dated this the 5 th before smt. dakshayani, d/o chinnayya
TRANSCRIPT
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
CIRCUIT BENCH AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2012
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK B. HINCHIGERI
WRIT PETITION No.64718/2012 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
Smt. Dakshayani,
D/o Chinnayya Nadurmath,Age: 43 years, Occ: Advocate,
R/o P2/1, PWD Quarters,Near Darbar Hall,
Behind Dharwad Hotel,Dharwad – 580 001. … Petitioner
(By Sri H. Subramanya Jois, Sr.Counsel for
Sri V.R.Datar for Sri Hemanth Kumar L.Havaragi)
AND:
1. The State of Karnataka,Represented by Chief Secretary to
Government of Karnataka,Bangalore.
2. State of Karnataka,
By its Secretary,
Department of Law andJustice and Human Rights,
Vidhana Soudha,Bangalore – 560 001.
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3. Deputy Commissioner,District Dharwad,
Dharwad – 580 001.
4. Sri Ramachandra,S/o Govindappa Avalakki @ Naidu,
Age: Major, Occ: Advocate,R/o Bin Govindappa,
Venkatadri plot 46,6th Cross, Mayor Park,
Lakumanahalli,Yalakki Shettar Colony,
Dharwad – 580 005. … Respondents
(By Smt. K.Vidyavati, AGA for R-1 to R-3,
Sri V.P.Kulkarni, Advocate for R-4)
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of theConstitution of India praying to quash the notification No.LAW
142 LAG 2009 dated 4.6.2012 issued by the respondent No.2produced herewith as Annexure-P declaring the same as
violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India andthe provisions of the Karnataka (Law Officer) appointment and
conditions of Service of Rule. 1977 and etc.
This writ petition being heard and reserved for orders on12.9.2012 coming on for pronouncement of orders this day, the
Court made the following:
O R D E R
The petitioner has raised the challenge to the order, dated
04.06.2012 (Annexure-P) relieving her of her duties as Dharwad
District Government Pleader and appointing the fourth
respondent in her place.
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2. Sri H. Subramanya Jois, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for Sri V.R.Datar, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the impugned order is illegal, as by the
very same order the petitioner is removed from the office of the
District Government Pleader, the fourth respondent is appointed
in her place. The passing of such composite orders is not
traceable to any provision of law.
3. He submits that no decision is taken, much less a
conscious decision for appointing the respondent No.4 as the
District Government Pleader. He submits that the Note No.142
only shows that the Law Minister has given his approval to the
appointment of the fourth respondent. On the other hand, no
functionary has ever made the proposal for appointing the fourth
respondent as the District Government Pleader. That being the
case, the question of according the approval would not arise at
all. No competent authority has taken the decision. No sanction
is given to appoint the fourth respondent as the District
Government Pleader.
4. The learned Senior Counsel complains of the violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submits that the
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removal of the petitioner smacks of malice. He submits that for
political reasons, the petitioner is being removed. He submits
that the same is on the basis of the minutes, dated 25.06.2010
(Annexure-C) given by Sri Jagadeesh Shettar, the then Rural
Development and Panchayat Raj Minister and the letter, dated
28.06.2010 (Annexure-D) sent by Sri Prahlad Joshi, the Member
of Parliament, Dharwad. He also brings to my notice the letter,
dated 29.06.2011 (Annexure-F) sent by the Hubli-Dharwad
Mahanagara District Unit of Bharathiya Janata Party. He submits
that a political party cannot comment on the professional
competence of anybody.
5. He complains of the colourable exercise of power. Only
to remove the petitioner from the post of the District
Government Pleader, the fourth respondent’s name is brought
in. He also complains that the official respondents have resorted
to the method of pick and choose. He submits that as per the
report, dated 17.12.2011 (Annexure-M) submitted by the District
Judge, the names of five advocates are forwarded with the
emphasis that they are in order of preference. In the list of five
names, the fourth respondent’s name is at the bottom. Without
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stating for what just reasons, the advocates from Sl.Nos. 1 to 4
are eliminated, the fifth name (the fourth respondent herein)
ought not to have been appointed.
6. He submits that as per Rule 5(3) of the Karnataka Law
Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service, Rules) 1977,
(‘the said Rules’ for short), once the services of the District
Government Pleader are extended, he or she shall hold the post
for three years. The provisions are extracted hereinbelow:
5. Appointment of Law Officers:
(1) …………..
(2) …………..
(3) Subject to the other provisions contained in
these rules, unless otherwise ordered in the order of
appointment, a person appointed as a law officer shall
hold at a time, for a term not exceeding three years, but
shall be eligible for re-appointment after the expiry of
such term:
Provided that notwithstanding the expiry of the term a
law officer shall, unless otherwise ordered, continue in
office until fresh appointment is made or for a period of
twelve months whichever is earlier.”
7. He submits that the District Government Pleader can be
removed from the office at any time, if he is found guilty of any
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act or conduct which is incompatible with his duties as the Law
Officer. In the instant case, the petitioner is not even being put
on notice; nobody has complained against her.
8. Nextly, the learned Senior Counsel reads out Rule 26(2)
of the said Rules to advance the submission that the
Government has to go by the remarks made by the District
Judge in the appointment of the District Government Pleader.
The said provisions are extracted hereinbelow:
“26. Appointment of District Government Pleader, etc.,
(1) ……………
(2) The Deputy Commissioner shall, whenever
required by the Government, invite applications from
eligible practising advocates of the place, for the post of
District Government Pleaders, Additional District
Government Pleaders and Assistant Government
Pleaders specifying the date before which such
application should be made and forward the applications
so received to the District Judge along with his remarks
about their suitability for appointment to the concerned
post. On receipt of the same, the District Judge shall
forward them to the Government in the Department of
Law and Parliamentary Affairs appending his remarks
regarding his suitability of each of them for the
concerned post. The Government shall thereafter make
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the appointments having regard to the remarks of
District Judge and the Deputy Commissioner.”
9. The learned Senior Counsel has also relied on this
Court’s decision in the case of S.H.MOHAN KUMAR vs. STATE
OF KARNATAKA reported in ILR 2005 KAR 5517 for
advancing the submission that it is incumbent upon the
authorities to follow the principles of natural justice and provide
an opportunity to the affected persons before passing any order
holding him guilty of misconduct. He submits that the duties of a
Law Officer cannot be equated to that of a professional, who is
engaged by the private client, as the responsibilities entrusted to
the Law Officer partake a public character. Any order removing
him from service on the basis of allegations made by the third
parties would have serious repercussions for him in his future
professional career.
10. Sri V.P.Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the
respondent No.4 has raised two preliminary objections to the
maintainability of this petition.
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11. He submits that the petitioner had filed
W.P.No.63773/2012 on 02.06.2012 two days prior to the
issuance of the impugned order on 04.06.2012. Subsequent to
the filing of the writ petition, the impugned order issued on
04.06.2012, was inserted and the matter was got listed on
07.06.2012. When these things were brought to the notice of
this Court, the petitioner withdrew the said writ petition on
02.07.2012.
12. Sri Kulkarni submits that the petitioner has not got the
liberty reserved to him by this Court in W.P.No.63773/2012 to
file one more writ petition on the same cause of action. He
submits that the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 1 CPC
dealing with withdrawal of the suit are applicable for the writ
proceedings also. He has also relied on the Apex Court’s
judgment in the case of SARGUJA TRANSPORT SERVICE vs.
STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, GWALIOR AND
OTHERS reported in AIR 1987 SC 88, wherein it is held that if
the writ petition is withdrawn without permission to institute the
fresh petition, the fresh petition on the same cause of action is
not maintainable.
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13. The second preliminary objection raised by Sri Kulkarni
is that the petitioner had earlier filed W.P.No.62266/2011
assailing the notification calling for the applications for the
appointment of the Government Pleader of Dharwad District. The
said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by
his order, dated 14.03.2011 (Annexure-G). This was confirmed
by the Division Bench in its judgment, dated 25.05.2011 passed
in W.A.No.6100/2011 holding that the petitioner has no right to
challenge the notification calling for applications for the post of
District Government Pleader merely because she is an incumbent
in the office as on the date of the notification.
14. Sri Kulkarni submits that the petitioner may have
sought the liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of
action, but when the Court has not granted it, what follows from
it is that such a sought liberty is impliedly refused. He read out
the Explanation 5 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is as follows:
“Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which
is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the
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purposes of this section, be deemed to have been
refused.”
15. He brings to my notice that the decision to remove the
petitioner from the office of the District Government Pleader and
appoint the respondent No.4 are independent of one another.
There is no composite decision, as was trying to be made out by
the petitioner’s side. He further brings to my notice, the Note
No.46 put up by the Law Secretary before the Hon’ble Law
Minister. The note put up was whether to continue the
petitioner’s services or call for fresh applications. The Hon’ble
Law Minister has made an order for calling for applications at
Note No.47.
16. The learned counsel brings to my notice, the Division
Bench’s judgment in the case of SRI HANUMANTHA RAO
KULKARNI vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER
reported in 2008(3) KCCR 1821, wherein it is held that the
opinion of the District Judge is not binding on the Government.
He submits that the District Judge’s opinion is of advisory
nature. The learned counsel also sought to draw the support
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from the Apex Court’s Judgment in the case of STATE OF U.P.
AND OTHERS vs. U.P. STATE LAW OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1994 SC 1654 to buttress his
submission that when the relationship between the Government
and the Government Pleader is basically of contractual nature,
when the rules specifically provide for the appointment and
termination of the Government Pleaders at the will of the
Government, nobody can claim any vested right that his or her
services be continued. He read out the following portions of
para-6:
“6. The appointment of lawyers by the Government
and the public bodies to conduct work on their behalf,
and their subsequent removal from such appointment
have to be examined from three different angles, viz.,
the nature of the legal profession, the interests of the
public and the modes of the appointment and removal.
Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented
profession. The ancestor of today's lawyer was no more
than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy
members of the society by articulating their case before'
the authorities that be. The services were rendered
without regard to the remuneration received or to be
received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering became
a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers came to
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depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The
nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was private
till the Government and the public bodies started
engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The
Government and the public bodies engaged the services
of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a
specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period.
Although the contract in some cases prohibited the
lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the
contract did not alter from one of professional
engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the
Government or a public body was not its employee but
was a professional practitioner engaged to do the
specified work. This is so even today, though the lawyers
on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public
bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely
for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the
saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules
waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against
the acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time employment.
The relationship between the lawyer and his client is
one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer
for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him also,
for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give
reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The
lawyer in turn is not an agent of his client but his
dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell
the court every fact or urge every proposition of law
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which his client wants him to do, however irrelevant it
may be. He is essentially an adviser to his client and is
rightly called a counsel in some jurisdictions. Once
acquainted with the facts of the case, it is the lawyer's
discretion to choose the facts and the points of law which
he would advance. Being a responsible officer of the court
and an important adjunct of the administration of justice,
the lawyer also owes a duty to the court as well as to the
opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that justice is
done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as a
mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the
lawyer and the private client is equally valid between him
and the public bodies.
x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
It would be evident from Chapter V of the said Manual
that to appoint the Chief Standing Counsel, the Standing
Counsel and the Government Advocate, Additional
Government Advocate, Deputy Government Advocate and
Assistant Government Advocate, the State Government is
under no obligation to consult even its Advocate-General
much less the Chief Justice or any of the judges of the
High Court or to take into consideration, the views of any
committee that " may" be constituted for the purpose.
The State Government has a discretion. It may or may
not ascertain the views of any of them while making the
said appointments. Even where it chooses to consult
them, their views are not binding on it. The appointments
may, therefore, be made on considerations other than
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merit and there exists no provision to prevent such
appointments. The method of appointment is indeed not
calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always
be appointed or that the appointments made will not be
on considerations other than merit. In the absence of
guidelines, the appointments may be made purely on
personal or political considerations, and be arbitrary. This
being so those who come to be appointed by such
arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination
of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come
by the back door have to go by the same door. This is
more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates
that the appointment is terminable at any time without
assigning any reason. Such appointments are made,
accepted and understood by both sides to be purely
professional engagements till they last. The fact that they
are made by public bodies cannot vest them with
additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public
office, howsoever made, is not necessarily, vested with
public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest
involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their
mode. From the inception some engagements and
contracts may be the product of the operation of the
spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save
them.”
17. The learned counsel submits that the impugned order
does not attach any stigma to the petitioner. It relieves her of
15
her position by giving one month’s retainership fee. The same is
done in exercise of power conferred by Rule 5(6) and not Rule
5(5) of the said Rules. No reasons are required to be assigned
for terminating the services of a Government Pleader. He
submits that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of
KHUSRO QURAISHI vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in
2012(3) AIR KAR 136, involving more or less similar facts and
circumstances, upheld the removal of Chairman of States
Minority Commission, as the statute under which he was
appointed itself states that the Chairman shall hold power only
during the pleasure of the Government.
18. On the grievance of the petitioner that she is being
removed for political reasons, Sri Kulkarni states that the
Government Pleader’s appointment is of political nature only. He
brings to my notice that even the petitioner was appointed only
on the basis of the recommendations of Dharwad (Urban) M.L.A.
Sri Gurappa Bellad and the Member of Parliament from Shimoga
Constitutency, Sri D.Y.Raghavendra. He read out Note No.11
from the noting sheet, a copy of which was produced as
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Annexure-N to the earlier writ petition in W.P. No.62277/2011.
They are extracted hereinbelow:
“F PÀÄjvÀAvÉ zsÁgÀªÁqÀ f¯ÉèAiÀÄ f¯Áè ¸ÀPÁðj ªÀQîgÁzÀ ²æêÀÄw
zÁæPÁëAiÀÄt a£ÀßAiÀÄå £ÀqÀÆgÀªÀÄoÀ, EªÀgÀ ¸ÉêÁªÀ¢üAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ±ÀºÀgÀ
±Á¸ÀPÀgÁzÀ UÀÄgÀ¥Àà ¨É®èzÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¯ÉÆÃPÀ¸À s̈Á ¸ÀzÀ¸ÀågÁzÀ ²æà r.ªÉÊ.
gÁWÀªÉÃAzÀæ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ G É̄èÃTvÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ : 07-01-2010gÀ ¥ÀæzsÁ£À f¯Áè
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀvÀæ £ÁåAiÀiÁ¢üñÀgÀ EªÀgÀ ²¥sÁgÀ¹ì£À ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ PÀArPÉ (6)gÀAvÉ ¸ÀzÀj
ªÀQîgÀ£ÀÄß ¢£ÁAPÀ : 10-02-2010gÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ¢£ÁAPÀ: 23-04-
2010jAzÀ eÁjUÉ §gÀĪÀAvÉ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ªÀµÀðzÀ CªÀ¢üUÉ CxÀªÁ ªÀÄÄA¢£À
DzÉñÀzÀªÀgÉUÉ EªÉgÀqÀgÀ°è AiÀiÁªÀÅzÀÄ ªÉÆzÀ¯ÉÆà C°èAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ zsÁgÀªÁqÀ
f¯ÉèAiÀÄ f¯Áè ¸ÀPÁðj ªÀQîgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
¥ÀÄl-17”
19. In the course of rejoinder, Sri Subramanya Jois
submits that W.P.No.63773/2012 had to be withdrawn because
of the technical errors inadvertently committed by the
petitioner’s learned counsel on record. He submits that the
advocate on record is an inexperienced member of the Bar. He
submits that the original prayers in W.P.No.63773/2012 were as
follows:
(i) Call for the entire records concerning and
connected with the appointment to the post of the
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District Government Pleader, Dharwad District,
Dharwad, in File No.Law 142 LAG 2009, peruse
the same and declare and quash the orders dated
28.4.2012 and 17.5.2012 found in paragraphs
142 and 144 of the said file vide Annexure-P
declaring the same as violative of Articles 14 and
16(1) of the Constitution and the provisions of the
Karnataka (Law Officers) Appointment and
Conditions of Services of Rules, 1977, etc.,
(ii) To issue a writ in the nature of prohibition
commanding the respondents 1 to 3 from issuing
any orders of appointment to the 4th respondent
in pursuance of the orders contained in File
No.Law 142 LAG 2009, peruse the same and
declare and quash the orders dated 28.4.2012
and 17.5.2012 found in paragraphs 142 and 144
of the said file vide Annexure-P.
(iii) Pass such other orders as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit in the circumstances of the case,
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including the award of the costs of this petition, in
the interest of justice and equity.”
20. The impugned order, dated 04.06.2012 came to be
issued subsequent to the filing of the W.P.No.63773/2012. The
prayer had to be incorporated for the quashing of the impugned
order. The petitioner’s learned counsel on record ought to have
filed an I.A. for the amendment of the petition. On the other
hand, not knowing the procedure, he straightaway inserted the
prayer for the quashing of the impugned order. It is because of
this inadvertent error that the earlier writ petition had to be
withdrawn. For the innocent mistake on the part of the advocate
on record, the petitioner should not be punished, so pleads the
learned Senior Counsel.
21. Smt.K.Vidyavathi, the Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 submits that the
appointment of the fourth respondent is in accordance with the
provisions contained in Rule 26(2) of the said Rules. She submits
that the petitioner challenged the notification, dated 26.2.2011
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(Annexure-L) calling for fresh applications for filling up the office
of the District Government Pleader but without any rate of
success. Further the petitioner has not made any application in
response to the said notification.
22. The learned Additional Government Advocate submits
that under Rule 5(2) of the said Rules, all law officers shall hold
the office only during the pleasure of the Government. The post
in question being a pleasure post, nobody can claim any vested
right to be continued as the Government Advocate or Pleader, so
submits the learned Addl. Government Advocate.
23. In the course of rejoinder, Shri V.R.Datar, the learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that there are no reasons
whatsoever for the removal of the petitioner. The petitioner is
not notified of the complaint or allegations. Unless the reasons
are assigned, the removal of the District Government Pleader
cannot be justified. He submits that just because a post is a
pleasure post, the incumbent cannot be removed whimsically or
arbitrarily. He read out paragraph No.34 of the Apex Court’s
judgment in the case of B.P.SINGHAL vs. UNION OF INDIA
20
reported in (2010) 6 SCC 331, which is extracted
hereinbelow:
“34. The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a
licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily,
whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the
need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other
words, “at pleasure” doctrine enables the removal of a
person holding office at the pleasure of an authority,
summarily, without any obligation to give any notice or
hearing to the person removed, and without any
obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for
the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of
pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of
the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.”
24. He submits that when the post itself has not fallen
vacant, the question of appointing the fourth respondent would
not arise.
25. Sri Datar submits that it is also the case of
the Government that the petitioner is removed from
the post, as the complaints are received against her.
The learned AGA’s submission itself is tantamount to
admitting that the impugned removal is stigmatic.
21
The observance of the principles of natural justice has to
precede the act of removing the incumbent. In a democratic
set-up, the doctrine of pleasure cannot be invoked for removing
the incumbent arbitrarily. He read out paras 22 and 24 of the
Apex Court’s Judgment in B.P.Singhal’s case (supra) which are
extracted hereinbelow:
“22. There is a distinction between the doctrine of
pleasure as it existed in a feudal set-up and the doctrine
of pleasure in a democracy governed by the rule of law.
In a nineteenth century feudal set-up unfettered power
and discretion of the Crown was not an alien concept.
However, in a democracy governed by rule of law, where
arbitrariness in any form is eschewed, no Government or
authority has the right to do what it pleases. The
doctrine of pleasure does not mean a licence to act
arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically. It is presumed
that discretionary powers conferred in absolute and
unfettered terms on any public authority will necessarily
and obviously be exercised reasonably and for the public
good.
24. It is of some relevance to note that the “doctrine
of pleasure” in its absolute unrestricted application does
not exist in India. The said doctrine is severely curtailed
in the case of government employment, as will be evident
from clause (2) of Article 310 and clauses (1) and (2) of
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Article 311. Even in regard to cases falling within the
proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, the application of the
doctrine is not unrestricted, but moderately restricted in
the sense that the circumstances mentioned therein
should exist for its operation. The Canadian Supreme
Court in Wells vs. Newfoundland has concluded that “at
pleasure” doctrine is no longer justifiable in the context of
modern employment relationship.”
26. Sri Datar further submits that the petitioner has given
up her entire private practice to become the Government
Pleader. Just because the appointment is of contractual nature,
the petitioner cannot be removed at will. The Government
Pleader’s post is virtually a civil post, therefore, the protection
guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India has to
be extended to the persons appointed as Government Pleaders.
27. He submits that the question of the petitioner applying
afresh for the post in question do not arise for two reasons: (a)
she was already holding the post, (b) vacancy in the post of
District Government Pleader has not arisen.
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28. Sri Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the respondent
No.4 submits that the petitioner has gone far beyond the
grounds urged in the writ petition. He submits that the Apex
Court’s judgment in the case of B.P.Singhal (supra) has no
application for appointment and the continuation of the law
officers; that the Governor cannot be removed, merely acting on
the doctrine of pleasure, cannot be extended to the law offices.
In this regard he read out the last part of paragraph No.70 of the
said decision.
“……………………. Though the Attorney
General holds a public office, there is an element of
lawyer-client relationship between the Union
Government and the Attorney General. Loss of
confidence will therefore be a very relevant criterion
for withdrawal of pleasure, in the case of a Minister
or the Attorney General, but not a relevant ground in
the case of a Governor.”
29. The submissions of the learned counsel have received
my thoughtful consideration. I do not propose to throw out this
petition on the preliminary objections raised by the respondent
No.4. The filing of the second writ petition on the same cause of
24
action is not normally permissible. But, in the instant case, the
first writ petition was withdrawn without inviting any order on
merits on account of the technical errors, committed by the
inexperienced member of the Bar.
30. Similarly, the unsuccessful attempts made by the
petitioner in W.P.No.62266/2011 for assailing the notification
calling for the appointment of the Government Pleader of
Dharwad District and W.A.No.6100/2011 arising therefrom,
would not come in the way of the petitioner challenging the
impugned order, because the orders passed in the writ petition
and the writ appeal were challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in S.L.P.No.20700/2011. The Hon’ble Supreme Court,
while dismissing the said S.L.P. as withdrawn, by its order, dated
08.08.2011 (Annexure-J) had observed that the same will not
prevent the petitioner from seeking the remedy, if and when
such cause of action arises. By the operation of the doctrine of
merger, the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and by
the Division Bench of this Court have merged in the order passed
by the Apex Court in the said S.L.P. Pursuant to the observation
25
made at the time of disposing the S.L.P., the petitioner is
challenging the impugned order. She cannot be shut out from
doing so.
31. Basically the following interconnected questions fall for
my consideration:(i) Whether the impugned order is illegal and
arbitrary? (ii) Whether the impugned order is actuated by
malafides? (iii) Whether the non-observance of the principles of
natural justice has vitiated the passing of the impugned order?
32. To answer these questions, it is necessary to know the
genesis of the appointment of the Government Pleaders. As held
by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Law Officers
Association (supra), the method of appointment is indeed not
calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will be appointed
or that the appointment made will not be on considerations other
than merit. In the absence of guidelines, the appointments are
made purely on personal and political considerations and at
times arbitrarily. This being so, those who come to be appointed
by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain that the
26
termination of their appointment is arbitrary. Those who come
by the backdoor have to go by the same door. The Apex Court
has further observed that from the inception, the Law Officers’
appointments are the product of the operation of the spoils
system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them.
33. The Apex Court’s decision in the U.P. State Law
Officers Association (supra) has full application for the facts
of this case. As is evident from Note No.11 (Annexure-N in
W.P.No.62277/2011), the petitioner was appointed on the basis
of the recommendations of Dharwad M.L.A., Gurappa Bellad and
the Member of Parliament from Shimoga Constituency, Sri
D.Y.Raghavendra. The said note is extracted supra. Now she
cannot nurse the grievance that the fourth respondent is being
appointed at the instance of Sri Jagadish Shettar and Sri Pralhad
Joshi. The initial appointments, their continuation and their
termination may be for political reasons only.
34. The petitioner has no legally vested right to demand
that her services be continued for a period of three years from
23.11.2010 based on the notification, dated 10.02.2010
(Annexure-B).The said order makes it very clear that the
27
petitioner’s services are continued for a period of three years or
until further orders, whichever is earlier. The said notification is
extracted hereinbelow:
PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ ¸ÀaªÁ®AiÀÄ,
¸ÀASÉå: ¯Á 142 J¯ïJf 2009 «zsÁ £À ¸ Ëzs À ,
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ, ¢£ÁAPÀ:
10.02.2010
C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É
²æêÀÄw zÁPÁë¬Ät a£ÀßAiÀÄå £ÀqÀÆgÀªÀÄoÀ, EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß PÀ£ÁðlPÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼À
(£ÉêÀÄPÁw ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÉêÁ µÀgÀvÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ) ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼À 1977 gÀ°è£À µÀgÀwÛUÀ½UÉƼÀ¥ÀlÄÖ
¢£ÁAPÀ: 23.04.2010 jAzÀ eÁjUÉ §gÀĪÀAvÉ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À CªÀ¢üUÉ CxÀªÁ
ªÀÄÄA¢£À DzÉñÀzÀªÀgÉUÉ EªÉgÀqÀgÀ°è AiÀiÁªÀÅzÀÄ ªÉÆzÀ¯ÉÆà C°èAiÀĪÀgÉUÉ zs Á gÀª Á q À f¯ÉèAiÀÄ
f¯Áè ¸ÀPÁðj ªÀQîgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀ¯ÁVzÉ.
PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdå¥Á®gÀ DzÉñÁ£ÀĸÁgÀ
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀ ºÉ¸Àj£À°è,
(E.²ªÁ£ÀAzÀ)
¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ C¢üãÀ PÁAiÀÄðzÀ²ð (DqÀ½vÀ-1)
PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ, £ÁåAiÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀiÁ£ÀªÀ ºÀPÀÄÌUÀ¼À E¯ÁSÉ.
35. Rule 5(2) of the said Rules unequivocally states that all
officers shall be appointed by the Government and shall hold
office during the pleasure of the Government. The appointment
of the District Government Pleader is only a professional
28
engagement terminable at all. Law is no trade; government
briefs are no merchandise.
36. The Division Bench in the case of Khusro Quraishi
(supra) has held that once the doctrine of pleasure is invoked,
neither the principles of natural justice would step in nor any
question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise.
37. This Court’s decision in the case of S.H.Mohan Kumar
(supra) does not come to the rescue of the petitioner in any
way. In the said case, Rule 5(5) of the said Rules was invoked
in the order removing the Government Pleader. But in the case
on hand, the impugned order is passed in exercise of the power
conferred by Rule 5(6) of the said Rules. While the order passed
invoking Rule 5(5) of the said Rules attaches stigma to the
Government Pleader, the same thing cannot be said in respect of
the order terminating the Government Pleader’s appointment
without assigning any reason and by giving one month’s notice
or giving one month’s retainership fee in lieu of such notice. For
invoking Rule 5(5), the observance of the principles of natural
justice is a condition precedent. Further, once the order is
29
passed invoking Rule 5(5), the concerned person is not entitled
to get one month’s retainership fee. On the other hand, if the
services are terminated invoking Rule 5(6) of the said Rules,
payment of one month’s retainership, in the absence of the
issuance of notice, becomes a mandatory requirement. The
impugned order does not attach stigma to the petitioner. It is in
the nature of termination simplicitor.
38. For the ready perusal, the said provisions are extracted
again:
“5. Appointment of Law Officers:
(1) …………..
(2) …………..
(3) …………….
(4) …………….
(5) A law officer shall be liable to be removed
from office at any time if he is guilty of any
act or conduct which, in the opinion of the
Government is contrary to these rules or is
incompatible with his duties as such law
officer. Decision of the Government in such
cases, shall be final.
(6) Save as otherwise provided in sub-rule (5)
and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),
30
the State Government may terminate the
appointment of a law officer without
assigning any reason for giving one month’s
notice in writing or by giving one month’s
retainer in lieu of such notice.”
39. Similarly, the Apex Court’s decision in the case of
B.P.Singhal (supra) would be of no assistance for the
petitioner. What fell for consideration in the said case is whether
the removal of Governor is justiciable. In the said case, the Apex
Court has taken the considered view that the loss of confidence
in the Attorney General would be a relevant criterion for the
withdrawal of pleasure. The same principle is applicable to the
Government Pleader also.
40. It is also profitable to refer to the Hon’ble Supreme
Court’s judgment in the case of STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
vs. RAKESH KUMAR KESHARI (reported in (2011) 5 SCC
341) wherein it is held that the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot
compel the State to utilise the services of an advocate
irrespective of its choice. It is for the State to engage and dis-
engage a counsel.
31
41. The submissions that the composite order for
removing the petitioner and appointing the fourth respondent is
passed and that no conscious decision is taken to appoint the
fourth respondent are meritless. Note No.46 put up by the Law
Secretary before the Hon’ble Law Minister is for the decision as
to whether to continue the petitioner’s services or call for fresh
applications. The Hon’ble Minister has made an order calling for
the applications at Note No.47. The notification intimating the
relieving of the petitioner and appointing the fourth respondent
as the Government Pleader does not suffer from any infirmity or
illegality.
42. On the slender ground that the fourth respondent’s
name is at the bottom of the list of five names prepared by the
District Judge, the appointment of the fourth respondent as the
Government Pleader cannot be quashed. The Apex Court in the
case of Hanumantha Rao Kulkarni (supra) held that the
recommendations of the District Judge is not binding on the
Government. The Government is only required to consider the
remarks of the District Judge; the Government cannot dispense
32
with the consultation itself. The Apex Court in the case of U.P.
STATE LAW OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (supra) has
recognised the wide discretion that the Government has in the
matter of appointing the Law Officers. The District Judge’s
remarks are only regarding the suitability of the candidates for
the appointment.
43. That apart, the petitioner has no litigational
competence to challenge the fourth respondent’s appointment on
the ground of the Government not following the order of
preference indicated by the District Judge. Such a ground could
have been raised only by the advocates found at Sl.Nos.1 to 4 in
the list.
44. In the result, I dismiss this petition. No order as to
costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Cm/MD/MKC/MRK