFWVRQWKHPRUHµGHYHORSPHQWDO¶HQGRIWKHpreparedness continuum. There are important strengths in being tied to national processes and supporting a range of actors. However, it is clear from the evidence that climate IXQGVDUHQRWDIHDVLEOHRSWLRQWRH[SDQGEH\RQGWKHLUFXUUHQWremit. Although some funding has gone to countries in which FRQÀLFWRIYDULRXVNLQGVH[LVWV&&$PHFKDQLVPVGRQRWVXSSRUWSUHSDULQJIRUFRQÀLFWRUIRUQDWXUDOULVNVWKDWDUHQRWclimate-related. Furthermore, they are seriously hampered E\WKHLUFXUUHQWODFNRILQWHJUDWLRQZLWK'50¿QDQFLQJDQGFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQSUHSDUHGQHVVSURFHVVHV3HUKDSVDERYHDOOHOVHWKHFRVWVRIH[SDQGLQJWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVWRORRNVSHFL¿FDOO\DWHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDUHYHU\KLJK±WKH\are simply not designed to support such an approach, and FDQQRWHDVLO\EHDGMXVWHGWRGRVR

That said, there are some clear recommendations to be made. It is increasingly important that CCA and DRM are EHWWHUFRRUGLQDWHGDWDOOOHYHOVWRPD[LPLVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGof harnessing opportunities to combine approaches towards different types of risk (climatic and non-climatic). At present national governments routinely manage DRM through interior ministries, civil protection or national disaster management authorities, while CCA is managed through environment ministries. Support for a more holistic DSSURDFKWRZDUGVULVNZLWKLQDFRXQWU\FRQWH[WLVUHTXLUHGand should be encouraged.

The preliminary evidence on the country case studies reveals considerable amounts of adaptation funding EH\RQGWKHWKUHHPHFKDQLVPVH[SORUHGKHUH7KHVHRWKHUPHFKDQLVPVVXFKDV-DSDQ¶V)DVW6WDUW)LQDQFHDQG*HUPDQ\¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO&OLPDWH,QLWLDWLYHDUHQRWSRROHGfunds. However, the need for them to be more closely FRRUGLQDWHGZLWKWKHDFWLYLWLHV¿QDQFHGXQGHU'55LVVWLOO

very relevant, though this will require a different kind of advocacy, reliant more on donors themselves (see below).

Pilot Program for Climate Resilience: maximise the existing entry points to fund emergency preparedness WKURXJKSURMHFWVWKDWUHODWHWRFOLPDWHVHUYLFHVGLVDVWHUclimate risk reduction and community preparedness.

The PPCR prioritises investments in climate information and services (e.g. early warning systems, hydrological LQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHV2QHRIWKHH[FHSWLRQVLVLQ%DQJODGHVKZKHUHWKHIRFXVLVRQFRDVWDO]RQHmanagement, with investments in early warning systems, including for non-climate risks such as tsunamis.

The recommendation is to build upon the interconnection between climate adaptation and disaster risk systems coherently and systematically at a country level. In line with the general recommendations for adaptation funding PHFKDQLVPVWKH33&5VKRXOGPD[LPLVHRSSRUWXQLWLHVin its operations, by ensuring that early warning systems DQGULVNLGHQWL¿FDWLRQVXFKDVLWVFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJIRUclimate monitoring) are integrated into a more holistic ULVNUHGXFWLRQDSSURDFK6SHFL¿FDWWHQWLRQVKRXOGEHpaid to the PPCR enhancing its support of community preparedness (highlighted in recent evaluations), particularly the increased involvement of vulnerable communities or the use of community-based approaches WREXLOGLQJDGDSWLYHFDSDFLW\,&)33&5

Least Developed Countries Fund: funding should be used to support emergency preparedness activities where they have been (or can be) included in NAPAs. Future NAPAs should have an obligatory emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVFRPSRQHQWLQFOXGLQJDQDQDO\VLVRIcurrent capacity.

:LWKLWVIRFXVRQ¿UVWVXSSRUWLQJWKHFUHDWLRQRID1$3$WKHLDCF already gives attention to emergency preparedness DFWLYLWLHVVLQFHWKH1$3$KDVVHFWLRQVWKDWORRNSUHFLVHO\at climate risks and the relationship to preparedness. It is UHFRPPHQGHGWKDWDOOIXWXUH1$3$V±ZKLFKDUHHVVHQWLDOO\WKHJXLGHWKURXJKZKLFKWKH/'&)RSHUDWHV±VKRXOGinclude emergency preparedness activities systematically. This should be coupled with a holistic analysis of risks LQFOXGLQJWKRVHEH\RQGFOLPDWHLQUHODWLRQWRH[LVWLQJroles, responsibilities and action, such as activities working PRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\RQ'557KHVHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVactivities should be supported by the LDCF.

Supporting advocacy will be required at the GEF (the PDQDJLQJDXWKRULW\WRKLJKOLJKWWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQ¿QDQFLQJfor adaptation, DRR and emergency preparedness.

Adaptation Fund: build upon the already close thematic relationship between the Adaptation Fund and emergency preparedness by making the connections systematic.6HHEDFNJURXQGSDSHUV&DUDYDQLDQG1DNKRRGDIRUWKFRPLQJ

7UXMLOORDQG1DNKRRGDIRUWKFRPLQJDQG+LOOIRUWKFRPLQJ

As shown earlier, the Adaptation Fund has an indicative set of four activities, three of which are aligned to HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV81)&&&7UXMLOORDQG1DNKRRGDIRUWKFRPLQJ7KHH[SDQVLRQRIVXSSRUWfor preparedness through the Adaptation Fund could involve the following actions, ensuring that preparedness becomes a clear focus of its investment decisions.

There should be more systematic analysis of the scope and impact of emergency preparedness-related activities that the Adaptation Fund has supported to date, with a view to helping strengthen their impact and effectiveness. Guidance to this effect could be developed through WKH)XQG¶V2SHUDWLRQDO*XLGHOLQHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDforthcoming overall comprehensive evaluation of the $GDSWDWLRQ)XQG$GDSWDWLRQ)XQG%RDUGD

The operational guidelines could include:

Ɣ 3URMHFWUHYLHZHOLJLELOLW\FULWHULD±WKHVHFRXOGLQFOXGHVSHFL¿FHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVTXHVWLRQVVXFKDVGRHVWKHSURMHFWLQFOXGHFRRUGLQDWLRQZLWKHPHUJHQF\related institutions at the corresponding levels?

Ɣ *XLGHOLQHVIRUWKHUHVXOWVIUDPHZRUN±WKHVHFRXOGinclude qualitative questions around key indicators and outcomes where sustainability is related to Adaptation Fund implementation alongside emergency preparedness activities

Ɣ Guidelines for complying with the annual reporting IRUPDWVLQFOXGLQJFOHDUH[DPSOHVRIUHSRUWLQJEDFNRQemergency preparedness activities, and integration with risk management in general.

4RANSFORMATIONALCHANGESOLUTIONSBEYONDTHECURRENTSYSTEM

!GLOBALMECHANISMFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESSlNANCING

There are many advantages to enhancing and improving H[LVWLQJFRXQWU\EDVHGPHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROVLQVXSSRUWof preparedness (in some cases, as indicated above, WKLVPHDQVHQKDQFLQJFXUUHQWPHFKDQLVPVVLJQL¿FDQWO\Concentrating efforts on improving the scale and scope of preparedness without involving new actors, channels or mechanisms will be less complicated for the current system. +RZHYHUEROVWHULQJH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWand at the very least a global solution must be considered, the rationale being:

Ɣ Decisions to engage with a particular country are not always determined by an adequate assessment of risk RUQHHGVRPHFRXQWULHVFDQEHµOHIWEHKLQG¶91

Ɣ &RXQWU\OHYHO¿QDQFLQJLVLQDGHTXDWH1RWDOOFRXQWULHVhave enough donors present in-country to adequately

engage with emergency preparedness needs. Capacity to engage with donors directly either regionally or globally is limited in many cases.

Ɣ ([LVWLQJIXQGVZKHWKHUDWFRXQWU\OHYHOPRVWRIWHQhumanitarian, though in some cases bespoke to that FRQWH[WRUDWJOREDOOHYHOGRQRWWDUJHWSUHSDUHGQHVVVSHFL¿FDOO\

Ɣ Finally, as evidence from across the case studies reveals, funding is siloed, with limits to the feasibility and willingness of individual fund managers to support preparedness.

In essence, if all we do is improve the preparedness IRFXVRIH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVQRPDWWHUKRZJRRGWKDWLVkey questions will always remain: how will underfunded preparedness needs be met? How will priorities across countries be determined? Who will take charge of UHGUHVVLQJWKHQHJOHFWRIFRQÀLFWSUHSDUHGQHVV"

A global fund meanwhile could, if designed and directed appropriately, prioritise funding across a range of countries, and make decisions as to the most appropriate FRQWH[WVIRUH[WHUQDOVXSSRUW,WFRXOGUDLVHWKHSUR¿OHof emergency preparedness as an issue for donors and agencies alike, in a way that any country-based fund is simply unable to do.

It should be noted that this is not to advocate for the µH[WUDFWLRQ¶RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVRXWRIH[LVWLQJprocesses, systems and approaches, such as DRR, VHFWRUE\VHFWRUSUHSDUHGQHVVPHDVXUHVRUFRQÀLFWprevention. The current research sees value in many of the current approaches, yet seeks to address the evidence that points to the gaps in delivery. A global fund for HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVFDQKHOS¿OOWKRVHJDSVZRUNLQJFDUHIXOO\WRSULRULWLVHLQYHVWPHQWVLQWKRVHFRQWH[WVWKDWmost require international assistance.

However, one key feature of the mechanism is that it should be designed to pilot a new way of working and thinking (see Table 7.3 for how a new fund would function), seeking funds drawn from both development

6HHLQGLYLGXDOFDVHVWXGLHVIRUH[DPSOHV

If all we do is improve the preparedness focus of existing mechanisms, no matter how good that is, key questions will always remain


and humanitarian funding streams (even from the same donor), where a holistic all-risk approach to emergency preparedness is pursued. Special attention should be paid to proposals that look to fund a range of activities across the preparedness continuum.

In addition, more concentrated efforts to partner with, and leverage greater support from, other stakeholders in-FRXQWU\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHG7KLVLQFOXGHVIRUH[DPSOHgreater links through PPPs, leveraging support through H[FKDQJHRIH[SHUWLVHLQFLYLOSURWHFWLRQDQGJHQHUDWLQJDstronger civic voice around preparedness as a means to LQÀXHQFHWKHVSHQGLQJRIUHPLWWDQFHV

/PTIONSFORAGLOBALFUNDINGMECHANISMdedicated to emergency preparedness

7KH¿UVWDQGPRVWREYLRXVFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVKRZDQHZIXQGFRXOGLILWZHUHVRGHVLJQHGPHHWPDQ\RIWKHH[LVWLQJframework questions, and do so in a way that would be PRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWWKDQSRWHQWLDOO\H[SDQGLQJWKHPRVWSURPLVLQJSUHSDUHGQHVV¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVDVSHUWKHDQDO\VLV±*)'55DQGWKH&3577)

During consultations conducted to consider this question, it was suggested that the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) RI¿FHRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVIRUH[DPSOHFRXOGVHWXSDIXQGwith such a range of preconditions built into its operational functioning. This would be a relatively simple process (at least in terms of administration), although decisions on how it could work, and who would do what, including the decision-making process for funding allocations, could possibly take considerable negotiation. Returning to the framework of questions, the one consideration on which, unsurprisingly, a new fund scores very low is feasibility in terms of obtaining the political support needed. This is a considerable challenge that should not be underestimated. Similarly, establishing a new fund risks creating a silo for preparedness, when it should in fact serve to better link the current humanitarian/development bifurcation. There would need to be included in WKHVHWXSFULWHULDWKHPHDQVIRUWKLVµOLQNLQJ¶UROHWREHIXO¿OOHG

to leverage greater coordination and collaboration with H[LVWLQJZRUN±DKLJKDPELWLRQIRUDQ\IXQGLQJPHFKDQLVP

7KHFRVWRIFKDQJHLHDGMXVWPHQWVWR*)'55DQGWKHCPR TTF) has to be weighed up against the value of the LQYHVWPHQWLQPDNLQJWKDWFKDQJH)RUH[DPSOHDOWHULQJthe CPR TTF is believed to be the easiest of these three options, but it does not meet the full range of criteria as well as a new fund would. (This is not surprising, given that it is possible, according to advice from the MPTF RI¿FHWRVHWXSDIXQGWRPHHWZKDWHYHUUDQJHRIFULWHULDZDVUHTXLUHG*)'55FRXOGEHH[SDQGHGWKRXJKQRWwithout its consultative group and the World Bank itself DJUHHLQJWRQHZSULRULWLHV±DQGFRQVXOWDWLRQDQGUHYLHZprocesses for this report suggest that this would prove a hurdle too high to overcome.

An analysis of the three options against both the framework questions and the cost of change suggests that *)'55ZRXOGEHWKHOHDVWIHDVLEOHLQWHUPVRIH[SDQGLQJLWVHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVUHPLW,WVODFNRIFRQÀLFWIRFXVis obviously a main reason, but to this could be added recent calls by donors for GFDRR to focus its attention RQH[LVWLQJSULRULWLHV:KDWWKHQRIH[SDQGLQJWKHZRUNRIthe CPR TTF or addressing the full needs of emergency preparedness through a dedicated mechanism? Weighing XSWKHVHWZRDOWHUQDWLYHURXWHVLVGLI¿FXOW$OWKRXJKDQHZfund could probably answer all the framework questions, WKHH[LVWLQJ81'3PDQDJHGIXQGFRXOGDOVRGRVRZLWKappropriate guidance and policy changes.

On balance, given the demands of emergency preparedness in meeting a set of needs that cross the KXPDQLWDULDQGHYHORSPHQWDQGGLVDVWHUFRQÀLFWGLYLGHVZKLFKVKRXOGEHUHÀHFWHGDSSURSULDWHO\LQWKHZD\LQZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGHDQGWKHQHHGIRUDVLJQL¿FDQWincrease in public (and donor) attention to preparedness, a new, highly visible fund is recommended. This would LQYROYHZKDWWKH037)RI¿FHZRXOGFRQVLGHUDµOLJKW¶model of operation, with clear, precise guidelines, a VPDOOUHYLHZERDUGGUDZQIURPUHOHYDQW81DJHQFLHVDQGDVPDOOVHFUHWDULDWVHH%R[,WLVIXUWKHUIHOWthat this model would be the one that would obtain both SROLWLFDODQG¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWZKLFKLVLGHQWL¿HGE\WKH037)RI¿FHDVDEVROXWHO\HVVHQWLDOWRWKHVXFFHVVRIDQ\QHZPHFKDQLVP7KHSROLWLFDODQG¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWnecessary for creating a successful fund should not be underestimated, and investment in advocacy would be essential to make a new mechanism a viable and sustainable improvement to the current system.

Special attention should be paid to proposals that look to fund a range of activities across the preparedness continuum

4ABLE!SSESSINGTHEPOTENTIALTOEXPANDPREPAREDNESSlNANCING'&$225.$0#0244&ANDANEWGLOBALFUND

5LVNIRFXVHGÀQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV

Framework questions GFDRR UNDP CPR TTF New global fund

Comprehensiveness Are funding decisions in-country based on a detailed understanding of all risks?

&DQZRUNLQFRQWH[WVRIFRQÀLFWEXWGRHVQRWµSUHSDUHIRUFRQÀLFW

Partially yes, as priority is given to a set of countries based on level of risk, need for support and likelihood of success.

Potentially


FRXQWULHVDUHSULRULWLVHGE\GFDRR, 11 are earmarked by donors.

)XQGLQJLVOLPLWHGWRDERXWpriority countries agreed upon ZLWK81'3EXUHDX[DQGEDVHGon assessment of risk.

Potentially


Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan of DFWLRQZLWKGH¿QHGUROHVDQGresponsibilities?


1RWFXUUHQWO\EXWSRWHQWLDOO\SRVVLEOHZLWKLQFXUUHQWFRQWH[W

Potentially

Is funding accessible to a range of actors?

Focus is on government and World Bank implementation. With government endorsement other DFWRUVFDQDFFHVVKRZHYHULWLVnot common practice.

All recipients possible but LQSUDFWLFH81'3&RXQWU\2I¿FHVKDYHEHHQWKHFRPPRQrecipients of funding.

Potentially


Funding can be multi-year. Funding can be multi-year (typically three years but sometimes more).

Potentially



Yes. 81'3FDQQRWVSHQGDQ\of these resources without JRYHUQPHQWDSSURYDOLQPRVWcases support follows a national strategy, or can provide support for its development.

Potentially


GFDRR is largely not funding preparedness at local levels.

This is possible. Historically support has included a range of activities from community to national level.

Potentially

Strong donorship Does the mechanism have strong M&E systems for learning?

Limited to date, but planned evaluations in preparation.

A multi-year results framework is adopted, which is compiled and published annually.92

Potentially


3RWHQWLDOO\\HVLQSUDFWLFHWRGDWHnone.


Potentially

Administration 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHWKHUHadministration costs in H[SDQGLQJZRUNLQHPHUJHQF\preparedness?

5HODWLYHO\ORZH[SDQGLQJEH\RQGcurrent priority countries.

&RVWVRIH[SDQGLQJZRUNLQemergency preparedness minimal.

1RWKXJHO\challenging

Feasibility ,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWSROLWLFDOsupport behind the inclusion RUH[SDQVLRQRIHPHUJHQF\preparedness?

GFDRR donors have asked the fund to focus its attention on H[LVWLQJSULRULW\FRXQWULHVDQGactivities.

1RVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHGLVFRYHUHGsupporting (or not) enhanced work in emergency preparedness EXW*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\resolution does mandate 81'3IRUZRUNRQGLVDVWHUpreparedness at a country level).

8QNQRZQEXWthis area could take some substantial work

Visibility Does the mechanism have a KLJKHQRXJKSUR¿OHWRSXVKpreparedness forward?

5HDVRQDEO\KLJKSUR¿OH *HQHUDOO\ORZSUR¿OH Potentially

)RUH[DPSOHIRUVHH81'3


!NEWFUNDHOWMIGHTITWORKA new global emergency preparedness fund, created in a way that positively addresses the framework questions outlined in this research (Table 2.3), would demonstrably add value to the current system. (Furthermore, stronger incorporation of emergency preparedness into the CPR TTF and GFDRR as they stand would still help add value DQGZHLJKWWRWKHSUHSDUHGQHVVFDXVH±LQDGGLWLRQQRWLQcompetition.)

The proposed new mechanism would be guided by the framework questions, and would be designed to respond

VSHFL¿FDOO\WRHDFK,WZRXOGDOVRDGGUHVVXUJHQWQHHGVFXUUHQWO\QHJOHFWHGE\H[LVWLQJFKDQQHOVDQGZRXOGEHDPHDQVWRSLORWDQHZDSSURDFKWR¿QDQFLQJSULRULWLVLQJapproaches that look beyond current international silos and sponsoring innovation in new areas, such as leveraging funding from the private sector and through remittances. A proposed response is put forward in Table 7.3.

"OX3ETTINGUPAMULTI DONORTRUSTFUND93

Process

The process for setting up a global-level MDTF is relatively straightforward.

$WOHDVWWZRRUPRUH81DJHQFLHVSXWIRUZDUGDFDVHWRWKH037)RI¿FHZKLFKKRXVHGE\81'3administers the funds.

2) The MPTF decides upon the strength of the case, considering, amongst other things, the following:

Ɣ $UREXVWWKHRU\RIFKDQJHVKRXOGJXLGHWKHIXQG¶Vdesign and the resulting framework and allocations.

Ɣ A broad range of stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making process, including national authorities, contributors/partners and participating 81RUJDQLVDWLRQVDVDSSURSULDWH

Ɣ 7KHQHZPHFKDQLVPVKRXOGEXLOGRQH[LVWLQJframeworks or plans rather than creating new, parallel structures.

Ɣ It should strengthen aid effectiveness through coordination and harmonisation of interventions to HQVXUHLQFUHDVHGFRKHUHQFHHI¿FLHQF\UHGXFWLRQRImanagement and reporting burdens and associated transaction costs.

Ɣ It should ensure that the funding, operations and implementation modalities provide for full transparency and accountability.

Ɣ ,WVKRXOGIRFXVRQH[SHGLHQWGHOLYHU\ZLWKDconcentrated focus on results.

3) Governance structures are put in place. A policy body (comprising the relevant stakeholders) sets fund policy, a steering committee that makes decisions is appointed, and a technical secretariat that reviews SURJUDPPHVDQGSURMHFWVIRUIXQGLQJLVDOVRFUHDWHG

4) A guidance note is prepared that outlines roles and responsibilities, as well as the way in which the fund will operate, especially the process of obtaining funds.

!DMINISTRATIONANDSET UP

7KH037)RI¿FHUHSRUWVWKDWWKHFRVWVRIUXQQLQJDQMDTF can be relatively low, which is largely dependent on the governance structure. Set-up time will depend upon agreement on the governance structures, but DGPLQLVWUDWLYHO\WKH037)RI¿FHFDQWKHRUHWLFDOO\VHWXSWKHIXQGZLWKLQMXVWDIHZGD\V

7KLVER[LVEDVHGXSRQDUHYLHZRI037)JXLGHOLQHVVHH81'3XQGDWHGFDQGFRQYHUVDWLRQVZLWKWKHKHDGRIWKH037)RI¿FHRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV

4ABLE#RITERIAFORANEWGLOBALFUNDFOREMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

Framework questions Suggested parametersComprehensiveness Are funding decisions based on a

detailed understanding of all risks?'HFLVLRQVZLOOEHJXLGHG¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWRQDGHWDLOHGunderstanding of combined risks in each country. Without this no funding will be granted.


The fund will distribute according to a global comparison RIULVNVLQFOXGLQJVORZDQGUDSLGRQVHWQDWXUDOKD]DUGVFRQÀLFWDQGIUDJLOLW\±VXFKDVWKHIRUWKFRPLQJ,QIR50,QIR50


Are funding decisions for emergency preparedness based on a common plan of action with GH¿QHGUROHVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV"

Funding will only be granted on approval of a combined plan of action. (This will include an analysis of the current capacity of actors, and a review of the work currently underway across the emergency preparedness continuum.) Priority will be given to proposals that look WREXLOGRQH[LVWLQJLQLWLDWLYHVHVSHFLDOO\ZKHUHWKH\FXWacross traditional boundaries.


All funding decisions will be based on an analysis of the comparative advantage and role/mandate. Favour to partnerships that demonstrate building of national capacity will be favoured.


$Q\IHDVLEOHSURMHFWOHQJWKZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHGGHSHQGHQWRQWKHDFWLYLW\EHLQJSURSRVHGSURMHFWVZKHUHWKH\look to build national capacity over a period of time will receive special attention.



$OOSODQVDQGSURMHFWVSXWIRUZDUGPXVWDUWLFXODWHthe current system of national preparedness, and be aligned to national priorities. Government and other QDWLRQDOFRXQWHUSDUWOHDGLQSURMHFWVZLOOEHHVSHFLDOO\encouraged.


The mechanism will fund all activities across the FRQWLQXXPEXWZLOOORRNWRMRLQXSHOHPHQWVLQWR a coherent plan of action, wherever possible.

Strong donorship Does the mechanism have strong M&E for transparent, accountable tracking in investment, as well as for learning?

7KHPHFKDQLVPLWVHOIVKDOOKDYHUHJXODUUHYLHZLQGLYLGXDOSURMHFWVZLOODOVREHUHYLHZHG/HVVRQVOHDUQWwill be built into future fund operation and allocation decisions. All proposals will be required to demonstrate LQFRUSRUDWLRQRIOHVVRQVOHDUQWIURPSDVWH[SHULHQFH


Funding will be accepted from all sources, public and private, with advocacy for funding built into its management structure.

Feasibility ,VWKHUHVXI¿FLHQWSROLWLFDOVXSSRUWbehind the inclusion of emergency preparedness in the fund?

7KLVZLOOEHWKHPDMRUFKDOOHQJHZLWKLQDQHZIXQGVHHFRQFOXGLQJµPDNLQJWKHEXVLQHVVFDVH¶VHFWLRQIRUPRUHon this.

Administration 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHWKHUHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFRVWVLQH[SDQGLQJwork in emergency preparedness?

5HODWLYHO\OLWWOHWRVWDUWXSDVORZDVIRUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQGXULQJWKHIXQG¶VRSHUDWLRQ

Visibility Does the mechanism have a KLJKHQRXJKSUR¿OHWRSXVKpreparedness forward?

$\HDUO\HYHQWHLWKHULQ1HZ<RUNRU*HQHYDZLOOEULQJtogether donors and partners together to assess the LPSDFWRIWKHIXQGDQGDGYRFDWHIRU¿QDQFLQJ


4HECASEFORDEVELOPMENTlNANCINGA huge amount of progress has been made on emergency preparedness in recent years, largely as a result of learnt H[SHULHQFHDQGWKHHYROXWLRQGHPDQGHGE\UHVSRQGLQJWRFRQWLQXDOFULVHVLQFRPSOH[SROLWLFDOHPHUJHQFLHVMoreover, the growing interest in establishing DRM policy and institutional architecture in national government V\VWHPVDVVHHQLQDOOWKHFDVHVWXGLHVH[FHSW6XGDQKDVUDLVHGWKHSUR¿OHRIULVNPDQDJHPHQWPRUHJHQHUDOO\DVDIXQGDPHQWDOFRPSRQHQWRIDFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWarmour. Yet fundamental challenges remain, which constrain the ability of international and national actors to pursue integrated approaches to the range of risks EHLQJIDFHG7KHVHLQFOXGHWKHDUWL¿FLDOGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQefforts to work on different types of risk present in the VDPHORFDWLRQVHH+DUULVHWDORUZKHUHWKHVDPHtypes of preparedness activities are required. Moreover, there are ample opportunities to improve the coherence of

preparedness efforts through more coordinated decision-PDNLQJSODQQLQJDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQVHH.HOOHWWforthcoming). The country case studies highlight the fact that donor funding for preparedness is undermined by the way in which funding is structured. This presents a challenge, as there is a fundamental tension between the suite of emergency preparedness activities that need WRWDNHSODFHWRHQDEOHDPRUHHIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWresponse to crisis and the bifurcated funding system that resources those activities. The silos in the system allow JDSVDQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWFUHDWHVFRSHIRUGXSOLFDWLRQ

The recommendations outlined here are based on the nature of the system, in particular the considerable and arguably unsustainable pressure on humanitarian ¿QDQFLQJFXUUHQWO\ZLWQHVVHGDQGWKHVWURQJSHUIRUPDQFHof bilateral in-country development funding within the IUDPHZRUNTXHVWLRQV7KLVLVDOVRLQIRUPHGE\WKHDXWKRUV¶DVVHVVPHQWWKDWWKHUHFXUUHQFHRIFRPSOH[HPHUJHQFLHVDQGWKHKXPDQLWDULDQ¿QDQFLQJWKDWJRHVWRWKRVHFRQWH[WVUHSUHVHQWVWRVRPHGHJUHHDIDLOXUHRIWUDQVLWLRQand that more money targeting the building up of national stakeholders and systems is required. In many cases, this goes beyond the funding practices and policies that KDYHEHHQH[DPLQHGDWDFRXQWU\OHYHOWRWKHZD\LQZKLFKdonors commonly view preparedness, and risk in general. That said, a shift of emphasis towards development ¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVGRHVQRWUHO\XSRQGRQRUVDORQHWKHV\VWHPQHHGVWRPDNHWKHFDVHDQGadvocate for change, including within individual agencies.

3UPPORTFORSYSTEMCHANGE

This report proposes a series of changes to the current ZD\LQZKLFKSUHSDUHGQHVVLV¿QDQFHGRULQPDQ\FDVHVLQWKHZD\VLQZKLFKLWLVQRW¿QDQFHG'RQRUVXSSRUWLVrequired to make these changes happen:

Ɣ 6XSSRUWVKRXOGEHJLYHQWRWKHVSHFL¿FPHDVXUHVSURSRVHGKHUHWRLPSURYHWKHH[LVWLQJV\VWHPincluding enhancing preparedness throughout humanitarian mechanisms, obligatory multi-year Strategic Response Plans,94 risk-focused mechanisms making preparedness an essential part of all country prioritisation, and preparedness becoming a core FRPSRQHQWRINH\DGDSWDWLRQ¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV

Ɣ In addition, increased support is essential within the current system and in various guises: support for practical steps that can help improve the coherence of preparedness and clarify the current division of ODERXUDQGDFRPPLWPHQWWRLQFUHDVH¿QDQFLQJ'RQRUadvocacy for change is essential.

Ɣ Donors are asked to seriously consider the options for a global mechanism that can address the preparedness issues and priorities that remain after H[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVKDYHEHHQHQKDQFHGWRWKHLUmost appropriate limit. This mechanism will pilot a QHZZD\RIZRUNLQJDFURVVH[LVWLQJGLYLGHVEHWZHHQhumanitarian and development approaches.

)RUH[DPSOHWKH1LJHU&$3RIGHVSLWHKDYLQJSUHSDUHGQHVVDVDFRUHJRDOVWLOOFRQWDLQVRQO\DVLQJOHSURMHFWZLWKWKHZRUGµSUHSDUHGQHVV¶LQLWVWLWOHGHVSLWHRIWKHVHSURMHFWVDUWLFXODWLQJpreparedness activities. This suggests that agencies are at best sceptical of the value of making it clear that emergency preparedness LVDFOHDUSDUWRIDSURMHFW¶VREMHFWLYHVSHUKDSVRXWRIFRQFHUQWKDWdonors will not fund it.

Fundamental challenges remain, which constrain the ability of international and national actors to pursue integrated approaches to the range of risks being faced. These include the arti!cial division between efforts to work on different types of risk present in the same location

Prioritising of risk

In addition, donors should consider a range of actions to address the current preparedness challenges from within their own structures and working practices, with, throughout, DQHPSKDVLVRQEULQJLQJGHYHORSPHQW¿QDQFLQJWREHDURQunderlying risk. This includes action to:

Ɣ Re-assess global and country programming priorities for risk. Investment in preparedness should be based on a global assessment of risk, related to capacity and YXOQHUDELOLW\QHHGDQGH[SRVXUH6XFKDQDVVHVVPHQWwould allow for a concentration of efforts where the QHHGLVJUHDWHVW$VSHFL¿FH[DPSOHLVWRFRQVLGHUXVLQJWKH,QGH[IRU5LVN0DQDJHPHQW,QIR5096 which seeks to address the fact that ‘there is currently no global and common evidence-base which could provide DWUDQVSDUHQWREMHFWLYHDQGVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQLWDULDQULVN¶,QIR50

Ɣ (QVXUHWKDWULVN¿QDQFLQJLQLWLDWLYHVDUHQRWMXVWSDUWof humanitarian and crisis-related structures but also become the foundation for development investments.

Ɣ )OH[LEOH¿QDQFLQJFRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHGDVDPHDQVto support more tailored and adaptable preparedness LQWHUYHQWLRQV(YLGHQFHIURPDFURVVWKH¿YHFDVHVWXGLHVUHYHDOVWKHQHHG±SDUWLFXODUO\LQFKDOOHQJLQJZRUNLQJHQYLURQPHQWV±WRDFFRPPRGDWHÀXFWXDWLRQVLQFRQWH[WZKHWKHUFRQGLWLRQVRIFRQÀLFWIUDJLOLW\DQGrisk or engagement by different stakeholders in policy SURFHVVHV7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVH[DPSOHVZKHUHHOHPHQWVRISUHSDUHGQHVVDUHZRUNLQJVXFFHVVIXOO\±HJHDUO\ZDUQLQJEDVHGRQDVVHVVPHQWRIULVN±EXWZKHUHDODFNRIÀH[LELOLW\LQH[LVWLQJIXQGLQJOLPLWVDFRXQWU\¶VDELOLW\WRSUHSDUHDSSURSULDWHO\7KLVLVZKDWFRXOGEHWHUPHGµSUHSDUHGQHVVIRUUHVSRQVH¶DWWKHhumanitarian end of the emergency preparedness continuum.

Ɣ Proactive internal advocacy within donor countries and institutions and multi-donor groups is required to ensure that preparedness is part of funding GHFLVLRQV9RFDODQGYLVXDOVXSSRUWFDQEHVXVWDLQHGin broader international debates only with the backing of key donors. It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that investments in emergency preparedness can make to their own FDVHORDGVLQWHUPVRIHIIHFWLYHQHVVDQGHI¿FLHQF\including value for money in the mid- to long term. On the basis of this, stronger internal advocacy can be undertaken to encourage a widespread internal FKDQJHLQGRQRUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGWKHYDOXHJLYHQto emergency preparedness (within both humanitarian and development departments).

Ɣ Consideration should be given to earmarking funding for emergency preparedness, whether from humanitarian or development sources. The most LPSRUWDQWDGYDQWDJHVRIHDUPDUNLQJDUH¿UVWO\WKDWLWguarantees some level of funding and, secondly, that it commits a donor to change. However, on the whole this is not recommended unless a much better global understanding of need can be articulated.

Ɣ Emergency preparedness is an inherent part of UHVLOLHQFHPDNLQJWKHUHVLOLHQFHDJHQGDSUDFWLFDOand operational should entail an adequate focus on SUHSDUHGQHVV7KLVFDQEHIUDPHGLQPDQ\ZD\V±as a means to improve the resilience and adaptive capacity of both national and international actors, and the humanitarian and development systems that operate in-country. It is recommended that emergency preparedness be embedded into current and future indicators of what makes for a resilient system.

It is suggested that donors invest in understanding the added value that investments in emergency preparedness can make to their own caseloads in terms of effectiveness and ef!ciency, including value for money in the mid- to long term

$OWKRXJKQRWDFRUHSDUWRIWKHDQDO\VLVLQWKLVZRUNPXOWLODWHUDOdevelopment banks have been shown in the case studies to be an LPSRUWDQW¿QDQFLQJVRXUFHIRUWKHGLVDVWHUHOHPHQWRISUHSDUHGQHVVZKHUHGLVDVWHUULVNFRQVFLRXVQHVVLVVXI¿FLHQWO\KLJKDQGWKHUHLVrelatively stable governance. Some of the recommendations in this list may therefore be appropriate to these banks, as key actors in VRPHFRQWH[WVDQGVXEVWDQWLDOGHYHORSPHQWGRQRUVWKHPVHOYHV

$OVRNQRZQDVWKH2SHQ+XPDQLWDULDQ5LVN,QGH[


Emergency preparedness and resilienceThere is no conception of resilience that does not ±LQVRPHIRUP±LQFRUSRUDWHHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV+DUULVIRUWKFRPLQJ$VWKH,$6&DUJXHV‘Resilience itself is not achievable without the capacity to absorb shocks, and it is this capacity that emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVKHOSVWRSURYLGH¶3UHSDUHGQHVVLVunderstood to be a fundamental component of the resilience agenda and one of the more practical aspects of the concept, lending itself to a grounded set of activities that can be implemented in practice, thus enabling a system to absorb shocks while retaining the same fundamental system attributes. This is sometimes described as ‘bounce EDFN¶LHUHWXUQLQJWRDSUHGLVDVWHUVWDWHRUWRDQimproved state) more rapidly and more easily.

Conceptualisations of the relationship between emergency preparedness and resilience vary between agencies. For VRPHVXFKDVWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQRU'),'HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVµSURYLGHVWKHQHFHVVDU\grounding to enable better prepared, more capable and ultimately more “resilient” recipient communities, agencies DQGJRYHUQPHQWV¶'),'2WKHUVUHFRJQLVHWKHmulti-dimensional aspects of resilience but, for operational purposes, pursue linked sectoral approaches that all FRQWULEXWHWRUHVLOLHQFH7KH:RUOG%DQNIRUH[DPSOHKDVVWUDWHJLHVWKDWVSHFL¿FDOO\WDUJHWWKHEXLOGLQJRIUHVLOLHQFHLQ'50FOLPDWHFKDQJHFRQÀLFWDQGIUDJLOLW\HQYLURQPHQWsocial protection and labour.

Given the increasing number of policy statements recognising that investing in resilience is cost-effective ZKHQFRPSDUHGZLWKDSSURDFKHVWKDWUHO\H[FOXVLYHO\on response and recovery after the event (European &RPPLVVLRQWKHUHLVUHDVRQWRVXJJHVWWKDWpreparedness, as part of a broader contribution to risk management, is fundamental to the pursuit of resilience. Yet while according to the Intergovernmental Panel on &OLPDWH&KDQJH,3&&µWKHFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIH[DQWHdisaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness PHDVXUHVVKRZWKDWWKHEHQH¿WVRXWZHLJKWKHFRVWVE\DIDFWRURIEHWZHHQDQG¶,3&&DQG:RUOG%DQNDLQ+DUULVIRUWKFRPLQJIXQGLQJSULRULWLHVremain skewed to post-disaster recovery, underlining KRZWKHFXUUHQWIXQGLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHPLVVHVPDMRUopportunities to invest in resilience.

ODA committed to supporting national systems of SUHSDUHGQHVV±ZKLFKLQWXUQFRQWULEXWHWRZDUGVEXLOGLQJUHVLOLHQFH±LVPLQLPDODWEHVWDVWKLVUHSRUWGHWDLOVThe latest data suggests that funding for DRR has DPRXQWHGFXPXODWLYHO\WRELOOLRQRYHUWKHSDVW\HDUVDPLQXWHIUDFWLRQRIWKHWULOOLRQLQoverall development commitments (Kellett and Caravani, 0RUHRYHUFRQVXOWDWLRQVLQWKH$UDEVWDWHVAsia and the Americas have revealed a strong desire to incorporate a stronger awareness of risk into national EXGJHWDOORFDWLRQVDQGWRHVWDEOLVKQDWLRQDOULVN¿QDQFLQJVWUDWHJLHVWKDWEXLOGRQDOODYDLODEOH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVLQFRXQWU\81,6'5D6XFKDQDSSURDFKZRXOGVXSSRUWPRUHULVNDZDUHDQGULVNDGMXVWHGGHYHORSPHQWWUDMHFWRULHVDQGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQDWLRQDOV\VWHPVWKDWare more resilient to the range of shocks and stresses OLNHO\WREHIDFHGLQDQ\JLYHQFRQWH[W

Resilience, and the role that emergency preparedness has to play in it, is thus a useful springboard from which to address the prevailing neglect of pre-emptive action DQGWKHFXUUHQWVSOLWEHWZHHQH[DQWHDQGH[SRVWLQYHVWPHQW,WLVLQPDQ\ZD\VDQR[\PRURQWRDWWHPSWto build resilience within the binary constraints of the humanitarian and development systems, given that these concepts focus on inter-acting system components. Thus DQHZDOWHUQDWLYHµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶QHHGVWREHIRXQGRQHZKLFKZRUNVWRVXSSRUWFRVWHIIHFWLYHH[DQWHDFWLRQand one in which there is a global consensus on the importance of addressing risk as a crucial component to building resilience.

,WLV\HWWREHVHHQKRZµUHVLOLHQFH¶ZLOOLQIRUPRUVKDSHWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLQJDUFKLWHFWXUHIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLIDWDOO,WLVFOHDUWKDWDWWKHSURMHFWOHYHOdonor funding is being infused with the term but, as a VLJQDORIPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWFKDQJHVWR2'$WKHUHLVOLWWOHevidence to suggest that any marked change is in the PDNLQJ:KDWWKHµUHVLOLHQFHDJHQGD¶GRHVUHSUHVHQWis a new way of thinking and approaching age-old KXPDQLWDULDQDQGGHYHORSPHQWFKDOOHQJHV±RQHWKDWPXVWbe embraced to mark the shift in supporting both national and international communities to be better prepared.

113

8. Conclusion PREPARINGFORTHEFORESEEABLEFUTURE

Key messages

Ɣ,QWKHIXWXUHGLVDVWHUVZLOOEHPRUHIUHTXHQWWKDQWRGD\WKHFHQWUDOLW\RIµULVN¶LVWKXV an essential component of all development and humanitarian work.

Ɣ:KLOHLQFUHDVHGVXSSRUWZLOOFRVWLQWKHLPPHGLDWHWHUPILQDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response.

Ɣ)LQDQFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\QHHGVWREHVKRXOGHUHGERWKE\DIIHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWVDQG by international humanitarian and development actors.

Ɣ$QHZLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQVHQVXVLVHVVHQWLDOEHWZHHQQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHinternational community on the need for countries to be better prepared.

Ɣ,QFOXVLRQRIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDVDNH\IHDWXUHRIWKHSRVWGHYHORSPHQWagenda is paramount.

Ɣ7KH,$6&PXVWVHL]HRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRDGYDQFHSUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKDKLJKSURILOHFKDPSLRQUHVSRQVLEOHIRUHQVXULQJWKDWWKHFDXVHGRHVQRWµIDOORIIWKHDJHQGD¶VXSSRUWHGby an appropriate agency or IASC structure.

8. Conclusion: PREPARINGFORTHEFORESEEABLEFUTURE

,QPRYLQJWRZDUGVDSRVWHUDZLWKHYLGHQFHSRLQWLQJtowards a world in which disasters are even more frequent WKDQWRGD\6KHSKHUGHWDOWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIµULVN¶LVbecoming an essential component of all development and humanitarian work. Beyond the rhetoric, at some point a decision has to be made to make a change. This means making a decision that will cost something, either in terms of SROLWLFDOHIIRUWEXUHDXFUDWLFFKDQJHVRU¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV7LQNHULQJDURXQGWKHHGJHVZLWKH[LVWLQJPHFKDQLVPVLVnot enough: the country case studies undertaken as part of this research have proved that. While increased support ZLOOFRVWLQWKHLPPHGLDWHWHUP¿QDQFLQJHPHUJHQF\preparedness activities has enormous potential to reduce the costs of response. This in turn will create a more sustainable platform from which to address the current pressures on the humanitarian system, which is stretched beyond both its means and its mandate. Risk therefore needs to be embedded in national and international planning and budgetary frameworks.

Cost is not limited to the way that we fund. It is also about how much is funded. Increasing the necessary commitment to emergency preparedness clearly requires a coherent business case built on solid incentives and a calculation of the return on investment, something that draws upon

PHWKRGVVXFKDVFRVWEHQH¿WDQDO\VLVHFRQRPLFVRIpreparedness and robust, clear messaging. This business FDVHVKRXOGEHWLHGGLUHFWO\WRFDOOVIRUVSHFL¿FEXGJHWVto support emergency preparedness (as well as risk management in general) from national resource allocations. Moreover, the international community needs to get serious about the funding volumes involved in creating sustainable, IXQFWLRQLQJQDWLRQDOSUHSDUHGQHVVV\VWHPV)RUH[DPSOHhow much has it cost developed country governments in DWULVNDUHDVHJ-DSDQWKH86*HUPDQ\RU$XVWUDOLDto achieve the advances in preparedness and risk management that they have? How does this compare with what is being invested by developing country governments and their international partners?

In advocating for emergency preparedness, as part and parcel of a risk-based approach to international aid, DµQRUHJUHW¶QDUUDWLYHVKRXOGEHDGRSWHG(PHUJHQF\preparedness is relevant beyond preparedness IRUUHVSRQVHDQGLVWKXVQRWMXVWWRWKHEHQH¿WRIhumanitarians. In the medium to long term, it will almost FHUWDLQO\VDYHPRQH\OLYHVDQGOLYHOLKRRGV7KH¿QDQFLDOresponsibility therefore needs to be shouldered by international humanitarian and development actors, as well as by national stakeholders and governments. Taking

116

this agenda forward will require continued efforts on the part of the IASC and engaged stakeholders to translate the recommendations in this report into action.

$VHDFKDQJHLQRXUDSSURDFKWRLQWHUQDWLRQDODLG¿QDQFLQJis needed, one that puts at the forefront the importance of managing risk. For development approaches, this means taking measures to avoid potential gains being lost or undermined, while for humanitarians it means being EHWWHUSUHSDUHGWRGHDOZLWKWKHJHRJUDSK\RIULVNLQand beyond. Preparing for future risks is a responsibility and a basic prerequisite to effective humanitarian and GHYHORSPHQWZRUN±LWLVQRWRSWLRQDO

A selection of possible spaces for engagement and action is outlined below.

-OVINGTHEAGENDAFORWARD Ɣ Deliver the recommendations contained in this report

to the IASC in Geneva and New York (and where appropriate, regional centres) securing commitment on the part of representatives to formulate a plan of campaign to address the changes required. The IASC Task Team on Financing for Emergency Preparedness should spearhead this.97

Ɣ 7KH,$6&PXVWVHL]HRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRDGYDQFHSUHSDUHGQHVV/HDUQLQJIURPWKHH[SHULHQFHVRIWKHPolitical Champions for Disaster Resilience group, a KLJKSURÀOHFKDPSLRQ should be designated to be responsible for promoting action on preparedness and

ensuring that the emergency preparedness cause does not fall off the political agenda.

Ɣ In addition, the IASC should reach out more overtly to key elements of the international system working on UHVROYLQJFRQÀLFWRIWHQLQWKHVDPHIUDJLOHFRQWH[WVWKDWattract considerable amounts of humanitarian assistance, but which in terms of planning and programming have to be outside of the IASC. The focus should be on direct FRQWDFWVZLWKWKH'$&,QWHUQDWLRQDO1HWZRUNRQ&RQÀLFWDQG)UDJLOLW\,1&$)DQGPRUHLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKLWVNew Deal for Fragile States.

Ɣ In discussions on the post-2015 development goals, clear messages should be communicated with regards to the added value of emergency preparedness for QDWXUDOKD]DUGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUVDQGFRQÀLFWDQGWKHlinks between the two.

Ɣ 1DWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWV81DJHQFLHVDQG1*2VVKRXOGseek to ensure stronger inclusion of emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVDVDNH\IHDWXUHRIWKHSRVWagreement on DRR (i.e. the successor to the Hyogo Framework for Action).

"OX%NSURINGPRACTICALCONNECTIONSRECOMMENDATIONSBEYONDTHEPURELYlNANCIAL

As has been highlighted throughout this report, effective DQGHI¿FLHQW¿QDQFLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVLVQRWMXVWD¿QDQFLDOLVVXH7KHUHDUHPDQ\ZD\VLQZKLFKKDYLQJDGHTXDWH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPVIRUpreparedness needs to be supported by enhancements to the preparedness system in general. The research team recommend the following:

Ɣ Clear guidance should be developed for the adequate coding, tracking and reporting of investments in emergency preparedness.

Ɣ The IASC Principals should support the roll-out of the Common Framework for Emergency Preparedness across both the HC and RC networks.

Ɣ In addition, the Principals should endorse other key and related work of the SWG for Preparedness: the Reference Modules for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level, and the Humanitarian Programming Cycle (and their enhanced focus on preparedness).

Ɣ CADRI, as an inter-agency tool for capacity-building for DRR, should be supported as a way of better KDUPRQLVLQJVXSSRUWWR81&RXQWU\7HDPV

Ɣ More should be done to integrate emergency SUHSDUHGQHVVZLWKLQWKH81'$)WKH,$6&VKRXOGDGYRFDWHIRUPRUHLQWHJUDWLRQPDNLQJXVHRIH[LVWLQJguidelines on DRR/CCA.

Ɣ 2SWLRQVH[LVWEH\RQGWKH¿QDQFLQJV\VWHPWKURXJKwhich the IASC largely operates. Other sources of funding (such as the private sector and remittances) should be harnessed, and integrated approaches, VXFKDVWKH1HSDO5LVN5HGXFWLRQ&RQVRUWLXPH[DPLQHGIRUSRVVLEOHUHSOLFDWLRQVHH$QQH[

Ɣ )LQDOO\DQGSHUKDSVPRVWLQÀXHQWLDOO\LQWKHORQJrun, the positive role that the Common Budgetary Framework can play in highlighting (and funding) gaps in preparedness should be investigated.

)RU+DLWL6XGDQ0\DQPDU1LJHUDQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHVVSHFL¿FVHWVRIrecommendations are outlined in the individual country case studies. 7KHVHZLOOEHPDGHDYDLODEOHYLDWKH2',ZHEVLWHGXULQJAppropriate platforms in-country should be used to discuss and H[SORUHWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUWDNLQJWKHVHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUZDUGDQGmaking them a reality

$QLQWHUDJHQF\LQLWLDWLYHRI81'3%&352&+$DQGWKH81,6'5secretariat, CADRI's mission is to advance knowledge of, and strengthen sustainable capacity development for, disaster risk reduction worldwide. See: http://www.cadri.net/

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | 8. CONCLUSION: PREPARING FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE

117

Ɣ 7KHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRQLPSURYLQJWKHH[LVWLQJ¿QDQFLDOPHFKDQLVPVDQGWRROVVKRXOGIHHGLQWRGHEDWHVDWIRUH[DPSOH81(&262&¶VIRXUWKDevelopment Cooperation Forum 2014LQ1HZ<RUN

Ɣ In preparation for the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, advocacy is required for emergency preparedness to be included as a central component of one of the four thematic areas to be determined WKURXJKWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVV:KLOHpreparedness already appears as part of the theme µUHGXFLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGPDQDJLQJULVN¶LWLVDOVRhighly relevant to the other three: ‘humanitarian HIIHFWLYHQHVV¶µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWKURXJKLQQRYDWLRQ¶DQGµVHUYLFLQJWKHQHHGVRISHRSOHLQFRQÀLFW¶2&+$I)XUWKHUPRUHDGYRFDF\LVQHHGHGIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVWREHSDUWRIWKH¿QDOµRoad Map and Plan of Action for Post-2016¶

Ɣ As follow-up to the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCCLQ:DUVDZLQDQGSUHSDUDWLRQIRUWKHWKVHVVLRQLQ/LPDSUHSDUHGQHVVshould be included as an integral part of the actions required to support climate change adaptation across YXOQHUDEOHDQGKLJKULVNFRQWH[WV

Ɣ Risk needs to be embedded in international planning and budgetary frameworks. At the level of individual QDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVDJHQFLHVDQGGRQRUV, efforts VKRXOGEHPDGHWRDVVHVVWKHSRWHQWLDOFRVWEHQH¿Wof investing in emergency preparedness across all VHFWRUV5HFRJQLVLQJWKH¿QDQFLDOFRQVWUDLQWVWKDWcurrently prevail, decisions should be made about what preparedness priorities are to be supported, informed by a comprehensive assessment of risk in relation to QHHGYXOQHUDELOLW\H[SRVXUHDQGFDSDFLW\

Agencies engaged in bilateral relationships with national JRYHUQPHQWV±LQDOOPDQQHURIFRQWH[WV±VKRXOGendeavour to emphasise the importance of taking a risk-based approach to humanitarian and development work. Where QDWLRQDOÀVFDOSODQQLQJSROLF\DQGEXGJHWDU\processes are being crafted, preparedness for risk must be embedded, taking heed of lessons from governments DFURVVGLYHUVHULVNFRQWH[WVLQGHYHORSHGDQGGHYHORSLQJcountries.

119

Annexes

121

The following papers have been prepared by the Overseas Development Institute to inform this report. Depending on the sensitivity of the information they contain, those that are for public release will be available on the ODI website.

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+DUULV. (PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQGLWV/LQNVWR5HVLOLHQFH

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+LOO0IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG33&5

+RFNOH\7IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVLQ6XGDQ

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.HOOHWW-IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVLQ7KH3KLOLSSLQHV

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3HWHUV.IRUWKFRPLQJ)LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVLQ0\DQPDU

5RELWDLOOH35LFKDUGV)DQG&RPEH(IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHU

7D\ORU*IRUWKFRPLQJ)LQDQFLQJIRU(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVV1HSDO&DVH6WXG\

7D\ORU*DQG&RXWXUH*IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG+XPDQLWDULDQ0HFKDQLVPV

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9DX[7DIRUWKFRPLQJ(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG&RQÀLFW

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Annex 1: #ASESTUDIESANDBACKGROUNDPAPERS

122

'HÀQLWLRQVDUHDGDSWHGIURP81,6'5¶7HUPLQRORJ\·KWWSZZZXQLVGURUJZHLQIRUPWHUPLQRORJ\

Adaptation

7KHDGMXVWPHQWLQQDWXUDORUKXPDQV\VWHPVLQUHVSRQVHWRDFWXDORUH[SHFWHGFOLPDWLFVWLPXOLRUWKHLUHIIHFWVZKLFKPRGHUDWHVKDUPRUH[SORLWVEHQH¿FLDORSSRUWXQLWLHV

Contingency planning

$PDQDJHPHQWSURFHVVWKDWDQDO\VHVVSHFL¿FSRWHQWLDOevents or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations.

Disaster

A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic RUHQYLURQPHQWDOORVVHVDQGLPSDFWVZKLFKH[FHHGVWKHability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.

Disaster risk management

The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of KD]DUGVDQGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIGLVDVWHU

Disaster risk reduction

The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal IDFWRUVRIGLVDVWHUVLQFOXGLQJWKURXJKUHGXFHGH[SRVXUHWRKD]DUGVOHVVHQHGYXOQHUDELOLW\RISHRSOHDQGSURSHUW\ZLVHmanagement of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

Early warning system

The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened E\DKD]DUGWRSUHSDUHDQGWRDFWDSSURSULDWHO\DQGLQVXI¿FLHQWWLPHWRUHGXFHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIKDUPRUORVV

Emergency management

The organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and initial recovery steps.

Emergency services

7KHVHWRIVSHFLDOLVHGDJHQFLHVWKDWKDYHVSHFL¿FUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGREMHFWLYHVLQVHUYLQJDQGSURWHFWLQJpeople and property in emergency situations.

Ex-ante/ex-post

([DQWHPHDQVµEHIRUHWKHHYHQW¶H[SRVWPHDQVµDIWHUWKHHYHQW¶,GHDOO\IXQGLQJIRUHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGEHH[DQWHEXWLQUHDOLW\LWLVRIWHQH[SRVW

Hazard

A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity RUFRQGLWLRQWKDWPD\FDXVHORVVRIOLIHLQMXU\RURWKHUhealth impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.

Mitigation

The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of KD]DUGVDQGUHODWHGGLVDVWHUV,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWLQFOLPDWHFKDQJHSROLF\µPLWLJDWLRQ¶LVGH¿QHGGLIIHUHQWO\being the term used for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that are the source of climate change.)

Natural hazard

1DWXUDOSURFHVVRUSKHQRPHQRQWKDWPD\FDXVHORVVRIOLIHLQMXU\RURWKHUKHDOWKLPSDFWVSURSHUW\GDPDJHloss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.

Annex 2: +EYDElNITIONS

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | ANNEXES

123

Preparedness

The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, LPPLQHQWRUFXUUHQWKD]DUGHYHQWVRUFRQGLWLRQV

Prevention

7KHRXWULJKWDYRLGDQFHRIDGYHUVHLPSDFWVRIKD]DUGVDQGrelated disasters.

Resilience

7KHDELOLW\RIDV\VWHPFRPPXQLW\RUVRFLHW\H[SRVHGWRKD]DUGVWRUHVLVWDEVRUEDFFRPPRGDWHWRDQGUHFRYHUIURPWKHHIIHFWVRIDKD]DUGLQDWLPHO\DQGHI¿FLHQWmanner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.

Response

The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.

Vulnerability

The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging HIIHFWVRIDKD]DUG

124

$SOHWKRUDRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVH[LVWVEH\RQGIRUPDOIXQGLQJmechanisms for supporting preparedness activities through different ways of working and alternative funding sources. 7KUHHDUHH[SORUHGKHUHWKH1HSDO5LVN5HGXFWLRQ&RQVRUWLXPDVDQH[DPSOHRIWKHIRUPHUDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUDQGUHPLWWDQFHVDVH[DPSOHVRIWKHODWWHU

nepal Risk Reduction Consortium .22#7KH155&UHSUHVHQWVDVXFFHVVIXORSSRUWXQLW\WREULQJnational and international, humanitarian and development actors together around a shared risk agenda. Though limited WRQDWXUDOGLVDVWHUVWKH155&KDVSRWHQWLDOIRUH[SDQVLRQWKRXJKQRWZLWKRXWVLJQL¿FDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\FRQWH[WDQGDSSURSULDWHDGDSWDWLRQRIWKHPRGHO

1RZLQLWVIRXUWK\HDURIRSHUDWLRQWKH155&KDVgenerated considerable national and international interest, DQGKDVVXSSRUWHGWKHPRELOLVDWLRQRIVLJQL¿FDQWGRQRUUHVRXUFHVERWKWHFKQLFDODQG¿QDQFLDO7KH&RQVRUWLXPZDVEXLOWDURXQG¿YHSURJUDPPHVDUUDQJHGWKHPDWLFDOO\DQGNQRZQDVµ)ODJVKLSV¶7KH¿YHDUHDVZHUHVHWRXWRQthe basis of government priorities, patterns of risk and YXOQHUDELOLW\LQ1HSDODQGWKHRQJRLQJSURJUDPPHVRIConsortium members.

Each Flagship, therefore, contains components of disaster preparedness, as well as elements of broader risk reduction. Flagship 2 is badged as the focal area for emergency preparedness and response capacity and has the broadest range of activities related to disaster planning across governmental and international systems, including clusters, national and international militaries and civil protection.

2YHUDOODUHYLHZ7D\ORUIRUWKFRPLQJIRXQGWKDWas an innovative structure that brings together a range of important actors and retains attention on the key issue RIULVNUHGXFWLRQLQ1HSDOWKH155&FDQEHYLHZHGas a success. As a platform for action and operational coordination, its results are varied, but it has to be DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKH155&UHSUHVHQWVDQHZZD\RIMRLQWZRUNLQJIRUDQXPEHURILQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKDWVXFKinstitutional adaptation can be a slow process.

7KHLQFXPEHQW815&+&ZDVDEOHWRSURYLGHDYLVLRQ[DURXQGZKLFKDQLPSUHVVLYHDUUD\RILQWHUQDWLRQDO

DJHQFLHVFRXOGUDOO\7KH155&ZDVEDFNHGIURPLWVLQFHSWLRQE\WKH*RYHUQPHQWRI1HSDODQGZDVEROVWHUHGIXUWKHUZKHQWKUHHLPSRUWDQWGRQRUVH[WHQGHGVLJQL¿FDQW¿QDQFLDODQGYRFDOVXSSRUW7KH155&LVunquestionably an innovative framework. From the perspective of international aid architecture, it sits astride humanitarian and development architectures. Although GHYHORSPHQWLVFOHDUO\WKHGRPLQDQWSDUDGLJPWKH155&KROGVWKHVWUXFWXUDOµWHQVLRQ¶EHWZHHQWKHSULRULWLHVRIWKHgovernment and those of development and humanitarian partners. It has required humanitarian actors in the system to consider: how to operate in a manner that complements GHYHORSPHQWQRUPVWKHQHHGIRUVXVWDLQDELOLW\ORQJHUWLPHIUDPHVDQGSHUKDSVDERYHDOOWKHQHHGWRZRUNwith and through government. Similarly, it has required development actors to consider programming with a humanitarian mindset: targeting and prioritising according to risk and the humanitarian imperative, as well as the need to collapse normal development timeframes for SURMHFWGHYHORSPHQWDQGFRPSOHWLRQ

7KH155&FDPHLQWREHLQJLQSRVWFRQÀLFW1HSDO$IDPLOLDUWUDMHFWRU\LVVHHQ7KH&$3KDVJLYHQZD\WRWKH81'$)DVWKHPDLQDSSHDOPHFKDQLVP&OXVWHUVHVWDEOLVKHGDQGVWUHQJWKHQHGGXULQJWKHFRQÀLFWDQGWKH.RVLÀRRGUHVSRQVHKDYHEHHQKDQGHGRYHUWRDJRYHUQPHQWOHDG2&+$¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQIXQFWLRQKDVEHHQKDQGHGRYHUWRJRYHUQPHQWZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRI81'3through its DRM programme, which continues to build capacity in legislation.

Private sector $VWKHHFRQRPLFLPSDFWVRIGLVDVWHUVJURZ3Z&0XQLFK5(DQGVWDWH¿QDQFHVFRQWLQXHWREHdepleted, the risk burden for emergency preparedness is increasingly transferring from the public to the private VHFWRU81,6'5F1RWRQO\GRHVWKHSULYDWHVHFWRURIWHQHQGXSSD\LQJIRUWKHPDMRULW\RIGLVDVWHUlosses, often by small business and farm owners (ADPC, DEXWWKHFKDOOHQJHVLQPRELOLVLQJSULYDWH¿QDQFHWREULGJHWKH¿QDQFLQJJDSLQDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWemergency preparedness-related areas is well recognised 81,6'5FHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVWDQGmost vulnerable nations. Furthermore, the challenges DQGFRPSOH[LW\RIVWLPXODWLQJUHVSRQVLEOHSULYDWHVHFWRUdevelopment and investment in frontier economies (where

Annex 3: /PPORTUNITIESBEYONDFUNDINGMECHANISMS

DARE TO PREPARE: TAKING RISK SERIOUSLY | ANNEXES

corruption, lack of transparency and accountability are PDMRUFRQFHUQVRIWHQLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGVWDWHVUHPDLQDserious obstacle for both multilateral development banks and national governments.

*URZLQJOHYHOVRIULVNDQGH[SRVXUHDUHGULYLQJSULYDWHsector organisations and multinationals to not only better account for disasters in their risk management planning processes, but also to more actively engage with governments and other public institutions to fund and support emergency preparedness activities (ADPC, D7KHUHKDYHWKHUHIRUHEHHQJURZLQJDQGUHSHDWHGcalls for enhanced private sector engagement in support RIHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV81,6'5FVSHFL¿FDOO\in relation to private business initiatives and investment, enhanced public-private partnerships to leverage SULYDWHVHFWRUH[SHUWLVHDQG¿QDQFHDQGDQLQFUHDVHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIGLVDVWHUULVNWR¿QDQFLDODQGFRUSRUDWHassets across globalised value chains.

Key areas include:

Ɣ political leadership to more effectively use public VHFWRUIXQGLQJWROHYHUDJHSULYDWHVHFWRUH[SHUWLVHDQGinvestment

Ɣ SULYDWHVHFWRUOHDGHUVKLSWRIXOO\UHFRJQLVHWKHEHQH¿WVof preventive actions and risk analysis to better XQGHUVWDQGDQGUHGXFHWKHH[SRVXUHRIFRUSRUDWHDQG¿QDQFLDODVVHWVWRGLVDVWHUV

Ɣ technical assistance from and leveraging of private VHFWRULQQRYDWLRQDQGH[SHUWLVH

Ɣ PPPs to provide additional support to local FRPPXQLWLHVWRKDYHVXI¿FLHQW¿QDQFLQJSUHDQGSRVWdisaster agreed prior to disaster).

Remittances and emergency preparedness2SSRUWXQLWLHVH[LVWWRLQFUHDVHORFDOOHYHOVSHQGLQJRQpreparedness through the use of remittances. The number RIPLJUDQWZRUNHUVZRUOGZLGHLQFUHDVHGE\EHWZHHQDQGDQGRYHUDOOUHPLWWDQFHVLQFUHDVHGE\RYHUWKLVVDPHSHULRGUHDFKLQJELOOLRQLQ:RUOG%DQNE

5HPLWWDQFHÀRZVSOD\DPDMRUSDUWLQWKHIDPLO\community and country economies of several of the FDVHVWXG\FRXQWULHV,QWKH3KLOLSSLQHVUHFHLYHGUHPLWWDQFHVWRWKHYDOXHRIELOOLRQ2QO\&KLQDand India had greater volumes of remittances and, per capita, the Philippines outstripped these two countries FRQVLGHUDEO\+DLWL¶V¿JXUHRIELOOLRQLQUHPLWWDQFHVZDVHTXLYDOHQWWRRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V*'3±HVVHQWLDOO\RQHLQ¿YHGROODUVWKHFRXQWU\µSURGXFHG¶ZDVactually sent back home from abroad.

Many studies have shown how remittances contribute to the livelihoods of families and varied studies have also shown that they increase during times of crisis (Ratha and 6LUNHFL:X)HZKRZHYHUKDYHORRNHGDWhow remittances have actually helped prepare households for crisis.

The role of remittances in development is seen as increasingly important. The World Bank has set up a Task Force for the implementation of Diaspora Bonds (see :RUOG%DQNKWRPRELOLVH¿QDQFHIRUVSHFL¿FSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHVHFWRUSURMHFWV81'3KDVMRLQHGIRUFHVZLWK:HVWHUQ8QLRQWRKHOSFKDQQHOIXQGVIRUVXVWDLQDEOHORFDOGHYHORSPHQWLQPLJUDQWV¶KRPHFRXQWULHV81'3

There are challenges, however, in targeting remittances as a source of spending on preparedness. Few studies H[SORUHKRZUHPLWWDQFHVFRXOGDFWXDOO\UHGXFHULVNLWVHOIEfforts towards building a high cultural awareness of risk (as demonstrated in the Philippines case study) could JRVRPHZD\WRZDUGVLQÀXHQFLQJVSHQGLQJSDWWHUQVRIUHPLWWDQFHV+RZHYHUWUDFNLQJÀRZVLVFKDOOHQJLQJ*LYHQthe volumes of money going to countries with high levels RIGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRIULVNLWLVUHFRPPHQGHGWKDWVSHFL¿Fresearch is undertaken to see how this source can be WDSSHGVSHFL¿FDOO\IRUSUHSDUHGQHVVLVVXHVHVSHFLDOO\DWa community level.

126

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Adaptation Fund Board (2013a) 2SWLRQVIRUDQRYHUDOOFRPSUHKHQVLYHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKH$GDSWDWLRQ)XQG (prepared by the Adaptation Fund Evaluation Function). Bonn: Adaptation Fund. https://www.adaptation-fund.org/VLWHVGHIDXOW¿OHV$)%()&B2SWLRQVIRUDQ2YHUDOO&RPSUHKHQVLYH(YDOXDWLRQRIWKH$GDSWDWLRQ)XQGSGI

Adaptation Fund Board (2013b)-RLQWUHSRUWE\WKH6HFUHWDULDWDQGWKH7UXVWHHVRQWKH6WDWXVRIWKH3LSHOLQH Bonn: Adaptation Fund. https://www.adaptation-fund.RUJVLWHVGHIDXOW¿OHV$)%()&B,QIBB-RLQWUHSRUWE\WKHVHFUHWDULDWDQGWKHWUXVWHHRQWKHVWDWXVRIWKHpipeline.pdf

Adaptation Fund Board (2010) An Approach to ,PSOHPHQWLQJ5HVXOWV%DVHG0DQDJHPHQW±5%0. Bonn: Adaptation Fund.

ADPC (2013a) 3ULYDWH6HFWRU(QJDJHPHQWLQ'LVDVWHURisk Reduction. Bangkok, Thailand: Asian Disaster Preparedness Center.

ADPC (2013b)5HGXFLQJ9XOQHUDELOLW\DQG([SRVXUHWR'LVDVWHUV7KH$VLD3DFL¿F'LVDVWHU5HSRUW. Bangkok, Thailand: Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. KWWSZZZXQLVGURUJ¿OHVBDSGU¿QDOORZUHVSGI

African Development Bank Group (2013a) µ1LJHU¶ http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/niger/

African Development Bank Group (2013b)µ6XGDQ¶http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/

$OORXFKH-DQG/LQG-$1HZ'HDO"'HYHORSPHQWDQG6HFXULW\LQD&KDQJLQJ:RUOG. Brighton, 8.,QVWLWXWHRI'HYHORSPHQW6WXGLHV,'6

Asian Development Bank (2013) ‘Asian Development %DQNDQG0\DQPDU)DFW6KHHW¶KWWSZZZDGERUJpublications/myanmar-fact-sheet?ref=countries/Myanmar

%DKDGXU$,EUDKLP0DQG7DQQHU7 ‘The UHVLOLHQFHUHQDLVVDQFH"8QSDFNLQJRIUHVLOLHQFHIRUWDFNOLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGGLVDVWHUV¶6WUHQJWKHQLQJClimate Resilience Discussion Paper 1. Brighton: Strengthening Climate Resilience.

%DOOR0DQG%DXHU-7KH(FRQRPLFVRI(DUO\5HVSRQVHDQG5HVLOLHQFHLQ1LJHU. World Food Programme.

BBC (2013a) 7\SKRRQ+DL\DQ%HIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHVWRUP%%&1HZV$VLDKWWSZZZEEFFRXNQHZVZRUOG

BBC (2013b)'HDGO\WRUQDGRHVKLW860LGZHVWVWDWHV. %%&1HZV86&DQDGDKWWSZZZEEFFRXNQHZVZRUOGXVFDQDGD

%LUG17LOOH\+.HOOHWW-DQG+DUULV.forthcoming) ,GHQWLI\LQJ)LQDQFHIRU(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVV.

&DERW9HQWRQ&DQG&RXOWHU/7KH(FRQRPLFVRI(DUO\5HVSRQVHDQG5HVLOLHQFH/HVVRQVIURP1LJHU. London: Department for International Development.

&DERW9HQWRQ&5LFKDUGV)DQG3HWHUV.forthcoming) (PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVLQ1LJHU$&RVW%HQH¿W$QDO\VLV.

&DERW9HQWRQ&)LW]JLEERQ&6KLWDUHN7&RXOWHU/DQG'RROH\2 7KH(FRQRPLFVRI(DUO\5HVSRQVHDQG'LVDVWHU5HVLOLHQFH/HVVRQVIURP.HQ\Dand Ethiopia. London: Department for International Development.

&DUDYDQL$DQG1DNKRRGD6IRUWKFRPLQJ )LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG/'&)

CDAC Network (2013) ‘Communicating with Disaster $IIHFWHG&RPPXQLWLHV¶ZZZFGDFQHWZRUNRUJ

CIF (2011) 7KH3LORW3URJUDPPHIRU&OLPDWH5HVLOLHQFHXQGHUWKH6WUDWHJLF&OLPDWH)XQG)LQDO'HVLJQ'RFXPHQWWashington, DC: Climate Investment Fund.

Department for International Development (DFID) (2011) 'H¿QLQJ'LVDVWHU5HVLOLHQFH. DFID Approach Paper. London: Department for International Development.

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+DUULV..HHQ'DQG0LWFKHOO7When GLVDVWHUVDQGFRQÀLFWFROOLGH,PSURYLQJOLQNVEHWZHHQGLVDVWHUUHVLOLHQFHDQGFRQÀLFWSUHYHQWLRQ. London: Overseas Development Institute.

+DUULV5 ‘Why Typhoon Haiyan Caused So Much 'DPDJH¶135:DVKLQJWRQ'&86$KWWSZZZQSURUJZK\W\SKRRQKDL\DQFDXVHGso-much-damage

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+LOO0IRUWKFRPLQJ)LQDQFLQJRI(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVVDQG33&5.

+LOOLHU'DQG'HPSVH\% $'DQJHURXV'HOD\7KHFRVWRIODWHUHVSRQVHWRHDUO\ZDUQLQJVLQWKHGURXJKWLQWKH+RUQRI$IULFD2[IDPDQG6DYHWKH&KLOGUHQKWWSZZZR[IDPRUJHQSROLF\GDQJHURXVGHOD\

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