david keen, james darcy, gullaume foliot and …hunger and achieving food security in complex...

David Keen, James Darcy, Gullaume Foliot and Thomas Gurtner

Humanitarian assistance in conflict and complex emergencies: conference report and background papers Conference report

Original citation: Keen, David, Darcy, James, Foliot, Gullaume and Gurtner, Thomas (2009) Humanitarian assistance in conflict and complex emergencies: conference report and background papers. United Nations World Food Program (WFP), Rome, Italy.

Originally available from United Nations World Food Program (WFP) This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60359/ Available in LSE Research Online: November 2014 © 2009 United Nations World Food Program (WFP) LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

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Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies

June 2009 conference report and background papers

Cover photo: Moises Saman/Panos Pictures

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Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies

Conference report and background papers June 2009

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Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

WFP’s Work in Complex Emergencies and On-Going Conflicts: A Discussion Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Trends in Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance: A Review of Literature, Policy and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 HumanitarianPolicyGroup—OverseasDevelopmentInstitute

Country Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

CompromiseorCapitulation?ReportonWFPandtheHumanitarianCrisisinSriLanka—David Keen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

TheLimitsofHumanitarianAction:WFP,FoodAssistanceandIinternationalAidinDRCongo—James Darcy and Gullaume Foliot . . . . . . . . . 103

ReviewofWFP’sResponsestoOperationalandProgrammingChallengesinConflictsandComplexEmergencies:ACaseStudyofHaiti—Thomas Gurtner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Participants List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Table of ConTenTs

WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009

Disclaimer: This report captures the substance of discussions over two days, research studies and reflection papers. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.

v

The World Food Programme (WFP) convened a two-day conference on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies in June 2009, inviting United Nations officials, academics, thinkers and practitioners to join senior staff and country directors and consider how WFP can meet the needs of vulnerable communities in the shifting humanitarian context of conflicts and complex emergencies.

foreword

Theconferencewasorganizedasafollow-uptoWFP’s2001FoodAidinConflictworkshop,

whichhadsparkedalivelyinternaldebateastohowWFPrespondstocomplexemergenciesand

wasanimportantstepinshapingWFP’spolicyandoperationsindifficultenvironments .

ThesettingsinwhichWFPoperateshavechangedsignificantlysince2001 .The2009

conferencewasthereforeavaluableopportunityforWFPtore-examinestrategiesforreducing

hungerandachievingfoodsecurityincomplexemergencies .Italsoprovidedanopportunityto

seekguidanceonoperationalizingthetoolsandinstrumentsoutlinedintheWFPStrategicPlan

(2008–2011) .

Theconferenceopenedon24June,the125thanniversaryoftheBattleofSolferino,whichled

tothefoundingoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentmovementsandtheGenevaConventions .This

madeitafittinganniversaryforhumanitarianactorstoreflectonnewchallengestotheprinciples

ofneutralityandimpartialityandnewriskstotheirsafetyandsecurity .Afghanistan,Ethiopia,

PakistanandtheSudan,whichareamongWFP’slargestandbest-fundedoperations,allprovide

starkexamplesofthecomplexityoftheworkingenvironmentsinwhichhumanitarianactorsare

engaged .Togiveonlyoneexample,WFPworkedwiththemilitaryinPakistantorespondtothe

massiveearthquakeinKashmirin2005,arelationshipthattodaygeneratesseriousreflections

abouttheperceptionofourneutralityasweworkinthecountry’swar-affectedfrontierareas .

TheobjectivesoftheJune2009conferencewerethreefold:

• totakestockoftrendsandcutting-edgetheoryonthenatureofconflictand

complexemergencies;

• toexaminehumanitarianresponsestooperationalandprogrammaticchallengesinconflict

settings;and

• toidentifystrategiesforWFPandthehumanitariancommunityforenhancinghumanitarian

actionandadvocacy .

AseriesofpresentationsinthefirstpartoftheconferenceunderthetitleOverviewof

TheoryandTrendswasfollowedbyadebateabouttheimplicationsforWFP’sprogramming

andoperations .Thesecondpartoftheconference—CriticalAreasofEngagementand

OperationalEffectiveness—consistedofdiscussiongroups .Thegroupsdiscussingcriticalareas

ofengagementtackledthefollowingissues:(i)UnitedNationsandintegratedmissions,andtheir

impactonhumanitarianspace;(ii)non-stateactorsandsecurity,andtheirimpactonhumanitarian

space;and(iii)protection,therightsagenda,principledhumanitarianactionandadvocacy .


vi

Thegroupsdiscussingoperationaleffectivenessfocusedon:(i)understandingandreaching

outtocommunities;(ii)planning,preparednessandresponseincomplexemergencies;and(iii)

programminginprotractedcrises,includingsustainabilityissuesandexitstrategies .

Inpreparationfortheconference,WFPcommissionedtheHumanitarianPolicyGroupofthe

OverseasDevelopmentInstitutetoconductaliteraturereviewofcurrentconflicttrendsandthe

implicationsforWFPprogramming .ExternalexpertsandWFPstaffalsoconductedareviewof

WFP’spoliciesandprogrammesinprotractedcrisesfrom2000to2009,andcarriedoutin-depth

casestudiesofWFP’soperationsincomplexemergencies .Thesedocumentsformthesubsequent

chaptersoftheReportoftheConference .Pleasenotethatviewsexpressedinthisreportdonot

necessarilyreflecttheofficialpositionofWFP .

WewishtoexpressourgratitudeforthegenerousfundingoftheInstitutionalSupport

PartnershipGrantoftheUnitedKingdomDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,whichmade

theconferenceandthecasestudiespossible .

Ramiro Lopes da Silva

WFP Deputy Chief Operating Officer and Director of Emergencies


1

Executive Summary and Recommendations1

The conference on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies generated two days of rich discussions, culminating in a set of actionable steps and ways forward.1 This summary outlines the thematic debates and gives an overview of the main recommendations.2

1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to individual participants.

2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.

executive summary and Recommendations

1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to individual participants.



—humanitarian,developmental,politicaland

humanrights—canbedifficulttoalignandare

sometimesuncomfortablysqueezedtogether

inanintegratedagenda .Severalparticipants

arguedthattheflexibleapproachadoptedby

theSecretary-Generalof“integrationwhenfea-

sible”or“integrationwhendesirable”or“inte-

grationadaptedtothesetting”maybepossible

intheory,butithasyettobeimplemented .

Conferenceparticipantsemphasizedthat

engagementintoday’scomplexemergencies,

withtheirsocio-politicalandculturaldynam-

ics,hasaprofoundimpactontheperceptions

ofagenciesandpersonnelontheground .At

thesametime,recipientanddonorstateshave

becomeincreasinglysophisticatedincreat-

inganti-humanitarianspacebymanipulating

humanitarianpersonnel,makingaccessfor

humanitariangroupsselectiveandcontrolling

theflowofinformationtohumanitarianactors

andthemedia .Statesarequicktosubordinate

humanitarianagendastopoliticalagendas,

forexampleinthenowpartiallydiscredited

“waronterror .”Andonthehumanitarianside,

agenciesareoftentoowillingtoconcedeon

humanitarianprinciplesormuffletheiradvocacy

toensurecontinuedaccesstovulnerableareas

—astrategythatmayyieldimmediatebenefits

butbeharmfulinthelongterm .

Theconferencealsofocusedonthemulti-

plicationofhumanitarianassistanceactors .An

increaseinwesternandnon-westerndonors

Theincreaseincivilconflictsinthepost-

ColdWarerahasledtoadramaticincrease

indeathandsufferingamongcivilians .This

shiftintheprofileofvictimsofwar,alongwith

theexpansionofpeace-keepingandpeace-

enforcementoperations,hasbroughthumani-

tarianworkersoutfromtheperipheryandinto

theheartofconflicts .Thedynamicsofinterna-

tionalinterventionaroundtheworldshiftedin

thewakeof9/11andtheensuingwaronterror .

Oneoutcomeofthisshifthasbeenincreased

targetingofhumanitarianworkers:notonlyare

humanitarianactorsworkingclosertoconflicts

—theyarenowbeingintentionallytargeted

andthehumanitarianspaceisconsequently

diminished .Aconsensusemergedduringthe

conferencethathumanitarianactorsmustap-

plymoreinnovativethinkingandapproaches

intheirworktoestablishawiderandmorepre-

dictablehumanitarianspace .

Inthecontextofthesechanges,thenew

modesofengagementoftheUnitedNations

havefavouredintegratedmissions .Although

theyhaveastabilizationpurpose,thesemis-

sionsposeconstraints—realorperceived—on

humanitarianagenciesinareassuchasadapt-

ability,neutralityandcoherenceofmessaging .

Thefour-foldobjectivesoftheUnitedNations


andmajororganizations,alongwithemerg-

ingpoliticalpowers,hasmadecoordinationof

commonmessagingmorecomplex .Ithasalso

allowedhostgovernmentstobenefitbyplaying

groupsoffagainstoneanother .Andthefragil-

ityofsomestatesincomplexemergencieshas

ledtoanincreaseinnegotiationswithnon-state

actors,whichfurtherreducesconsistencyof

approachanddemandsuniquestrategiesto

balancevariousinterests .

Anumberofmajorrecommendationsfor

WFPemergedduringtheconference:

• Developguidanceondeliveringhumanitar-

ianaidinpoliticallychargedenvironments,

includingclarityastotheapplicationof

humanitarianprinciples .WFPshouldtake

intoaccountthepoliticalconstraintsin

eachofitscomplexoperationsandstriveto

definetheminimumacceptableconditions

foritsinterventionsanddevelopguidance

tohelpcountryofficestoidentifytherange

oftoolsavailable—fromnegotiatingac-

cess,tovariouslevelsofadvocacy,towith-

holdingassistance—toensurethatsuch

conditionsaremaintained .

• Enhanceanalyticalabilitiesatthefieldlevel

tounderstandthecausesbehindcrisesand

theregionalandlocalcontextsinwhich

WFPworks .Feedbackloops—inparticular

utilizinginformationfromoperations,staff

andpartners—shouldbeusedtokeep

thecontextanalysiscurrent,andensure

clearandconsistentunderstandingofthe

dynamicsofacrisis,theactorsinvolvedand

theiragenda .Contextanalysisisnecessary

toshapeapproachesandtypesofassist-

anceintheeventofsudden-onsetemer-

gencies;itbecomesevenmorecrucialin

casesofpersistentconflict .

• ReiterateWFP’scommitmenttotheprotec-

tionofitsbeneficiariesandtheircommuni-

ties,forexamplebyexplaininghowprotec-

tionrelatestoitshungermandateandby

definingthelimitsofitspotentialcontribu-

tiontotheprotectionofcivilians .Develop

bestpracticesandclearguidanceonways

toinstitutionalizeprotectioninWFP’spro-

gramming,forexamplebygivingmore

trainingtostaffandseniormanagement .

• Workmorecloselywithnationalnon-gov-

ernmentalorganizations,community-based

organizationsandreligiousleaders,and

encouragethemtotakepartinprogram-

minganddecision-making .Recognizein

practicethatorganizationshavetheirown

capacities,identitiesandflexibility,andre-

frainfrombuildingthemintotheimageof

theUnitedNationsandWFP .

• DeterminethedegreetowhichWFP

prioritizesparticipationinanintegrated

approach,becausesuchparticipation

canimpactperceptionsofneutralityand

independence .WFPshouldconsiderwhen

andhowitmightbeappropriateto“de-

brand”itselffromUnitedNationsorother

politicalandmilitarymissions .Reflect

furtherwithotherdual-mandatepartners

ontheextenttowhichthisispossiblefor

aUnitedNationsagencyandhowitmight

beachieved .

• Developabroaderapproachtoprogram-

mingthatinvolvesmoreinvestmentin

humanitarianpreparedness,includingre-

sponsetoclimatechange .

3

Conference Report

Challenges of Humanitarian Action in Conflicts and Complex Emergencies3

3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. The themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the conference agenda on page 135. Trends in Conflict and Complex Emergencies4

Theconferenceopenedwithasessionon

thegeo-politicsofthelastdecadeandtheac-

companyingrapidshiftsinthehumanitarian

context,notablyincomplexemergenciesand

conflicts .Today’sinternalconflictsaremostly

motivatedbystrugglesforcontrolofpowerand

resourcesratherthanthemorehistoricalgoals

ofstate-buildingandstatecontroloverre-

sources .Withmoreandmorecivilwarsrelative

tointernationalwars,thenumberofinternally

displacedpeoplehassignificantlyincreased;

andthemajorityofdeathsinthesenewwars

arecivilian .

Humanitarianassistancewillcontinueto

beshapedbycivilconflictsamongaprolifera-

tionofarmedgroups .Presenterspredictedthat

insurgencies—groupsvyingforthesupport

ofciviliansandcontrolofterritory—andtheir

tactics,whichincludetheburningofvillages,

forcedmigrationandterrortacticssuchassui-

cidebombing—willbecomemorecommonin

thefuture,particularlyinfragilestates .

Newdriversofconflictsuchasclimate

changearealsolikelytoemerge .Theinterna-

tionalsystemwillstruggletorespondtomore

frequentsudden-onsetemergenciescaused

byextremeweather,butthecumulativeeffects

ofclimatechange—resourcescarcitysuchas


decreasedavailabilityofwaterforagricultural

production,anddiseaseandmassmigration

—couldbemoredetrimental,forexample

throughkindlingorexacerbatingconflicts,even

iftheyarelessimmediatelyperceptible .

Theconsensusamongthepresenterswas

thattheneedforhumanitarianactionwillbe

greaterinthefutureandthathumanitarianac-

torswillneedtobebetterpreparedforthe

combinationofconflictandnaturaldisasterand

theincreasingcomplexityofconflict .

Humanitarian Space and Humanitarian Action

Thechangingnatureofconflictshasim-

mediaterepercussionsforthehumanitarianop-

eratingenvironment .Asonepresenternoted:

“ . . .gonearethedaysofthepristineemergency

suchasthefaminesinEthiopiaandSudanin

themid1980s:we’renowinwhatonecouldcall

second-generationemergenciesthatarecom-

plexineverysense .”

Inthecontextofthesenewcomplex

emergencies,thepresentationshighlighted

threefactorsthathavecontributedtothe

shrinkingofhumanitarianspace,including:i)

thesophisticatedstrategiesofgovernments

andrebelgroupsincarvingoutanti-humani-

tarianspace;ii)thesubordinationofhumani-

tarianactivitiestopoliticalagendas;andiii)

theshortcomingsofhumanitarianagenciesin

defendingtheirspace .

Statesandrebelgroupsareincreasingly

adeptatmanipulatinghumanitarianaidbycon-

trollinghumanitarianworkersandtheflowof

3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. The themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the conference agenda on page 135.




informationbygivingselectiveaccess,offering

onlyselectedbitsofinformationandplaying

humanitarianagenciesoffagainsteachother .

Presentersarguedthattherearelessonstobe

learnedfromthesetactics,forexamplethose

usedbytheGovernmentofSudaninDarfur,

andfromIsraelandtheUnitedStatesastohow

informationisshaped .

Humanitarianassistanceisalsoattimes

hijackedbypoliticalandsecurityagendas .Gov-

ernmentshaveusedtherhetoricofthe“waron

terror”togainpoliticalandfinancialsupport:

forexampleSriLankapresenteditsactions

againsttheLiberationTigersofTamilEelamas

partofthewaronterrorandalsoclaimingits

actionswereindefenceofnationalsovereignty .

Governmentsarealsolessreliantonaidfrom

theWest:Asiancountries,Chinainparticular

andincreasinglytheGulfstates,offeralterna-

tiveeconomicresourceswithoutthetiesof

traditionaldonors,whichincludecallsforadher-

encetohumanitarianprinciples .

Atthesametimethehumanitariancom-

munityhasnotbeenpreparedtodefendits

ownspace,makingiteasierfornationalgovern-

mentstostage-managethesystem .Evenin

complexconflictenvironments,humanitarian

assistancecontinuestobeapproachedinmany

casesasatechnicalproblemfollowinganatural

disastermodelthatcalculatesneedsandshort-

falls—butneglectstheirsocio-politicalroots .

Applying Humanitarian Principles: General and Operational Challenges

Humanitarianactorstryingtoapplythe

principlesofneutrality,impartialityandinde-

pendenceandtodefendhumanitarianspace

confrontnumerousdilemmas .Atthebroadest

level,themoralityandvalueofadheringtothe

principles—inparticulara“purist”humanitar-

ianapproach—isbeingchallenged,especially

inthecontextof“with-us-or-against-us”rhetoric

andthetacticsofterrorismandanti-terrorism .

Amoreoperationalandpersistentdi-

lemmaistheinnertensionbetweenadhering

tohumanitarianprinciplesandservingthehu-

manitarianimperative,particularlyinrelationto

access .Agenciesareconfrontedwithdifferent

situations:denialofaccesswhennotperceived

asneutral,asinDarfur;compromisingneutrality

andimpartialitytogainaccess,asinSriLanka;

andtradingadvocacyforaccessindealingwith

governments,asinMyanmar .

Ageneraldilemmaidentifiedbypartici-

pantsarisesfromtheincreasingintegrationof

militaryandpoliticalissuesandaidapproaches

intheUnitedNationsunderitsintegratedmis-

sionpolicyandinthepoliciesofmajordonor

countriesandorganizationssuchastheNorth

AtlantictreatyOrganizationandtheEuropean

Union .Peace-buildingandnation-buildingare

bynaturepoliticalprocesses,andtheparticipa-

tionofhumanitarianactorsinthoseprocesses

—especiallyUnitedNationsorganizationsand

NGOswithdualhumanitariananddevelopment

mandates—canaccordingtosomejeopardize

humanitarianobjectives .Thequestionwasalso

discussedinthesessionon“OneUN”andinte-

gration,coveredbelow .

Applying Humanitarian Principles: Immediate and Operational Dilemmas

Aidagenciesalsofaceimmediatedilem-

maswhenattemptingtoapplyahuman-rights

orprotectionapproach .Inthisrespect,onepre-

senterarguedthatagenciesnotonlyundermine

theirneutralitybutalsofailtoactdisinterested-

lywhentheytradeadvocacyonhumanrightsor

aprotection-centredapproachinexchangefor

access,whichcanbringresourcesandvisibility

forexample .Thissendssignalsofunhealthy

compromiseinternationallyandlocallyand

becomesdangerousforhumanitarianactors .It

wasalsonotedthatlessonsarelearnedbyabu-

siveactors,oftenmorequicklythanbyhumani-

tariangroups .Ultimately,itwasargued,the

humanitariancommunityneedstoassessthe

signalsitissendingoutandtherepercussions

ofthoseactionsonfuturenegotiations .One

contributorremarkedthatthemoralauthority

ofagencieshasweakenedasaresultoffailings

todefendtheirstatedprinciples;thisincludes

WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 5

non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)and

UnitedNationsorganizationswhoseagendas

areperceivedtobetoocomfortablyaligned

withtheinterestsofmajordonors .

Otherspositionedthevalueofneutrality

foragenciesatagloballevel .Itwasargued

thatreliefagenciesmustthinkbeyondanalysis

oftheirpresentbehaviourinagivencountry

andtheirneedtobeperceivedasneutralin

thatcontext .Agenciesshouldadoptamore

nuancedunderstandingofhowtheyarelinked

toandassociatedwithotheractorsandevents

andhowthoselinkageswillhaverepercussions

wellintothefutureandacrosscontinents .The

invasionofIraq,forexample,harmedpercep-

tionsoftheWestandthoseassociatedwiththe

Westandtheirlegitimacybycreatingtheim-

pressionamongmanythattheydonotabideby

internationallaw .

Otherparticipantsofferedamoreutilitarian

perspectiveonthevalueofneutrality .Inreal-

ity,humanitarianprinciplesdonotdetermine

whetherhumanitarianactorsaregrantedaccess:

thekeyfactorfordetermininghumanitarian

spaceisinfactahumanitarianactor’suseful-

ness .Theserviceorcommodityprovidedbythe

reliefagencymustbeperceivedasbeingbenefi-

cialtothosewhograntaccessorcontrolbound-

aries:theseincludemedicalservicesandfood

forcombatantsandtheirfamilies,salaries,provi-

sionofcarsortaxis,andthelegitimacyafforded

togovernmentsornon-stategroupswithwhom

negotiationsarecarriedout .Forprinciplestobe

pursued,reliefagenciesmustfirstbeperceived

asuseful—aprerequisitefordialoguewith

armedgroupsastoaccess .Thechallengeisto

findanacceptablecompromisebetweenthe

politicaloreconomicinterestsofthosewhocon-

trolaccessandthepoliciesofdelivery .

Someparticipantsassertedthathumani-

tarianprinciplesarenotgoalsinthemselves,

butratherameanstoattainsafeandsecure

accessinordertoservethegreatergoalofthe

humanitarianimperative .Inviewofthis,neutral-

ityshouldbeconstantlypursued;butfailureto

achieveitfullyshouldnotbeanimpedimentto

action .Itwasalsonotedthatitisunlikelythat

theobjectiveofhumanitycanbeservedfor

longinaconflictcontextwithouttheprinciple

ofneutrality .

Perceptions of Humanitarian WorkersThegreaternumbersofattacksonhu-

manitarianworkersinrecentyearshasledto

greaterrelianceonremoteimplementationof

aidthroughlocalcontractswhileUnitedNa-

tionsstaffremaininfortifiedofficesorhousing

complexesorinneighbouringcountries .This

“bunkerization”ischaracterizedbyhumanitar-

ianactorsretreatingfromplacesdeclaredrisky

bytheUnitedNationsDepartmentofSafety

andSecurity .Asaresult,accordingtoone

presenter:“ . . .theUnitedNationsisfailinginits

attemptstobeknown .Butlikewise,theUnited

Nationsisfailingtoknowthesocialandlocal

environmentsinwhichitworks .”Thisdistance

fromcommunitiesmayalsobecontributing

totheperceptioninsomeinsecurecountries

thattheUnitedNationsistoomuchassociated

withaWesternpoliticalagenda .Unfortunately,

thehumanitariansystemhastooinfrequently

compensatedforitslossofstaffpresencewith

adequateinvestmentinenhancementofthe

capacitiesofitslocalpartnersortolisteningto

theagendasoflocalandregionalactors .

Someparticipantsalsoexpressedconcern

thattheperceptionofhumanitarianworkers

issufferingasaresultoftheirassociationwith

“coalition”forcesand/orUnitedNationsinte-

gratedmissions .

One-UN and Integrated Missions Participantsrevealedawiderangeofviews

onandunderstandingofUnitedNationsin-

tegratedmissions .Accordingtoanumberof

speakers,politicalagendas,compromisesor

agreementssupportedbytheleadershipof

aUnitedNationsmissionmaytrumpneeds-

based,humanitariandecision-making .Accord-

ingtothisargument,thehumanitarianagenda

oftenlosesouttothepoliticalagenda,neutral-

ityiscompromisedand,ultimately,humanitar-


ianactorshavelessaccessandarelesseffective

indeliveringaidandsavinglives .Somepartici-

pantsarguedthatUnitedNationsintegrated

missionsexemplifythissubordinationofthe

humanitarianagenda;otherscounteredthat

integratedmissionscanbeanopportunityto

enhancehumanitarianwork,andthatharmto

thehumanitarianagendaasaresultofUnited

Nationsintegratedmissionsisexaggeratedor

notsupportedbyevidence .

Therewassomedisagreementastowheth-

ertheUnitedNationsSecretary-General’stwo

guidancenotesonintegratedmissionstendto

advanceintegrationasagoalinitselfratherthan

asameanstoanend .Theexpulsionofaidagen-

ciesfromtheSudanwascitedasanexample

thatpoliticalandreliefobjectivesarenotalways

compatible .TheUnitedNations,accordingto

thisargument,hasfourbasicinstrumentsthat

itcanbringtobearinacomplexemergency:

(i)political/military;(ii)humanitarian;(iii)human

rights,andtruthandjustice;and(iv)develop-

ment .Itwasstressedthatalthoughthereareex-

ampleswheretheseinstrumentsreinforceeach

otherasinSierraLeoneandLiberia,theysome-

timesarenotfullycomplementary .Thefour

componentsareinaveryunstablerelationship

withoneanother,especiallywithintheconfines

ofconflict .Itwasthereforearguedthatintegra-

tionshouldnotbeanoverarchinggoalorthe

defaultsetting,butratheroneofseveralpossi-

bleconfigurationsthatshouldbeconsidered .

MovingbeyondUnitedNationsintegration,

oneparticipantdiscussedthenegativeimpact

ofthecoherenceagendamoregenerally,cit-

ingtheexampleofhearts-and-mindstacticsin

militarycampaigns .Theexchangeofmaterial

orreliefgoodsforinformationandpolitical

supporthas,accordingtothisargument,en-

dangeredhumanitarianactors .InAfghanistan,

forexample,thedeliveryoffoodassistanceby

someforeignmilitaryforcesincivilianclothing

hasblurredthelinesbetweenhumanitarianac-

torsandthemilitary .

Othersadvocatedcoherence,arguingthat

thoseinvolvedinaid,politics,trade,diplomacy

andmilitaryactivitiesshouldworktowardscom-

moninterestsofpeace,stabilityanddevelop-

ment,andthatcoherenceisthemosteffective

wayofachievinglong-termstability .Recent

UnitedNationsreformprovidesanopportunity

foragenciessuchasWFPtobenefitfrombeing

partofacoherentoverallUnitedNationsstrat-

egythatcouldultimatelyincreasetheefficiency

andeffectivenessofeachagency’sassistance .

Goodcoordinationbringswithitcoherentdivi-

sionoflabour,enhancedinformationflowsand

sharingoflessonslearnedandgoodpractices .

Therewas,however,somescepticismwith

regardtocoherenceandcoordination .Some

participantspointedoutthattheUnitedNations

hasatendencytocreatemechanismsforthe

“coordinationofcoordinationbodies”—most

recentlywiththeclustersystem .Theusefulidea

ofcoordinationinsteadbecomesafashionable

buzzword,duplicationofrolesensuesand,in

certaincases,acollective“de-responsibiliza-

tion”isthefinaloutcome .Integratedmissions

alsopresentdifficultchallengesintermsofinter-

agencycommunicationandcoordination .

Thepracticeofabsorbingadvocacyforhu-

manrightsandtheprotectionofciviliansinto

humanitarianandpeacekeepingagendaswas

alsoquestioned .Somehumanitarianactorsbe-

lievethatadvocacyforhumanrightscanthreat-

enthecoreagendaofhumanitarianactionby

closingthedooronpoliticalalliancesnecessary

foraccessanddelivery .

Theneedforbetterevidenceastotheim-

pactofintegratedmissionsonhumanitarianac-

tionwasnoted,aswastheneedforbettercom-

municationtodispelexistingbiasesandfalse

perceptions .Operationalactorsurgedmore

accessibledecision-makingprocessesatUnited

NationsHeadquartersonintegratedmissions,

includinggreateraccessforcountryofficesof

theoperationalagencies,sothatanorganiza-

tionsuchasWFPmightproperlyintegrateits

missionwithNewYork .Atpresent,theUnited

NationsSecretariatmissionprocessesrequire

adegreeofstaffcommitmentthatoperational

agencieshavetroublemaintaining,especially


thosenotheadquarteredinNewYork:thisin

turnmakesitdifficulttobringintheviewsof

operationalactorsontheground .

Critical Areas of Engagement: Proposed Tools and Strategies in the Face of New Challenges — Breakout Sessions of the Conference

• Prioritizinglocalengagement .

• Applyingtheprotectionlens .

• Engagingstateandnon-stateactorsand

thehumanitarianprinciples .

• Effectiverecoveryprogramming .

Prioritizing Local EngagementBecauseofitsfinancingmodel,theabsolute

quantityofaidthatWFPcandeliverhasoverthe

yearsbeenanimportantinstitutionalincentive .

ItmayalsobeafactorinWFP’sdecisiontoin-

vestmoreinincreasingitslogisticscapacitythan

itsprogrammingapproachesandquality .Ama-

jorityofparticipantsemphasizedthedrawbacks

ofalogistics-drivenapproachbyWFP,whichhas

resultedinrelativelyweakanalysisofthecontext

ofitsoperations,aninabilitytoreachoutmore

tocommunitiesaspartofitsprogrammingproc-

essandalackofunderstandingofthelinkages

betweenfoodassistanceandprotection .

NGOsandcommunity-basedorganizations

areessentialtoeffectiveWFPprogrammeimple-

mentationandpresence .Andyetacrossdiffer-

entremote-managementmodalitiesincomplex

emergencies,WFPhasnotinvestedenoughin

enhancingthecapacitiesofitspartners .Some

participantsarguedthatinsufficientattention

hasbeenplacedontheagendasoflocalactors

andpartners .ThisknowledgegaplimitsWFP’s

understandingofhowassistanceisperceived

andusedbydifferentactorsontheground .

Muchofthediscussionduringthissession

centredontheopportunitiesandchallengesof

partneringwithIslamicorganizationsandcom-

munityleaders .PartneringwithIslamicorgani-

zationscanhelpwithlocalacceptance,build

thecapacityoftheorganizationsandenhance

thesecurityofreliefworkers .However,aswith

allpartners,anuancedunderstandingoftheir

politicalagendasandtheircapacitytoensure

accountabilityisnecessary .

Incomplexsettingswithaccessconstraints,

listeningandreachingoutwithlocalcoop-

eratingpartnersisespeciallyimportantand

canyieldsignificantbenefitsforhumanitarian

outcomes .TheexampleofCycloneNargisin

Myanmarwascited,inwhichinternationalac-

torsfacedsevereaccessconstraints;localand

nationalactors,however,wereempoweredwith

internationalresourcesandweretherebyable

todeliveradequateassistance .Localpartners

areoftenbroughtintoplanningprocesses—in

parttodemonstratetransparency—butthese

sameorganizationsoftencomplainof“being

used”tosatisfyminimaldonorandagencypoli-

cies .Instead,theirexistingstrengthsshouldbe

understoodanddeployed,andmoresystematic

effortsshouldbemadetoincreasetheircapac-

ity .Effortstoenhancethecapacitiesoflocal

cooperatingpartnersremainpredominantly

un-coordinated .

Arecurringthemeofthesessiononlocal

engagementwasthathumanitarianactorscan

achievetheirobjectivesbetterbybeingbetter

listeners .Andalthoughlisteningwellhaslong

beenastapleofstandardhumanitarianpolicy,it

neverthelessstillrequiresashiftinorganization-

alcultureinmanymajorhumanitarianorganiza-

tions .Animportantcomponentofa“listening

culture”isunderstandingmoreclearlyhow

humanitarianactorsareperceivedbycommuni-

tiesandadjustingouroperationsandassist-

anceaccordingly .

Reallocalengagementisalsoaprerequi-

siteforunderstandingcontextsandpeople’s

vulnerabilitiesandcopingmechanisms,andisa

potentiallycrucialtoolinensuringthesafetyof

aidworkers .

Applying a Protection Lens Inrecentyears,WFPhasbeenincreasingly

engagedinimprovingitscapacitytocontribute

totheprotectionofciviliansinthecontextofits


foodassistanceprogramming .Thenatureand

dimensionsofthis“protectiveassistance”was

discussed .Therewasageneralconsensusthat,

ataminimum,thereisaneedtoenhancequali-

tativeprogrammingbyengagingmorewith

communitiesandbystressing“donoharm”

whenengagedinfoodassistance .Therewas

alsoagreementthattheprovisionoffoodcan

serveassignificantleveragetoinfluenceactors

positivelyandhelptoensurethatbeneficiaries

aretreatedinasafeanddignifiedmanner .

Itwassuggestedthataprotectionap-

proachforanassistanceagencyisgenerally

consistentwitharights-basedapproach—one

thatadvocatesfortherealizationofpeople’s

rightsandrecognizesandtriestomitigate

violationsandthreatstorights,forexampleby

helpingstatestomeettheirobligations .Apro-

tectionapproachsuchasthis,integratedinto

programming,sendsclearermessagestostate

andnon-stateactors,therebyshieldingpeople

andcommunitiesfromabusesmoreeffectively .

Protectionactivitiescanalsolinkbeneficiaries

closertoagenciesandhelptoestablishdown-

wardsaccountabilityforhumanitarianactors .

Conferenceparticipantsconcludedthata

greatereffortshouldbemadetoclarifyWFP’s

roleinprotection—alsowithregardtothepro-

tection-mandatedagencies—andthatWFP’s

potentialcontributionstoprotectionaswellas

itslimitationsshouldbebetterdocumented .

Participantsalsosuggestedthatacleardefini-

tionofprotectionforWFPshouldbeaccompa-

niedbyguidanceonhowandtowhatextenta

protectionapproachshouldbeutilizedindif-

ferentcontexts .Suchguidanceshouldtakeinto

accounttherisksandtensionsthatcomewith

engaginginprotectionissues,particularlypos-

sibleconsequencesforaccessandstaffsecurity,

especiallynationalstaff .Someparticipantsalso

cautionedagainstre-inventingtoolswhileadopt-

ingaprotectionlens;ratheritwassuggested

thatexistingtoolssuchasparticipatorymethods

bemergedintoaprotectionapproach .There

wasastrongrecommendationamongpartici-

pantsthatWFPshouldcontinueandexpandits

ongoingtrainingprogrammeonprotectionand

thateffortsshouldbemadetoincludecountry

directors,otherfieldmanagersandseniorHead-

quartersstaff .Bettersensitizationontheground

shouldalsobeaccompaniedbythedevelop-

mentofclearerguidanceonhowtoinstitutional-

izeprotectioninWFP’sprogramming .

Toenhanceprotectioninprogramming,a

numberofparticipantsproposedtheideaof

forgingbetterlinkagesbetweenlivelihoodsand

protectioninconflictenvironments .Comple-

mentarylivelihoodsandprotectionworkwould

meanthatpeople’seconomicvulnerabilities

andtheirpoliticalvulnerabilitiesareaddressed .

Itwasalsopointedoutthatthisapproachwould

allowWFPtooperateatmultiplelevels:ad-

dressingorpreventingviolationsthataffectthe

protectionandlivelihoodsofthepopulationas

wellasrespondingtotheconsequencesofthe

violationsthroughdirectassistance .

Engaging State and Non-State Actors and the Humanitarian Principles

Participantsdiscussedtheever-presentpro-

grammatictensionbetweenadheringtohumani-

tarianprinciplesandservingthehumanitarian

imperative,withsomespeculationthatprinciples

areincreasinglybeingcompromised .According

toWFPparticipantsandothers,WFP’sactions

inthisdilemmaareinconsistent:humanitarian

principlestendtobeoverruledbytheshort-term

humanitarianimperativeoffooddelivery .But

importantexceptionsexist:forexampleWFP’s

worktomaintainapositionofneutralityinSo-

maliawascited .SeveraloftheseniorWFPstaff

calledforfurtherclarityonexistingpoliciesand

programmingandespeciallyontheextentto

whichprincipledstancestakeninthefieldwillbe

supportedbyWFPleadersatHeadquarters .

Asenseamongparticipantsofincreased

instrumentalizationofaidbystateandnon-

stateactorshighlightstheneedtounderstand

andemployhumanitarianprinciplesinadvocacy

andnegotiations .Itisnecessarytoidentifybot-

tomlinesandminimumoperationalstandards

innegotiatingaccess,becausefailedthreatsto


withdrawandwithholdassistancecannegative-

lyimpactthecredibilityoftheUnitedNations .

Betterunderstandingofthespectrumoflever-

ageavailabletohumanitarianactorswillfurther

assistinnegotiations .

TherealityofWFP’sworkmakesestablish-

ingandsustainingaperceptionofneutralitydif-

ficult,forexamplein:i)transportingfoodover

longdistancesthroughinsecureareas,which

oftenrequiresanarmedmilitaryescort;andii)

WFP’sdualmandateofreliefanddevelopment

—thelatterlinksWFPwithgovernmentobjec-

tivesandprogrammes .

Non-WFPparticipantsemphasizedthe

importanceofWFPengagingonissuesofhu-

manitarianprinciples,stressingitsstrongpoliti-

calleverage .WFPhasaspecialroletoplayin

takingaprincipledapproach,givenitssizeand

influence .Oneparticipantstressedthatitmat-

terstogovernmentsifWFPis“intheroom,or

outsidetheroom .”

Noconsensuswasreachedastowhether

ornotWFPshoulddistributefoodwhere

principlessuchasimpartialityandneutrality

cannotbemet .Somearguedthatthisshould

beaddressedatthepolicyleveltodetermine

theextenttowhichconditionalitycanbeused

whilenegotiatingaccess;othersstressedthat

auniformpolicywasunlikelytobepractical .

Participantsdidagreethatthedecisiontouse

WFP’sleveragetopushforprincipleshastobe

context-specific;theyalsoagreedthatitmat-

terstoWFP’slong-termcredibilitytodoso

whenappropriate .Itwasalsonotedthatthere

areinstitutionaldriverssuchasthetonnage-

basedapproachtofundingthatmakeitdifficult

forWFPtotakeaprincipledstance .

WithregardtoUnitedNationsintegrated

missionsandhumanitarianprinciples,some

participantsfeltthattheimplementationof

integratedmissionsthreatenstoweakenthe

addedvaluethatUnitedNationshumanitarian

agenciescanbringtoavolatilesituation,and

—whichisimportant—adverselyaffectthe

efficientdeploymentoftheirvariousresources .

Otherquestionswereraisedaboutthefeasibili-

tyofhumanitarianagenciessimultaneouslypur-

suingthetwogoalsof:i)workingaseffective

membersofintegratedmissions;andii)enhanc-

ingtheirinternational“brand”asprincipled

humanitarianactors,forexamplebyreaffirming

theircoremandates .

ItwassuggestedthatWFPdevelopamore

nuancedapproachtoUnitedNationsintegra-

tionandeducateWFPstaffmorefullyaboutthe

objectives,flexibilityandoptionsinaUnited

Nationsintegratedapproach .Inparticular,WFP

shouldconsiderwhenandhowitmightbeap-

propriatepartiallyto“un-brand”itselffrom

UnitedNationsorotherpoliticalormilitaryac-

torsandreflectfurtherwithotherdual-mandate

partnersontheextenttowhichthisispossible

foraUnitedNationsagency .

Effective Recovery ProgrammingDespitesuccessinavertingfamine,there

arestillmajorweaknessesinemergencyop-

erationsandinrecoverystrategies .Current

analysesofcrisestendtoemphasizethemag-

nitudeofacrisisbutdonotalwaysconsiderthe

causesortherisksassociatedwithintervention .

Abroaderprogrammaticapproachinformed

bypowerandwealthrealitiesisfundamentalto

understandingwherevulnerabilitieslieandwhy .

Assessmentsandanalysisinemergency,

rapid-responseandprotractedengagement

needtobeimproved,buttherewerealsosug-

gestionsthatWFPshouldcarryouthonest

assessmentsofitsowncapabilitiesandtobe

modestinitsrecoveryprogrammingwhenap-

propriate .Realisticdialogue,planningandcol-

laborationarehinderedbyunrealisticexpecta-

tionsinupstreamanddownstreamprogrammes

—earlywarningandhand-overs—andthe

characteristicsofcertainprogrammaticcatego-

riessuchasanassumptionofrecoverybeing

linearandalackofsecuremedium-termand

longer-termfundingintheprotractedreliefand

recoveryoperation(PRRO)category .

Contextualanalysisofneedsandcapacity

isbestunderstoodthroughthemediumofre-

lationships .Approachingcommunitieswithout

10

anagendaandlisteningtotheirvoicesarean

importantwayofreachingout .Toooften,hu-

manitarianactorsarequicktooffersolutionsor

setupfocusgroupswithoutexploringwhether

therearegroupsorlocalcapacitiesalreadyin

place .Thisapproachoflistening,watchingand

workingwithcommunitystructuresenhances

understandingofandintegrationwithlocal

authorityandthedevelopmentofcommon

agendasofmutualco-existencebetweenlo-

calandinternationalorganizations .Tosome

extent,however,UnitedNationsstaffsecurity

restrictionsonpersonnelmovementscurtail

thismannerofinteractionwithcommunities

andmakeitdifficulttodevelopacoherent

understandingoflocaldynamicsandbuildup

longer-termrelationships .

Otherareasforimprovementwerehigh-

lightedsuchas:i)improvedtargetingintransi-

tionsituationsinordertocontinuetomeet

acuteneedsbutnotunderminepeople’sown

recoverymechanisms;ii)theneedtoencourage

theprocessofstateownership;andiii)better

monitoringofthechangingroleoflocalauthori-

tiesandthedynamicsoflocalpower .Another

crucialareaofengagementhighlightedasa

frequentweaknessinrecoverysituationsissuffi-

cientandmedium-termsupportforreturningor

integratingdisplacedpopulationswhiletaking

theneedsofhostcommunitiesintoaccount .

Inconclusion,itwasrecommendedbythe

participantsthatWFPreviewitsprogramme

categories,thePRROcategoryinparticular,

becausetheyrelyonassumptionsthatdonot

playoutinreality;thesituationineasternareas

oftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongowas

citedasanexample .Inparticular,WFPneedsto

re-thinkhand-overstrategiesinthelightofre-

alitiesontheground,includingcapacity,rather

thanbepressuredbydonorsandsometimesby

programmegovernmentstomovetooquickly

fromrelieftorecovery .Again,itwasrecom-

mendedthatgreaterinvestmentbemadein

contextanalysisandthatrecoveryinterventions

bedesignedthataddressunderlyingsocio-

politicaldynamics .

Recommendations for WFP Emerging from the Conference

OnemainWFPobjectiveinhostingthe

Conferencewastoseekrecommendationsfrom

itspartnersandinternationalexpertsforthe

Programme’sworkinconflictsandcomplexen-

vironments .Participantsfromtheplenaryand

variousbreakoutsessionswereaskedtosyn-

thesizediscussionsandtranslatethetalkinto

tangiblefutureactionsforWFP .Theresulting

recommendationsaresummarizedbelow:

• Developguidanceondeliveringhumanitar-

ianaidinpoliticallychargedenvironments,

includingclarityastotheapplicationof

humanitarianprinciples .WFPshouldtake

intoaccountthepoliticalconstraintsin

eachofitscomplexoperationsandstriveto

definetheminimumacceptableconditions

foritsinterventionsanddevelopguidance

tohelpcountryofficestoidentifytherange

oftoolsavailable—fromnegotiatingac-

cess,tovariouslevelsofadvocacy,towith-

holdingassistance—toensurethatsuch

conditionsaremaintained .

• Enhanceanalyticalabilitiesatthefieldlevel

tounderstandthecausesbehindcrisesand

theregionalandlocalcontextsinwhich

WFPworks .Feedbackloops—inparticular

utilizinginformationfromoperations,staff

andpartners—shouldbeusedtokeep

thecontextanalysiscurrent,andensure

clearandconsistentunderstandingofthe

dynamicsofacrisis,theactorsinvolvedand

theiragenda .Contextanalysisisnecessary

toshapeapproachesandtypesofassist-

anceintheeventofsudden-onsetemer-

gencies;itbecomesevenmorecrucialin

casesofpersistentconflict .

• ReiterateWFP’scommitmenttotheprotec-

tionofitsbeneficiariesandtheircommuni-

ties,forexamplebyexplaininghowprotec-

tionrelatestoitshungermandateandby

definingthelimitsofitspotentialcontribu-

tiontotheprotectionofcivilians .Develop

bestpracticesandclearguidanceonways

toinstitutionalizeprotectioninWFP’spro-



gramming,forexamplebygivingmore

trainingtostaffandseniormanagement .

• Workmorecloselywithnationalnon-gov-

ernmentalorganizations,community-based

organizationsandreligiousleaders,and

encouragethemtotakepartinprogram-

minganddecision-making .Recognizein

practicethatorganizationshavetheirown

capacities,identitiesandflexibility,andre-

frainfrombuildingthemintotheimageof

theUnitedNationsandWFP .

• DeterminethedegreetowhichWFPpri-

oritizesparticipationinanintegratedap-

proach,becausesuchparticipationcan

impactperceptionsofneutralityandinde-

pendence .WFPshouldconsiderwhenand

howitmightbeappropriateto“de-brand”

itselffromUnitedNationsorotherpolitical

andmilitarymissions .Reflectfurtherwith

otherdual-mandatepartnersontheextent

towhichthisispossibleforaUnitedNa-

tionsagencyandhowitmightbeachieved .

• Developabroaderapproachtoprogram-

mingthatinvolvesmoreinvestmentin

humanitarianpreparedness,includingre-

sponsetoclimatechange .

13

WfP’s Work in Complex emergencies and on-Going Conflicts: a Discussion note

The purpose of this note is to frame the debate on the World Food Programme’s strategic priorities and investments for more effective engagement in conflict situ-ations. Drawing on a set of case studies on the role of WFP in complex humanitar-ian crises,5 the note highlights some of the current problematic areas of opera-tions and programming with a view to outlining the possible short and long-term consequences of WFP’s strategy.6

5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009.


5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009.


for“deliveryfirst”—sometimesattheexpense

ofneutralityorimpartiality—haveyettobe

thoroughlyunderstood .

Operationalizing Coordination. Theor-

ganization’sleadershipinthelogisticscluster

hasbeenpraisedbyNGOsanddonorsasan

exampleofthepositivebenefitsofeffective

coordination,asWFPhasbeenabletofacilitate

commonservicesandimprovedeliverycondi-

tionsforthewiderhumanitariansystem .The

samecannotbesaidofcoordinationwithin

thewiderconflictmanagementsystem .WFP’s

strengthasahands-on,operationalagency

hasnotalwaysmeldedwellwithnewinitiatives

basedonUNintegratedmissionsoronthe

“OneUN .”CommoncriticismsbyWFPstaffin-

cludeinefficienciesincoordinationmechanisms

and,moreimportantly,themarginalizationof

thehumanitarianagendatosecurityorpolitical

concerns .Formulatingstrategiestonegotiate

fortheprioritizationofhumanitarianconcernsin

thesesettingsremainsacontinuedchallengein

manyofWFP’soperations .

Creating Relevant Programming. Alarge

fieldpresenceprovidesWFPwiththeoppor-

tunitytogeneratehumanitarianspace,not

onlyforitsownoperationsbutalsoforother

agenciesinthedeliveryofaidandthepromo-

tionofrightsandprotection .However,the

organizationcontinuestofacechallengesof

WFPfacesfourmajorchallengesinadapt-

ingtothehumanitarianenvironmentofthe21st

century,asdescribedbrieflybelow:

Adhering to the Humanitarian Principles.

WFPcontinuestomaintainareputationforpro-

fessionalismandrapiddelivery .Butinconflicts

suchasthoseinSudanandSriLanka,WFPis

regularlyconfrontedbythetensionbetween

itsobligationstomeeturgenthumanitarian

needsanditscommitmenttoadheretothe

overallprinciplesofthehumanitarianagenda,

includingrightsandprotection .Afamiliarpat-

ternemergesinthehumanitarianinterventions

inwhichWFPisamajoractor:argumentsfor

adheringtohumanitarianprinciplesarecon-

sistentlytrumpedbytheneedtomeetthe

humanitarianimperative,toprovidelifesaving

aidwhenconflictseruptintoviolence .Gradu-

ally,theprincipledspacethatinitiallydidexist

forWFPandotherhumanitarianactorserodes

overtime .Throughouttheevolutionofthecon-

flicts,WFPisfrequentlyhesitant,and,attimes,

ill-equippedtopunchatitsweightandstrongly

advocate .TheramificationsofWFP’spropensity



effectivelyassessingneeds,linkingassessment

toprogramming,andmonitoringtheoutcomes

ofactivities .Itsoperationsalsoriskbecoming

staticinthecontextofrecoveryandrelapsing

conflicts,underscoringproblemsindefiningthe

vulnerable,integratingdevelopmentelements

intohumanitarianinterventions,andgenerating

livelihoods .Shortcomingsinunderstandingthe

dynamicsoftheconflictandthelocalandna-

tionalplayersfurthercontributetotheproblems

ofdevelopingeffectiveprogramminginsuch

complexandfragileenvironments .Further-

more,inthesesituations,WPFmustoftenim-

plementremotelythroughpartnerswithvarying

capacity—creatingconsiderablechallengesfor

programmequalityandoverallaccountability .

Confronting Staff Security. WFPcan

rapidlyreachthemostremoteandturbulent

places .Buttheseoperationsputthestaffin

riskysecuritysituations .Andinmanycases,the

riskistransferredtonationalstafforimplement-

ingpartners .CapacitydeficienciesoftheUN

DepartmentforSecurityandSafety,including

problemsinadaptingtoWFP’sneedsinthe

field,havebeenregularlynotedbyWFPcountry

offices .WFPitselfisinvestingheavilyinstaff

security—includingthroughthedeploymentof

significantnumbersofinternationalandnational

securityofficers .Despitelargesystem-wideand

WFPinvestments,theconditionsforthefree

andsafemovementofstaffappeartobewors-

eninginmanysettings .

Despitetheseconstraints,WFPisexperi-

mentingwithnewtoolsunderitsrecentlyap-

provedstrategicplan,7includingtheuseofcash

andvouchersandtheintroductionofnewnutri-

tionproductsinhumanitariansettings .Recentin-

novationsinleveragingWFP’spresenceandfield

knowledgetocontributetoprotectionconcerns

demonstrateshowprinciplesforhumanitarian

assistancecanbetranslatedintoreal,ifmodest,

improvementsinthesafetyanddignityofaffect-

edpopulations .This,inturn,isenhancingWFP’s

7 WFP Strategic Plan (2008 — 2001). WFP/EB.A/2008/5-A/1/Rev.1, 19 May 2008.

abilitytoengageinnationalcontextsandonthe

internationalstageindiscussionsonhumanitar-

ianprinciplesandinternationallaw,including

protectionstrategies .WFPcouldfurtherexploit

itsdeepreachintothefieldforthebenefitof

thewiderhumanitariansystemthroughmore

systematicanalysisofconflictsinrealtime .While

WFPcouldcontinuetogivealmostexclusive

prioritytothehumanitarianimperative,itcould

alsobecomemoreassertiveandsystematicin

orchestratingadvocacyforthehumanitarian

principleswithpartiestotheconflictandnational

authorities,theUNcountryteamandmission,

andwiththeSecurityCouncilanddonors .

Humanitarian PrinciplesContinuedcompromiseswithGovernments

suchasSudanandSriLankahaveplacedWFP

inanuntenablesituation .Thereducedsetof

optionscanbeillustratedbytheexpulsionof

theNGOsfromDarfurinMarch2009 .Asthe

humanitariancommunitycontinuedtomake

concessionsinitsdealingswiththeGovernment

ofSudan,itisnotclearwhatWFP’sadvocacyat

thatprecisemomentwoulddoonitsowntoen-

surethattheNGOscontinuedtheiroperations .

Similarly,whileWFPishighlypraisedforef-

ficiencyandprofessionalisminSriLanka,ithas

alsobeencriticizedforactingasanimplement-

ingarmofthegovernment—tothedetriment

ofupholdinghumanitarianprinciples .

Andyet,sidesteppingordelayingthe

promotionofhumanitarianprinciplesforthe

sakeofrapidaccessdoesnotappeartoalways

returnthedesiredresults .Severalofthose

interviewedinSriLankathinkthattheprioritisa-

tionofdeliveryoveradvocacyultimatelyhad

adverseaffectsfortheprotectionoftarget

populations,andaccomplishedlittletoenhance

staffsecurityoreventheabilitytodeliverrelief

goodsandservices .

WhileWPF’sreliefconvoysin2008were

laudablefromtheperspectiveofhumanitar-

ianaccess,italsoappearsthattheSriLankan

GovernmentaswellastheLTTEusedthisas

coverformilitarymanoeuvres .TheGovernment


alsoemployedavarietyoftacticstostallor

prohibithumanitarianpractices .Itusedvisas,

travelpermits,compulsoryevacuations,written

agreements,andvariouskindsofintimidation

toensurethatdamaginginformationwasnot

leakedthroughtheactivitiesofaidagencies .

TheSriLankangovernmenthasalsousedthe

broadrubricof‘securityissues’toimposevery

far-reachingrestrictionsonthemedicalsup-

plies,waterandsanitationandfoodthathave

beendirectedattheVanniregion .

ItcanbearguedthatinSriLanka,advocacy

wasmostcrucialatanearlystage .Forexam-

ple,pressuretoensureIDPs’rightsatthepoint

whenthescaleoftheirmovementswasrela-

tivelysmallmayhavebeenmoreeffective .With

amassinflux,theperceptionof‘humanitarian

imperative’maymakeadvocacyandpressure

onprotectionissuesmoredifficult .Thereisa

strongbeliefthatconcessionstotheGovern-

mentonvarioushumanitarianprincipleshad

emboldenedthegovernmentinitsrelationship

withthehumanitariancommunity .Onesource

saidthehumanitariancommunityhadbeenre-

ducedtobeggingratherthannegotiating .

ItisnotclearwhethertheSriLankanGov-

ernmentwassubjecttoanysignificantcon-

sequencesforitsvariousattemptstorestrict

humanitarianspace .Aidagencies’werereluc-

tanttospeakpubliclyonsensitiveissuesand

withheldtheresultsofnutritionalsurveys .They

weaklyprotestedtheejectionofaidagencies

fromtheVanniinSeptember2008andGovern-

mentshellingandaerialbombardmentduring

theintensifiedmilitarypush .Ingeneral,aid

agencies—whetherintheUNsystemorNGOs

—appeartohavebeenverymuchonthede-

fensiveinacontextwhereanyactioncouldeas-

ilybeturnedagainstthem,notablyinamedia

subjecttosignificantgovernmentcontrol .

WhileWFPisreluctantforthevariousfac-

torsoutlinedabovetoengageinwhatsome

viewasaformofpoliticalpressure,thereare

anecdotesofsuccessfuladvocacybyWFP .Many

arepurposefullydonebehindcloseddoorsand

involvepersonaldynamicsanddecision-making

processes,makingdocumentationdifficult .

However,interviewswithCountryDirectors

haverevealedthatWFPcanmoreeffectively

utiliseitsweighttoensuretheprotectionof

humanitarianprinciplesandaccess .Forexam-

ple,whentheGovernmentofSudansaiditwas

toshutdownwarehousesofNGOsoperating

inDarur,WFP’sthreattostopdeliveryoffood

wasenoughtoreversetheircourse .

Thestrategyofadvocatingforhumanitar-

ianprinciplesisnotaneasyone:itcanrequire

pushbackagainstdonors,whenthepriority

istodeliverregardlessoftheconditions,and

entailseffectivecoordinationwithotheractors

toensurethatthewithholdingofaidgener-

atessufficientweight .TheGovernmentofSri

Lankaenjoyedabundantoptionsforinterna-

tionalsupport,whichimpliesthatadvocacy

onthehumanitarianfrontwouldhavebeen,

onitsown,insufficientandsowouldrequire

orchestration .ExploitationofWFP’sleverage

insecuringtheaccessandupholdingimparti-

alitydependsinpartontheleadershipofthe

CountryDirector,andhisorherrelationships

withtheGovernment,donorsorotherpartsof

theUNsystem .

CoordinationWFPhasbeenabletogeneratehumani-

tarianspaceforthewiderhumanitariansystem

throughtheuseofcoordinationmechanisms

inseveralways .WFPoperatestheUnitedNa-

tionsHumanitarianAirService(UNHAS)in

manyconflict-riddencountries .Inthecontext

ofSudan,itserves100destinations(mostly

inDarfur)andprovidessupportformedical

evacuationsandrelocations,forwhichNGOs

constitute60percentofusers .Inthesouth-

centralzonesofSomalia,WFPisforthefirst

timeestablishingfivemedicalstabilization

centersthatwillprovideemergencyassistance

asacommonservice .Donorsoftenpraise

WFP’sleadershipinthelogisticsclusterasan

innovativemethodforeffectivedeliveryand

forengagingNGOsinthefield .Furthermore,

WFPandhumanitarianactorsinDRChaveral-


liedaroundimplementingthestrategicpriori-

tiesoftheHumanitarianActionPlan(HAC) .

WFP’sexperienceinemergencyresponse

coordinationwithotherpartsoftheUNsystem

andwiththemilitaryhasbeenmixed,however .

TheWFPcountryteamstressedthepositive

cooperationwiththeHaitianmilitaryduringthe

firstemergencyphaseofthefloodsinAugust

andSeptember2008 .However,humanitarian

agenciesremainwearyofthemilitary’sroleas

operationscontinue .Therearealsotensions

betweenMINUSTAHandtheUNcountryteam

—includingWFP—ontheground,andalim-

itedunderstandingoftheirrespectiverolesin

supportingHaititobecomeamoreviablestate .

IntheDRC,interviewswithWFPstaffinthefield

indicatethatMONUChastoldWFPwhereto

deliverfoodandprioritizedtransportformili-

tarypersonnel .

Insomeinstances,WFPdisagreeswithother

partsoftheUNsystemonthehumanitarian

imperative .InSomalia,WFPhascontinuedto

directlyengagewithauthoritiesontheground,

includinginsurgentgroupssuchastheAl-

Shabaab,toassistthemostvulnerable .WFPbe-

lievesthattheaffiliationwiththeUN-backedTFG

wouldthreatenthesafetyandsecurityofstaff,as

wellastheperceptionofhumanitarianneutrality .

Conversely,theSpecialRepresentativeof

theSecretary-General(SRSG)inSomaliahas

criticizedhumanitarianorganizations,andpri-

marilyWFP,forunderminingpoliticalobjectives

bynegotiatingforhumanitarianaccesswith

Islamicinsurgents,andchargedthattheUNCT

isirresponsibly‘fundingthewar’throughhigh

valuecommodityimportsandlogisticscon-

tracts .Meanwhile,shortcomingsincoherence

extendtoheadquarters .TheSecurityCouncil

approvedtheSecretary-General’sproposalto

establishaJointPlanningUnitintheofficeof

theSRSGtofacilitateeffectiveandefficientim-

plementationoftheintegratedstrategy .Over

oneyearlater,theJointPlanningUnithasstill

notbeenestablished—inpartasaresultof

scepticismofheadquartersunderstandingof

thesituationontheground .

Programming Whilenocomprehensivestudyhasbeen

completed,thereisalsoanecdotalevidence

thatWFPhasprovidedaprotectivepresence

initsdeliveryofaid,inplacessuchasMyanmar

andColombia. Inbothcases,WFPdedicated

resourcestoprotection,eitherthroughtheform

ofaprotectionofficerorbyinvestinginunder-

standingthelocalsocialnetworksand

copingmechanisms .8

Programmingbringswithititsownsetof

challenges .Ontheonehand,WFPcontinuesto

struggletoensurethatfoodgetsintotheright

handsanddoesnoharm .Ontheotherhand,

WFPisattemptingtointegratehumanitarian

anddevelopmentpracticesinordertomanage

complexcrises,suchasHaitiandtheDRC,as

theconflictsevolve .Asa2007reportbyODI

concluded,WFP’sprogressininitialneedsas-

sessmentshadnotbeenmatchedinthelifespan

ofprojectsandfailedtointegrateawidersetof

responseoptionsbeyondfoodaid .“WFPoften

lacksthenecessaryinformationtopredictand

gaugetheevolutionofafoodcrisis;andtoim-

plementitsresponsesinawaythatissensitive

tochangesintheexternalenvironment .”

Thedesignofappropriatehumanitarian

anddevelopmentresponsesinDRCrequiresa

nuancedassessmentofthecomplexoverlaying

ofacuteandchronicvulnerability .DRCischar-

acterizedbyanextraordinaryextentofchronic

vulnerability,evidencedinchronicallyhigh

levelsofmortality,morbidityandacutemalnu-

trition .Thiscoupledwithconstantexposureto

violentinsecurityresultsinasituationwhere

crisis—inthesenseofadangerousdeviation

fromthenorm—isnolongeranadequate

term .Pocketsofcrisis(or‘emergencies’)canbe

identifiedwithintheprevailingnorm .Neither

humanitariannordevelopmentapproachesas

normallyunderstoodarewelladaptedtothis

kindofcontext .Thisalsoraisesthechallenges

8 James Darcy, Stephen Anderson and Nisar Majid A Review of the Links between Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in Response to Food Crises Study undertaken for the World Food Programme under the SENAC project, 2007.


ofprogrammingforearlyrecoveryandliveli-

hoods .InDRC,sourcingthefoodlocallywould

requiremajorinvestmentintransportforfarm-

ers .ConstraintsonWFPactivitieshaveexclud-

edexploringoptions,suchascashorvouchers,

beyondthedeliveryoffood .

Haitiisinasituationofprotractedcomplex

crisisshapedbyurbanviolence,naturaldisas-

ters,andtheimpactoftheglobaleconomic

crisis .FollowingtheApril2008riotscausedby

highfoodprices,WFPscaledupitsoperations

toreachanadditional1 .5millionpeopleinneed

offoodassistance .Thiswascomplementedby

anemergencyoperationtoassistupto800,000

peopleforasix-monthperioduntiltheendof

April2009,inresponsetothethreeconsecutive

hurricanesandthetropicalstormsbetweenAu-

gustandSeptember2008 .InterventionsinHaiti

arenowaimedatfoodinsecurepopulations

anddisasterpreparednesswhileattemptingto

supportthelonger-termgoalsofrebuildingof

vitaleconomicandsocialinfrastructure .

Inadditionthechallengeofaddressingre-

liefandrecovery,WFPcontinuestograpplewith

ensuringthatfooddistributionisnotvulnerable

topoliticalmanipulationbylocalstructuresand

actors .Experiencesintargetingandregistration

illustratetheurgentneedforunderstandinglo-

caldynamics .Forexample,inpartsofSudan,

WFPassistancebecomesinstrumentalinshifting

powerfromtraditionalleaderstoyoungerlead-

ers,withoutmuchcommunitysupport—further

generatingproblemswithimpartialdistribution .

InWestDarfur,somesheiksheld200to300

fraudulentrationscardsandusedthemtocollect

additionalfoodtosellinthemarket .InKalma

camp,thelargestIDPcamp,WFPsuppliedfood

to160,000beneficiaries;butinasurprisehead-

countin2005,usingthreedifferentmethodolo-

gies,identifiedonly90,000beneficiaries .

Afghanistanprovidesanotherexampleof

theneedforadequatetargeting .Challenges

arisefromacomplexmixoffactorsrelatedto:1)

thereliabilityandcapacityofpartnersandthe

Governmentatalllevelsandacrosssectors;2)

theset-upofCommunityDevelopmentCoun-

cilsandtheirabilityandwillingnesstorepresent

theinterestsandneedsoftheoverallcommunity:

and3)WFP’sabilitytoexercisequalitycontrol

overthewholeprocess,fromassessmentto

monitoringandevaluation,thusreducingthe

potentialforshortcomings .Separateconsidera-

tionsshouldbemadefortraditionalcommunity

structuressuchasshuras andjirgas,whichcan

offerahigherlevelofreliabilityandtrustworthi-

ness .Infact,whilegovernmentalbodiesgener-

allysufferfromlackofcapacityandwidespread

corruption,thesebodiesstillupholdtheinterests

ofthecommunitiestheyrepresent,andtherefore

are“relatively”lesssubjecttomanipulationand

corruption .Thisagain,requiresrigorousand

consistentunderstandingoflocaldynamicsand

structures .

Withsecurityconstraintsandlimitedaccess,

WFPinAfghanistanmustrelyheavilyondataand

analysisprovidedbycooperatingpartners .WFP’s

abilitytoexercisequalitycontroloverthewhole

distributionprocess,fromassessmenttomoni-

toringandevaluation,isalsohindered .Though

thisishappeningacrossthewholespectrumof

WFP’sactivities,WFPstaffreportedmoredif-

ficultiesinrelationtogeneralfooddistribution,

mainlyduetomagnitudeoffooddistributedand

numberofbeneficiariestargeted .InAfghani-

stan,WFPhastakenanumberofmeasuressince

2007,includingoutsourcingitsassessmentand

monitoringactivitiesinUN“no-goareas”toa

thirdparty(internationalprivateorganizations),

tominimizetheserisksandimprovetheoverall

managementofprojectsontheground .

Ultimately,WFP’scapacitytoeffectively

engageauthoritiesandtheinternationalsystem

onhumanitarianprinciplesmayendangerpro-

grammingobjectives .ToreturntothecaseofSri

Lanka,protectionfailuresincludedciviliancasu-

altiesresultingfromthewar;theinternmentof

hundredsofthousandsofdisplacedpeople;and

thelackofcleartimelinesforscreeningorreset-

tlement .Therealsoseemedtobeaperceived

lackofopennessabouttheinadequatequantities

offoodreachingthenorth,whichintheendwas

problematic .


Staff SecurityTheviolenttargetingofwhitecars—tradi-

tionallyassociatedwithhumanitarians—isper-

hapsthegreatestsymbolofthedeteriorating

shieldforhumanitarianworkers .Inresponse,

someorganizationsandagencieshavetakento

rentingcarsormini-busesorusingpinkcars .In

Afghanistan,humanitariansunderlinethediffer-

encesbetweentheblackUN(UNAMAcars)and

blueUN(humanitarianagencies’) .Atthesame

time,incidentsofthemilitaryusingwhitevehi-

clestomanipulateitsneutralrepresentationfor

differentpurposeshavebeenreported .Beyond

thedilemmaofthepopularperception,the

shiftinghumanitarianenvironmentandsafety

ofhumanitarianworkersraisesimportantissues

aboutdailyoperations,coordination,capaci-

ties,andprinciplesofengagement .

WFPhasimplementedavarietyofmeas-

urestoaddresssuchsecurityconstraints .For

example,theWFPfleetinDarfurisequipped

withGPS,enablingeachvehicletobetracked

inrealtimeformoreeffectiveprotectionofthe

staff .Theestablishmentofmorewarehouses

(andindifferentlocations)inDarfurhasallowed

WFPtopre-positionfoodsupplyequivalentto

threetofourmonthsofprojectedneedsand

toreducetheimpactofpipelinebreaks .InAf-

ghanistan,itappearsthatthecalloftheSRSG

nottoattacktheUNhasseensomedecreasein

attacks,especiallyagainstWFPconvoys .

Inresponsetothemurderoftwonational

staffinSomalia,WFPcreateda“Re-engage-

mentStrategy”withlocalauthoritiesatthe

beginningof2009 .Operationsinsouth-central

zoneswerehalteduntilcommunitiescouldpro-

videassurancesforsafeandsecureaccess .WFP

hasalsoprioritizedoutreachtotheSomalicom-

munitytoexplainitsobjectives,garnersupport,

limitpotentialthreats,anddevelopanetworkof

allieswithcommunityelders .

Seriouschallengesexistwithintheco-

ordinationandcapacityoftheUNsystemto

promotethesafetyofitsstaff .TheUNDepart-

mentforSafetyandSecurityhasbeencriti-

cizedfornotbeingcontext-specificinitsanaly-

sisandjudgmentofsecuritymeasures,and

asaresulttoocautious .UNDSSisalsoshort

onresourcesandcapacity .Forexample,tight

securityguidelinesinHaitipreventWFPfrom

movingasfreelyasitwouldlike .AttimesWFP

continuestorelyonitsownsecuritymecha-

nisms,forexampleinSomalia.

AttimesWFPstaffarefrustratedbythe

limitationsimposedonitsoperationalcapacity

andwhatitviewsasconstraintsinactingaspart

ofaUNcountryteamorintegratedmission .

Commoncriticismsarethelackofpayofffor

heavyinvestmentsintime,whilehumanitar-

ianprioritiesandWFP’svoicetendtoloseout

intheResidentCoordinator/UNcountryteam

structure .Asmentionedpreviously,thereare

alsodisagreementsaboutsecuritymeasures .

Effectivesecurityandprogrammingre-

quiresarigorousunderstandingoftheback-

groundandevolutionoftheconflictsincluding

thepoliticaldynamicsbetweenlocalactors

andtheirperceptionsofWFPandaidagencies .

Contextualunderstandingandanalysisremains

agapforWFP .TheviolenceagainstWFPstaff

andcooperatingpartnersIOMandSC-US

duringa2005re-registrationexerciseinWest

Darfurdemonstratestheimportanceofunder-

standingcommunitystructuresandeffective

communication .Initialrumourswerethatthe

registrationwaspartoftheGovernment’sat-

tempttorepatriateIDPs,andlocalleaderswho

fearedlosingtheirmultiplerationcardslashed

outagainstthestaff .

Anotherseriousdilemmaisthesecurity

ofnationalstaff,themostfrequentvictimsof

targeting .Timeandresourceconstraintsoften

meanthatlittleisinvestedinthecapacitiesof

nationalstaff,sothatwheninternationalswith-

drawthesecurityinfrastructureleftbehindis

seriouslyimpaired—furtherendangeringthe

nationalstaff .

Thetargetingofhumanitarianactorsalso

raisestheissueofwhatsomeargueisthere-

lationshipbetweenthedeteriorationofthe

securityofstaffandthefailuretorigorously

adheretohumanitarianprinciples .Forexample,


someoftheWFPstaffinDarfurbelievethatthe

pressuretoachieveresultsanddelivermayhave

ultimatelyendangeredthestaff .

Organizationsanddonorcountriesmay

havethecapacitytogeneratesomeleverage

inshapingtheactionofnationalandlocalau-

thorities,whichcouldultimatelyimprovethe

perceptionsofhumanitarianworkandthese-

curityconditionsforhumanitarianworkers .Of

course,someactorswilltargetaninternational

presence,andassociatednationalstaff,regard-

lessoftheapproachofthehumanitarianactors

—makingthedecisionofwhentodeployand

capacityofnationalstaffallthemorecrucial .

Points for Further Discussion

Priorities and InvestmentConsistentanalysiscouldpromotemore

effectivedeliveryofservicesandimprovethe

safetyofthestaff .Suchanalysiscouldalso

providethewiderhumanitariansystemwith

animprovedunderstandingoftheconflictand

politicaldynamicsastheyevolve,especiallyas

viewedfromWFP’slargeanddeepfieldpres-

ence—auniqueperspectiveinmanysitua-

tions .Thechallengeistostrengthenthecapaci-

tiesofnationalandinternationalstaffandto

ensurethatthisknowledgeiscapturedsothatit

informsWFP’sstrategicplanning .

Buildingontheexamplesofcreativeinno-

vationsinprogrammingwouldrequiresignifi-

cantcommitmentandinvestment .Butthiswill

alsohingeon:1)thecapacityofWFPtoassess

needsandoptionsascrisesevolve,and2)how

WFPmanagesthechallengeofadheringtohu-

manitarianprincipleswhilenegotiatingaccess

andmeetingthehumanitarianimperative .

Whileeachcomplexemergencyentailsa

uniquesetofcircumstancesandconstraints,

WFPwillcontinuetobepressuredbybenefi-

ciaryanddonorGovernments,whowishto

demonstratetheirgoodintentionsorpursue

theirpoliticalobjectives .AsWFPadaptsitsop-

erationsandprogrammingtomeettheneeds

ofhumanitariancrisesinthe21stcentury,the

leadershipofWFPwillhavetoconfrontthe

questionofwhetheritspresentstaff,practices

andsystemsfordeliveringassistance—andits

strategyforbalancingprinciplesandhumanitar-

ianneeds—areadequateinaworldofmore

complexhumanitarianenvironments .

References:

MariangelaBizzarriOperational Challenges and

WFP Responses: A Reflection Paper on Afghani-

stan March2009 .

ThomasGurtnerReview of WFP Responses to

Operational and Programming Challenges in

Conflict and Complex Emergencies: A Case

Study on HaitiJune2009 .

JamesDarcyandGuillaumeFoliotThe limits of

humanitarian action: WFP, food assistance and

international aid in DR CongoJune2009 .

ThomasGurtnerandRajRana,Review of WFP

Literature 2004–2009: Policies, Protection, Gen-

der, Needs Assessments, Targeting and Key

Evaluation Reports of Emergency and Protract-

ed Relief and Recovery OperationsJune2009 .

TreenaHuangOperational Challenges and WFP

Responses: A Reflection Paper on SomaliaJune

2009 .

DavidKeenCompromise or Capitulation? Re-

port on WFP and the Humanitarian Crisis in Sri

Lanka.June2009 .

GinaPattugalanOperational Challenges and

WFP Responses: A Reflection Paper on Darfur

May2009 .

21

Trends In Conflict and Humanitarian assistance:a Review of literature, Policy and Practice

Undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group, overseas Development Institute

IntroductionThis paper represents a summary of a review of trends in conflict and humanitarian assistance undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI on behalf of the UN World Food Programme, in preparation for the conference “Humanitarian as-sistance in conflict and complex emergencies” held in Rome, 24 -25th June 2009. The review was based primarily on literature and recent research, with a focus on humanitarian policy trends and implications.9

9The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.deadly;andthatbothtrendscouldbeattributed

inlargeparttosuccessfulinternational(particu-

larlyUN-led)interventions .Thisanalysisisopen

tocritiqueonanumberofgrounds .Theconcept

of“civilwar”isambiguous,bothinfailingtotake

accountofinternationaldimensionsofconflict,

andinfailingtotakeaccountofthespectrumof

violentinstabilityfromcommunalviolenceand

widespreadbanditrytofull-scalearmedconflict .

Perhapsmostsignificantly,inconcentratingon

battlefielddeaths,thisapproachfailstotake

account(astheauthors”acknowledge)ofboth

non-battlefielddeathsandtheindirecteffectsof

conflict .IncontextslikeCambodia,Rwandaand

DRCongo,tonamejustthree,thisishighlymis-

leading .Here,non-battlefieldcasualtiesandthe

indirectcasualtiesofconflict(particularlythrough

diseaseandmalnutrition)havefaroutweighed

whatcouldbeclassedasbattlefielddeaths .

Reliablestatisticsarehardtocomeby .

Retrospectivemortalitysurveyssuchasthose

undertakenonbehalfofIRCinDRCongoface

problemsbothofquantificationandcausalat-

tribution .Theresultsneverthelessconfirmthe

significanceofindirecteffectsofconflictonlev-

elsofexcessmortality .

Anotherwayoflookingatconflicttrendsis

toconsiderthenatureoftheconflictsthatare

occurringandtheimplicationsforciviliansand



Thereviewfocusedprimarilyonthefollow-

ingtopics:

• Generaltrendsinconflictanddisplacement

• Trendsininternationalengagementincon-

flict&protractedcrisis

• Operationalsecurityand

“humanitarianspace”

• Trendsinfinanceandtherangeofhumani-

tarianactors

• Emergingthreatsandpotentialcausesof

futureconflict

Themainpointsarisingundereachhead-

ingaresummarisedhere .Forfulleranalysisand

referencestorelevantliterature,pleaseconsult

thefullReviewpaper .

General Trends in Conflict and Displacement

Therearedifferentwaysofapproachingthe

questionoftrendsinconflict .Oneistolookat

thenumbersinvolved .The2005HumanSecu-

rityReportattemptedbothtoidentifytrendsin

battlerelateddeaths,andtocorrelatethiswith

keycausalfactors .Inbroadterms,itconcluded

thattheincidenceofcivilarmedconflictswas

inadownwardtrendsincetheearly1990s(an

80%decline);thatconflictswerebecomingless


forhumanitarianinterventions .Commentators

suggestthatcurrentwarfarehaschangedand

“newwars”nolongerconformtothewarfare

ofclassicalmodernityinwhichtherewereclear

distinctionsbetweengovernments,armiesand

civilians(Kaldor,1999) .Itisarguedthatprocess-

esofglobalisationandthedemiseincoldwar

patronagehaveweakenedstateauthority,con-

sequentlyredefiningthegoals,methodsand

financingofwarfare(Ibid) .Stateincumbents

andotherstrongmennowseekself-preserva-

tionandtheaccumulationofwealththroughthe

trans-borderandparalleltrade(Duffield,2001) .

Terrorisingciviliansthroughimmiserationand

displacementhavebecomestrategiesofthis

newmodeofwarfareandterritorialboundaries

havebecomeincreasinglymeaningless(Hoff-

manandWeiss,2006) .Civiliansratherthan

militarynowsufferthegreatestcausalities(Ka-

ldor,1999) .These“newwars”aremoreakinto

organisedcrime,inwhichwarlordsandstate

actorsengagein“theviolentextractionofre-

sourcesandstrippingofassetsasacommercial

enterprise”(DeWaal,1997);“acontinuationof

economicsbyothermeans”(Keen,2000) .

Thisanalysishasimportantpolicyimplica-

tions .Traditionalhumanitarianismanditssole

concernforalleviatingthesymptomsofcrises

isconstruedasinadequateinconfrontingthe

challengesofmodernconflictsandinsome

circumstanceactuallycreatingmoreharmthan

good .The“newwars”aredeemedtorequire

morecomprehensivesolutionsthanthesimple

provisionofrelief(HoffmanandWeiss,2006) .

Trendsinconflict-relateddisplacement

arebetterdocumented,thoughheretoo

thereareproblemsofclassification—includ-

ingthequestionofwhocountsasforcibly

displaced,andhowmuchisattributableto

conflict .Whilenumberswerealmostcertainly

underreportedinearlieryears,theupward

trendindisplacementoverthepast40-50

yearsisstriking(seefigure1) .Withinthis,the

mostobvioustrendistheincreaseinnumbers

ofinternallydisplacedpersonsrelativeto

refugees .Thatratiohaschangedsomewhat

since2003withtheexodusfromIraqandwith

significantrefugeeflowselsewhere .Neverthe-

less,thetrendismarked .

Thereappeartobemultiplecausalfac-

torsbehindthistrend .Somearerelatedto

changesininternationalasylumpolicy,which

hasbecomeincreasinglyrestrictiveinboth

developedanddevelopingcountries(Collin-

son,2009) .Policiesof“containment,”“internal

flightoptions”etc .andotherhavecontributed

Figure 1: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 1964–2003

Source: Philip Orchard, 2004

Mill

ions

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

1968

1966

1964

■ Displaced persons (total)

■ Internally displaced persons

■ Refugees


toaclimateinwhichinternaldisplacementis

deemedbyinternationalpolicymakersprefer-

abletoasylum,despitetheabsenceofeffective

meansofprotection .UNHCRhasnowbeen

taskedwithleadingeffortstoprotectandas-

sistIDPsbutacknowledgesthatitisstruggling

withthisnewremit .Theimplicationsforother

humanitarianactorsareconsiderable .Reaching

IDPpopulationsisoftenproblematic,particular-

lywheretheyaredispersedamongstlocalhost

populations .Numbersarehardtodetermine,

theimpactonlocalcommunitiesisoftensevere

butunquantified,andtheproblemspansboth

ruraland(increasingly)urbancontexts .

General Trends in Humanitarian FundingThesetrendsshouldbesetagainsttrends

inofficialfundingforinternationalhumanitarian

assistance .Thishasbeenonagenerallyupward

curvesince2000,eveniffundingforIraqand

Tsunamiarediscounted(Figure2aboveex-

cludesfundingforthesetwocrises) .

Thegreatmajorityofthisincreasinghu-

manitarianexpenditureisaccountedforby

humanitarianresponsesinprotractedconflict

situationsorcomplexemergencies .Almosthalf

ofallexpenditureisaccountedforbyhumani-

tarianresponsesinSudan,IraqandAfghani-

stan .Overall,theavailablefiguressuggestthat

between70-80%ofallhumanitarianresponse

expendituregoestowardsprotracted,conflict-

relatedcrises .

Trends in International Engagement in Conflict and Protracted Crisis Situations

The Search for Policy CoherenceShiftsinthegeopoliticsandpoliticalecon-

omyofconflictshaveleddonorgovernmentsto

pursuenewmodesofengagementinconflict

andcrisiscontexts .Trans-nationalthreatssuch

asterrorism,organisedcrime,illicitmarketsand

weaponsproliferationareincreasinglyseenas

linkedwithstatefragilityandviolentconflicts .

Attemptsatmanagingthesesourcesofinstabil-

ityhavegivenrenewedimpetustoa“stabilisa-

tion”agendaamongWesterngovernments

and,increasingly,withintheUN,basedona

growingconsensusthatthereisaneedtogo

beyondtheprovisionofrelieftoincludemore

robustandcoherentinternationalengagement

insuchcontexts .Theterroristattacksof9/11

pushedthisagendacentrestage .

Figure 2: General Trends in Humanitarian Funding

Source:AbbyStoddard .FigurescompiledfromOCHAFinancialTrackingServiceat16March2009

US

(co

nsta

nt) d

olla

rs

7,000,000,000

6,000,000,000

5,000,000,000

4,000,000,000

3,000,000,000

2,000,000,000

1,000,000,000

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008


Development,securityandhumanitarian

actionareincreasinglyviewedasmutuallyrein-

forcingcomponentsofstabilization,withdonor

governmentspushing“wholeofgovernment”

approaches—variouslylabelled“3Ds”(de-

fense,development,diplomacy),“3Cs”(coher-

ent,coordinated,complementary),“integrated”

or’comprehensive”approaches .Theseinvolve

greatercooperationandpolicycoherence

betweendefence,foreignpolicyanddevelop-

mentministriesanddepartments(Hioyosand

Muggah,2009)andhaveledtothecreationof

newofficesanddepartmentsdesignedtospe-

cificallylinkdifferentpolicyspheres,including

humanitarianassistance(e .g .intheUS,UKand

Canada) .Insomecontexts,thesechangeshave

ledtoincreasedinteractionbetweenmilitary/

securityandcivilianactorsattheoperational

level .InAfghanistanandIraq,forexample,civil-

ianandmilitaryactorsworktogetherwithinPro-

vincialReconstructionTeams(PRTs)toprovide

reliefandreconstructionaspartoftheWestern

coalitions”stabilizationandcounter-

insurgencyefforts .

These“integrated”approacheshavecome

inforparticularcriticismfromanumberof

humanitarianagenciesforthethreattheyare

arguedtoposetotheimpartialityandneutrality

ofhumanitarianassistance,andtherisksof“in-

strumentalisation”ofhumanitarianreliefinsup-

portpoliticalobjectives .Thisuneasereflectsa

deepertensionbetweenmainstream“reliefas-

sistance”conductedbyspecialisedhumanitar-

ianinstitutionsandtheinvolvementofpolitical

andmilitaryactorsorinterventionineffortsto

protectorassistanceoutcomes .Theprotection

failuresofthe1990sinSomalia,formerYugosla-

viaandtheGreatLakesexposedthelimitations

oftherelief-focusedor“assistance-first”model

ofhumanitarianaction;althoughhumanitarians

remainatbestambivalentabouttheinvolve-

mentofothersinthehumanitarianagenda .The

needto“joinup”politicalandhumanitarian

strategywasunderlinedbythe2000Report of

the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

(theBrahimireport)whichproposedtheestab-

lishmentof“integrated”UNmissions .Butthe

tensionsinvolvedinthisattemptcontinueto

playedoutinthefield .

Agreatdealstillneedstobedonetowork

outtheinstitutionalimplicationsofthesearch

forpolicycoherence .Thesecomprehensive

approachesconsistofawidearrayofinterven-

tionsincludingconflictprevention,counter-

insurgency,counter-narcotics,humanitarian

assistance,earlyrecovery,peace-keeping,

post-conflictreconstruction,state-buildingand

peace-building .Considerableproblemsareas-

sociatedwithsettingappropriatestrategicand

operationalobjectivesandsequencingthese,

particularlygiventhemultiplicityofactorsand

institutionsinvolvedandcompetingobjectives,

mandatesandinterests .Policiesremaintorn

betweennarrowdefinitionsofsecurityinterests,

whichwouldfocusactiononcombatopera-

tionsagainstdirectthreats,suchasterrorist

networks,andabroaderdefinitionfocusedon

widerstabilizationefforts,includinghumanse-

curity,peacekeepingandstate-building .

TheUS,UK,Canada,Australiaandtheirkey

alliesaremostpreparedtoleadenforcement

actioninareaswheretheirowninterestsare

mostdirectlyatstake,usuallyinassociationwith

akeyregionalorganization .Yetitisleftlargely

totheUNandregionalorganisationstohandle

crisissituationsoflesserstrategicimportance

andtoleadinthemoredifficultandprotracted

businessof“post-conflict”recoveryandrecon-

struction .Theconsequenceisaninconsistent

andconstantlyshiftinglandscapeofinterna-

tionalstabilisationengagement .

The UN, Integrated Missions and Peace Enforcement

TheintegrationofUNmissions,thecrea-

tionofthePeace-buildingCommissionand

Peace-buildingFundandthedraftingofanew

doctrineforUNpeacekeepingoperations(the

so-called“CapstoneDoctrine’)areallindicative

ofastrengtheningstabilizationagendawithin

theUN,albeitonethatisnotexplicitlylabelled

assuch .Yetthenatureofnewinstitutional


structurestosupporttheUN’sstabilizationen-

gagementvariessignificantlyaccordingtothe

politicalandstrategicsignificanceandnature

ofthecontextsconcerned .InIraqandAfghani-

stan,theUNpresencehasbeenveryclosely

integratedwiththecoalitionforces,andNATO

hasbeenmandatedbytheSecurityCouncilto

undertakepeace-keepingoperationsonbehalf

oftheUN(Doninietal,2008) .Inlessstrategi-

callysensitivecontexts,theSecurityCouncilhas

shownawillingnesstomandatestabilization-

typeengagement,butWesterngovernments

havebeenfarlesskeentocontributemilitarily

totheseefforts .DRCongoisonestrikingexam-

pleofthis .

Considerablenormativeandoperational

uncertaintyandinconsistencysurroundsthe

UN’sengagementininternationalstabilization

efforts .WhereastraditionalUNpeacekeeping

restedprimarilyonimpartialityandconsent

(ChapterVIoperations),thegrowinginvolve-

mentoftheUNincomplexinternalconflicts

sincetheColdWarhasmeantthattheUNis

increasinglyactingonmandatesthatsitcloser

toChapterVII“peaceenforcement,”inwhich

itsneutralitycannotbemaintained .Tensions

surroundingtheimpartialityofbothhumani-

tarianassistanceandUNpeacekeepinghave

beenaggravatedbyaseriousandpersistent

lackoffundingandcapacity .Thereisariskof

failureineasternDRC,Darfurandelsewhere,

withkeyproblemsincluding“overstretch”and

anabsenceofinternationalconsensustosup-

porttheUN’smandatesandobjectivesinthese

contexts .UNSGKofiAnnanwarnedthatthese

operations“willstretchtothelimitandbeyond

thecapacityoftheUnitedNationstorespond .”

Pervasivedoubtsaboutthecapacityof

theUNsystemtoaddresstheinternational

stabilization“caseload”isreflectedinagrow-

inginternationalemphasisontheimportance

ofregionalresponsestoconflictsandassoci-

atedpoliticalandhumanitariancrises .However,

seriousquestionsalsosurroundthecapacities

andlikelyeffectivenessofregionalinstitutions

inpursuingstabilizationobjectives .NATO

lacksthelegitimacyandpoliticalleadership

oftheUN,andisstretchedmilitarily .InAfrica,

increasedinterestinpan-Africandefence

cooperationhascentredontheAU’s2004

CommonAfricanSecurityandDefencePolicy

andthecreationofanAfricanStandbyForce .

Since2002,theAUhasundertakenanumber

ofcivilianandmilitarycrisismanagementand

peacekeepingoperations .ButtheAU’smis-

sionsinDarfur,particularly,havehighlightedits

limitations,includingweakmandatesandforces

toosmallandill-equippedtobeeffective .The

recordofECOWASandSADCinpeacekeeping

interventionandrelatedhumanitarianactivity

ismixedatbest .Withoutasignificantincrease

introopcontributionsbyWesternstatestoUN

andregionalpeacekeepingoperations,AUand

otherregionalpeacekeepingwillcontinuetobe

hamperedbyinsufficientnumbersandcapaci-

tiesofavailabletroops .

Inlightofthesedevelopments,national

counter-insurgencycampaigns,suchasthose

inPakistan,ColombiaandSriLanka,arelikely

tofindatleasttacitsupportfromtheleading

Westernpowers,particularlywhereitchimes

withtrans-nationalsecurityagendas,orwhere

thesepowerslackpoliticalleveragewiththere-

gimesconcerned .Indoingso,theyfacedomes-

ticpublicandinternationaloutcryoverthehu-

manitarianconsequencesonthegroundwhen

thesebecomeparticularlyacuteandreachthe

attentionoftheinternationalmedia .

Evolving Civil-Military RelationsRelatedtothetrendsnotedabove,the

militaryisincreasinglyaskedtogobeyondits

traditionalwarfightingactivitiesandengageina

rangeoftaskslinkedtohumanitariananddevel-

opmentgoals(Wheeler&Harmer,2006) .Various

factorsliebehindthis,includingthepost-cold

warsearchforanewroleformilitaryforces,per-

ceivedshortcomingsindeployablecivilianca-

pabilities,evolvingcounter-insurgencydoctrine

andassociationofthenew“responsibilitytopro-

tect”doctrinewithmilitaryhumanitarianinter-

vention .Theresultisanincreaseinthenumber


ofcontextsandagendaswheremilitaryandcivil

institutions(includinghumanitarianagencies)

findthemselvesoperatingalongsideeachother .

Thisincreasingcoexistenceisalsodueto

theideathatcivilianagenciesarelimitedin

theirabilitytoworkininsecureenvironments,

andthatthemilitary,whileplayingasignificant

roleincreating“humanitarianspace,”need

meanwhiletocarryoutnon-militaryactivities,

includingreliefprovision .Thishasledtoatrend

inwhichmilitariesareincreasinglyinstitutional-

isingciviliancapacity,withcivil-militaryrelations

nolongerviewedasthepoorcousinofwar

fightingbutanintegralpartofterritorialand

populationcontrol .

Inresponsetothesetrends,humanitarian

actorshavedevelopedaseriesofguidelines

tomanagetheirengagementwithmilitaries,

whichwillmainlyconsistofinformation-sharing

aroundsecurityconditionsandhumanitarian

operations .Althoughmosthumanitarianagen-

ciesrecognisetheimportanceoftheroleofthe

militaryinhumanitariancontexts,thereisdi-

vergencearoundhowagenciesshouldengage

withsuchinstitutions,particularlyincontexts

wheretherethemilitaryisanactivebelligerent .

Therehasalsobeenanincreasinginter-

facebetweenhumanitarianagenciesandthe

militaryintheareaofprotection .Protectingthe

safetyanddignityofconflict-affectedpopula-

tionshaslongbeenahumanitarianconcern,but

inthepastfifteenyearstherehasbeenarapid

expansioninengagementonprotectionbyhu-

manitarianactors(O’CallaghanandPantuliano,

2006) .Thishasseenagrowingnumberofpeace

operationswithmandatesforcivilianprotection;

withthephrase“protectciviliansunderimminent

threatofphysicalviolence”becominganintegral

elementofalmostallUNmandatedpeaceop-

erations(HaraldSandeLie,2008) .Furthermore,

theSecurityCouncilhasbecomeincreasingly

willingtoagreetotheuseofforceunderChapter

VIItorespondtohumanrightsandhumanitarian

crises .Whilesomecommentatorsindicatethat

thegrowingengagementofpeacekeepersin

protectionisdeliveringbenefitsforciviliansun-

derthreat(Grono,2006;Holt,2005),thereare

anumberofnotablecaseswherethepositive

impacthasbeenlimitedatbest(DRC,Darfur) .

Whilesuchformsofmilitaryengagement

maybewelcomedinprinciplebyhumanitarian

agencies—notleastbecausetheylackthe

meansthemselvestoprovidephysicalprotec-

tion—theengagementofhumanitarianac-

torswithmilitaryprotection(whetherthrough

advocacyofactivecoordination)hasraised

concernsaboutneutrality(O’Callaghan,2007) .

Thisisparticularlytrueinsituationswheremili-

taryactorsareengagedinpeace-enforcement

andotherexplicitlypoliticalroles .Thecurrent

collaborationbetweenMONUCandthegov-

ernmentofDRCincounter-insurgencyopera-

tionsineasternCongoisonesuchexample .

Protection of Civilians and the Pursuit of Justice

The Responsibility to ProtectThegrowingtrendofdeploymentofmili-

taryforceswithprotectionmandatesreflects

broadershiftsinthinkingaboutprotection

inthepolitical,militaryandhumanrights

spheres .The1990swasadecadeinwhich

externalmilitaryinterventionforhumanpro-

tectionpurposeswasassertedbytheinter-

nationalcommunity,inparticulartheUSand

UK,tojustifyinterventioninSomalia,Bosnia

andKosovo .Theconceptof“humanitarian

intervention”hasbeencriticisedbysomeas

athreattothenotionofstatesovereignty,by

othersasadangerousconflationofhumanitar-

ianandpoliticalagendas .The“Responsibil-

itytoProtect”doctrineturnstheissueon

itshead,placingthesovereignstateatthe

centrebutinsistingonsovereign responsibil-

ity toprotectascentraltostatelegitimacy .

Firstarticulatedin2001(ICISS),R2Pgained

politicalmomentumatthe2005UNWorld

Summitwheregovernmentsagreedthatwhen

astate“manifestlyfails”initsresponsibilities

toprotectciviliansfromgenocide,warcrimes,

crimesagainsthumanityandethniccleansing,


theinternationalcommunitymusttakeaction,

includingcollectiveuseofforceauthorisedby

theSecurityCouncilunderChapterVII(World

SummitOutcomeDocument) .Whilesome

arguethattherecognitionofR2Panditssubse-

quentendorsementbytheUNSecurityCouncil

hasmeantthattheconcepthasbecomean

emergentinternationalnorm .Othersclaimthat

thedebatehasshiftedfromwhetherthereisa

righttointervenetothe natureoftheinterven-

tion(Wheeler,2005;Grono,2006) .

Amidthevariousdebatesaboutthein-

terpretationoftheR2Pdoctrine,itsstatusand

legalfoundations,perhapsthemostserious

challengeitfacesistoovercometheunwilling-

nessofstatestoexpendmilitaryorpolitical

capitaltoaddressmasshumanrightsabuses

inothercountries .Darfur,ZimbabweandSri

Lanka(amongstothersituations)demonstrate

thatthechallengestoitbecomingestablished

practice .YettheUNSecretaryGeneralBanKi

Moonhasstressedthathewillspare“noeffort

tooperationalizetheresponsibilitytoprotect”

andinearly2009issuedareportaimedatpro-

vidingdoctrinal,policyandinstitutionallifeto

thedoctrine .

Human Rights and Protection: Balancing Peace, Security and Justice

The1990swasmarkedbyare-energisingof

thehumanrightsmovement,whichledtoaraft

ofnewinternationalinstrumentsand“softlaw”

suchastheIDPGuidingPrinciples .Thesenor-

mativedevelopmentshavebeenunderpinned

bytheoperationalexpansionofhumanrights

actorsinconflictsettings,mostparticularly

theexpansionofOHCHR,whichisincreas-

inglypresentandactiveinconflictcontexts .

TheSecurityCouncilhasbecomemoreactive

intheestablishmentofinternationalaccount-

abilitymechanismssuchastheadhoctribunals

forRwandaandtheformerYugoslavia,butthe

mostsignificantdevelopmentwastheestablish-

mentoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)

toprosecutethoseresponsibleforwarcrimes,

crimesagainsthumanityandgenocide .

TheICChasaglobalmandate,yetitsac-

tivitiestodatehaveconcentratedonAfrican

countries—stirringAfricansensitivitiesabout

sovereignty,aswellaschargesofhypocrisythat

theactionsofWesterngovernmentsinIraqand

Afghanistanarenotsubjecttothesamelevelof

accountability .TheCourtcanonlyinvestigate

crimescommittedaftertheRomeStatutetook

effectin2002,hencethecourthasbeendrawn

intocontextswhereconflictsarestillactive,or

barelyconcluded(WaddellandClark,2008)

andconflictmediatorsareconcernedthatthis

reducesoptionsforconflictresolution .Ten-

sionbetweenjusticeandpeacehasbecomeall

tooevidentinthecontextofnorthernUganda

andSudan(FlintanddeWaal,2009;Hoviland

Lomo,2005) .Concernsthattheactivitiesofthe

ICCmayaffectongoinghumanitarianaccessin

conflictsettingshasledtheICRCtoassertits

immunityagainstprovisionoftestimonyand

MSFtoissuestatementstothepressindicating

non-cooperationwiththeCourt(DuBois,2009) .

Thistensionwasalltooevidentwhenanarrest

warrantwasissuedforPresidentOmaral-Bashir

ofSudan,followingwhich15internationaland

nationalorganisationswereexpelledfrom

northernSudanorclosedongroundsofalleged

cooperationwiththeICC .HPGresearcherssug-

gestthattheexpulsionsarenotonlydetrimen-

taltotheneedsandprotectionofcommunities

inconflict-affectedareasofSudan’snorth,but

mayalsohaveimplicationsforthemultiple

peaceprocessesinthecountry(Pantulianoet

al) .ItisstilltooearlyintheCourt’sjurisdiction

toknowwhetherconcernsregardingitsimpact

onconflictareoutweighedbyaccountability

anddeterrence .

Protection in Humanitarian Practice: Expansion and Specialisation

Amonghumanitarianagenciesthereis

increasingrecognitionthatprotectionisacore

componentofhumanitarianaction .Anincreas-

ingnumberanddiversityofinternationaland

nationalagenciesarenowengaginginprotec-

tion,joiningthecadreofagencieswithspecific


mandatestoprotect(ICRC,UNHCR,UNICEF

andOHCHR) .Protectionisnowoneofthe11

“Clusters”thatcoordinatespecialisedhumani-

tarianactiongloballyandinthefield .Theresult

ofthisincreasedactivityhasbeenthedevelop-

mentofnewapproachesandtechnicalcapaci-

ties,muchofitfromthenon-mandatedactors

workingatcommunitylevel(O’Callaghanand

Pantuliano,2007) .

Thisrapidgrowthinthinkingandpractice

isnotwithoutitsdifficulties .Alarmshavebeen

repeatedlyraisedaboutthe“internationalisa-

tion”oftheprotectionagendawithhumanitar-

ianssubstitutingformorerobustandeffective

action,asaconsequenceofbothtransferralof

responsibilitiesbyotheractorsandexaggerat-

edclaimsbyhumanitarians(DuBois,2009;Pan-

tulianoandO’Callaghan,2006;Aeschilmann,

2005) .Therehasbeencriticismofthequalityof

protectionwork,includingthedeploymentof

inexperiencedstaff,breachesofconfidential-

ityofaffectedpopulationsandinconsistent

knowledgeandapplicationofrelevantlaws

(Bonwick2006;PantulianoandO’Callaghan,

2006) .Finally,therehavebeenconcernsthat

therehasbeenanimbalanceofattentionto

someissues(suchasIDPs)tothedetrimentof

others .Despitetheexpansionofinterest,refu-

geeprotectionanditscoretenets(asylum, non-

refoulement)seemlargelytohaveslippedoff

thehumanitarianagenda .

Variousinitiativesareunderwaytoaddress

someofthechallengesoutlinedaboveandto

furtherdevelopthesector,includingefforts

todevelopstandardsinprotection .Thereare

alsosomelinesofresearchandthinkingabout

protection .Oneoftheseconcernsthelink-

agesbetweenprotectionandlivelihoods .This

workispremisedontheunderstandingthat

thethreatsthatpeoplefacetotheirprotection

andlivelihoodsarefrequentlyinterrelated .The

directtargetingofcivilianpopulationsandtheir

assetsisoftenadeliberatewartactic .Violence

hasmajorimplicationsforpeople’slivelihoods

becauseitcandisruptbasicservices,limitac-

cesstoemployment,marketsandfarms,and

evenunderminesocialnetworks(Jasparset

al,2006) .Protectionandlivelihoodsarealso

connectedinthewaypeoplerespondtothese

risks .ResearchbyHPGinDarfur,Chechnya,Sri

LankaandtheoccupiedPalestinianterritories

(oPt)showsthatpeoplecarefullycalibrate

coststotheirsafetyanddignityagainsttheir

economicstatus(JasparsandO’Callaghan,

2008;O’Callaghanetal,2009) .

Humanitarian and Development Interventions in Protracted Crises

Protracted CrisisTheavailablefiguressuggestthatsome-

wherebetween70-80%ofallhumanitarianre-

sponseexpendituregoestowardsprotracted

crises;thatis,tosituationsofprotractedhu-

manitarianconcerntypicallyinvolvingacom-

binationofviolentpoliticalinstability,forced

displacementandhumanrightsabuse,and

weakorabsentgovernanceandserviceprovi-

sion .Thefactthatsomuchofhumanitarian

expenditureoccursinsuchcontextsraises

fundamentalquestionsabouttheproper

roleofhumanitarianassistanceinrelationto

other“fragilestates”agendas,particularly

withregardtodevelopment .Reliefassistance

oftenprovidesan(inadequate)substitutefor

welfaresafetynets,providingpatchyaccess

tothemostbasicrequirementsforhealthand

subsistence .Muchofthepolicyconcernwith

situationsofthiskindliesinidentifyingthe

appropriatecombinationofapproachesand

instrumentstotacklethecombinedeffectsof

acuteandchronicvulnerability .

New Types of Relief, Livelihood Support and Basic Services in Conflict

Conflictaffectsallaspectsoflivelihoods .

Warstrategiesoftendeliberatelyundermine

livelihoodsandwareconomiesmaydevelop,

whereapowerfulelitebenefitsfromwarby

usingviolentorexploitativepractices .War

directlyimpactsonlivelihoodsthroughthe

destruction,lootingandtheftofkeyassets,


andindirectlythroughthelossofbasicservices

andaccesstoemployment,markets,farms

orpastures .Asaresult,mostpeople’sliveli-

hoodstrategiesbecomeextremelyrestricted

andmayinvolveconsiderableriskstopersonal

safety .Contemporaryconflictisfrequentlypro-

tracted,andriskstolivelihoodsthuspersistfor

longperiodsoftime .

Whilefoodaidremainsthedominant

modeoftacklingfoodinsecurityintheseenvi-

ronments,agencieshaveincreasinglyexplored

arangeofotherfoodsecurityandlivelihoods

supportinterventionstohelpmeetbasicneeds

andreduceprotectionrisksinbothacuteand

protractedphasesofconflict .Thesehave

includedinterventionsthatreduceexpendi-

ture,suchasfuel-efficientstovesandgrinding

mills;vouchersorgrantstoincreaseaccess

toarangeofgoodsorservices;cashforwork

e .g .forroadrehabilitation;andcashgrantsto

meetbasicneedsorassistlivelihoodrecovery .

Agencieshavealsoexaminedthepotentialfor

incorporatingandutilisinglessonsfromsocial

protectionprogramming .

Social ProtectionSocialprotectioninvolves“publicactions

takentorespondtolevelsofvulnerability,risk

anddeprivationwhicharedeemedsocially

unacceptablewithinagivenpolityorsociety”

(Nortonetal .,2001) .Considerableoverlap

existsamonghumanitarianassistance,social

protection,widerlivelihoodspromotionand

foodsecurityinterventions,whichsharesimilar

goalsinrelationtoreducingvulnerability,risk

anddeprivation(Harvey,2009) .Socialprotec-

tionholdsnewpotentialforthelong-standing

challengesthattheinternationalcommunity

faceswhenrespondingtoconflict .Recentthink-

inghasbeguntoexplorethepotentialforthe

provisionofregularsocialprotectionasawayto

addresstheneedsofthemillionslivingindif-

ficultenvironments(Harvey,2009;Harveyetal

2007;Darcy2004) .Ataprogrammaticlevelhow-

ever,socialprotectioninfragilestatesandin

situationsofconflictremainslargelyuncharted

territory,withtraditionalformsofhumanitarian

assistanceoftencontinuingtobethepredomi-

nantmodeofengagement .Nationalsystems

forlonger-termsocialassistancearegenerally

perceivedasadistantgoal .

Socialprotection,traditionallyaconcept

appliedto“betterperforming”environments

wherethestatemaybewillingandableto

providesomeformoflong-termassistanceto

itscitizens,requiressomeadaptationifused

inconflictsituations .Here,asocialprotection

agendaneedstotakeintoaccountthefactthat

therangeofrisksandvulnerabilitiesthatpeo-

pleareconfrontedwithhasasmuchtodowith

threatsfromviolenceaswiththreatsderiving

fromincomepoverty(Darcy,2004) .Theconcept

ofsocialprotectioninthesecontextswillneed

toencompass“threatsofviolenceandpersecu-

tion,coercionanddeliberatedeprivation,as

wellasprotectionagainstlossofentitlements

andeconomicvicissitudes”(Ibid:2) .Theacts

andmeasuresdesignedtoprotectpeople

intheseenvironmentsmayinsomecasesbe

limitedtosustaininglifeandalleviateimmedi-

atesuffering .Inthesecontexts,thereareclear

overlapsbetweensocialprotectionandhuman-

itarianassistancewherebothagendasshare

similarobjectivesaimingatreducingriskand

vulnerability(Harvey,2009) .

Theobstaclestodeliveryareoftenformi-

dable .Devereuxdescribesthe“Catch22of

socialprotection”where“thegreatertheneed

forsocialprotection,thelowerthecapacityof

thestatetoprovideit”(Devereux,2000) .Inthis

regard,socialprotectionhasbeenconsidered

asanagendathatcanstrengthenthelegitimacy

ofthestateandsupportsocialandpolitical

stability .Forexamplebyallowingthestateto

re-shoulderitsresponsibilitiesforthewelfareof

itscitizenssocialprotectioncanbeconsidered

animportantwayforrevitalizingthepolitical

contractbetweenthestateandcitizens(Chris-

toplos,2004) .

Applyingthenotionofsocialprotectionto

situationsofviolentinsecurity,fragilestatesand

protractedcrisisalsobegsthequestionofwho


isresponsibleforitsdelivery .Inthesecon-

texts,evenifinlegaltermsthestateremains

ultimatelyresponsibleforthewelfareofitsciti-

zens,theweaknessordisruptionofstateinsti-

tutions,thelackofcapacityand/orwillingness

toprovideforallorpartofthepopulation,

meansthatthestateoftencannotorwillnot

playtheleadingroleinowningandadvancing

asocialprotectionagenda .Non-stateactors,

suchaslocalcivilsocietyactorsandinter-

nationalhumanitarianserviceproviders,will

oftenacquireacentralroleinprovidingforthe

welfareofthepopulationinthesesituations

(Darcy,2004) .Moreover,communitiesthem-

selveswillalsobekeysocialprotectionactors

forexamplethroughextendedfamilynetworks

(e .g .hostingofIDPs)orthroughfinancialsup-

portsuchasremittancesorzakatinIslamic

communities .

Cash-Based ResponsesCashtransfersandvouchers—i .e .pro-

vidingcashtopeopleaffectedbycrisisinthe

formofunconditionalorconditionalgrants,

CashforWorkorredeemablevouchers—are

increasinglyusedtomeetneedsincrisesasan

alternativeorcomplementtoprovidinggoods

in-kindinresponsetocrisis .Sincethecloseof

the1990sthenumberofcash-basedrespons-

eshassurged .Discussionsamonghumanitar-

ianagencieshaveevolvedfromwhetherthey

canbeanappropriateresponsemechanism

tohow,whenandwhereorganisations,donors

andgovernmentscanbestprogrammeand

supportcashtransfers .Cashtransfersareseen

asprovidingflexibilitytoaidrecipientsand

alsosupportinglocaleconomies .Whilefew

donorshaveexplicitpoliciesoncash,certain

donors(e .g .DFID)havebeengenerallysup-

portiveoftheiruse .Itisnearlyimpossibleto

determinepercentageofcash-basedrespons-

escomparedasaportionoftotalhumanitarian

programming,becauseoftheunreliabilityof

financialtrackingdataandthefactthataid

agenciesanddonorsrarelydisaggregatetheir

assistanceintocashandin-kindcategories .

Early RecoveryThecurrentinternationalaidarchitecture,

instrumentsandmodesofengagementstrug-

gletoaddresstherangeofstrategic,capacity

andfinancingneedsofcountriesexperienc-

ing(oremergingfrom)protractedconflict .

Theinternationalcommunityhaslongbeen

concernedwiththeneedtostrengthenthe

synergiesbetweenhumanitariananddevelop-

mentassistanceandimproveprogramming

intheimmediateaftermathofconflict,often

withthefocusona“transitions”—fromwarto

peaceandfromrelief,recoveryandultimately

longer-termdevelopment .“Earlyrecovery”has

beengainingmomentum,particularlyinpolicy

circles,asaframeworktobetteraddressneeds

andpromoterecoveryinhumanitarianandtran-

sitionalsettings .

Themeaningofearlyrecoveryisstillvery

muchindiscussion,inparticulartheextentto

whichitshouldincludesecurityandsecurity

sectorreformobjectives .UNDPiscurrently

leadingglobaleffortstopromoteearlyrecov-

ery,withafocusonthepromotionofaself-sus-

taining,nationally-ownedprocessforpost-crisis

recovery,buildingonlife-savinginterventionsin

conflict-affectedenvironmentswhereandwhen

appropriate .Inconflictsettings,therearecon-

cernsaboutpotentialtrade-offsbetweenmeet-

ingimmediateneedsandpromotingeventual

recovery .Herethereareoftenmajorquestions

aboutwhethertheconditionsexistunderwhich

effectiverecoverycanbeexpected .Others

conceiveearlyrecoverymorebroadly,asover-

lappingwithpeace-buildingandstabilisation .

Theextenttowhichearlyrecoveryapproaches

willinfluenceandimproveprogrammingincon-

flict-affectedareaswilldependinnosmallpart

onhowUNagencies,NGOsanddonorgovern-

mentsdefineandfundearlyrecoveryactivities

inhumanitariansettings .Thisagendaisboth

flexibleandrapidlyevolving .

Basic Service DeliveryThesurgeinattentiontofragilestates

hascoincidedwithagrowinginterestinbasic


servicedeliveryinthesecontexts .Distortedor

brokenlinesofaccountability,weakornon-ex-

istentsectoralpolicyframeworksatthenational

level,andpoormonitoringandcontrolsystems

oftencreateahighlyfragmentedservicedeliv-

erypatterns .Severegovernancedeficitsand

thebreakdownofsocialorderthroughconflict

oftentranslateintothesystematicexclusionof

certaingroupsalongethnic,religious,political

andgenderlines,thusseriouslychallenging

effectiveprovisionofservices—suchashealth

careorwatersupply—premisedonnormsof

universality,equityandparticipation .

Themodesandinstrumentsofengagement

inservicedeliveryshouldreflectthetypeand

contextofstatefragilityandthecharacteristics

anddynamicsofthespecificservicedelivery

sector(OECD,2007;Ransonetal .,2007;OECD/

OCDE,2006) .Despitethiswidelyagreedprinci-

pleofengagement,humanitariananddevelop-

mentactorswantingtosupportservicedelivery

initiativesinfragilestatescontinuetofacea

rangeoftechnical,securityandpoliticalhurdles

inpursuitofgoalsthatmaybehardtoreconcile .

Theseincludefindingtheappropriatebalance

betweenrespondingtotheimmediatehealth

andotherneedsofcrisis-affectedpopulations

andbuildingstatecapacitytoensureeventual

sustainableserviceprovision .Italsorequires

abalancebetweenengagingwiththestate

andnon-stateproviders;andbetweenworking

throughcentralstateinstitutionstopromote

basicserviceinterventionsandsupportingde-

centralizedmodesofdeliverywhichuselower

levelinstitutions(e .g .localgovernment) .

New Actors in Humanitarian ResponseThepictureofinternationalinterventionin

conflictsettingsisgrowingmorecomplexwith

theadventofsignificantnewactors,including

non-DACdonorsandprivatesectorcompanies .

Whilemuchattentionhasbeenplacedonre-

formingthehumanitariansystemfromwithin,

thewidereconomicandgeo-politicalenviron-

mentandchangingdynamicsofhumanitarian

interventionhavemeantthattheinternational

humanitarian“system”nowcomprisesagreater

diversityofactorsthaneverbefore .Fromas

fewasadozengovernmentfinanciersjustover

adecadeago,itisnowcommonplacetohave

upto50or60donorgovernmentssupporting

ahumanitarianresponsereflectingthefactthat

humantiarianactionisnotonlytheoccuptionof

rich,andindustrializedwesternnations .Inaddi-

tion,thereisagrowingengagementoffor-prof-

itenterprisesasdonors,privatecontractorsand

partnersintheprovisionofhumanitarianrelief

andservicedeliveryincrisis-affectedcountries .

Bothtrendsraiseopportunitiesandchal-

lengesfortraditionalhumanitarianactorsin-

cludingUNagencies,NGOsandtheRedCross

Movements .Withanincreasinglylimitedcapac-

itytorespond,addedresourcesandexpertise

arelikelytoplayacentralroleincontributing

towardshumanitarianoutcomes .Buttherole

oftheseactorsinhumanitarianactionremains

poorlyunderstood .RecentresearchbyHPGhas

trackedthegrowingroleofnon-DACdonors

(HarmerandMartin,2009)andtheevolvingrole

ofprivatesectoractorsincrisiscontexts(Mar-

tin,forthcoming) .Inbothcases,trendsarehard

todetermine,withcontributionsthatareoften

lesssignificantinabsolutefinancialtermsthan

inpoliticalandotherterms .

Operational Security and “Humanitarian Space”

Trendsinsecurityincidentdatashowapro-

nouncedriseoftheratesofattacksagainstaid

workers,mainlydrivenbyafewextremelyinse-

curecontexts(Stoddard,Harmer,DiDomenico,

2009) .Althoughattacksonhumanitarianopera-

tionsseemtohavelevelledoffinmostparts

oftheworldsince2006,inasmallnumberof

themosthighlycontestedoperationalenviron-

mentstheviolencehasworsenedandtakenon

anincreasinglypoliticalorientation .Thefabled

“humanitarianspace”hasnotmerelyshrunkin

theseenvironments,buttheveryconcepthas

beenrenderedmeaningless,asaidworkersand

theirmaterialassetshavebeentreatedasap-

propriateanddesirabletargetsforhostileac-


Source:Stoddard,Harmer,DiDomenico,2009

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 4: Absolute Numbers of Aid Worker Attacks — Trend in Rates Per 100,000

Sep

arat

e In

cid

ents

of

Vio

lenc

e

Trendline for Rate of Victims Per 100,000

tion .UnitedNationssecuritypersonnelandoth-

ershavenoteda“paradigmshift”inthethreat

environment,inwhichpersonnelarepolitically

targetedevenwhentheyareattemptingtoen-

gageinneutralhumanitarianaction .Insecurity

leadstoconstraintsonaccesstobeneficiaries,

whichincreasestheirvulnerability .

Globally,violenceagainstaidworkershas

risensignificantlyoverthepast12years(the

periodforwhichdatahasbeensystematically

collected) .Theabsolutenumberofmajorsecu-

rityincidentsinvolvingaidworkers—defined

askillings,kidnappings,andattacksthatresult

inseriousinjury—hasrisenfour-foldoverthe

timeperiod,withthelargestjumpoccurringin

thepastthreeyears .Theaveragenumberof

incidentsperyearin2006-2008wasup177per-

centfromtheannualaverageofpriorrecorded

years .Whilethismustbeunderstoodagainst

abackgroundofrisingnumbersofaidworkers

inthefield,thenumberofattackshasunques-

tionablyoutpacedthesteadilygrowingpopu-

lationofaidworkers,resultingina61percent

riseinattackratesforthesameperiod .In2008

alone,260aidworkersfellvictimtodeliberate

violence—arateof9/10,000 .Ofthese,122lost

theirlives .

Thejumpinsecurityincidentswasmainly

drivenbytheextremelyinsecureoperational

environmentsofAfghanistan,SomaliaandSudan

(Darfur),whichtogetheraccountedformorethan

60percentofthetotalattacksonaidworkers .

Importantly,whencontrollingforthesethree

extremecases,theattackratesforaidworkers

intherestoftheworldappearstobestable,

evenslightlydeclining .Thiswouldsuggestthat

advancesinoperationalsecuritymanagement

amongmanyhumanitarianorganisations,includ-

ingmoresophisticatedmethodologiesforrisk

assessmentandmitigation,haveseenpositive

resultsforaidprovidersinallbutthemostviolent

settings .Howeveritisinsuchsettingsthatthe

humanitarianneedswilloftenbegreatest,and

agenciesengagedinlifesavingreliefassistance

needtofindawaytosustainvitaloperations .

Althoughintentionalityisnotoriouslydif-

ficulttoascertaininsecurityincidents,thebest

availabledataindicatethatagreaterproportion

ofaidworkerattacksarenowpoliticallymoti-

vated(ibid) .Theinternationalaidsystem,UN


andINGOcomponentsalike,hasbeeneffec-

tivelypaintedbyarmedoppositiongroupsas

aninstrumentofaWesternpoliticalagenda .As

oneUNsecurityprofessionalobserved,humani-

tarianaidhascometobeseenasamanifesta-

tionoftheWesternnations”“state-building”

projecttoextendtheirpower .Attacksagainst

aidoperationsareastrikebackagainstthat

powerextension—“anti-state-building .”

Thereisadivergencebetweenthevictimi-

zationratesofUNagenciesandNGOs .Interms

ofaidworkersoverall,therateofinternational

staffvictims,longseentobedecliningrelative

totherisingnationalstaffvictims,spikedsud-

denlyinthepastthreeyears .Inkeepingwith

thisfindingtherewasa350percentriseinkid-

nappings—atypeofattackthattraditionally

favoursinternationaltargetsfortheirhighersym-

bolicandransomvalues .Thisglobalincident

patterndoesnotholdtrueacrossalltypesof

aidorganisations,however .WhenattacksonUN

agencieswerelookedatseparately,thecasual-

tieswerestillseentobeheavilyweightedtoward

nationalstaff,particularlycontractors,suggest-

ingthatassecurityworsensagreaterrelianceon

programmingthroughlocalentitieshasshifted

theriskburdentotheseindividuals,manyof

whomhaveneithertheresourcestoenhance

theirownsecuritynortheeconomicwherewithal

toturndowntheopportunityofwork .Theethi-

calproblemswiththisaremanifest .

Whencontracteddriversareincluded,the

datashowthatWFPhashadmorethanthree

timesthenumberofworkerskilledinattacks

whileonthejobthaneachoftheotherUNhu-

manitarianagenciesandthelargestNGOfed-

erations .WFP’scasualtiesarealsomoreheavily

bornebynationalstaffthanisthecasewithits

felloworganizations

Operational Security — Developments in Policy and Practice

Withinthehumanitariancommunity,the

securitydomainhassignificantlyprofessional-

isedoverthepastfiveyearsandsecuritybudg-

etshaveincreased .Agencieshaveestablished

formalsecuritypostsatheadquarters,regional

andfieldlocations .Securitypoliciesandproce-

dureshavebeendevelopedemphasizingapro-

gramme-ledapproachtoriskmanagement,and

Figure 5: Highest Incident Countries, 2006-2008

Source:Stoddard,HarmerandDeDominici(2009)

Countries with most aid worker attacks20006–2008

0 20 40 60 80 100

Separate Incidents of Major Violence

Pakistan

Iraq

Chad

SriLanka

Somalia

Afghanistan

Sudan


investmentsarebeingmadeinsecurityauditsto

analysewhetherpracticeonthegroundreflects

organisationalpriorities .TheUNhasplayedan

activepartinthispolicyshift,andWFPhasbeen

oneoftheleadersinthis .HowevertheUNsuf-

feredasignificantsetbackwithalargescale,tar-

getedattackagainsttheorganisationinAlgiers

in2007 .EffortstoestablishaUN-wideincident

reportingmechanism,andencouraginggreater

collaborationbetweenaidactorsontheground

throughtheSavingLivesTogetherinitiativehave

alsofallenshortoftheiroriginalgoals .

Thestrategyof“acceptance”—cultivating

relationswithlocalactorsandcommunities—is

stillseenasakeyapproachtosecurity,particu-

larlyforNGOs .ButUNhumanitarianagencies,

includingWFP,facewidersecuritychallenges

astheyformpartofalargerentitywithaclear

politicalidentityandrole .Itisinherentlymore

difficultforUNagenciestocultivateacceptance

asindependenthumanitarianactors .Insomeof

themostinsecurecontexts,suchasSomaliaand

Afghanistanmostsecuritymanagers—NGOs

andUNalike—acknowledgethatacceptance

isincreasinglynotaviablesecuritystrategy .

Manyagencieshavealsoreinforcedtheir

adherencetohumanitarianprinciples,inparticu-

lartheprincipleofindependence .Humanitarian

practitionersseeindependenceasincreasingly

vitaltotheirabilitytonegotiateaccessandto

theiroveralllevelofsecurity .Thisisdoneprima-

rilybyreducingtheagency’srelianceoninsti-

tutionalfunding,especiallyifapotentialdonor

isnegativelyperceivedbythehostcommunity .

Howeffectivethisisinmaintainingthesecurity

ofstaffis,however,debatable .TheICRChas

hadsomesuccessinregainingtheacceptance

thatitsuniquemandatebestows,buttheUN

andNGOshavesufferedincreasingattacksirre-

spectiveoftheirfundingandpartnerships .

Remote Management and the Transfer of Risk

Securityincidentshaveasignificantimpact

onanaidagenciesprogrammingapproach .

Strategiessuchasremotemanagementare

increasinglyemployedtoensurethataidcon-

tinuestoreachthebeneficiarypopulation .The

organisationwithdrawsorlimitsthemovements

ofitsinternationalstaff,whileshiftingmore

responsibilitytonationalstafforlocalpartners

and/orcontractors .Thisapproachisgener-

allybasedontheassumptionthatlocalactors

facealowerlevelofriskthaninternationalenti-

tiesorpersonnel .However,thisassumptionis

frequentlyfalse,andsimplyshiftstheburden

ofrisktothosewhooftenhavefewersecurity

resourcesandlesstraining .

Remotemanagement,thoughintended

asashort-termexpedient,canhaveaseriesof

knock-oneffectswhichmakeitdifficultforthe

agencytore-engagelaterthroughmoretra-

ditionalmeans .Theseeffectsincludereduced

ground-levelinformation,lesscredibilityand

lowerlevelsoftrustintheagency,aswellasin-

creasedrisksforlocalimplementingactors(Rog-

ers,2006) .Recognisingthisdilemma,agencies

haveincreasedtheirinvestmentinnationalstaff

capacitiesinrecentyears .Mostalsoacknowl-

edge,however,thatmoreneedstobedone .

Security-Related Constraints on AccessAssecurityworsens,aidoperationsare

oftenscaledbackorwithdrawn,affectingboth

thequalityandquantityofassistancebenefi-

ciariesreceive .Measuringaccessis,however,

achallengingpursuitandthereareasyetno

robustmeanstoassessclaimsthataccessis

declining .Whiletheoverallfootprintofthe

internationalassistancecommunitymighthave

shrunkinagivencountry,someagenciesmay

havemaintainedorevenincreasedtheiropera-

tionalpresenceinresponsetothewithdrawal

ofotheragencies .ICRC,forexample,maintains

thatithasincreaseditsoperationalengage-

mentinsomeveryinsecurecontexts,andhas

donesowithinternationalstaffandwithout

armedescorts,armouredcarsormilitarypro-

tection .WFParguesthattheincreasednumber

ofsuspensionshaspartlycomeaboutbecause

theorganisationhaspusheddeeperintothe

heartofconflictenvironments .


OCHAhasdevelopedatrackingsystem

tomonitorandreportaccessconstraints,and

thisiscurrentlybeingpilotedinsixinsecure

contexts .Inhis2009reporttotheUNSecurity

CouncilontheProtectionofCivilians,theSec-

retaryGeneralhighlightsthatthemostmarked

deteriorationofhumanitarianaccessisevident

inthestrikingincreaseinattacksonhumani-

tarianagencies .IndeliveringfoodtoSomalia,

AfghanistanandDarfur,WFP,forexample,has

sufferedrepeatedattacksonconvoys,including

killingandkidnappingstaffandcontractors .In

Afghanistan,inthefirsthalfof2008,800tonnes

offoodaidwerelostinattacks .InDarfur,Sudan

inthesameyearmorethan100truckswerehi-

jacked,forcingtheorganisationtoreducethe

rationsofuptothreemillionpeopleby50% .

Somalia,inturn,providessomeparticularlystark

evidenceoftheimpactofinsecurityonaccess .

Emerging Threats and Potential Causes of Future Conflict

Urbanisation, Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis

Therapidanduncontrolledprocessofur-

banizationinthedevelopingworldisthreatening

thewell-beingandthedevelopmentopportuni-

tiesofmillionsofcitydwellers .Thethreatsthat

theyareconfrontedwithareinmanycases“no

lessseverethansomesituationsdescribedinter-

nationallyas“humanitarianemergencies’”(IRIN

andUN-Habitat,2008) .Despitethescaleofthe

challenge,bothhumanitariananddevelopment

actorsareill-equippedtodealwiththecomplex-

itiesposedbysuchrapidandunplannedurban

growth .Thegraphonthenextpageshowsthe

historicandprojectedtrendsforurbanandrural

populationgrowthtotheyear2030 .Almostallof

theprojectedgrowthbetweennowand2030is

inurbancentresindevelopingcountries .

Whileurbanisationisaglobalphenom-

enon,itaffectslessdevelopedcountriesdis-

proportionately .Overthelasttwodecadesthe

urbanpopulationofthedevelopingworldhas

grownanaverageof3millionpeopleperweek

(UN-Habitat,2008) .Itisestimatedthatbythe

middleofthe21stcentury,thetotalurbanpop-

ulationofthedevelopingworldhavedoubled;

withSoutherncitiesabsorbing95%oftheurban

andAfricademonstratingthehighestrates .

Therapidgrowthofurbancentreshas

beenaccompaniedbyanincreasingtrendin

variousformsofviolence,aswellasbeingaf-

fectedbyitsconsequences .Researchbythe

CrisisStatesResearchCentre(CSRC)onCities

andFragileStateshasshownthatcitiescan

becometheatresofregionalandinternational

conflictsandoftenexperiencetheeffectsof

largescaledisplacementduetocivilstrife .Cit-

iesarealsoregularlycharacterisedbysegrega-

tionandfearthatisaresultofviolentcrime

andconflict .Differentformsofurbanviolence,

suchasarmedconflict,gangwarfare,organized

crimeandriotsposeseriousthreatstothelives

ofurbanresidentsandexposethemtoongoing

protectionthreats(ICRC,2008) .

Inadditiontotherangeofstructuralprob-

lemsfacingtheurbanpoor,recentdevelop-

mentssuchasthefood,fuelandfinancialcrisis,

andglobalprocessessuchasclimatechangeare

inducingnewtypesofrisksandrepresentpo-

tentialtriggersforurbanhumanitariancrises .Ur-

banpopulationsweretheworstaffectedbythe

globalfoodcrisisinmanycontexts(HighLevel

TaskForceontheGlobalFoodCrisis,2008) .

Youth Radicalisation, Political Islam and Transnational Drivers of Conflict

Attheheartofmuchurbaninsecurityis

urbanunemployment .Citiesinfragilestatesin

particularsufferfromhighlevelsofpopulation

growthwhichexceedtheircapacitytogener-

atejobsandlivelihoods(CSRC,undated) .Un-

employmentratesareusuallyparticularlyhigh

amongsttheyouth,engenderingfrustration

andresentmentwhichinturnoftenleadstovio-

lenceandconflict .Theroleofsocialexclusion,

poverty,inequality,powerandpowerlessness

inexplainingurbansocialviolenceandyouth

militancyinmanyurbancontextshasbeenlong

documented(DFID,2007) .Theseelementsin


themselvesdonothoweveralwaysleadto

conflict .ExtensiveresearchbyStewart(2006)

hasshownthatitisacombinationofstrong

culturalaffinities,charismaticororganised

leadershipandexclusionistgovernmentpoli-

ciesthattendtoturnlatentgrievancesinto

actualprotest,whichmaybecomeviolent .

Acurrentstrongmanifestationofyouth

radicalisationistobefoundinIslamiccon-

texts .Inthesecontextsthelinkbetweenpov-

erty,inequalityandviolenceassociatedwith

radicalisationorextremismisnotstraight-

forward .ThetraditionalbackboneofIslamist

politicalmovementshasnotbeenprovided

bytheverypoor,whoaregenerallytoopreoc-

cupiedwiththeirstrugglefordailysurvivalto

besuitablymobilized(Lieven,2008) .Islam-

istmilitantsoftencomefromeconomically

advantagedbackgroundsandyoungmenin

particularareoftenradicalizedbyconsidera-

tionsofjobandstatus(Lieven,ibid.) .Acom-

prehensiveliteraturereviewforDFIDoncon-

flict,statefragilityandsocialcohesion(SDD,

2008)illustrateshowthelimitedlinksbetween

terrorismandincomepoverty,underlining

thatradicalizationandextremismappearto

bemorearesponsetopoliticalconditions

andlong-standingfeelingsofindignity,and

frustrationatlackofopportunity .Povertyand

illiteracytendtostillbeimportantmotivating

factorstorecruitmilitantsatthelowerlevelsof

extremistorganizations(SDD,ibid.) .Thesitua-

tionhowevervariesgreatlydependingonthe

contextsandthecountry,makingitverydif-

ficulttodrawgeneralconclusions .

Transnationalforcesoftenplayakey

roleininfluencingconflictdynamicswithina

country .MaryKaldor(1999)hasshownwars

arefrequentlyembeddedwithincomplex

transnationalnetworks .Thisincludestherole

ofdiasporasinfinancingandprovidingpoliti-

calsupportaswellasthetradinginarmsand

conflictcommoditiessuchasnaturalresources

throughillicittraffickingnetworkstofinance

war(SDD,2008) .Transnationalnetworkstend

tobemoreeffectiveifthestateisweak .Inthe

caseofBangladesh,governmentauthorities

haveadmittedbeingunabletocontrolunregu-

latedflowsofmoneyandlackingcapacityto

identifyorganisationswhoengageinfunding

activitiesofradicalizedandextremistgroups

(Munizzuraman,2008) .Manystateshavebeen

unabletoregulatetheinflowofmoneyfrom

theGulfortheMiddleEasttonationalNGO’s .

Figure 6: Historic and Projected Trends for Urban and Rural Population Growth

9

8

7

6

5

3

2

1

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

■ Developing–Urban

■ Developing–Rural

■ Developed–Urban

■ Developed–Rural


DiasporagroupsoriginatingfromMuslim

countrieshavebecomeincreasinglyradical-

izedandtheyareseenasnotonlyfinancing

salafigroups,butalsoasbringingradical

thoughtstothecountriesinquestion .The

stereotypicalimageofmilitantsbeingforged

inthemadrasasofPakistanisbecomingrap-

idlyoutdated .Militantsareincreasinglyusing

theinternetandsocialnetworkingtoaccess

radicalthoughtandreachothergroupsacross

theworld .Nationalcounter-terroristunitsin

BangladeshandPakistanarestudyingthe

Facebook-generationtoseehowyoungmili-

tantsareshiftingradicalthoughtsfromcoun-

trytocountry .

Natural Resource-Based ConflictsAlthoughsomestudieshaveoverem-

phasisedtheroleofnaturalresourcesinwar

(seeCollier2000),thepoliticaleconomyof

contemporaryarmedconflictshighlightsthe

importanceofeconomicagendasandnatural

resourcesinshapingthecauses,durationand

characterofviolence .Loot-ableresources

arethoughttoprolongconflictsastheycan

disproportionatelybenefitinsurgentsthereby

avoidingtheirdefeat .Theycancreateinter-

naldisciplineproblemswithmanysoldiers

preferringconflicttopeace(Ballentineand

Nitzschke2003) .IneasternDRC,forexample,

differentarmedactorshaveestablishedalu-

crativesystemofeconomicprofitandpower

throughtheexploitationofnaturalresources

thatisdependentontheongoingconflict .

Nonloot-ableresourcessuchasoilordeep

shaftmineralstendtofavourgovernments

intheirattemptstosecurerapidmilitaryvic-

tory,thoughthestruggleforcontroloversuch

resourcesmaybeadominantagendaforall

sidesinaconflict .

Theseeconomicagendascanalso

changethecharacterofaconflict .Conflicts

becomecomplexandfragmentedaseconom-

icmotivescometothefore,whichcanleadto

moreindiscriminatepredationofciviliansas

armedactorsnolongerfeeltheneedtocre-

ateconsentandaccountability(Leader2000) .

Thiscanhavesubstantialeffectsonpeople’s

livelihoodsasarmedactorsdestroyorstealkey

assetssuchashouses,land,foodsuppliesand

livestock,oftenforcingcivilianstoflee .Local

institutionsorgovernancestructurescentralto

safeguardingpeople’slivelihoodsmaybede-

stroyedormanipulatedforpersonalorpolitical

gain .Manyciviliansmayalsobeforcedtoseek

copingmechanismswithinwareconomiesthat

inturncanfurthersustaintheconflict(Jaspers

andMaxwell,2009) .

Climate Change, Pastoralism and ConflictClimatechangemaycontributetonatural

resourcescarcitysuchasdecliningaccessto

waterortoland,andcompetitionoverincreas-

inglyscarceresourcescanleadtoviolentcon-

flict .Thereisagrowingawarenessthatclimate

changeandtheincreasedfrequencyandseverity

ofextremeweathereventscanincreasetherisk

ofconflictandmayfurtherexacerbatecurrent

conflicts(FMR,2008;Brownetal .2007;Smith

andVivekananda,2007) .Theeffectsofclimate

changeandviolentconflictcanbeseenasmutu-

allyreinforcingprocesses .Inconflict-affected

statestheinteractionofclimatechangewith

violentconflictisseenascreatingavicious

circlewhereconflictfurtherconstrainsadap-

tivecapacityandclimatechangeincreasingly

deepenstheconflict .Incountrieswherepoverty,

politicalmarginalization,weakgovernanceand

institutionalsystemsarealreadyentrenched,the

consequencesofclimatechangesarelikelyto

interactwithotherprocessestoincreasestherisk

ofviolentconflict(SmithandVivekananda,2007) .

Directandindirectconsequencesofcli-

matechange—suchasnaturalresourcescar-

cityordisplacement—willinteractwithother

factorsincludinggovernanceandinstitutions,

politicalandeconomicstability,thusmakingit

difficulttopredictwhetherorhowviolencewill

breakoutinanygivencontext(CrisisGroup,

2008) .Thereforeratherthanseeingclimate

changeasthekeydriverofconflict,climate

changeanditsconsequencesshouldbeseen


asincreasingtheriskandlikelihoodofviolent

conflictinalreadyfragilesocialandpolitical

environmentswhichoftenlackthecapac-

itytoadapt,respondandrecover(Smithand

Vivekananda,2007) .

Theclimateofthearidandsemi-aridlands

(ASALs)intheHornofAfricaischaracterisedby

hightemperatures,lowanderraticrainfalland

cyclicaldroughts .Pastoralistshavedeveloped

sophisticatedanddynamiclivelihoodstrate-

gies,includingbuildingupherdsizesasinsur-

anceagainsttimesofhardship,accessingand

managingnaturalresources,andmaintaining

highlevelsofmobilityacrosslargetractsofland

(Destaetal,2008;HPG,2009;Markakis,2004) .

Duringthepastfewdecadeshowever,thecli-

mateoftheASALshasbecomemorevariable

andlesspredictableanddroughtshavein-

creasedinfrequencyandmagnitude .Pastoral-

istlivelihoodshavebecomesignificantlyunder

strainandtheiradaptivecapacitytoresistand

recoverfromdrought-relatedshockshasbeen

progressivelyundermined .Althoughthecausal

factorsarecomplex,itisimportanttoconsider

howclimatechangeinteractswithanddeepens

existingproblems(HPG,2009) .Theadverseef-

fectsofclimatechangeinthisregionhavebeen

associatedwiththeexacerbationofphenomena

suchasforcedmigration,environmentaldegra-

dation,socialbreakdownandconflict .

Inrecentyearsconflictsovernaturalre-

sourcesandaccesshaveincreasedsignificantly

togetherwiththeintensificationofrecurrent

climateshocks .Pastoralgroupsresorttomigra-

tionasaclimateadaptationstrategyandmove

overlargertractsoflandinsearchofavail-

ablegrazinglandandwater .Thismovement

increasespopulationpressure,accelerates

environmentaldegradationandleadstofierce

competitionoverscarceresources,oftentrig-

geringconflictbetweendifferentcommunities,

bothnomadicandsettled .

Land as Key Issue in Future ConflictAcriticalissueinmanyofcurrentandfu-

tureconflictsistheaccess,ownershipanduse

ofland .Landiscentraltopeople’slivelihoods,

particularlyinruralsocieties,andinequitiesor

antagonismsinlandtenurecoupledwiththe

institutionalfailuretoresolvedisputescanlead

toviolentconflict .InColombia,akeygrievance

oftheinsurgencyistheinequitiesinlandten-

urethatresultedfromtensionsbetweenlarge

landholdingsandsmallscalefarming(Elhawary

2009) .IntheDRC,agradualerosionofcustom-

arysystemsoflandaccessduetocolonialand

statepoliciesofappropriationandpatronage

ledtoincreasingconflictsoverland(Vlasen-

root2008) .Thesetensionsinlandtenureare

oftentheresultofthedevelopmentprocess,as

changesinagrariansocietiesoftencreateten-

sionsaroundlanduseandlabourasitrequires

communitiestoshifttoadifferentformofpoliti-

cal,economic,socialandinstitutionalorgani-

sation .Forexample,subsistencefarmingand

customaryownershipoflandwilloftencontrast

withtheneedforlandandasufficientlabour

supplyonlargemechanisedfarmsorincities .

Similarly,thelivelihoodsofsedentarygroups

willoftencontrastwiththoseofmobilepasto-

ralists .Miningconcessionswillalsooftenaffect

people’saccesstolandandconsequentlytheir

livelihoods .Ifinstitutions(formalorinformal)are

unabletopeacefullymanagetheantagonisms

thatarisefromsuchtransitions,theprocessis

likelytobeviolent .

Landrelationscanbeaggravatedbycon-

flictitself,particularlywhenthereislargescale

displacementofpopulationsand/orlandbe-

comesakeyresourceofconflict .Landcanof-

tenbeusedtorewardkeyalliesinconflict .For

example,inDarfur,thegovernmentoffersits

allieslandinreturnforengagingintheconflict,

whichconsequentlyaffectspeople’slivelihoods

andcreatestensionsaroundlandtenure(de

Waal2009) .Controloflandisalsoameansto

gainimportantresourcesthatmayliebeneath

theland .Forexample,ineasternDRC,control

oflandbyarmedgroupsiscentraltoacquir-

ingmineralwealthandprofitingfromitstrade .

Similarly,inColombia,paramilitarygroupshave

soughttoacquirelargeareasoflandasameans


ofwealthaccumulation .Forceddisplacement

canfurtheraggravatelandconflicts .Refugees

orIDPswilloftenoccupylandintheirareasof

refugeandothers,sometimesopportunistical-

lyandothertimesoutofnecessity,willoften

occupylandinareasofdisplacement .

Theseissuesalsocometotheforein

thepost-conflictperiod,especiallyiftheim-

portanceoflandintheconflicthasnotbeen

recognisedoraddressedinthepeaceproc-

ess .Despiteformalagreementsbetweenbel-

ligerents,conflictsoverlandwilloftenpersist

particularlywhentherehasbeenlargescale

andprotracteddisplacement .Landgrabbing

oftenoccursinthetransitionperiod,theland

administrationisoftendysfunctionalorcor-

rupt,peoplehavelostorhadtheirdocumen-

tationdestroyed,returneesoftenbringnew

ideas,technologiesandcapitalthatcanalter

landrelations,somewillhaveavestedinterest

inmaintaininglandtenureinsecurityandland

policywilloftenlackrelevanceinacontextof

rapidchange(Huggins2009,AldenWily2009) .

Frequentlytheresponsetodisplacementin

thepost-conflictperiodistoreturnIDPsand

refugeestotheirareasoforigin,yetchang-

ingdynamicsduringtheconflict,particularly

aroundlandtenuremeansthatthisprocessis

oftenfraughtwithtensionsaslandisoccupied

byothersorreturneesmightnothavehad

landinthefirstplace .Forexample,inRwanda,

thereturnofaround600,000Tutsirefugees

bythelate1990sandthereturnenmasseof

Huturefugeesin1996and1997ledtoincreas-

ingtensionsoverlandaccess .InAfghanistan,

itwasestimatedbetweenMarch2002and

May2004that60%ofreturneeswerelandless,

while60%ofthosegoingbacktoruralareas

weredependentonlandasameansofsurvival

(UNHCRfigurescitedinOzerdemandSofiza-

da2006) .Thecentralityoflandinconflictand

post-conflictsituationsmeansthatignoring

theseissuescanleadtomissedopportunities

tosupportpeople’slivelihoodsorworsefeed

intotensionsorcreateconflictbetweendiffer-

entgroupsseekingaccesstoland .

Implications of Conflict Trends for WFP

Responding to Current and Future Challenges

ManyofthechallengesfacingWFPin

workinginconflictsituationsarealreadyap-

parentinitscurrentprogrammes:howtoas-

sesschangingpatternsofneedinprotracted

crises;findingformsofassistanceappropriate

tothesecontexts;strikingtherightbalance

betweenreliefandrecoveryassistance;main-

tainingsecureaccesstoaffectedpopulations;

andmanagingcomplexandexpensivelogisti-

caloperations,foritselfandothers .Someof

thechallengesrelatetoprinciples:howtowork

withgovernmentsorevenotherUNbodies—

particularlyinintegratedmissions—whose

agendasareovertlypolitical,whilemaintaining

neutralityandimpartiality?Someareabout

strategyandcoordination:howbesttoconfig-

ureWFP’sapproachalongsidethoseofothers

(particularlyFAO)toachievethebestcombined

result?Alloftheseraisequestionsaboutthe

properroleofWFPandhowitsnewstrategic

plan(2008-11)shouldbeinterpretedinsitua-

tionsofprotractedcrisis,violentinstabilityand

weakgovernance .Theaspirationsinthatplan

facehugechallengesinthesecontexts,yet

thesearethesettingforalargeproportionof

WFP’sglobalprogramming .

Itisworthre-statingherethe5strategic

objectivesinthe2008StrategicPlan:

• Savelivesandprotectlivelihoods

inemergencies

• Preventacutehungerandinvestindisas-

terpreparednessandmitigation

• Restoreandrebuildlivesandlivelihoodsin

post-conflict/post-disaster/transitions

• Reducechronichungerandmalnutrition

• Strengthenthecapacitiesofcountriesto

reducehunger

Eachoftheseposeschallengesinconflict

situationsthathaveyettobeadequatelyad-

dressed,andwhichrequirerethinkingandad-

aptationofapproach .Someofthebestthink-


ingisemergingfromcountryprogrammes,

thoughmanyarestrugglingwiththereality

that“countryownership”(aprinciplestressed

inthestrategicplan)maybeamixedblessing

inconflictsettings,andsometimesanunrealis-

ticgoalintheshorttomediumterm .

Whilesomegoodinnovationcanbefound

atthefieldlevel,theparametersandscopefor

actionaretoalargeextentsetinRome,New

Yorkanddonorcapitals .Moreflexibilityofap-

proachiscertainlyrequired:theoldbusiness

modelcannotcopewiththesechallenges .The

aspirationsoutlinedinthestrategicplancan

onlybeachievedifeachthecontextsinwhich

WFPoperatesisunderstoodinitsownterms,

andrealisticprogrammingobjectivesareset .

Blueprintsareunlikelytosucceed .

Thechallengesabovewillcontinuefor

theforeseeablefuture,buttheyneedtobe

seenagainstthebackdropofthelikelyfuture

trendsnotedinthissurvey .Thesehaveimpli-

cationsforthekindsoffoodinsecurity—and

theoperatingenvironment—thatWFPand

otherswillfaceincomingyears .Someofthe

specificchallenges(currentandfuture)are

consideredbelow .

WFP and Safety NetsGiventhescaleofitsoperationsandthe

extentofitsreachinthefield—uniqueamong

theUNagencies—WFPfindsitselfrequiredto

dealwithawidespectrumofacuteandchron-

icfoodinsecurity .Intheabsenceofalternative

mechanisms,itislikelytoretainakeyrole(per-

hapsthekeyrole)inprovidingsafetynetsin

protractedconflictsituations .Planningforthe

alternative,i .e .government-providedsafety

nets,formstherationalebehindstrategicob-

jective5aboveandisnecessaryandappropri-

ate;butitwilldependonthepoliticalrealities

ofeachsetting .CurrentWFPapproachesto

safetynets(FoodForWork,vulnerablegroup

feeding),maybedifficulttosustaininconflict

situations .Inanycase,moreinnovativethink-

ingisrequiredifWFPistocontinuetoprovide

effectivesafetynetsinconflictsettings .

Alternatives to Food AidTheWFPstrategicplanrecognisesthe

importanceofdevelopingalternativewaysof

providingfoodassistanceandfoodsecurity

support,includingtheuseofcashandvouch-

ers:WFP will continuously assess and align its

approaches to changes in the external operat-

ing and funding environments, and develop

its range of tools in order to meet hunger and

humanitarian needs in ways that are as sensi-

tive as possible to local conditions, for ex-

ample by using vouchers and cash when ap-

propriate, as an alternative or addition to food

commodity responses .(SP2008-11para12) .

Thishasaparticularsignificanceincon-

flictsettings,notonlybecauseapproaches

otherthanfoodaidmaybeamoreappropri-

ateandefficientwayoftransferringvalue;

butalsobecausetheycanprovidebothsafer

waysofprogrammingandawayofmaximis-

ingtheimpactoffoodaid(e .g .reducingthe

needtosellfoodaidinthemarket) .One

exampleofthiswithdirectlinkstofoodaidis

theprovisionofvouchersformilling .

WFPhastakenimportantandinnovative

stepsinthisarea,pilotingandimplementing

cash-basedresponsesprimarilyinresponse

tonaturaldisastersbutalsotoconflictand

insecurity(e .g .Darfur,OccupiedPalestinian

Territories) .Giventhegreaterflexibilityofun-

conditionalcashtransferscomparedtofood

vouchers(allowingpeopletodeterminetheir

ownpriorities),thisispreferableinprinciple;

thoughvouchersmaybemoreappropriate

forsecurityreasonsinmanyconflictset-

tings .UnlikeNGOsthatarelargelyconfined

tomountingsmaller-scaleprogrammesand

pilots,WFPhastheopportunitytopromote

large-scalecash-basedresponses .Asother

UNagencieslikeUNICEFandUNHCRareus-

ingcashandvouchersforbasicneeds,reset-

tlement/reintegration,andeducation,WFP

shouldexploreoptionsforcollaboratingwith

theminthefieldonjointprojectsthatuse

cashtransferstoachievethevariousobjec-

tivesofdifferentagencies .


Assisting RecoveryThestrategicplanidentifiesaroleforWFP

inbothassistingrecoveryatthehouseholdlevel

andinhelpingbridgethegapbetweenconflict

andpeaceatthemacro-politicalandeconomic

level .ThePRROmodel—whichnowapplies

tothemajorityofWFP’sprogramming—is

premisedontheideathatWFPcanhelppeople

recover .Butthechallengestothisinmanycon-

flictsettingsareimmense .DRCisoneexample

amongmanywherethe“recovery”partofthe

programmeisparticularlyproblematic,and

wheretheobjectivessetoutinthePRROlook

unrealistic,atleastintermsoftimeframe .They

arepremisedonbothprevailingsecurityandon

growingstate-ledassistanceandinvestment .In

short,theplanningassumptionsthatunderlie

PRROsinconflictsettingsneedtobereviewed .

WFPmaintainsinvolvementinearlyrecovery

throughtheClusterprocess,butitfacesitsown

challengesinrecoveryprogramming .Inparticu-

lar,itneedstoconsiderhowbesttoprogramme

foodassistance—includingquestionsoftarget-

ing—inareastransitioningfromconflicttopeace

inawaythatprovidesforacuteneedswhilenot

underminingpeople’sownrecoverymechanisms,

theprocessofstateownershipandthechang-

ingroleoflocalauthorities .Thereisaspecific

challengeinsupportingreintegrationofformer

displacedpopulationsinwaysthattakeproper

accountoftheneedsofhostcommunities .

Working Effectively and Accountably in Conflict Settings

WFPneedstobetterunderstandtherel-

evanceoflocalinstitutions(formalandnon-for-

mal)topeople’sfoodsecurity .Theseinstitutions

mayplayabenignoradamagingrole .WFPhas

tofindwaysofdeterminingthemostappropri-

atewayofdistributingfoodorotheritemsin

situationsofconflictwhichensuresboth that

mostvulnerablearereachedandthattheriskof

diversion,manipulationandcorruptionaremini-

mised .Itisnotaloneinfacingthischallenge,

thoughtheinternationalenvironmenthasper-

hapsbecomemoreriskaverseinthisrespect .

Relatedtothisisthequestionofpro-

grammemonitoringandprogrammingquality .

ThisisanareawhereWFPisfeltbysometo

laggingsomewhatincomparisontoothers,

partlyafunctionofthescaleandcomplexityof

itsoperations .Thereisnodoubtthattheflex-

ibilityandneedsresponsivenessthatWFPas-

pireswilldependinpartonitsabilitytomoni-

tormorethantonnagedelivered .Country-level

staffneedtobegivengreaterincentivestoask

questionsaboutcontinuedprogrammerel-

evanceandquality,andtotakeremedialsteps

wherenecessary .

Policy Coherence and Civil-Military Relations

Whenworkingalongsidegovernments,

donorsandotherUNagenciesthatarepursu-

ingwiderpoliticalandsecurityobjectives,WFP

needstounderstandthepoliticaleconomyof

theparticularcontextinordertodetermine

whetherandhowtoengage .Collaborationwith

themilitary,forexample,hastotakeintoac-

countlocalsensitivitiesaroundlegitimacy,since

itcannegativelyaffecthumanitarianaccessand

WFPstaffsecurity(seebelow) .Thisrelatesto

widerdissonancesbetweendifferentagendas

inintegratedapproaches .Principles,objectives,

prioritiesandmandatesoftendifferbetween

actorsandcarefulconsiderationhastobegiven

tocompatibility .Thisisparticularlyimportant

inlightofrecenteventsinDarfurwhereefforts

toseekjusticeforhumanrightsabuseshave

hinderedtheabilityofagenciestorespondto

immediateneeds .

Engagement with the StateTheroleofthestateinconflicts,andin-

creasinglywithcounter-insurgencyorstabilisa-

tionoperations,raisesseriousquestionsfor

WFPaboutwhetherandhowtoengagewith

thegovernment .Operationalhumanitarian

agenciestendtoby-passthestatemechanisms,

concernedabouttheirneutrality;butgiven

WFP’ssizeandmandate,strategicengagement

isoftencalledfor .Itiswellpositionedtosup-


portthecapacityofstateinprovidingservices

andensuringfoodsecurity .Advocacyisimpor-

tantinthisregardbutpubliccriticismmaybe

counter-productive .Understandingthenature

ofgovernanceinthesecontextsiscentralin

definingthisengagement .Thereisoftenscope

toworkproductivelywithcertainelementsof

thestateevenwhenthereareotherelements

thatpresentblockages .

Protection and LivelihoodsWFPhavebeenincreasinglyengagedin

developingaroleintheprotectionofcivilians .

Theseeffortscouldbefurtheredbyintegrat-

inglivelihoodsandprotectioninconflicten-

vironments .Complementarylivelihoodsand

protectionworkmeansthattheynotonlyad-

dresspeople’seconomicvulnerabilitybutalso

engagequestionsofpoliticalvulnerability .It

wouldallowWFPtooperateatmultiplelevels:

addressingviolationsthataffecttheprotection

andlivelihoodsofthepopulationasawhole;

specificmeasuresthatimpactoncommuni-

tiesorindividual’slivelihoodsandprotection;

aswellasrespondingtotheconsequencesof

theviolationsthroughdirectassistance .Italso

expandsthenatureoftheapproachfrompure

responsetopotentialprevention .

Operational SecurityWFPisconsideredaleaderinthehumani-

tariansecuritydomain .AsthelargestoftheUN

agencies,itmanagesandsupportscomplex

foodassistanceoperationsinhighlyinsecure

environments .Asaresult,securityissueshave

beenattheforefrontofWFP’soperationalap-

proach .Itsrequirementsaresignificantandcan’t

bemetbyUNDSSalone .WFPhas53profes-

sionalsecuritystaffinthefieldin14countries(by

comparison,UNDSShas250peopleinthefield

forthewholeUNfamily) .Duetofrustratingtime

lags,WFPhasalsopushedaheadwithinitiatives

thatwereoriginallydesignedtobecoordinated,

UN-wideexercises .Butthishasimplications .Ad-

equatesecurityprovisionforhumanitarianop-

erationsrequiresacommonalityofpurposeand

coordinatedactionacrossthehumanitarian

community .Asaleadagencyinthefield,and

onewhoseoperationsarehighlydependent

ontheeffectivenessofitspartnersandcon-

tractors,WFPshouldadvocateforincreased

incidentreporting,trackingandsharing,and

fortheestablishmentofadditionalfield-level

securityservicesinallinsecurecontexts .

WFP’sattemptstobeperceivedasa

neutralandindependenthumanitarianactor

arechallengedonanumberoffronts .First,

WFP’smainenterpriseandoperationalmod-

el—thatofsupplyingfoodaidwhichoften

hastobetransportedsignificantdistances

meansitisahighlyvisibleandeasilytargeted

entity .Asaresultitmoreheavilyrelieson

escort—oftenmilitaryandarmed—tofa-

cilitatethemovementofconvoyoperations .

Whilethiscanfacilitatesecureaccessto

populations,itmayundermineanypercep-

tionofneutralityandindependenceofWFP

anditspartnersandreducetheiracceptance

onthepartofallpartiestotheconflictand

amonglocalpopulations .Secondly,WFP,like

manyUNagenciesandNGOs,attemptsto

upholdadualhumanitariananddevelopment

mandate,whichresultsinitbeingperceived

asahighlyvisiblepoliticalactoraswell .This

perceptionisheightenedintheUN’sdrive

forcoherence,whereIntegratedMissions

andOneUNapproachesmakesithardto

differentiatebetweenWFP’smandateand

principles .ForWFP,maintaininganactive

acceptancestrategyinthesecontexts—and

supportingitspartners”effortsinthisregard

—shouldbeapriority .

Thisneedstobedistinguishedfroma

moreworryingtrend .Attacksagainstaid

workersinsomeofthemosthighlyinsecure

contextsareontheincrease,andincreasingly

politicallymotivated .Attemptingtobeneutral

andindependentwillnotnecessarilyprovide

protectiontoWFP,oritspartnersandcontrac-

tors .ItisvitalWFPseekssecuritysolutionsfor

operatinginthesemostdangerouscontexts,

particularlyforthoseitcontractstoundertake


theriskiestwork .Thismustinvolveactivesteps

toprotectstaffandprogrammes,notsimply

effortstosecureacceptance .

Responding to Future ChallengesTheclassificationofconflictintoneatcat-

egoriessuchas“old”and“new,”civilorinter-

national,“greed”or“grievance”driven,denies

thecomplexity,multifacetedandevolvingna-

tureofwarandviolence .Mostconflictssuchas

thoseinDRC,Colombia,Somalia,Afghanistan

andSudanareprotractedinnatureandaresub-

jecttosignificantchangesinintensityovertime .

Theintersectionofdifferentagendas—wheth-

ereconomicopportunism,climateorresource-

basedtensionsoryouthdisaffection—with

violenceisnothomogenousandresultsindif-

ferenteffectsfordifferentcontextsandgroups .

Thepotentialtoexacerbateviolencethrough

ill-informed,poorlytargetedorinappropriate

responsesinsuchenvironmentsishigh .This

suggeststheneedforWFPtounderpinitsre-

sponseswithstrong,timelycontextualanalysis

wherethedifferentmotivationsforviolenceare

examined;thedistributionofpowerandwealth

betweendifferentgroupsisexplored;andthe

implicationsforpeople’slivelihoodsandfood

securityunderstood .

Youth RadicalisationYouthareofparticularconcernindriving

violenceassociatedwithradicalisationdueto

theirrelativereceptivitytoideologicalnarra-

tivesandassuch,anyconflictassessmentmust

ensureastrongfocusonthisgroup .WFPmay

beinapositiontorespondincontextsdem-

onstratingstronglinkagesbetweenextremism

andvulnerability,butinothers,thiswillbebe-

yondtheorganisation’sremit .Inmanysuchen-

vironments,anti-terroristlegislationmayhinder

WFP’sabilitytoformpartnershipsandaccess

particulargroups .However,WFPshouldremain

alerttothesecurityimplicationsofinternational

organisationsbecomingassociatedwithanti-

Westernsentimentsinparticularcontextsand

beparticularlyattunedtothepotentialofbeing

perceivedasanagentofconflictthroughthe

provisionofassistancetocertainsocial,ethnic

orreligiousgroups .

Responding to Chronic VulnerabilityThegrowingsignificanceofresource-based

conflictsinthecontextofincreasedclimate

change,populationgrowthandfoodshort-

agesunderscoresthenecessityoflivelihoods

interventionsinmanyoftheseconflictcontexts .

Whilstthereisincreasedrecognitionamongst

humanitariansofthesignificanceoflivelihood

supportinconflict,biasesinthesystem—po-

litical,financial,institutional—tendtoresultin

apreponderanceofshort-termreliefinterven-

tions .Experiencewithpastoralistcommunities

highlightstherisksassociatedwithshort-term

interventionsincontextsoflonger-termvulner-

ability,whereover-dependenceonex-post

foodassistanceinparticularhasbeendetrimen-

taltopastoralistlivelihoods .Whilstfoodaidwill

remainanimportantmeansofmeetingemer-

gencyfoodrequirements,WFPinterventionsin

thecontextofprotractedvulnerabilityassoci-

atedwithclimateandresource-basedconflicts

shouldformpartofcoordinatedinterventions

aimedatmeetingbasicneeds,protecting

livelihoodsassetsandsupportinglivelihoods

strategies .Guardingagainstcentralised,camp-

baseddistributionsinsuchcrisesisimportant

tohelpsupportthecontinuationoflivelihoods

strategiesandthemaintenanceofassets .WFP

hassignificantexperiencetodrawfrominthis

regard;forexamplefromDarfur,whichdem-

onstrateshowfoodassistanceinruralcontexts

canhelpfarmerstoretainaccesstoland .

Urban CrisesHumanitarianactorshavebeenslowto

recognisethetrendtowardsurbanisation .

Whiletherecentfoodcrisisandotherglobal

processesdemonstratethepotentialforurban

vulnerabilitytoserveasatriggerforfuture

conflicts(foodriotsetc .),thepredominance

oftheeliteratherthantheimpoverishedin

youthradicalisationhighlightshowurbancon-


flictscannotbepinnedtopovertyalone .But

humanitarianagenciesarefacedwitharange

ofinstitutionalandoperationaldifficultiesin

respondingtotheneedsofurbancommuni-

ties;notleasttheidentificationandtargeting

of(oftenhidden)vulnerablegroups,andde-

visinginterventionsappropriatetourbanen-

vironments .Methodologies,approachesand

toolstoaddressassociatedrisksforvulnerable

groupsarestillintheirinfancy,althoughIDMC

andTuftshavemadeheadwayindeveloping

profilingtoolsandHPGisundertakingnew

researchexploringthedifferenthumanitar-

ianinterventionsinurbansettings .Cash-and

voucher-basedinterventionsareparticularly

relevantinurbancontextsandasaresult,

thereisanopportunityforWFPtoplayasignif-

icantroleinboththerefinementofapproaches

andthedevelopmentoftools .

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adox of Humanitarian Action,(London;Cornell

UniversityPress) .

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2005)

A/60/L .1,WorldSummitOutcomeDocument,

15September2005

UN-HABITAT .2006 .TheStateoftheWorld’s

CitiesReport2006/7

UN-HABITAT .2008 .StateoftheWorld’sCities

2008/2009—HarmoniousCities

Vlassenroot,K .(2008),“Landtenure,conflictand

householdstrategiesintheeasternDemocratic

RepublicofCongo”inAlinovi,L .,Hemrich,G .

andRusso,L .(eds .),Beyond Relief: food security

in protracted crises,(Rugby;PracticalAction) .

WheelerN(2005)“Avictoryforcommonhu-

manity?TheResponsibilitytoProtectafterthe

2005WorldSummit,”Journal of International

Law and International Relations,2(1)Winter

2005,pp95-105 .

49

Compromise or Capitulation: Report on WfP and the Humanitarian Crisis in sri lanka

David Keen, london school of economics10

10 2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.

Case study: sri lanka (Field visit, April 2009)


IntroductionA major humanitarian disaster has been unfolding in Sri Lanka. The message in official pronouncements and most of the national press is that this is a disaster that the government has been trying to ameliorate. Defence Minister Gotabaya Raja-pakse described the situation as “the world’s biggest hostage rescue operation.”11 Sri Lankan officials have described the government’s military push as a “humanitar-ian” operation. Simultaneously, it has been presented as part of a war on terrorism. With the military defeat of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], according to the Sri Lankan government, “The President’s dream of creating an environment in which all citizens can live in harmony and liberty is now being realised.”12

11 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily News, 21 April 2009.

12 ITN News, UK, April 26 2009.

Significantly,theSriLankangovern-

ment’sdiscoursehasfoundsignificantech-

oeswithintheinternationalcommunityand

withintheUNsystem .Moststrikingly,the

UNHumanRightsCouncilrejectedadraft

statementthatwascriticaloftheSriLankan

governmentandon27May2009putoutan

alternativestatementthatwasveryuncritical,

withoneclause“Welcomingtheconclusion

ofhostilitiesandtheliberationbytheGov-

ernmentofSriLankaoftensofthousandsof

itscitizensthatwerekeptbytheLTTEagainst

theirwillashostages,aswellastheeffortsby

theGovernmenttoensuresafetyandsecuri-

tyforallSriLankansandbringingpermanent

peacetothecountry .”13

Helpingtogivesomedegreeofplausi-

bilitytoofficialaccountsoftherecent“hu-

manitarianrescueoperation”havebeenthe

13 UN Human Rights Council, adopted text, Eleventh special session, 27 May 2009, p. 2.

extremestowhichtherebelLTTETigershave

beenpreparedtogointheirviolenceagainst

civilians,includingthecoercionofsupport-

ers .Havingenjoyedsomedegreeofcivilian

supportinespousingaseparatestateforthe

Tamils,therebelTigersbecameincreasingly

unpopularwithmuchoftheTamilpopulation .

Inlinewithpatternsobservableelsewhere,14

thisseemsonlytohavereinforcedtheabuses

oftheTigersagainstthecivilianpopulation:

thesupportthattheycouldnotgarnervol-

untarilywasincreasinglysecuredthroughthe

useofforce(includingforcibletaxation)and

thisinturnseemstohavehelpedtogener-

atea“viciouscircle”inwhichtheincreasing

antipathyfeltbyciviliansgeneratedgreater

levelsofcoercion .

AlthoughagreatmanyTamilsaredisil-

lusionedwiththeTigers,acountervailing

tendencyisalsoimportanttonote .Thisisthe

tendencyforgovernmentabusestoreinforce

supportfortheTigers—notleastwithinthe

Tamildiaspora .

14 See, for example, David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey.



12 ITN News, UK, April 26 2009.



Evenfromtheoutset,theLTTE’suseof

forceincludedviolenceagainstrivalTamilor-

ganisations .Itwasextendedtoforciblerecruit-

ment,includingtherecruitmentofchildren .15

HumanRightsWatchnotedinDecember2008

thattheLTTEhaddramaticallyincreasedits

forcedrecruitmentpractices .16Inadditionto

abusesagainsttheTamilpopulationtheyclaim

torepresent,theLTTETigershave—asiswell

known—havecarriedoutnumerousactsofter-

rorismagainsttheSriLankanpopulationmore

generally,includinggovernmentofficialsand

ordinarymembersofthepublic .ADecember

2008HumanRightsWatchreportnoted:

… the LTTE has brutally and systemati-

cally abused the Tamil population on

whose behalf they claim to fight… the

LTTE bears a heavy responsibility for

the desperate plight of the civilians in

the Vanni17… The LTTE has frequently

targeted civilians with bombs and

remote-controlled landmines, killed

perceived political opponents includ-

ing many Tamil politicians, journalists,

and members of rival organizations,

and has forcibly recruited Tamils into its

forces, many of them children.18

Duringtherecentgovernmentmilitary

pushfromSeptember2008,theLTTEhasused

civiliansasahumanshield—forcinglargenum-

berswhowereunderitscontroltomoveeast-

wardstoanarrowstripoflandinthenorth-east .

Thisactionseemstohavebeenundertakenin

thehopethatthepresenceofcivilianswould

preventagovernmentassaultfromdestroying

15 I use the word children here to mean those under 18.

16 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” December, p. 3). Internally displaced people reported LTTE recruiting children as young as 12, and sometimes four or five from the same family (BBC, 6 April 2009, in IDMC [International Displacement Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009. p. 10).

17 This is sometimes written as “Wanni.”

18 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” December, pp. 2-3.

theTigerforcesinthenorth,ahopethathas

turnedouttobemisplaced .

Noteveryelementofthehumanitarian

disastercanbepinnedontheTigers,how-

ever,anditisimportanttoconsideraradically

differentinterpretationoftheunfoldinghu-

manitariandisasterfromtheonepresentedby

theSriLankangovernment .Accordingtothis

alternativeview,thedisasterhasbeenactively

producedbythecombinedagendasofthe

mostpowerfulactors .Itisworthrecallingthat

formanyyearsresponsestoconflict-generated

emergenciesaroundtheworldwereinhibited

byamodelofdisasteranddisaster-response

thatwasbasedlargelyonnatural disasters .19

Thismodeltendedtoproduceapatternofre-

sponse(andanaccompanyingdiscourse)that

wasessentiallytechnicalinitsorientation:it

wasbasedprimarilyoncountingthenumbers

ofdisplacedinvariouslocationsandshipping

outacorrespondingquantityoffood(and

sometimesotherreliefsupplies)withoutasking

toomanyquestionsaboutofficialobstruction

ofrelieforabouttheprocessesbywhichthe

targetpopulationhadbecomedisplacedor

hadarrivedataconditionofextremedepriva-

tion .Thismodelwassubjectedtoincreasing

criticism,notleastbecauseofanawarenessof

thedevastatingfamineamonginternallydis-

placedpeopleinSudaninthelate-1980s(and

periodicallythroughthe1990s)andbecauseof

thecritiquesofinternationaleffortstochannel

relieftoRwandansinZaire/DemocraticRepub-

licofCongoandTanzaniaincircumstances

wheretheinitialhumanitariandisaster(the

1994genocide)hadbeenlargelyignored .20Itis

worthstressingthatanapoliticalandtechnical

discoursearoundhumanitariandisastersoften

19 For example, Mark Duffield, 1994. “The Political Economy of Internal War,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, (eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies. London: Zed Books and Save the Children, UK; David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press).

20 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996, Copenhagen: Danida.


exists—andflourishes—incircumstances

wheredisasterispolitically-generatedand

wherebothnationalandinternationalactors

havestrongpoliticalorgeopoliticalagendas .

Fornationalgovernments,atechnicaldis-

coursemayhavetheadvantageofobscuring

theirownroleingeneratingadisaster .This

mayalsosuitpowerfulinternationalactors .For

example,inthecontextoftheColdWar,inter-

nationalquietudeovergovernmentabusesin

Sudaninthe1980swascloselyrelatedtoade-

sirenottoembarrassa“friendoftheWest”(as

wellasabureaucraticinterestininsistingthat

aidmoneyhadbeenwellspent) .21

Evenincontextswhereconflicthasclearly

beendrivingahumanitarianemergency,there

hasbeenatendencytoblameeveryillon

somevilifiedrebelgroup—forexample,the

RevolutionaryUnitedFrontinSierraLeone,

theLord’sResistanceArmyinUganda,the

HutuextremistsintheDemocraticRepublicof

Congo[DRC]—withoutgivingadequateat-

tentiontotheroleofsocietyasawhole(and,

inparticular,governmentactors)inhelping

togenerateoratleasttosustainaparticular

conflict .22Naturally,theactualabusesofthese

vilifiedrebelgroups(whethertheseaream-

putationsinthecaseofSierraLeone,recruit-

mentofchildreninthecasesofSierraLeone

andUganda,orpriorinvolvementingenocide

inthecaseofRwanda/DRC)willtendtogive

adegreeofplausibilitytothesediscourses .

Evenwhenlookingatthecausesofnatural

disasters,itisunwisetoconcentrateexclu-

sivelyonan“externalfactor”(forexample,a

drought,aflood,anearthquakeoratsunami)

withoutgivingadequateattentiontothe

internal—oronemightsaysocial—factors

(markets,politicalinequalities,thelocation

andstructureofresidencesandsoon)that

21 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press).

22 David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey; David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.

mediatetheexternalshockanddetermine

thehumanimpactofthedisaster .Inconflict-

relatedemergencies,thisdangerisredoubled

sincepoliticalfactorstendtodeterminenot

justhowashockismediatedbutthenatureof

theshockitself .Inthesecircumstances,blam-

ingavilifiedrebelgroupcaneasilydistract

attentionfromwaysinwhichthewidersociety

andelementsofthegovernmentitselfmaybe

helpingtogenerateorsustainanemergency .

Indeed,thisqualityofdistractingattention

hasoftenbeenpartofthefunctionofsucha

patternofblame .23

Despitemanyyearsofcriticismofthe

“naturaldisastermodel,”itisstrikingthatin

SriLankatheold“naturaldisaster”modelof

emergencyresponsehasretainedagreatdeal

ofinfluence .Inparticular,theresponse(andac-

companyingdiscourse)hasbeenlargelytechni-

calinorientation,andbasedmainlyoncount-

ing(orestimating)thenumbersofdisplacedin

variouslocationsandshippingfoodtothem .

Asinmanyearliercrises,therehasbeena

lackofinterest—atleastatthelevelofpublic

discourse—intheprocessesbywhichpeople

havebecomedisplacedorotherwisedeprived,

whilstpubliclyavailabledescriptionsoftheoffi-

cialobstructionofreliefhavebeenveryscarce .

Contributingtotheseomissions—asinearlier

crises—hasbeenthehumanitariancommu-

nity’stendencytoadoptrelativelyshort-term

time-horizons .AsonesenioraidworkerinSri

Lankaputit,“Thedecisionsofhumanitarians

arereactive—‘Thereare40,000peoplehere,

whattodo?’”Asinmanyearliercrises,arather

apoliticaldiscoursehasflourishedwithinana-

tionalandinternationalcontextthathasbeen

intenselypolitical—notably,acivilwarthathas

beenframedaspartofawiderinternational

“waronterror .”

23 I discuss these dynamics at greater length in: David Keen, 2005, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press); David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey; David Keen, 2006, Endless War: Hidden Functions of the “War on Terror”; and David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.


Experienceinarangeofcountriesstrongly

suggeststhatthemostneedygroupswilltend

tobeunabletostakeaclaimtoreliefwithinthe

administrativestructuresoftheirowncountry

forpreciselythesamereasonsthattheywere

exposedtodeprivationinthefirstplace—

becausetheylackpoliticalcloutwithinthose

institutions .Ifthisapplieseveninnaturaldis-

asters,itislikelytobeevenmoreapplicable

inwartime:thosewhocannotstakeaclaimto

physicalsecuritymayalsobeunabletostakea

claimtorelief .ItisstrikingthatinSriLankathe

governmenthasmadeatleastsomeeffortto

directfoodaidatareaswheretherebelsare

strong .QuitehowfarSriLankadeviatesfrom

thenorminagreatmanyotherconflictswillbe

exploredinwhatfollows .

Thisreporttriestotakeaverybroadlook

attheprovisionandmanipulationofinterna-

tionalassistanceinSriLanka,askingwhathave

beentheopportunities—takenandnottaken

—forimprovingthedeliveryofreliefandthe

protectionenvironmentmoregenerallywithin

thiscontext .Itfocusesprimarilyon2009but

alsoincludessignificantinformationonhuman-

itarianaccessinprecedingyears .

TheinterviewsinSriLankaincludeddiscus-

sionswithaidworkersandgovernmentofficials

inVavuniya(ontheperipheryoftheconflict

zone) .Theyincludedinterviewswithmilitary

andcivilianofficialsandwithinternationaland

nationalaidagencystaff .Unfortunately,while

wewouldhavelikedtohavemuchmoreexten-

sivecontactwiththedesignated“beneficiar-

ies”ofhumanitarianinterventions,interviewing

displacedpeopleinsidethecampsinVavuniya

wasvirtuallyimpossible .TheSriLankanmilitary

donotjustsurroundthecampsbuttheyalso

haveaheavypresenceinsidethem .Evenata

majoraidcoordinationmeetinginVavuinya,it

wasstrikinghowmanyuniformedandarmed

soldierswereliningthesidesoftheroom .Itis

notable,too,thatVavuniyaistheheadquarters

ofthegovernmentsecurityforcesfortheVanni

region .Weweretoldthatparamilitarygroups

(manyofthemanti-LTTE)alsohaveasignificant

presenceinthecampsandinVavuniyatown

moregenerally .

Aidworkersemphasisedstronglythat

interviewmaterialshouldnotbeattributed

tothemortheirorganisations,andnational

staffwereparticularlyfearfulofofficialor

paramilitaryretaliationiftheywereperceived

asleaking“dangeroustalk”tointernational

researchers .24Certainly,SriLankaisadanger-

ousplaceforaidworkers .Theworstincident

wasthekillingof17localstaffoftheFrench

NGOActionContreLaFaiminMutturinAu-

gust2006 .Basedonnumberofattackson

aidworkersin2006-8,SriLankarankedfourth

worstintheworld .25Aidstaff(andresearchers/

consultantslikemyself)alsofaceseveretravel

restrictions,andthegreatmajorityofaidwork-

ershavetooperateontheedgeoftheconflict

zone .Evenforrepresentativesofmajorgov-

ernmentandbilateraldonors,gettingaccess

toVavuniyacannotbetakenforgranted(let

aloneaccesstothoseareasundergoingactive

hostilities) .Asiswellknown,therearealsovery

far-reachinggovernmentrestrictionsonjour-

nalisminthecountryasawholeandthenorth

inparticular;clearly,thislimitsthequalityof

accountsinthepress .

Some Significant WFP SuccessesManyofthoseweinterviewedgaveWFP

agreatdealofcreditforgettinglargequanti-

tiesoffoodtotheVanniinextremelydifficult

circumstances,particularlywhenthewarin-

tensifiedfromSeptember2008 .AsoneNGO

workerputit:

WFP was the only organisation still

useful for the people of the Vanni in

24 Some interviewees said the camps had numerous paramilitaries. The International Crisis Group noted that killings and disappearances in Eastern Province have apparently been committed by government security forces and/or their allies in the anti-LTTE Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) (International Crisis Group, 2009, “Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province,” April 16).

25 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, 2009, “Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 update,” HPG Policy Brief 34, ODI, London, April.


November-December-January [2008-

9]. It was the only UN organisation still

doing something in the Vanni… WFP

was sending food on convoys and now

[that is, April 2009] they’re sending

food to the no fire zone. They’ve been

heroic in terrible circumstances.

Alongsimilarlines,aSriLankanaidworker

noted:“WFPdispatchedfoodtotheVanni .

Whenwecomparewithotheragencies,WFP

didagoodthing .IDPs[internallydisplaced

persons]toldmetheyreallydependonWFP

food,especiallyduringthe“hightime”from

September2008 .”Inacontextwhereadvocacy

andprotectionworkcouldeasilyprovokesome

kindofbacklash,deliveringfoodrepresenteda

concreteandknowablebenefit .Anaidworker

whotravelledwithseveraloftheWFPfoodcon-

voysfromOctober2008saidsimply:“Whenyou

seethepeople[receivingfood],youarereally

happy .”Evenbeforethisperiod,WFPwasakey

provideroffoodforthenorth .Whenthebenefi-

ciariesofvariousschemes(generalfoodration

forIDPs,schoolfeeding,supplementaryfeed-

ing,foodforwork,foodfortraining)wereasked

in2006aboutwhowasprovidingthefood,their

answerssuggestedthat60percentcamefrom

WFP,18percentfromthegovernment,and8

percentfromNGOs .26

AlocalNGOworkerstressedthatWFPhad

hadconsiderablesuccessinensuringanunbro-

kenfoodpipeline,notablytotheVavuniyaarea,

andthatthepipelineforthedisplacedseemed

tobeingoodshapefortheimmediatefuture .

Headded,“Ofalltheagencies,WFPseemsto

beabletobebetterpreparedontheground .”

AnotherlocalNGOworkersaid,“Whenthe

situationwasveryurgent,WFPcontactedusto

feedthoseIDPsandworkedwiththem[WFP] .

Thesecurityforcesappreciatedit .Wehada

strongpartnershipwithWFP .”Athirdlocal

NGOworkersaid,“WFPhasdoneacommend-

ablejobtorespondtosuchalargedisplace-

26 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment,” Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 24.

ment .Itmanagedinthemostdifficult

period .”27

ManyintervieweesstressedthatWFPhad

hadtoovercomeagreatdealofobstruction

fromgovernmentauthorities,mostnotablythe

military .OneWFPworkerwithextensiveexpe-

rienceofaiddeliverysaid:“Thegovernment

doesn’twantanyhelp[intheVanni],evenfood,

becausetheywantpeopleout .”Hesaidthat

inthesecircumstancestheWFPcountryoffice

hadhadtomakeahugeefforttogetthefood

intothenorth,andhaddonereallywell .Along

similarlines,aWFPworkerwithseveralyears

ofexperiencetrackingdeliveriestothenorth

commented,“WFPhadaverygoodworking

relationshipwiththegovernmentandweman-

agedtocoaxthemtodeliversomefood .But

itwasalwaysastruggle,especiallyfortheIDPs

[internallydisplacedpersons] .”

WFPwasseenhashavingreactedflexibly

andwithingenuityinitslogisticaloperations .

Severalexamplesarenotable .

First,thepracticeofpurchasingfoodlo-

callywasausefultacticinthefaceofsecurity

concernsandofficialobstructions .Asonelocal

aidworkernoted:“Thereweremanyobstruc-

tionsfromtheSLA[SriLankanarmy]side .We

boughthighqualityricelocally .Sothathelped

usalot .Therewasasurplusandtheycannot

selltothisside[thatis,southoftheVanni]

becauseoftransportandotherthings .”Some

supportforlivelihoodsinagriculturalcom-

munitiesalsoresultedfromthispolicyoflocal

purchase .28Clearly,theproblemofrisingfood

pricesindicatesaneedtoguardagainstfuel-

lingsuchpriceriseswithlocalpurchaseand

theneedforsubstantialinputsoffoodintothe

northinparticular .Itwouldalsobeamistake

27 One local NGO worker said other agencies circulate a hard copy of previous minutes before the meeting, adding that WFP only circulated these at the meeting itself. The result, he said, was that senior management of other aid agencies do not get a chance to prepare any follow-up to the previous meeting.

28 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 9. There were some delays in delivery of locally purchased rice (WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1,” n.p.).


tosupposethatlocalpurchasemadeupforthe

shortagesindeliveriesfromoutsidetheregion .

Asecondexampleofflexibleoperations

wasthepracticeofsealingtrucksundermilitary

supervision .Althoughthisinfringedtheprin-

cipleofnotallowingmilitarypersonnelinWFP

compounds,sealingtruckshelpedtomake

reliefconvoysmoreacceptabletothegovern-

mentbyreducingtheperceivedriskofsup-

pliesreachingtheLTTEviatheconvoys .One

logisticsworkersaidofthesealingpractice:

“Weagreedthemilitarycouldcheckthetrucks,

doingsealedloadings .Itbreachedtheprinci-

pleofnothavingarmsinthecompound,butit

doeswork .”

Third,theuseofthelogisticshubatVa-

vuniya,withsignificantstorageinplacethere,

helpedtogiveWFPatleastsomedegreeof

operationalautonomy .Inaddition,fourteen

mobilestorageunitsweredeployedtoareas

closetoconflict-affectedpopulationsinthe

Vanni .WFPalsohad30ofitsowntrucks .29As-

sessingoperationsin2008,oneWFPreport

notedthat“SpecialOperationstrucksand

bufferstocksinthehumanitarianhubcloseto

conflict-affectedareasnegateddelays[indeliv-

erytotheVanni]bytheendoftheyear .”30WFP

staffonthegroundemphasisedtheseadvan-

tages,butstressedtheimportanceofadding

totheamountsheldinstorage:“InSeptember

lastyear,wehaduptotwo-and-a-halfmonths

bufferstock .Atpresent,Icangivefullrationfor

9 .51daysfor100,000people…Weshouldsay

weneedthisfoodinstock .”

AfourthexampleofflexibilitywasWFP’s

roleinorganisinglarge-scaletransportation

offoodbysea(underanICRCflag)afterroad

convoysbecameimpossibleinJanuary2009 .

However,itisnotablethatthereweresevere

shortfallsinthedeliveryoffoodtothosedis-

placedinMullaitivu,particularlyinFebruaryand

March2009 .

29 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.

30 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1,” n.p.

WFPseemstohavebeensuccessfulin

cultivatingagoodimagewiththeSriLankan

government .Duringtheresearch,mention

ofWFPdrewafavourableresponsefromcivil

andmilitaryofficialsalike .WithinWFP’scoun-

tryoffice,therewasasensitivitytothefact

thattheSriLankangovernmentisahighlyso-

phisticatedandcapableentityadministering

amiddle-incomecountrywithadevelopment

recordthatisinmanyrespectsastrongone .

Asoneseniorstaffmemberputit:“Comingin

withacondescendingattitudeisnotright,or

talkingaboutcapacitybuilding .”AlocalNGO

workersaid .“WFPhasbeengoodinaccept-

ingotherpointsofview,veryparticipatory,

moresothanotherUNagencies .Someof

theseareverybureaucratic .Theysticktotheir

mandateanduseitasanexcuseratherthan

havingrealparticipation,andmanywantonly

toworkwiththeirtraditionalpartnerswhile

WFPareflexibleandlookatwhowilldeliver

thegoods .”WFP’ssensitivitycanonlyhave

beenamajorassetwhenitcametothevery

difficulttaskofnegotiatingaccessforfood

convoysintheVanni .Therealsoseemstohave

beenagoodleveloftacticalawarenesswithin

WFPwhenitcametogettingfooddelivered

—evidenced,forexample,bytheemphasis

thatstaffplacedontheneedtodiscernwhich

partsofthegovernmentweremostreceptive

toWFPgoalsandtoworkinclosecooperation

withtheseactors .

Thecloserelationshipwiththegovernment

hashadamoreworryingside,however .Ahigh

degreeofofficialfavourandgoodwillmayhave

beenfosteredbyanemphasisonavoidingpub-

liccriticisms,notablyofthegovernment,and

byapatternofreliefprovisionthatwaslargely

consistentwith—andevenactivelyhelpful

for—thegovernment’spoliticalandmilitary

objectives .Manyofthoseweinterviewedex-

pressedconcernsalongtheselines .Afuller

assessmentoftheimpactofWFP—andofaid

agenciesmoregenerally—isbestapproached

viaananalyticalnarrativeoftheunfolding

emergency,andthisisattemptedbelow .


Analytical Narrative

Government Manipulation of Relief and the Risk of Complicity

ManipulationofreliefbytheLTTEhasbeen

significant,andinternationalassistanceundoubt-

edlyhelpedinconsolidatingLTTEadministrative

capacityinthenorth .Thefocushere,however,is

primarilyongovernmentmanipulation—aphe-

nomenonemphasisedbymostofthoseweinter-

viewed .IfreliefoperationsinthenorthofSriLan-

kahavebeenlargelysubordinatedtothegov-

ernment’smilitaryandpoliticalagendas,manyof

themechanismsinvolvedarequitefamiliarfrom

pastemergencies .Suchmanipulation,whilst

extremelyregrettable,shouldnotbesurprising .

Duringcivilwarselsewhere,ithasbeenmuch

moretherulethantheexception .Noristhis

kindofmanipulationanythingverynewintheSri

Lankancontext .Forexample,inthelate1990s

theNorwegianRefugeeCouncilwasreporting

claimsthatthegovernmenthaddeliberately

providedfoodatbelowthelevelofneedofIDPs,

andhaddeliberatelydelayedassistance .31Itcan

bearguedthatthelongyearsofwarinSriLanka,

combinedwithlongexperienceofhumanitarian

operations,havemadebothsidesinthewarvery

goodatmanipulatingrelief .32

AkeystrategyinSriLanka—alsofamiliar

fromEthiopiaandSudan,forexample—has

beenusingrelieftoweakenpopulationslinked

totherebelsandultimatelytopromotethede-

populationofareasofrebelstrength .Manyaid

workerspointedtoasetofpoliciesandprac-

ticesonthepartofgovernmentactorsthathave

hadthepredictableeffectofdebilitating,dis-

placingandultimatelyinterningaverysubstan-

tialportionoftheTamilpopulation .Inpractice,

theSriLankangovernmenthasusedthebroad

rubricof“securityissues”toimposeveryfar-

reachingrestrictionsonthemedicalsupplies,

waterandsanitationandfoodthathavebeen

31 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 11.

32 See, notably, Nicholas Crawford, “Sri Lanka: Principles and Protection in Programming,” draft, n.d.

directedattheVanniregion .AsoneUNworker

putit,“Thegovernmentusesaidtocontrolthe

movementofthepopulation,todictatethe

courseofmilitaryoperations .”

AsecondtechniqueinSriLankahasbeen

usingreliefascoverformilitarymanoeuvres,

notablywhenitcametotheaidconvoysfrom

October2008(discussedbelow) .Again,theuse

ofreliefascoverformilitaryactivitieshasalong

history,andincludesNigeria/Biafra33andSu-

dan;inthelattercase,manyrelieftrainstothe

southinthelate1980scarriedmilitarysupplies

forgovernmentforcesaswellasrelieffoodand

commercialfood .34

AthirdmechanisminSriLankahasbeen

usingvisas,travelpermits,writtenagreements,

compulsoryevacuations,impedimentstoland

convoys,andvariouskindsofintimidationto

minimisethedamaginginformationleakingout

viatheactivitiesofaidagencies .

AfourthmechanisminSriLanka(clearlyin

somekindoftensionwiththepreviousthree)

hasbeentousetheexistenceofhumanitarian

operationsinordertodemonstratethegov-

ernment’sgoodintentionsand“humanitarian

credentials .”Thispracticehasprovidedimpor-

tantlegitimacyforthegovernmentevenasthat

governmenthascontributedtohumanitarian

crisisinimportantways .Asseveralaidworkers

stressed,theSriLankangovernmenthasbeen

takingfullcreditforWFPdeliveriesas“govern-

ment”food .Togetherwiththegovernment’s

ownreliefconvoys,thisprocessof“taking

credit”appearstohavebeenusefulinsustain-

ingadegreeofinternallegitimacy .Moreover,

thegovernment’sinvolvementin—andacqui-

33 During Nigeria’s civil war in 1967-70, the Nigerian government tried to starve out the Biafran rebels; partly to secure relief and partly for military reasons, the rebel Biafran administration mixed relief flights with those bringing in military supplies and insisted on night-flights to impede Nigerian government interceptions (see, for example, John Stremlau, 1977, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress; Dan Jacobs, 1987, The Brutality of Nations. New York: Knopf.

34 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press).


escencein—fooddeliveriestothenorthmay

havehelpedtogivetheimpressioninternation-

allythatthishasbeenarelatively“humani-

tarian”warandarelativelywell-intentioned

government .Forexample,oneverysenioraid

workernoted:“It’sarelativelycivilisedwar,with

channellingfoodthroughtoenemyterritory .”

Again,therearemanyprecedentsforusingre-

liefasasourceoflegitimacy .35

AfifthmechanisminSriLankahasbeen

usingtheexistenceofreliefoperationsasakind

of“leverage”overtheinternationalcommunity:

agencieshaveineffectbeenencouragedto

acceptquietudeinreturnforaccess .Inseveral

earliercrises,animplicitdealhasarguablybeen

struckinwhichtheinternationalcommunity

sacrificesstrongpressureonprotectionissues

fortheabilitytocarryouthigh-profilerelief

operations .Thisdynamiccameintoplayin

Bosnia,asMarkCuttshasshown .36Inrelation

toSudaninthe1990s,AlexdeWaalsuggested

thattheUN’sOperationLifelineinSudanfrom

1989becameanendinitself,moreimportant

thanaddressingtheunderlyinghumanrights

abuses,andthatthispreoccupationwithsecur-

ingaccessforreliefgavetheSudangovernment

importantleverageinternationally .37

WhilstwehaveseenthatWFP’srelatively

closerelationshipwiththeSriLankangovern-

mentfacilitatedanumberofimportantfood

deliveriestothenorth,manyinterviewees

stressedtheirconcernthatWFP,ineffect,had

falleninlinewithgovernmentprioritiesthat

weredamagingtolargeelementsoftheSri

Lankanpopulation .OneaidworkerwithinWFP

35 A good example is Operation Lifeline Sudan in the 1990s.

36 Mark Cutts, 1999, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992–95: The Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access, Working Paper 8, New Issues in Refugee Research, Geneva: UNHCR.

37 Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: James Currey. See also Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield et al., 1996. “OLS: Operation Lifeline — a Review.” Geneva: Department for Humanitarian Affairs, July. Human Rights Watch, 1999, “Famine in Sudan, 1998” The Human Rights Causes; Marc Lavergne and Fabrice Weissman (eds.), 2004, In the Shadow of “Just Wars”: Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

saidtheorganisation“riskedbecomingthe

logisticsarmofthegovernment .”Concerns

aroundcooptionextendedwellbeyondWFP,

andoneexperiencedaidworkercommented,

“TheUNhasbeenrelegatedtobeingasub-

agencyofthegovernment .”

Themechanicsoforganisingconvoys

underlinedthatdangerofbecominga“logis-

ticsarm .”OneexperiencedWFPworkersaid:

“Whenthere’saninfluxofIDPs,sometimesthe

militarydictatetothelineministry[theMN-

BEID]andthey[theministry]thencontactWFP

andsayweneedaconvoy .”Manyofthoseinter-

viewedstressedthatstrongcontroloverrelief

operationshasbeenexercisedbythegovern-

mentandbytheSriLankanMinistryofDefence

inparticular .Forexample,oneaidworkercom-

mented:“TheMinistryofDefenceisincontrol

ofeverything .Whattheysaygoes .Sothat’s

anotherelementofchallenge .”Thedangersof

servingasa“sub-agencyofthegovernment”

wereclearlyenhancedinacontextwherethe

governmenthasmanipulatedhumanitarianaid

forpoliticalandmilitarypurposes .

Toaverylargeextent,theSriLankangov-

ernmenthasdictatedtermstotheinternational

communitywhenitcomestohumanitarianaid

andprotectionissues .Thegovernmenthasbeen

ableto—andhasbeenpermittedto—control

theinformationenvironmenttoaveryhighde-

gree .Severalsourcesexpressedthebeliefthat

theSriLankangovernmenthaslearnedlessons

aboutinformationcontrolfromothercontem-

porarycrises(includingAfghanistan,Sudanand

Israel/Gaza)—andindeedthatothergovern-

mentsmaywelllearnlessonsfromSriLanka .One

UNworkernoted,“Thisisthetraininggroundfor

anystatethatwantstobehavelikethis .Fifteen

yearsagotheUNwasstrongerandprinciples

weren’tupfornegotiationtothatextent .”

Shortage of Relief for the Vanni from 2006 to the September 2008 Evacuation of Aid Agencies

One2007paperlookingatprotectionis-

suesnoted,“Questionsofbias(egfavouring


government-controlledareasorgovernment-

declaredreturnareasattheexpenseofLTTE

strongholds)onthepartofGOSL[Government

ofSriLanka]intheprioritizationofWFPfood

deliverieshavebeenraised .”38Thereisindeed

evidenceofsuchabias .Regionally-disaggre-

gatedfiguresforquantitiesdispatchedandton-

nagescalledforwardwereobtainedforWFP’s

PRROreliefoperationsin2006 .Whentheton-

nagedispatchedisexpressedasapercentage

ofthetonnage“calledforward,”thefigurefor

thenorth(Killinochi,Mullativu,Jaffna,Trincoma-

lee,Batticaloa,Mannar,Vavuniya)was26 .38

percent,whereasthecorrespondingpercent-

ageforotherdistrictsofSriLankawasroughly

doublethat—at53 .33percent .Strikingly,the

LTTE-controlledareasofKillinochiandMullaiti-

vufaredtheworstwithonly14 .9percentofthe

tonnage“calledforward”actuallydispatched,

andJaffnahadafigureofonly16 .65 .Yetton-

nagescalledforward—aswellasevidence

availablefromothersources—suggestthat

needsinKillinochi,JaffnaandMullaitivuwere

particularlysevere .Notethatthesearenotton-

nagesdeliveredbuttonnagesdispatched .39

Inadditiontosecurityobstaclesandgov-

ernmentobstruction,alsosignificantweretruck-

ers’anxietiesaboutdeliveringtothenorth .40

Butsuchreluctancecanbecounteredwith

financialincentivesifthewillisthere .Oneaid

workerwhohastrackeddeliveriestothenorth

overmanyyearssaidgovernmentobstruction

wasakeyreasonforlowdeliverytothenorth .A

localstaffworkerwithWFPcommented:

Our assistance reached the people

with great difficulty. It needed approval

38 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 3.

39 Calculations from monthly figures in WFP records. Mother-and-child nutrition programmes for Mullaitivu district were very badly hit in the period April-July 2006 (WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment,” Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 10.)

40 Interview with WFP worker. See also WFP Sri Lanka, “Special Operation SP 10539.0, Augmentation of logistics preparedness capacity,” 1 September 2006-31 January 2007, p. 3.

from the Ministry of Defence, especially

after August 2006. So we couldn’t get

the approved amount of food for our

beneficiaries — IDPs, food-for-work,

school feeding, and mother and child

nutrition. We couldn’t get sufficient

food for these. The increasing fuel

price led to some difficulties.

Afoodsectorcoordinationmeetingon24

July2007,whichincludedUNandNGOrepre-

sentatives,notedoftheVanni:“Allagreedthe

regionwasnotreceivingmuchattentioncom-

paredtotheEast .”41AWFPreportnoted,“The

lackofaclearUN-governmentagreementtoes-

tablishhumanitariancorridorsandfacilitatethe

passageofhumanitarianaidandstaffthrough

securitycheckpointswasabottleneckforthe

movementofassistance .”42Giventhescarcityof

reliefreachingthenorth,programmeslikefood-

for-trainingandfood-for-worktookabackseat

torelieffeedingforIDPs .43

NeedsinJaffnaweresignificant,andone

June2007reportnoted,“All600,000inhabit-

antsofJaffnadistrictareinonewayorthe

otherdirectlyorindirectlyaffectedintheir

livelihoods .”44TheclosureoftheA9roadbythe

governmentinAugust2006hadledtosevere

shortagesoffood,fuelandelectricityinJaff-

na .45ButthedisplacedinJaffnawerenotget-

tingmuchinternationalattention .46AtaFood

SectorCoordinationMeetingon24July2007,it

wasnotedthatWFPhadbeentargeting120,000

41 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 2.


43 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 12.

44 World Food Programme, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June (p. 39).

45 Newsweek, 16 October 2008, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 7.

46 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 7.


peopleinJaffna,butthat“Shippingremainsa

problem,ascommercialshipmentsappearto

takepriorityaheadofhumanitarianones .”47A

WFPreportnotedthat“…movementofcom-

moditiestoJaffnawasdependentongovern-

ment-managedshipping .”48Anothernotedthat

relieftoJaffnahadbeenimpededby“refusal

toallowWFPtodirectlychartervessels .”49A

thirdWFPreportobserved:“TheGovernment

haspromisedtoarrangeshipstotransportWFP

foodbutsofarthishasnothappened .Currently

WFPonlyhas200tonsoffoodinJaffnadistrict,

comparedtoapotentialmonthlyrequirement

ofalmost3,000tons .”50AUNaidworkersaid

therehadnotbeenafullrationforIDPsinthe

northsinceFebruary2008,estimatingdeliver-

iesat50percentofthosethatwouldprovidea

fullration .Aglobaltrendofrisingfoodprices

wascompoundingtherisingfuelpricesandob-

structionfrombothsidesoftheconflict—with

allthesefactorshelpingtopreventadequate

deliveries .Oneworkercloselyinvolvedinfood

distributionsforWFPsaid,“Fromthebeginning

of2008,withglobalprices,ourbudgetmeant

wecouldnolongerprovideenough .Plus,there

were[government]controlsatOmanthaiand

controlsontheLTTEside .”Inadditiontothe

effectofrestrictingsupply,priceswerealso

boostedbythecostsinvolvedinunloadingand

reloadingatcheckpoints .51

AnNGOworkerinVavuniyaemphasised

theinadequacyoffooddeliveriestothenorth,

particularlybeforetheSeptember2008evacu-

ationofaidagencies:“Whenwecouldworkin

theVanni,WFPwasprovidingbasicfoodand

therewasslowregistrationwiththegovern-

ment .FoodsenttillSeptember2008tothe


48 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1,” n.p.


50 WFP, “Hunger’s global hotspots,” 25 May 2007.

51 WFP, “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October,” p. 6.

VanniwasnotenoughtofeedalltheVanni .”

HesaiddeliveriesactuallyincreasedfromSep-

tember2008:“Whenwehadtoleave,withthe

trucks[convoysfromOctober],morefoodwent

intotheVanni .”

Therewerealsosignificantconcernsabout

distributionsystems .Forexample,afoodsector

coordinationmeetingon24July2007noted,

“Allagreedthattheregistrationsystemisinad-

equateandwith3overlappingsystemsinplace

(President’sSecretariat,UNHCR/MNBDand

SpecialTaskForce)itisveryhardtomonitor .”52

Some Government Concerns in Relation to Relief for the North

Bycontrastwiththemanyaidworkerswho

criticisedaneglectofthenorthoverasignificant

period,governmentrepresentativesstressed

thatthegovernmentwastryingtomeetneeds

throughoutthecountry,whilstdonorswereun-

reasonablytargeting thenorth .Asoneofficialat

theMinistryofNationBuildingandEstateInfra-

structureDevelopmentputit(MNBEID):“Some

donorsrestrictonlyforthenorth .It’snothelpful .

Wedon’thaveanythingfortheeast .Ifanything,

theyshouldsayconflict-affectedareas,notthe

north .”Therelativescarcityofnutritionaldata

forthenorth(andthesuppressionofimportant

nutritionaldatathathas beencollected)addsto

thedifficultyoflobbyingfordeliveriesthatarein

proportiontoneed,includingtheprioritisation

ofdeliveriestothenorth .

OfficialsattheMNBEIDtoldusthatre-

strictionsondeliveriestothenorthweredue

tosecurityconcernsandnottoanythingelse .

Certainly,thegovernmenthashadsignificant

securityconcerns,andsomeofthesearelegiti-

mate .Governmentofficialsexpressedconcern

thatnationalstaffinaidagenciesmighthave

somelinkstotheLTTEandalsothatreliefma-

terialswithapossiblemilitary“dualuse”might

fallintothehandsoftherebels .Whenwesug-

gestedtooneveryseniormilitaryofficerthat

foodwasrelativelydifficulttousedirectlyfor



militarypurposes,hereplied,“Yes,foodisnot

somucha“dualuse”item,butthelocalstaff

worrywasthere—andthereweredetections,

batteriesinthepanelofthetruck,truckshired

byWFP .”Headded:

All organisations had to depend on

local staff. Some of the local staff

employed by the majority of organisa-

tions were recommended by the LTTE.

We had a problem identifying their

neutrality. We don’t know if they gave

them [the LTTE] a percentage of their

salaries or whatever. We have no way of

monitoring anything happening on that

side. We’re finding stuff buried now all

over the conflict zone… There’s a worry

on local staff, even with WFP.

Someoftheaidworkerswespokewith

indicatedthataportionofnationalstaffinthe

northwouldindeedhavehadsomelinksto

theLTTE(andthatsomeotherswouldbecon-

nectedtovariousparamilitarygroups) .One

experiencedaidworker,whowasgenerally

verycriticaloftheSriLankangovernment,said,

“Some25percentoflocalstaffprobablyhave

somesympathyorlinkstoLTTE .We’vehad

staffthreatenedbyanonymousphonecalls .”

Itisalsofairtoreiteratethatwhilethemilitary

usefulnessofreliefgoodsisuncertain,theLTTE

administrationinthenorthwasclearlystrength-

enedbyinternationalassistanceinmanyways .

UnderthePRRO,WFPfoodhasbeen

handedovertogovernmentauthorities,with

onlyalimiteddegreeofmonitoringallowed .

OneNGOworkerwhohadearlierbeenworking

withNGOsinsouthernAfricawasstruckbythe

differenceinSriLanka:

Here, WFP brings in food and hands

over to the government. As the conflict

has changed, the government’s rela-

tionship with WFP has become more

political. The government see the food

as theirs, and being able to direct where

the food goes. As NGOs, we have very

little to do with WFP in Sri Lanka.

OneWFPworkernoted:

When we came to this country, back in

1968, it was a development problem.

When we came in the Tsunami emer-

gency [from December 2004], we were

using the government as our partner

only. In other countries, we have solidly

relied on NGOs. [But here] convoys’

food was handed over to the Addition-

al Government Authority (AGA) who

remained behind. We take food to the

nearest government warehouse and

they distribute and we come back later

to monitor.

Hesawasignificantadvantageinhanding

foodovertothegovernment,particularlyincir-

cumstanceswherereliefagenciescouldeasily

beaccusedofaidingandabettingtherebels:

“OnetimetheycomplainedthatWFPbags

werebeingusedforLTTEbunkers,butwesaid

‘Wegavethemtoyou,whathappened?’They

withdrewit[theallegation]straightawayfrom

theMinistryofDefencewebsite!”

Relief and the Military Push from September 2008

Whilstthegovernment’smilitarypushinthe

eastofthecountryhadbeenrelativelyslow,the

pushfromthewestwasveryrapid—particularly

fromSeptember2008 .TheSriLankaarmy’s

rapidmilitaryadvancedramaticallychangedthe

humanitariancontextinthecountry .Oneexpe-

riencedaidworkercommented,“UptoSeptem-

ber2008,thesituationwasmoreorlessstable,

butthentherewasahugechange—another

country,anotherproblem .”September2008saw

thegovernmenttellinghumanitarianagencies

thattheyshouldmoveoutoftheVanni,noting

thattheirsecuritycouldnolongerbeguaran-

teed .OnlyICRCandCaritasremained .53

Inthisnewcontext,someoftheoptimism

thathadbeenexpressedaboutthevirtuesof

53 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 4-5.


workingcloselywiththeSriLankangovernment,

alreadyratherstrainedinviewoftheprolonged

obstructionofreliefsuppliestothenorth,be-

gantolookincreasinglyunrealistic .Oneexam-

pleofsuchoptimismwasaWFPPRROConcept

Paperfor2008,whichnoted:

The continued working through Govern-

ment structures will require considera-

ble effort and initiative to ensure appro-

priate standards of delivery but, if suc-

cessful, will allow for better access and

a greater, more integrated response

capacity than working independently.

Eventually maintaining this approach

should also allow WFP to cease food

distribution activities in Sri Lanka.54

AsofOctober2009,such“cessationof

fooddistributionactivities”looksalongway

off .Theenforcedevacuationofaidagencies

inSeptember2008wasdefendedbytheSri

Lankangovernmentasnecessaryforthesecu-

rityofaidstaff .But,asoneHumanRightsWatch

reportnoted,aidagenciesareaccustomedto

dealingwithenvironmentsinwhichthereare

significantphysicaldangersandtheyneedto

beabletoexercisetheirownprofessionaljudg-

mentonoperatingininsecureareas .55There

hasbeenagreatdealofdiscussioninthein-

ternationalcommunityabouttheimportance

of“protectionbypresence”inthecontextof

variouscrisesaroundtheworld;butclearlythis

mechanismwasnotbeingtakenveryseriously

inSriLanka:assoonasamilitaryconflictthreat-

enedtoescalate,thehumanitarianpresence

wasvirtuallyremoved .Oneexperiencedaid

workerremembered:

There was a push on the east side of

the country from March 2008. The idea

was to close the LTTE in Mullativu.

When the offensive came to Kilinoc-

hchi, so at that point the government

54 WFP PRRO Concept Paper for 2008 .

55 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 3.

says we will have to use massive force.

They came to us and said we can no

longer provide security assistance,

you need to go out. The LTTE tried to

secure Kilinochchi, now it’s completely

destroyed… When the government

entered, a lot of civilians were pushed

by the LTTE to retreat. Surprising eve-

rybody was the speed [of the govern-

ment advance].

Hesaidhumanitarianswereregardedas“a

nailonthefootofmilitaryplanstoadvance .”

Hesuggestedthatthegovernment’splanhad

beento“pushbackthecivilians,”adding,“But

thatconflictswithinternationallawsonhowto

handleIDPs .Plus,shellingcausescasualtiesto

IDPs .”Inthiscontext,heemphasised,ejecting

aidworkersofferedtheadvantageofejecting

potentialwitnesses .

Protestsunderlinedthedangersthatwere

seentoarisefromtheaidagencies’evacuation .

Oneaidworkerrememberedthatatthetimeof

thehumanitarianwithdrawalfromKilinochchi,

“Localinhabitantswereblockingthe[com-

pound]gatesandsayingyoucan’tleave,you’re

leavingussoexposed .”56Therewasundoubt-

edlyalsopressurefromtheLTTEtoremain .This

wasmentionedbyanotheraidworker,whoalso

stressedthatgovernmentguaranteesofsecu-

rityforthoseevacuatingfromKilinochchiwere

meaninglessinpractice:

The LTTE organised demonstrations

that wouldn’t let us leave. We were

stuck. There were nine UN internation-

als and two from international NGOs

and local staff, a terrible situation. It

was obvious we had to leave. It was

always about getting permission to

leave from the LTTE. The solution came

from thanking the LTTE for their coming

solution, showing them to be in control,

so it would have been difficult to stop

us. We were 15-20 minutes delayed

56 See also WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1.”


when the LTTE were messing with us.

Then there was a great air strike, three

bombs on the road where we were sup-

posed to be! So a guarantee here is not

a guarantee. [The air strike here would

have been from the government.]

UnderpinningthecrisisintheVanniwas

notjustthenecessityofrepeateddisplace-

mentbutalsoahugedisruptionofproduction,

notablyagriculturalproduction .Theescalation

ofviolenceinthenorthhitfoodproduction

hard:KilinochchiandMullaitivuhavebeenim-

portantrice-producingareasandprobablyhad

nosignificantagriculturalproductionin2009,

whilstthepreviousmilitarypushintheeasthad

alreadydamagedriceproductionthere .

TheSriLankangovernmentclaimedthatin

theabsenceofinternationalagencies,itwould

provideforthepeopleoftheVanni .However,

thegovernmenthasnotbeenabletobackup

thisclaimbydemonstratingthelevelofas-

sistancegivenortheadequacyofdistribution

mechanisms .57Withthewithdrawalofhumani-

tarians,diplomaticandaidagencyenergywas

heavilyinvestedinsecuringpermissionsforde-

liveriesintotheVannibyconvoy .Thefirstrelief

convoywasinOctober2008 .

BeginninginOctober2008,convoys

wenttothreemainplaces:Mullyavallai,Thar-

mapuramandPuthukkudiyiruppu(knownas

PTK) .ButafterearlyDecember,theycouldnot

gotoMullyavalaiandthentheywerecutoff

fromTharmapuramandthelastconvoy(which

departedonJanuary162009)gotstuckatPTK

becauseofincreasedfighting .

Acarefulanalysisoftheadequacyofcon-

voyreliefdeliveriesfromOctobertomid-De-

cember2008hasbeendonebyHumanRights

Watch .Itshowedthatactualdeliverieswere

only40percentoftheminimumnutritionre-

quirementsofthedisplaced .Itisworthquoting

theanalysisatsomelength:


Seven large UN food convoys were dis-

patched to the Vanni between October

2, 2008, and December 15, 2008, car-

rying a combined load of 4,120 metric

tons of food (another food convoy is

scheduled for December 18)… The UN

World Food Program (WFP) and the

government estimate that at least 750

metric tons per week are needed to

meet the minimum nutritional require-

ment of the displaced population in

the Vanni… Even the 750 metric tons

is an underestimate, since the basic

minimum WFP rations per person of 0.5

kilograms [cereals, pulses, oil, sugar] for

230,000 persons (the smallest credible

estimate of the displaced population)

would require a total of 805 metric

tons per week, or 3,450 metric tons per

month. Based on this formula, the IDP

population of the Vanni would require

a total of at least 10,250 metric tons of

food for the three months between the

withdrawal of the UN on September 16,

2008, and the time of the finalization

of this report, December 15. However,

the seven food convoys combined only

delivered a total of 4,120 metric tons

of food, a shortfall of 6,230 metric tons

of food over the minimum nutrition

requirements of the displaced (p. 27)

population... As a result, a very large

gap exists between the minimum daily

requirements of the population and the

food being brought into the Vanni. Ac-

cording to humanitarian officials, some

of the camps they work in are already

down to distributing just two meals per

day, and one camp is reportedly surviv-

ing on just one meal a day.” (pp. 27-28).58

A3October2008WFPpressreleasenot-

ed,“WFPplanstosendaminimumofoneaid

58 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December.


convoyperweek .”Butsevenconvoysbetween

October2andDecember15representsrather

lessthanaconvoyaweek .Evenso,itwasa

majorfeat,giventheobstaclesinvolved .After

thetenthconvoyarrivedintheVanni(thefirst

of2009),WFPnotedthatithadnowdelivered

6,617metrictonsoffood .Inaddition,WFPhad

procured781metrictonsofricefromwithinthe

regionfordistributiontotheIDPs .59

InthereportsofWFPandotherUNagen-

ciestherewasagreatdealoffocusonthe

displaced .Whilsttherewassometimesanac-

knowledgementthatotherpeopleinthenorth

wereverymuchinneedofassistance,therewas

atendencyforthedisplacedtobeequatedwith

“thoseinneed .”Particularlyastheescalating

wardisplacedmoreandmorepeople,esti-

matesforthedisplacedcametostandasakind

ofproxyforthepopulationingeneral .Butall

thiscarriedthedangerofunderestimatingthe

numbersinneedofreliefbyomittingthenon-

displaced .HumanRightsWatchnotedinDe-

cember2008thatthosewhowerenotdisplaced

andlivinginLTTE-controlledareasoftheVanni

had“almostidenticalsecurityconcernsand

humanitarianproblems,sothetotalaffected

population—displacedandnon-displaced

—iswellover300,000,evenbyconservative

estimates .”60AnumberofWFPfoodsecurity

59 WFP News Release, “First WFP food convoy of 2009 reaches the Vanni region,” 9 January 2009, Rome.

60 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 40. By “conservative estimates,” they meant the estimate of 230,000 displaced. Human Rights Watch noted, “There are an estimated 230,000 to 300,000 displaced persons currently trapped in the Vanni conflict zone, as well as a small number of Vanni residents who remain in their homes.” (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 25). While UNHCR put the number of displaced in the Vanni at 230,000 in November 2008, a UN interagency assessment mission of October 17-18 2008 put the number at 300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, pp. 23-24). The figure of 230,000 was mentioned by the UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (“Press release: UN convoy delivers food to Vanni civilians,” 18 October 2008). WFP noted in October 2008 that the organisation “has dispatched a first convoy of food and other supplies for 200,000 displaced people in the LTTE-controlled area of Sri Lanka.” (WFP News Release, “First food aid convoy reaches thousands of displaced in northern Sri Lanka,” 3 October 2008, Rome).

assessmentshadfoundthatconflicthadhada

profoundeffectonhostfamiliesandnon-dis-

placedhouseholdsaswellasIDPs .61Ifwetake

afigureof300,000inneed,thenthequantity

deliveredbetweenOctober2andDecember15

2008wouldrepresentonlyabout31percentof

theamountrequired .

HumanRightsWatchnotedinFebruary

2009,“SinceSeptember[2008],theWFPhas

delivered8,300metrictonsofmixedfoodcom-

moditiestotheareain11separateconvoys .

SinceJanuary16theWFPhasbeenunableto

deliveranyfoodtotheareas .”62

Thereweresomereliefdeliveriesinaddi-

tiontothemaininternationalconvoys—nota-

blyaconsignmentfromtheIndiangovernment

andthegovernmentconvoyscarryingfood-

for-sale—butthesewillnothavesignificantly

pluggedthegaps .63

Shortfallsinessentialprovisionswereeven

moreseriouswhenitcametonon-fooditems

andservices .Asenioraidworkersaid:“There

wasnoshelter,and[therewas]controlofmedi-

cinesthatcouldgoin—notmakingitcom-

fortablefortheIDPs .”Anotheraidworkerwho

61 An October 2008 WFP report observed, “WFP emergency food security assessments (EFSAs) in LTTE-controlled Vanni in October 2006, Jaffna in November 2006, Batticaloa in May 2007 and Trincomalee in July 2007 all indicate similar effects of conflict on IDPs, host families and non-displaced households…” (WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 6). In a June 2007 report, WFP noted, “Besides the internally displaced persons (IDPs) are an increasing proportion of the general population across a number of areas in the North and East that are affected by the conflict” (WFP, 2007, “Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment,” based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 37).

62 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” February.

63 Human Rights Watch noted, “The government is also sending in additional convoys of non-UN food through Government Agents, but the food on those convoys is destined partly to be sold at (28) the government-organised Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society (MPSC) stores, and not for free distribution to displaced persons.” Many displaced people did not have the money to buy the food. The Indian government contributed 1,700 tons of humanitarian assistance (including food, clothing and hygiene items) in late November (distributed by ICRC) (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, pp. 28-9).


travelledwithmanyoftheconvoyssaidsimply,

“ThegovernmentofSriLankadoesnotwant

anythingtogoin[totheVanni]exceptfood .”

Partlybecauseofrepeateddisplacementswith-

inthenorth,shelterandwater/sanitationwere

ofparticularimportance .HumanRightsWatch

notedinDecember2008:

It is in the non-food sectors that the

impact of the ordered withdrawal has

been felt most severely; it is these

sectors that are not included in the

permitted UN shipments ino the Vanni

and which are most impacted by the

absence of qualified humanitarian per-

sonnel on the ground. The provision

of basic assistance to IDPs in the Vanni

is made more complicated by the fact

that many families have had to move

multiple times to escape approaching

fighting. Each time, new shelters and

sanitation facilities need to be con-

structed and new supply

lines established.64

Oneaidworkersaidthepoliticalimpor-

tanceofbeingseentodeliverfooddidnot

seemtoextendtoothersupplies .“Wecould

nottakemedicineontheconvoys[fromOcto-

ber2008] .Thegovernmentsays,“Wecontinue

toprovidefoodtothepopulation .”Starvation

wouldbehugeinthemedia,butblockingmedi-

cineisnotsodramaticorvisible .”

TheSriLankangovernment’sabilitytoal-

lowsomereliefdeliveriesbutnotothersdidnot

enhancethesenseofunityamongdifferentaid

agencies .Oneaidworkerwhotravelledwith

someoftheconvoyssaid:

The great majority of non-food items

were not allowed. There was a lot of

negotiation to add other items and it

was delaying departure and distribu-

tion. There were jealousies of WFP be-


ing in the frontline and other agencies

not. The Humanitarian Coordinator

was under pressure from other agen-

cies that were not seen to be doing

something for the people. If UNHCR

wants to get shelter, it has to go and

get permissions [from the government]

separately, and UNICEF for water and

sanitation and education materials. At

times permission comes from Colombo

and the commander here [in Vavuniya]

says no.

Withagenciesvyingforspaceonthe

convoys,thechancesofcollectivepressure

andadvocacyseemtohavebeensignificantly

reduced .OneUNworkercommented:“The

governmentlikesbilateralagreements,with

UNICEF,UNHCRetc .Someagencieswerenot

happywithWFPexpansionfromSeptember

2008 .Theywantedtheirgoodsonit[theconvoy

operation]too .Theybypassedsomecollective

procedures .”Anotheraidworkersaid:

With WatSan [water and sanitation],

the amount going in for two years was

negligible. What was going in was on

the GA [Government Authority] con-

voys. There were more and more IDPs

over time with the [military] push. We

were never allowed to take water tanks

and pipes in any significant quantities,

and it was deliberate. They [the peo-

ple in the north] were supposed to

get sick. UNICEF never made a fuss,

not publicly.

Significantly,thediscriminationagainst

non-fooditemswasnotnew .Figuresfrom

OCHA-Kilinochchifor2006indicatedthatwhile

16percentoffoodprojectsintheVanniwere

negativelyaffectedbytheconflict,fully49per

centofWaterandSanitationprojectswereaf-

fected,51percentofhealthprojectsand55per

centofeducationprojects .65

65 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 32.


Someofthoseinterviewedrecalledthat

theconvoysthatwentintotheVannifrom

October2008weremanipulatedformilitary

purposes .Partofthisseemstohavebeenan

attempttouserelieftoinfluencepopulation

movementswithin theVanni .Oneaidworker

commentedangrily:

There was strong pressure. At a De-

cember 12 [2008] meeting, I said

that [coming] convoy was screwed…

When WFP was ordered to leave PTK

[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and go to the no

fire zone, it was supposed to draw peo-

ple there. The convoy ended up in the

no fire zone getting shelled to shit, and

the strategy didn’t work because the

LTTE was putting their own people into

the no fire zone.

Inthisconnection,itisimportanttorecall

thatthegovernmentwasinanycasetryingto

encouragepopulationmovementstotheex-

tremenorth-eastofthecountry .Anaidworker

withextensiveexperienceofthenorthnoted:

No army wants enemies behind their

lines. People were pushed east to west.

It was both the army and the LTTE, a

combination of the army and LTTE not

letting people go through their lines.

If you get through the LTTE, then you

have to go through the army. During

convoy number 1, to Mullaitivu and

PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu], the second to

third of October, I saw empty vehicles

going east to west and full vehicles

west to east, 24 hours a day.

OneWFPsituationanalysisinSeptember

2009notedthatcivilianswerelikelytobepre-

ventedfrommovingfromLTTEareasbecause,

first,theLTTEwantedtokeepcontrolofthis

populationand,second,“theSriLankanArmy

(SLA)wantsnoTamilelementstomovethrough

thelinesandhavepotentialinfiltratedelements

initsback .”66

66 WFP situation analysis, 22 September 2008.

Anotherproblemwasthatthetwowar-

ringpartieswereseekingtotakeadvantage

oftheconvoysasphysicalcoverformilitary

manoeuvres .Anaidworkerwhotravelledwith

severalconvoysrecalled:“Goingandcoming,

everyconvoyinnoman’slandsufferedsecurity

incidents .Wearenottargetedbybothpar-

ties,theproblemiswhensomeonewantsto

takeadvantageoftheconvoy,especiallyinno

man’sland .”Herecalledthefinalconvoy:

The January 16 [2009] convoy, we

left here around 10 am and reached

about 60 kilometres from here. We

were not allowed to use the A9 [main

road], I think the military wanted to

use it. They wanted us to use a dirt

road. From Puliyankulam, we had to

use a dirt road. At Ouddusuddan,

the convoy branched into two, one

to Mullyavallai and the other to PTK

[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and then Thar-

mapuram, delivering food. We were

trapped at PTK. There was fighting

going on all around. The LTTE were

firing over the warehouses and the

military firing back to other ware-

houses. The government was arguing

that they will lose military advantage if

they have to make way for the convoy.

Heexplainedthemanipulationofthecon-

voyinmoredetail:

The SLA [Sri Lankan army] wants to fol-

low the convoy and use the convoy to

hide behind, and if you are behind the

convoy, the other side cannot fire. The

government used convoys for physical

cover to move and to find if an areas

is safe and, if so, they ask others to

come and join. Before they change

their forward position, they send oth-

ers ahead.

AHumanRightsWatchreportcitedone

sourcewhoindicatedthatconvoyshadbeen

delayedwhentheSriLankanarmyandLTTE


insistedondifferentroutes,withbothfavouring

routesthatwouldallowthemtoadvancetheir

militarypositions .67

Anotheraidworkerwhotravelledwith

theJanuary16convoytoldusthatbothsides

useditascover:“They[thegovernmentarmy]

didittous,andtheLTTEusedtheconvoyto

movearound .”Itisclearthatconvoystravelled

withouteffectiveguaranteesforthesafetyof

staff .Thisaidworkeradded:“Forallofuson

theconvoys,thesecuritywasnotenough .The

guaranteesweresolow!Theguaranteesforthe

convoyscouldn’tbetrusted .Thelastconvoy

[January162009]wascrazy,toomuchshell-

ing,fromlandandsea .”WFP’sAsiaRegional

Directorhadstatedina3October2008press

release:“WFPtakesthesafetyandsecurityof

humanitarianaidworkersveryseriously .We

willnottoleratethreatstohumanitarianwork-

ersnordisruptionstothecriticaldispatchingof

foodforthepeoplehithardestbythecontinu-

ingconflictinnorthernSriLanka .”WhilstWFP

undoubtedlyhadaconcernforthesafetyof

itsworkers,thestrongdiplomaticpressurefor

convoydeliveryalongsiderelativelyweakpres-

sureonprotectionissues(includingtheuseof

militaryconvoysascover)wascertainlyendan-

geringhumanitarianworkers .

HumanRightsWatch’scalculationthat

convoydeliveries(toDecember152008)met40

percentofnutritionalrequirementswasbased

ontheassumptionofanefficientdistribution

systemwithminimalwasteorsiphoningoff

ofaid .This,asHumanRightsWatchpointed

out,wasdifficulttoconfirmormonitorwithout

ahumanitarianpresenceintheVanni .Itdoes

appearthatreliefwassubjecttosignificantpo-

liticalmanipulationonceitarrived—notleast

bytheLTTE .Somefeltthatalackofadequate

internationalsupervisionofdistributionfedinto

diversionofrelieffromtheintendedbenefici-

67 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” February. pp. 24-5. Human Rights Watch cites one source saying the Sri Lankan army (SLA) had used the convoy on December 29 to advance its position and that “long lines of SLA troops were walking alongside the convoy” (p. 25).

aries .Whilstafewinternationalstafftravelled

withtheconvoys,monitoringwasverylimited .

Theaidworkerwhocomplainedaboutlackof

securityguaranteesadded:“Thetimethatstaff

wereallowedtostayandinterviewpeoplewas

verylimited,onetotwohours .NGOstaffwere

notabletogo .”Thoseontheconvoysacknowl-

edgedthatsomeoftherelieffoodendedup

withtheLTTE,sayingthiswasinevitable .One

internationalaidworkercommented:

Expats were not there for the distribu-

tion of food September to December

2008. Feedback from colleagues says

that on the list of beneficiaries given

by the GA [Government Authority]

sometimes the same name was there

two times… Colleagues said there was

not a real monitoring of the distribution

and some IDPs didn’t receive food they

were entitled to. It was remote control

with problems. Some part of the food

was taken by the LTTE. In the last few

weeks, I heard the LTTE take first what

they want, the rest is distributed to the

population… Before, it was more si-

phoning off some of what people got.

I’m not saying it’s better to stop. Peo-

ple need the food.

Itwasdifficulttogetaclearpictureof

howextensivesuchdistributionproblems

were .Certainly,someseniorstaffatWFPdid

notseethemassignificant .OneseniorUNof-

ficialcommented:

Donors were resisting sending in food

without international supervision. WFP

sided with the government. WFP be-

lieved that food should go in. The gov-

ernment was saying it wouldn’t allow

international staff to be in the conflict

area. The loss of international supervi-

sion was not a drawback at all. Rapid

monitoring confirmed several times

that people received food and received

their fair share.


Manipulationofhumanitarianoperations

bythegovernmentincludedamanipulation

oftheinformationflowsassociatedwithsuch

operations .Ifthemostobviouselementofthis

wasthegovernment’sinstructioninSeptem-

ber2008thathumanitarianagenciesshould

leavetheVanni,governmentoppositionto

internationalaidmonitorscanalsobeseen

asanattempttocontrolflowsofinformation .

Significantly,thoseinternationalaidworkers

whodidtravelwiththeconvoyhadonlyavery

limitedtimetotalkwithpeoplebeforethe

aidworkershadtoreturn .Whenroadconvoys

werenolongerpossible,theemphasisinre-

liefoperationsshiftedtotransportingfoodby

sea,specificallyfromTrincomaleetoMullaitivu

district,withWFPfoodbeingtransportedon

ICRC-charteredships .Again,theshiftmayhave

beenrelatedtothegovernment’saversionto

witnesses .AsoneUNworkerputit:

We were no longer able to go to Kilino-

chchi, so we opened a corridor to Oud-

dusuddan. The convoy went only to

PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu]. From the end

of January 2009, it was no longer pos-

sible… When the military were pushing

the LTTE to coastal areas, there were

no more WFP convoys… They al-

lowed vessels by sea. The government

doesn’t want people to see the devas-

tation of the land.

Civilianswerenowbeingsqueezedinto

ashrinkingconflictzoneintheareanorthof

PuthukkudiyiruppuinMullaitivudistrict .68Con-

ditionsweredangerousandsqualid .ICRCwas

takingoutsomeofthesickandwounded,and

bringinginfood .69

SmallshipmentsofrelieftoMullaitivu

districtstartedon17February .70WFP’saim,



70 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1.

expressedonFebruary272009,wastodeliv-

eryupto300metrictonsoffoodcommodities

perweekbyboat .71Butintheperiodbefore

7March2009,160metrictonsof(mixed)food

hadarrivedbyseathere .On7March,WFPan-

nouncedthatanadditionalshipmentof500

metrictonshadarrivedinMullaitivu .By2April,

1,189metrictonshadarrived,andon2April

WFPdispatchedanother1,030metrictons .72At

end-April2009,oneUNworkersaid:

It’sbeenverydifficulttogetfoodintothe

Vanni,nofoodsince6April[2009] .Thereare

seriousproblems .Thegovernmentsendsin

justenough .Justwhenaccusationsoftrying

tostarvepeoplecomeout,theysendinsome

food .ItwasveryinadequateinFebruary .

Relief and the Politics of NumbersDecisionsonhowmuchrelieftoallocate—

andretrospectiveassessmentsonitsadequacy

—dependheavilyonassessmentsofthenum-

bersinneed .YetnumberstrappedinMullaitivu

wereverymuchamatterofdispute .

InearlyApril,ICRCestimatedthenumber

ofIDPstrappedinathinstripoflandinMul-

laitivudistrictat150,000 .73OnApril7,theUN

SecretaryGeneral’srepresentativeoninternally

displacedpersonsWalterKaelinspokeover

“over100,000”trappedinthisstripofland .74

Justadaylater,UNhumanitarianreliefcoor-

dinatorJohnHolmesestimatedthenumbers

trappedat150-190,000 .75On20April,anIn-

ternationalCrisisGroupreportnotedthat“as

manyas150,000ormorecivilians”wereinMul-

laitivudistrict,addingthat“UNsatelliteimage-

71 WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009.

72 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.

73 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, fiscal year 2009,” citing figures for 1 April.

74 Text at “UN expert on IDPs tells LTTE to free all civilians,” 8 April 2009, News Line, President’s Office, Sri Lanka (http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200904/20090408un_expert_on_idp_tells_ltte_free_civilians.htm).

75 See, for example, John Holmes, “Let them decide,” 8 April 2009.


ryasof23March2009showsmorethan30,000

tentsinthearea:estimatesofthenumberof

men,womenandchildrenatriskvarydepend-

ingonassumptionsabouttheaveragenumbers

ineachtent .”76

WFPputthenumbersratherlower .A27

MarchWFPinternalsituationreportnoted,

“Thegovernmentestimatesthatthereare

about70,000IDPsremainingintheVanni .Other

sourcesclaimthenumbertobeover100,000 .”77

Whenthedispatchof1,030metrictonsoffood

forMullaitivuwasannouncedbyWFPonApril2

2009,itwasnotedthat“TheWFPfoodsentto

theareawillbesufficienttofeedapproximately

100,000InternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)for

aperiodof20days .”78Strictly,thepressrelease

wasnotclaimingthattherewereonly100,000

IDPsintheVanni/Mullaitivu,andtheassumption

mayhavebeenthatnoteveryIDPintheVanni

neededafullration .Butthefiguremaystill

havecontributedtotheimpressionofasmaller

numberthantheactualnumber .Thisimpres-

sionwasnotfullycorrectedbytheuseinother

reportsofthephrase“morethan100,000”(as

inaMarch27WFPinternalsituationreport,

whichnoted,“Morethan100,000IDPsarestill

trappedinVanni“safezone”andrequirehu-

manitarianassistance .”79

Earlier,WFPwasgivingcredencetomuch

higherfigures .Ina2007FoodSecurityAssess-

ment,onetablenotes:Populationestimate

(2006)Jaffna1,513,196,Kilinochchi157,946,

Mannar460,918,Mullaitivu793,063,Vavuniya

412,784,Trincomalee807,024 .Table10,p .51 .80

76 ICG, 2009, “Crisis in Sri Lanka,” April 20. An ICG report of 9 March, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” noted, “Independent estimates from sources on the ground and satellite imagery suggest at least 150,000 people are trapped by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military….” OCHA reported that, as of 8 April, more than 7,500 patients and relatives were evacuated from Mullaitivu district by boat.


78 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.


80 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 51. The report also gives a high figure for numbers in need: “… 900,000

ThetotalherefortheVanni(i .e .excludingJaffna

andTrincomalee)is1,824,711 .Thismaywellbe

anoverestimateandnotallofthesepeoplewill

havebeencaughtupinthemassmovementto

thecoastalstripatMullaitivu,butthedifference

withlaterfiguresisstillstriking .Itisveryrareto

findanysubstantialorevenbriefexplanationof

howpopulationestimateshavebeenarrivedat,

andinthesecircumstancessuchsubstantialfalls

innumbersmaypassalmostwithoutcomment

orexplanation .

Thefigureof100,000trappedinMullaitivu

districthasbeenmentioned .AnOctober2007

WFPreportmentioned“400,000conflict-affect-

edbeneficiaries,”andthefigureitwasplanned

tohelpwas500,000 .81InsofarasUNagencies

weredealinginsuchrounded-upfigures,confi-

denceinthenumbersusedmustbelimited .

Ifweturnnowtogovernmentestimates

oftheIDPsintheVanni(moreandmorecon-

centratedinMullaitivudistrictasthewarpro-

gressed),thereweremanydifferentestimates .82

USAIDquotesaSriLankangovernmentesti-

mateof50-60,000peopletrappedinMullaiti-

vu .83AseniorcivilianofficialinVavuniyaputthe

numbersignificantlyhigher,tellingustowards

theendofAprilthat“160-170,000maybethere

intheVanni .”Onefairlyseniorofficialtoldus

around80,000peoplehadarrivedinVavuniya

inthelastfewdays,withroughly50,000people

stillpresentintheVanni .Evenwithinthemili-

tary,differentofficialscameupwithdifferent

estimates .Amoreseniormilitaryofficialcom-

mented,“Weoriginallysaid60-120,000inthe

need support with livelihood protection as their coping strategies are depleting in Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Trincomalee.” (WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 50).

81 WFP, “Budget Increases to Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations — Sri Lanka 10067.1,” Projects for Executive Board Approval, Agenda item 9, Executive Board, Second Regular Session, Rome, 22-26 October 2007, p. 5.

82 Reported in November, cited in Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 24.

83 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, fiscal year 2009,” 10 April 2009.


nofirezone .Maybe105,000areherealready .

Thereareonly10-15,000leftthere[intheVan-

ni] .”TheInternationalDisplacementMonitoring

Centrecitesagovernmentestimateofonly

1,000peopleintheVanniinApril .84

Muchhighernumberscamefromlocal

governmentofficialsinthenorth .InDecember

2008,aHumanRightsWatchreportnotedthat

theGovernmentAgentsforMullaittivuand

Kilinochchiwereestimatingatotalof348,102

displacedintheirregions .85ButinColombo

governmentofficialstoldustheywerevery

scepticalaboutlocalgovernmentofficers’

numbers .AnofficialwiththeMinistryofNation

BuildingandEstateInfrastructureDevelop-

ment(MNBEID)said:“Weheardfiguresup

to500,000 .Weagree110,000,thenumberof

peopleintheunclearedareas .Alotofnames

wererepeated—thatinflatedthenumbers…

Governmentagentsexaggeratethenumbers .”

Theissueof“double-counting”thosedisplaced

morethanoncewasalsoraisedbyHuman

RightsWatch .86Someaidworkerswerealso

scepticalaboutthefigures,sayingthattheLTTE

wasabletoexertpressurethatinflatedthem .

Inadequate Relief in MullaitivuGiventhewidelyvaryingestimatesof

population,theadequacyoffooddeliveries

canonlybeconditionallycalculated .Thelast

internationalrelieffoodtoarriveintheVanniby

landcameonJanuary16convoy .Ifweallowfor

aweekattheendofJanuary,atotalof66days

elapsedbetweenthelastroadreliefandthe

beginningofApril .Yetifwetakethefigureof

100,000,the1,189metrictonsoffoodthatar-

rivedbythebeginningofAprilwouldhavebeen

enoughtofeedthispopulationforonly24days .

IfwetaketheICRC/ICGfigureof150,000,this



86 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December.

amountwouldhavefedthepopulationforonly

16days .IfwetaketheGovernmentAgents’fig-

ureof348,102,thenthisquantityoffoodwould

havefedthepopulationforonlyabout7days .

TheMarch72009SituationReportofMul-

laituvuDistrictAdditionalGovernmentAgent

(AGA)K .Parthipangivesaverydetailedac-

countofquantitiesofreliefreceivedandquanti-

tiesneeded:

Almost the entire people from all AGA

Divisions of the District are displaced.

The IDPs of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi

and parts of Vavuniya, Mannar and

Jaffna Districts are now staying in Mul-

laitivu District… The population of

Mullaitivu District at present is about

81,000 families, consisting of about

330,000 persons… The required food

items for the issue of Dry Ration under

WFP have not been transported to the

district. Only a few MT of food items

were brought by ships and were issued

to the IDPs. There is a severe shortage

for food in the area. People are unable

to purchase the food in the market.

Prices of the food items have increased

and vegetables and fruits are not avail-

able at all in the area.87

ThisfigureisratherclosetotheGovern-

mentAgents’figureof348,102(citedabove) .

TheAGAs’sSituationReportgaveamonthly

foodrequirementforFebruaryof4,950metric

tons(mixedfoods),notingthatonly110metric

tonshadactuallyarrivedinFebruary .Sincethe

foodwassoscarce,itwasdistributedtoabout

30,000people,whilethegreatmajoritydidnot

getanyrelieffood .88

SincetheSriLankangovernmentplayeda

considerablepartinpushingpeopleintothis

stripofland,itmightreasonablyhaveantici-

patedthatsubstantialdeliveriesbyseawould

87 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.

88 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.


benecessary .Itseemsquitepossiblethatthe

graveandpredictableshortfallsinFebruary

andMarchservedamilitaryfunctioninen-

couragingcivilianstobreakfreefromtheLTTE

andcometogovernment-heldareas,notably

Vavuniya,whereIDPsweresaferwithbetter

accesstorelief .

Ofcourse,thesignificantdegreeofLTTE

controlinthenorthcomplicatedthedifficulty

ofgettingaccuratefigures .Evenso,itisdif-

ficulttobelievethatinasmallcountrywitha

sophisticatedadministrationandasignificant

governmentpresenceinthenorth,there

couldbesomuchdoubtaboutthenumbers

intheVanni .Whatseemstohavehappenedis

thatdifferentelementswithinthegovernment

madewidelyvaryingestimates,influencedby

arangeofpoliticalfactors .Ingeneral,mini-

misingthenumbersmayhaveservedafunc-

tioninminimisingtheimpliedneedforrelief

aswellasinminimisingtheimpliedcasualties .

Certainly,populationestimatescomingfrom

themilitarywereparticularlylow .Certainly,

thegovernment’slowpopulationfiguresfor

theVanniwereseenbyseveralaidworkers

asencouragingorlegitimisinglowfoodde-

liveriesorasakindofmorale-boosterforthe

militarypushagainsttheLTTErebels .Oneaid

workercommented:

An example of data that was use-

ful — OCHA implemented it with full

WFP cooperation — was detailing

the amount that went it the Vanni.

We could say only a small amount

went it and could do advocacy. But it

depends on the population. Then the

government says it’s only 70,000 odd.

It was partly to show the food was ad-

equate and partly to show there were

not many Tamils and they were not a

force to be reckoned with. The GAs

in Mullativu and Kilinochchi had 350-

370,000 figures. But Colombo was say-

ing they’re compromised by the LTTE.

There are incentives to ask for more.

Plus, they were totally compromised.

Anotheraidworkersuggested,“Maybe

the70,000numberwastomakeassistance

inadequate .”

Crisis in VavuniyaWhilethemigrationtoVavuniyawascer-

tainlyrapidanddramatic,thequestionofwhy

peoplehadmovedtherewasrelativelyneglect-

ed .TheSriLankangovernment’sofficialexpla-

nationwasthatthesepeoplehadfledtosafety

afterbeingheldcaptivebytheLTTErebels .

ThatflightfromtheTigerswasindeedanim-

portantpartofthestory,andthemostrapid

influxesintoVavuniyacoincidedwithgovern-

mentsuccessesinbreakingthroughtheLTTE

ranksandreleasingsomeoftheciviliansthat

therebelshadbeen,ineffect,holdingcaptive .

Severalcaveatsareworthstressing,how-

ever .First,whilethedesiretoescapetheLTTE

wasstrong,itwasalsohardtoseparatethis

fromthevulnerabilitytogovernmentattacks

whichproximitytotheTigersinvolved .

Second,therewassignificantmigration

intoVavuniyaattheendof2008andbeginning

of2009—thatis,beforethe“rescueopera-

tion”inMullativu .89

Third,thoseweinterviewedsuggesteda

numberofotherfactorsinfluencingthelarge-

scalemovementofcivilianstowardsVavuniya .

OnemajorfactorinthemovementtoVavuniya

fromNovember2008toApril2009waspro-

longedgovernmentshellingandaerialbomb-

ingofareaswithintheVanni,particularlyfrom

August2008 .Inadditiontoconstitutingadirect

securitythreat,thesemilitaryactionsalsode-

stroyedmuchoftheinfrastructureneededfor

continuedexistencewithinthearea .Aidwork-

ersreportedinApril2009thatwoundsforthose

inVavuniyahospitalweremostlyshrapneland

gunshotwounds .Untilroughlythesecondweek

ofApril,mostofthewoundswerefromshrapnel

89 A WFP report noted at end-March, “Since late January, nearly 52,000 IDPs have crossed over to government controlled areas and are accommodated in IDP centres/welfare villages: Vavuniya (44,823), Jaffna (4,861), Mannar (856), Trincomalee (464) and Pulumudai hospital (957)” (WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1).


(theresultofshellingoperations),andafterthis

moreandmorewerebulletwounds .Oneaid

workerinVavuniyasaid“Casualtiesweremainly

bytheSLA(SriLankanarmy) .Thegovernment

saysthere’sshellingbytheLTTE,butthat’snot

happening .TheLTTEisshootingatpeople,and

there’s[LTTE]suicidebomberstoscarethem .”

AUNworkercommented:“Civilianshavebeen

deliberatelyshelled .Probablythefiguresare

prettyhigh,maybethesamefigurekilledas

Srebrenica…Partofthestrategyistoshell

civilianstomovethemaround .Iguess10,000

liveslostandthousandsmaimed .”Inanopen

lettertotheIMFonMay132009,HumanRights

Watchnoted,“AccordingtotheUnitedNations,

asoflateAprilmorethan6,500civilianshave

beenkilledandmorethan13,000woundedin

theconflictareasinceJanuary2009 .Giventhe

intensefightingoverthepasttwoweeks,those

numberswillhaveincreasedsignificantly .“90

Asecondfactorencouragingmovementto

Vavuniyawastherestrictionofsupplies(includ-

ingfoodsupplies)movingintotheVanniover

asignificantperiod .OneNGOworkermade

anexplicitconnectionbetweenthedryingup

offoodsuppliesandthemigration:“FromOc-

tober2008,theconvoyswereverygood,and

NGOstriedtobringinfoodthroughtheGA

convoys .Butthenpermissiontogobyroadwas

notthere .PeoplestartedtocometoVavuniya .”

Anotheraidworkercommented:“The

conditionofIDPsisincreasinglyworseand

worsethemoretheystayinthenofirezone .80

percentofmedicalproblemsaresurgicalcas-

es .Malnutritionisbecomingmoreandmoreof

aproblem .”

Wehaveseenthateventheconvoyshad

metonlyaround40percent—atbest—of

thedisplacedpeoples’nutritionalneeds,while

relieftransportedbyshipmetonlyafractionof

theneedsinFebruaryandMarch2009 .

AUNworkerstressedthatthegovern-

ment’semphasisonescapingtheTigershadto

beputintoabroadercontext:“They[theIDPs]

90 Human Rights Watch Letter to IMF Executive Directors on Sri Lanka’s IMF Loan Request, 13 May 2009.

wanttogetawayfromtheLTTEandtheconflict

zone .Buttheywouldrathergototheirhomes .

There’smineclearance[needed],basicservices

arenone,alackofbasicsecurity .Soit’snotre-

alistictoaskforthemtostayintheVanniright

now .”Onerepresentativeofamajordonorsaid:

In Vavuniya, the people say they are

leaving because of, one, shelling, and,

two, hunger. It’s the same thing on

medicines — the government has a

longstanding policy of not allowing

antibiotics, ostensibly because they

wouldn’t want it to fall into LTTE hands

and treat their war-wounded, and the

same with anaesthetics.

Alocalaidworkergaveasimilaranalysis:

“WhydidtheynotsendfoodtotheVanniifit’s

ahumanitarianwar?Peoplearenotwillingto

comehere[toVavuniya],butcontinuousshell-

ing,heavydamageandnofoodormedicine

makethepeoplecomeout .”

Athirdfactorencouragingthemovement

toVavuniyawasthegovernmentpolicyofbus-

singpeoplefromtheMullaitivuarea,firstto

OmantheiandthenfurthersouthtoVavuniya .It

isnotatallclearthatthedisplacedhadtheop-

tionofnot catchingthebuses .Oneaidworker,

aveteranofmanyemergencies,said“The

peoplewanttogetawayfromtheLTTE,but

thentheyhavetogowiththearmy .Themilitary

putpeopleonbuses,butit’snotvoluntary,not

atall .”Oneseniorgovernmentadministrator

hintedatthisproblembynoting,“Peopleare

coming[toVavuniya],Idon’tknowifwilfully,

transportingbybuses .”

Afourthfactorencouragingmassmove-

menttoVavuniyahasbeeninformationcontrol .

Inparticular,thereisreasontobelievethat

peoplewerenottoldthewholestoryabout

thecampsinVavuniya—notablythelackof

freedomofmovementforthoseinside .One

aidworkerinVavuniya,forexample,stressed

thatthedisplacedwereshockedbywhatthey

foundinVavuniya,especiallytheinternment:“‘If

we’dknownwhatwascoming,we’dneverhave

come .’Youhearthatallthetime .”


Significantly,someIDPsdoappeartohave

anticipatedthereceptiontheywouldget—and

thisseemstohavebeenonefactorhelpingto

reinforceLTTE“control”overcivilians .Whilst

acknowledgingthatLTTEintimidationwasthe

mainreasonforciviliansnotfleeingtheMullaiti-

vuarea,aFebruary2009HumanRightsWatch

reportnotedthatmanycivilianswerereluctant

tofleebecauseoffearsoftheirlifeandsafety

inthehandsofgovernmentforces;asonerelief

workercommented:

If people knew that there was ICRC or

other international agency waiting for

them on the other side, thousands,

virtually all of them, would have run

for safety, even if it meant breaking

through LTTE cordons. But risking your

life to end up in government detention

— not many are willing to do this.91

InVavuniyadistrict,thedisplacedwere

confinedincampsbehindbarbedwireandun-

abletomovetofriendsorrelativesortopursue

anyeconomicstrategiesbeyondthecamps .

Ineffect,thedisplacedhaveineffectbeen

internedincampsinVavuniya .Onesenioraid

workercommented:“Thereislittlefreedom

ofmovement;allthecampsarebarbedwire…

Familiesgetseparatedatscreeningcentresand

it’sverydifficulttogetfamiliestogetheragain .”

Anotheraidworkercommented:“Firewood

willrunout .Whenpeoplearedesperate,the

armysurroundsthemandallowsthemtogo

outintothebusharoundhere .”Militaryofficials

haveclaimedthatthebarbedwireisthereto

protectthoseinthecampfromtheLTTE .92One

aidworkermentionedthisinterpretationbut

stressedthatthelocationofconcertinawireon

theinside ofthefenceindicatesitisthereto

keeppeoplein .Afourthaidworkercomment-

ed:“Ninetypercenthavefamilytheycouldgo

91 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” February, p. 28.


to—ifnotinVavunya,thenelsewhere .”The

militaryinVavuniyatoldusthatfreedomof

movementwouldcomeingradually .

Self-helpwasbeingactivelydiscouraged .

Asoneaidworkernoted:

You have masons, bakers, competent

people. But the Sri Lankan govern-

ment will not allow any agencies to

employ people from the camps. They

say they’re sending them to techni-

cal school to teach them a trade, but

many already have a trade. If they want

bread, give them an oven to make it or

bricks to make an oven!... They don’t

let you work with IDPs, forming com-

mittees, like for food distribution. They

won’t allow it.

Therewasamajorsenseofcrisisasunex-

pectedlylargenumbersofinternallydisplaced

peoplefloodedintothetown .AnIDMC(In-

ternationalDisplacementMonitoringCentre)

reportnotedthat,“Over150,000IDPshad

managedtofleetheVannibetweenNovember

2008andApril2009 .Theywerebeinghousedin

campsandsitesinthegovernment-controlled

districtsofVavuniya,Mannar,Trincomaleeand

Jaffna .”93ByApril,theinfluxintoVavuniyawas

extremelyrapid .Peoplewerecrammedinto

smallareaswithinadequateornon-existent

toiletfacilitiesandalackofcleanwater .The

hospitalwasseverelyovercrowded .Oneaid

workerobserved:“Thehospitalischokedwith

peoplewithmissinglimbs .Ithas2,000people

andisdesignedfor450patients .”Anotheraid

workernoted:

People are being discharged from

Vavuniya hospital who shouldn’t be,

and they’re being discharged into

camps… C-sections [cesarian sections]

are normal in this country, but women

are being discharged after three days

— there’s so much risk of infection…

There’s no list of patients. People just

93 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009.


disappear from the hospital and you

don’t know who’s gone.

Lookingbackonthemassinfluxinto

Vavuniya,alocalNGOworkernotedinSeptem-

ber2009:

We could have been better prepared

to face the emergency. WFP, the gov-

ernment, the NGO community — get-

ting ready as a coordinated effort was

neglected. WFP staff were preoccupied

with supplying food to the no fire zone.

The government figure [for those who

would come out] was very low, maybe

100,000, and then there were 290,000!

Aidworkersstressedtherewasadesireto

keepthedisplacedawayfromtherestofthe

population .Whenweaskedaseniorcivilianof-

ficialaboutthelackoffreedomofmovement,

therewasanevidentconcerntoprotectthe

residentpopulationofVavuniya:“Thereare

200,000civiliansinVavuniyaalready .Thereis

notanyindustrialactivity .TheIDPscan’tdocul-

tivation—theydon’thaveland .”

WhilstVavuniyahasbeenseverelyover-

crowded,establishinga“spill-overarea”has

beenfraughtwithdifficulties .OneNGOworker

observed,“…the[current]ideaofgetting

moreIDPsintoMannar,oneminuteit’son,one

minuteoff .ItseemstheMinisterofDefence

wantseveryoneinVavuniya .”

Closelyrelatedtothepolicyofinternment

istheweaknessofscreeningprocesses .Thisis

aparticularworryinviewofthehistoryofgov-

ernment-relateddisappearancesofthosesus-

pectedoraccusedoflinkstotheLTTE .94Such

screeningashasoccurredseemstohavebeen

prettysuperficial .95OneNGOworkernoted:

94 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy (ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org). On these disappearances, see for example International Crisis Group, 2009, “Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province,” 16 April.

95 NRC Sri Lanka, April 2009, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 6.

There isn’t a thorough screening proc-

ess. If there was a thoughtful and clear

procedure, for example in Omanthei,

then we’d be in a much better position

to negotiate for freedom of movement

— not necessarily full resettlement but

for example day passes and some abil-

ity to leave the camps. So long as that

screening is not done properly, they

can say they need restrictions on the

camps. Being able to achieve anything

in these circumstances is very difficult.

Alongsimilarlines,aUNworkernotedin

April:

The screening process doesn’t exist in

any sense that it has an end-point…

You need to check, but show us that

system! People are sitting under sur-

veillance for a year. If there was screen-

ing, one single person could say I am

a combatant or not. That hasn’t hap-

pened. It justifies detaining 200,000

people96 on the grounds that they are

a security threat. We bought the line

that they would show us that [screen-

ing] system.

Onerepresentativeofamajordonorsug-

gested,“Theyhaven’tscreenedthesepeople

verywell .Theyprobablytakemetalobjectsoff

them .Thereareprobablyalotofex-combat-

antsinthesecamps .Soitreallyisaninternment

situation .”AUNworkersuggestedstarkly,

“Thegovernmentthinktheentirepopulation

ispro-revolution .”

Aidworkerssaidscreeningbeganwitha

basicbodysearch,thensomebasicscreeningin

Vallipuram,thenontoKilinochchiandOmanthai

formorebasicscreening .AnofficialattheMinis-

tryofResettlementandDisasterReliefServices

acknowledged:“Screeningisnotaverythor-

oughprocessbecauseofsuchlargenumbers,”

whilstaseniorcivilofficialinVanuniyanotedthat

inpracticetherewasnotmuchscreening .

96 Subsequently, the number rose significantly.


Therapidityoftheinfluxandtheinad-

equacyofpreparationsgavetheimpression

thatthiswasasuddenandunexpectedpopula-

tionmovement .However,theinfluxhadactually

beenpartofgovernmentplanning .Asone

HumanRightsWatchreportnotedin

December2008:

In September 2008, the Sri Lankan

authorities informed the UN and

humanitarian organizations that they

were in the process of drawing up

contingency plans to keep up to

200,000 displaced people from the

Vanni in new camps in Vavuniya dis-

trict, in case a mass outflux from the

Vanni materialised.97

Thisannouncementleftaidagenciesina

dilemma,andthegovernmentwaspresumably

awarethatitwould .Iftheypreparedforama-

jorinflux,theymightbesaidtobeencouraging

andfacilitatingthedepopulationofthenorth .

ThiswasparticularlyproblematicastheSri

Lankangovernmenthadnotansweredques-

tionsonwhetherthosewhoweredisplacedto

Vavuniyawouldenjoyfreedomofmovement .98

OneNGOworker,speakinginApril2009,em-

phasisedthepracticalproblemscreatedby

internationalagencies’reluctancetoprepare

foraninflux:“Wesaidwehadprinciplesin

relationtothecamps,notpreparingtheland

andwewon’tbuildbeforetheIDPsarehere .

Wewerestrict,andnowhavemoreproblems .”

Therewasalsoasignificantproblemwiththe

governmentnotallocatinglandtoreceivepeo-

ple .OneUNworkercommented:

It’s a protection emergency. They have

interned the entire civilian population

that’s come out of the Vanni, saying

there are security reasons for not hav-



ing freedom of movement. Security

is such a big factor. They wouldn’t

allocate land to us. We are finding our-

selves in a situation as though it came

out of nowhere.

Addingtothedifficultiesofprovidingas-

sistance,itappears,wasareluctancetoaccept

NGOhelpandaclaimbythegovernmentthatit

couldcopeonitsown .AnIDMCreportnoted,

“InVavuniya,thegovernmentinitiallyinsisted

thatitwouldtakeprimaryresponsibilityforthe

IDPsandthattherewasnoneedforNGOsto

becomeinvolved .”99

Contributingtothelackofpreparationwas

asevereunderestimationofthenumbersinthe

Vannibypowerfulelementsofthegovernment .

Oneverysenioraidworkercommented,“The

governmentbelieveditsownpropagandaon

numbers—the70,000 .Itfellinwiththemilitary

figures .”TheUNworkercomplainingaboutlack

oflandallocationadded:

Since September last year [that is,

September 2008], agencies were told

they need to leave the Vanni. The gov-

ernment said we will bring everyone

to Vavuniya and it was saying there

are only 70,000 there [in the Vanni].

They said the UN was exaggerating

[the numbers] and that LTTE is always

exaggerating to get more resources.

Since then [September 2008], we are

starting to prepare. We try to discour-

age displacement so as not to create

a city so people will come, but we at

least try to get land, clear the land.

We’ve been saying this since Septem-

ber. The consequences now are no

draining, no toilets, last night it rained

[in Vavuniya], no road, the ground is

not level. The first people were com-

ing in November 2008. It’s not like

there hasn’t been warning.



OneaidworkerinVavuniya,whohad

givenconsiderableattentiontothenumbers

issue,commented:

CIMIC [Sri Lanka’s Civil Military Coop-

eration unit] said there were 432,000

citizens in the Vanni. This was in Octo-

ber-November 2008. There were some

losses of life. Perhaps 370,000 were left

in the Vanni late November, 365,000

with those who went to Jaffna. The

army agreed — 400,000 was written

on the whiteboard [that is, the military

whiteboard] in November 2008, I saw

it. Now the army has been saying a

maximum of 70,000. There’s been no

census in the Vanni since 1983. Some

of our esteemed colleagues took the

70,000 figure too much, didn’t question

it. It’s a big reason why preparation is

so bad now.

Thefigureof365,000isnotsofarfrom

theabovementionedoftotalof348,102given

bytheGovernmentAgentsofMullaitivuand

Kilinochchidistricts .

Particularlywiththefocusofthewarshift-

ingtowardsthecoastofMullaitivudistrict,there

wasanopportunitytoincreaseroaddeliveries .

Butthiswasneglected .Oneaidworkersaidin

April2009,“Thegovernmenthasnotallowed

foodtogotoKilinochchi,”addingthatthefood

wasinstockandcouldbemovedthere .Ata

majoraidcoordinationmeetinginVavuniyaon

April222009,thelackoffoodinOmanthaiwas

raisedasamajorproblem .Thegovernmentwas

handlingfeedingthere .Oneaidworkerwith

goodknowledgeofthesituationinOmanthai

commented:“Thefoodandwatersituationis

uncertain .Itlookslikepeopledidn’teatinVal-

lypuram .PeoplearestarvinginOmanthai,no

water,food,exhaustion .2-3peopledied .”

Securityobstaclesshouldnothavebeen

prohibitive,thisaidworkeremphasised:“Just

afterthenofirezone,there’sariskofsuicide

attacksbutit’sOKbeyondthat .Weshouldbe

presenttogivewaterandfood .”Onesenior

UNworkercommentedthattherewasnogood

reasonthatWFPcouldnotbeinKilinochchiand

Omanthai,pointingoutthattheroadwasbeing

usedforcivilianscomingoutofthearea .

Anationalaidworkercommented:“They’re

sending15-20busesaday .Peopledon’thave

food,waterfacilities,elderlyandinjuredpeo-

ple .300busesareatOmanthai .Thesituation

ismuchworsetherethanhere .”Asenioraid

workernotedthat21elderlypeoplehaddied

inOmanthaithepreviousday,apparentlyfrom

exhaustion .Problemswerecompoundedwhen

buseswerereturnedfromVavuniyatoOmanthai .

Asoneaidworkernoted:“Theyputthemin

busesinOmanthai .Some20,000areinOman-

thainow .Alotcametotransitcentresinbuses

anddidn’tfindanyspace,sotheyhadtogoback

toOmanthai .”InanarticlefortherespectedSri

Lankanthink-tank,theCentreforPolicyAlterna-

tives,”SanjanaHattotuwanoted:“Acourtorder

issuedApril[that]IgotviaemailfromtheVavuni-

yaDistrictMagistrateCourtflaggedup30cases

inIDPcampswhereseniorcitizenshadpassed

awayduetothestarvationandmalnutritionand

withoutanyspecialcare .”100

Distributionsystemswerealsoaproblem .

OneaidworkercommentedonOmanthaiin

particular:“Thereisnodistributionsystem .

Thestrongeronesgetfood,thereisafightand

theweakeronescannot .”EveninVavuniya,the

feedingarrangmentswereseenasdamaging

foranumberofvulnerablegroups .OneUN

workernoted:

Given mass internment, people’s abil-

ity to supplement is very restricted,

except if they bribe soldiers, who are

not too much on the make [that is, not

much inclined to take bribes]. There are

150,000 you need to fully support. WFP

is providing a basic food basket, but

the food may be culturally inappropri-

ate, a lack of variety, or not tasty. The

government has always had a policy of

100 Sanjana Hattotuwa, 2009, “Cartography of shame,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, 17 May.


giving cooked meals. This emergency

has been going three months and

they are still doing communal cook-

ing. It doesn’t allow decisions on who

eats first in a family. It’s very clear that

the most vulnerable are finding it dif-

ficult to access food in the camps. A

woman with a 20-day-old baby — if I

have no family members, it’s necessary

to go and wait in line and scuffle and

try to get my food, so I’ll miss meals

regularly. The are no separate lines or

cooking areas for the most vulnerable.

The government has reliable registra-

tion data. They have data on women

with small children etc., but they don’t

share with WFP or UNHCR. Coopera-

tion with the government is very poor...

Pregnant women are also vulnerable,

and the elderly. They don’t have the

stamina, with months of not having ac-

cess to food in the Vanni, they are very

weak, dehydrated. There are recorded

instances of preventable deaths.101

CommentingontheproblemsinVavuniya

arisingfromthelowpopulationestimateof

70,000,oneaidworkercommented,“Theycan

alwaysblameitonus—there’snothinginwrit-

ing .”Ingeneral,governmentofficialstended

toplaydownproblemsinthenorthandamong

thoseenteringVavuniya,whetherthiswaspro-

tectionproblems,malnutritionordisease .102

The Question of Speedy Population Return

Giventhatthedisplacedpopulationisbasi-

callybeinginternedinVavuniya,theneedto

101 One local NGO worker said the quality of the dahl provided was very low and that it would have been more culturally appropriate to provide unpolished brown rice than white rice.

102 Human Rights Watch noted: “… the humanitarian plight of the Vanni displaced population has greatly concerned neighbouring India, with a large Tamil population in Tamil Nadu state; lowering the figures of affected persons may be an attempt to limit Indian pressure.” (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 24)

facilitateaquickandsafereturnfromVavuniya

toareasfurthernorthbecomesallthe

moreurgent .

Civilandmilitaryofficialsstressedthatthe

SriLankangovernmentseesthistaskasurgent

butthatthegovernmentfacesseverecon-

straints,notablyinde-mining .Oneseniorcivil-

ianofficialstressedthatworktoallowpeople

toreturnhadalreadybegun:“Wehavestarted

reconstructionoftheA9[road],hospitals,build-

ings,schoolsandotheradministrativeblocks,”

adding,“Theproblemofdemining,thearmy

willdoitveryquickly .”Althoughtheofficialline

isthattheLTTEwasbeingcomprehensively

routedinthenorth-east,thereseemstobean

awarenessthatpocketsofLTTEresistancewill

remain .Thismayanotherreasontodiscourage

resettlement .OneNGOworkercommented,

“Thegovernmentstresstheneedforde-mining

andthattheremightbeclustersofLTTEand

theyneedtobeclearedout .”

Whenweaskedwhenitwouldbepossible

forpeopletoreturn,answersweregenerally

vague .Forexample,aseniormilitaryofficer

said,“That’saverydifficultquestiontoanswer .

De-miningisnecessary .”Othersreiteratedthe

viewthatthepopulationwouldbereturnedto

thenorthassoonaspossibleandthatexplod-

edmineswereamajorobstacle .Oneofficialat

theMinistryofResettlementandDisasterRelief

Servicestoldus:“Peoplewereallunderthe

controloftheLTTE,100,000people .Assoon

aspossible,theywillberesettled .Theareais

heavilymined .De-mininghastobedone .The

processhasalreadystartedinMannarandat

theendofthemonthitshouldbedonethere .”

Infact,experienceinMannarhasnotbeenpar-

ticularlyencouraging .Oneaidworkerwhose

organisationwasworkinginMannarsaid:“In

Mannarittookagesfororganisationstodode-

mining,partlybecauseofarmyauthorisations…

Ittooksixmonthsforthesepeopletogoback .”

Somepeoplearestillincampsthere,moreo-

ver .OnemanwhohadbeenworkinginMannar

observed,“Peoplehavebeenmorethanone

yearincampsinMannar,andmovementisre-


stricted .”Anotheraidworkergavemoredetails

ontherestrictionsinMannar:“Ifonemember

ofafamilyisgoing,youhadtoleavetherestof

thefamilymembersinthecamps .It’saffected

accesstoschools,evenuniversityandhospi-

tals,forasingleperson .”Headdedthatrestric-

tionshadloosenedtothepointwhereleaving

onememberofafamilybehindwassometimes

acceptable,butsaidthiswasstillamajorprob-

lemforanyonewithoutfamilypresent .Another

aidworkeradded,“Theyhaveno-onetoserve

as“collateral .”103

Onerepresentativeofamajordonorwas

alsoscepticalaboutthegovernment’sresettle-

mentplans:

In Sri Lanka, we’ve seen some IDPs in

camps for many years. There’s currently

a caseload under SO1 of 433,000 peo-

ple. Many IDPs are in camps for a year

or more, so they’re not meeting the US

government definition of an emergen-

cy. Many can’t go home because of the

government and when that’s the case,

it’s not incumbent on the international

community to feed them. It’s up to the

government… The UN ought to be

working with the government for a real-

istic resettlement strategy. In February

2009, the government said 80 per cent

would go home by end-2009. It’s clear

now that that’s not going to happen.

Now is the time the government can

and should develop a returns strategy

and WFP ought to be part of that.

AnaidworkerbasedinTrincomaleecom-

mented:“Twoyearsfromnowwhenit’snoton

thefrontpage,resettlementisgoingtobea

103 A Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) report noted, “Two camps at Kalimoddai and Sirikundel in Mannar have been in existence since March 2008, and house approximately 900 IDPs, only a small fraction of whom have been allowed to leave permanently. To leave, they have to obtain a pass for a specific purpose from the army and have a family member act as guarantor.” (CPA, “A profile of human rights and humanitarian issues in the Vanni and Vavuniya,” March 2009, 40, cited IDMC [International Displacement Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 6).

bigproblem .”Alongsimilarlines,aUNworker

noted:“There’scurrentcoverage,yes,buthow

longwillitlast?Peopleincampswillbeforgot-

ten—justlikeatPuttalamwheretherehave

beencampsfor15years .”Infact,thereare

over60,000IDPslivinginmorethan140camps

inPuttalamandthesecampshaveexisted

since1990 .104Meanwhile,inJaffna,manyIDPs

havebeenunabletoreturnhomeaftertheir

landwasdeclaredtofallwithingovernment-

designatedHighSecurityZones .105Onthe

otherhand,resettlementfromtheEastern

Provincehasbeenfar-going(andindeedthere

werepressurestoreturn .106

Theprioritygivenbythegovernmentto

establishingofreliefvillagesmademanyaid

workersscepticalabouttheurgencywithwhich

resettlementwasbeingcontemplated .Asone

NGOworkerputit:“Everyonehasbeenunder

hugepressuretocontributetotheconstruc-

tionofthesevillages…Theideaofreliefvil-

lagesisthatpeoplearetobehousedfor2-3

yearsandwe’resayingfocusonthreemonths

andmonitoritandseewhatwelearnfromit .”

Anotheraidworkernoted,“Theinternational

communityisstickingtoathreemonthtime-

line,andmaybeanotherthreemonths .The

government’sinitialplanwasfor1-3yearmodel

villages .ManikFarmwasgoingtobethe

model .”Whilemoretemporaryshelterwasin

practicealsosetup,aseniorcivilianofficialtold

usthatthreevillagesontheManikFarmmodel

104 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 9. The displaced in Puttalam have been receiving rations from WFP and the government. There has been some local integration; but the government resists this, saying the displaced will one day return to their homes (p. 9).


106 IDMC commented, “In the Eastern Province, where there had been massive displacement in 2006 and 2007, almost all the IDPs had returned to their areas of origin, with exceptions including those whose land had been designated as a High Security Zone by the government.” (IDMC [International Displacement Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 1).


wereindeedbeingplanned .107AJanuary2009

documentfromtheMinistryofResettlement

andDisasterReliefServicesmakesthegov-

ernment’sintentionsprettyplain:“Sincethe

incomingIDPs[inVavuniya]wouldbelargein

numbersandexpectedtostayrelativelylong-

erperiod(2-3years),welfarevillageswillbe

establishedwithsemipermanentstructures

whichincludesheltersandotherfacilities… .”108

Thefacilitiesplannedincludedtemples,

churchesandlibraries—nodoubtuseful,but

notthekindofthingonewouldassociatewith

ashort-termstay .

Severalaidworkersvoicedasuspicion

thatsomekindofpermanentorsemi-perma-

nentdemographicchangemightbeintended,

andbothpoliticalandeconomicreasonswere

putforwardforsuchaprocess .Onelocal

NGOworker,whoechoedothers’emphasis

onthelackofresettlementfromcampsin

Mannar,pointedtoanumberofreasonsfor

governmentactorstoopposeresettlementto

thenorth:

The government is planning to keep

the people in the area for more than

three years. The reasons? First, you

can destroy the financial capacity of

the Tamils. Second. If they have no

purchasing power, they have to get

out and lose our education and lose

strong children and have malnour-

ished children. Our total generation

will be spoiled, and you can treat thee

guys as slaves. Third, the opportunity

to bring all the wealth from the Vanni,

timber, coconuts, we can abandon

our area… The sea is our big re-

source, pearl in the Mussali area. In

future, they can do resettlement for

Sinhalese families. In Mannar most of

107 See also Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, 2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of Vanni,” January.

108 Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, 2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of Vanni,” January.

the area was cleared [that is, of LTTE] in

2006, but they still did not do any re-

settlement [of the displaced] in almost

two years. You can easily do mine clear-

ance. Do they need two years to do the

mine clearing?

Aninternationalaidworkeralsoempha-

sisedthateconomicvalueoftheVannimight

impederesettlement .Henoted,“Thenorthis

thebreadbasketofthecountry .Itwasproduc-

ing60percentoftherice .”109

AseniorUNworkersaid:“SomeIDPcen-

tresaresemi-permanent .Somesuspectthe

governmentistryingtogofordemographic

change .”AnNGOworkersaid,“Eventually,re-

population[oftheVanni]mightbethreetofive

years .Theremightbesomeethnicre-composi-

tion .”Hebelievedthatthegovernment’sstrat-

egywastokeeptheguerrillasseparatefromthe

Tamilpopulationandtoexerciseclosecontrol

overthelatter:“Theviewis,keepthefishaway

fromthewater,they’llfadeaway .”Anotheraid

workersaidtheburyingofPVCpipesat“semi-

permanentsettlements”suggestedtheywere

actuallyintendedaspermanent .Headded,

“Thelong-termaimistobreakthem[theTamil

population]psychologically .ManikFarmhastin

roofs—they’resweathouses,110plusthelackof

freedomofmovement .”

Significantly,thepoorprotectionenviron-

mentwasdamagingthefundingofhumanitar-

ianoperations .AseniorUNworkernotedthat

donorgovernmentscepticismonprotection

issuesandresettlementwasinhibitingtheir

fundingofaidoperations:“Humanitarian

agencies,othershaven’tgottoomuch .You’re

talkingabout5-20percentfunding .WFPis

closeto59-60percentfunding .”WhenIasked

whythefiguresweresolowformostagencies,

hereplied:

109 On the importance of the north as the “rice basket” of Sri Lanka, see WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 9; and WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1.

110 See also Sanjana Hattotuwa, “Cartography of shame,” 17 May 2009, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.


Donors have no faith in the handling

of IDPs and protection issues are not

being addressed. Donors want settle-

ments to be temporary and a roadmap

to the IDPs’ return. The government

has no roadmap. Defence people say it

will take longer than other representa-

tives, different stories.

InSeptember2009,alocalNGOworker

stressedtheurgencyofdealingwithconges-

tioninthecamps,emphasisingthatcreating

newsmallercampswasnottheanswerwhilsta

strongadvocacycampaignfromtheUNsystem

wasessential:

260,000 are being kept in camps. It’s

internment and not acceptable. The

screening process is unending… It’s

very difficult to predict what numbers

will be in camps by the end of the year.

The government is not willing to share

any schedule. The monsoon rains are

fast approaching and we fear that we

will not be able to prevent an impend-

ing disaster…111 Relieving the conges-

tion in the camps is still not happening

on a large scale. Even those who are

taken out are still kept in temporary

camps in their districts rather than be-

ing released to their relations or friends,

as claimed by the government. We are

asked to food these people in these

new camps and we do not have resourc-

es and we also face an ethical dilemma.

Anotherlocalaidworker,speakinginSep-

tember2009,said:“TheUNsaysit’sproviding

shelterfor120,000people,but260,000areoc-

cupyingthoseshelters,sopeoplearelivingin

overcrowdedtents .Womanareminglingwitha

lotofstrangersandpeopletheydon’tknow .It’s

very,veryunhealthytosaytheleast .”

111 The possibility of major disease outbreaks was stressed by other local NGO workers. One said in September 2009, “We are facing the monsoon. When the rain comes, the water systems will all get clogged. The water purification system can’t handle it.”

Advocacy And Humanitarian Priorities

WedidencountersomepraiseforUNad-

vocacyefforts .Moststrikingly,oneNGOworker

commented,“Tobehonest,theUNdidwellin

termsofadvocacy—answeringtotheneeds,

andinparallel,advocacy .”

Levelsofadvocacyandinterestwereseen

hashavingincreasedsignificantlywiththecrisis

inthe“nofirezone”inthefirstfivemonthsof

2009andthemassinfluxintoVavuniya .Asone

UNworkerobserved,“It’snotjuststatements

betweentheagencieshere .Yougetsomething

fromtheSecretaryGeneral,somethingfrom

theHighCommissionforHumanRights,alotof

high-levelinterestrecently .”TheUNSecretary

General’sspecialrepresentativeonInternally

DisplacedPersonsWalterKaelincalledforfree-

domofmovementfortheIDPs .UNUnder-sec-

retarygeneralforhumanitarianaffairsSirJohn

Holmes,whovisitedinFebruaryandApril2009,

repeatedlycalledforatemporaryceasefireand

forimprovedhumanitarianaccessandhecalled

ontheLTTEandthegovernmenttoavoiduse

ofheavyweapons .Therewerealsovisitsfrom

theUNSecretaryGeneralBanki-Moon,who

criticisedthegovernment’suseofheavyweap-

onry,incivilianareasandfromtheSecretary-

General’schefdecabinetVijayNambiar .

SomestatesincludingFrance,theUSand

BritainincreasedtheirpressureonSriLankaas

thecrisisinMullaitivuworsenedinApril2009 .

ButinNewYorktheissueremainedrelegated

toinformalstatementsandunofficialmeetings

takingplacenotintheSecurityCouncilcham-

berbutinthebasementoftheUNbuilding .

Importantstatesopposingengagementbythe

SecurityCouncilhaveincludedChina,Russia,

Libya,VietnamandJapan .112

Despitesomerecognitionofincreased

interest,mostofthoseweinterviewedwere

verycriticaloftheadvocacyeffortoverapro-

longedperiod .

112 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy (ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).


Weighing Advocacy and Delivery: The Wrong Balance?

Inmanycrisesaroundtheworld,aidworkers

haveseenthemselvesasmakingdifficult,ifnot

impossible,decisionsbetweenprioritisingthe

deliveryofservices,ontheonehand,andspeak-

ingupaboutabusesandprotectionissues,on

theother .Inacademia,HugoSlimhasexpressed

thisdilemmaveryeloquently,andhassuggested

thatthereisoftenastrongcaseforprioritising

theprovisionofanimmediateandknowable

benefit(deliveringservices)overthehopeofa

longer-termandessentiallyunknowablebenefit

(throughadvocacy) .113InSriLanka(asinother

countriesundergoingconflict-relateddisasters),

gettingthebalancerighthasbeendifficult .

Weheardsomeaidworkersexpressthe

fearthattheirabilitytodeliverreliefwouldbe

impededbyadvocacy,particularlyifthistook

theformofpubliccriticism .Butbeforeconclud-

ingthatadvocacycanreasonablybesacrificed

todelivery,threeimportantpointsareworth

stressing .First,itisnoteworthythatseveralof

thoseinterviewedinSriLankafeltthataprioriti-

sationofdeliveryoveradvocacyhadultimately

hadveryadverseaffectsfortheprotectionof

targetpopulations,andhadactuallydonelit-

tletoenhancestaffsecurityoreventheability

todeliverreliefgoodsandservices .Infact,

theamountof“humanitarianspace”inwhich

aidagenciescouldoperatewasperceivedas

havingshrunkalongsideaseriesofconces-

sionstotheSriLankangovernment .Second,in

practicedecision-makinghasnotbeensimply

aquestionofweighingdeliveryagainstadvo-

cacy .Manyotherconsiderationshavecome

intoplay,includinggeopoliticalconcernsand

organisationalorbureaucraticinterests .These

considerationsunderlinethepossibilitythatthe

balancebetweenadvocacyanddeliverymay

nothavebeenoptimalfromthepointofviewof

thetargetpopulation .Athirdconsiderationis

113 Hugo Slim, 1997, “Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War,” Disasters, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 244-257.

thesignalthatmaybesentinternationallywhen

humanitarianprinciplesarecompromisedinthe

pursuitofaccessadjuststructureofthissection .

Wehavenotedtheperceivedshrinkage

of“humanitarianspace .”Someconcessions

werenotimmediatelydamagingtotarget

populationsbutmayneverthelesshavebeen

significantinallowingthegovernmenttosenda

signalofitspower,whilstalsosendingasignal

tothegovernmentthatitcouldgoevenfurther .

Onesuchmayhavebeenallowinggovernment

soldierstosearchUNvehicles,notablyatMeda-

vachchiya,justsouthofVavuniya .

Morefundamentally,theinternational

community’swillingnesstosupportapeaceful

solutiontoSriLanka’slong-runningcivilwarwas

repeatedlycalledintoquestion .Thisiscom-

plicatedandcannotbeexaminedinanydetail

here .Onecriticofinternationalapproachesto

peacemakinginSriLankahasobserved:

In June 2003 donors pledged US $4.5

billion in reconstruction aid for the “en-

tire” country, but only the (unspecified)

amount destined for the war-shattered

northeast was made conditional on

“progress” in the peace process.

Outside these pledges, bilateral and

multilateral aid to the state continued…

By not recognising that rising violence

was a cycle of retaliation between army-

backed paramilitaries and the LTTE,

international actors denounced the

latter’s intransigence and saw the state

as tolerant and applied sanctions and

incentives accordingly. Indeed, LTTE

protests that violence was sustained by

ongoing state support for paramilitaries

in contravention of the CFA [Ceasefire

Agreement] were not taken seriously by

the international community until late

2006, long after the shadow war had

become open (if undeclared) war.114

114 Suthaharan Nadarajah, “Prejudice, asymmetry and insecurity,” Conciliation Resources, London, p. 1-2 (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/incentives/asymmetry.php).


OnelocalUNworkerrecalled:

There were lots of conditions for agen-

cies to work after the east was liber-

ated. That’s when the state saw how

far it could push. NGOs were told they

have to do provision of services and

not human rights work… If one agency

refuses to engage, another will go in.

That’s a problem.

AUNworkerwithprolongedexperienceof

thecountrysaidtheSriLankangovernmenthad

beenemboldenedbyinternationalquietude

overtheejectionoftheceasefiremonitoring

missioninJanuary2008:

We should have had a bigger protest

when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

was asked to leave [in January 2008].

They were monitoring the ceasefire.

Nobody did anything, and after a while

I think the Sri Lanka government got

very bold because nobody was stand-

ing up to them.

Thisthemeofemboldeningthegovern-

mentwastobeechoedbymanyofthosewe

spokewith .Certainly,thegovernmentfeltbold

enoughtoejecthumanitarianagenciesfromthe

northinSeptember2008(withtheexceptionof

ICRCandCARITAS) .Further,someaidworkers

sawtheinternationalcommunity’snear-silence

atthisexpulsionasgivinga“greenlight”tothe

escalationofwar .Askediftherewereprotests

frominfluentialinternationalgovernmentsat

theexpulsion,oneexperiencedUNworkersaid:

No, they [the government] have the

support of the Americans, the Pakista-

nis and the Indians for their strategy.

The Americans wanted to avoid civilian

casualties — they pushed to allow the

humanitarian corridors to go in, but

only to the extent that it did not conflict

with war objectives.

OneNGOworkerwhohadrecentlyarrived

inthecountryrecalledtheevacuation:

I was surprised and shocked it was

so easy. It took only a few days. Local

staff started working for the GA [Gov-

ernment Authority] as volunteers and

then civil servants. I don’t understand

why it was so easy to tell everyone

to leave. Some expats were really

upset at headquarters in Colombo,

saying they should have reacted in a

stronger way.

TheNGOworkeraddedthatgiventhe

fighting,itwouldhavebeenverydangerousto

stay,pointingoutthatclearlyidentifiablehos-

pitalshadbeenattacked .However,thefeeling

thatmorecouldhavebeendonetoprotestthe

expulsionswaswidespread .Anotheraidwork-

erwhohadbeenworkinginKilinochchisaid,

“InAugustandSeptember2008,bombswere

droppedfromplanesrightnextdoortoour

office .Wewerereallyangry .Thestatements

comingoutofColombowerecompletelyun-

helpful,includingOCHA/Colombo .”

TheevacuationofaidagenciesinSep-

tember2008wascompensated,toalimited

extent,bythecreationofaseriesofroadcon-

voysforrelief,butwehaveseenthatthese

didnotmeetthefullextentofhumanitarian

need,eveninlate2008 .After16January

2009,theconvoyswerenolongerpossible

becauseoftheescalatingwar .

OneUNaidworker,whilstverymindful

ofthedangersforaidagencyoperationsof

speakingouttoopubliclyorboldly,said:

There’s a different level of negotia-

tion that actually becomes begging.

There’s a need for stronger advocacy

at all levels. We say, “No, we can-

not be searched.” You protest, then

you accept. You are a Catholic and a

Protestant at the same time! First the

vehicles, then the staff, then the “big

guns” [visiting dignitaries].

OneUNaidworkersaid,“Thebullying

thathasgoneonherehasbeenabsolutely

incredible .Wehavecompromised .Historians


andacademicswillworkoutwhetheritwascor-

rect .”AthirdUNworkersaid:

There are very few opportunities to

look back and say “We confronted,

and it didn’t work.” We’re told we have

no leverage. I don’t know if that’s true.

It gets taken from us, and we accept.

It’s different from saying, “We tried

other strategies and they failed.” Over-

whelmingly, we decided at all costs to

stay engaged. It hasn’t worked. It hasn’t

helped us to protect IDPs and it hasn’t

helped us to get influence.

Theargumentthatspeakingoutcould

improvetheprotectionenvironmentwassup-

portedwithanexamplefromtheeast .OneUN

workerrecalled:

I was working in the east. There were

forced returns of refugees from Bat-

ticaloa to Trincomalee.115 UNHCR was

releasing protection information in a

very controlled way, in bed with the

government. People were getting

beaten onto buses, separated. Informa-

tion did get out there, for example via

OCHA, forcing UNHCR to come out

with a strong statement. From then on,

the way returns happened was so much

better, though there were still abuses.

WhenthereliefconvoysfromOctober

2008wereusedascoverforgovernment(and

LTTE)militaryoperations,thisseemstohave

drawnlittleornoprotest .Itappearsthatsilence

onthisissuewasseenasthepricetopayfor

gettingreliefdelivered .WhenIaskedanaid

workerwhohadtravelledwithseveralconvoys

whethertherehadbeenanyprotestsfromthe

UNatconvoysbeingusedformilitarycover,he

115 An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) report (“Sri Lanka Fact Sheet — Batticaloa District,” 22 March 2007) noted: “Despite Government assurances that all return movements will be voluntary, interagency monitoring reports indicate that heavy pressure has been applied on IDPs, including local authority statements that assistance will be stopped if they stay in Batticaloa.”

said,“TherewasnoprotestfromWFPbecause

theyknowtheLTTEisalsousingtheconvoys .”

Asecondaidworkerwhoalsohadexperience

ontheconvoyssaidgettingpermissionfor

theconvoyswasactuallydependentonthe

governmentbeingabletousethemmilitarily:

“Thegovernmentcannotgiveagreenlightif

theycannotensurethattheywillalsotakead-

vantage .”Objectionstotheconvoysfromboth

sidesreportedlyhelpedtocreateacontextin

whichmilitarymanipulationbybothsideswas

tacitlyaccepted .

WhenitcametoassistanceinVavuniya,

significantconcessionsonprincipleweremade .

Onesuchwasthedecisiontoworkatthe

governmentreliefvillageofManikFarm .One

aidworkersaidoftheSriLankangovernment:

“Theyareclever,it’sworking .Whatwerefused

threemonthago,we’renowaccepting .Manik

Farm,withaplantodetainfor3-5years,were-

fused,butnowwe’reworkingthere .”

Intervieweessaidtheboldnessofthe

governmentextendedtoejectingindividual

aidworkerswithoutgivingreasonsandtoat-

temptstoabolishthe“clustersystem”(asys-

temunderwhichdifferentagenciestakethe

leadonparticularactivitiesinaccordance

withtheirexpertise) .OneaidworkerinVavu-

niyacomplained:

They [the government] tried to abolish

the cluster system. They basically de-

cide what to do, and nobody stands up

to them. They play the PNG [persona

nongrata] game. Two CARE people

were just PNG’d, one had been in the

country for four years. They had a lot of

institutional memory. They [the govern-

ment] gave no reason.

Collectiveconcessionsonimportanthu-

manitarianprinciplesmaysendasignal,both

locallyandinternationally,thatemboldens

abusiveactorstostepuptheirmanipulationof

aid .Thesamemayapplytoaparallelmanipula-

tionoftruth .InSriLanka,severalaidworkers

expressedstronglytheviewthatthisprocess


wastakingplaceinthecountry .Onediplomat

stressedtheimportancetothegovernmentof

controllinginformationflows:

There are certain parameters — the

idea that you must not give in to inter-

national pressure to stop the war, which

partly has happened before. In the

1990s, there were so many human rights

violations in the counterinsurgency that

it limited the state’s ability to crush the

insurgency. A paradigm shift now, so

you use propaganda and state resourc-

es to get support for the war. You have

an organisation that can hold onto the

objective of finishing the business. The

army is not going to rebel — the Presi-

dent’s brother is in charge.

Wemaynoteherethatitisnotnecessarily

theabsenceofhumanrightsviolationsthatmay

“createspace”foreradicatingtheLTTEbutthe

absence—ornearabsence—ofinformation

ontheseviolations .

CommentingontheSriLankangovern-

ment’ssuccessinlobbyingfortherejectionof

acriticalresolutionattheUNHumanRights

CouncilinGenevaandfortheadoptionofa

complimentaryresolutionon27May2009,

SriLanka’sPermanentRepresentativetothe

UnitedNationsinGeneva,DrDayan

Jayatilleka,observed:

The attempt to hold a special session

of the HRC [UN Human Rights Council]

was on for four weeks. Those driving

the move wanted to hold it when the

war was on, and they pushed for it to

be held on May 14th. They wanted to

put the international brakes on our final

offensive. In short they wanted to save

the Tigers. We thwarted that exercise

and bought the time and space for our

armed forces to finish the job.116

116 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand up for you,” interview in Waani Operation, June 3 2009 [wannioperation.com].

Whereuntruthsarenotchallenged,thereis

alwaysthepossibilityofbuyingintothemorof

encouragingotherstobuyintothem .Oneaid

workermentionedarangeofissueswherehe

feltuntruthsneededtobechallenged:

When the BP-100 was locked up [the

vehicle transporti ng these high-energy

biscuits was detained at Medovach-

chiya], the government accused

UNICEF of feeding the Tigers to make

“Supertigers.” Is this not something to

stand up and refute?117 I feel like it’s got

progressively worse to the point where

[Defence Minister] Gotabaya Rajapakse

can say ridiculous things like not one

person has been killed in our “humani-

tarian operation.” We’ve made them

believe there is total impunity. They’ve

started to believe their own figures.

We’ve been saying it’s not 70,000 [the

total number of people in the Vanni]…

They are in trouble. The situation is go-

ing to get so bad.

Meanwhile,therewasconsiderableintimi-

dationofjournalists,andreportsonthewar

wereconsistentlypro-government .Constraints

onjournalismcertainlyinhibitednationaland

internationalunderstandingoftheunfolding

humanitariandisasterinthenorth .118

SomeNGOworkerscomplainedthatthey

hadhadtosignaMemorandumofUnderstand-

ing(MOU)withthegovernmentthatprevented

themfromspeakingpubliclyevenontheade-

quacyofreliefservicesthatwerebeingprovided .

Aidagencies’reluctancetospeakpublicly

onsensitiveissueshasevenextendedtowith-

117 A statement from the UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator noted, “The United Nations deplores that such life saving items, destined for severely malnourished children, were diverted from their intended purpose” (UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, “UN Sri Lanka Statement,” 10 March 2009, Colombo.)

118 On these, see for example International Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression Mission to Sri Lanka, 2008, “Media under fire: Press freedom lockout in Sri Lanka,” December (http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_sri_Lanka.pdf).


holdingtheresultsofnutritionalsurveys .(Natu-

rally,thesesurveysrepresentabasicfoundation

forassessingtheseverityofhumanitarianemer-

genciesandformatchingassistancetoneeds .)

LevelsofmalnutritionamongtheIDPsinVavuni-

yadoseemtohavebeensignificant .Onesurvey

ofsixcampsinearlyMarchbyDrRenukaJaya-

tissaofSriLanka’sMedicalResearchInstitute

foundthatmorethan25percentofchildren

underfiveweresufferingeithersevereormod-

eratewasting .119Accordingtoonereport,“Mal-

nutritionamongchildrenbelowtheageoffive

inMullaitivudistricthasreached25percent,the

highestintheisland .Theresultsarebelievedto

beindicativeofmalnutritionamongchildrenstill

strappedinthewarzone .”120Towardstheendof

April2009,oneseniorUNaidworkersaid:

The government is not very coopera-

tive on getting an objective baseline.

UNICEF did a nutritional assessment

more than a month ago, and when I ask

I am told “We’re still finalising and talk-

ing with the government.” We could

say we will not provide food unless we

can provide nutritional data with results

that can be public. They don’t want to

release nutritional data because they

don’t want to be accused of having

starved people inside the Vanni.

AnotherUNaidworkersaid:“Therearehigh

levelofmalnutrition,25percentamongIDPsin

Vavuniya .Thegovernmentwon’treleaseit[the

recentUNICEFsurvey] .Itwillbeusedinternally

byUNICEFfortheirbudget .”InSeptember

2009,OnelocalNGOworkercommented,“It’s

difficulttogetacurrentassessment[ofthenutri-

tionalsituation] .Weareworkingwiththehealth

ministry .Wehelpedcollectnutritionaldataand

119 Renuka Jayatissa, 2009, Rapid Assessment of Nutritional Status Among Displaced Population in Vavuniya, Medical Research Institute, Colombo.

120 AFP, “Quarter of displaced Sri Lankan children malnourished,” 11 April 2009, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 10.

sentittotheMinistryofHealth,andnowthey

arenotwillingtosharetheresultswithus .”

Alsocriticisedbyaidworkersinthefield

weretherelativelyweakprotests—atleastin

public—attheciviliancasualtiesresultingfrom

governmentshellingandaerialbombardment

duringtheintensifiedmilitarypushfromSep-

tember2008 .Thereweresomeprotestsfrom

variousofficials(asnotedabove),butmanyfelt

theyweretoolittleandtoolate .Thelackofpro-

testatchilddeathsresultingfromtheseraids

wascontrastedbysomeaidworkerswithwhat

theysawasamuchgreaterdegreeofpublic

protestofchildrecruitment(bytheLTTE) .One

UNworkerobserved:

There are probably more than 1,000

children killed in the war since Janu-

ary 2009. We don’t hear that. The

UN spoke on underage recruitment,

which was not verified, but not on child

deaths. It compromised our neutral-

ity a great deal… It was not helpful to

have the UN back away from casualty

figures, 4,500. If the UN speaks out on

this, it is only going to be embarrassed

by the scale of the error in the other

direction in a year’s time. It became

embarrassing for ICRC to come out

and speak about casualties because

no-one else would, so the UN said a

bit more… Our ability to verify that

[child recruitment] was much less than

our ability to verify child deaths. The

UN had names, addresses and eve-

rything… It was dragged into making

statements on child deaths.121

Over-optimisminrelationtogovernment

intentionshasbeenaprominentfeatureofUN

statementsinmanycrisesaroundtheworld,122

121 Statements on child deaths during the final stages of the war and on conditions in the government-run camps seem to have contributed to the expulsion of UNICEF’s James Elder by the Sri Lankan government in September 2009 (Randeep Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who criticised camps,” Guardian, 6 September 2009).

122 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.


andthissometimesextendedtothe“safe

zone”inMullaitivudistrict,SriLanka .Thewar

intheformerYugoslavia,ofcourse,suggests

everyreasontobescepticalaboutthesafetyof

zonesthataredeclaredtobe“safe .”Inthecase

ofSriLanka,theconceptofthe“safezone”was

oftenusedratheruncriticallybyaidagencies—

andwithoutinvertedcommas .123TheUNOffice

oftheResident/HumanitarianCoordinatorob-

servedon16February2009:“Whilethedesig-

nationofthenewsafezonehasprovidedsome

respiteforthetensofthousandsofcivilians

trappedforweeksbyheavyfightingwhichhas

killedandinjuredmanypeople,reportsfrom

yesterdayindicatethattherewassomefight-

inginsidethezone .”124Butiftherewasfighting

insidethezone,itisdifficulttoseehowitwas

providing“respite .”

HumanRightsWatchreportedinFebruary

2009,“Manyoftheciviliandeathsreportedin

pastmonthhaveoccurredinanareasthatthe

SriLankangovernmenthasdeclaredtobea

‘safezone .’”125TheInternationalCrisisGroupre-

portedon9March2009that“governmentforc-

eswereshellingcivilianareas,includinginthe

no-firezonewhichithadunilaterallydeclared,

withoutanysignificantpause…Whilethey[an

estimated150,000IDPs]aremostlyinornear

thegovernment-declared“nofirezone”along

thecoast,thegovernmentitselfhasshelledthat

zonedaily .”126USAIDnoted,“Satelliteimagery

takenduringthemonthofMarchindicated

extensiveshellingoccurringinandaroundthe

no-firezone .”127

123 For example, a WFP press release noted on 27 February 2009: “… most displaced persons are now concentrated in a new safe zone along the eastern coastline of Mullaitivu district (WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009).

124 UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, Sri Lanka, “UN Sri Lanka statement,” 19 February 2009.


126 ICG, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” 9 March 2009.

127 USAID, “Complex Emergency Fact Sheet no. 4,” 10 April 2009, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 5.

Bymid-March,theUNOfficeoftheHigh

CommissionerforHumanRightswassaying

thatarangeofcrediblesourcesindicatedmore

than2,800civilianshadbeenkilledsince20

January,128andbyAprilthisfigurehadrisento

6,432 .129TheICG’sGarethEvansnotedon1

May2009:

Despite the government’s April 2 an-

nouncement that the military had been

ordered to cease using air attacks, artil-

lery, and other heavy weapons against

remaining LTTE-held areas, such at-

tacks have carried on with increasing

intensity…the government has default-

ed on its promises and paid mere lip

service to calls for restraint, all the while

pursuing its military onslaught.130

Itisimportanttorememberthecontext

inwhichtheSriLankangovernmentwastrying

(successfully)topreventcondemnationofgov-

ernmentactionsinboththeUNSecurityCoun-

cilandtheUNHumanRightsCouncil .

Ifthe“safezone”wasnotsafe,anotherdif-

ficultywiththeconceptofasafezone—anda

furtherreasonnottoadoptthetermuncritically

—isthattheconceptmaybeusedtoindicate

orimplythatciviliansoutsidethiszonehaveno

righttosafety .AMinistryofDefencestatement

of2February2009isrevealinghere:

While the Security Forces accept all

responsibility to ensure the safety and

protection of civilians in the Safety

Zones, they are unable to give such

an assurance to those who remain

outside these zones. Therefore, the

government, with full responsibil-

128 OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN), 13 March 2009, cited in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 5-6.

129 AP, “UN says nearly 6,500 civilians killed in Sri Lanka,” 24 April 2009, cited in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 5-6.

130 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy (ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).


ity, urges all civilians to come to the

Safety Zones; and also states that as

civilians who do not heed this call will

be among LTTE cadres, the Security

Forces will not be able to accept re-

sponsibility for their safety.131

Someaidworkersperceivedahighdegree

ofindifferencetocivilianwelfareonthepartof

thegovernment .OneUNworkersuggested:

“InKilinochchi,thegovernmentwasnotcaring

aboutciviliansorevenhumanitarianworkers .

TwiceourofficewasbombedbecauseLTTEof-

ficeswerenearby .Iftheykill100civiliansforone

LTTE,theywillsayit’sasuccess .”

Manysawadvocacyastoocautious .An-

otherUNworkercommented:

A figure of 2,500 civilian deaths in the

no fire zone — we got Tamil press fig-

ures checked against health workers’

figures. But the humanitarian coordina-

tor, under pressure, said he can’t verify

the figures. It’s probably over 4,000

already a few months back. But a state-

ment about child recruitment came

from UNICEF and it makes the govern-

ment happy.

Advocacy and “Counter-Advocacy”Cautiononpublicisingcasualtyfigures

seemstohavereflected,inpart,thegovern-

ment’sdeterminationtochallengeanyuncom-

fortabledata .AsoneUNworkernoted:

Opportunities for leverage are very

small. Data is seen as key, but you can

always turn it round and question the

sources. Sometimes data can backfire,

as when a WFP guy said the situation

was worse than Somalia.132 If you ex-

pose the casualty figures, it can raise

131 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” February.

132 It appears that a WFP representative in the north said on BBC Sinhala news service that the situation was as bad as Somalia; WFP later issued an apology.

the alarm but it can also backfire, un-

less you can back it up 100 per cent of

the way. There’s a process of counter-

claim and counter-counterclaim and

then people get bored of it — and

that’s part of the strategy.

Ingeneral,aidagencies—whetherinthe

UNsystemorNGOs—appearedverymuch

onthedefensiveinacontextwhereanyaction

couldeasilybeturnedagainstthem,notablyin

amediasubjecttoextremegovernmentcon-

trol .Onseveraloccasions,humanitarianorgani-

sationshavebeendepictedbytheSriLankan

governmentandintheSriLankanmediaasun-

derminingthefightagainstterrorismbylending

supporttoanegotiatedsettlementor,inthe

caseofseveralaidagencies,aslendingdirect

materialsupporttotherebelLTTE .

Someofthemorechaoticelementsinthe

aidagencies’responsetotheTsunamiseem

tohavecontributedtothedeepsuspicionof

NGOs .133Certainly,therewasasenseofwant-

ingtoavoidaccusationsofworkingagainstthe

government .OneNGOworkercommented:

At the national level, we are working

with IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Com-

mittee], now the humanitarian team,

Vanni group, CHA [Consortium of Hu-

manitarian Agencies]. We coordinate

with each other. It’s become very hard.

We had what was called “the coffee

club.” The reason it was called that was

to demonstrate informality of NGOs

working in the north. After the Tsunami,

it was whittled away but then became

quite important again. It makes its way

to the media, seen as elitist, a “crème

de la crème” international NGOs group

scheming against the government.

Inacontextwheremanyinternational

agencieshavebeenwaryofbeingseentosup-

133 On the Tsunami response, see in particular Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2006, “Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.”


portalong-termresettlementscheme,some

officialswereabletomakeaccusationsofpro-

vidinginadequateassistanceorpreferringtents

tomoresolidstructures .AsoneUNworker

noted:“ThegovernmentsaysManikFarm,this

iswhatwe’reproviding .Whatareyouprovid-

ing?It’ssoeasytoturnitonitshead .”

NGOshavebeenpubliclytakentotask,

andmajordonorshavenotbeensparedharsh

criticismsfromgovernmentofficials .UNICEF

wasaccusedofsupplyinghigh-energybiscuits

toLTTEterrorists .OCHAcameundersome

strongpressurefromthegovernment,inline

withpatternselsewhere(includingDarfur) .One

senioraidofficialnoted:

The government has really taken on the

NGOs, castigating them. It’s front-page

news if any aid agency vehicle is found

to be used by the LTTE, or equipment

donated. NGOs have been browbeat-

en and scared and some were asked to

leave. But the government is also quite

ruthless with donors — the German

ambassador, the Norwegian ambas-

sador, the [Sri Lankan] Foreign Ministry

has done dressing down sessions.

Onediplomatrecalled:

An underlying theme is the feeling

that international NGOs in the north

and east have been tools of the LTTE.

The LTTE decided who could work

where and there were LTTE people

inside the NGOs, and this is partly cor-

rect because the international NGOs

needed some kind of understanding

with the LTTE. The government fright-

ens, singles out organisations and

individuals — for example, UNICEF,

Norway, the US — depending on the

issue. It’s craftily and skilfully done and

they avoid collective efforts on various

issues. Another technique is to start

with very extreme demands and shake

up what’s possible. The proposed

MoU [Memorandum of Understanding]

agreement, for example, you shift your

perception of what is possible. If you

get a compromise, it can still be quite

harsh and obstructive.

Somedefendedamorecautiousapproach,

butatthesametimestillstressedthegovern-

ment’sextremesensitivitytocriticism .Forex-

ample,aseniorNGOworkersaid:

UNHCR has quite a lot of influence,

from experience in the east. Negotia-

tions here can’t be done on the basis

of demands. It was something UNHCR

learned in the east, making demands

for IDPs in the east and the government

just shoots it down. These lessons are

embodied in the aide memoire and

guidance notes for the north. The gov-

ernment has genuine concerns around

security… It’s about picking your battles.

The government is incredibly sensi-

tive about being criticised and losing

face. Any criticism and the government

just turns it round and blames some-

one else… One helpful thing is the

UNHCR scorecard, part of an ongoing

evaluation. What’s good is it’s saying to

government, “These are what we have

achieved and this is the gap that still

remains.” With protection, the space

for negotiation is a lot slimmer. The

most success in terms of negotiation is

less formal and public. Anything that’s

thrown out publicly, the government will

react in a certain way. The JVP, JHU, NFF

[National Freedom Front], the national-

ist groups, can criticise the government.

The government had to rely on their

support to win the last election… The

government doesn’t like it when, in their

words, we go running to our ambassa-

dors and chase up on issues… It’s about

being sparing with your political capital,

for example if the ambassador is running

to the government every time there’s a

problem, it becomes ineffective.


Astrongimpulsetodefendnationalsov-

ereignty(andinparticulartheinfluenceofvo-

ciferousSinhalesenationalistparties)wasseen

ascreatingparticulardifficultieswhenexerting

internationalpressure .Asonediplomatputit:

“Normalrestrictionsonabuseincludewhen

officialsliketohavefriendsabroad,visasto

NorthAmericaandEurope .Buthereit’sthe

reverse .Themoreyoubashtheinternational

community,themorevotesyouget .”Whilst

mostintervieweesstressedthegovernment’s

sensitivity,manyfelttherewasstillsignificant

leverage .Forexample,oneacademicstressed

tomethevalueplacedbymanypoliticiansin

SriLankaonhavingaccesstoeducationaland

healthservicesinEurope .

TheNGOworkerwhostressedtheim-

portanceof“pickingyourbattles”alsoem-

phasisedtheimportanceofnotdisruptingthe

effortsoflocalNGOs:

There are tensions between interna-

tional and national NGOs. There are

some very well established entities in

this country. Some local NGOs have

very good connections to top leaders

and in international organisations we

tend to go like a bull in a china shop

— and when national agencies are

trying to negotiate, it becomes dif-

ficult for them when the internationals

rush in.

Advocacy and Interests/IncentivesIfprioritisingdeliveryoveradvocacywas

oftenseenascontributingtotheshrinkageof

humanitarianspace,weneedalsotoconsider

thepossibilitythatthisprioritywasshaped

notjustbyaconcerntodeliverhumanitarian

aidbutbyvariouskindsofself-interest .At

theindividuallevel,theseincludeconcernfor

personalsafetyandforone’scareer .There

areimportantorganisationalinterests .These

appearstohavehadsomeinfluenceinde-pri-

oritisingprotectioninmanycrisesaroundthe

world(ashavegeopoliticalconcerns,consid-

eredbelow);SriLankaisnotanexception .

Fearisamajorreasonforsilenceonkey

issues .OneUNworkerputthesefearsvery

bluntly:“Anyonewhospeaksupgetsabulletin

thehead .Aidworkershere,thereare49dead

andtwomoreunaccountedfor .SriLankaisthe

mostdangerousplaceintheworldforaidwork-

ers .”AnInternationalDisplacementMonitoring

Centrereportnotedthat“Atleast63national

staff[ofhumanitarianagencies]arebelievedto

havebeenkilledbetween2006and2008,while

otherformsofviolencehaveincludedstaff

abductions .”134Totheextentthatkeepingquiet

islinkedtoconcernforsafety,itunderlines

theneedfortheinternationalcommunityto

pushhardontheinvestigationofviolenceand

threatsagainstaidworkers .Theuseofparamili-

tariesmakesthisharderbutdoesnottakeaway

fromtheurgencyoftracingresponsibility .

PartoftheclimateofintimidationinSriLan-

kahasbeenafearofbeingexpelledfromthe

countryasapersona non grata.Suchexpulsions

caninhibitthecapacityofaidagenciesandmay

makelifemoredifficultforaidstaffleftbehind .

OneseniorUNworkersaid,“PNGmakesit

harderfortheagencyasawhole .”Thus,avoid-

ingsuchanexpulsioncanbedefendedonthe

groundsofprioritisingdelivery .However,some

intervieweesalsosuggestedthataidstaffwere

worriedabouttheirindividualcareers,andthat

arecordofbeingPNG’dmightinpracticehold

themback .OneUNworkersaid,“FearofPNG

shouldnotbedrivingourresponse,”adding

thattheUNshouldbemakingclearthatbeing

PNG’dinSriLanka(orsimilarcontexts)would

notadverselyaffectone’scareer .Anaffinity

forSriLankaasaplacetolivewasseenasan-

otherfactorthathadsometimeskeptadvocacy

withincertainbounds .Onediplomatremarked:

“InternationalNGOstaffhavekidsatschools,

andtheylikethiscountry .Theygetmoneyfrom

Westerndonorsandthegovernmentknows

theycanpushpeoplebecausetheyliketostay



here .”InSeptember2009,theSriLankangov-

ernmentexpelledJamesElder,headofcom-

municationsforUNICEFinthecountryafterhe

expressedconcernsforTamilsinthegovern-

ment-runcamps .Elderhadearlierspokenofthe

“unimaginablehell”sufferedbychildreninthe

laststagesofthewar .135

Organisationalincentivesareimportant

too .Foraidagencies,theremayalsobesignifi-

cantfinancialadvantagesinbeingseentobe

presentinaprominentemergency—perhaps

particularlyinthecontextofwhatoneaidwork-

erreferredtowrylyasthecurrent“shortage”

ofinternationalhumanitariancrises .Aidagen-

ciesmayarguethattheyneedtoraisefunding

iftheyaretobeinapositiontodoanygood;

whilethisargumentclearlycontainsadegreeof

truth,italsorunstheriskofinvitingthepursuit

ofaccessatanycost .

Thewaythatfearandmoremundanemo-

tivationscouldfeedintoadvocacyfailureswas

summedupbyonenationalaidworker:

In many places [within Sri Lanka], the

international community fails to raise

their voices. One reason is working

permits will be cancelled or they will be

named a “white tiger” [that is, a white

supporter of the LTTE rebels]. Plus,

everyone is hunting for bread [money].

Inlinewithsomelongstandingcriticisms

ofhumanitarianaid,136somesawtheincentives

withinaidorganisationsasgearedprimarilyto-

135 Randeep Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who criticised camps,” Guardian, September 6 2009.

136 Randolph Kent and Ken Wilson have both stressed how a concern with organisational health and growth can create a bias towards measurable and visible solutions to measurable and visible problems, including a bias towards shifting physical commodities to people once they have become thin in environments that can be easily monitored and publicised. See, for example, Randolph Kent, 1987, Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action. London: Pinter Publishers; Ken Wilson, 1992. “A State of the Art Review of Research on Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique.” Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority; David Keen and Ken Wilson, 1994, “Engaging with violence,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, London: Zed Books and Save the Children, UK.

wardstangibleandmeasurableoutputsrather

thanco-ordinationorprotection,whicharemore

difficulttomeasureandusuallymorepolitically

sensitive .Forexample,oneUNworkernoted:

Theincentiveistokeepyourheaddown,

doyourjob,putyourtentsup,deliveryour

food .Output-basedindicatorscanbeaprob-

lemhere,andallthereportinglinesareup-

wards .Thereareveryfewincentivestodothe

coordinatingmeetings .Itbecomesan“addon”

—abitliketraining .

SomefeltthatthisappliedstronglytoWFP .

OneseniorWFPstaffmembersaid,“There’s

ahugeproblemwithourfinancingpractices .

We’refundedthroughapercentageofthe

tonnagewedeliver .Youkeepthesub-office

openthroughacertainamountoftonnage—

whetherit’spurchasedinternationally,locally,or

comesinkind .”

Advocacy and the Geopolitical ContextAsforthegeopoliticalcontext,aUN

workersaidofthemilitarycampaignfrom2006,

“There’sneverbeenaseriousinternationalop-

positiontothewar .”OneUNaidsuggested:

The only leverage is much higher up.

I don’t think we’ve been clever in ne-

gotiating… I don’t think anyone thinks

Sri Lanka is important. You just have to

compare injuries and deaths to Gaza.

It’s been a forgotten catastrophe,

partly because of the restrictions on

journalism. But if it was seen as impor-

tant, the journalists would have been

pressing to come and have access.

AlocalNGOworkercommentedinSep-

tember2009:

We do not know what the WFP/UN

policy is on these new camps… In

terms of advocacy, I think the UN as a

whole should take a tougher stand at

Headquarters level and continue to

express its displeasure over the contin-

ued detention of IDPs… This can’t go

on — it’s against international law and


everything else. On your own, individual

agencies can’t do much advocacy. The

government is very strong and popular

and controls the media… The sad real-

ity is that larger geo-political realities

(China, India, Pakistan, Iran) give the

government of Sri Lanka unprecedented

freedom to act with impunity and disre-

gard international humanitarian law.

ALocalUNworkercommented:

There is value in using the human rights

framework, including the Supreme

Court. UN agencies and the humanitar-

ian community need a common posi-

tion. There’s been no common position

on when emergency funding should end

or whether to support the centres hous-

ing ex-combatants… The problem is not

having a coherent stand on an issue and

not coordinating with the UN stance as a

whole. If the state knows it can play one

agency off against another, what’s the

leverage?... Within agencies, I don’t think

there is a push for a common stand.”

Somewhatsimilarly,alocalNGO

workersaid:

The UN Resident Representative wasn’t

able to get a common position on Manic

Farm from a human rights framework.

There has to be a lead from the UN

Resident Representative and his team,

supported by New York and Geneva…

There’ve been a lot of missions — John

Holmes, Walter Kaelin, but have they

really made a difference?... Many do

not realise that by funding internment

camps, you are violating national laws.”

ItwasstressedtousthattheUNCountry

Teambroughtseveralprotectionconcernsto

thenoticeofthegovernmentbothinwriting

andorally—andattimesthroughthemedia .

Butmanyalsofelttheseeffortswereweak .The

internationalgeopoliticalcontextisimportant

inshapingwhatactionsaCountryTeamcanand

cannottake,andherecircumstanceswerepar-

ticularlyunhelpful .

WhenSriLankahasnotbeenforgotten,it

hasoftenbeenseenaspursuingauseful“war

onterror .”Particularlyimportantinsettingthe

contextforrepeatedconcessionstotheSri

Lankangovernmenthasbeenthegovernment’s

successinpositioningthewaragainsttheLTTE

withinamoregeneralframeworkofaglobal

“waronterror .”BoththeUSandtheEuropean

CommissionhavedeclaredtheLTTEaterrorist

group .Asoneaidworkerputit,“Allthewestern

countrieshavesaidtheLTTEisaterroristgroup,

soyoucan’tbackupandsayit’snotreallya

terroristgroup .”AnNGOworkercommented:

“Thegovernmenthasplayedasmuchasitcan

ontheglobalwaronterror,butalsoatthesame

timetheyusethedefencethatthisisapurely

nationalproblem,notanissuethathasinterna-

tionalimplications .”

Itisnotablethatwhilethe“waronter-

ror”frameworkplayswellwithmanyWestern

governments,atthesametimetheSriLankan

governmenthasexplicitlyaligneditselfwiththe

Non-AlignedMovement(andRussiaandChina)

andhasportrayeditselfasstandingupforna-

tionalsovereigntyandstandinguptotheWest

andthedecliningcolonialcountriesofEurope .

NorhasacceptanceoftheWest’s“waronter-

ror”beenunconditional .Askedaboutmedia

allegationsofabusesinthecamps,SriLanka’s

PermanentRepresentativetotheUNinGeneva

DrDayaJayatillekareplied:

… anyone who has read Noam Chom-

sky on Kosovo will know the pernicious

role played by sections of the western

media in artificially creating the im-

pression of a humanitarian crisis which

provided the smokescreen for interven-

tion. These media you speak of are the

very same that tried to convince the

world that Iraq possessed weapons of

mass destruction!137

137 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand up for you,” interview in Waani Operation, 3 June 2009 [wannioperation.com].


Whilstthestrengthsandweaknessesof

diplomaticinitiativeshavenotbeenaprimary

focusofthisreport,someofthoseconsulted

wereclosetodiscussionsinNewYork,andthey

suggestedthatmostpowerfulgovernments

wantedtogettheconflictoverasquicklyas

possible .Thisseemstohavesetthecontextfor

statementsandsilencesfromUNofficials .Also

influential,itappears,weretheprospectofco-

operatingwiththegovernmentonreconstruc-

tionandthedesiretoavoidbeingejectedfrom

SriLanka .

WhenitcametotheleverageofWFPin

particular,somestressedthatthemajorprotec-

tionresponsibilitiestraditionallyliewithUNHCR

andICRC .However,onemajordonorrepre-

sentativecommented:

It’s mainstream to say humanitarian

actors have no leverage. I disagree.

They are implementing operations and

have advocacy tools and mandates.

WFP is not known for its large advo-

cacy approach. But it’s part of the UN

family. We see WFP not as a technical

implementer of food on behalf of the

government, which is taking credit for

it and winning elections, but the PRRO

[Protracted Relief and Recovery Opera-

tion], which is currently running for two

years, is a non-adequate instrument to

deal with the current humanitarian cri-

sis. We’ve told WFP this since October

2007. You have a mandate, you’re part

of a family. You cannot reduce your-

self to logistics! We understand the

humanitarian imperative of bringing in

the food now overrules. But from the

beginning, there were problems of ac-

cess and insufficient attempts to moni-

tor and control distribution because

the government said “We’ll take care

of it.”… The system did not work before

the influx [the mass influx into Vavu-

niya]. The system was not functioning

before… The government continues to

use the argument, “It’s under the PRRO

and we distribute.” They’ve used this

politically to say, “‘We did the distribu-

tion.”… We need to keep emergency

at three months. WFP is raising money

for 20 months for the emergency under

the PRRO, saying it ensures the pipe-

line. But this is too long.

HesaidEMOPwouldbeamoreappropri-

atevehicleforWFPassistancethanthe

PRRO .OneexperiencedUNworkerdisagreed

withthis:

If we had an EMOP [Emergency Op-

erations Programme], you would still

have to work with the government. A

PRRO allows you multi-year flexibility.

You’re not confined to 12 months. If

conflict re-escalates, you can switch to

relief mode, you don’t have to go back

for an EMOP.

Thedonorrepresentativewhostressedthat

WFPwas“partofafamily”wentontosuggest

thatadvocacyhadbeeninadequateoverapro-

longedperiod:

There is New York. There are other

levels [of the UN]. We have reacted a

bit late. In late 2008, the government

didn’t want assistance in the Vanni.

They saw it as interfering with the war

operation. The humanitarian commu-

nity was ordered out of Vanni. WFP was

allowed, not others… Then we asked,

“Would you consider international

monitors.” The first reaction was “no,”

and then “yes.” Just before he left [that

is before leaving his post as WFP coun-

try director], [Mohamed] Saleheen felt

bold to push hard [in relation to

the convoys].

Aperceivedlackofopennessaboutthein-

adequatequantitiesoffoodreachingthenorth

wasseenasasignificantproblem .OneUNaid

workersaid:

The MOU [Memorandum of Under-

standing] with the government left


WFP in a difficult situation. WFP was

not making a fuss about the fact that

the food going into the Vanni was not

sufficient. From February 2008 was

probably the last time a full ration

went in for the IDPs. It was probably

around 50 per cent after that. It was

kept a secret. It was felt that a better

fuss might jeopardise the food that

was going in.

Somereportsdidnotesecurityobstacles

toreliefbutthewaythiswasexpressedwas

usuallyfairlygeneral .Thus,aJune2007WFP

reportnoted,“Securityconcerns,logistical

constraintsandlackofaccesshaverestricted

foodassistancebymorethan50percentover

thelastninemonths .”138Notuncommonwas

theattempttopreserveanimageofgovern-

mentalgoodintentionseveninthefaceof

evidencetothecontrary .Thusone2007WFP

reportnoted:

Although the government is trying

to maintain a normal level of health

services in the conflict affected areas

in the North and East, this can not be

achieved due to the destruction of

health facilities in a number of areas

and the lack of qualified medical per-

sonnel. Virtually everyone in the Vanni

area suffers form inadequate medical

and educational services due to the

conflict-imposed embargo.139

AccordingtoHumanRightsWatch:

At a December 10, 2008, Inter-Agen-

cies Standing Committee (IASC) meet-

ing, WFP officials estimated that the

food deliveries into the Vanni since the

September 2008 withdrawal had been

38 percent below the minimum nutri-

138 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 38.

139 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 37.

tional requirements, but this estimate

was based on an estimate of 200,000

IDPs, which is lower than the 230,000

number used by other UN agencies,

and also uses the date of the first con-

voy, October 2, as the starting date for

its needs assessment, ignoring the fact

that no food deliveries were made in

September. Because of this, the WFP

figures underestimate the actual food

shortcomings in the Vanni.140

AnOctober2008WFPreportnoted

that,“WFP’sassessments…indicatethatcur-

rentWFPactivitieshavelargelyachievedthe

goalsofmaintaininggoodnutritionalintake

andpreventingmalnutritionratesamong

beneficiaries .”141However,thisstatementsits

oddlywithastatementonpage5ofthesame

report:“Malnutritionlevelsamongchildren

under5arehigh,especiallyinthemainconflict

areasofthenorthandeast,where40percentof

childrenareunderweight,31percentarestunt-

edand28percentsufferfromwasting .”What

reconcilesthetwostatementsisthereference

inthemoreoptimisticstatementtomalnutri-

tionrates“among beneficiaries” (thatis,among

thosewhohavereceivedfood) .Onpage9,

thisisexplainedfurther:“…malnutritionrates

amongbeneficiarypopulationshaveremained

stable,whiletheyincreasedinunassistedcon-

flict-affectedhouseholds .”

Thehumanitarianarmsofmajordonor

bilateralorganisationsandgovernmentsfre-

quentlycompetewithotherarmsofgovern-

ment,whichmayputcommercialorgeopolitical

aimsaheadofhumanitariangoals .Inthese

circumstances,agreaterdegreeofopenness

withintheUNsystemofferstheprospectof

strengtheningtheargumentsandthepersua-

140 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 28. Human Rights Watch (p. 27) acknowledges some food stocks in the Vanni at the time the government ordered the humanitarian withdrawal.

141 WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 3.


sivenessofthosewithmorehumanitarianman-

datesandagendas .Inlinewithotheremphases

onalackofopennessintheUNsystem,one

representativeofamajordonorcommented:

We need from our UN partners trans-

parency, admitting there are obstacles

and problems. The system as pre-

sented on paper is not the reality. It’s

not helpful if these elements remain

hidden — the protection environment,

problems of distribution.

Weneedtoconsiderthepossibilitythatin

theabsenceofapoliticalwilltocounteractthe

“end-game”againsttheLTTE,emphasisingthe

provisionofhumanitarianaidratherthanthe

provisionofprotectionservedasaconvenient

wayofdemonstrating(notleasttoWestern

constituencies)that“somethingwasbeing

done .”Certainly,thereareprecedentsforthis,

themostnotoriousexamplebeinginternational

inactionoverthe1994Rwandangenocideand

thesubsequenthigh-profilehumanitarianas-

sistanceforRwandansinZaire/DRCandTanza-

nia .inhisbookonwarintheformerYugoslavia

(withtheironictitleofLoveThyNeighbour),

PeterMaassexpressedacommonsenseofbe-

trayalarisingfromtheneglectoffundamental

securityissues:

What, [the Bosnians] asked, was the

point in feeding us but not protecting

us? So we can die on a full stomach?

There was much truth to this: the main

humanitarian problem in Sarajevo was

not a lack of decent food but a surplus

of incoming shells.142

AnotherrelevantcaseisSudan—overa

longperiod .Asearlyasthe1980s,protection

issueswereconsistentlyneglectedinfavour

ofafocusonhumanitarianrelief;143in2004

142 Maass, Peter, 1996, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War, London and Basingstoke: Papermac, p. 30.

143 See, for example, David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press).

theInternationalCrisisGroupnoted,“The

U .S .isstillfixatedongettinghumanitarian

workersintoDarfur,aworthybutinsufficient

objective .”144InthecaseofSierraLeone,

theinternationalcommunitylargelyturned

a“blind-eye”toabusesbySierraLeonean

governmentforcesintheearly-tomid-1990s

whentheemphasis,onceagain,wasoninter-

veningthrough“humanitarianaid”;thisform

ofinterventionseemstohaveservedasasub-

stituteforvigorousdiplomaticintervention .

Moregenerally,MarkDuffieldhasobserved

thatwiththeendoftheColdWartherewas

adropindiplomaticinterestinmanypartsof

theworldandhumanitarianagencieswere

encouragedtostepintothevacuumleftby

thisdiplomaticwithdrawal .Someaidworkers,

forexampleinAfghanistan,sawthemselvesas

legitimisingthiswithdrawal .145

WhilstmostofthoseinterviewedinSri

Lankaviewedhumanitarianaidasasincere

attempttohelp(ratherthanacynicalattempt

toshowthat“somethingwasbeingdone”),

manyneverthelessadheredtotheviewthat,

forcomplexandsometimesself-interested

reasons,anexcessiveproportionoftheinter-

nationalcommunity’stimeandenergywasput

intodeliverycomparedtoprotection .

Thereislittledoubtthatthereliefconvoys

fromOctober2008wereamajorprioritywithin

theUNsystemandamongthediplomatic

community .Oneaidworkerwithexperience

onthereliefconvoysremembered,“Allthe

convoyswereveryimportant .Therewaspoliti-

calpressurefromthe[UN]SecretaryGeneral .”

OneUNworkerinColombosaid:“Therewas

abigdiplomaticpushontheconvoy,ahuge

energyinvestment .”Isuggestedthatthiswas

notabadthinginitself,butperhapstherewas

onlysomuchenergytogoround?Hereplied,

“Yes,andcompetencytoo .”

144 ICG, 2004, “Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur,” p. 13.

145 Mark Duffield, 2001, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books. Michael Ignantieff noted this perception in Afghanistan in his 1998 book The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, New York: Henry Holt.


Obstructionstoaiddeliveryandabuses

againstaidstaffmayalsoserveafunctioninab-

sorbingtimeandenergythatmightotherwise

bedevotedtoadvocacyandprotectionmore

generally .TheWFPcountryrepresentativein

SriLankawashavingtoputagooddealofen-

ergyintopushingfortherelaxationofsecurity

measuresforUNstaffatcheckpointsaswellas

fortheearlyreleaseofUNstaffanddepend-

entsfromIDPcentres .146Asimilarprocessof

absorbingvaluableenergieshasbeennotable

elsewhere,forexampleinSudan .147

Advocacymayalsohavebeenimpeded

by“pipeline”issues .AWFPreportonreliefin

2008noted,“…thepipelinefacedcriticalshort-

fallsinearly2008duetohighfoodprices .”148

WhenWFPdidnothaveenoughfoodavailable

forrelief,thiscomplicatedtheattributionof

responsibilityforlackofdistributions,provid-

ingsomethingofan“alibi”forgovernment-led

obstruction .InsofarasWFP’sownsupplyprob-

lemswerecontributingtolowdistributions,

itwasalsoclearlyharderforWFPtopointthe

fingeratthegovernment .Insofarassupply

shortagesencouragemore“targeting”tothe

neediestareas,WFPbecomesmorevulnerable

togovernmentaccusationsof“bias,”forexam-

pleinfavourofthenorth .

Advocacy and LeverageWhenitcametoadvocacyandpushing

forimprovementsinprotection,onesourceof

leveragewasseentoliepreciselyinthegovern-

ment’sextremesensitivitytocriticalorinconven-

ientinformation .AsoneUNworkernoted:“The

stateisconcernedaboutitsinternationalrepu-

tation .Otherwise,youdon’tcontrolinformation

andjournaliststotheextentthattheydo .”

Thegovernmentseemstohavehadasen-

sitivitytoanyaccusationofcreatinghunger,and

certainlyinneighbouringIndiaanysuggestion

146 WFP, Internal situation report, 27 March 2009, p. 1.

147 Aid workers in Darfur have stressed how bureaucratic obstructions took time and attention from a range of other issues, notably protection issues.

148 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1.”

ofa“famine”isconsideredamajorpolitical

threattoincumbentpoliticians .149OneUNaid

workernoted:“FromAtoZ,thegovernment

controlsallthelogisticsofWFP .Thegovern-

mentisabitafraidofhumanitariangroups

jumpingonthemandsaying‘You’remaking

hunger .’”OneseniorUNworkersuggested:

“Thegovernmentrealisedearlyonthatthey

didn’twantanoutrightfood-basedhumanitar-

iansituation .Thegovernmentwaskeenfood

goesintoKilinochchiandMullativu .”Thefact

thatthegovernmentorganisedsomeconvoys

ofitsownalsosuggestsadegreeofdesireto

getreliefthrough .Foodongovernmentcon-

voyswassoldinthemarketatlowprices .Anaid

workerwhotravelledwithsomeoftheconvoys

said:“TheLTTEwantedconvoysbecauseit

wantedfoodforpeople—andthegovernment

doesn’twanttobethevillain .”150

SeveralintervieweesstressedthatWFP’s

resourceswerevaluabletotheSriLankangov-

ernment,andthatthisimpliedsomesignificant

degreeofleverage(includingonprotection

issues) .OneUNworkercommented:

From a protection perspective, WFP

needs to be fully in the protection dia-

logue in Colombo. They do come to

meetings, but we need more action on

food from a rights perspective… Food,

it’s been pushed very hard, with hours

of negotiating, including senior diplo-

mats in Colombo. So it’s isolated from

other humanitarian issues, and from

protection issues in particular. There is

scope to use the issue of food more in

terms of pressuring the government.

The government is entirely reliant on a

149 See, for example, Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: James Currey.

150 While there does seem to have been a desire on the government’s part to use food to influence population movements, one senior UN worker felt there was an awareness that food was not the only factor here: “Yes, the military probably would say ‘Separate the civilians and use food aid’, and they put a lot of obstacles in our way. But there was also some recognition that civilian movements were also being shaped by the LTTE, so it was not all about food.”


daily basis on the international food…

They’ve needed WFP since day one.

Adoptingasimilaremphasisontheim-

portanceofWFPadoptingaclearprotection

role,anNGOworkersuggested:“WFPcanplay

akeyroleinfreedomofmovement .Itcando

morethanNGOs,maybegoingfortimelines—

forexample,inrelationtoscreening .”Alocal

NGOworkersaid,“WFPcouldlobbyformore

freedomofmovementifit’sdoneinasensitive

way .”AnotherlocalNGOworkercautioned:

Protection is a very sensitive thing. It

should be taken over by UNHCR, that’s

their mandate. WFP is a service organi-

sation. They shouldn’t take protection

as a main them, but as a cross-cutting

issue. If WFP takes that as one theme,

the government will listen and talk. If

they [WFP] emphasise protection too

much, the government can react.

Inlinewiththeviewthatthegovernment

neededWFP,oneexperiencedUNworkerob-

served,“Economically,thegovernmentwasn’t

fittorespondtotheemergencyneeds .”When

IsuggestedthattheSriLankangovernment

wasneitherparticularlypoornorparticularly

desperateforinternationalassistance,one

UNworkerreplied:“Inaway,theyaredesper-

ate .Theycan’tfeedthem[theIDPs],theycan’t

housethem .”AnotherUNworkerechoedthis

analysis:“Governmentmoneyisrunningout .

Theyarenotpayingsalariesincertainminis-

tries .It’sgivenusmorebargainingpowerin

relationtothegovernment .Theycan’taffordto

lookaftertheIDPs .”AnotherUNworker,aSri

Lankannational,said:“Idon’tthinkthegovern-

mentwouldsaygoawaycompletely,because

theycan’tfeedhundredsofthousandsofpeo-

ple .WFPgives70percentplusofthefood .If

that’snotleverage,thenwhatis?”Onesenior

UNworkersaid:

The food’s value to the government is

substantial. It saves a lot of money for

them… The economy has rapidly de-

teriorated over the last six months — a

costly war and the international finan-

cial crisis and loss of tourism, and de-

mand for textiles and rubber is down,

remittances are down (including Tamil).

The government has decided to go to

the IMF having shut off the IMF a few

years ago. A 1.9 billion dollar bail-out

package is wanted.

Inmid-May2009USSecretaryofStateHil-

laryClintonsuggesteditwasaninappropriate

timefortheloan;buttalksbetweentheIMF

andtheSriLankangovernmentprogressedin

anycase .151

IfWFPwasseenashavingatleastsome

leverage,sotoowastheinternationalcommu-

nitymoregenerally .Onenationalaid

workercommented:

I’m still having doubt why the interna-

tional community cannot make pres-

sure, like economic barriers [sanctions]

for Sudan. We are not challenging the

government calling it a “humanitarian

war.” It’s actually not. Yesterday around

400-500 people died in the no fire

zone… They shoot and shell with multi-

barrage. Every day they killed at least

200 people.

OneUNworkerobserved:

It’s easy to place the argument at

the end of the spectrum, saying “Is it

about walking away?”… IDPs are still

in camps, two high security camps

in Mannar are around a year old. We

failed them… Nothings changed. It’s

just more people… When we had

space to negotiate, we weren’t doing

it. There were small numbers coming

into Vavuniya last year [2008], Novem-

ber, December and January 2009. The

151 See, for example, transcript of a press briefing by Caroline Atkinson, Director, External Relations, International Monetary Fund, 21 May 2009 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2009/tr052109.htm).


government could have met needs at

that time if we’d withdrawn. Now they

couldn’t afford to. It’s been played

really nicely… We have to fill gaps at

100,000 and didn’t have to at 20,000.

It’s not a poor country.

Anotheraidworkerechoedthisanalysis:

Pressure should have started much ear-

lier, at the time when we had to leave

the Vanni. Pressure from the UN was

not enough. Now if you say we stop the

food today, it’s very hard to pressure.

With this amount of people, it’s too

late. In September 2008 or in February

this year, more should have been done.

OneUNworkerasked:

Have there ever been consequences

for the state in terms of how it be-

haved? They started to shell hospitals

and health care locations, each shifting

to makeshift facilities. Nothing in the

vicinity was retuning fire. Plus, limit-

ing medical aid that did go in [to the

Vanni]. It was fundamentally eroding

the ability to meet health needs.

AnotherseniorUNworkersaidsimply:

“Nobodybackedwordswithathreat .”Adiplo-

matnoted:

As long as the Security Council doesn’t

see a threat to international security,

as long as there’s no willingness to im-

pose sanctions, nothing will change…

Short of serious sanctions, there’s noth-

ing we can do. The EU is playing with

GSP plus [an updated Generalised Sys-

tem of Preferences] trade concessions.

But it has had no effect, in my view.

The state says it’s willing to take the

loss. The IMF loan is coming up.

There’s a possibility of restrictions. It’s

to be decided 10 May. There’s no sign

of the state getting more accommodat-

ing, though there may be some con-

cessions in the two days before 10 May.

If the EU or US want, they can block it.

Inothercontexts,includingGuatemala,

loansfromIFIshavehelpedtounderminethe

efficacyofpressureonhumanrightsexertedby

arangeofdonors .152

OneUNaidworkersuggested:“Unlessthe

governmentfaceshighcriticismfrommajordo-

nors,India,theUS,theJapanese,economicdo-

nors,thedonorswon’trealiseinternationalinflu-

ence .”Otheranalystshavepointedtoamarked

lackofcoherenceorunityamongdonorsas

somethingthathelpedtounderminethe2002

CeasefireAgreement .153Asthingsstand,the

governmentseemstohavebeenabletoplay

actualandpotentialdonorsagainsteachother .

AnApril2009reportintheEconomistnoted

thatPakistanhadbecomeSriLanka’smainarms

supplier,withIranproviding70percentofSri

Lanka’soilsupplyoncreditandLibyapoisedto

makeasoftloanof500millionUSdollars .154A

seniorUNworkercommented:

If you don’t get assistance from the US,

Iran can come in and offer an oil deal.

If not the UK, then China is happy to

provide. Japan is ever ready to help the

country economically. Arab countries

are ready to come in. India does scare

Sri Lanka, but they have a strategy

for India.

China’srolewasseenasimportant .As

oneUNworkersuggested,“Chinaisvetoing

analternativepath .Theyhavetheirseparatist

movementinTibet,andaresupportingthegov-

ernment[inSriLanka]withweapons .”TheSri

LankangovernmenthascultivatedArabstates

throughitspositiononPalestine .Accordingto

the“WanniOperation”website(waaniperation .

152 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.

153 Georg Frerks and Bart Klem, 2006, Conditioning Peace among Protagonists: A Study into the use of Peace Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

154 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.com).


com)(subtitle:“Strengtheningthehandsof

bravesoldiers”):

… President Mahinda’s support for

Palestine (He’s President of Palestine

Association if Sri Lanka) has won the

hearts of Arab Leaders (at the cost of

Israel), resulting in all Arab Countries

such as Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan

and Saudi Arabia voting for Sri Lanka

at UNHRC.

Thewebsitenotesthatinadditionto

cultivatingthesecountriesandChina,Russia,

PakistanandIndia,thePresidenthasalsomade

friendswithPresidentGaddafiinLibyaand

PresidentMahmoudAhmadinejadinIran .

Inmanyways,theSriLankangovernment

hashadagooddevelopmentrecord,andthe

currentregimeemphasisessuccessfuldevel-

opmentinitiativesaspartofitslegitimacy .

Thus,PresidentMahindaRajapaksestatedin

April2009:

The government has launched a mas-

sive development drive while prosecut-

ing a war against the most ruthless and

powerful terrorist outfit in the world.

The government has not reduced wel-

fare programmes or subsidies. This is

the only government that has launched

five port development projects, four

power generation projects, reconstruc-

tion and rehabilitation of thousands of

kilometres or rural and urban roads,

four express ways and hundreds of

other development projects simultane-

ously while in a war against terrorism.155

Mindfulofcertaindevelopmentalsuccess-

es,aWFPConceptPaperfor2008notedthat

“…SriLankaisoncoursetoreachmostofits

MilleniumDevelopmentGoaltargets,though

thenationaldevelopmentfigureshidethestrik-

ingregionalinequalities .”156TheEconomist

155 Sandun Jayasekera, “President offers to rehabilitate Prabha,” Daily Mirror, 21 April 2009.

156 WFP PRRO Concept Paper for 2008.

notedinApril2009,“Coincidingwithaperiod

ofhigheconomicgrowthoutsidethewar-zone,

inthewestandsouth,theconflicthascome

toseemanincreasinglyanachronisticbloton

ahopefulcountry…MrRajapaksahasalmost

erasedthisstain .”157Itisworthnotingthatother

states—includingUgandaandRwanda—have

beenabletoharnessarelativelygooddevelop-

mentalrecordinsecuring“space”forabuses

againstinternalandexternalenemies(andnot

leastformilitaryinterventionsintheDRC) .

The Future:Itseemsquitepossiblethatcontrollingac-

cessmaybemaintainedasa“card”todeter

movestowardssomekindofwarcrimestribu-

nal .Scepticismonthepossibilityofaquickre-

turnofdisplacedpeopletotheVannihasbeen

notedabove .Itdoesappearthatthegovern-

mentdoesnotwantthesepeoplefurthersouth,

sothismayfeedintosomekindofreturn,par-

ticularlyifinternationalobjectionstointernment

arestronglyandcontinuouslyexpressed .

Whetherthewarisnowoverisaninterest-

ingquestion .Militaryvictoryhasbeendeclared

(andtheremaybesignificantelectoraladvan-

tagesinbeingseentowinacomprehensiveand

decisivemilitaryvictory) .However,thereseems

tobeadegreeofawarenessinofficialcircles

thatthewarmaymutateratherthanend .One

governmentministerofferedtheviewthatthe

securityproblemwillbesimilartothatfacedby

theUKortheUS,andwillconsistofterrorism .

Severalofthoseinterviewedexpressedtheview

thatsomekindofguerrillaactionwaslikelyto

continue .ItwasfeltthatmanyLTTEsoldiersand

sympathiserswillhavesoughttoavoidalmost

certaindeathorcapturewithinthenarrow,so-

called“nofirezone”onthenorth-eastcoast,

andwouldlikelyhaveslippedawaysouthwards .

Onediplomatnoted:

The LTTE has lost a conventional war

and probably will never come back and



have territorial control. But that does

not mean they are out of the equation,

for example as an exile movement with

the diaspora controlling, and the ability

to exercise terrorist attacks is unknown.

Severalaidworkersandsomegovernment

officialsmentionedthatthewaydisplacedpeo-

plearetreatedwillaffectthelikelihoodoftheir

supportingsomekindofviolenceinthefuture .

Internmentmaygivehugenumberstheimpres-

sionthattheyarebeingtreatedasterrorists .158

Itisworthnotinginthisconnectionthatinearly

2002,WFPreported,“Theresidentsofthe[gov-

ernment]welfarecenters,whoweredisplaced

byfightinginthenorthandeastoftheisland

nation,havebeendeprivedofthefoodrations

theynormallygetfromWFPbecausedonor

supporthasfallenoffsharply .”159Residentshad

receivedverylittlefood,ifany,fortheprevious

threemonths,WFP’sthenCountryDirector

noted .Ihavenotseenanyanalysisofwhatcon-

tribution,ifany,thisshortcomingmadetothe

resurgenceofviolenceinSriLanka .

Beyondtheimmediatequestionofthedis-

placed,themannerinwhichgovernanceissues

areaddressedwillbeparticularlyimportant .

OneNGOworkerobserved:

The LTTE is resurgent in Batticaloa

and Ampara, different cells hiding and

coming up. It’s far, far from over. In the

east they can use Karuna… Now peo-

ple feel less secure than when the LTTE

was there. There are lots of abductions,

extortions, white vans — people feel

very, very insecure in the east. We need

pressure from the international com-

munity — what sort of governance is

going to be put in place?

Manywerepessimistichere .Alocalaid

workerobserved:


159 WFP Press Release, “WFP urges aid for forgotten victims of strife in Sri Lanka,” 28 February 2002.

The war won’t be over. If they give a

political solution, it can be. But they

didn’t give before. Do you think they

will give it now? The [Tamil] bargain-

ing position is zero. Another group will

come and the LTTE will also be strong.

The way the government is treating the

Tamils will make another

liberation movement.

Anotherlocalaidworkercommented

voicedhisscepticismattheideaofa

“militarysolution”:

We have not solved the problem. We

have militarily defeated the armed

group. But all the factors that led to

this conflict are still there… Even the

opportunities for reconciliation, the

government is not using them. We are

heading for a big disaster, not rebellion

soon because the Tamils will be very

passive and Tamil politicians will be

compliant. But the government is still

not sending any message to the Tamil

community that they are equal citizens,

especially confining them in camps.

There has not been a significant move

on the hearts and minds.

Progressonsomekindofautonomyinthe

eastwasalsoseenasimportant .Asonesenior

aidofficialputit:“Thegovernmentwillhaveto

deliver,onservicesandsomegeneralauton-

omy,totheeast,orKuranaetcwilltakesome

action .”Theeastremainspronetoviolenceand

theprovincialgovernmentchiefministerSivane-

sathuraiChandrakanthanhasminimalpower .160

ArecentICGreportontheeastnoted:

Violence, political instability and the

government’s reluctance to devolve

power or resources to the fledgling

provincial council are undermining am-

bitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s

Eastern Province… Despite the pres-



ence of tens of thousands of soldiers

and police in the east, the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have

proven able to launch attacks on gov-

ernment forces and on their rivals in the

Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP).

There have also been violent conflicts

between different factions of the pro-

government TMVP, and impunity for kill-

ings and disappearances, many of them

apparently committed by government

security forces and/or their allies in the

TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked

to the TMVP also remain problems.161

Theremaybeconsiderablereluctanceto

holdanelectioninnorthernprovinceunless

ananti-LTTEvictorycanbeassured .162WhenI

raisedthequestionoftheTamils’weakbargain-

ingpositionwithonediplomat,hereplied:

Yes, there won’t be big concessions…

The Tamil civilian population, in the first

year you will have people back on their

feet and back to their original place, with

rehabilitation and gradual development

of some kind of Tamil polity, trying to

implement the thirteenth amendment

[governing the powers of provincial coun-

cils]. If there’s a minimal interpretation of

this, it’s almost useless… The pessimistic

scenario is the government will do as

they have done in the east, put in lead-

ers and ministers with almost no support

from the Tamils, and disappearances,

killings of those who raise their voices…

The population is so fed up with war, no

willingness to take up arms, so you don’t

have to do much to avoid big problems

in the next 5-10 years. Plus, the northern

Tamils detest the LTTE. Colombo Tamils

might be more positive, and have only

161 ICG, 2009, Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, 16 April, Executive Summary, p. 1.


the experience of suffering at the hands

of the government, while the northern

Tamils have suffered from the LTTE.

Ontheotherhand,itwasfeltthataperiod

ofreconstructionmightofferabetterchance

foroutsiderstopressureforpoliticalreform .As

thisdiplomatputit:

The biggest lever we will have is to

help Sri Lanka with reconstruction and

we must demand a legitimate political

process in the north and a restoration of

democracy and a state where minorities

have a rightful place. It’s appropriate to

say, “Show us what you’re planning to do.

If we do not like it, we cannot fund it.”

The problem now is we are confronted

with a humanitarian imperative, and the

government is so fixed on winning the

war that they don’t have resources for

saving lives. There will be a better oppor-

tunity to exercise influence later on.

Thatopportunitymightevenbeincreased

ifthe“victory”inthewarwiththeLTTEweak-

enedtheinfluenceofpartiesespousingSin-

halesenationalism .Thediplomatsuggested,

“WhoisPresidentdependsontheparliament,

togiveminoritiessubstantialconcessions,then

hehastohaveanewmandatefromthepeople

withlesspresenceofJVPandJHU .That’sthe

optimisticscenario .”

Perhapsthegroundsforpessimismremain

morepersuasive .Wehavenotedthatsomekind

ofanti-governmentviolenceremainslikely,and

therewouldseemtobeelementsonthegov-

ernment“side”thathaveaninterestinsome

kindofcontinuedconflict .Suppressionoffree-

domofspeechhasflourishedunderwhatsome

localanalysts(CPA)havepresentedas“AState

ofPermanentCrisis”(thetitleofoneoftheir

publications),163asituationwhere“bothconflict

aswellastheassumptionofextraordinarypow-

163 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.


ersandmeasuresbytheStatehavebecome

normalisedasapartofeverydaylife .”164Isug-

gestedtoseveralmilitaryofficialsthattheend

ofthewarwouldsoongivethemtheopportu-

nitytodemobilisemanyoftheirsoldiers,they

repliedwithouthesitationthatthiswouldnotbe

possibleornecessarygiventhecontinuingim-

portanceof“prevention”and“anti-terrorism .”

Severalotherintervieweesstressedthatthisis

ahighlymilitarisedsocietyandeconomyand

manypeople,particularlyinpoorruralareas,

havecometodependonincomefromthemili-

tary(includingthehomeguards) .Development

ofthenorthislikelytobehighlymilitarisedand

with“HighSecurityZones”aprominentfeature,

onelocalUNworkerstressed .Certainly,there

hasbeenahugeincreaseinmilitaryspending

inrecentyears .Thegovernment’smilitaryex-

penditurerosefrom562millionin2003to856

millionin2008 .165Thepossibilityofahighlymili-

tarisedpeacewasraised,andoneaidworker

commented:“Themilitaryaregoingtowar .

Theyhavelostalotofmen .Theywillwanttheir

share,theirfiefdomsafterwards .”

Conclusion: Key Points

Number 1: Credit for Delivering Food in Extremely Difficult Circumstances

ThoseweinterviewedtendedtogiveWFP

agreatdealofcreditforgettinglargequanti-

tiesoffoodtotheVanniinextremelydifficult

circumstances,particularlywhenthewarin-

tensifiedfromSeptember2008 .WFPwasseen

hashavingreactedflexiblyandwithingenuity

initslogisticaloperations,includingonthe

establishmentoflogisticshubs,theuseoflocal

purchase,thepracticeofsealingtrucks,andthe

useofshipsasanalternativetotrucks .Inmany

164 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, p. 237. Mark Duffield drawn attention to the paradoxical existence of “permanent emergencies.”

165 The Sipri Military Expenditure Database, 2009, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4). These figures are adjusted to keep the value of the dollar constant, based on 2005 values.

ways,thisrepresentsasignificantpractical

contributioninacontextwheremanyagencies

wereleftasvirtualbystanders .

Number 2: Government Manipulation of Aid

Reliefoperationshavebeenlargelysubor-

dinatedtothegovernment’smilitaryandpoliti-

calagendas .Manyofthemechanismsinvolved

arequitefamiliarfrompastemergencies .

Akeytechniquehasbeenusingreliefto

weakenpopulationslinkedtorebelgroupsand

ultimatelytopromotethedepopulation—for

anunknownperiod—ofareasofrebelstrength .

Manyaidworkerspointedtoasetofpolicies

andpracticesonthepartofgovernmentactors

thathavehadthepredictableeffectofdebilitat-

ing,displacingandultimatelyinterningavery

substantialportionoftheTamilpopulation .In

practice,theSriLankangovernmenthasused

thebroadrubricof“securityissues”toimpose

veryfar-reachingrestrictionsonthemedical

supplies,waterandsanitationandfoodthat

havebeendirectedattheVanniregion .

Asecondtechniquehasbeenusingrelief

ascoverformilitarymanoeuvres,notablywhen

itcametotheaidconvoysfromOctober2008 .

Athirdmechanismhasbeentousevisas,

travelpermits,compulsoryevacuations,written

agreements,andvariouskindsofintimidation

toensurethatdamaginginformationdoesnot

leakoutviatheactivitiesofaidagencies .

AfourthmechanisminSriLanka(clearlyin

somekindoftensionwiththepreviousthree)

hasbeentousetheexistenceofhumanitarian

operationsinordertodemonstratethegov-

ernment’sgoodintentionsand“humanitarian

credentials .”Thishasprovidedimportantlegiti-

macyforthegovernmentevenasithascontrib-

utedtohumanitariancrisisinimportantways .

Afifthmechanismisusingtheexistenceof

reliefoperationsasakindof“leverage”over

theinternationalcommunity—notablytoen-

couragequietudeoverprotectionissues .166

166 This might also extend to leverage over the question of “war crimes,” which has recently come to prominence.


Number 3: Too Close for Comfort?Whilstassistingfooddeliveriesincertain

respects,WFP’srathercloserelationshipwith

theSriLankangovernmenthascarriedimpor-

tantrisks .Manyofthoseinterviewedexpressed

aconcernthatWFP,whilstineffectassisting

thegovernment’swar/reliefstrategy,didnot

doenoughtoraisethealarmonprotection

issues—orevenonshortcomingsindelivery .

WFPwasfelttohavesignificantleveragein

relationtotheSriLankangovernment,though

thisalsohaditslimits(particularlygiventhe

geopoliticalcontextofa“greenlight”forthe

government’s“militarysolution”) .Severalin-

tervieweesstressedthatWFP’sresourceswere

extremelyvaluabletotheSriLankangovern-

ment(particularlyinthecontextofeconomic

crisisandthemassinfluxintoVavuniya),and

thatthisimpliedsomesignificantdegreeof

leverage(includingonprotectionissues) .An-

othersourceofleverage(fortheinternational

communityingeneral)wasseentolieprecisely

inthegovernment’sextremesensitivitytocriti-

calorinconvenientinformation .

Number 4: Emboldening the Government

Whenitcametoadvocacy,exertingearly

pressureat an early stage wasseentobeimpor-

tant,andoneexamplewastheneedtopressure

forIDPs’rightsatthepointwhenthescaleof

IDPmovementswasrelativelysmall .Whenthere

isamassinflux,governmentsmaybeunable

toprovidefullassistanceandtheperception

of“humanitarianimperative”maymakeadvo-

cacyandpressureonprotectionissuesmore

difficult .Manyintervieweesstressedthatmak-

ingconcessionstothegovernmentonvarious

humanitarianprincipleshadhadtheeffectof

emboldeningthegovernmentinitsrelation-

shipwiththehumanitariancommunity,andone

sourcesaidthehumanitariancommunityhad

beenreducedtobeggingratherthannegotiat-

ing .Officialuntruthsneedtobechallengedat

anearlystage—ortheinternationalcommunity

risks“buyingintothem .”Aidagencies’reluc-

tancetospeakpubliclyonsensitiveissueshas

evenextendedtowithholdingtheresultsofnu-

tritionalsurveys .Alsocriticisedbyaidworkersin

thefieldweretherelativelyweakprotests—at

leastinpublic—attheejectionofaidagencies

fromtheVanniinSeptember2008andatthe

civiliancasualtiesresultingfromgovernment

shellingandaerialbombardmentduringthe

intensifiedmilitarypushfromaroundthattime .

Anyprotestswereseenastoolittleandtoo

late .Thelackofprotestatchilddeathsresulting

fromthesemilitaryactionswascontrastedby

someaidworkerswithwhattheysawasamuch

greaterdegreeofpublicprotestofchildrecruit-

ment(bytheLTTE) .Ingeneral,aidagencies

—whetherintheUNsystemorNGOs—ap-

peartohavebeenverymuchonthedefensive

inacontextwhereanyactioncouldeasilybe

turnedagainstthem,notablyinamediasubject

toextremegovernmentcontrol .Interviewees

questionedwhethertheSriLankangovernment

hadeverbeensubjecttoanysignificantconse-

quencesforitsvariousattemptstorestricthu-

manitarianspace .Thegovernment’sabundant

optionsforinternationalsupportwerefeltto

havebeensignificanthere .

Number 5: Openness on Shortcomings in Protection and Assistance

ItisimportantforWFPandotheragencies

tobeasfrankaspossibleaboutshortcomings

inprotectionandassistance .Thiscanstrength-

enthehandofthosewithinpowerfulinterna-

tionalgovernmentswhomayhaveverysignifi-

cantleveragethatcaninfluencetheSriLankan

governmentinparticular .Thehumanitarian

armsofmajordonorbilateralorganisationsand

governmentsfrequentlycompetewithother

armsofgovernment,whichmayputcommer-

cialorgeopoliticalaimsaheadofhumanitarian

goals .Inthesecircumstances,agreaterdegree

ofopennesswithintheUNsystemoffersthe

prospectofstrengtheningtheargumentsand

thepersuasivenessofthosewithmorehumani-

tarianmandatesandagendas .Keyprotection

failuresinSriLankainclude:civiliancasualties


resultingfromthewar;theinternmentofhun-

dredsofthousandsofdisplacedpeople;and

thelackofcleartimelinesforscreeningorreset-

tlement .Intermsofassistance,aperceivedlack

ofopennessabouttheinadequatequantities

offoodreachingthenorthwasseenasasignifi-

cantproblem .Wherethereisastrongdesire

toshowthatreliefhasmetthehumanitarian

needs,theremaybeadangeroustendencyto

minimisethenumbersinneed;thisinturncan

weakenadvocacyandprotectionefforts .In

general,WFPandotherUNagenciesneedto

bemindfulofthedangersingivingtheimpres-

sionthatkeyprotectionandreliefgapsarebe-

ingmetwheninrealitytheyremainextremely

grave .ThereisalsoadangerthattheUNin

generalservesafunctionforpowerfulinterna-

tionalgovernmentsingivingthisimpression .

Number 6: Advocacy as a Way to Enhance “Humanitarian Space”— and the Question of Incentives

Whilstsomeaidworkersexpressedthe

fearthattheirabilitytodeliverreliefwouldbe

impededbyadvocacy,twoimportantcoun-

terargumentsemergedpowerfullyfromthe

research .

First,severalofthoseinterviewedinSri

Lankafeltstronglythataprioritisationofdeliv-

eryoveradvocacyhadultimatelyhadveryad-

verseaffectsfortheprotectionoftargetpopu-

lations,andhadactuallydonelittletoenhance

staffsecurityoreventheabilitytodeliverrelief

goodsandservices .Infact,theamountof“hu-

manitarianspace”inwhichaidagenciescould

operatewasperceivedashavingshrunkalong-

sideaseriesofconcessionstotheSriLankan

government .Eventhedeliveryoffoodrelief

oftenfellveryshortofthelevelofneed .

Second,inpracticedecision-makinghas

notbeensimply aquestionofweighingdelivery

againstadvocacy .Manyotherconsiderations

havecomeintoplay,includinggeopolitical

concernsandorganisationalorbureaucratic

interests .Theseconsiderationsunderlinethe

possibilitythatthebalancebetweenadvocacy

anddeliverymaynothavebeenoptimalfrom

thepointofviewofthetargetpopulation .Par-

ticularlyimportantinsettingthecontextfor

repeatedconcessionstotheSriLankangovern-

menthasbeenthegovernment’ssuccessinpo-

sitioningthewaragainsttheLTTEwithinamore

generalframeworkof,first,anpurelyinternal

strugglewheresovereigntyisunderthreat,and,

second,aglobal“waronterror .”

Tosomeextent,foodaidhasbeenused—

bytheSriLankangovernmentandbyinterna-

tionalgovernments—toshowthat“something

isbeingdone”whileaninternational“green

light”hasbeengiventothegovernment’s

pursuitofmilitaryvictory .Otherkindsofself-

interestinhibitingprotectionhaveincluded;

thefearforpersonalsafety(whichisdistinct

fromaconcernwithdeliveryandimpliesaneed

forstronginternationalandnationalactionto

improvesuchsafety);concernforindividualca-

reers(whichhasbeenadisincentivetorisking

ejection);concernfororganisationalhealthand

growth(withincentivesoftencentringondeliv-

eringmeasurableoutputsratherthanenhanc-

ingprotection) .Eachoftheseappearstohave

hadsomeinfluenceinde-prioritisingprotection

inmanycrisesaroundtheworld,andSriLanka

isnotanexception .

Theresearchsuggeststhattoday’strade-off,

evenwhenitappearstobeasensibleone,may

createaworsesituation(andasmallerhumani-

tarianspace)tomorrow—becauseofthesignals

sent .Speakingoutisnotsimplysomethingto

bebalancedagainstdelivery(orabandonedin

favourofdelivery);itisalsoaquestionofmeet-

ingagencies’protectionmandates .Insofarasaid

agenciesareactivelyassistinginagovernment

planofinterninglargeelementsofthenorth-

ernpopulation,speakingoutbecomesaclear

responsibility .AsoneUNworkerputit,“It’sour

moneythatallowsthemtosupportthisplan .”

Theinterviewsleftmewithastrangeim-

pression:itwasgenerallysomeone elsethat

hadtheleverage .Itseemed,moreover,that

thosewhodidhavesomeabilitytopressurethe

governmentweremostoftenleavingthistask

102

tothosewhoeitherdidnothavetheleverageor

whowereunwillingtouseitbecauseofaper-

ceivedhumanitarianimperative .

OneUNworkersaidsimply:“Wearenot

withoutpower,wearewithoutawilltouseit .”

Whileindividualagenciesmayhavesignificant

leverage,thebestopportunitiestopressurefor

improvedprotectionclearlyliewithcoordinated

action,notablythroughthecountryofficeand

withfullsupportfromNewYork .Yetpressures

ontheselinesseemtohavebeensporadicat

best,andcamemostlyfromApril2009when

theSriLankancrisisbecameamajorinterna-

tionalmediastory .Again,theweakinternational

responsetogovernmentejectionofaidagen-

ciesfromthenorthinSeptember2008wasa

keymoment .

Number 7: Who Learns the Lessons?Wefoundasignificantconcernthatcol-

lectiveconcessionsonimportanthumanitarian

maysendasignalinternationally(aswellaslo-

cally),thatemboldensabusiveactorselsewhere

tostepuptheirmanipulationofaid(anda

parallelmanipulationoftruth) .Whilsttheinter-

nationalcommunityoftentalksabout“lessons

learned”fromvarioushumanitariancrises,there

isaneedtobesensitivetothelessonsthatgov-

ernmentsandotherkeyactorswithinparticular

crisis-affectedareasmaybelearningfromcrises

elsewhere(andindeedfromthecrisisinSri

Lanka) .Thisunderlinestheimportanceofde-

fendinghumanitarianprinciples .Itwouldseem

thatlocalactorsmaybelearninglessonsfaster

thanthehumanitariancommunity .

Number 8: Advocacy and the PipelineAdvocacymayalsohavebeenimpeded

by“pipeline”issues .WhenWFPdidnothave

enoughfoodavailableforrelief,thiscompli-

catedtheattributionofresponsibilityforlackof

distributions,providingsomethingofan“alibi”

forgovernment-ledobstruction .Insofaras

WFP’sownsupplyproblemswerecontributing

tolowdistributions,itwasalsoclearlyharderfor

WFPtopointthefingeratthegovernment .


103

The limits of Humanitarian action: WfP, food assistance and International aid in DR Congo

James Darcy, Overseas Development InstituteGuillaume Foliot, World Food Programme

PrefaceThiscasestudyisbasedonavisittoDRC

undertakenbytheauthorsfrom7th–16thMay

2009 .Forreasonsoftimeandsecurity,thevisit

wasconfinedtoKinshasaandtoGomatownin

theEastofthecountry .Thereportisbasedon

acombinationofinterviews,reviewofdocu-

mentationandsomelimitedprogrammesite

visits,followedbydiscussionandreflection .167

Thelimitationsofsuchareviewwillbeap-

parent .Itisnotanevaluationofperformance

(ofWFPoranyoneelse),nordoweattempt

tomakedetailedrecommendationsspecific

toDRC,sincewearenotinapositiontodo


so .Rather,theideawastoconsiderthechal-

lengestoprovidingfoodandotherformsof

humanitarianassistanceinDRC,thewaythose

challengeswereunderstoodbyhumanitar-

ianactors,whatapproacheshadbeentried

toovercomethem,andwhatbroaderlessons

mightbelearnedfromthisforworkingincon-

flictsituations .Wehaveattimesexpressedour

viewsrobustlywiththeaimofprovokingdis-

cussion,andwehopethiswillbetakeninthe

positivespiritintended .168,169

168 The ToR for the case study are included in an Appendix.

169 The authors would like to thank all those who gave their time to contribute to the study. In particular they would like to thank the staff of WFP in Rome, Kinshasa and Goma for organising and hosting the visit during such a busy period. We hope the result will be found useful and worthwhile.

Case study: DR Congo (Field visit, May 2009)


TheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC)hasapopulationofaround60millionuneven-

lydistributedover2 .4millionsquarekilometres(roughlythesizeofWesternEurope)andborder-

ing9othercountries .Itranks177thof179countriesUNDPHumanDevelopmentIndex .Decades

ofmisruleandlackofinvestment,exacerbatedbyconflicts,havedestroyedthegovernment’s

capacitytoadministeratalllevels .TheentireterritoryoftheDRC,includingtheconflictzones,is

affectedbythedilapidatedstateoftheinfrastructure,thelackofroadsandothertravellinks,and

theweaknessofbasicstateservices .

Althoughthewestofthecountryremainsinastateofrelativepeace,thepopulationsare

victimsofacutemalnutrition,epidemics,violenceandseriousviolationsofhumanrights .The

dilapidationofroad,river,lakeandrailinfrastructuresandthelackofcapacityofthegovern-

mentmakeaccesstoaffectedpopulationsdifficultandcostly .Itisestimatedthatonly20%of

thecountrycanbeaccessedbyroad .Lessthan2%ofroadsarepaved .

Aneedsassessmentprocessforthe2009HumanitarianActionPlanwasconductedinAu-

gustandSeptember2008 .Atthattime,1,350,000personsremaineddisplacedinSouthKivu,

NorthKivuandinthenorthofProvinceOrientale;193outof515healthzonesdidnothavethe

necessarycapacitiestorespondtohealthcrises;andsome1,700,000childrenwereestimated

tobesufferingfromacutemalnutrition,ofwhichalmost1,000,000wereseverecases .Overall,

athirdofchildrenunder5sufferfromchronicmalnutrition(stunting),and13%sufferacutemal-

nutrition(WFP/FAO2006) .

Levelsofschoolenrolmentfellfrom92percentin1971–1992to64percentin2001–2002(PRSP) .


Background and ContextThehistoryoftheDemocraticRepublic

ofCongo(formerlyZaire)hasbeenoneofvio-

lence,conflictandchronicunder-development

stretchingbacktothecolonialperiod .170More

recently,ithasbeenthesettingforwhathas

beencalledtheworstemergencytounfold

inAfricainrecentdecades,measuredboth

intermsofhumansufferingandregionalin-

security .Between1998and2006alone,an

estimatedthreetofourmillion“excess”deaths

areestimatedtohaveoccurred,mostthrough

indirecteffectsofconflict:diseaseandmalnu-

trition .171Despiteitsrelativewealthintermsof

naturalresources,thesheerscaleofthecoun-

tryandthestruggletocontrolitsterritoryand

resources(minerals,diamonds,timber)have

ledtoastatethatisfragmented,anarchic,

weaklygoverned,highlyunstableinpartsand

withsomeoftheworsthumandevelopment

indicatorsintheworld .172

In1997whenneighbouringRwandainvad-

edthecountrytoflushoutextremistHutumili-

tias(theringleadersoftheRwandangenocide

of1994),itgaveaboosttotheanti-Mobutu

rebels .Thesequicklycapturedthecapital,

Kinshasa,installedLaurentKabilaaspresident

andrenamedthecountrytheDemocraticRe-

publicofCongo .AriftbetweenKabilaandhis

formeralliessparkedanewrebellion,backed

byRwandaandUganda .Otherstates(Angola,

NamibiaandZimbabwe)tookKabila’sside,

turningthecountry—especiallytheeastern

provincesofKivu—intoavastbattleground .

Thefightforcontrolofthecountry’senormous

mineralwealthandlargescalehumanrights

abusescharacterisedtheconflicts .Following

170 The country was known as “Belgian Congo” prior to independence in 1960

171 These figures and the basis on which they were derived are much debated. The primary source is the surveys conducted on behalf of IRC between […, Roberts, L. et al)]. For a recent review of the debate between the relevant experts, see the recent HNTS peer review paper which casts some doubt on the high mortality estimates from the IRC surveys.

172 Ranked 177 out of 179 in the HDI

theLusakaCeasefireAgreementin1999,aUN

peacekeepingmissionwasdeployed(MO-

NUC—seebelow) .ButthissecondCongowar

lastedfrom1998throughto2003,withdevas-

tatinghumanconsequences .

Aftercontinuedviolencefollowingthe

formationoftheTransitionalGovernmentin

2003,presidentialandnationalelections—

thefirstin45years—wereheldinthesecond

halfof2006 .Politicalprogressandimproved

securityinsomeareasallowedinternallydis-

placedpersons(IDPs)andrefugeestoreturn

home,especiallyinProvince-Orientale(except

Ituri),Équateur,Katanga,Maniemaandsome

partsofNord-KivuandSud-Kivu .Someeast-

ernregionsincludingIturi,Katanga,theKivus

andManiemanonethelessremainedseriously

insecure:therewereclashesbetweenthe

Forces armées de la République démocratique

du Congo (DRCarmedforces)(FARDC)and

troopsloyaltothedissidentLaurentNkunda

(Tutsi)inNord-Kivu .Thesetensionsaffected

thepresidentialelectionsinAugust2006 .

Thebehaviourofsomeunitsofthearmy

andofmilitiassuchastheFront démocratique

pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR;Demo-

craticFrontfortheLiberationofRwanda—a

“Hutupower”militia)contributedtocontin-

uedinsecurityandhumanrightabuses .Coup

attemptsandsporadicviolenceheralded

renewedfightingintheeasternpartofthe

countryin2008 .

Inanattempttobringthesituationun-

dercontrol,thegovernmentinJanuary2009

invitedintroopsfromRwandatohelpmount

ajointoperationagainsttheRwandanrebel

HutumilitiasactiveineasternDRCongo .

RwandaalsomovedtoarresttheHutumilitias’

mainrival,GeneralNkunda,aCongoleseTutsi

hithertoseenasitsmainallyinthearea .

BeyondtheKivus,afurthercrisishasarisen

becauseoftheactivitiesoftheLord’sResistance

Army(LRA)fromUganda .TheLRAisactivein

theNorthofProvinceOrientale(HautUélé)us-

ingtheareaasthesafehavenandperpetrating

atrocitiesagainstlocalcivilianpopulation .


TheUNpeacekeepingmissioninDRC

(MONUC)173isanimportantactoronthe

ground .MONUCwasestablishedbyUnitedNa-

tionsSecurityCouncilResolutions1279(1999)

and1291(2000)tomonitorthepeaceprocessof

the“SecondCongoWar,”thoughinfactithas

beenactivelyengagedwiththeconflictsinIturi

andtheKivus .

InMay2007,theUNSecurityCouncilunani-

mouslyadoptedanambitiousnewmandatefor

MONUCunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,au-

thorisingtheuseofforcetotacklethethreatsto

peaceandsecurityposedbythearmedgroupsin

EasternCongo,andspecificallytoprotectcivilian

population .Inaddition,itwastaskedwithshor-

ingupthedemocraticinstitutionsinthecountry

andpromotinghumanrights .AsofMarch2009,

MONUCremainsunderstrength—andaccord-

ingtomany,under-equippedandinadequately

deployed—withnumbersstandingat18,430

uniformedpersonneland3,700civilianstaff .

MONUCandtheCongoleseArmyarejoint-

lyplanningoperationsinSouthKivutoelimi-

natetheFDLR(operation“Kimia2”) .Atthetime

thiscasestudywasbeingundertaken,overthe

weekendof9-10May2009,FDLRrebelswere

blamedforattacksonthevillagesofEkingiand

BusurungiinSouthKivuprovince .Morethan90

peoplewerekilledatEkingi,including60civil-

iansand30governmenttroops,and“dozens

more”weresaidtobekilledatBusurungi .The

FDLRhadattackedseveralothervillagesinthe

precedingweeksandclashesoccurredbetween

FDLRforcesandtheCongoleseArmy .Themost

recentattackshaveforcedasignificantnumber

ofpeoplefromtheirhomes .

This“peaceenforcement”collaboration

byMONUCwiththeFARDC—ineffect,ajoint

counter-insurgencycampaign—isthesubject

ofconsiderablecontroversy .Manyoftheatroci-

tiesbeingperpetratedintheeastofthecountry

areattributedtogovernmenttroopsofthe

FARDC .Moreover,intheeyesofsome,thequa-

173 A French acronym for Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo

si-belligerentstatusoftheUNforces—sym-

bolisedforexamplebytheuseofUN-badged

attackhelicoptersagainstrebelforces—com-

promisestheneutralandindependentstatusof

theUNhumanitariananddevelopmentagen-

cies,potentiallyjeopardisingtheirsafeaccess

toaffectedcommunities .MONUCisblamedby

manyCongoleseintheEastforfailingtopro-

tectthecivilianpopulation,andthisunpopular-

ityappearstocolouropinionofUNagenciesas

well(sincemostdonotdistinguishtheagencies

fromMONUC) .Bothhavebeenthesubjectof

angrydemonstrationsbylocalpopulations .

WFPstartedtooperateinDRCin1973and

mostofthecurrenthumanitarianactorshave

beenactiveinthecountrysincethemid-1990s

withtheeruptionoftheconflicts .Until2006,

theiractionswerelimitedtotheconflictzones

intheeastofthecountry .Sincethen,thehu-

manitariancommunityhasgraduallystarted

enlargingitsareaofoperation,havingnoted

alarmingindicatorselsewherethecountry .

Fundingforhumanitarianprogrammesin

DRChasrisendramaticallyfrom$150millionin

2002to$650in2008 .Levelsofdevelopmentas-

sistancehavefluctuatedoverthesameperiod,

buthaveconsistentlybeen5-10timesgreater

thanhumanitarianassistance .174

Defining Vulnerability and Aid Priorities in DRC

Defining Vulnerability and Setting Response Priorities

ItisimportantinacontextlikeDRCto

distinguishacuteandchronicvulnerability,and

theriskfactorsthatunderlieeach .Acutevulner-

ability,orexposuretoshort-termhazard,tends

tobelinkedinDRCtolocalizedviolence,mass

displacement,naturalhazardsandepidemics .

Thisformofvulnerabilityfluctuatesovertime

andbetweendifferentareasandpopulations,

thoughpeopleintheEasthavebeenrepeat-

edlyexposedinthisway .Chronicvulnerability,

174 Source: OECD DAC


orexposuretopersistenthazard,relatesto

multipleinteractingfactors,includinggeneral-

isedinsecurity,poorhealthandnutrition,fragile

livelihoodsandlong-termdisplacement .These

arefactorsthat,ratherthanrepresentingacriti-

caldeviationfromthenorm,havebecomethe

prevailingnormformany .

Bothkindsofvulnerabilityareinlargepart

afunctionofstructuralfactors:weakorabusive

governance,corruption,impunityandthefail-

ureofbasicstatefunctions(includingsecurity

andruleoflaw),combinedwiththecommon

featuresofunder-developmentandpoverty:

grossdisparitiesinwealthdistribution,weak

infrastructure,lackofaccesstoservices,andso

on .Thereisastrongsocialdimensiontoboth

kindsofvulnerability—particularlyrelatingto

gender,ageandethnicity—thoughthelackof

disaggregateddatamakesithardtodrawmany

firmconclusionsinthisregard .

Oneofthefeaturesthatmakeitdifficultto

designappropriatehumanitariananddevelop-

mentresponsesinDRCisthecomplexoverlay-

ingofacuteandchronicvulnerability .Theuse

oftheterm“crisis”todescribethesituationin

thewholeofDRC,oreventhesituationinthe

easternprovinces,isinmanywaysmisleading .

Itimpliesaconstantstateofacutevulnerability .

ButwhatcharacterisesDRCistheextraordinary

extentofchronicvulnerability,evidencedin

chronicallyhighlevelsofmortality,morbidity

andacutemalnutrition .Thiscoupledwith(for

many)constantexposuretoviolentinsecurity

resultsinasituationwherecrisis—inthesense

ofadangerousdeviationfromthenorm—is

nolongeranadequateterm .Pocketsofcrisis

(or“emergencies”)canbeidentifiedwithinthe

prevailingnorm .Inmanyways,neitherhumani-

tariannordevelopmentapproachesasnormally

understoodarewelladaptedtothiskindofcon-

text .Thispointisexploredfurtherbelow .

Fivecross-cuttingstrategicobjectivesare

identifiedinthecommonHumanitarianAction

PlanforDRC:

(i)Protect&assistIDPs,returned/relocated/

repatriatedfamilies&hostcommunities

(ii)Strengthentheprotectionofcivilian

populations

(iii)Reducemortalityandmorbidity

(iv)Restorelivelihoods

(v)Promotenear-termcommunityrecovery .

Thechoiceofthesecategoriesreflects

judgementsaboutprevailingvulnerabilitiesand

threats .Italsorecognisesthe(limited)rolethat

humanitarianactioncanplayinthereductionof

chronicvulnerabilityandthepromotionofresil-

ience .IntherelatedNeedsAnalysisFramework,

five“actionthresholds”havebeenidentifiedin

ordertoguideresponses .Thesearebasedon:

• Mortalityandmorbidity

• Acutemalnutrition

• Incidenceofviolence

• Populationdisplacements

• Populationreturns

Ineachcase,athresholdforactionisspeci-

fied(e .g .U5MR>2/10,000/day) .Thesethresh-

oldscorrespondtotheidentifiedmajorcauses

ofhighmortalityinthecountry,andhavethus

beenagreedastriggersforhumanitarianre-

sponseanywhereinthecountry .Resulting

fromthisanalysis,the“humanitarianmaps”

presentedintheHumanitarianActionPlan

(HAP)in2008differedfromthoseofprevious

years .Ratherthanconcentratingonthezones

ofactiveconflictintheeasternprovinces,the

humanitariancommunityintheDRCwasasked

torespondtothevariousemergencypockets

identifiedthroughtheactionthreshold,wher-

evertheseneedsmaybepresent .

Tosomeextent,this“threshold”approach

avoidstheproblemassociatedwithdistinguish-

ingacuteandchronicvulnerability .Infocus-

ingonsymptomsandoutcomes,itpointsto

interventionsthattackletheproximaterather

thanstructuralcausesofvulnerability .Giventhe

scaleofthedevelopmentneedsandtheneces-

sarylimitsofhumanitarianaction,thismaybe

inevitable .Butitalsoservestohighlighttheim-

mense(andlargelyunaddressed)challengeof

tacklingstructuralcauses .

Perhapsthemostimportantfeatureofthe

HAPisthat,ratherthantakingtheindividual


sectors/clustersasthebasisofanalysisand

planning(asinmostCAPs),itfocuseson

cross-cuttingoutcomesofconcern(thestra-

tegicobjectives) .Theapproachofeachof

thesectors/clustersisthenconsideredac-

cordingtoitsrelevancetotheoutcome/ob-

jective .Whilenotpresentingafullyworked

outanalyticalframeworkforachievingthis,

itneverthelessrepresentsaconsiderable

advanceonsector-basedapproaches .Given

theverylimitedextentofimpactassessment

inDRC,itremainstobedemonstratedthat

thisleadsinpracticetomorecomplementary

programmingandmoreeffectivemulti-sec-

toralinterventions;butanecdotalevidence,

atleast,suggeststhatitleadstosignificantly

moreeffectivepracticethanpreviously .

Theeffectsofviolenceandpoliticalin-

stabilityremainthesinglebiggestvariable

factoraffectingboththegeneralpopula-

tionandthoseplanningaidorinvestment

programmes .Theuncertaintythiscreates

affectstheabilitytoplanateverylevel,and

isitselfaformofvulnerabilityandinsecurity .

Wheneveryventure(includingaid)ispoten-

tiallyhighrisk,thebusinessofintervention

becomesoneofweighingtheriskofaction

againsttheconsequencesofinaction .Itfol-

lowsthatjointriskanalysisisanessential

componentofjointplanning .

Approaches to Food Security in DRCDRCfacesproblemswithallthreedimen-

sionsoffoodsecurity:availability,accessand

utilisation .175Thecountryusedtobefood

self-sufficient,butitlastexportedfoodinthe

1960s .Someareasremainproductive,but

oncurrenttrendsitwilltakeuntil2060toget

backtothelevelofthe1960s .Ahighpropor-

tionofpeople(exactfiguresarenotavailable)

producetheirownfood;butthereisgenerally

littleincentivetoproducesurplusgivenlack

ofaccesstomarkets .Purchasingpowerhas

175 For a full “baseline” analysis of food security in DRC, see the WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) report of July 2008.

fallendramaticallyoverthepast18monthswith

theriseinfoodprices;particularlysincelabour-

ersarepaidinfrancsbuttradersdealindollars .

TheCongolesefrancisreportedtohavelost

some40%ofitsvalueagainstthedollar .

The2007WFPProtractedReliefandRe-

coveryOperation,drawingonthePoverty

ReductionStrategyforDRC,putthepercent-

ageoffoodinsecurepeopleinthecountryat

70percentofthepopulation .Thesamesource

identifiesa30–40%decreaseinfoodcrop

production(itdoesnotsayoverwhatperiod);

afallinfoodconsumption,whichisnowputat

1,650kcalperpersonperdaycomparedwith

arequirementof2,300kcal/person/day;and

increasedmalnutritionlevelsamongbothchil-

drenandadults .

The2007PRROdocumentstatesthat“in

theabsenceofanyrecentexhaustivesurvey,

thecurrentnutritionalsituationcannotbeac-

curatelyassessed”thoughitidentifiesthenu-

tritionalsituationasbeingparticularlyserious

intheconflictzones:Ituri,Nord-KivuandSud-

Kivu,ManiemaandnorthandcentralKatanga,

where“fightingcontinuestocausemassive

populationmovementsaffectinghousehold

foodsecurity .”SincethePRROwaslaunched,

numeroussurveysindicatelevelsofmalnutri-

tioninother(non-conflict)areasinthecentre

ofcountryasequallyserious .The2009HAP

recordsthat:

In the course of the 59 nutritional studies

undertaken in the DRC between January

and August [2008], 28 nutritional emergen-

cies were identified (acute malnutrition

rate above 5%), including a majority in the

western provinces. This distribution shows

that while acute malnutrition in the conflict

zones must be closely monitored, it is also

important to take into account the zones af-

fected by chronic food insecurity in the west-

ern provinces. The results … [indicate] a

similar level of vulnerability to acute [nu-

trition] crises in all parts of the country,

including the capital. [emphasisadded]


Thisfindingisperhapsunsurprisinggiven

thelevelofresourcescommittedtofoodas-

sistanceintheeasternprovinces .Toaccept

thisastheexplanationastowhythenon-

conflictareasappeartosufferlevelsofacute

foodinsecuritycomparabletoorworsethan

thoseinconflictareasistoassumethatfood

assistance(predominantlyfoodaid)hasmade

asignificantimpactonacutemalnutrition

levelsintheEast .Thismaybeso,thoughthe

relativelackofcredibleimpactanalysismakes

itdifficulttoestablish .Whatisclearisthatthe

availablecapacitytorespondto(orprevent/

mitigate)nutritionalcrisesintheEastisfar

greaterthaninotherareas,giventhelevel

ofresources,numberofagencies,etc .Italso

seemsclearthat,thoughthetriggersofnutri-

tionalcrisesmayberatherdifferentinconflict

andnon-conflictareas,thesameunderlying

factorsbehindfoodinsecurity(poverty,isola-

tion,etc .)affectallareas .

WFP PRRO (10608.0): Targeted Food Aid for Victims of Armed Conflict and Other Vulnerable Groups

Numberofbeneficiaries

1styear: 1,120,690

2ndyear: 2,159,950

3rdyear: 1,765,980

Totalnumberofbeneficiaries(30months)

3,367,770(66percentwomen)

Durationofproject30months

(1July–31December2009)

WFPfoodtonnage210,084mt

Cost (United States dollars)

WFPfoodcost 71,830,601

TotalcosttoWFP 230,874,212

ThegoalofPRRO10608 .0istohelpto

reducehungerandpovertyinaconflict

andpost-conflictcontextbyprovidingfood

aidfor3 .4millionpeoplefromJuly2007to

December2009 .

AsappearsfromthefiguresinthePRRO

descriptionabove,thecostoffoodaiddeliv-

eryinDRCisveryhigh .176AsthePRROputsit

“WFP’s logistics in DRC are complex and costly

because of the size of the country, the poor

state of roads, air, river and rail communica-

tions, the numerous supply corridors and the

distances between them and the shortage of

reliable transporters. WFP’s intervention areas

are generally remote; the limited capacity of the

commercial transport sector is likely to result in

high costs.Muchofthecostrelatestooverland

truckingoffoodoriginatinginneighbouring

countries,anditisnotablethatthereisaneg-

ligibleamountofin-countrypurchase .WFP’s

newroleasheadofthelogisticsclusterand

leadsupplieroflogisticsservicespresumably

allowssomeeconomiesofscale,andithas

recentlyintroducedanairtransportservicefor

aidpersonnel .

ThePRROdocumentrecordsthemaincon-

clusionsfroma2006processofjointevaluation

offoodsecurityandnutrition,subsequentdis-

cussionandfieldverificationvisits .Fourmajor

themeswerehighlighted:

i)The impact of mass displacement on

food security:“Looting and chronic insecurity

have caused major population movements and

prevented those who stayed behind from pro-

ducing food. An optimistic scenario assumes that

populations will return, but the situation is still

precarious in the Ituri, Katanga and Maniema tri-

angle. The ratio of displaced people to returnees

will depend on the level of security that the new

authorities can guarantee.”Intheevent,newdis-

placementsin2008/9haveseenoverallestimat-

ednumbersofdisplacedpeoplerisefrom1 .1to

1 .35million,despiteasignificantlevelofreturn

ofthosepreviouslydisplaced .The“optimistic

scenario”inthePRRO—onthebasisofwhichit

wasinfactplanned—wasovertakenbyevents .

ii)Food availability and access. Despite

DRC’s“enormousagriculturalpotential,”crop

176 Average internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs for the project are given as US$353.49/mt in the PRRO.


productionisestimatedtohavefallen30–40

percent .ThisisattributedinthePRROtoavari-

etyoffactors:

• Continuouspopulationmovements

• Reductionofcultivatedareasbecauseof

insecurity

• Degradationofinfrastructuresleadingto

limitedaccesstomarkets

• Lackoftechnicalassistanceforfarmers

• Limitedaccesstofarmtoolsandinputs

• Lowcropyieldsandthespreadofcassava

mosaicdisease .

• Lootingoftoolsandfoodstocks .

Itisapparentthatonlyafewofthesefac-

torsareamenabletoaidsolutions .Mostliebe-

yondthecapacityofaidagenciestoinfluence,

atleastintheshortterm;andtheprevalenceof

insecurityandlootingrenderanyfoodproduc-

tioninputspotentiallyfutile,atleastintheEast .

Inotherwords,eventhemoreimmediatecaus-

esoflowfoodproductioninDRC(andcertainly

thestructuralcauses)arecurrentlydifficultor

impossibletotacklethroughaidinterventions .

iii)Household access to food, lifestyles

and survival strategies. ThePRROdescribes

copingstrategiesastendingtobe“highly

improvised,”particularlybyIDPsandrefugees

withlimitedmeansofsubsistencecompared

withhostpopulations .“In most cases they lack

access to land and subsist by selling labour or

gathering wild foods. Displaced groups live in

camps or host families and are entirely depend-

ent on them.”

Withashifttowardssupportforhostfami-

liessince2007,thismaynolongerbetrue .But

asinmostsuchcontexts,theextentandnature

oftheburdenonhostfamiliesremainslittle

understoodandhardtoassess .Levelsofde-

pendenceonaidamongcamppopulationsis

variable,butthefactthatmanydisplacedfami-

liesareonlypartlyreliantonaidisevidencedby

widespread(thoughunquantified)saleoffood

rationsandtheapparentlynon-criticaleffect

ofWFPreducingrationsfrom100%to50%for

thosewhohavebeeninMugungacampmore

than3months .

iv)Nutrition, food and health. The2006

jointmissionfoundthat“at the national level,

global acute malnutrition is 13 percent; stunting

is 38 percent, but there are major differences

between regions. The joint mission noted that

extreme poverty restricts households’ access

to food and is a major cause of the high rate of

malnutrition. Access to food is limited in terms

of quantity and quality: 30 percent of the popu-

lation eat one meal a day or less; 60 percent eat

no more than two meals a day. Meals are gener-

ally the same and consist of cassava or corn.”

Onthehealthsituation,thereportnotes

that“The rate of maternal mortality is among the

highest in the world — 1,000 deaths per 100,000

live births. The main causes of morbidity and

mortality are malaria, acute respiratory infections,

tuberculosis (TB), diarrhoea and malnutrition.”

Inadditiontopoorgeneralpublichealth,

thereportnotesthat“women and children are

regularly exposed to sexual abuse by soldiers.

This contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS,

prevalence of which reaches 4.5 percent — 20

percent among women subjected to sexual

abuse; 400,000 people affected by HIV/AIDS

need medical care and nutritional support. DRC

currently has 3 million orphans and abandoned

children, including 1 million AIDS orphans.”

The2007PRROhasundergonetwosub-

sequentrevisionsinthelightofchangingcir-

cumstances .Itisaveryambitiousprogramme

onanyanalysis—someofthoseinterviewed

judgeditoverlyambitious .Itisbeyondthe

scopeofthisreporttocommentfurther,except

tonotethataprogrammeofthissizeandcom-

plexityplacesgreatstrainsontheavailableca-

pacityanditisveryhardtogaugeitscontinued

effectivenessandappropriatenessinthelight

ofshiftingvulnerabilities .

The International Humanitarian Response in DRC

“There are few places on earth where the

gap between humanitarian needs and avail-

able resources is as large — or as lethal — as in

Congo” (Jan Egeland, former UN ERC).


Althoughlevelsofhumanitarianfunding

toDRChaveincreaseddramaticallyoverthe

past5years,mostofthoseinterviewedcon-

sideredthattheamountsinvolvedremained

grosslyinadequatetocovertheneeds—

thoughmanyconstruedneedinthiscontext

asextendingbeyondthe“humanitarian”ina

restrictivesense .177

AstheExecutiveSummarytothe2009

HAPmakesclear,thehumanitariansarealso

concernedaboutthequestionof“sustainabil-

ity”ofaid .Afterareviewofinterventionssince

2006,itwasconcludedthat:

Humanitarian action is effective when it

responds to basic needs at the outset of a cri-

sis. However, it is not very appropriate during

the prolongation of the crisis, particularly if the

beneficiaries are displaced people living within

a host community or in isolated sites. The

humanitarian actors have noted an increasing

need to:

a. Strengthen the traditional coping mecha-

nisms of the Congolese populations, par-

ticularly for host communities in charge of

displaced people;

b. Limit the dependency on humanitarian aid

and favour durable solutions by providing

beneficiaries with the means to progres-

sively take charge of themselves.

Thisanalysisisfleshedoutinthemain

text,whichidentifiestheproblemofcontinued

vulnerabilityto“newcrises”asaresultofthe

failuretoaddressrootcauses .“To confront

this situation, and eventually reduce humani-

tarian aid in the DRC, the actors hope:

a. To strengthen the capacities of the af-

fected communities to confront new crises

through actions beyond emergency aid;

b. To establish, in collaboration with the

development actors, an early warning

mechanism facilitating the identification

of communities likely to be affected by

177 See for example “Sur quelle base? Document de reflexion, Oxfam RDC” 2009 which critiques current approaches as being based on criteria other than need, resulting in distortions and a failure to address urgent needs in areas other than those affected by conflict.

humanitarian crises, and humanitarian or

development aid to prevent them;

c. Advocate with the Congolese government

and the development actors in favour of

reorienting the microeconomic devel-

opment programmes towards the crisis

zones, which hamper sustainable develop-

ment.”

TheHAPthereforeincludestwonew

strategiesfor2009 .“The first is the restoration

of livelihoods of the populations and com-

munities in crisis situations, essentially through

activities linked to food security, which allow

the victims to take charge of themselves. The

second is short term community recovery,

including a multi sector strategy of post or

pre crisis actions, complementing the micro-

economic development programmes. Without

results with regard to these objectives, the

humanitarian actors will have to remain indefi-

nitely in the DRC.”

Thereareanumberofpropositionshere

thatareopentochallenge .Thislineofthink-

ingreflectsthedominantparadigmof“linking

reliefanddevelopment”andthemorerecent

formulationof“earlyrecovery .”Thesentiments

expressedrestonhighlydoubtfulpropositions

bothaboutdependencyandaboutthecapac-

ityofpeopleto“takechargeofthemselves”

(astrangelypatronisingphrase—whois“in

charge”ofthemnow?) .Thereasonpeople

inDRCdonotrecoverisnotbecausethey

havebecomedependentonhumanitarian

assistanceandneedtobeweanedoffit .The

languagesuggeststhataidisakindofdrug,

peddledbyhumanitarians,towhichtherecipi-

entshavebecomeaddictedandwhichrenders

themhelpless .Thislineofthoughtmaysatisfy

aself-criticalimpulseonthepartofaidwork-

ersbutitdoesnotreflectreality,anditmis-

representsthepartthataidplaysinpeople’s

lives .178Hereasinmostcontexts,aidisoneofa

varietyofmeansbywhichpeople(eventhose

incamps)meettheirbasicrequirements .

178 See Harvey and Lind, 2006 — ODI


Thephrasetake charge of themselves

presumablyreferstoeconomicself-sufficien-

cy,butitimpliesanupwardtrajectoryinpeo-

ple’sfortunes(oncethey“comeoff”aid)that

isnotindicatedbythecurrenteconomicand

politicaltrendsinthecountry .Indeedmanyof

theassumptionsthatunderliethe“earlyre-

covery”paradigmappeartobechallengedin

theDRCcontext .Thereisnoinexorablepath

fromreliefthroughrecoverytodevelopment .

Theexpectationthatpeoplewillrecoveronce

agreaterdegreeof“normality”isrestored

dependsonthatnormalitybeingoneinwhich

safetyandaviablelivelihoodareachiev-

able .Formanypeople,inmanypartsofthe

country,thatdoesnotappeartobethecase;

indeed,manypeopleareincreasinglyimpov-

erishedandinsecure .

Itisdoubtfulwhether“copingmecha-

nisms”istheappropriatetermhere .But

preventingexistingsurvivalstrategies—

includingassetsaleanddebt—frombe-

comingundulydetrimentaltothemedium

andlonger-termwelfareofthehouseholds

concernedisclearlyapriority .Atthemost

extremeend,many“survivalstrategies”in

DRClooklikeanaccommodationtoformsof

abuse(sexualviolence,looting)perpetrated

onthosewhohaverunoutofsafeoptions .

Suchpracticesclearlyfallinthecategoryof

thingsfromwhichpeopleneedprotection .

Thatprotectionmayconsistpartlyofprovid-

ingsaferalternatives,includingsafeflight

optionswherenecessary;anditlieslargelyin

therealmoflawenforcementandeffective

areaprotectionbygovernmentforcesand

MONUC .Tacklingthesourceofthethreat

(e .g .byfeedingthepredatoryarmyorpaying

theiroverduesalaries)maybeanunpalatable

andinsufficientbutnecessarystep .

UnderlyingthesentimentsintheHAP

isastatedconcernwith“sustainability,”and

anapparentconvictionthathumanitarianas-

sistanceisitselfinherently“unsustainable .”It

isnotclearwhy .Ithasbeensustained(more

orless)forthepast15yearsintheEast,and

indeedhasincreasedsignificantlyinthepast5

years .Overthattime,forallitsinadequacies,

ithasprobablysavedmanylives,keptmany

inreasonablehealthandpreventedliveli-

hoodsfromcompletecollapse .Inmanyways

itperforms(howeverimperfectly)theroleofa

welfaresafetynet,intheabsenceofanysuch

provisionbythegovernment .Whileno-one

wouldarguewiththedesire(expressedinthe

sametext)toeventually reduce humanitarian

aid in the DRC,thismustsurelybepremisedon

theneedforsuchassistanceitselfreducing .It

isveryhardtodefendthepropositionthathu-

manitarianaidis“notveryappropriateduring

theprolongationofthecrisis”intheabsence

ofaneffectivealternative .Ifwhatismeantis

thatitdoesnotgetat“rootcauses,”fewwould

disagree;butthatdoesmakeitinappropriate

orunsustainable .Onthecontrary,formanyit

hasprovedanessentiallifeline .

Nevertheless,thefailuretoevolveand

adapthumanitarianapproachesovertime

isopentocriticism .Itwaspointedoutby

someofthoseinterviewedthatagencies

havea“vestedinterest”incontinuingtheir

programmes,perhapsexhibitingaformof

dependenceoftheirown .Atanyrate,inDRC

andothercontexts(includingDarfurinSudan)

wherehumanitarianassistanceisprovidedover

longperiods,thereappearstobeatendency

toreplicateapproachesyearonyearwithout

takingdueaccountofchangesintheenviron-

mentandthepotentialforalternative(prefera-

ble)approaches .Itwasnotpossibleinthiscase

studytoassesstheextentofthistendency,but

itwasacknowledgedbymanyoftheagency

staffinterviewed .Partoftheproblemisthe

limitedextenttowhichstaffareencouraged

andauthorisedtoberesponsivetochangein

theenvironment—andtorecognisewhere

assistanceofaparticularkindmaybebecom-

ingaproblemratherthanasolution .Theaid

recipientsthemselvesmayalsoberesistantto

change,whichcomplicatestheissue .Aidin

thesecontextsbecomespartoftheenviron-

mentinwhichpeoplemakedecisions .


Wherethepotentialexiststoassistpeople

inre-buildingeffectivelivelihoodsandattain-

ingself-sufficiency,mostofthoseinterviewed

agreedthatitwouldbeirresponsiblenotto

attempttodoso,andthiswasanappropriate

goalforatleastpartofthe“expanded”hu-

manitarianagenda .Thisshouldnotentailsim-

plycuttingbackaidentitlements,althoughit

maybeappropriatetochangetheaidpackage

inconjunctionwithothermeasurestoboost

self-sufficiency .Thequestionofwhoprovides

aid,andtheroleandresponsibilityofthegov-

ernmentinthatregard,wasfeltbysometobea

significantissue .Therewassomeconcernthat

thecontinuedexpectationthattheinternational

systemwoulddeliverbasicserviceswouldun-

dermineattemptstoestablishtheroleofthe

governmentasserviceprovider—andinawid-

ersense,therefore,underminethefragilesocial

contract .Thereweredangers,inotherwords,

infillingthevacuumofstateprovision .Thebrief

visitonwhichthisstudyisbasedwasenough

toshowhowfarremovedthecurrentsituation

isfromoneinwhichthestateisestablishedthe

mainserviceprovider .Thereseemstobeno

prospectofthischangingintheshorttermor

eventhemediumterm .

Allofthoseinterviewedforthisstudywere

askedthecounterfactualquestion:whatwould

happenifyou(andotheraidagencies)werenot

here?Themajority,atleastonthefoodsecurity

side,feltthattheresultwouldnotbecata-

strophic .Peoplewouldfindotherwaysofmeet-

ingtheirneeds,thoughitwouldhaveanimpact

onoverallpovertylevels .Thisperspectiveon

foodsecuritywasinfluencedbytherelative

naturalabundanceofmostoftheareascon-

cerned .Onlyinthehealthsectordidallthose

interviewedfeelthattheimpactofwithdrawing

internationalserviceswouldbecatastrophic,

particularlyinrelationtothelossofvaccination

coverage .Somefeltthatthelackoninterna-

tionalagencypresencewouldrenderpeople

evenmorevulnerabletoviolenceandcoercion

(thoughthatopiniondidnotalwaysextendto

thepresenceofMONUC) .Allagreedthatthere

wouldinanycasebeamajordownturninthe

localeconomyandinlevelsofemployment:the

aidmachineisgoodforbusiness .

Strategic and Operational Challenges of Operating in DRC

Multiple Agendas and the Search for Strategic Coherence

Incommonwithother“fragile”states,inter-

nationalaidpolicyinDRChastobeunderstood

aspartofawiderspectrumofpolicyconcerns

that,inthecaseofDRC,includeregionalsecu-

rityasacorecomponent .Thepotentiallydesta-

bilisingeffectofapoliticallyvolatileDRChas

beendemonstratedrepeatedlyintheperiod

sincethemid-1990s .ThefactthatDRC’sneigh-

bourshavesometimesexacerbatedthatinstabil-

ityandchosentoexploittheresultingchaosfor

theirownpurposesdoesnotnegatethis .Butit

pointstoakeyfactorinthecountry’sstability—

namely,thesupportofneighbouringstates,no-

tablyRwandaandUganda,forthemainstream

political“project”oftheKinshasaauthorities,

andinparticularforthecounter-insurgencypro-

grammedesignedtoeliminatetheviolentop-

position(oropportunism)ofrebelmilitia,some

ofwhomoperateacrossinternationalborders .

Acentralaspectofthecurrent“stabilisa-

tion”agenda(tousethecurrentinternational

jargon,nowalsoadoptedbytheDRCgovern-

ment)involvesMONUCasadirectallyinthe

government’scounter-insurgencycampaignin

theEast .Someoftheissuesassociatedwiththis

relatingtoperceptionsofneutralityweremen-

tionedabove .Afurtherdimensionrelatestothe

rationaleforaidprogramming .Itisclearfrom

interviewsconductedwithdonorrepresenta-

tives,MONUCandagencystaffthatconcern

withwinning“heartsandminds”representsa

significantdriverforinternationaldonorsand

governmentalike .Whileitwasnotpossibleto

judgetheextenttowhichthishadinpractice

“skewed”thedeliveryofassistance(contrary

totheprincipleofimpartiality),ithighlightsthe

challengesoftryingtopursuemultipleagendas


governedbypotentiallycontradictoryprinci-

ples .AnecdotalevidencerangedfromWFP

“beingtoldbyMONUCwheretodistribute

food”179toagencystaffbeingde-prioritisedfor

availableplacesontransportinfavourofmili-

tarypersonnel .Whilethehumanitarianagen-

ciesareworkingtotheHAPpriorities,MONUC

isworkingtoother(stabilisation)priorities .

Arguably,theheavyweightingofassistance

towardstheEastern(conflict-affected)provinc-

esrepresentsadistortionwhenjudgedagainst

observedneedsintherestofthecountry .180But

thisisinpartatleastafunctionofthehumani-

tarianjudgementthatconflict-affectedanddis-

placedpopulationsfacemoreacuterisks .Italso

reflectsthemandatesoftheagenciesinvolved,

manyofwhicharebasedaroundresponse

toconflictanddisplacement .Theimmediate

causesoffoodinsecurityandotherthreatsto

well-beingareeasiertoidentifyandrespondto

intheEast .Foralltheinsecurity,itisalsoarela-

tivelyeasierplacetooperateinlogisticalterms

thansomeotherareas .

Thestabilisationagendaitselfhastobeset

inthewidercontextofpeace-buildingandthe

consolidationoftheprocessthatbroughtabout

anewadministrationin2006 .Thisislargely

beyondthescopeofthecurrentpaper,but

thinkingaboutpeacesetsthecontextformuch

thinkingaboutaid .Inarecentpaper,181the

CrisisGroupidentifyfiveprioritiesforapeace-

buildingstrategyfortheeasternCongo:

1) Acredibleandcomprehensivedisarma-

mentstrategyfordealingwithRwandan

HuturebelsinbothNorthandSouthKivu;

2) Resumingsecuritysystemreformwitha

newfocusonbuildingcapacityandac-

countabilityintheKivusaswellasOrientale

province;

3) Aspecificplanforfosteringreconciliation

andhumansecuritythatconcentrateson

179 Subsequent enquiries indicate that this is not general practice, and is not a policy endorsed by either MONUC or WFP. The comment cited should be read in this context.

180 See Oxfam paper “Sur quelle base?” cited above

181 May 2009, Crisis Group

judicialaccountabilityandtherequire-

mentsofrefugeeandIDPreturnandre-

integration;

4) Politicalengagementdedicatedtoim-

provinggovernancethroughincreased

economictransparency,equitabletaxation,

decentralisationandlocalelections;and

5) Continuingeffortstosustainstableregion-

alrelations .

TheCrisisGroupdoesnotseeanyimmedi-

atelesseningoftherequirementforinternation-

alengagement .Onthecontrary,“International

engagement and support for peace-building

in the Congo at least through the 2011 elec-

tions needs to be maintained… with a view to

implementing a roadmap that defines precisely

the role and responsibility of each partner and

the benchmarks to be met so that the process

becomes irreversible. Only then should the

UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) begin its

drawdown.”Whatseemsclearisthatthistran-

sitionwilldependinpartonthegovernment

demonstratinganabilitytoassumeeffective

responsibilityfortheprovisionofsecurityand

thedeliveryofbasicservices .

The2009HAPdoesagoodjobofbring

greatercoherencetothehumanitarianagenda

and(toalimitedextent)ofdefiningtheinterface

betweenthisandthedevelopmentagenda .

Perhapsunsurprisingly,ithasmuchlesstosay

abouttheinterfaceswithstabilisation,peace-

buildingandrelatedpolicyagendas .Itdoesnot

purporttobeanoverarchingpolicyframework

forinternationalintervention,andindeeditis

unlikelythatconsensuscouldbefoundforsuch

aframework .Theresultisthattheoverallstrat-

egyofthevariousinternationalactorshasto

begleanedfromavarietyofsources(including

SecurityCouncilresolutions)whilethejobof

workingoutthepracticalimplicationsofthese

multiplestrategiesandrelatedplansfallslargely

totheactorsontheground .Thisismostobvi-

ouslyapparentwithinMONUC,wheremultiple

agendas(civilandmilitary)arecombinedinways

which,accordingtothoseinterviewed,itstrug-

glestomakesenseofinternally .


Beyondthesecurity,humanitarianand

developmentagendas,muchofwhatactually

shapestheenvironmentinDRCarethecompet-

ingcommercialandpropertyinterestsandthe

struggleforcontrolofland .InDRCmorethan

perhapsanyothercountry,thenatureofthe

conflicthasbeendeterminedbythedesireto

controlnaturalresources .Thisoverliesthecom-

petitionoverlandrightsamongstindigenous

groups,whosedisputeshavebeenexploitedin

thewartocontrolresources .

Whileitisbeyondthescopeofthispaperto

explorethistopicfurther,theroleofChinaasa

majornewinvestorandspeculatorinDRCshould

bementioned .Thismaybringmuchneededin-

vestment,butsomehaveinvokedthespectreof

imperialland-grabsinthe“ScrambleforAfrica .”

TheInternationalFundforAgriculturalDe-

velopment(IFAD)notedin2002thattheCongo

basinwassubjecttodeforestationcausedby

uncontrolledtimberloggingandincreasing

demandforfuel-wood .Thislackofregulation

hasmajorimplicationsforDRC’sfuturedevel-

opmentprospects,andsomeimmediateim-

plicationsforwhatconstitutesresponsiblepro-

gramming .WFP,forexample,hasaprogramme

supportingreforestationandtheconstruction

ofimprovedstovesinallprimaryschoolsben-

efitingfromitsschoolfeedingprogrammes .

“In collaboration with the Government and

implementing partners, and principally under

the food security cluster, WFP will develop strat-

egies to preserve forest cover while increasing

production and managing soils and water sus-

tainably.”(2007PRRO)

Security, Protection and RightsAsthestrategicprioritiesintheHAPmake

clear,theprotectionofthecivilianpopulation

fromviolenceandcoercionsitsatthetopof

thehumanitarianagenda .Thisconcernisnot

confinedtotheEast,thoughhereatitsmost

extreme,intheformofkillings,sexualviolence,

forceddisplacementandlooting .Muchofthe

requirementforreliefassistanceisanindirect

resultoftheviolenceperpetratedonthepopu-

lationbythevariousarmedfactions,including

thegovernment’sowntroops .182Thepatternsof

violencedictatetoasignificantdegreetheaid

priorities,thoughtheyalsodictatetheextentto

whichareasaredeemedsafetoaccessforaid

workerswhoarethemselvesvulnerabletoat-

tack .Thisleadstoafamiliarparadox:thatthose

whomaymostrequireassistancemaybethe

leastabletoaccessit .Thequestionofaccessis

consideredfurtherbelow .

Whilethispaperisnotconcernedprimarily

withprotection,itiscentraltothehumanitarian

agendaand(asnotedabove)thereareimpor-

tantlinkswithreliefassistance .Whatconstitutes

effectiveprotectionstrategyinsuchcontexts

islargelybeyondourscope .TheCrisisGroup

papercitedabovemakesthepointthatpolitical

actionasmuchas(ormorethan)armedforceis

essentialtoaneffectiveinternationalstrategy

ofengagementforprotection .“During the

October-November 2008 crisis in North Kivu,

when a humanitarian catastrophe threatened in

and around Goma, robust political engagement

with national and regional actors did more than

troops on the ground to protect civilians.” [opcit] .

Protectionofciviliansoccupiesanambigu-

ousspaceinthehumanitarianagenda .Onthe

onehanditisagreedtobeacentralconcern;

ontheother,thereisconsiderabledoubtasto

theproperresponsebyhumanitarianagencies .

Therearestrictlylimitedmeansbywhichsuch

agenciescanprovideprotectioninanydirect

sense .Thewayinwhichassistanceisprovided

cancertainlyaffectpeople’ssecurity,buttoa

largeextentsecurityliesinthehandsofoth-

ers .Thisquestionofwhocanprotectandwho

isresponsibleisadifficultone .TheProtection

ClusterinDRC,forexample,lobbiesMONUCto

protectciviliansincamps .Butthelocalauthori-

tiesandtheFARDChaveformalresponsibility

forsecurityincamps—andtheyarenotpartof

theProtectionCluster .Moreimportantly,they

182 Although the figures for excess mortality given by the IRC surveys (cited above) are disputed, most agree that large numbers of people have died as an indirect consequence of the war, principally through disease and malnutrition.


arethemselveslargelyheldresponsibleforthe

veryinsecurityfromwhichpeopleneedprotec-

tion,andimpunityforabuseisrife .

Itisclearthatintheattempttoprotect

themselves,peopleareforcedtoadoptstrat-

egiesthatareharmfulanddangerous .They

reachanaccommodationwithagivenarmed

faction—e .g .byallowingthemtoexactpay-

mentsinkind,lootfields,etc .—reachingakind

ofequilibriumthatinvolvesabusebutatalevel

thatiscontainable .Shiftsinthebalanceofpow-

erandcontrolofterritorydisturbthatequilib-

riumandcreateperiodsofheighteneddanger,

untilanewequilibriumisestablishedwithanew

faction .Thesameistrueofbusinesses,which

regularlypayprotectionmoneytothefactions .

Theresultisasituationofperpetualfearand

uncertainty .Manydisplacementsarereported

toariseonthebackofrumoursratherthanac-

tualattacks;butthethreatsfrom“exactions”

andphysicalattacksarecertainlyreal .

Oneoftheissuescontributingtoinsecu-

rityisconflictoverlandrights .Landissuesare

reportedbyWFPandotherstobe“constantly

raised”bybeneficiaries .Returneesfaceuncer-

taintyaboutbeingabletoreturntotheirland,

particularlysincetheyoftenlacktitledeedsor

formaltenancies .Formalandcustomaryland

rightsmayconflicthere,andmanyfeareviction

bylandlordsorthosewithmineralextraction

rights .Socialfactorsarealsoatplayhere .Wom-

enareunabletoinheritland,andwhatlandis

availabletofamiliesgetssplitintoeversmaller

parcelsassonsinherittheirfathers’land .

Planning and Needs AnalysisWFP’s2007PRROplanisexplicitlyprem-

isedonasetofpredictedscenarios,expressed

asfollows:

The international community expects

that the situation will gradually stabilize

and that returning populations will need

assistance to resettle. The Government

will have to enhance all available mecha-

nisms to consolidate the peace and pro-

mote sound governance and sustainable

development. It will need to embark on

reconstruction programmes to enable

people to access social services such as

health, education and transport and to

resume their normal activities.

In the worst-case scenario, conflict

would continue in the east, with the risk

of entire regions being involved. Vol-

canic eruptions, drought and floods are

also a source of concern …

The current PRRO is based on an op-

timistic scenario involving progressive

improvement in institutional capacities.

The worst-case scenario will be consid-

ered in re-examining the planning of

emergency operations (EMOPs).

Onthisbasis,WFPseesitsbasicroleas

beingtorespond to emergencies and organ-

ize recovery activities, giving priority support to

internally displaced people and returnees…The

operation will focus on areas at risk of serious

food insecurity, particularly in the east and Ka-

tanga. WFP has closed several of its sub-offices

in the areas less affected by food insecurity and

foresees a reduction in the level of aid in 2009.

Thisraisessomeinterestingquestions

aboutwhatconstitutesarealisticandrespon-

siblebasisforprojectingfutureneedsandde-

signingappropriatestrategiesinsuchvolatile

contexts .The2007PRROclearlyreflectsthe

dominantpoliticalmoodatthetime .Theop-

timismthatinformsitprovedtobesomewhat

misplaced,giventhesubsequentoutbreaksof

majorinsecurityintheKivusandinHautUélé

(anEMOPwaslaunchedinresponsetothe

lattersituation) .Butcrucially,italsoassumes

thingsaboutcapacitiesandthepaceofgovern-

ment-ledreformthatnow(andperhapsatthe

time)lookhighlyover-optimistic .Perhapsthis

iswhatWFPthoughtitsdonorswantedtohear,

butitraisesseriousquestionsaboutthekindof

consensusthatallowssuchpropositionstobe-

comethebasisforplanning .183

183 Afghanistan is another notable example of this tendency towards unrealistic scenario planning.


TheriskassessmentforthePRROacknowl-

edgesthepotentialforthingsnottogoac-

cordingtoplan .Theoperation“will be imple-

mented after the new institutions arising out of

the 2006 elections are established. Any political

blockage would undermine national unity and

lead to a resurgence of hostilities. Fresh popu-

lation movements would take place and ac-

cess to target populations would be reduced.

Benefits stemming from WFP interventions

would be jeopardized, especially the return

and resettlement of IDPs and refugees.”Fresh

populationmovementsdidindeedoccur,but

thefailureofstateinstitutionstodevelopcan-

notbeattributedtopoliticalblockagesorthe

continuingconflict .

Allowingfortheunexpected,thePRRO

makesprovisionfor contingency planningand

situationalmonitoring,includingsentinelsites

establishedwithFAO,stafftraininginemergen-

cypreparedness,provisionforacontingency

plantobeupdatedregularly,andstrategic

foodstockssetupinKampala,Goma,Lubum-

bashiandKinshasa .Whennecessary,priorities

wouldbereassessed:In the event of large-scale

resumption of hostilities and consequent limita-

tion of humanitarian work, WFP will refocus its

assistance on populations directly affected by

the situation; vulnerable groups and malnour-

ished people will be treated in nutritional cen-

tres…In addition to life-saving interventions, the

other components — FFW, emergency school

feeding etc. — will be reviewed in the light of

the situation.

Theoverallprocessofneedsanalysisin

DRCisbasedonacommonneedsassessment

framework(NAF) .Needsassessmentinacon-

textlikethisposessomeobviouschallenges,

particularlyforsurvey-basedassessments .

Populationfigures(includingnumbersofIDPs)

aremuchdebated,providinganuncertainde-

nominatorforcalculationofaidrequirements .

Thatsaid,whiletherearemajorreported

gapsintheavailabledata,moreisnowbeing

investedinthis“diagnostic”aspectofthe

internationalprogramme,includingtheestab-

lishmentofsentinelsites184andepidemiologi-

calsurveillancebyWHO .Togetherwithagreed

action“thresholds,”thesearebeginningtopro-

videafullerpictureofneedsacrossthecountry .

Capacitiesandresourcestotacklethese

needsremaininadequate,thoughthePooled

FundhasallowedtheHC(whooverseesalloca-

tion)totakeactiontodealwithsomeofthe

mostobviousanomaliesbetweenareas .Report-

ingagainstthePooledFundallocationsnow

includesabreakdownofperformanceagainst

target(numbersofbeneficiariesreached),pro-

vidingapotentialbasisforimpact assessment

whichatthemomentislargelyabsent .Thechal-

lengeofreportingagainstoutputsisalready

considerable185;thechallengeofreporting

against outcomesisofadifferentorderagain .

Determiningimpactinvolvesestablishingcor-

relationsandcausalrelationshipsbetweenpro-

grammeinterventionsandobservedoutcomes .

Animportantmid-waystepisidentifyingcor-

relationsbetweenoutcomeindicatorsandrisk

factors,whichcanthenbeaddressedthrough

programmeinterventionsknowntobeeffective

againstthosefactors .Thecapacitytodothisin

DRCisstillrudimentary .

Ultimately,forbothneedsandimpactas-

sessment,acombinationof(reliable)quantita-

tiveandqualitativedataisrequired,including

feedbackfromaidrecipientsandserviceusers;

andameansofgatheringsuchdataonarolling

basis .Butdataaloneisnotuseful:ithastobe

processedinsuchawayastoleadtoaction-

ableconclusions .Theexplanatorymodelsfor

shiftingformsofchronicvulnerabilityarefeltby

manytobeweakorabsent .Asoneinterviewee

said“wearegettingbetteratmeasuring,but

notatanalysing .”

AstrikingfeatureoftheDRCcontextisthe

extenttowhichthemajordonorsengagedirect-

184 Serious concerns were raised in interviews about the quality of the data (about malnutrition, market prices, etc) being generated from these sites. One respondent described it as “very low quality data, very unreliable.”

185 One respondent said, “We are not honest enough about what we actually deliver.”


lyintheplanningandpriority-settingprocess,

aswellasinoversightofprogrammeimplemen-

tation .TheconsensusrepresentedbytheHAP

couldarguablynothavebeenreachedwithout

this .TheGovernmentofDRCispartofthis

consensus,thoughmanyofthoseinterviewed

reporteddifficultiesandfrustrationsinworking

withgovernmentdepartmentsandofficials .The

donorinfluence(particularlythatoftheEU,UK

andUS)iswidelyperceivedaspositive,though

perhapssomeofthoseinterviewedwerebeing

diplomaticintheirresponses .Certainlyithas

influencedtheextentofcoordinationamong

UNagenciesandNGOs,whichisgreaterthanin

mostcomparablecontexts .Asonemajordonor

representativeputit,thisis“multilateralismwith

edge”—acriticallyengagedbutessentially

collaborativemodeofoperating .Judgingby

the(high)leveltowhichappealsarecurrently

funded,thislevelofengagementhasevidently

broughtwithitincreasedlevelsofdonorconfi-

denceinthewholeprocess .

Thereisperhapsadangerof“groupthink”

here .Thesmallerdonorswerefeltbyonein-

tervieweetobe“scaredofgoingagainstthe

consensusview .”Whateverthemeritsofcoor-

dinatedstrategy,itisclearlyessentialthatthe

analysisonwhichitisbasedremainsopento

challengeinthefaceofcontradictoryevidence .

Relatedtothepointaboveisthequestion

oftherelativeindependenceofhumanitarian

NGOsinDRC .Someofthoseinterviewedfelt

thatfundingthroughtheclustersystemhad

ledtoalossofflexibilityandindependenceof

thoughtandactiononthepartoftheNGOs .

Theyhadbecome“implementingpartners,”

focusedondeliverybutnotnecessarilydo-

ingtheirownthinkingandanalysis .Itwasalso

pointedoutbysomethatNGOstendedtohave

a“survival”mentality,needingtojustifyand

sustaintheirowncontinuedpresence—and

thereforeperhapsbeingunwillingtothinktoo

criticallyabouttheroletheywereactuallyplay-

ingandtheaddedvalueoftheirprogrammes .

ThesameisprobablyalsotrueofUNagencies .

Theauthorsnotedadegreeoftirednessand

resignationintheattitudeofsomeofthose

interviewed .Thisisnotunusualinprogrammes

thathavecontinuedforalongtime,butittends

toleadtoalackoffreshthinkingandperhaps

alsosomecarelessnessaboutquality .However,

itisnotpossibletogeneraliseaboutthisandit

isnotedhereasanimpressiononly .Itisanim-

pressionsharedbysomeofthoseinterviewed

forthisstudy .

The Challenge of CoordinationTheintegrated missionstructureofMO-

NUCallowsforaUNHumanitarianCoordinator

whoisalsoDeputySpecialRepresentativeof

theSecretaryGeneral(DSRSG) .Heoverseesthe

designandimplementationofthehumanitarian

strategyembodiedintheHAPwhileworking

withhiscolleaguesontheoverallUNstrategic

prioritiesforDRC .Whethersucharoleisinher-

entlycompromisedasbetweenpoliticaland

humanitariangoalshasbeenmuchdebated,

anddependsonone’sviewastotherelation-

shipbetweenpoliticalandhumanitarianagen-

das .Itdoesatleastensureagreaterdegreeof

programmecoherencethanmightotherwisebe

thecase,andfewwouldquestionthepresent

HC’shumanitariancredentialsorhiscommit-

menttothehumanitariancause .Iftheposition

iscompromiseditisperhapsmostobviouslyin

therequirementnotedabovetoworktoscenar-

iosandprioritiesthatarepoliticallyacceptable

bothtotheDRCgovernmentandtointerna-

tionaldonors .TheHCpositionishardlyunique

inthisrespectwithintheUNsystem .

Thepresenceofanintegratedmissionhas

implicationsforWFPandforotherhumanitar-

ianorganisations .OneOCHArepresentative

saidinrelationtoMONUC“weco-existwith

themratherthancoordinate,”andstressedthe

needtokeepatarmslengthwhereMONUC

was“fightingawar .”Asthejointoperationof

theFARDCandMONUCagainstFDLRinthe

Eastgatherspace,itislikelythat“humanitar-

ianspace”andaccesswoulddecrease .The

NGOswereconcernednottobeseenasthe

aidwingofMONUC(letalonetheFARDC) .


EvenamongsttheUNagencies,engagement

withthebluehelmetsofMONUCwasguarded .

OCHA,UNICEFandWFPdonottakepartin

the“jointprotectionteams .”UNHCRdo,but

theymaketheirownprotectionassessment .

AndwhiletheUNagencieswerereliantonMO-

NUCforarmedescorttoinsecureareas,NGOs

tendedtomaketheirownarrangements .

ThisdistancebetweenMONUCandtheaid

agencieswasalsoperceivedasoneofdiffer-

ingunderstandingaboutpriorities .Asoneaid

agencyrespondentsaid“MONUCseeaidasa

meanstoanend .Theydon’t“get”humanitari-

anism .Theythinkweandtheyhavethesame

goals .”MONUCpersonnel,fortheirpart,were

reportedtobescepticalabouttheaddedvalue

ofthehumanitarianagencies .

DRChasactedasatest-bedformanyof

thehumanitarian reformprocessesofthepast

fewyears—theCERF,theenhancedroleofthe

HC,theuseofpooledfundingmechanismsand

thecoordinationofsector-specificworkthrough

Clusters .Whilethisstudyisnotconcernedwith

thereformprocessesper se,mostofthose

interviewedfeltthatthereforms,takenasa

whole,hadhadabeneficialeffectontheeffec-

tivenesswithwhichtheinternationalcommunity

engagedinthecountry .TheHAPisitselfa

productofabettercoordinatedapproach .In

thesphereoffoodsecurity,WFPandFAOhad

combinedtoformafood“cluster”andthiswas

reportedtobeworkingwell .Somepre-existing

mechanisms,notablytheRapidResponse

MechanismledbyUNICEF(withIRCandSoli-

daritéasimplementingpartners)hadyettobe

properlyreconciledwiththeclusterapproach,

butcontinuedtoplayavitalrole .

Thereisahighlystructuredsetofarrange-

mentsinDRCtobringthevarioushumanitarian

actorstogetheratnational,provincialandlocal

level .AtnationallevelthereisaHumanitarian

AdvocacyGroupchairedbytheHCthatbrings

agenciesanddonorstogether .Attheprovincial

levelistheCPIAthatbringstheIASCagencies

together(UN,RedCross,NGOs) .Thenthere

istheInter-Clustermechanismwhichbrings

theheadsofthevariousclusterstogether,and

belowthattheClustersthemselves .Thework-

ingsandeffectivenessofthesemechanismsis

beyondthescopeofthispaper .Whatisstrik-

ingisthattheyadduptoasystemforsharing

informationanddiscussingresponsepriorities

betweendifferentlevels,bottomupandtop

down .Althoughthereareproblemsateach

level(“wesometimeshavetoprodtheclusters

todrawconclusionsratherthanjustpresent

data”),itneverthelessrepresentsaconsider-

ableadvanceonpreviouspractice .Thefactthat

allworktoacommonhumanitarianactionplan

givesmeaningtoaprocessthatmightother-

wisebesimplybureaucratic .

Programme Approaches“Pure”humanitarianresponserepresents

aminorityoftheworkundertakeninDRC,con-

finedlargelytoemergentnutritionalandhealth

crisesorsuddendisplacements .Asoneinter-

vieweeputit“mosthumanitarianprogramming

inDRCishumanitarianplus”;thatis,itgoes

beyondaconcernwithlife-savingandacute

vulnerability,aimingtoensurepeople’saccess

(atleastintheshortterm)tobasicsubsistence

andtheconditionsforgoodhealth .Itishere

thatthedisjuncturebetweenhumanitarianand

developmentalapproachesismostobvious,the

lattertendingtoinvolveformsofengagement

forwhichtheconditions(atbothmacro-and

micro-levels)appearnotyettoexistinmany

partsofDRC .Theinterfacebetweenhumani-

tariananddevelopmentapproachesremains

unclear,butcurrentapproachesassumeatran-

sitionalphasefromonetotheother .

Theconceptof“earlyrecovery”isusedto

describethistransition,butthereisconsider-

ableuncertaintysurroundingthemeaningof

theterm .Someappeartouseitinterchange-

ablywith“stabilisation,”pointingtosomecon-

ceptualconfusionwithbothterms .ForOCHA,

itrepresentsademarcationpointatwhichthe

humanitarianroleceases .Inthewordsofan

OCHAofficialinGoma:“Forusit’sourexit

strategy .Wheretheindicatorsfallbelowthe


definedthresholdsandstaythere,that’sare-

coverysituation .”TheHumanitarianCoordina-

torRossMountainusesthephrase“slip-back

insurance”todescribetherationaleofearly

recovery;inotherwords,itaimstoensure

thatpeopledonotfallbackintoconditionsof

completedestitution .Inthatsenseitimpliesa

buildingofresiliencetoshocks .Giventhesig-

nificanceoftheearlyrecoveryparadigminboth

agencyanddonorpolicy,boththetheoryand

practiceofearlyrecoveryeffortsdeservecloser

attention .Themainquestionseemstobe

whethersucheffortsarepremisedonvalidas-

sumptionsabouttheprevailingconditions,and

whetherthesearesuchastoallow“recovery”in

thesenseimplied .

Inthiscontext,itisimportanttoconsider

thepreventiveagendaandriskreduction .This

formspartoftherationaleforearlyrecovery,

butdeservesconsiderationinitsownright .

OneOCHAstaffmembergavetheexample

ofcholeraepidemics .“Everyyearthereisa

choleraoutbreakinManiema .Toberesponsi-

blehumanitarians,wehavetoworktoprevent

this,towork“upstream”ofthepotentialcrisis .”

Fewwoulddisagreewiththisinacontextof

repeatedexposuretoacutevulnerability .But

inadditiontoemergencyresponseprepared-

ness,itimpliesawillingnesstotakeactionto

beforeacrisisactuallymaterialisesandthere-

foretotacklethekeyriskfactorsinvolved .This

isanagendathatfallssomewherebetweenthe

humanitariananddevelopmentalagendasas

normallyunderstood .Itdoesnot“fit”neatly,

butitsurelydeservestobegivenpriority .The

questionthenarises:howfarshouldthissame

logicbeappliedtootherkindsofthreat?Itis

notclearwheretheboundarieslie .

Ofallthemanyprogrammeapproachis-

sues,onethatrepeatedlycameupininterviews

wasthequestionofwhetheritwasbetterto

givein-kindassistance(particularlyfood)or

cash/voucherstobeneficiaries .OneWFPman-

agersaid“IfIwasgivenafreehand,I’ddo

muchmorecashandvouchers,”butsaidhewas

constrainedbymandateandavailableresourc-

es .Thiswastheviewofallthosewhoexpressed

anopiniononthesubject .Theredoesappear

tobeconsiderablescopetoexplorealternative

foodassistanceinterventions .Giventhecost

anddifficultyofdeliveringfoodinDRC,this

surelydeservespriorityattention .

Access and Operational SecurityPeople’saccesstoreliefassistanceinEast-

ernDRChasbeenconsistentlyhamperedby

insecuritysincethe“official”endofhostilitiesin

2003 .Agencies’abilitytoaccessaffectedpopu-

lationshasfluctuatedoverthatperiodandcon-

tinuestodoso .Allprovincesarecurrentlybe-

tweensecurityphases2-4ontheUNfivepoint

scale,withtheKivus(beyondGomaandBukavu

towns)onlevel4 .Thatsaid,theoverallimpres-

siongainedwasthatsecuritywasasignificant

butnotcurrentlyadominatingfactorinopera-

tions,withconditionsimprovingsomewhatsince

early2009andmostareasreasonablyaccessible .

Since2006,UNDSSandMONUChaverun

integratedsecurityarrangement .Itappearsthat

theUNandNGOsapplyratherdifferentstand-

ardswithregardtosecurity .Oneinterviewee

saidthat“atleast3mainroutesinKivuthat

NGOshaveconsideredsafeformonthsarestill

offlimitsforUN .”However,areasthatwerepre-

viouslydeemed“outofbounds”byDSShave

nowopened,thoughtravelinthemoreinsecure

areasisrestrictedtotransportwithaMONUC

escort .NGOstendtorelyontheirownjudg-

mentaboutsecurity .Asonecommented:“We

knowwhotospeaktointheProvince .Once

aparticulargroupestablishescontroloveran

area,securitycalmsdownandwecannegotiate

directly .Weemployourownsecurityofficers .”

Thereisnodoubt,however,thatDRC

remainsahighlyinsecureplacetooperate,

particularlyintheEast .WFP’soperationshave

beenhamperedbythisandthelevelofinsecu-

rityhasalsoaddedconsiderablytothecostof

operating .Themostextremecaseofthisisthe

EmergencyOperation(EMOP)inHautUéléin

Orientaleprovince,whereWFPhasbeenforced

tomountanairliftoffood .


Conclusions and implications for WFP

ThescaleandnatureofneedsinDRCpose

oneofthegreatestchallengesthatWFPand

otheragenciesfaceanywhereintheworld .

Thehumanindicatorsinbothconflictandnon-

conflictareasareextremelyserious,thereisa

country-widenutritionalandhealthcrisis,and

around1 .3millionpeopleremaindisplacedby

violentinsecurity .Thehopedfor“peacedivi-

dend”followingelectionsin2006hasnotma-

terialised,andinternationaleffortsareaimedin

largepartatconsolidatingthepeaceandpre-

ventingaslidebackintogeneralisedconflict .

Tothisend,theUNthroughMONUChassided

withtheGovernmentinitsattemptstobring

stabilitytotheEast .Buttheinstitutionsofgov-

ernment,includingthearmyinparticular,are

weakandcrippledbycorruption .Thisprovides

ahighlyuncertainplatformforcooperation

bothonsecurityanddevelopment .

Theparticularprogrammaticchallenge

facingWFPistorespondappropriatelytoboth

acuteandchronicformsoffoodinsecurity .

Aswithotherformsofvulnerability,theseare

combinedincomplexways .Whilemostofthe

meansavailabletoWFP—inparticularfoodaid

—arebestadaptedtotacklingthesymptoms

ratherthanthecausesoffoodinsecurity,the

aimssetforthePRROdemandthatitalsotack-

lesatleastproximatecausesandattemptsto

helppeople(re-)establishresilientlivelihoods .

Thereislittledoubtthatitischronicvulner-

abilitythatposesthegreaterchallenge—a

functionnotonlyofconflictbutofdesperate

povertyfollowingyearsofunder-development,

isolationandmisrule .Here,WFP’spartnership

withFAOispotentiallycrucial .Buttheprevail-

ingconditionsinthecountry,aswellasthe

challengeofscaleandresources,setthelimit

onwhatispossible .ApproacheslikePurchase

forProgresscanhelp,thoughitisstrikinghow

littleofthefoodWFPdistributesissourcedlo-

cally .Butunlessmajordevelopmentfundingis

directedatcreatingtheconditionswherefarm-

erscanprofitablybringtheirproducetomarket,

effortstobuildresilientlivelihoodswillalways

behampered .

Giventhescaleandseverityoftheprob-

lems,WFP’sprogrammesrepresentavital

safetynetforvulnerablegroupsinDRC,wheth-

erthroughitsschoolfeedingprogrammesor

throughitstargetedassistancetodisplaced

andhostcommunities .Thatsaid,itisnotclear

exactlywhatrolethatassistanceplaysinpeo-

ple’slives .Itwasapparent,forexample,that

aconsiderableproportionoffoodaidissold

inlocalmarkets .Giventhehugecostofdeliv-

eringthatfood,itisessentialtounderstand

thescaleofthisandthereasonsforit,andto

exploreoptions(suchascashorvouchers)that

mightrepresentbothamorecosteffectiveway

oftransferringvalueandgivingpeoplemore

choice .WhiletheimplementationoftheWFP

programmeinthefaceofmassivechallenges

isimpressiveandcommendable,therationale

fortheprogrammesometimesappearedtobe

assumedratherthantestedinpractice .Amore

generalcritiqueofhumanitarianpracticeinDRC

couldbemadeontheselines,withprogramme

approachesseeminglynotalwaysadaptedto

takeaccountofevolvingvulnerabilitiesandop-

portunities .Someprogrammesseemratherto

beself-justifyingandself-perpetuating .

Someoftheassumptionsonwhichcurrent

approachesarebasedseemhardtojustify .

AskedthecounterfactualquestionWhat would

happen if you (and other aid agencies) were not

here?,themajorityofthoseinterviewed—at

leastonthefoodsecurityside—feltthatthe

resultwouldnotbecatastrophic .Peoplewould

findotherwaysofmeetingtheirneeds,though

itwouldhaveanimpactonoverallpoverty

levels .Onlyinthehealthsectordidallthose

interviewedfeelthattheimpactofwithdrawing

internationalserviceswouldbecatastrophic,

particularlyinrelationtothelossofvaccination

coverage .Othersfeltthatthelossofinterna-

tionalpresencewouldrenderpeopleconsidera-

blymorevulnerabletoabuse .Alreadytheywere

forcedtoreachadangerousaccommodationto

thedemandsofthemilitaryfactions,thoughex-


actionsandotherwise .Thiswouldonlyincrease

withoutinternationalpresence .

Generalassumptionsabout“sustainabil-

ity”and“dependence”oftenseemmisplaced,

basedonideologyratherthanevidence .Per-

hapsmostsignificantly,thedominantparadigm

ofearly recoverydeservesmuchmorecareful

attention .Thecrucialquestionseemstobe

whethereffortsaimedatsupporting“earlyre-

covery”arebasedonvalidassumptionsabout

theprevailingconditions,andwhetherthese

aresuchastoallow“recovery”inthesense

implied .Thereisgoodreasontothinkthatin

manycasestheyarenot .Moregenerally,the

relationshipbetweenhumanitarianandde-

velopmentapproachesisunclear .Whilethe

humanitarianagendaasdefinedinthe2009

HumanitarianActionPlanhasastrongdegree

ofcoherence,itleavesopenthequestionof

howchronicvulnerabilityistobeaddressed—

andhowthe(necessarilylimited)humanitarian

effortstoincreaseresiliencerelatetoawider

developmentalagenda .

Therearemanyconstraintstoeffectivehu-

manitarianprogramminginDRC,notleastthe

sheerscaleofneedsandtheremotenessand

scatterednatureofmanyofthecommunities

whoneedassistance .Securityisacontinuing

constraintintheEast,thoughthisfluctuates

overtime .Thepatternsofviolencedictateboth

aidprioritiesandtheextenttowhichareasare

deemedsafetoaccessforaidworkers,lead-

ingtoafamiliarparadox:thatthosewhomay

mostrequireassistancemaybetheleastable

toaccessit .Thereareotherlimitssetbythe

availabilityofresources,thoughthescaleof

humanitarianfundinghasincreaseddramati-

callyinthepast5yearsandthereisarguably

scopeforworkinginmorecost-effectiveways .

Implementingcapacityiscertainlyaconstraint,

onethatwasrepeatedlyexpressedbythose

interviewedforthisstudy .Skilledandexperi-

encedstaff(nationalandinternational)appear

tobehardtofind,andtheagencycoverageon

thegroundessentiallysetsthescopeofwhat

iscurrentlyachievable .OCHA’sfieldpresence

islimited,anditisunclearhowwellstandbyar-

rangementswithUNDPareworking .

ThepresenceofanintegratedUNMission

(MONUC)hassignificantimplicationsforthe

deliveryofaid,positiveandnegative .Onthe

onehand,withoutmilitaryescort,manyareas

wouldremaininaccessibleintheconflictzones .

Ontheotherhand,MONUC’sunpopularity(it

isperceivedbylocalpopulations,particularlyin

theEast,ashavingfailedtoprotectthem)col-

oursopinionoftheUNingeneral,andperhaps

ofotheragenciesaswell .Withthesteppingup

ofjointcounter-insurgencyoperationswiththe

Governmentforces,itisfearedthataUN-badged

forceopenlywagingwaroninsurgentswillfurther

undermineeffortstoestablishtheUNasaneutral

andimpartialactor .Thepolicyofaidagenciesap-

pearstobetomaintainanarms-lengthrelation-

shipwithMONUC,butthedistinctionishardto

maintainfortheUNagenciesinparticular .

Winning“heartsandminds”representsa

significantdriverforinternationaldonorsand

governmentalikeunderthestabilisationagenda .

Whileitisnotcleartowhatextentthishasin

practice“skewed”thedeliveryofassistance

(contrarytotheprincipleofimpartiality),ithigh-

lightsthechallengesoftryingtopursuemultiple

agendasgovernedbypotentiallycontradictory

principles .Theprioritisingofassistancetothe

Eastern(conflict-affected)areasofthecountry

whencomparablelevelsofneedexistelsewhere

reflectsbothhumanitarianandpoliticaljudge-

mentsaboutthesignificanceoftheconflict

areas .Atthemoreoperationallevel,priorities

sometimesclash:whilethehumanitarianagen-

ciesareworkingtotheHAPpriorities,MONUCis

workingtoother(stabilisation)priorities .

Onthequestionofplanningassumptions

andneedsanalysis,itseemsthatsomeofthe

scenariosonwhichforwardplansarebased

areconsiderablyover-optimistic .Thisprobably

reflectsthequestionofwhatisapoliticallyac-

ceptablenarrative,butitleadstosomefalseas-

sumptionsandunrealisticexpectationsofwhat

ispossible .The2007PRROisanexampleofthis,

thoughadaptationandcontingencyplansmade

122

responsetothesubsequentmoreacuteneeds

possible .Again,thisreflectsWFP’srelatively

greatercompetenceinrespondingtoacute

vulnerabilitythantochronicvulnerability .

NeedsassessmentinDRChasbeen

strengthenedconsiderablyacrosstheboard

inthepast2year,andthisisreflectedinthe

2009HAPaswellasinthewaythatPooled

Fundmoniesareallocated .Thediscoverythat

acutemalnutritionlevelswereashighinparts

ofCentralandWesternDRCasintheEastled

tosomere-assessmentofpriorities .Butdespite

investmentinsentinelsitesandothermonitor-

ingmechanisms,thereremainsahuge“diag-

nostic”challengeinDRC,andaneedtobetter

correlateoutcomeindicatorswithriskfactors

toinforminterventions .Crucially,thecrisispre-

ventionagendaliesuncomfortablybetween

developmentandhumanitarianactors,andthis

ambiguityneedstoberesolved .


123

Review of WfP’s Responses to operational and Programming Challenges in Conflicts and Complex emergencies: a Case study of Haiti

Thomas Gurtner, Consultant

Executive SummaryOf Haiti’s 9 million people 60 percent reside in towns, of whom half live in slums; 55 percent live below the poverty line of US$1 per day. A severely degraded environ-ment, frequent hurricanes, decades of poor governance, poor market infrastructure, small and fragmented landholdings and lack of health and agriculture extension ser-vices are all factors that exacerbate poverty and vulnerability. Food security, health and nutrition are extremely precarious in many areas, and critical in some places.186

186 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.Haitiisafragilestatewithverylimited

nationalcapacities .FivepreviousUnitedNa-

tionsmissionshavefailedtomakeadiffer-

ence;thecurrentmissionshowslittlesignof

sustainablesuccess .Thereisanurgentneed

fortheinternationalcommunitytodevelop

newjointworkingmethodswithaviewto

poolinghumanitariananddevelopmentre-

sourcesinamoreunifiedandcomprehensive

approachthatwillrespondwithurgencyand

inafocusedmannertothecriticalproblems

inHaiti .

WFPisknownasacredibleandreliable

partner .Itsroleappearstoberecognizedby

beneficiaries,whodistinguishbetweenitand

otherUnitedNationsentities .WFP’sroleas

leadagencyofthelogisticsclusterisparticu-

larlynoteworthy .

WFPisintheprocessofreviewingits

overallapproaches .Itiswillingtoinvestin

innovationandisdevelopingprogrammatic

approachesthatarehumanitariananddevel-

opmentalinnature .CriticalfactorsinWFP’s

successwillbeitscapacitytoengagewith

civilsocietyandtodevelopamoreflexible

approachinwhichoutputscanberapidly

adaptedonthebasisofsoundunderstanding

oftheevolvingsocio-economic,climaticand

politicalenvironmentofHaiti .

Case study: Haiti (Field visit, June 2009)


Haitiliesinthepathoftropicalstorms

andhurricanes;itstopographycombines

steepdeforestedhillsandflood-proneareas:

itishenceextremelyvulnerabletoclimatic

shocks .Severedegradationofthelandscape

andnaturalresources,especiallyforestcover,

isamajorfactorinvulnerabilitytodisasters

andlong-termfoodinsecurity .

Thecurrentpoliticalsituationisvolatile,

withtriggersforrenewedsocialunrest .Inthe

opinionofmany,thisjustifiesthecontinued

peace-keepingoperationledbytheUnited

Nations .Thecomingyearisexpectedtobe

politicallydelicatebecausepresidentialelec-

tionswillbeheldin2011 .

TheUnitedNationsintegratedmissionis

dominatedbytheUnitedNationsStabiliza-

tionMissioninHaiti,whichdisposesofase-

curityforceof9,000andisalsoincharge

ofgovernmentcapacity-development

projects .Therearetensionsbetweenthe

UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti

andtheUnitedNationscountryteamthat

stemfromtheabsenceofacomprehensive

frameworktoregulatetherolesandrespon-

sibilitiesofUnitedNationsbodiesunderthe

“OneUN”concept .



Introduction Overthepastdecade,unprecedentedse-

curityrisks,unforeseenoutcomesofthe“war

onterror”andconvergingmilitary,diplomatic

anddevelopmentagendashavestrainedthe

inventivenessandcapacityofWFPincomplex

emergencies .Atthesametime,newthinkingon

powerdynamics,livelihoodsinconflict,fragile

stateeconomiesandstatebuildingareshaping

thehumanitarianagenda .

Haitiisnotatwar,butmostotherconsid-

erationsapplyandWFP’shumanitarianandde-

velopmentinterventionscontinuetogrow;they

areintheprocessofshiftinginresponsetothe

realitiesontheground .

Thiscasestudyexaminesthechallenges

facedbyWFP,itsresponsesanditspractices—

goodandbad—indeliveringassistance .

Objectives and Methods

ObjectivesThisstudyaimstoidentifythechallenges

anddilemmasfacedbyWFP,itsoperatingpart-

nersandthehumanitariancommunityindeliver-

ingassistanceinafragilestatesuchasHaiti .The

countryisexperiencingaprotractedcrisischar-

acterizedbyurbanviolence,naturaldisasters,

extremelevelsofpovertyandmassiveexposure

totheglobaleconomicdownturn,whichisforc-

ingmanymoreHaitianstojointhe4 .4million

peoplealreadylivingonlessthanUS$1perday .

ItwillconsidertheOneUNconcept,which

isdominatedbytheUnitedNationsStabiliza-

tionMissioninHaiti(MINUSTAH)andalarge

militarystabilizationforce;MINUSTAHalsohas

amandatetoreformthepoliceandthejudici-

ary .ThestudywillalsoassessWFP’scapacityto

beaneutralandimpartialhumanitarianactor

intheUnitedNationsintegratedmissionandto

beperceivedandacceptedassuch .

MethodsThecasestudybuildson:

• adeskreviewofinternalandexternalre-

portsandpublicationsonHaiti;

• acountryvisittoallowface-to-faceinter-

viewsandfocus-groupdiscussionswith

WFPstaff,partners,otherUnitedNations

agencies,governmentagencies,military

andpoliceforces,non-governmental

organizations(NGOs),theInternational

FederationofRedCrossandRedCrescent

Societies(IFRC)andbeneficiaries;and

• additionaltelephoneinterviewswithexperts

andpersonnelformerlyworkinginHaiti .

The Country and Context

Historical BackgroundFollowingthefalloftheDuvalierdictator-

shipin1987,anewconstitutionwasratified

thatisstillinplacetoday .InDecember1990,

Jean-BertrandAristide,acharismaticRoman

Catholicpriest,won67percentofthevotein

electionsthatinternationalobserversdeemed

largelyfreeandfair .PresidentAristide’sradical

populistpoliciesalarmedmanyofthecountry’s

elite,andinSeptember1991hewasoverthrown

inamilitarycoup .Therewasviolentresistance

tothecoup,inwhichhundredswerekilled,and

Aristidewasforcedintoexile;therewasalsoa

majorexodusofrefugees .

InJuly1994,asrepressionmountedin

Haiti,theUnitedNationsauthorizeditsMember

Statestouseallnecessarymeanstofacilitate

thedepartureofthemilitaryleadershipandto

restoreHaiti’sconstitutionallyelectedgovern-

menttopower .WithUnitedStatestroopshead-

ingforHaiti,thethenleadersagreedtostep

downandPresidentAristidewasabletoreturn

inOctober .

Theinitialforceof21,000wastransformed

intoaUnitedNationspeacekeepingforceof

6,000troopsin1995;itwasscaledbackpro-

gressivelyoverthenextfouryearsasaseriesof

UnitedNationstechnicalmissionssucceeded

it .InJanuary2000,thelastUnitedStates

troopsdeparted .

InFebruary1996RenéPréval,aprominent

Aristideally,waselectedPresidentwith88per-

centofthevote .Butinlate1996,Aristidebroke


withPrévalandformedanewpoliticalparty .He

andhispartywonelectionsinApril1997,but

wereneveracceptedbythethengovernment .

InMay2000electionsfortheChamberof

Deputiesandtwo-thirdsoftheSenatefinally

tookplace .Voterturnoutwas60percent,and

Aristide’spartywonalandslidevictory .But

theelectionswereflawedbyirregularitiesand

fraud:asaresult,theNovember2000elections

wereboycottedbytheopposition .Thispolitical

deadlockbetweenAristideandtheopposition

continuedwithincreasingtensionuntilarebel-

lionin2004broughtGoinaivesandCapHaitien

underrebelcontrol .

The Political and Security SituationOn29February2004,withrebelsmarching

towardsPort-au-Prince,Aristidewasforcedto

departfromHaitiandaninterimgovernment

petitionedtheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil

foraninternationalpeacekeepingforce .This

wasimmediatelygranted,andamilitaryforce

ledinitiallybytheUnitedStatesarrivedinHaiti

thesameday .

Inspiteofthecontroversyandviolence,

however,theinterimgovernmentplannedlegis-

lativeandexecutiveelections,whichwerefinally

heldinFebruary2006 .Theelectionswerewon

byRenéPréval,whoisstillPresident .

InApril2008,“foodriots”brokeout;

somemainroadswereblockedandtheair-

portatPort-au-Princewasclosed .Asaresult

thecountrywaswithoutagovernmentforfive

months .Thetenseandfragilesituationwasex-

acerbatedasHaitiwashitbytheworststorms

intwodecadesinAugustandSeptemberof

thatyear:65percentofagriculturalproduction

waslostandafurther1millionHaitianssaw

theiralreadyfragilelivelihoodssweptawayby

thefloods .

Thecountryisworseofftodaythanitwas

beforethefoodriots;sixsuccessiveUnitedNa-

tionsmissionstoHaitihavenotmanagedto

createasustainablestate .Theélite,mainlyrep-

resentedintheSenateandParliament,remains

reluctanttosupporttheGovernment,whichstill

predominantlyrepresentstheinterestsofthe

poor,initseffortstoreform .Electionsthatwere

deemedcrucialwereheldinApril,buttheturn-

outwasbelow10percentandmanyvoterswere

“encouraged”tostayathome .

The Socio-Economic ContextHaitihasapopulationof9million,with

another1millionlivingabroad;60percentof

theresidentpopulationareconcentratedin

towns,ofwhomhalfliveinslums .Morethan

halfofthepopulationlivebelowthepoverty

line:76percentliveonlessthanUS$2perday

and56percentliveonlessthanUS$1perday .

About1millionHaitiansaretotallydependent

onremittancesfromabroad;another2–3million

arepartiallydependent .Remittancesin2006

accountedfor20percentofthegrossnational

productofUS$1 .65billion .

Haitinormallyproduces50percentofits

foodrequirements,butthefloodsin2008re-

ducedthiscapacityas60percentofarableland

wastemporarilylost .Halfthepopulationhasno

accesstopotablewater;72percenthavenoac-

cesstoanyformofhealthcare .Only40percent

ofchildrenarevaccinated;oneinfourappears

tobechronicallymalnourishedandstunted .HIV

prevalenceisthehighestintheCaribbean,esti-

matedat2 .2percentamongpeopleaged15to

49 .Thisamountsto120,000peoplelivingwith

HIV,ofwhom58,000arewomenand6,800are

children .Itisestimatedthatfewerthanhalfof

thosewhoneedanti-retroviraltherapyreceive

treatment .Haiti’sliteracyrateis53percent;

fewerthan20percentofschool-agechildren

haveaccesstopublicschools .

Tropicalstormsandhurricanesappearto

beincreasinginfrequencyandintensity .Haiti’s

forestcoverhasalmostentirelydisappeared,

butfirewoodandcharcoalcontinuetobeused

forcookinginmosthouseholds .

Theglobaleconomicdownturnhasre-

ducedtheflowofremittancesby30percent .

Thepoliticalstalemateandtheresultingslow-

nessofgovernmentreformsarefurtherun-

derminingthestrainedcopingmechanismsof


millionsofHaitians .Itisnotsurprisingthatthe

MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsarefarfrom

beingreached;progressonsomehasactually

reversed,particularwithregardtomother-and-

childmortality,eradicationofextremepoverty

andenvironmentalsustainability .

Future ProspectsTheGovernment,supportedbyMINUS-

TAH,isembarkingonvariousreformstore-build

aneffectivepoliceforceandjudicialsystem .The

UnitedNationscountryteam(UNCT)isworking

undertheUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssist-

anceFramework(UNDAF)187todevelopacoor-

dinatedapproachtoenhancegovernmentca-

pacitiesintheareasdefinedinthe2007Poverty

ReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP) .TheGovern-

mentremainsextremelyweak,anditscredibility

andlegitimacyinHaitiarecurrentlylessthan

theywerebeforethefoodriotsofApril2008 .

Thecurrentpoliticalsituationisvolatile .

ConcernsareexpressedbyMINUSTAH,the

UNCTandtheinternationalcommunitythatso-

cial-unrestcouldflareupatanytime .Thecom-

ingyearisexpectedtobepoliticallydelicate,

withpresidentialelectionsscheduledfor2011 .

ThereisconsensusamongtheUNCTand

NGOsthathumanitariananddevelopment

agendasmustworkhand-in-hand .Butcoor-

dinationamongstakeholdergroupsremains

extremelyweak .

The Humanitarian and Development Environment

The Government of HaitiTheGovernment’sprimarychallengeisto

keepHaitionthepathtosocialandeconomic

stabilityandimprovedsecuritydespiteincreas-

ingpoverty .TheGovernmentfacesadaunting

task:ithasfewcapableofficersanddelivers

almostnoservicessuchashealth,nutrition

andeducation .Publicadministration,whereit

exists,iscarriedoutbyNGOs,privateentre-

187 See Annex 4

preneursorchurchassociations .Thelegitimacy

oftheGovernmentisfurtherweakenedby

oppositionfromdifferentandofteninfluential

segmentsofHaitiansociety:thisisexempli-

fiedbythelowvoterturnout—estimatedby

independentobserversatlessthan5percent—

duringtheelectionsinApril2009 .

ThePRSPapprovedbytheGovernment

attheendof2007requiresUS$3 .8billionover

threeyears .Itservesasaroadmapforimprov-

ingsocialservices,expandinginfrastructure

andcultivatinggrowthanddevelopmentareas .

Itsthreepillarsare:

• enhancehumandevelopmentbyimproving

basicservices;

• promotegrowthwithafocusonagricul-

ture,tourism,infrastructureandlabour-

intensiveconstruction;and

• promotedemocraticgovernance,focusing

onimprovedjusticeandpublicsecurity .

ThePRSPissometimesperceivedasinsuf-

ficientlyfocused,butitneverthelessidentifies

criticalareaswheretheGovernmentneedsto

scaleupitscapacitiestodeliverservicestoits

population .

Thesecondgovernmentdocumentdriving

itsagendaisthePost-DisasterNeedsAssess-

mentReport(PDNA),whichwaspreparedafter

thecatastrophicfloodsinAugust2008with

supportfromtheWorldBank,theUNCT,the

EuropeanUnion,IFRCandotherstakeholders .It

highlightstheneedforurgentactiontodevelop

anadequatedisasterriskmanagementplanfor

Haiti,forwhichacrucialprerequisiteiscreation

ofthecapacitytoengageinreducingrisksand

tomovethedevelopmentandpoverty-reduction

agendaforward .ThethreepillarsofthePDNA

actionplan—foodsecurity,socialprotection

andwatershedprotection—requireurgent

interventionandshouldideallyleadtoadjust-

mentsinthesectoractionplansinthePRSP .

Althoughprogressisextremelyslow,there

aresignsthattheinternationalcommunity

iswillingtocontinuetosupporttheGovern-

ment .Thedonorconferencethatlaunchedthe

PRSPinApril2009alsoallocatedanadditional


US$320millioninfunding,thoughthisamount

waswellbelowtheUS$3billionrequested .

TheGovernmentiswillingtomoveforward,

butinviewofitslackofcapacitymuchwill

dependonthespeedandeffectivenesswith

whichdonors,MINUSTAHandtheUNCTcan

developajointframeworkforcapacity-develop-

ment .Itisrevealinginthiscontextthatduring

abriefingwiththeDeputyDirectoroftheCivil

ProtectionAgencyofHaitiandhiscoordinator

forpreventionandmitigationmeasures,thedis-

cussionwasmainlyledbyrepresentativesfrom

theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

(UNDP)andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInter-

nationalDevelopment(USAID) .

Governmentrepresentativesinterviewedin

Port-au-PrinceandGonaivesweregenerallysat-

isfiedwithWFP’sresponsetolastyear’sflood-

ing,thoughtheymentionedthatassistancehad

beenslowtoarrive .TheyapplaudedWFP’swill-

ingnesstoengagewiththem .Butgovernment

andNGOrepresentativesanddonorsappeared

tobeconcernedbywhattheydescribedasle

travail cloisonné des agences—theagencies’

compartmentalizedwayofworking:ittran-

spiredthattherepresentativeswerefrustrated

bywhattheysawaslackofcoordinationamong

UnitedNationsagencies,particularlytheUnited

NationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)and

theUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDe-

velopment(USAID) .andWFP,andsometimes

UNDP .Allthreeareessentialinprovidingcon-

certedsupport,particularlyinresponsetothe

plannedPDNAinitiatives .

Haitian Civil SocietyThebackgroundofpastslaveryandcur-

rentpoverty,manipulationofthepoorestby

éliteinterestgroups,lackofamiddleclassand

dominationoftheslumsbygangshavereduced

solidaritymechanismstoabareminimum,often

theimmediatefamily .Theincreaseinevangeli-

calchurcheshasreducedtheproportionof

Catholicsfromthe80percentof20yearsago .

NGOsassociatedwithChristiangroupsare

usuallyapproachedtopartnerinternationalas-

sistanceagencies;theyarethemainpartnersof

WFPinHaiti,particularlyCaritas .

Ithastobeunderstoodthatvirtuallyall

Haitiansremainfaithfultotheotherofficialna-

tionalreligion—Voodoo .Thisdoesnotreceive

enoughconsideration:fewmembersofthe

internationalaidcommunityengagewiththis

movementbeyondsuperficialnetworkingwith

someofitsmoreprominentleaders .Following

thedisasterinGonaives,variousVoodooorgan-

izationsthathadpreviouslycompetedagainst

eachotherralliedtogethertofindwaystohelp:

itwasstrikingtomeetyoungHaitiansinGona-

iveswhowerelobbyingagenciesforsupportfor

theiryouth-mobilizationcampaignstoaddress

theurgentneedforreforestationintheregion .

Voodoomaynotbewellorganized,but

canbeseenasadynamicgrassrootsmovement

pressingforchange .ThisaspectofHaitiansoci-

etyunfortunatelyremains“belowtheradar”of

mainstreamagencies .Itisdefinitelyworthen-

gagingmorewithHaitiansociety:theremaybe

ahiddenpotentialherethatcouldcontributeto

improvingthelivesofHaitiansovertime .

The United Nations System and Integrated Mission

The Peace-Keeping and State-Building Mission of MINUSTAH

AftertheoverthrowofPresidentAristide,

violenceinHaiticontinueddespitethepres-

enceofpeacekeepers .Clashesbetweenpolice

andAristidesupporterswhoweredemanding

forhisreturnwerecommon;severalofthepro-

testsresultedinviolenceanddeaths .Criminal-

ityinthetownshipswasatitspeak .

On1June2004,thepeacekeepingmis-

sionwaspassedtoMINUSTAH .Itcompriseda

7,000-strongmilitaryforceledbyBrazil,com-

plementedbyaUnitedNationspolicecontin-

gentof2,000;itwassupportedbyLatinAmeri-

cancountries,particularlyArgentinaandChile .

ItreceivedastrongChapterVIImandateto

ensuresecurityandstability,supportthepoliti-

calprocessandmonitorthehumanrightssitua-

tion .On15October2005,Brazilcalledformore


troopstodealwiththedeterioratingsituation:

theyintervenedinseveraltownships,whichled

toamajordisarmamentoperation,thearrestof

hundredsofgangleadersandgeneralcontain-

mentoftheviolence .188

TheHaitianNationalPolice(HNP)iscur-

rentlybeingre-formedwithsupportfromMI-

NUSTAH;theriotsinApril2008showedthat

HNPwasunabletomaintainorderorensure

stability .HNPwillhaveaforceof9,500bymid-

2009,onitswaytoatargetof14,000by2011 .

ButwithonlyUS$150millionallocatedtoHNP

annually,thereareseriousdoubtsastowhether

theywillbeabletoaddresstheviolenceand

crimeinHaiti .

Althoughthecountryiscurrentlycalmer,

thecontinuedpresenceoftroopsandUnited

NationspoliceseemsjustifiedastheUnited

NationsworkstorebuildHNP .Manyobservers,

however,questionthelargemilitarydeploy-

mentsbecausetheviolenceofthelast25years

haslargelybeenamatterofthemobilizationof

poverty-strickencrowdsforpoliticalinterests .

TheUnitedNationsintegratedmissionis

ledbyaSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecre-

tary-General(SRSG)fromtheDepartmentof

PeaceKeepingOperationswhoiscloselyasso-

ciatedwithMINUSTAH .TheSRSGisassistedby

aforcecommanderandtwodeputySRSGs,one

ofwhomisfromUNDPandactsastheUnited

NationsResidentCoordinator .

Humanitarianagenciesarewaryoftherole

ofthemilitary,eventhoughthetroopsgave

valuableassistanceinprovidingreliefforflood-

affectedpopulationsandtheWFPcountry

teamstressedthepositivecooperationwiththe

militaryduringtheinitialemergencyinAugust

andSeptember2008 .MINUSTAH’sstatement

ofitsintentiontotakeoverthecoordinationof

humanitarianresponsesduringthenextcrisis

wasreceivedwithsomealarm,butitishoped

thatwithmoreproactiveinvolvementofNGOs

188 According to Médecins sans frontières (MSF), gunshot casualties referred to their hospital in Port-au-Prince fell from 20–30 per night to 30 per month after the MINUSTAH clean-up operation.

inthemanagementoftheclusters,particularly

logistics,problemscanbeaverted .

MINUSTAHhaslargemilitaryandpoliceas-

sets,anditsdirectprogrammaticengagement

withtheGovernmentinmattersofpolicing,

justicereformandelectoralsupportcausesitto

beperceivedaswantingtocontroltheUnited

Nationsagendaratherthanworkharmoniously

inanagreedframeworkofresponsibilities .

Thereare,therefore,tensionsbetween

MINUSTAHandtheUNCTandthereappearsto

beonlylimitedmutualunderstandingofroles

inhelpingHaititobecomeamoreviablestate .

DialoguebetweenUNCTandtheSRSGalso

remaineddifficultandresultedintensionsbe-

tweenthetwoentities:someUNCTmembers

feltsidelinedintheprocessofreconstructing

stateinstitutions,butappearedworriedthat

MINUSTAHwastakingontasksinsectorswhere

theylackedexperienceandthatcouldhave

beencarriedoutbetterundertheleadershipof

thespecializedagencies .

Thereisfurtheruneasewithregardtothe

maintenanceofthestrictsecuritymeasures

forUnitedNationsagencies,whichaccording

tomostobserversareoutofproportionto

thecurrentlevelofsecuritythreats .TheIFRC

andNGOshavelargelyrelaxedtheirsecurity

rulesandcanmovefreelyinthemostpoverty-

strickenareas,whereasUNCTmovements

areconstrainedandithastorelyonastrict

notificationprocedureoronmilitaryescorts

whenenteringtheseareas .Thisdoeslittleto

enhanceitsacceptancebylocalpeoplewho

areunimpressedbythepresenceofforeign

troopsandwhohaveseenlittleprogress,even

thoughthecurrentUnitedNationsmissionto

Haitiisthesixth .

The United Nations Country Team and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework

TheUNCTinvolvesthefollowingorganiza-

tions:

• FAO;

• theInternationalFundforAgriculturalDe-

velopment(IFAD);


• theInternationalOrganizationfor

Migration(IOM);

• theOfficefortheCoordinationofHumani-

tarianAffairs(OCHA);

• theJointUnitedNationsProgrammeon

HIVandAIDS(UNAIDS);

• UNDP;

• theUnitedNationsEnvironment

Programme(UNEP);

• theUnitedNationsEducational,Scientific

andCulturalOrganization(UNESCO);

• theUnitedNationsChildren’sFund

(UNICEF);

• theUnitedNationsDevelopmentFundfor

Women(UNIFEM);

• theUnitedNationsPopulationFund(UN-

FPA);

• theUnitedNationsOfficeforProject

Services(UNOPS);

• WFP;and

• theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO) .

AnewUNDAFfor2009–2011hasnowbeen

released .Itembodiesapeaceconsolidation

andashort-termtransitionalstabilizationstrat-

egytobeimplementedbeforethe2010presi-

dentialelectionscombinedwithlonger-term

recoveryanddevelopment .Thethreepriority

areasare:i)democraticgovernance;ii)sustaina-

blehumandevelopment;andiii)environmental

anddisastermanagement .TheUNDAFalsoin-

dicatestheleveloffundingnecessarytoensure

properprogrammeimplementation .Butinan

environmentsuchasHaiti,wheredonorcoor-

dinationissub-optimal,189itremainstobeseen

whethertheUNDAFwillcontributetoimproved

coordinationamongthepartners .

189 It has taken UNDP several years to produce a comprehensive framework that engages donors in a coordinated strategic approach. The Government’s leadership weakness and bilateral donor agendas have made this approach difficult. Today the ten top donors — the EU, the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, CIDA, USAID, Spanish Development Cooperation, French Development Cooperation and the ABC group — sit on a joint steering committee chaired by the Resident Coordinator; technical work is carried out through sector and sub-sector groups with a view to harmonizing donor strategies and adhering to the code of good donorship.

OCHA,whichhasfacedmanydifficultiesin

recentyears,hasbeenstrugglingforimproved

coordinationandinformation-sharingamong

UnitedNationsandotherpartners .Ithasbeen

considerablyunder-fundedandonlynow,after

lessonslearnedfromthelasthurricaneseason,is

thereawillingnessintheUNCTtoacceptalarger

OCHArole .

UNCTmemberagenciesappeartoprefer

toengagebilaterallywithministriesandservices

ofdirectinteresttothem;thistendencyiscom-

poundedbythelackofleadershipingovernment

andthenatureoftherelationshipsintheUnited

Nationsintegratedmission .UNCTeffortsap-

pearedtobebasedonatheoreticalconceptin

thatnoevidenceofjointplanningandimple-

mentationwasvisible .Statedcommitmenttofull

coordinationandconsultationwasrarelyfollowed

upwithjointaction .WFPwasinvolvedinthe

UNDAFexercise,butseemedmorecomfortable

maintainingitsrelationshipwithUNCTpartnersat

abilaterallevel .

WFP,however,waswillingtoinvestresources

forcoordinationinareasforwhichitwasaccount-

ablesuchasre-activatingandupgradingthelogis-

ticsclusterinpreparationforthehurricaneseason,

engagingproactivelywithallstakeholdersand

invitingNGOstojoininthemanagementofthis

inter-agencyservice .Thisapproachwasapplaud-

edbytheinternationalcommunityingeneral .

ImportantrelationshipsexistwithUNICEF

inthenutritionandclustersectorsandwith

UNDP,FAOandILOinrelationtoearly-recovery

projects .WFPhassometimesbeenfrustrated

bytheslownessofpartners’responses;some

stafffeelthatitcannotalwaysrelyonitsUnited

Nationspartners,whoregularlyfacecapacity

orcash-flowproblemsandarenotnecessarily

comfortablewiththesenseofurgencyprevalent

inanorganizationthatismorehumanitarianthan

developmentalinorientation .

International NGOs and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

TheIFRCandtheInternationalCommittee

oftheRedCross(ICRC)havegoodworkingrela-


tionships;IFRCconfirmsthatithasbeenprofit-

ingconsiderablyfromtheservicesprovided

throughthelogisticscluster .

InterlocutorsfromtheCooperativeforAs-

sistanceandReliefEverywhere(CARE),Action

contre la faim(ACF)andMédecins sans fron-

tières(MSF)emphasizedthattherewaslittle

sharingofinformationorcoordinationbetween

theUnitedNationsandNGOs,thoughOCHA

hadtriedtofacilitatesuchapproaches .NGOs

alsofeltthatalthoughlastyear’sclustershad

helpedtoimprovecoordination,theUnitedNa-

tionsorganizationsfocusedonsectorsandso

rantheriskofnotcoveringcriticalassistance

gapsorduplicatingefforts .NGOswerepropos-

ingtoimproveinter-clustercoordinationtoen-

surethatcross-sectoralconcernssuchassecu-

ritywereaddressedmorefully .Theywelcomed

theResidentCoordinator’sinvitationtoengage

moreactivelyandassumejointleadershipof

selectedclustersinpartnershipwithUnitedNa-

tionsagencies .

CAREinparticularhighlighteditsconcerns

aboutlong-termfoodaidapproaches .Like

otherdonorssuchasEuropeanCommission

HumanitarianAid(ECHO),itfeltthatmecha-

nismstorespondtolonger-termneedswerein-

adequate .CAREhadrevieweditsownstrategy,

andwouldmaketheprovisionoffoodameans

oflastresort .Butthisdidnotpreventitfrom

maintainingadialoguewithWFP,whichthey

sawastheonlyUnitedNationsagencycapable

ofengaginginsustaineddialogueoutsideits

immediatedomainofintervention .Ingeneral,

NGOsfeltthatmostUnitedNationsagencies

inHaitiwereweak,ajudgementbasedonthe

perceivedlimitedcapacityofUNICEFandIOM

tomanagetheirclustersin2008 .

MostNGOsfeltthatWFPhadbeentoo

slowtoreviewandadaptitsapproaches:many

feltthatbetterengagementwithcommunities

andamoredifferentiatedapproachtolarge-

scalefooddistributionswererequired .WFPhas

recentlystartedtoaddresstheseconcerns .But

ononepointtherewasunanimousagreement:

WFPistheonlyUnitedNationsAgencythatis

actuallyseenworkingonthegroundandrec-

ognizedassuchbythepeopleofHaiti;byand

largeitisatrustedandreliablepartnerwitha

goodtrackrecord,willingtoengagewithexter-

nalstake-holdersandcapableofadaptingtoa

changingenvironment .

WFP and Interactions with PartnersWFPcontinuestodeployitsentiresetof

toolstorespondtotheneedsofvulnerableand

disaster-affectedpopulationsinHaiti .Follow-

ingtheApril2008riotscausedbyhighfood

prices,WFPscaledupitsoperationstoreachan

additional1 .5millionpeople;thiswascomple-

mentedbyanemergencyoperationtoassistup

to800,000peopleforsixmonthsinresponseto

thethreehurricanesandthetropicalstormthat

stuckHaitiinrapidsuccessioninAugustand

September2008 .

Theseshocksweakenedanalreadyvulner-

ablepopulation .Logisticscapacitywasmas-

sivelyincreased:intwospecialoperationsWFP

reachedcommunitiesthathadbeencutoff

fromfoodsuppliesbecauseroadshadbecome

impassable;700mtofhigh-energybiscuitsand

nutritiousfoodsweretransportedbyairand

children,malnourishedmothersandinjured

peoplewereevacuatedtohealthcentres .WFP

wasalsothefirsttoarriveinGonaiveswithfirst

aidsuppliesafterthetropicalhadkilled125

peopleandcoveredthetownwith2millionm3

ofmud .Inrecentmonths,WFPhasshiftedits

operationstowardsearlyrecoveryandrehabili-

tationinterventions .

Duringthe2008shocks,manyschoolswere

damagedandotherswereusedasshelters .This

delayedthestartofthe2008–2009schoolyear

byamonthinmanyareas .Inresponse,WFP

expandedschoolfeedingtotheareasworst

affected,reaching480,000children .During

the2008schoolholidays,thefoodneedsof

200,000schoolchildrenandout-of-schoolchil-

drenweremetinsummercampsorganizedby

WFP .Thisinitiativewasrecognizedbyallstake-

holdersasaninnovation;itwasmuchappreci-

atedbypoorparents .


Thecountryofficeisplanningtoholdwork-

shopsinthefourWFPsub-officesthatwillfocus

on:i)improvingcapacityforseasonalanalysis

andtargetingbyenhancingunderstandingof

livelihoodmechanisms;ii)fosteringacultureof

information-sharingamongstakeholders;and

iii)discussingpartnershipsandwaystoimprove

theirperformance .

Conclusions and Recommendations

Thenewcountryteamisreviewingits

approachesandaddressingchallengesrelated

todeterioratingcopingmechanismsamong

thepoorestandtheincreasingriskof

naturaldisasters .

WFPsometimesfeelsisolatedandfrus-

tratedbylimitationsimposedonitsoperational

capacitybytheconstraintsinherentinaUnited

Nationsintegratedmission .Theseincludetight

securityguidelines—whicharenotfollowedby

non-UnitedNationsentities—thatpreventit

frommovingfreely,andrelianceonUNCTpart-

nerswhomaybereluctanttoengageorwho

faceproblemsinmeetingcommitmentswhen

workingwithWFPinjointprogrammes .

Asinmanyotherplaces,however,WFP

showsconsiderablecapacityforadaptation:

learningfromthelessonsofthefloodresponse

barelyayearago,forexample,ithaschampi-

onedre-activationofthelogisticsclusterina

timelyandeffectivemannerandisencouraging

NGOstobecomeco-conveners .Bysub-con-

tractingitsvehiclefleettoaspecializedtrans-

portNGO,WFPhasaccelerateddeliveriesof

goodsforthehumanitariancommunitywithout

therestrictionofUnitedNationsDepartmentof

SafetyandSecurity(UNDSS)requirements .

Mostpartnersconsultedemphasizedthat

ofalltheUnitedNationsagenciesWFPwasthe

mostresponsiveandthatitwasseentobeac-

tiveandoperational .Haitiansdifferentiatebe-

tweenWFPandotherUnitedNationsentities,

inparticularMINUSTAH,becauseitispresent

inthefieldandseentobesupportingcom-

munitiesandbringassistancewhenneeded .

Haitiansmaybesomewhatdisenchantedbythe

performanceoftheUnitedNations,butWFP

standsoutascapableofrespondingtohumani-

tarianneedsrapidlyandimpartially .

The Way ForwardAcasestudysuchasthisaimstopromote

discussionoftheoptimumapproachestoco-

ordinatesupportforHaitiwithaviewtolifting

itoutofitsdesperatesituation .Observations

ontheissuesoffragilestates,protractedcri-

sesandtheUnitedNationsintegratedmission

conceptwillfeeddirectlyintoaconferenceto

beconvenedbytheInstitutefortheStudyof

theAmericas .

Haitiisnotacountryinconflict,norisit

experiencingacomplexemergency .Itisan

extremelypoorcountrywithoneofthehighest

corruptionindicesintheworldandwidesocial

disparity;ithasademocraticallyelectedgov-

ernmentthatfaceshugelegitimacyproblems

andlackofcapacityandthatisincreasingly

exposedtohumanitariandisasterslinkedto

200yearsofenvironmentaldegradation .Haiti

isregularlysupportedbytheinternationalcom-

munity,ledbytheUnitedStatesandCanada .

Fiveprevioushigh-profileUnitedNationsmis-

sionshavefailedtobringchangeforthebetter:

howwillthisonesucceed?

Theinternationalresponsereliesprinci-

pallyonadisproportionateinvestmentina

militarystabilizationforcethathasalsobeen

mandatedtoaddressgovernmentcapacity

deficitsinjudicialreform,securityandthecon-

stitutionalandpoliticalprocesses,andtofoster

principlesofdemocraticgovernanceandinsti-

tutionaldevelopment .

Itcanbearguedthatthedauntingtasks

tobeaddressedthroughthePSRPandPDNA

requiredonorsandtheUnitedNationstoadopt

afocused,balancedandcomprehensivestrat-

egytoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofHaiti’s

fragility .MINUSTAHspendsUS$500millionper

year,mainlyonpeace-keepingandthemain-

tenanceof9,000securitypersonnel,butthe

developmentagenciesreceivefarlessfinancial


support .IfthesizeofHaitiandtheissuesat

stakearecomparedwiththeDemocraticRe-

publicoftheCongo,itmustbeaskedwhether

thepresenceofsuchalargepeace-keeping

forcecanbejustified .Theresourcescurrently

spentontroopmaintenanceinHaitimight

betterusedfordirectinvestmentinrecovery,

reconstructionandcapacity-developmentin

education,health,agricultureandenvironmen-

talrehabilitation .

ShouldtheUnitedNationstakeamore

principledstanceinadvocatingforadifferent

strategy?Thismaybeanargumenttobedevel-

opedfurther .Therecenthumanitariandisaster

inHaititriggeredthereleaseofadditional

humanitarianfundsandcreatedawindowof

opportunitytoensurethaturgentneedswere

addressedcomprehensivelyandsustainably .

Failuretoinvestinsubsequentmajorrecovery

willresultinahighprobabilitythatnaturalhaz-

ardssuchastheoneswitnessedin2009will

shiftanother1millionormoreHaitiansfrom

livinginpovertyonlessthanUS$2perdayinto

abjectdestitution .

Insuchanenvironment,wherethepost-

crisisresponseisalsoapre-crisispreparedness

phase,thetraditionalseparationofhumanitar-

iananddevelopmentagendasintotwodistinct

approachescannotbemaintained .Humanitar-

iananddevelopmentagendasneedtobecome

farmoreinter-linked;thehumanitarianandaid

communitiesneedtodevelopworkingmodali-

tiesthatareinterchangeableandcomplemen-

tarytomakeprogressinaddressingHaiti’s

diverseillsinasustainableway .

Theoptimumwayforwardcantherefore

onlybedevelopedthroughreflectiononthe

bestwaystoharmonizehumanitariananddevel-

opmentpracticesinanewmodularapproach

toaddresscomplexcrisesinafragilestatesuch

asHaiti .

WFP’sinterventionstoprotectvulnerable

andfood-insecurepopulationswhilesupport-

inglong-termgovernmentworkindisasterpre-

paredness,riskreductionandtherebuildingof

economicandsocialinfrastructuresshowthat

itisalreadyembracingacomprehensiverelief/

developmentapproachaspartofitsresponse

tothechroniccrisisinHaiti .

Becauseitisrecognizedbymoststake-

holdersasareliableandeffectivehumanitarian

player,WFPcouldtakeonabroaderroleand

engagemorefullywithcivilsociety,usingits

positiontomobilizeotheragenciestoengage

inaprocessthatwillensureamorefocused,

complementaryandcomprehensiveinter-

agencyapproachtotacklingthestructuraland

humanitarianissuesinHaiti .


Annex 1. Partial List of Interlocutors

WFP Port-au-Prince

MyrtaKaulard Countrydirector

BenoitThiry Deputycountrydirector

EtienneLabande Headofprogramme,a .i .

MontserratBarroso Schoolfeedingprogramme

MichelFontaine Headoflogistics

EdmondoPerrone Headoflogisticscluster

Baskarane,Deiva Fieldsecurityofficer

WFP Gonaives

Jean-PierreMambounou Headofsub-office

ZacharieBagula Logisticsofficer

JerumeDieujuste Seniorprogrammeassistant

United Nations system

EricMuillefarine Strategicplanningadviser,OfficeoftheRC

PhilippeGauthier OCHA,headofofficeinPort-au-Prince

JudyDacruz Headofprogramme,IOM,Port-au-Prince

UNICEFstaff Nutrition/educationclusters

Jean-MarcCordaro UNDP,BureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery

MINUSTAH

GérardLeChevalier Director,PoliticalAffairsandPlanningDivision

HeinerRosendahl Actinghead,civilaffairs

GuidoGalli Seniorpoliticalaffairsofficer

IFRC

ValentinaBernasconi Actinghead,ICRCHaiti

BrigitteGaillis Headofoperations(floodrecovery),IFRC

NGOs and civil society

SophiePerez Director,CAREHaiti

MassimilianoCosci Headofmission,MSFBelgium

OlivierLeguillox Headofmission,ACFHaiti

CarolineBroudic Foodsecuritycoordinator,ACF,Haiti

ClémentJudeCharles CARITAScoordinator,Haiti

MaxG .Beauvoir Grand Maître, Le Peristyle de Mariani

Government services

Pierre-LouisPinchinat Directeur adjoint, Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités

Territoriales, direction de la protection civile

RooseveltConfrère Coordinateur prevention aux désastres, direction de la

protection civile

MarjorieCharles Nationalexpertindisastermanagement(UNDP)

AlexCeus Coordinateur de la rehabilitation de l’environment, Ministère de la

Planification, Les Gonaives


Annex 1. Partial List of Interlocutors – continued

Donors

MartinWeiersmüller Coordinateur, direction du development et de la cooperation,

Confédération Suisse

DennisB .McCarthy Office chief, Food Security and Humanitarian Assistance Office,

USAID,Haiti

MarieFloreCadet Deputy office chief, Food Security and Humanitarian Assistance

Office,USAID,Haiti

DamienBerrendorf HeadofMission,ECHO,Haiti

JanJakobiec Deuxième secrétaire, Coopération Canadienne (CIDA)

Ambassador Brazil

Rose-LuceCadot-Prevot DisasterRiskManagementSpecialist,USAID

Annex 2. Literature ConsultedCall,C .T .2009 .United Nations Peace Operations and State Building: a Case Study of Haiti .NewYork,

NewYorkUniversityCentreonInternationalCooperation .

Collier,P .2008 .Haiti: from Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security: a Report for the Secretary-

General of the United Nations .NewYork .

GovernmentofHaiti .2008 .Rapport d’évaluation des besoins après désastre: cyclones Fay, Gustav

et Ike .Port-auPrince .

GovernmentofHaiti .2007 .PRSP:Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction

de la pauvreté .Port-au-Prince,MinistryofPlanningandExternalCooperation .

ICG .2008 .Reforming Haiti’s Security Sector .LatinAmericaCaribbeanReportno .28 .Port-au-Prince .

ICG .2009 .Haiti: Stability at Risk .LatinAmericaandCaribbeanbriefingno19 .Port-au-Prince .

Schwendinger,K .2008 .Coordination des partenaires techniques et financiers en Haiti .RSSGA .

WFP .2009 .Haiti Executive Brief .Rome .

WFP .2008 .EmergencyOperation10781 .0 .Rome .

WFP .2008 .DevelopmentProject10386 .0 .Rome .

WFP .2009 .Programme Formulation Support Mission, Haiti PRRO .Rome,OMXD .

WFP .2007 .EvaluationReport:PRRO103382 .Rome .

UNDP .2009 .The Decline of Remittances .Crisisupdateno .4 . PanamaCity, RegionalBureauforLatin

AmericaandtheCaribbean,ClusterforPoverty,HumanDevelopmentandMDGs .

UnitedNations .2009 .HaitiUNDAF(2009–2011) .NewYork .

Conférence sur le développement économique et social d’ Haiti .WashingtonDC,14April2009 .


Acronyms used in the document

MINUSTAH UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti

NGO non-governmentalorganization

IFRC InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties

PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

UNCT UnitedNationscountryteam

UNDAF UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework

PDNA Post-DisasterNeedsAssessmentReport

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

HNP HaitianNationalPolice

FAO FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations

SRSG SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General

IFAD InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment

IOM InternationalOrganizationforMigration

OCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

UNAIDS JointUnitedNationsProgrammeonHIVandAIDS

UNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme

UNESCO UnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization

UNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

UNIFEM UnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomen

UNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFund

UNOPS UnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServices

WHO WorldHealthOrganization

CARE CooperativeforAssistanceandReliefEverywhere

ACF Actioncontrelafaim

MSF Médecinssansfrontières

ECHO EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAid

VAM vulnerabilityanalysisandmapping

M&E monitoringandevaluation

CFSVA comprehensivefoodsecurityandvulnerabilityassessment

CNSA Coordinationnationaledelasécuritéalimentaire

PNSAN Plannationaldesécuritéalimentaireetnutritionnelle;NationalFoodand

NutritionSecurityPlan

UNDSS UnitedNationsDepartmentofSafetyandSecurity

137

Conference agenda

23Rd June Arrival Of Participants (All Day) Welcome drinks and snacks available at the Gazebo from 16:00 to 19:00

24Th June Day 108:30–09:00 Registration and Welcome Coffee Venue: San Francesco Room & San Bernardo Room

09:00–09:15 Opening Address Venue: San Francesco Room

Ramiro Lopes Da Silva (Conference Chair) WFPDeputyChiefOperatingOfficerandDirectorofEmergencies

09:15–09 .30 Introduction of the Conference Objectives and Programme Venue: San Francesco Room

Nicholas Crawford and Thomas Gurtner OverallConferenceFacilitators

Part I: Overview on Theory and Trends

09:30–10:30 Conflict, Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Assistance:Theory and Trends

Venue: San Francesco Room

SessionChair: Mark Duffield (University of Bristol) Panelists: James Darcy (ODI), David Keen (LSE), Fabrice Weissman (MSF)

10:30–11:15 Open Floor Discussion

11:15–11:30 Coffee Break Venue: San Bernardo Room

11:30–12:15 From Theory to Practice: Findings from the Field Venue: San Francesco Room

SessionChair: Lauren Landis (WFP)

Panelists: Thomas Gurtner –FindingsfromWFPstudies Abbas Gullet (KRCS) –Nationalhumanitarianorganisationsin

conflict Dominik Stillhart(ICRC) –Principledhumanitarianaction Peter Goossens (WFP) – Complexemergencies/protractedcrisis

perspective


13:00–14:15 Lunch at the Gazebo



Part II: Critical Areas of Engagement and Operational Effectiveness

14:15–14:30 Introduction to the Plenary on Critical Areas of Engagement Venue: San Francesco Room

PlenaryChair: Ramiro Lopes Da Silva

14:30–16:00 Critical Areas of Engagement – Simultaneous Fora for Debate

Forum 1 – States, UN/Integrated Missions and Impact on Humanitarian Space

Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side)

Facilitator: Jean-Luc Siblot (UNDOCO)

Presenters: David Harland (UNDPKO) Antonio Donini (Tufts University)

Rapporteur: Mohammed Haider Reza (UNMAC-Afghanistan)

Forum 2 – Non-State Actors, Security and Impact on Humanitarian Space Venue: Bottegal Room (Convent Side)

Facilitator: Mustafa Darboe (WFP)

Presenters: Hussein Halane (SCF), Khaled Mansour (UN)

Rapporteur: Corinne Fleischer (WFP)

Forum 3 – Protection, the Rights Agenda, Principled Humanitarian Action, and Advocacy

Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side)

Facilitator: Gemmo Lodesani (WFP)

Presenters: Liam Mahony (Fieldview Solutions) Christine Knudsen (UNICEF) Rapporteur: Bruno Lemarquis (UNDP)

16:00–16:30 Tea Break Venue: San Bernardo Room

16:30–17:45 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion Venue: San Francesco Room

18:00–19:00 Welcome Reception at the Gardens and the Gazebo

25Th June Day 209:00–09:05 Introduction to Day 2 Programme Venue: San Francesco Room

OverallFacilitators:Nicholas Crawford/Thomas Gurtner

09:05–09:15 Introduction on the Plenary of Operational Effectiveness Venue: SanFrancescoRoom

PlenaryChair: Ramiro Lopes da Silva

09:15–10:30 Simultaneous Fora for Debate on Operational Effectiveness

Forum 1 – Understanding and Reaching Out Effectively to Local Communities

Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side)

Facilitator: Zlatan Milisic (WFP)

Presenters: Jemilah Mahmood (Mercy Malaysia) Margaret Vogt (UNDPA)

Rapporteur: Claude Jibidar (WFP)


Forum 2 – Challenges to Effective Programming (1): Planning, preparedness and rapid response

Venue: Bottegal Room

Facilitator: Myrta Kaulard (WFP)

Presenters: Rashid Khalikov (OCHA), Carlos Veloso (WFP)

Rapporteur: Giancarlo Cirri (WFP)

Forum 3 – Challenges to Effective Programming (2): Protracted Crisis, Sustainability and Exit

Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side)

Facilitator: Mohammed Diab (WFP)

Presenters: Luca Alinovi (FAO), Barbara Boyle-Saidi (ICRC)

Rapporteur: Al Kehler (WFP)

10:30–10:45 Coffee Break Venue: San Bernardo Room

10:45–11:30 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion Venue: SanFrancescoRoom

11:30—12:15 Plenary Presentation: Drivers of Conflict and Future Challenges to Humanitarian Assistance


SessionChair: Laurent Thomas (FAO)

Panelists: Elisabeth Rasmusson (NRC) Adil Najam (Boston University) Alexander Downes (Duke University)


13:15–14:45 Lunchtime Dialogue with WFP Executive Director Ms Josette Sheeran At the Gazebo

Part III: Summary, Next Steps and Closing

14:45–16:00 Highlights of Findings: Brief thematic presentations drawn from the conference



16:00–16:15 Tea Break Venue: San Bernardo Room

16:15–17:15 Consolidation and Presentation of Key Recommendations for Moving Forward



17:15–17:30 Closing Remarks by the Conference Chair Venue: San Francesco Room

141

Participants list

Mr. Luca Alinovi

FoodandAgricultureOrganization

luca .alinovi@fao .org

Mr. Chris Barron

WorldFoodProgramme

Chris .Barron@wfp .org

Mr. Gian Carlo Cirri

WorldFoodProgramme

Giancarlo .Cirri@wfp .org

Mr. Nicholas Crawford

WorldFoodProgramme

Nicholas .Crawford@wfp .org

Mr. Mustapha Darboe

WorldFoodProgramme

Mustapha .Darboe@wfp .org

Mr. James Darcy

OverseasDevelopmentInstitute

j .darcy@odi .org .uk

Mr. Antonio Donini

TuftsUniversity,

FeinsteinInternationalCenter

antonio .donini@tufts .edu

Professor Alexander Downes

DukeUniversity

downes@duke .edu

Professor Mark Duffield

UniversityofBristol

m .duffield@bristol .ac .uk

Ms. Fernanda Fernandes

UnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs

fernandes19@un .org

Ms. Corinne Fleischer

WorldFoodProgramme

Corinne .Fleischer@wfp .org

Mr. Peter Goossens

WorldFoodProgramme

Peter .Goossens@wfp .org

Mr. Mohamed Diab

WorldFoodProgramme

Mohamed .Diab@wfp .org

Mr. Abdou Dieng

WorldFoodProgramme

Abdou .Dieng@wfp .org

Mr. Hussein Halane

SavetheChildrenUS

hhalane@savechildren .org

Mr. David Harland

UnitedNationsDepartment

ofPeacekeepingOperations

harland1@un .org

Mr. Wolfgang Herbinger

WorldFoodProgramme

Wolfgang .Herbinger@wfp .org

Mr. Claude Jibidar

WorldFoodProgramme

Claude .Jibidar@wfp .org

Mr. Edward Kallon

WorldFoodProgramme

Edward .Kallon@wfp .org

Ms. Myrta Kaulard

WorldFoodProgramme

Myrta .Kaulard@wfp .org



Professor David Keen

TheLondonSchoolofEconomics

andPoliticalScience

d .keen@lse .ac .uk

Mr. Abbas Gullet

KenyaRedCross

gullet .abbas@kenyaredcross .org

Dr. Thomas Gurtner

IndependentConsultant

tgurtner@gmail .com

Mr. Adnan Khan

WorldFoodProgramme

Adnan .Khan@wfp .org

Ms. Christine Knudsen

UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

cknudsen@unicef .org

Ms. Lauren Landis

WorldFoodProgramme

Lauren .Landis@wfp .org

Ms. Janet Lim

UnitedNationsHighCommissioner

forRefugees

Lim@unhcr .org

Mr. Paul Larsen

WorldFoodProgramme

Paul .Larsen@wfp .org

Mr. Bruno Lemarquis

UnitedNationDevelopmentProgramme

bruno .lemarquis@undp .org

Mr. Gemmo Lodesani

WorldFoodProgramme

Gemmo .Lodesani@wfp .org

Mr. Al Kehler

WorldFoodProgramme

Al .Kehler@wfp .org

Mr. Rashid Khalikov

UNOfficefortheCoordinationof

HumanitarianAffairs

Khalikov@un .org

Mr. Khaled Mansour

UnitedNationsMissiontoSudan

mansourk@un .org

Mr. Zlatan Milisic

WorldFoodProgramme

Zlatan .Milisic@wfp .org

Professor Adil Najam

BostonUniversity

anajam@bu .edu

Ms. Christine Van Nieuwenhyuse

WorldFoodProgramme

Christine .VanNieuwenhuyse@wfp .org

Cdr. Mathias Plaschka

CanadianExpeditionaryForceCommand

TheCanadianForces

Mathias .Plaschka@forces .gc .ca

Mr. Stefano Porretti

WorldFoodProgramme

Stefano .Porretti@wfp .org

Ms. Elisabeth Rasmusson

NorwegianRefugeeCouncil

elisabeth .rasmusson@nrc .no

Datuk Dr. Jemilah Mahmood

MERCYMalaysia

president@mercy .org .my

Mr. Liam Mahony

FieldviewSolutions

liammahony@fieldviewsolutions .org

Ms. Barbara Boyle Saidi

InternationalCommittee

oftheRedCross

bboylesaidi@icrc .org

Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot

UNDevelopmentOperations

CoordinationOffice

jean-luc .siblot@undg .org

Mr. Ramiro Lopes da Silva

WorldFoodProgramme

Ramiro .LopesDaSilva@wfp .org


Mr. David Stevenson

WorldFoodProgramme

David .Stevenson@wfp .org

Mr. Dominik Stillhart

InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

dstillhart@icrc .org

Mr. Laurent Thomas

FoodandAgricultureOrganization

laurent .thomas@fao .org

Ms. Terri Toyota

WorldFoodProgramme

Terri .Toyota@wfp .org

Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza

UnitedNationsMineActionCentre

haiderr@unmaca .org

Ms. Nancy Roman

WorldFoodProgramme

Nancy .Roman@wfp .org

Mr. Charles Vincent

WorldFoodProgramme

Charles .Vincent@wfp .org

Ms. Margaret Vogt

UnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs

vogt@un .org

Mr. Oliver Ulich

OfficeoftheUNSecretaryGeneral

ulich@un .org

Mr Carlos Veloso

WorldFoodProgramme

Carlos .Veloso@wfp .org .

Mr. Fabrice Weissman

MedecinsSanFrontieres

fweissman@paris .msf .org

Staff and Observers

Mariangela Bizzarri

IndependentConsultant

Dalia Bresky

WorldFoodProgramme

Evelyn Chung

WorldFoodProgramme

Anne Marie Faustino

WorldFoodProgramme

Jessicah Filipas

WorldFoodProgramme

Silvia Mariangeloni

WorldFoodProgramme

James Melanson

GovernmentofCanada,Afghanistan(PRT)

Annarita Marcantonio

WorldFoodProgramme

Gina Pattugalan

WorldFoodProgramme

Peter Rodrigues

WorldFoodProgramme

Guillaume Foliot

WorldFoodProgramme

Colin Hourihan

WorldFoodProgramme

Treena Huang

WorldFoodProgramme

Michael Kaethler

WorldFoodProgramme

Naila Sabra

WorldFoodProgramme

Paola Tantillo

WorldFoodProgramme

Edem Wosurnu

UNOfficefortheCoordinationof

HumanitarianAffairs

World Food Programme Via C.G.Viola 68, Parco dei Medici, 00148 — Rome — Italy

The “Trends In Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance: A Review of Literature, Policy and Practice” section was prepared by the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, London

For more information contact:Humanitarian and Transitions serviceTel: +39-06-65131 • Fax: +39-06-6590632

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