DRAFT

Emergence and Evil

by

David A. Bella

Professor Emeritus Department of Bioresource Engineering

Oregon State University Corvallis, OR 97331

April 2005

Contact Address and Information:

3295 NW Charmyr Vista Dr Corvallis, OR 97330

bella@proaxis.com

(541) 753­0020

Biographical Sketch

Dr. David A. Bella is Professor Emeritus of Bioresource Engineering at Oregon State

University. He received his B.S. in Civil Engineering from Virginia Military Institute (1961), his

M.S. (1965) and Ph.D. (1967) in Environmental Engineering, New York University. Beginning

in the 1960s, his research involved computer simulation of aquatic ecosystems. He has been

involved in a wide range of assessment research including pollution in lakes, rivers, and

estuaries, nuclear waste disposal, destruction of chemical weapons, global climate change, space­

based weapons, and the decline of salmon in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. A theme in his research

is that systemic distortion, negligence, and corruption can emerge and we make a fundamental

mistaken when we merely blame individuals. He has published widely and was coauthor of

“The Dark Side of Organizations and a Method to Reveal It,” published in Emergence (2003).

Abstract

The production of biological weapons occurred in the Soviet Union on a vast scale of

deadly effectiveness that is chilling and horrific. How could they do this? We are forced to take

seriously the notion of evil. But, if we fail to address a central claim of emergence – that the

character of a whole cannot be reduced to its parts – we will seriously misperceive evil with

grave consequences. Drawing upon an account of this program by its chief research scientist,

this paper exposes the character of emergent patterns within which people, much like ourselves,

devoted their time and effort to preparations for mass murder. The patterns are disturbingly

familiar. This paper demonstrates that emergence, as a disciplined way of thinking, can expand

our understanding of evil and responsibility in ways that are relevant and critically important.

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Understanding the factors that can and do lead people of faith and goodwill – wittingly or unwittingly – into destructive and evil patterns of behavior must be a high priority on the world’s agenda. (Kimball, 2002: 7)

Introduction

The word “evil” means portending great harm, threat, or danger. It implies something

sinister, seductive, or hidden and yet potentially powerful. Essayist Lance Morrow (2003:7) tells

us, “evil is the most powerful word in the language, and the most elusive.” “Eventually,”

Morrow writes, “a democratic world will need a more democratic sense of evil – an

understanding of the ordinariness and shallowness of evil.”

To merely blame individuals – presuming that evil outcomes arise from evil people – is

to avoid (preclude, presume away) the essential claim of emergence: that the character of wholes

should not be reduced to the character of parts. If we believe that this central claim of

emergence is valid, then we cannot avoid a disturbing possibility: evil (distorting, threatening,

harmful) outcomes can emerge through the efforts of normal, competent, and well adjusted

people much like ourselves. This paper seeks to expose this possibility as terribly real.

The model and method employed herein (Bella, 1997; Bella, King and Kalin, 2003)

involve the following. The behaviors of people are shaped by the contexts within which they act.

Contexts are emergent phenomena; they emerge as behaviors settle into self­reinforcing

patterns. 1 The character of a context can be sketched. This investigation begins with an episode

from recent history.

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The Episode: Rebirth Island, Aral Sea, 1982

It was a desolate place, an island in the Aral Sea that divided Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

“Languishing fifty miles off the Kazakh shoreline in waters so polluted by the runoff of

agricultural fertilizers that nothing could possibly live in them any more, it was the antithesis of

its name.” But now, Rebirth Island was the place where Biopreparat – an upstart organization in

the Soviet Union – could prove its worth.

Biopreparat was formed in 1973 to recruit the “nation’s best biologist, epidemiologist,

and biologchemist.” In 1979, General Yury Tikhonovich Kalinin took over Biopreparat. Kalinin

had remarkable abilities. He was able to break Biopreparat free from the rigid army hierarchy,

while securing enormous funds to support extensive laboratories across the country staffed by

sixty thousand personnel including some of the best young researchers in the country. Now, on

the desolate Rebirth Island, Biopreparat would test its first biological weapon, tularemia.

“Tularemia is a debilitating disease.” Biopreparat “had obtained, from a leading

international research institute in Europe, a strain capable of overcoming immunity in vaccinated

monkeys.” As far as they knew, “There had never been an attempt anywhere in the world to

weaponize a vaccine­resistant strain of tularemia.” The test provided an opportunity to prove

what Biopreparat could do. It’s director, Kalinin, saw it as a key to the success of the program.

The “best” biological weapons, agents, “were those for which there was no known cure.”

Thus, biological research was in a continuing race to stay ahead of cures, antibiotics, and

vaccines. Biopreparat was about to demonstrate that it could meet the demands of this race.

“Five hundred monkeys were ordered from Africa for tularemia tests on Rebirth Island.” “All of

the monkeys had to be immunized before they were exposed.” After all, they “were testing a

vaccine­resistant weapon.”

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As test results filtered back from Rebirth Island, “the news was better than anyone had

expected.” Upon hearing the results, the head of Biopreparat, Kalinin, called Kanatjan Alibekov,

chief of technological development, and enthusiastically told him, “You’re a Great Man!”

“Other congratulatory calls followed from colleagues in Moscow who had heard about the

results.” Alibekov received a special military medal.

But a mistake in the test procedure had been discovered. The credibility of Biopreparat

was challenged by critics. But, Kanatjan Alibekov turned this potentially damaging result

around. In his own words:

The next year we conducted new tests with an even more efficient dry variant of tularemia, following all the procedures meticulously, and the new version of weaponized tularemia entered the Soviet arsenal. The achievement launched Biopreparat as a significant force in the nation’s weapons establishment.

During this tularemia effort, a meeting took place. Alibekov was told by Kalinin, “I’m

going to nominate you as deputy director of Omutninsk,” a major research facility. Alibekov

had a hard time believing this. He “was six years out of graduate school, a thirty­one­year­old

captain with a lot of energy and only a few achievements for it.” He gained the attention of those

in higher position because of a technique he had “recently developed for improving biological

weapons production.”

Alibekov was called to Kalinin’s office. When he arrived, he heard shouting behind

closed doors. A red faced man barreled out of the meeting room, stopped and looked over

Alibekov. He was furious. “I don’t know what you think you’re up to!” he barked. “You’re

nothing but a puppy.” He stormed back into the office. Clearly there were those who resented

the advancement of younger people, regardless of their qualifications. Clearly, the head of

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Biopreparat, Kalinin, thought otherwise. A short time later, Kalinin came out of his office

looking “mildly apologetic.” He told Alibekov to return to his hotel. He would call.

Kalinin called Alibekov later in the afternoon to congratulate him. Alibekov had been

promoted to the new deputy director at Omutninsk. How did Kalinin convince the “armchair

generals” that this “puppy” should be promoted? Kalinin replied that he convinced them that

despite his young age he would “do all right.”

Fearfully, Alibekov ventured, “How?”

“You’ll turn our tularemia project around,” Kalinin answered. In Alibekov’s words:

It was an assignment no scientist of my age and experience could have expected to get so early in his career. … I knew the project was fraught with risk, but I was caught up in the challenge.

Alibekov did indeed turn the tularemia project around and he advanced to higher positions within

Biopreparat.

Two Prayers

This episode is based upon the actual accounts of Kanatjan Alibekov, the first deputy

chief of Biopreparat. In 1992, he defected to the United States and changed his name to Ken

Alibek. The quotes in the episode above come from Alibek’s book (Alibek, 1999). In the prolog

to this book Alibek tells more about Rebirth Island.

On a bleak island in the Aral Sea, one hundred monkeys are tethered to posts set in parallel rows stretching out toward the horizon. A muffled thud breaks the stillness. Far in the distance, a small metal sphere lifts into the sky then hurtles downward, rotating, until it shatters in a second explosion.

Some seventy­five feet above the ground, a cloud the color of dark mustard begins to unfurl, gently dissolving as it glides down toward the monkeys. They pull at their chains and begin to cry. Some bury their heads between their

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legs. A few cover their mouths or noses, but it is too late: they have already begun to die.

At the other end of the island, a handful of men in biological protective suits observe the scene from binoculars, taking notes. In a few hours, they will retrieve the still­breathing monkeys and return them to cages where the animals will be under continuous examination for the next several days until, one by one, they die of anthrax or tularemia, Q fever, brucellosis, glanders, or plague.

These are the tests I supervised throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. They formed the foundation of the Soviet Union’s spectacular breakthroughs in biological warfare.

(Alibek, 1999: ix)

At the end of his book he writes

As a young boy in Kazakhstan I once came across a book about a doctor who risked his life and health to heal his patients. He was the physician I dreamed of becoming. I cannot unmake the weapons I manufactured or undo the research I authorized as scientific chief of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program; but every day I do what I can to mitigate their effects. … This is my way of honoring the medical oath I betrayed for so many years.

(Alibek, 1999: 292)

We can respond to Alibek’s confessional account from two radically different

perspectives. The first is expressed in the prayer, “thank God we’re not like him.” The

expression comes almost automatically when we are confronted by the terrible program

described in Alibek’s account. The second prayer is “lead us not into temptation but deliver us

from evil.” 2 This expression, from an ancient prayer, is troubling and paradoxical. Evil repulses

us but temptation attracts us. Moreover, the word “us” – employed twice – is inclusive. It

includes Alibekov and myself! How could this be? I’ve never worked in a biological weapons

program and I’m horrified, not tempted, by Alibekov’s “achievements.” The first prayer, “thank

God I’m not like him,” comes so easily. It allows me to set aside these disturbing and terrible

matters. I can’t imagine myself doing such terrible things. Despite such strong reactions, it is

the second more challenging prayer that we will follow. It is an expression, not of belief, but of

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commitment to consider troubling matters in a deeper way. It involves confessional discipline, a

demanding effort to look past the particular individuals and events to uncover something that is

familiar, tempting, and crucial to the outcomes that emerged.

Uncovering the Context

Look back on this episode, Rebirth Island, 1982. Amid the tularemia testing, there is a

meeting. It seems incidental, easy to overlook. And, yet, in such seemingly incidental events we

find evidence of a powerful force lurking in the background, hidden by the terrible outcomes it

produces. This is the force of context. To expose the context, we will sketch out, not the

character of the individuals, but rather the general behaviors they act out: what they do, how

they feel, and what they see.

General behaviors seen or implied at the end of this episode are sketched in Figure 1. To

read, begin with any statement. Move forward or backward along an arrow. Say “therefore” if

you move forward, “because” if you move backward. Read the next statement and continue,

forward or backward.

These behaviors point to the competence of Alibekov and Kalinin. Kalinin comes across

as an exceptional manager. He promotes Alibekov, a young non­Russian, on merit, even when

he has to take on powerful opponents to do so. Alibekov, in turn, accepts the responsibilities

given to him. These behaviors are expressions of a continuing pattern in Alibekov’s career in

Biopreparat. This pattern can be uncovered by employing two common sense guidelines.

1. Behaviors continue because they have continuing reasons that make sense from the perspective of those acting out the behaviors.

2. Continuing behaviors have consequences that continue.

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Figure 1. Behavioral Interactions Found at the End of the Rebirth Island Episode. When reading, say “therefore” if you move forward on an arrow, “because” if you move backward.

In Figure 2, the behaviors sketched in Figure 1 are rearranged. The first guideline is met

because each behavior (boxed statement) has at least one incoming arrow, a reason. The second

guideline is met because each behavior has at least one outgoing arrow, a consequence. The

pattern that results from these guidelines appears in the form of mutually reinforcing loops.

Read through the entire pattern through many routes; read forward (say “therefore”) and

backward (say “because”) until you get the whole picture.

We can imagine others in Biopreparat, the “nation’s best biologists, epidemiologists and

biochemists,” experiencing the same pattern. Figure 3 restates the pattern to include the voices

of other competent people. Alibekov advanced in the system because he was competent; that is,

he was able to excel within the context of competency sketched in Figure 3. Had he failed,

Kalinin would have selected someone else.

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Figure 2. The Pattern Resulting from the Rearrangement of Continuing Behaviors (Figure 1). Note that each behavior (boxed statement) now has at least one incoming arrow (reason) and one outgoing arrow (consequence).

Figure 3. A General Context of Competence.

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Read through Figure 3 forward (say “therefore”) or backward (say “because”) as you

choose until you sense the pattern as a whole. The pattern looks quite good, even idealistic. A

colleague told me, “I wish I worked in such a system.” It is here that the paradoxical prayer –

“lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil” – provokes us. Temptations don’t repulse

us, they attract us and the word “us” includes Alibekov, my colleague, and myself.

The Demonic

Competence can be seen as being fit, well adjusted, and well adapted to the context

sketched in Figure 3. Kalinin and Alibekov were competent in this way (Figure 2). The

production of effective biological weapons on such massive scales required the competent

actions of many people. While these people differed in skills, personalities, and fields of

competence, their actions were acted out within contexts of the character sketched in Figure 3.

Our attention should be drawn, not to the character of the individuals, but to the character of the

context. But, now consider a troubling matter. In Alibek’s words,

The government I served perceived no contradiction between the oath every doctor takes to preserve life and our preparations for mass murder. For a long time, neither did I. (p. x)

How could he not perceive this contradiction?

To answer, we need to understand what has been trivialized in our modern age, the

“demonic.” Drawing upon a leading theologian of the twentieth century (Tillich, 1963), the

demonic is always associated with the good. The demonic emerges when a vehicle to Goodness

becomes overextended until it becomes a substitute for Goodness itself. As an example, tests

can be vehicles (means) to student learning but when passing tests becomes overextended until it

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becomes a substitute for learning itself – students call this “plug and chug; cram and flush” –

then passing tests becomes demonic; it becomes the substitute for learning (Bella, 2003).

Let us now show how competence becomes demonic. Start with Figure 3. Add only

three behavior statements and arrows consistent with our common sense guidelines. The result is

shown in Figure 4. Notice how the avoidance of troubling matters and negative implications

actually strengthen the pattern. Referring to Figure 4, this strengthening is shown by an

additional incoming arrow to the statements “Our work contributes to the success of the

program” and “We gain a positive self­identity from our work.”

Figure 4. A Competence Context that Becomes Demonic. Three behaviors (dotted lines) are added to Figure 3.

Yes, competence can serve to “preserve life,” but it can also serve “preparations for mass

murder” (quotes from Alibek). When the pursuit of competence – the drive to excel, be affirmed

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by peers, and accomplish things never done before – becomes a driving force in itself, then

competence can become demonic.

When Alibekov and his young colleagues first entered Biopreparat, they agonized over

the moral implications of their work. “Kan, we’re doctors!” a troubled friend exclaimed. “How

can we do this?” But, as they gained competence, as they proved themselves, as they became

“caught up in the challenge,” such troubling concerns receded. In Alibek’s words,

I was developing a reputation for getting results. Uncertainties about the direction of my life, and the morality of what I was doing, had long since receded. (p. 82)

A transformation of Alibekov occurred as his identity was given over to the system.

The idealistic young doctor from Tomsk who had agonized over the difference between saving lives and taking them was gone. The worst possible fate for me had become banishment from Biopreparat, and from the privileges that came with it. … the secret culture of our labs had changed my outlook. My parents would not have recognized the man I had become. (p. 101­102)

The drive to excel within the context became a powerful hunger, a calling, that so consumed

Alibekov and his colleagues that they overlooked the terrible outcomes of their work. Alibek

tells us,

The hunger to be on the newest frontier of biology was so powerful that scientists who answered the call to participate in the new program were willing to overlook its connection with weapons­making. (p. 157)

But, to satisfy this “powerful hunger” one had to excel within the context of competence. Then,

Having tasted accomplishment, recognition from peers, affirmation from superiors, respect from

subordinates, and a positive self­identity, the hunger gained power. And in the busyness of work

– with its demands, challenges, and risks – it became “normal” to “overlook its connection to

weapons­making.” Here the word “normal” means well adjusted, fit, and competent within the

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context. In Alibek’s confessional account we are confronted with the power of contexts,

emergent patterns that shape behaviors of normal people in ways so subtle and strong that an

idealistic young healer was transformed into a producer of “mass murder.” The context was

crucial! If we fail to grasp the nature and power of contexts, if we overlook the ways contexts

shape our own behaviors, we will have learned very little; this could be a very dangerous failure.

Contexts as Basins of Attraction

Alibek describes a 1988 meeting in which plans were made to arm intercontinental

missiles, SS­18s, with a potent form of anthrax.

New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Chicago were some of the targets to come up in subsequent meetings, but they were abstract concepts to me at the time. All I cared about was ensuring that our weapons would do the job they were designed for. … I don’t remember giving a moment’s thought to the fact that we had just sketched out a plan to kill millions of people. (p. 7)

With this form of anthrax, Alibek writes, “a single SS­18 could wipe out the population of a city

as large as New York.” The meeting went on to go over the available menu of “toxic choices.”

Plague could be prepared on a similar schedule. The plague weapon we had created in our laboratories was more virulent than the bubonic plague, which killed one quarter of the population of Europe in the Middle Ages. Smallpox was stockpiled in underground bunkers at our military plants, and we were developing a weapon prototype based on a rare filovirus called Marburg, a cousin of Ebola. … Our meeting ended after an hour or so of additional calculations. We shook hands, packed our papers, and congratulated one another on a productive session.

(p. 7­8)

How can we explain such behaviors? Some might answer, “Those people were dedicated

communists,” “They were only following orders,” or “They had no choice.” Alibek’s account

exposes such answers as superficial at best and even absurd. We might point to the environment

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of the Cold War and the threats they perceived from the United States. Alibek’s account

provides some support for this kind of answer, but only partially. What his honest account does

reveal as powerful, pervasive, and essential is the drive to be highly competent. Such

competence required initiative, not mere following of orders. It demanded dedication, not to

communism, but to competence itself. It called for devotion and sacrifice, not to the state, but to

work, science and research. And through such dedication, devotion, and sacrifice, Alibekov and

many others did indeed become highly competent in what they did. And then, driven to be

highly competent, to be “on the newest frontier of biology,” they were able to “overlook its

connection with weapons­making.” The model presented herein, Figure 4, seeks to explain this,

not by describing the character of individuals, but rather the character of the context within

which they excelled.

Consider an analogy. Imagine a square table with a top that is flat and white. We place a

number of coins on the table and shake it. A video camera looks down on the table top and

records the coins as they shift back and forth. Assume the table has a reflective edge to prevent

the shifting coins from falling off. If we initially placed the coins in a cluster and then shook the

table, the video, taken from above, would show a tendency for the coins to spread across the

table. But, now imagine that in one corner of the table (say the lower left as viewed from the

video camera above), I pressed the table surface downward to form a basin, a bowl or

depression. Then, after distributing the coins across the surface, I again shook the table. What

would you see recorded on the video taken from above? You would, of course, see coins

shifting about. But, amid this shifting, you would see a tendency among all the coins to gravitate

toward the basin in the lower left region of the table (viewed from above).

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Now consider the table surface to be a map of behavior space as shown in Figure 5.

Imagine that the position of a particular coin represents the behavior of an individual within

Biopreparat. As we shake the table, we notice that the positions of coins shift, indicating shifting

behaviors among individuals. The precise shift of a particular person (coin) at a specific time is

unpredictable. But, as before, the general shift will be toward the basin of attraction as shown on

our map.

Figure 5. A Map of Behavior Space with a Basin of Attraction. The character of the basin is sketched in Figure 4.

To explain this general shift, it would make no sense to pick up each coin and carefully

examine it. It is the basin that demands our attention. This is analogous to our study of

Biopreparat. As with the coins, examining the character of individuals tells us little. In human

affairs, contexts act as basins of attraction, drawing behaviors toward some regions of behavior

space and not others (Figure 5). Thus, the character of the context is crucial; this character can

be sketched. And, following our analogy, if one of the coins had our name on it, it too would be

drawn into the basin.

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The Common Context: Radical Implications

In the Soviet Union, Alibekov and his colleagues “could not take the risk of making

close friends outside of the program.” “In our isolation,” he tells us, “we found relationships

among ourselves.” 3 While their particular skills, personalities, assignments, and fields of

specialty were diverse, they held in common the context sketched in Figure 4. Of course, there

were other factors shaping their behaviors. But, when explaining how so many people could do

such things, the character of the common context within which they devoted their time, energy,

and abilities must be seen as crucial.

Now, let us consider, not the horrors of Biopreparat but rather the underlying context

sketched in Figure 4. To sense the character of this context, conduct a simple experiment. Read

again Figure 4, forward (“therefore”) and backward (“because”), until you sense the character of

the pattern as a whole. Then, imagine that you discover some “troubling matter” that has been

avoided by competent people (i.e., people acting within the pattern). Imagine that you have the

opportunity to ask them questions. Your questions and their answers are given in Table 1. One

of the most telling and disturbing insights from this exercise is how familiar these responses

sound, how ordinary. Troubling matters are overlooked by ordinary people who say, “I’m too

busy,” “It’s not my job,” or “There is nothing I can do.” Within the context sketched in Figure 4,

such responses (Table 1) make sense.

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Table 1. Responses of Participants Within the Competence Context (Figure 4)

Person Addressed Question Asked Answer

Do you consider yourself a responsible person?

Of course I do! I accept responsibility for the work I do and I do it well; ask my peers.

But, aren’t there some troubling matters that are not being addressed?

Well, I suppose there are. But, it’s not my job to deal with them; I’m busy enough.

So who should address such matters?

I really don’t know, but it’s not my job. The people I’ve known through work are, for the most part, competent, responsible, and hard working. If they aren’t, we should get rid of them.

Any Participant

You mean get rid of people who don’t go along?

I wouldn’t put it that way. We should help people who have problems. But, if they can’t or won’t accept responsibilities like the rest of us, then we can’t continue to support them.

Participant in Lower Position

Are these troubling matters being addressed?

I can’t say. I assume that they are. But you’ll need to speak to those in higher positions. They are the ones with broader responsibilities.

Have these troubling matters been addressed?

I can assure you that the people working in our program are highly competent. They take their responsibilities seriously. I have utmost confidence in their ability to do what is needed.

Participant in Higher Position

Do you selectively support some work and not other work?

Of course I do! That’s my job! If the work is done well and supports the program, I do whatever I can to provide the resources the work needs.

But shouldn’t these matters be addressed?

Perhaps, but, it’s not my job! Even if I tried to address such matters, I couldn’t change anything so I stick to my own work and do it well.

And you get a sense of accomplishment from that work?

Yes, I do! And quite frankly, I’d rather not be troubled by your concerns. There is nothing I could do about them except maybe depress myself.

Any Participant

So you stay focused on your work?

Yes. It’s challenging work and I don’t have the luxury of wasting time on other matters that won’t make a bit of difference any way.

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Our inquiry challenges us – those who have proven our competence – to face up to three

things. First, the answers given in Table 1 are familiar and reasonable because they arise within

a common context. Second, through our own competent (e.g., in context) behaviors, we too gain

position, recognition, and a positive identity (Figure 4); here are temptations. Indeed, Figure 4

provides a good description of the context within which university professors, myself included,

prove our competence and gain our identity. Third, evil can emerge from such competent

behaviors on scales greater than any individual or group could pull off; Alibek’s book testifies to

this. The prayer “lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil” thus addresses a reality

common to our own lives and capable of great harm. If, in contrast, we can only see evil in the

horrible acts of others, acts that repulse rather than tempt (attract us), then perhaps we are unable

or unwilling to understand evil and why the word has carried devious and sinister implications.

Taking Emergence Seriously

In Biopreparat, we make two observations. First, we see order in human affairs on vast

scales. Second, we see outcomes that portend dangers so disturbing that the word evil is

justified. In both cases – order and evil in human affairs – common explanations fail to grasp the

radical implications of emergence: that wholes cannot be reduced to parts. In the case of order,

it is commonly assumed that “Somebody must be in charge!” Similarly for evil, it is commonly

assumed that “Evil people did this!” Emergence challenges such views.

Self­organization occurs in both human and nonhuman systems. No one need be in

charge. Order often emerges on scales of complexity far greater than the capacity of individuals

(ants, termites, people) to design. Moreover, the character of emergent wholes cannot be

reduced to the character of the parts. Funny jokes cannot be reduced to funny words. Likewise,

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evil outcomes that emerge from human systems cannot be reduced to the evil character of the

individuals. None of this denies that there are powerful people who are good organizers or evil

people who do bad things. Instead, this paper claims that when considering order and evil,

emergence must be taken seriously.

The implications for the study of emergence are radical. This paper is in agreement with

fundamental claims of emergence (Holland, 1998; Wheatley, 1999). I agree that emergence

provides coherence in human affairs far beyond the ability of intentional design. I agree that it

allows people to become part of something greater than themselves, giving them identity,

purpose, and meaning. Capabilities that emerge in human affairs do exceed the sum of

individual capabilities.

But, despite such valid insights, the emergence of evil – outcomes that portent great harm

– has not been well addressed in the study of emergence. Emergence in organizations has been

more commonly described in positive terms. To be blunt, much of the literature on emergence in

human affairs has been too nice, more positive and affirming than the evidence justifies. While

the positive possibilities of emergence should not be denied, we must also face its darker side.

And, in doing so, we challenge practices that have arisen in recent times.

In recent decades, the word evil has been used as an accusation to define the character of

one’s enemies. The exclamation, “Thank God we’re not like them!” follows such use. Thus, the

Soviet Union was defined by President Ronald Reagan as an “evil empire,” an accusation not

unnoticed in the Soviet Union. Alibek writes:

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We didn’t need hawkish intelligence briefings to persuade us of the danger. Our newspapers chafed over Reagan’s description of our country as an evil empire, and the angry rhetoric of our leaders undermined the sense of security most of us had grown up with during the détente of the 1970s. Although we joked amongst ourselves about the senile old men in the Kremlin, it was easy to believe that the West would seize upon our moment of weakness to destroy us. It was even conceivable that our army strategists would call for a preemptive strike, perhaps with biological weapons. (p. 89­90)

This paper has looked into this “evil empire,” examining a program that would indeed fit

definitions of evil. But, instead of mere accusation of “them,” this study followed the

paradoxical prayer, “lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil.” The paradox involved

emergence. Ordinary people (“us”) were drawn into self­reinforcing patterns, contexts, that gave

them identity, support, purpose, and meaning (“temptation”). Within such contexts, they

devoted their time and abilities to their competent work to such an extent that they overlooked

troubling matters arising from this work, even when such matters led to great threat on vast

scales (“evil”). And we discovered that the pattern through which this occurred is familiar! We

too have been caught up in such a pattern. The prayer “thank God we’re not like them” is

wrong!

The emergence of evil – arising from whole systems and not reducible to the character of

individuals – may sound like a radical notion. However, it is an ancient view expressed in the

“prophetic tradition.” Biblical scholar Markus Borg (1997) writes:

The passion for social justice that we see in the prophets is a protest against systemic evil. … systemic evil is a major source (perhaps the single greatest cause) of human suffering.

Importantly, the issue is not the goodness or wickedness of the elite individuals. Elites can be good people: devout, responsible, courageous; kind, gentle, charming, intelligent; committed to family, loyal to friends, and so forth. Moreover, systemic evil is not necessarily intended even by some who benefit from it. So the issue is not character flaws among the elites. (p. 141)

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Clearly, this prophetic view challenges the modern motion that evil outcomes can be

reduced to the evil character of individuals, people quite different, of course, from ourselves.

The study of emergence and evil in our own age, I claim, supports this prophetic challenge, not

by claiming the “factuality” of particular events in ancient tales, but rather by discovering that

their insights on matters of great importance are relevant to our own age. 4

Conclusion

The evidence is clear that in the Soviet Union, people, resources, and expertise were

drawn together on a vast scale for “preparations for mass murder” (Alibek’s words). But, the

evidence does not support the explanation that such evil was the direct outcome of calculated

plans, deliberate designs, and specific orders from the command and control center in the

Kremlin. Nor was this the result of deranged minds. The evidence points to something more

chilling, something too dangerous to overlook, the emergence of systemic evil.

In the absence of independent checks and the presence of insulating secrecy, mutually

reinforcing patterns of competent behaviors emerged at multiple levels to form the coherent

whole known as Biopreparat. Competence and the collective claim on resources became

mutually reinforcing. And from this emerged the ability to mobilize the latest scientific

knowledge to produce the means for mass slaughter of a horrible kind. And within it, the driving

motivations were not ideological commitments, commands of powerful authorities, or the evil

intentions of deranged minds. The essential and pervasive motivation was the drive to

demonstrate one’s competence within the contexts of the emergent system.

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At the end of her widely acclaimed book (revised edition, 1999), Margaret Wheatley

wrote:

I have found that nature and people provide more hopeful examples of self­ organization than I can possibly comprehend” (Wheatley, 1999: 168)

With respect to emergence in human affairs, my own conclusion rephrases this statement.

I have found that people provide more hopeful, paradoxical, demonic, and evil examples of self­organization than I can possibly comprehend.

By “hopeful” I mean that self­organization can indeed lead to much that is good. By

“paradoxical” I mean that the character of the emergent outcomes can be quite different than the

character of the people involved. By “demonic” I refer to the emergence of self­reinforcing

patterns that define the good – for those involved – in ways that sustain the patterns themselves.

By “evil” I refer to emergent patterns (contexts) that mobilize great power and sustain the

dedication, devotion, and sacrifice of many competent people – much like ourselves – leading

them (us) to overlook troubling matters and produce outcomes that portent great harm, threat,

and danger. The assumption that evil outcomes depend upon the intentions of evil people

(“Thank God we’re not like them”) is both dangerous and wrong.

But this troubling conclusion is also an opening, an opportunity and challenge, to

reconsider common notions of responsibility. While acknowledging the responsibilities of

competence – doing one’s work well – this conclusion provokes us to acknowledge a very

different kind of responsibility, a “response­ability” that transcends contexts, including

(especially) contexts of competence. The prophetic name for such transcendent responsibility is

faith. 5 In a competence driven world, however, faith has been transformed – trivialized – to

mean strong beliefs often held in the face of contrary evidence. Thus, in the name of “faith,”

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people justify their actions because they are “based upon their beliefs.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith,

eminent historian of comparative religion, describes this notion – faith equals belief – as a

“modern heresy” that leads to “monstrous confusion.” 6

The study of emergence and evil can help to challenge this “monstrous confusion.” It

does this by showing that evil outcomes can and do emerge, not because the people involved are

themselves evil but rather because ordinary people, much like ourselves, fail to live out

responsibilities that transcend the emergent patterns (contexts) that they (we) work within.

Prophetic faith involves responsibility that transcends contexts. Such faith calls us “out of

bondage” to systems that capture our very identity. The prophetic traditions involves a calling to

open our eyes, expand our imagination, to see what captures our devotion of time and energy,

our very lives. It calls for something more than going along and getting ahead. And such

responsibility can lead to out of context acts of faith that disturb evil systems. The failure to live

out such responsibility ­­ faith in the prophetic sense – can be horrific. And such responsibility

cannot be simply turned over to those most competent, the experts. On such crucial matters, this

paper and prophetic tradition agree.

Notes

1. In this paper, “emergence” is understood in a way consistent with the general statements

of Holland (1998). “Recognizable features and patterns are pivotal in this study of

emergence … The crucial step is to extract the regularities from incidental and irrelevant

details … This process is called modeling … Each model concentrates on describing a

selected aspect of the world, setting aside other aspects as incidental” (pp. 4­5). “…

emergence usually involves patterns of interaction that persist despite a continuing

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turnover in the constituents of the patterns” (p. 7). “Emergence, in the sense used here,

occurs only when the activities of the parts do not simply sum to give activity of the

whole” (p. 14).

2. This two thousand year old expression is from the “Lord’s Prayer” found in the Christian

tradition.

3. Largely because of an independent citizenry and institutional checks, the United States

under Richard Nixon renounced its program to develop biological weapons in 1969. The

Soviet Union continued its program, in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention. For a history of biological weapons, see Miller, Engelberg and

Broad (2001).

4. The approach employed in this paper has been applied to the tobacco industry (Bella,

1996), educational failures (Bella, 2003), and distortions of information in organizations

(Bella, 1987, 1997; Bella, King and Kailin, 2003). In all cases, bad outcomes could not

be simply reduced to bad people.

5. The writings of the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith provide what is probably the most

comprehensive and thoughtful works on the meaning of faith through the ages. Drawing

upon many traditions, ancient and modern (including secular, Christian, and Islamic),

Smith makes a profound and convincing case that “faith has not and is not belief.” In

Smith’s words, “Faith bespeaks involvement in transcendence” (1998: 139). “Faith is the

human orientation to transcendence” (1977: 84). Smith quotes St. Augustine as saying,

“Faith is the virtue [or power] by which commitment is given to the transcendent” (1998:

103). But, Smith shows we moderns live in a “non­transcendence­oriented culture (the

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first such in human history).” This paper seeks to show that great harm – yes, even evil –

can emerge when a “non­transcendence” notion of responsibility is acted out.

6. Smith is certainly not alone in his claim that faith is not belief. Paul Tillich, one of the

leading Christian theologians of the twentieth century, wrote, “It is a disastrous distortion

of the meaning of faith to identify it with the belief in the historical validity of the

Biblical stories” (Tillich, 1957: 87). “Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned”

(Tillich, 1957: 1). Abraham Heschel, a leading Jewish theologian, wrote, “Faith is not

the same as belief, not the same as the attitude of regarding something as true,” (Heschel,

1978: 154).

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