de broglie's armada: a plan for the invasion of england, 1765-1777

De Broglie’s Armada

A Plan for the Invasion ofEngland, 1765–1777

Translated with Critical Analysis by Sudipta Das

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iii

List of Tables v

Foreword vii

Abbreviations ix

Introduction xi

Map of British Isles xiv

I Broglie and His Lineage 1

II French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778 4

III An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777 14

IV Broglie’s First Mémoire 22

V Broglie’s Second Mémoire 42

VI De Broglie’s Observations 67

VII Execution of the Invasion of England 74

VIII The Honorable Last Word 97

Conclusion 99

Bibliography 103

Index 113

Contents

v

Table 3.1. Table of the different expeditions to be undertaken in concert by France and Spain against England 19

Table 5.1. Table of the different expeditions both real and simulated that form the general offensive project to be concerted between France and Spain against England according to the consequently prepared memoir in which one sees the number of vessels and troops that the two crowns could employ in this and the number that the English would of necessity have to oppose to it. [p. 68 #2; p.91 # 1] 64–65

Table 7.1. Table on the current situation of our land forces and the successive project of augmentation 87

Table 7.2. Army of the ocean destined for the descent in England and placed from Dunkirk to Brest 88

Table 7.3. The table of our land forces with the increases announced 92

Table 7.4. State of the Distribution of the Fleet Destined to Transport an Army of Invasion of England according to the Expeditionary Plan 94–95

Tables

vii

This volume represents my second monograph on the study of crucial devel-opments in eighteenth century French imperial and diplomatic history. Myfirst contribution attempted to study and analysis of the French presence inIndia from 1763–1778 and was published in December 1991. It offered a newperspective positing that the French, unlike the British, did not aspire for anIndian empire in the eighteenth century. A successive attempt at anothermonograph was stalled owing to serial upheavals in my personal life. Thus,the present endeavor represents a long-awaited enterprise. It is based on mycollection of research information from the French archives on an intriguinginvasion scheme in French military and naval history that was brainstormedduring the great era of Anglo-French commercial and colonial rivalry in theeighteenth century.

The subject of this contribution—the theme of an invasion of England—has never ceased to be of topical interest to students and scholars of Britishand French diplomatic, military, and naval history. References to the invasionplans made by Spain in the Spanish Armada (1585–98), or by the French Di-rectory (1795–99) against Ireland and England in the later 1790s, or those ofNapoleon Bonaparte (1799–1815), or perhaps “Operation Sea Lion,” the Ger-man plan of invasion during the Nazi era are common in England. Thisknowledge has of course been based on published material. Yet, most of thesegrand schemes of invasion were derivatives of earlier plans, at the heart ofwhich was the grand project authored by Charles François, Comte de Broglie,Marquis de Ruffec (20 August, 1719–16 August, 1781) in 1777. This greatplan has not been published in its entirety in the English language and I amexcited to be the architect of this exposition.

Foreword

Therefore, my present contribution is centered on my translation ofBroglie’s original plan of an invasion of England. The grand scheme was firstdrawn up by Broglie in 1765, but he revised and resubmitted it toward the endof 1777. I have included additional chapters that are focused on an introduc-tion of Broglie’s political background, an analysis of French foreign policyobjectives post-1763, and a sneak summary of Broglie’s lengthy invasionscheme, all of which I believe will serve as essential links in elucidating thecore translation.

I would like to acknowledge my deep appreciation of the assistance that I re-ceived at the French Foreign Affairs Archives in Paris for the collection of rareand significant information on the subject. I am also informed that this trans-lated version will be added as an advanced research resource to the acquisitionsof the French Foreign Affairs Archives. I eagerly hope that my published workwill offer English-speaking students interested in French colonial and maritimehistory a document of reference on one of the most intriguing military and navalprojects ever shaped in the ivory towers of French diplomacy.

On a personal note, I dedicate this endeavor to the loving memory of mydeceased husband, and to the love and support of my two beloved daughters.I must also fondly mention the inspiration I received from my eldest brotherwho spurred me on to retrace and restore the disappearing threads of my re-search in its proper perspective at the present time. My entire family’s spiri-tual and emotional support has been of inestimable value in the completion ofthis project.

viii Foreword

ix

A.E. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris(Archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris)

A.N. Archives Nationales, Paris (National Archives, Paris)

B.N. (N.A.F.) Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions Français(National Library, New Acquisitions in French)

C.P. Correspondance Politique (Political Correspondence)

M.D. Mémoires et Documents Memoirs and Documents)

S.P. Secret Proceedings

Abbreviations

xi

A leading French naval historian praised Broglie’s plan as “the most carefullystudied and the most complete plan of naval warfare against England everdrawn up.”1

According to another French historian, Napoleon Bonaparte studiedBroglie’s plan and drew from it.2 A modern French naval historian pro-nounced Broglie’s war plan as “infinitely superior” to all others that precededit.3

Furthermore, it is historically significant that the Franco-Spanish invasionplan of 1779, as well as those of the French Directory from 1795–99 andNapoleon’s schemes during 1803–05, were no more than the last of a long se-ries of pet projects formed in France over a long period of time and were es-sentially drawn from Broglie’s original plan of invasion. It is on this premisethat I consider this endeavor as an important project because it attempts to of-fer a holistic exposition of Broglie’s war plan of 1777 in every detail as its au-thor had structured it.

As a necessary backdrop to the exposition of the plan, I have dedicatedChapter One to the portrayal of Broglie’s family ancestry and his own mili-tary and political identity and career. Broglie’s wealth of diplomatic experi-ence prepared him as a grand military and naval strategist. It is anticipatedthat the information will help to elucidate the influences which shapedBroglie’s political upbringing and his political acumen, inspiring him to con-trive a war plan of a unique nature.

In Chapter Two, I have attempted to offer information on the political cli-mate prevailing in Europe and in Versailles in the aftermath of the SevenYears’ War (1756–63). French foreign policy objectives are explained as ahistorical rationale for the coming of Broglie’s invasion plan. The Seven

Introduction

Years’ War had ended in the ignominious defeat of France, resulting in a sig-nificant decline in her rank among the European powers. The war had alsodramatically altered the European balance of power with England reigningsupreme in her newfound colonial and naval supremacy established by hervictory in the war. French sentiment for national revenge reached a state offrenzy at the royal court, thus prompting an enthused extension of diplomaticpatronage to a war plan which seemed to excel in strategy and sound planningover all others that had preceded it.

In Chapter Three, I have offered a preview of Broglie’s detailed invasionplan using my insight and training of historical investigation and presenta-tion. All the links in the chain of planning in strategy and deployment, whichBroglie laid out step-by-step in tremendous detail in the original documentfor his august King and his military advisers, are connectively summarized inthis single chapter.

The translation of Broglie’s war plan document is covered in ChaptersFour, Five, Six, and Seven. Chapter Four dwells on Broglie’s first memoir tohis King, in which he introduces the text of his war plan and explains his in-tention for the drawing up of an invasion plan of a detailed nature. His inter-pretation of the political and military situation in England and in France islaid out in enormous detail with his rationale stated in clear terms for makinghis pointed interpretation. In this memoir he also builds up his case for re-questing the King’s prompt attention to his submission. He writes it in thethird person, passive voice, perhaps to denote that his presentation repre-sented an erstwhile endeavor that should have long been fulfilled with the ap-propriate royal patronage.

Chapter Five covers Broglie’s second memoir to the King in which he of-fers a realistic survey of French military and naval preparedness at that junc-ture. He compares French military and naval strength with England and pro-poses strategies by which France would be able to overcome her weaknessesand match the strength of England. In this memoir, Broglie also suggests amilitary and naval alliance with Spain that would ensure a powerful defensiveand offensive strategy with the use of concerted forces. The various points ofdefense and attack, deployment of forces, and details of strategy, includingthe points of attack on English soil are also laid out with justifications foreach category in the second memoir.

Chapter Six continues with Broglie’s observations on the plan of opera-tions designated in Chapter Five. It continues to design the plan of operationsto be undertaken by Spain and an evaluation of Spanish military and navalstrength and ability.

Chapter Seven documents Broglie’s stipulations on the execution of the di-rect invasion of England, which he considers as the “last preparation.” He ad-

xii Introduction

vises three separate operations, namely in England, Ireland, and Scotland andmaps strategies for sea and land forces to follow. Actual projections in termsof infantry, cavalry, and naval compositions are made in this final analysis byBroglie, in which he also underlines the proposed routes of attack.

Chapter Eight includes Broglie’s concluding statement on his entire proj-ect. The translation in English follows the original French document in syn-tax and punctuations. As a result, translated sentences in some parts of thetext may appear convoluted and awkward in construction.

The Conclusion represents the author’s summative reflection on the themeof this monograph, including an overview of the historical turn of develop-ments in 1778 that precluded Broglie’s invasion project from being translatedinto action. The last word iterates the significance of a document that is pre-served to this day among clandestine historical papers in the French ForeignAffairs archives. Broglie’s Plan bears singular testimony to the genius of itsauthor.

The End Notes for each chapter document additional references along withthe principal source used in the writing of this monograph. Details of histor-ical analysis and reference elucidating textual information are also offered inthis section.

The Bibliography offers a list of unpublished and published primary andsecondary sources, including books, articles, and dissertations used for at-tempting this presentation. Some of the references that may have been stud-ied but not directly cited in the text are also listed, only to indicate their in-trinsic relevance to the subject of Anglo-French diplomatic and militaryhistory in the eighteenth century.

NOTES

1. G. Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de La France sour le Règne de Louis XV.Paris, Honoré Champion, Libraire, 1910, 430.

2. P. Coquelle, Les Projets de descente en Angleterre. Paris 1902, 61.3. R. Castex, Les Idées Militaires de la Marine au XVIIIe Siècle. Paris, 1902,

157–59.

Introduction xiii

xiv Introduction

Map of England and Wales, 1660–1892

1

Charles François, who was also known as the Comte de Broglie (Count ofBroglie) and Maréchal de Ruffec (Marshal of Ruffec), (20 August, 1719—16August, 1781) came from a distinguished family of French war leaders. Here-after in the text, Charles François will be referred to as “Broglie.” A brief ex-position of Broglie’s ancestral background is offered below in order to un-ravel the key to his own ascendancy to the limelight of eighteenth centuryFrench military and diplomatic history.1

Broglie’s great grandfather was François Marie (1611–56), who took the ti-tle of the Comte de Broglie and distinguished himself as the heroic lieutenant-general who died at the siege of Valenza (2 July 1656). Broglie’s grandfatherwas Victor Maurice, Comte de Broglie (1647–1727), who served underCondé, Turenne, and other great military commanders during the reign ofLouis XIV. Victor Maurice became Maréchal de camp in 1676, lieutenant-general in 1688, and finally Maréchal of France in 1724. Broglie’s father wasreferred to as François Marie, Duc de Broglie (11 January, 1671—22 May,1745). He achieved military honor and glory through a distinguished careerof military service, which started from his childhood and ended two yearsprior to his death in 1745. François Marie was appointed marshal of Francein 1734 and governor-general of Alsace in 1740, and a peer of France in 1743.The eldest son of François Marie was Victor François, Duc de Broglie(1718–1804), who also achieved fame as a renowned soldier and general.Victor François received the rare honor of being appointed as Maréchal-Général, meaning first marshal of France.

Broglie was the younger son of François Marie, and the younger brother ofVictor François. He left his indelible imprint in French imperial history as acourageous soldier and patriot, a skilled diplomat, and a military strategist of

Chapter I

Broglie and His Lineage

the highest cadre. Broglie entered the army in 1734, and was stationed at sev-eral army headquarters in Italy (1734–35), in Bohemia and Bavaria(1741–43), in the Rhine (1744–45), and in Flanders (1746–48). He was pro-moted to the rank of Brigadier general in 1747. Subsequently, he was ap-pointed ambassador to Poland in 1752 and retained the position until 1758.While executing this diplomatic role, he received other military honors suchas Maréchal de camp (temporary marshal) in 1756, and as Chevalier duSaint-Esprit (knighthood) in 1757. Broglie participated in the campaigns ofthe Seven Years’ War under the orders of the Comte de Clermont (1758) andthe Marshal of Contades (1759), and as a sergeant (in mounted arms) underhis brother, Victor François, who was then the marshal of Broglie (1759–61).In 1760, Broglie was made lieutenant-general, a position which he did not en-joy for long.

Court intrigues forced Broglie into exile in 1762. He was returned to royalfavor in 1764. He drafted his first invasion plan of 1765 during the ministryof the Duc de Choiseul (1758–70). Broglie may have risen to the limelight ofFrench politics if his invasion plan had been implemented at that very junc-ture. Unfortunately, a conglomeration of developments such as the lack ofFrench military preparedness for a major war, Louis XV’s persistent politicalindifference, and the downfall of Choiseul in December 1770, followed byBroglie’s own exile, created a state of diplomatic incertitude during whichBroglie’s strategy and ideas faded into insignificance. Broglie’s other politi-cal honors included his appointment as governor of Saumur in 1770, second-in-command of Trois-Évêchés in 1774, and finally Commander-in-Chief ofFranche-Comté in 1781.

Intriguingly, Broglie’s amour-propre stemmed largely from his leadingrole in the Secret du Roi, (1756–1774), which was a clandestine intelligenceservice that Louis XV maintained with various French diplomats and otherconfidential agents outside the knowledge of his official ministers. Broglie isdescribed as the chief actor in the little drama of the King’s secret correspon-dence circle in Versailles.2

To acquire an understanding of his role in this ministerial underworldpropped up by royal connivance, as well as his character and personality, andhis unparalleled courage and bravery, one may consult the testimonies con-tained in the Correspondance Secrète du Comte de Broglie avec Louis XV,1756–74 by Ozanam Didier and Antoine Michele.3 It is stated therein that inspite of Broglie’s many weaknesses, he was endowed with “. . . the pleasingspectacle of a mind to which lofty political views were familiar, and of a soulfilled with passionate desire for the public welfare.”4

The war plan for the invasion of England was designed by Broglie in twophases. His first invasion plan of 1765 comprised of a main attack and no

2 Chapter I

fewer than six subsidiary operations intended to distract the attention of theBritish. As mentioned above, political intrigues frustrated Broglie’s effortsand he was forced into exile in 1771. He was asked to return to court in 1774when the Comte de Vergennes, French foreign minister, resumed Choiseul’santi-British policy. The outbreak of the American Revolution promptedBroglie to prepare an improved version of his original plan which he submit-ted to Louis XVI (1774–1792) at the end of 1777, just when the British set-back at Saratoga had shown that France might safely join the Americancolonists in their struggle against England. The revised invasion plan entailedminor changes in certain areas of strategy and details of resources. In hisgrand military and naval design, Broglie passionately emphasized that every-thing had to be subordinated and directed to obtaining a crushing naval vic-tory in the Channel which would pave the way for a military invasion of En-gland.5 The political climate and circumstances in France and in Europewhich impelled Broglie to draw up his grand project will be the focus of thenext chapter.

NOTES

1. Charles François, Comte de Broglie, the main subject of this chapter, will be re-ferred to as Broglie hereafter.

2. See Didier Ozanam and Michel Antoine, Correspondance Secrète Du Comte DeBroglie Avec Louis XV (1756–1774). Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1961, for a de-tailed analysis of Broglie’s intriguing role and his character and activities in theKing’s private circle of clandestine correspondents.

3. Ibid, 56, 147, 154, 288.4. Ibid vi.5. It is contained in three volumes, A.M./A.N./ B/4, 297–299.

Broglie and His Lineage 3

4

Angleterre: c’est notre modèle et notre rivaleNotre lumière et notre ennemi.England is our model and our rivalOur guiding light and our enemy1

French antipathy to England was grounded in centuries of mutual rivalries,conflicts, and mistrust. The hostility was exacerbated by the terms of theTreaty of Paris in 1763, which ended the Seven Years’ War between Franceand England and their allies. The treaty marked the worst moment of degra-dation for France in the eighteenth century. It was the second time that theBourbon power had bowed before another European power, the first being atthe Treaty of Utrecht. The Seven Years’ War had started, as the Duke ofChoiseul, French foreign minister, passionately expressed, when England“threw at its feet the most sacred rules of equity, the most inviolable maximsof the rights of nations.”2

Its intention, he alleged, was to

attack France’s American colonies, chase France from that Continent and en-gross all its commerce there. But, even this did not arrest its ambitions. It as-pired to seize all of Louisiana, to enter by this way to Mexico, and thereby cuta passage through to all the Spanish possessions. This was the reverie ofCromwell. Indeed, they would go further. They would stifle our marine in itsbirth, rule the sea alone and without a rival.3

According to Choiseul, the treaty was a national humiliation. It was shame-fully purchased at the price of French colonial possessions, French commerce,and French credit in the Indies. It was purchased, he said, at the cost of Canada,

Chapter II

French Foreign Policy Objectives,1763–1778

Louisiana, Isle Royale, Acadia, and Senegal. According to the peace terms,France ceded to England the vast part territorially of what was still left of hergreat colonial empire that had once comprised half of North America and therichest of the American islands, some outposts in India, and the West Africancoast. She retained Gorée on the African coast, St. Dominic, Guiana, Martinique,Guadeloupe, Saint Lucia and its dependencies in the West Indies, the small fish-ing islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon (off Newfoundland), and a few tradingoutposts in India with the isles of France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Rèunion).She was prohibited from fortifying the fishing stations.4

Ironically however, even though the material losses appeared to be colossal,they were not economically or strategically crippling for France. On the map,Canada and Louisiana embodied an impressive domain, but from the stand-point of commercial or trading advantages these possessions were worthless.Louisiana was practically uninhabited and Canada was hardly returning thecost of administration. The losses in India were regarded more of a blessingthan a calamity, while Guadeloupe and Martinique (in place of which Englandhad finally consented to take Canada) were of great commercial value.5

France’s veritable loss aside from the prodigious expenses of the war wasin prestige. Her armies were defeated, her fleets annihilated, and her allieswere disappointed. In the political hierarchy in Europe, France had descendedto the rank of a second grade power. The peace treaty signalized this humili-ation most graphically by renewing the defunct provisions of the Treaty ofUtrecht against the fortification of Dunkirk, to which was later added the pro-vision of an English commissioner at that port, “. . . without whose consentnot a pier could be erected, not a stone turned.”6 Equally ominous was thenature of the claims made by British diplomatic representatives at variouscourts that in view of their victory in the Seven Years’ war, they were entitledto more privileges over French diplomatic representatives. French amour-propre could not have been more bluntly flouted.7

Choiseul’s communication with Louis XV on the subject clearly demon-strated the direction that French foreign policy was likely to adopt in the sub-sequent years—

England is, and will ever be, the declared enemy of your power, and of yourstate. Her avidity in commerce, the haughty tone she takes in the world’s affairs,her jealousy of your power, the intrigues which she has made against you, makeus foresee that centuries will pass before you can make a durable peace with thatcountry which aims at supremacy in the four quarters of the globe.8

Choiseul’s language was pointed. It demonstrated how ruffled the feathersof French diplomacy had become at this juncture of Britain’s maritime andcolonial supremacy in Europe. The fact that Britain’s commercial and colonial

French Foreign Policy Objectives, 1763–1778 5

pre-eminence had been won almost completely at the expense of France wasclearly unveiled.9 The Seven Years’ War was clearly the most disastrous defeatFrance had suffered in modern times.10 How then was France to recover herprestige and influence upon continental affairs? This was the question that ad-dressed itself and in terms extremely poignant to the guardians of Frenchdiplomacy in the period from 1763 to 1778. The responses to this question byall schools of French diplomats carried the analogous implication that in orderfor France to restore her status in Europe English power had to be vanquished.This became the unique goal of French foreign policy between the years of1763 and 1783. Preparations for implementing the premeditated war of re-venge were vigorously undertaken through the reconstruction of French inter-nal and external resources. To Choiseul, the prevailing peace agreement was aprovisional measure. It would also be his personal defeat if the treaty termscould not be reversed. From 1763, he became “Cato, the Elder” of France, urging ceaselessly that England had to be vanquished and the treaty had to beundone.11

He perceived the Seven Years’ War as only a first game in a match of three.England had won the first game, but France will prepare to win the second.The ramifications of French diplomacy as laid out by Choiseul ultimately re-sulted in French participation in 1778 in the War of the American Indepen-dence. The restoration of the balance of power in Europe and the retrieval ofFrance’s position as a great power were at stake, and subsequent formulationof French foreign policy aimed to attain this prime objective.

Ironically, the articulation and preparation of the modus operandi for a suc-cessful war of revenge against England required an intervening climate ofpeace and diplomatic amity in Europe. While Choiseul’s plan of retaliationwas to seize a pretext for rupture with England at the first opportune moment,all had to remain peaceful until then.12

In the inter-war years, Choiseul, his cousin Choiseul-Praslin, Broglie, andseveral others of the avant-garde at Versailles strove to resuscitate their na-tion’s former ascendancy by laying down a systematic plan of approach to thewar of revenge by an invasion of the British Isles. A keynote feature of thisplan was the rebuilding of French overseas commerce and sea power in orderto enable a naval victory as a prelude to invasion. Only the knowledge thatFrance would not be strong enough for several years after 1763 to fightBritain with any prospect of success tempered the resentment of France to-ward her traditional enemy.13

A redefinition of French foreign policy followed in 1763. Limitation ofcontinental commitments and a new focus on the colonial conflict with En-gland, with a special emphasis on the war at sea, marked a significant read-justment of French political priorities.14 “If,” as William Pitt (the Elder) had

6 Chapter II

phrased it, “Canada had been conquered on the banks of the Elbe,” Choiseulwas determined that it was not to be defended there.15 French resources werenever again to be diverted from the struggle overseas, which Choiseul and hissuccessors considered to be France’s main interest. Therefore, they tried toensure that the continental states would remain neutral in the event of futureAnglo-Bourbon war at sea.16

The fulcrum on which the lever of French revanche strategy was to rotatewas the “Family Compact” or the Pacte de Famille of 1761. It was essentiallya military alliance between France and Spain, but the treaty also containedsome commercial agreements. The agreement became the cornerstone ofFrench diplomacy after 1763.17 Since the conflict centered on a concentrationof sea power, a navy able to defeat England became the prerequisite of a suc-cessful war of revenge. Choiseul was well aware of England’s continued mas-tery at sea. During the Seven Years’ War, the English navy had reached an un-precedented size, and after the Peace of Paris its strength on paper was at least120 ships or even 150 of the line.18 The English could be successfully chal-lenged only if the two Bourbon States built a combined fleet approximatelyequal in strength to the English navy. In his Mémoire of February 1765 toLouis XV, Choiseul placed absolute emphasis on the military and naval al-liance between France and Spain. The war of revenge had to be waged in co-operation with a rejuvenated Spain.19

The French colonies in the Antilles, Martinique, St. Dominic, and Guade-loupe would also play a significant role by augmenting the French forces andproviding strategic military bases. In the East Indies, preparation would bemade in the Isles of France and Bourbon to strengthen the French possessionsin India and equip these to launch an attack on the English settlements in theregion. French resources were to be used for launching an attack on the En-glish colonies in the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The French wouldalso help the English colonies in North America if these revolted against En-gland, and above all, carry out a successful invasion of England herself.20

The idea of attacking England in England had been a pet project of theFrench government since 1545.21 Just as Carthage had been destroyed by the Romans, the French planned to destroy England by an invasion of herhomeland. While the planning of such an invasion had continued without apause since 1545, it became charged with a burning desire for national re-venge in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, and particularly under the pa-tronage of the Duke of Choiseul (1758–1770) and Broglie. This project con-tinued to be extremely popular in government circles until 1779. Choiseul andBroglie believed that in any war with England, the ideal French strategywould be a direct invasion of the island. But, an essential precondition for thesuccess of this enterprise was to acquire a temporary naval superiority in the


Channel. Since the combined naval strength of France and Spain was not cal-culated to give that superiority, it was necessary to reduce the presence of theEnglish fleet in home waters by creating diversions in outer seas. One of theseprincipal diversions was to be an attack on the English settlements in India.In view of England’s large vested interests in that region, it was anticipatedthat England would immediately send a strong naval squadron to neutralizethe French assault. At the time of the Falkland Islands’ crisis between En-gland and Spain in the early 1770s, France was offered the ideal opportunityto execute these projects. However, the sudden dismissal of Choiseul in 1770,followed by Broglie’s exile, aborted the attempt and the plan remained inabeyance. The scheme was revived in 1778, but the pressure of French com-mitments on American soil during the War of the American Independence un-expectedly diverted from this endeavor.

A pre-condition for the timing of the conflict with England, including theplan to invade the island was the readiness of the Franco-Spanish armed andmarine forces, particularly the marine. Thus, rearmament became the primor-dial issue in the plan for a war of revenge. In the correspondence exchangedbetween Louis XV and the King of Spain, these realities were repeatedly em-phasized. In his first letter written in end-December 1770, Louis XV warnedthe King of Spain that France was avoiding hostilities until such time she wasadequately prepared to launch her crusade of vengeance.22 He cautioned thatSpain must peacefully resolve the dispute over the Falklands with England,or else fight alone. However, in his second letter written after the fall ofChoiseul in January 1771, Louis XV assured King Charles of the sanctity ofthe Family pact and encouraged the Spanish king to accelerate the Spanishrearmament program, so that the Bourbon powers would be well-equipped toconsummate the war of revenge once hostilities started.23

To accomplish the readiness for war, the two Bourbon powers instituted anumber of reforms at home and in their overseas possessions. In addition,there were administrative reforms strengthening the forces on the continentand in the colonies, in preparation for the war of retaliation against England.24

Given Spain’s limited resources, it was inevitable that the main burden of anyfuture war would fall on France. Hence, the French administration from thetime of Choiseul devoted its energy to the construction of a powerful Frencharmy and navy.25

In 1761, Choiseul assumed ministerial responsibility for the army andnavy. While his cousin, the duke of Choiseul-Praslin, took over the day-to-day conduct of French diplomacy under Choiseul’s direction, Choiseul vig-orously pursued the task of military and naval reconstruction. He devotedmore resources to the upgrading of the navy owing to the war that was antic-ipated to come at sea. It may be said that under Choiseul’s direction, there was

8 Chapter II

a veritable renaissance in the army and in the navy. The French army recov-ered swiftly from its partial destruction during the Seven Years’ War. Origi-nally there were twenty-six foreign battalions in the French army, comprisingof Germans, Italians, Swiss, Corsicans, and Irish French.26 By 1770, the to-tal number of foreign recruits increased to 152,758. When Choiseul reportedin 1765 to Louis XV about his military reforms, he set the date of 1768 for itscompletion. He was confident that by that time France would emerge with astrong army that would “. . . reap the fruits at the next war.”27

Choiseul restored the marine as a most formidable weapon to fight an ef-fective sea battle and to protect French commerce and French overseas pos-sessions. He expressed that the “marine must be the principal defense of thecolony. . . .”28

In 1763, France had only forty-four ships of the line and ten frigates, mostof them not being in seaworthy condition. In 1765, Choiseul estimated thatFrance needed more than eighty ships of the line and forty frigates, plus boatsfor transporting supplies for the planned war of revenge.29 Based on this cal-culation, he ordered a replacement of the ships destroyed during the SevenYears’ War and requisitioned for new ships to be built, furnished, and armed.The anticipation was that by 1770, France would secure a total of 80 ships ofthe line, 118 battalions, and 56 squadrons.30

However, Choiseul’s enthusiasm was not appreciated by the dilettanteLouis XV who had the minister removed from power in December 1770.Broglie was also exiled from court through the influence of his private ene-mies soon after Choiseul’s fall. Ironically, by this time the French naval andarmed forces had been sufficiently retrieved to play the decisive role in thesuccessful American Revolution eight years later.31

As mentioned before, the acceleration of the military and naval recon-struction program had been designed as part of a modus operandi of an “in-vasion of England” and the ancillary wars of diversion in the colonies, whichwere planned for execution some time between 1769 and 1771.32

If Choiseul and Broglie had not left the diplomatic scene in 1771, theirplans and impending strategy may have created a milestone in the annals ofFrench history at that very juncture. However, this is a point of speculation.On the other hand, in spite of their dismissal the impetus that both diplomatshad provided to the plan of an invasion of England during their tenure in of-fice, subsisted for a long time after them. The Abbé de Terray (ComptrollerGeneral of Finance, who also acted as the Minister of Marine for a fewmonths after the fall of Choiseul-Praslin in 1770) and Pierre Étienne Bour-geois de Boynes (who succeeded as Minister of Marine in 1771) conductedthe reforms in the administration of marine and colonies on the principles fa-thered by Choiseul.33


The stimulation in the planning of an invasion of Britain ebbed during thelast four years of Louis XV’s reign (1770–74). The next chapter will offer anoverview of Broglie’s scheme before the actual unfolding of his written ver-sion on the political rationale and military strategy he would use in planninghis pet project for the demise of the national enemy.

NOTES

1. J.P.L. de Luchet, Les Contemporains de 1789 et 1790, ou les opinions dé-battues pendant la première legislature; avec les principaux événemens de la revolu-tion. Rédigé par l’auteur de la Galerie des états-généraux. 3 Vols. Paris, 1790.

2. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, (hereafter cited as A.E.) Mémoires et Documents, (hereafter cited as M.D.)—France, Vol. 581, 3–4.

3. A.N., K/164,dossier 3, No. 22. Also see, Étienne François de Choiseul, Mé-moire de Monsieur de Choiseul Remis du Roi en 1765. Paris: Charles Giraud, 1881,8. Hereafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire.

4. G. F. de Martens, Recueil de Traité . . . des Puissances et États de l’Europe . . . depuis 1761 jusqu’à Présent. Göttingen, 1817, I, p. 104–120. Quoted in EdwardS. Corwin, “The French Objective in the American Revolution,” American HistoricalReview, 21 (1915–16), 51.

5. See M. De Flassan, histoire Général et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie Françaisedepuisla Fondation de la Monarchie jusqu’à la fin du Régne de Louis XVI. 7 Vols.Second Edition. Paris 1811, VI, 480.

6. E. S. Corwin, “French Objectives in the American Revolution,” 52.7. M. De Flassan, VI, 183–187; VII, 26–27.8. A.N., K/164, dossier 3, No. 22. Also see Choiseul, Mémoire.9. Henri Verdier, Le Duc de Choiseul. La politique et les plaisirs. Nouvelles Édi-

tions. Paris, 1969, 121.10. H. M. Scott, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the strat-

egy of Choiseul after the Seven Years’ War,” International History Review I (1979),17. See also, Hubert Méthivier, L’Ancien Régime en France, XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIesiècles. Presses Universitaires de France, 1981.

11. C. H. Van Tyne, “Influences which determined the French Government tomake the Treaty with America, 1778,” American Historical Review 21 (1915–16),529. See Henri Blet, Histoire de la colonization Française. Naissance et decline d’unEmpire des origins à 1789. Paris, 1946, 279.

12. Henri Verdier, Le Duc de Choiseul. La politique et les plaisirs. Nouvelles Édi-tions. Paris, 1969, 121.

13. H. M. Scott, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to the strat-egy of Choiseul after the Seven Years’ War,” International History Review I (1979),17. See also, Hubert Méthivier, L’Ancien Régime en France, XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIesiècles. Presses Universitaires de France, 1981.

10 Chapter II

14. See D. Gerhard, “Kontinentalpolitik und Kolonialpolitik im Frankreich des ansgehenden ancient régime,” Historische Zeitschrift, 147 (1933), 21–31, for this newemphasis and its implications. The desire to abstain from continental commitmentswas most clearly seen in the aftermath of the death of the King of Poland, AugustusIII in October 1783. France had traditionally played an active role in Polish politics;yet in 1763–64, she was an idle though not an indifferent spectator of the election ofStanislaus Poniatowski as King. (On France’s attitude to the Polish situation, see H. M. Scott, “France and the Polish Throne, 1763–64.” Slavonic and East EuropeanReview, 53 (1975), 370–88). This restraint was a severe challenge to the assumptionson which French foreign policy had long been based; opposition to Russia had beenscarcely less important to eighteenth century French foreign ministers than hostilitytoward England. This opposition was necessarily suspended during the Severn Years’War and in these early years of peace when revenge against England was the domi-nant theme at Versailles.

15. See E. Daubigny, Choiseul et la France d’outre mer après le traité de Paris.Paris: Hachette, 1892, 274. Choiseul, he says, first planned to isolate England beforeundertaking any enterprise against it, and he had essentially planned a maritime warbecause the results of the Seven years’ War had shown that a continental war wouldbe detrimental to French interests, which after 1763, aimed predominantly at theweakening of British power.

16. H. M. Scott, 18. Choiseul’s judgment on the Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756:“Cette nouvelle alliance fit négliger la guerre de mer et d’Amérique qui était la veri-table guerre. Tous les moyens se portèrent avec enthusiasme et sans réflexion à uneguerre de terre don’t le but était d’élever la maison d’Autriché.” Quoted in E. Daubigny, 28.

17. For a detailed discussion of the implications of the Pacte de Famille, see JohnRoopnarine Singh, “French Foreign Policy, 1763–1778, with special reference to theCaribbean.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1972, 24–44; For the clausesof the Pacte de Famille concluded at Paris on August 15, 1761, see Alfred Bourguet,Le Duc de Choiseul et l’alliance Espagnole. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1906, 239–50; seealso, F. P. Renault, “Études sur le Pacte de Famille et le politique coloniale française,1760–90.” Révue de l’histoire des colonies françaises, Dixième année (first semester,1921), 1–52; William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French Al-liance. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1969, 1.

18. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London, 1976,106; Nicholas Tracy, ‘The Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770: Use of Naval Force,” En-glish Historical Review, 90 (1975), 40, in which a paper strength of as much as 157ships is suggested.

19. A. S. Aiton. “Spanish Colonial Reorganization,” Hispanic American Histori-cal Review, 12 (1932), 270; Louis Blart, Les rapports de la France et de l’Espagneaprès de Pacte de Famille. Paris: Libraire Félix Alcon, 1915, 78. Also see, Choiseulto Ossün, November 13, 1763, A.E./Correspondance Politique (hereafter cited asC.P.), Vol. 530—Espagne, 319. It was essentially a military alliance between Franceand Spain, but the treaty also contained some commercial agreements.


20. Choiseul, Mémoire, 8–9.21. Earlier in 1377, the French had burnt Portsmouth and landed in the Isle of

Wight, but the expedition had ended in failure.22. M. E. Boutaric, Correspondance secrete inedited de Louis XV sur la politique

étrangére avec le comte de Broglie, Tercier, etc. et autres documents relatifs au min-istère secret. 2 vols. Paris, Henri Plon, Chief Editor, 1866, I, 412. “Tout les mesuresque j’ai prises jusqu’icy dans mes ports, sur mes côtes et dans mes colonies ne sontque de pure defensive.” In this connection, see “Instructions Duchatelet (French am-bassador at London, 1768–70), January 10, 1768. A.E./C.P., I, Vol. 477, 30. Also pub-lished by P. Coquelle, Le Comte Duchatelet, ambassadeur de France à Londres(1768–70) d’après les documents inédits des archives des Affaire Étrangéres. Paris,1909, 3–6. Louis XV instructs Duchatelet to approach the English foreign ministerwith propositions for a commercial treaty with England that will maintain freedom ofthe seas and commercial equilibrium. France desired to prolong the peace in order togain sufficient time for her internal reorganization.

23. M. E. Boutaric, I, 416–18.24. For Bourbon internal reconstruction, see John R. Singh, 60–85. See also, H. M.

Scott, 17–35. For the reforms in the army, see H. Carré, Histoire de France, ed. E. Lavisse, VIII:ii (Paris 1909), 369–75; and, Comte de Montbas, “Choiseul et la res-urrection de l’armée de Rossbach,” Révue des Travaux de l’Académie des Sciences,Morales et politiques, 107 (1954), 48–61. For Choiseul’s reforms, see Henri Verdier,122–27. Also, see the following works on French military and naval reconstruction:Georges Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de la France sous le régne de Louis XV.Second Edition, Paris 1910. The volume enthusiastically plaudits Choiseul’s achieve-ments; J. Tramond, Manuel d’histoire maritime de la France: des origins à 1815. Sec-ond Edition, Paris, 1927; R. E. Abarca, “Bourbon Revanche against England. . . ,” Un-published Ph. d. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1964, 137–71; E. Batiffol,“Le Ministère de la Marine du duc de Choiseul et la preparation de l’Ordonnance de1765,” Ibid, 118 (1893), pp. 31–48. These treatises give useful information on the ad-ministrative reforms; P. Roger, “Choiseul, Ministere de la Marine,” Révue Maritime,203 (1963), 1160–71. This article offers a laudatory tribute to Choiseul’s accom-plishments; Jacques Aman, Les Officiers beaus dans la marine française. . . , (Genève1976); Above all, see Choiseul, Mémoire, 397–409. On the regeneration of the army,see especially, Emile Léonard, L’armée et ses problèmes au XVIIIe siècle. Plon, 1958.

25. For the spadework done by Choiseul to implement the war of revenge, seeJules-François Saintoyant, La Colonisation français sous l’Ancien Régime (du XVesiécle à 1789). Tome II, Paris 1929.

26. Choiseul, Mémoire, 14.27. Ibid, 258; 15.28. Choiseul, “Mémoire concernant la defense des colonies françaises de

l’Amérique et le moien de tenir la marine militaire en activité en temp de pais,Amérique du Nord 1714–77.” A. N. Colonies, F/2C, Vol. 8, Carton No. 8.

29. Choiseul, Mémoire, 17.30. “Mémoire sur les forces de mer et de terre de la France et l’suage qu’on pour-

rait en faire en cas d’une guerre avec l’Angleterre.” A.E./C.P., vol. 550—Espagne,

12 Chapter II

495–97. In his treatise, “The Importance of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction to thestrategy of Choiseul after the Seven years’ War,” International History Review, H. M.Scott states that the shortage of ready cash slowed down the pace of the naval recon-struction program. In the critical early years of peace, the navy did not receive thefunds necessary for reorganization on the scale Choiseul had planned, nor were theamounts allocated to the navy paid in full (25). Instead of the eighty ships, the Frenchnavy consisted of only sixty seven ships of the line (27). See, “Liste Générale desVaisseaux du Roi (1768).” Archives Marine, B.5/5. Naval reconstruction had in theshort term proved a failure for both Bourbon powers; the large numbers of ships ofthe line demanded by an aggressive strategy simply could not be built with any speed.In A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, (London: Yale University press,1985), Jonathan R. Dull contradicts Scott’s numbers on French naval strength. Hemaintains that the French had only sixty three line ships during this period. He alsoadds that owing to the slowness of naval rearmament in France and Spain, Choiseulsuspended indefinitely the planned war against England and assumed a more trucu-lent stance against expansionist Russia (35). By the time of the great Falklands cri-sis of 1770, the Franco-Spanish war of revenge against England had become largelya hollow threat (36). See, ‘Tableau des forces navales du roi dans le courant des treizeannées, 1775.” Archives de la Marine at the A.N. (Paris), Series B5, Box 10. Becauseof his country’s military unpreparedness, Choiseul strove to convince the Englishgovernment of France’s pacific intentions. See Choiseul to Comte de Chatelet, Feb-ruary 29, 1768, A.E./C.P., vol. 477—Angleterre. Choiseul encouraged the ambassa-dor on his peace mission to the Duke of Bedford, Lord Shelburn and Lord Weymouth.

31. John F. Ramsey, 146.32. See, Choiseul, “Mémoire sur les forces de mer . . . guerre avec l’Angleterre,”

1767. A.E./C.P., Vol. 550. It is clear from the statements in this document thatChoiseul anticipated the French offensive to happen within ten years of the peace of1763.

33. E. Daubigny, 285. Chapter III: An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War,1765–77.


14

The idea to attack England in England had been a favorite scheme in the ivorytowers of French diplomacy for at least a century and a half. SuccessiveFrench administrations had demonstrated continuous patronage to the evolu-tion of ideas nurturing the pet scheme. In the aftermath of the Peace of Paris,the objective became even more alluring and quite realistic. France had notrecovered sufficiently to contend with England in a long drawn out war. Herfinances and her military resources were not ready for a sustained effort.However, in a short and vigorous assault upon her neighbor, there lay somepossibilities of success. There existed a consensus among the higher govern-ment officials at Versailles that the only effectual way to defeat Englandwould be to strike at London. The court of St. James would be bound to ac-cept the terms of the invaders once the capital was invaded successfully. Amore sharpened and systematic approach became a keynote of the planningunder the direction of one or the other of the two outstanding figures ofChoiseul and Broglie. Already, Choiseul had ordered a thorough survey of allthe ports along the northern coast of France to deduce their present conditionand the number of ships they were capable of harboring. At the same time hehad deputed secret agents to reconnoiter the southern coast of England withthe plan of a descent on her shores.1

On April 7, 1763, Broglie had been entrusted by Louis XV to draw up avast project of a maritime campaign against England.2 At the heart of the proj-ect was the necessity of a victory in a major sea battle that would give theBourbon powers the advantage to accomplish the land invasion. While thesuccession of invasion plans submitted prior to that of Broglie had all been ofa defensive nature, the latter’s original proposal prepared in 1765 rejected any

Chapter III

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War,1765–1777

defensive distribution of forces and laid down a strategy of peripheral attacksintended to distract the British forces from the Channel which would open theway for an invasion of the island. M. René Castex, a modern French navalhistorian wrote in 1901 that Broglie’s plan was infinitely superior to the oth-ers before him because it rejected a defensive distribution of forces. However,he added that even Broglie had not clearly grasped that a major naval battlewas the indispensable preliminary to invasion, and that the main purpose ofcontriving local superiority at sea must be to fight one at an advantage.3 Thedeficiency in Broglie’s original invasion plan of 1765 (which M. Castex re-ferred to) was subsequently corrected by Broglie in a revised plan which hewas prompted to prepare after the outbreak of the American Revolution. Inhis second great plan of 1777, Broglie insisted on a decisive naval victory anda single deadly thrust at Britain’s heart and capital.4

While he had continued to urge through his secret correspondence the in-vasion of Britain on the lukewarm Louis XV, and could not make much head-way in the actual implementation of his project in the late 1760s, Broglie ob-tained leave (exiled) to rethink his information and ideas with those ofChoiseul. On the accession of Louis XVI in 1774 and the appointment ofComte de Vergennes as the foreign minister, Broglie obtained permission toreturn to court. Although Louis XVI was peace-loving by nature, he had anintrinsic interest in the navy, and the idea of France avenging herself againstBritain through an invasion of the island kindled his interest as it gained pop-ularity in French political circles. Broglie re-submitted an improved versionof his original plan to Louis XVI toward the end of 1777.

Broglie’s revised plan reformulated his first (original) plan in all details ex-cept that his allocation and distribution of military and naval resources weredesigned to achieve a major naval victory to facilitate the mainland invasion.It had taken Broglie four years (1763–66) to draw up his first plan.5

He prepared this plan after a grueling investigation of the topography, coastaldata, strength and size of the marine, and the financial and military resources ofboth France and England. He had appointed M. de la Rozière, an engineer andofficer of merit, to reconnoiter the English coast. Broglie’s project actually em-braced operations in several corners of the globe. In June 1765, he sent twomemoirs to the King on “the general disposition of the project,” one with regardto France and the other pertaining to Spain. The French part of the project con-sisted of four maneuvers: diversion in Scotland, diversion on Mahon in theMediterranean, the expedition to India from the Isles, and assembling an arrayof observation in Flanders. Broglie underscored in his original plan that the warsof diversion in other parts of the globe are accessories to the principal project ofa descent on England. “It is to London that we must go and attain success.”6

An Overview of Broglie’s Plan of War, 1765–1777 15

The following excerpt from Broglie’s correspondence indicate his ration-ale for drawing up the plan

The unfortunate events of the last war between France and England and its dis-astrous consequences necessitated considerable sacrifices for obtaining thepeace; the manner of despotism and arrogance that the English, swollen by theirsuccesses, have taken during and since the course of this negotiation, and themultiple proofs that they have given of always abusing the superiority of theirforces on sea to impede the augmentation of the marine of the King, needed tosustain the few French colonies that have escaped their greed, have determinedHis Majesty to look in the wisdom and range of his enlightenment, a new meanswhich in order to succeed demands an assiduous effort for some years. . . . It isstrongly feared that the injustices and vexations of the English will renew thewar between the two nations, and in order to confront this event with successthat we must promise ourselves of measures well-planned. . . . These are HisMajesty’s views with regard to England. He perceives the possibility of… a de-scent on England, (which) is the goal he proposes. . . .7

In his instructions to Rozière, Broglie had emphasized that this was a topsecret mission, and that Rozière ought to conduct his investigations withthe utmost secrecy. On December 14, 1763, Rozière had submitted hisviews in a long letter to Broglie. “I dare to assert,” he wrote, “that the planof an invasion of England is not only possible but will also be easy fromthe moment that His Majesty will make preparations for such a massiveproject.” On July 12, 1764, Broglie had delivered a closed case to theKing, the key of which was left in the solitary possession of the King. Thecase contained two maps of England. A large map, prepared by Rozière,detailed the thirty leagues of coasts and drew an itinerary on London. Thesmaller map was of the whole island, illustrating the remoteness of the dif-ferent points on the coast from the capital. “While waiting for the generalplan of the project which will take several months to make,” wrote Broglieto King Louis XV, “he presents for the moment to the King what he callsthe ‘Prospectus’.”

In order to convince his King again of the necessity of this operation,Broglie had eloquently iterated the first principles of his grand project—

I will begin, Sir, by establishing as a maxim recognized as incontestable that allStates which are reduced to a simple defensive posture must begin at once toundo it as it loses everyday its esteem . . . the only means of abandoning the po-sition where France finds herself vis-à-vis England, if scarcely proportionate tothe dignity of its crown and the actual strength of its power, is of forming a gen-

16 Chapter III

eral plan, well-conceived, of which the goal will be of destroying its enemy’s ar-rogance.8

He had proposed that an agreement be made with Spain for a military liai-son against England, ensuring that Spanish operations remain confined to amere exhibition of strength and not play a decisive role. A Spanish fleetwould be assembled at Havana for making a demonstration against the En-glish colonies of New England and Jamaica, and one other in Spain itself forthreatening Gibraltar. There were to be two channels of operation: the firstwould create two diversions with the fleet of the Mediterranean, one towardMinorca and the other toward the Isle of France (directed at India). There-after, the final act of an invasion of England would be implemented. The di-version attacks involving at least six subsidiary naval engagements were de-signed to divide the forces of the enemy so that they would not be able toimpede the passage of the French fleet and its debarkation on the coast ofEngland. Thus, such a strategy would consummate the glory of the reign of “. . . His Majesty, the salvation and welfare of his State and the happiness ofhis subjects.”

Broglie’s memoir dealt at length with questions of martial preparations anddetails of strategy. He had suggested that the French were to arm at Bresttwenty-six vessels and four frigates; at Rochefort eight vessels, six frigates,and six prames. The transportation vessels had to be reassembled at diversepoints of the coast from Dunkirk to Bayonne. (Later, during the launching ofthe main operation, all the transportation vessels were to be reassembled inthe Channel). The fleet of Brest would join the fleet of Rochefort to sail to-gether to Plymouth. The Rochefort squadron would cruise around this port,while the fleet of Brest would continue to cross the canal of Portsmouth.These would secure the safe passage for the transportation vessels coming infour divisions and carrying an ensemble of sixty thousand men, who were tobe landed between Dunge Ness and Beachy Head, at Rye, Winchelsey, Hast-ings, and Pevensey respectively. After the debarkation was completed, thetroops would march toward London. In eight marches of which the details areminutely indicated, the army could arrive to the interior of the English capi-tal. The cost of the transportation of troops would be approximately thirty-three million livres.

In March 1768, Broglie had sent his ambitious project to Choiseul. Per-haps, he became impatient with the inaction of the king and hoped that the en-ergetic Choiseul would envision the significance and worth of his marvelousstrategy. Broglie had also believed that a conjunction of ideas and efforts


would increase the chances of implementation of the project. He received thecooperation of the foreign minister as Choiseul signed off on all the instruc-tions on the project while the former directed the communication. Broglie hademployed the services of several agents such as Hugel, Mesnil-Durand,Béville, La Rozière, and d’Ornay for the exploration of different parts of theFrench coast in August 1768. The surveillance reports were treated as highlyconfidential. These were studied by Broglie who forwarded the reports toChoiseul with his recommendations.9

Choiseul’s dismissal in 1770 brought a suspension in the progress of thisinvestigation. Broglie was also exiled to Ruffec being disliked by the Dukeof Aiguillon who succeeded Choiseul in office. As will be recalled, Brogliewas recalled to court after the accession of Louis XVI to the throne and theappointment of Vergennes as foreign minister in 1774. When the outbreakof the American Revolution in 1775 foreshadowed the extended nature ofEngland’s military preoccupation across the Atlantic, the indefatigableBroglie renewed his efforts to prevail upon the Comte de Saint-Germain,Minister of War, to render serious consideration to his plan of an invasionof England. It was in 1776 that Broglie started to revise his first plan andsubmitted his “grand design” toward the end of 1777 to Louis XVI for con-sideration. He explained the purpose for the re-submission of his idea toinvade England as follows—

An offensive on the part of France is absolutely necessary in 1778 since itwould act as a preventive war. The English, an extirpating and avariciousrace, seeking to establish an universal monarchy, would soon aggrandize atthe expense of French and Spanish possessions in America, in the Antilles,and in Asia. Before England can secure the advantage, France and Spainshould strike, taking the advantage of England’s preoccupation with herNorth American Colonies.10

Broglie’s revised plan vehemently emphasized that everything must be sub-ordinated and directed to obtaining a crushing naval victory which wouldpave the way for invasion. As mentioned earlier, the revisions focused on sec-ondary details complementing the first plan that he had submitted to LouisXV in 1765. They included the same diversionary attacks as was projected inthe plan of 1765, with the object of producing local superiority in the Chan-nel. However, in the second edition, he offered precise figures and expandedthe deployment figures of the vessels, men, and horses needed for the expe-dition.11 He added two large Tables depicting every detail of his colossalscheme of an invasion of England. Table I underlined the different expedi-tions planned against England.

18 Chapter III

In a second table, Broglie described the details of the operations on the in-vasion on England.13 He insisted that there were to be no other splitting up offorces. The invasion fleet, which would consist of French ships only, wouldbe concentrated at Brest to forty line ships and twenty frigates. The functionof this great force would be to win a decisive battle in order to clear the wayfor a landing on the island. The attack would be launched in April or October,preferably the latter because of the prevailing winds, the absence of manyBritish seamen in distant waters at that time, and the fact that after harvest theinvaders would be able to live on the resources of the country.14

He laid out the structure and strength of the land forces, naval forces, trans-port fleet, and the ports where troops were to be assembled. The navalsquadron was to comprise of forty vessels, twenty frigates, and some lightboats to be united at Brest. The author placed emphasis on this part of thescheme. The land forces consisting of sixty thousand men would be dividedin four regiments. The first regiment would embark at Dunkirk, Calais, andBoulogne; the second at Dieppe and Havre; the third at Honfleur and Cher-bourg; and, the fourth at Saint-Malo and Morlaix. There would be five hun-dred and ninety boats transporting the troops, which would be apportioned


Table 3.1. Table of the different expeditions to be undertaken in concert by Franceand Spain against England12

For France Number of Vessels Number of Troops

Descent on England 40 vessels 60,000 men20 frigates

Diversion in Scotland 6 frigates 800 menIn the Mediterranean 10 vessels 15,000 men

10 frigatesIn India (Isle of France) 1,500 men

Total 50 vessels 77,300 men36 frigates

For Spain Number of Vessels Number of Troops

Enterprise on Gibraltar 12 vessels 20,000 men8 frigates

Diversion in America 15 vessels 12,000 men(attack Jamaica) 10 frigates

Descent on Ireland 15 line ships 15,000 menand Canal of Bristol 10 frigates

Total 42 vessels 47,000 men28 frigates

Source: A.E./M.D./53: Angleterre, 72–73

equally for the transportation of troops to each of the nine ports. Their aver-age tonnage would be 150 tons. In regard to the debarkation strategy, Brogliesuggested that as soon as the fleet of Brest would cross the canal ofPortsmouth after having defeated the English fleet, the transportation vesselscarrying the four land detachments would debark under cover in Sussex, Rye,Winchelsey, Hastings, and Pevensey. These ports were advantageous in viewof their proximity to France, facility of debarkation, and easy for the marchto London where the troops could arrive only in eight halts. The enemy,Broglie believed, could be defeated in a single blow and the war terminatedin a conjoined naval and land campaign involving a period of some weeks.

The subsequent pages of this volume will unfold a translation of Broglie’sinvasion plans as submitted by his first and revised submissmions cited in thereference notes.

NOTES

1. The idea of invading England was first developed in the correspondence of M.Durand, the French minister in London, (1763). According to him, a descent on Eng-land would produce a financial panic in a short time, and would put the country at themercy of the invader. He adduced his arguments by recalling the difficulties of thebank of England during the invasion of Charles Édouard. The financial weakness isthe other side of an England whom we solely see as a formidable naval power withendless resources, he wrote. As all the defensive forces of England consisted in itsmarine, it would be necessary to combine the fleets of France and Spain for attackingas well as for creating diversions for the English fleet in the Channel to remote partsaway from the metropolis. England would be without power and resources when at-tacked at those strategic points that provide her with the means of economic suste-nance. On April 11, 1767, Colonel Grant of Blairfindy, who had been entrusted byChoiseul on a highly secret mission to survey the topography of the English coast,also submitted his report on the feasibility of an invasion of the island. Colonel Grantconsidered that the most suitable landing place would be “Deal,” which was eightmiles from Dover. The topography being flat would enable smaller vessels to comeright up to the shore, while larger vessels of the fleet could approach close enough toprotect the debarkation of the troops. Another mémoire titled, “Reflections on the re-connaissance made in England in September and October 1768,” was drawn up by M. de Béville, a marshal who had been assigned by Choiseul to investigate the mili-tary situation at the English coasts. In this report, Béville discussed various plans ofinvasion at considerable length, but favored a descent near Portsmouth from wherethe French could effectively ruin the English fleet. Béville submitted another mé-moire titled, “Essai d’un projet de descente en Angleterre,” in December 1770, justbefore Choiseul’s dismissal. See A.G., Ang., T.1414, 13. Also see, M. C. Morrison,

20 Chapter III

“The Duc de Choiseul and the Invasion of England,” R. Hist. S. Trans. (Third Series),IV, 93–100.

2. Although Louis XV abhorred another immediate war, he had surprisinglyagreed to this project in principle. See Henri Verdier. Le Duc de Choiseul. La Poli-tique et les Plaisirs. Nouvelle Editions. Debresse, Paris, 1969, 127. The documentscontaining the project of Broglie are filed in three large registers in the Archives ofthe Marine at the Archives Nationales in Paris, B/4/297–299. In December 1777,Broglie revised his plan and resubmitted it to Louis XVI under the title, “Plan of Waragainst England, drawn up on the orders of the late King, in the years 1763, 1764,1765, and 1766, by M. le Comte de Broglie and recast and adapted to the present cir-cumstances in order to be placed under the eyes of His Majesty to whom it has beensent, the December 17, 1777.” Of this revised edition, there are two copies in theArchives de la Marine, B/4/132, B/4/135, and four copies in the Archives Nationalesamong the papers compiled by the Consulate for the expedition of England, AF IV,1597. One of the copies at the National Archives bear this note: “This report remainsunder the personal custody of the Director-General of the Department of Marine, whocan only communicate or deliver the copies on a written order from the Minister ofWar. Signed the 1st Nivôse (fourth month of the Republican Calendar, i.e. December-January) of year IV of the Republic. Aubert Dubayet.” This notification demonstratesthe extraordinary importance and secrecy of this document.

3. R. Castex, Les idées militaries de la marine au XVIIIe siècle, 157–9. Cited in,A. Temple Patterson, The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to InvadeBritain in 1779. London: Manchester University Press, 1960, 8.

4. A. Temple Patterson, 20.5. While the subsequent chapters of this volume will offer a translation of

Broglie’s actual Plan step-by-step as formulated in his own language, this chapter in-tends to offer a holistic preview of the plan. The author feels that such a summarywould make the reading of the actual plan more connective and meaningful.

6. Broglie, Memoire, A.F./M.D. Angleterre 53, 1778, 80. Also, see G. Lacour-Gayet, 429.

7. Broglie, “Memoire: Plan of War against England. . . ,” A.E./C.P. Angleterre 53,1778, 25–133.

8. Broglie, Memoire, A.F./M.D. Angleterre 53, 1778, 57.9. Mémoire du Comte de Broglie au duc de Choiseul. Mars 1769, A.F./M.D. B4

298.10. See Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l’establissement

des États-Unis d’Amérique. Tome II. Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1884–89, 668.11. See M.D.53 Angleterre, 92-93.12. G. Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire de la France sour le Règne de Louis XV.

Paris,Honoré Champion Libraire, 1902, 448–9.13. See A.E./M.D. Angleterre, 73. Also, see M. Lacour-Gayet, 450–51.14. A. Temple Patterson, 13.


22

MÉMOIRE FOR PRESENTATION TO LOUIS XVI1

When the political crisis of the kingdom invites all good citizens to speculateand reflect, there are some to whom this right seems particularly suited andfor whom it is even a duty.2 Such are those who, attached to the King and theState through long service and great benefits, have acquired some insightthrough their diligence and experience. The Count de Broglie takes the libertyof presenting to his Majesty his political and military speculations on the cur-rent state of affairs.

His Majesty knows that the late King deigned to honor the Count deBroglie with an intimate trust for nearly twenty-three years and that he hadentrusted him with a specific task and that this task—which covered all po-litical interests and whose branches stretched across all Europe—had placedthe most important and secretive affairs before the eyes and hands of theCount de Broglie during the duration of this correspondence. Among the di-verse great objects confided to the Count de Broglie, one of the most impor-tant was the preparation of a war plan contrived in all parts and aspectsagainst England. All the letters, memoirs, maps, and plans relative to the workwere sent to the late King from April 20, 1763, until June 15, 1766. The reign-ing King must have found them in the private papers of his august late an-cestor. After [the King’s] death, the Count de Broglie had a complete copymade and gave it to the Marshal de Muy; one says that it is lost; it is not lo-cated in the War Offices.

This was in 1762,3 nearly at the moment of peace, when the Count deBroglie, although enveloped then in the disgrace of his brother the Marshal,had proposed to the King to prepare this great endeavor. This was not because

Chapter IV

Broglie’s First Mémoire

of ambition or with a goal of ending a peace that the kingdom needed in or-der to recover from its losses. He knew too well the principles of moderationand the good faith of his Majesty, and he was himself too penetrated with hisprinciples to present him with projects that might prove contrary to them buthe knew that the King kept in his heart the old memory of the wrongs of En-gland. Even the peace had just revealed the claims of this power to an exclu-sive empire of all the seas, and in the execution of the articles of this peace,she [England] conducted herself with an arrogance that merely betrayed herplan to humiliate France and to attach her [France] again every time that she[France] would try to improve her navy. Never had it thus been more prudentto think about war while conducting the peace. The experience of the two un-fortunate wars at sea and the wisdom of the judgment of the late King hadshown him that our dreams had as their principal source4 to have always beenaverted by the English and to have never opposed them with an organizedstrategy. It was thus simply necessary to place before his eyes a comparisonof the potential of France and that of England in order to have him see theenormous superiority of the former when one would know how to prepareand employ it and the advantage that France should have in attacking the lat-ter, corps for corps, instead of wasting her forces in distant and disparate ex-peditions. These consequences caused him to embrace ardently the project ofan invasion of England as the first blow that it was necessary to strike at thebeginning of a new war and as the only one that was capable of eliminatingthe deficits of the peace that one had just concluded and of setting the twocrowns in the place and rank that their real power assigned to them in Europe.

Approved by the late King, this work was accomplished in spite of all theobstacles that resulted from its intrinsic difficulties and then from the pro-found secret to which it was subjected. Because not even the minister couldhave any knowledge of it, it was done with as much activity as care; it wasnot conducted like all the war works that are ordinarily drafted with vagueand uncertain speculations in the cabinet but was instead drafted on the spotand was supported by demonstrated calculations. Talented officers were sentto England; they recognized the possibility of an invasion, the points of de-barkation, the methods of supplying provisions, the marches, the camps, thepoints, and every possible operation even beyond London. Finally, one cal-culated and combined on our very coasts all the resources that we had to ex-ecute its project, the places where one had to assemble the troops, the portsfrom which it was necessary to dispatch them, the quantity of ships that eachone was able to furnish, the materials that it was necessary to prepare, the ar-tillery, the munitions, the provisions, the number and type of required troops;alas, everything—including the calculations of the seasons, the winds, andthe tides—entered into this plan, which one accompanied at the same time

Broglie’s First Mémoire 23

with maps, spending charts, and other information proper to contributing thegreatest probability to the possibility of success.

The Count de Broglie did not limit himself to these speculations alone. Helinked this principal expedition to other diversionary projects to be executed atthe same time, whether this is done by us, or Spain. He indicated the secret andhidden measures that it was necessary to take during the peace in order to beplaced in a state to strike this great blow unexpectedly at the onset of the war; heproposed to prepare an international political plan that sapped the credit of En-gland little by little in the north and among the great powers of the continent; fi-nally, the revolution that England undergoes today with the revolt of her coloniesand the war that must likely result from it between France and her were foreseenand indicated as the moment that this great project could be executed.5

Such was the immense work placed by the Count de Broglie into the handsof the late King. This Prince did not do with the plan that which he was sus-ceptible of doing. It was necessary that he might have dictated to his minis-ters the measures that were to be taken in advance either by initiating6 theminto his secret diplomacy (as the Count de Broglie often took the liberty ofbeseeching him to do) or by directing the measures himself without commu-nicating the goals of this to them; but, while he wanted on one hand to hidefrom them the slightest traces of this work, his wisdom—which enabled himto see the best advantages in all occasions—was, on the other hand, unfortu-nately not (one dares to say) always accompanied by the trait that carries [theadvantages] out. Thus, none of the preparatory measures indicated by theCount de Broglie was taken—the stockpiling of munitions and artillery, pre-meditated concert with Spain, international negotiations—all remained un-prepared. Even the navy, which was supposed to be the basis of the project,remained in a state of lethargy, and it was not until the reign of his Majestythat one became occupied with this with zeal and success.

With the death of the late King having exposed the mystery of the corre-spondence with the Count de Broglie as well as the work that he had be-stowed upon him and with the7 clouds between France and England beingable to induce in a single moment that war that the object of this work was topredict and prepare,8 the Count de Broglie believed that he had to devote him-self to a new examination of the former plan with all the attention that his zeal and experience can make him capable of, and it is this former work—examined, reworked, and applied in the greatest detail to the present possi-bilities—that he takes the liberty of placing before the eyes of his Majesty.

This work will be divided into the two following memoirs. The first9 hasas its subject the development of the present conditions between France andEngland relative to the great event in America and of the nearly inevitableconsequences that it is necessary to expect from an approaching war between

24 Chapter IV

the two powers. Subdivided into several parts, the second incorporates a strat-egy of the military preparations that must be taken in the different cases thatcould lead to the events. Whether it is to prepare to maintain a war if Englandstarts it or to act before she does if this is judged necessary, one has adoptedthe great project of the invasion of England to the offensive preparations thatare discussed in this memoir, as drafted by the order of the late King.

One thus exposes the present situation of our resources with regards totroops and military material, the distribution that one will be forced to assignto them relative to the different war plans that one can form, the insufficien-cies that result from this distribution compared to our current state of arma-ment, the urgent need of correcting this, and the resources that seem to beneeded to be taken in order to correct this.

A portion of the ideas that are developed in this second memoir and notablythat which related to an invasion of England will not be kept from his Majesty.With the work of the Count de Broglie having appeared in his hands after thedeath of the late King and unfortunately perhaps in those of many others after itwas lost in the War offices, different people have procured extracts, and someothers have even tried to take credit for it, but the insight of his Majesty will eas-ily allow him to see the differences that exist between the surreptitious, muti-lated, and parceled works that lack any knowledge of places or things in com-parison to a complete work linked in all its branches and accompanied by all theoriginal proofs and maps submitted to his Majesty—in a word, a work so pre-pared by all the officers that were employed in the reconnaissance and in its con-fection and the Count de Broglie, author of the project that he has just adaptedwith the most mature reflection on the present circumstances.10

Finally, the Count de Broglie deposes the totality of his work into the handsof his Majesty as an indication of his attachment to his service and his person,and he asks of him no other price than to deign to read it attentively. His Majestymust sufficiently see that from the conduct that the Count de Broglie constantlymaintains since [his Majesty’s] ascension to the crown and throne that he doesno attempt to become involved in affairs nor to solicit trust, but it is a matter to-day of the major interest of the State and of the glory of the King. In the crisis,the Count de Broglie would believe his silence to be culpable, and he consideredthe following work as a debt to his conscience and his master.

POLITICAL MEMOIR ON THE SITUATION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND

There has never been greater events, as much for their implications as fortheir consequences, than the quarrel of England with the Colonies. In effect,


this is not at all an affair of intrigue and ambition, a precarious jealousy, or amomentary discussion; this is an absolute resolution; it is a continent that isseparating itself from the others, and there is a new order of interest and con-formity that is going to arise in the midst of this great shock; while waitingfor this event to have an influence on all of Europe, it actually places Englandand France in the most delicate and difficult crisis in which two neighboringand rival countries have ever found themselves.

The most likely result of this crisis will be a war between these two pow-ers; one could even say that it [war] has already awkwardly begun and that itwill thus spread even more everyday until it explodes since—unless the im-possible happens—all topographical and political circumstances result ininviting the two governments to an impending rupture. One will begin by ex-amining the situation and the interests of England. It is England that is themost essentially and most actively involved in the crisis; for us, it [the crisis]is only possibility and speculation, and our interests will be the subject of thesecond part of this memoir. Speaking about the interests of France in relationto the current circumstances is to include Spain in this; their politics and theirmotivation are or must be common.

SITUATION AND INTERESTS OF ENGLAND

One will reflect as little as possible on the past; it is from the present state ofaffairs that one must depart, but these are bases that it is essential to recalland—without any precision—one only speaks haphazardly. England cannotdo without its colonies since, without colonies there is no commerce; withoutcommerce, there is no navy; without a navy, England is no more than a third-rate power in Europe.

With the defection of the colonies in the continent of America, Englandfinds herself reduced to her possessions in the Antilles, her vast establishmentin Asia, and her holdings in Africa, but all these colonies united consequentlydo not suffice to meet the needs of her navigation or her maritime power,which must be her first objective. Her glimmering islands are very inferior toours; her establishment in Asia is without doubt an immense source of rich-ness for her, but her commerce there only consists in commodities of lux-ury;11 it does not furnish any outlets for her national factories and is only con-ducted with a small number of ships and sailors. This is the same with herpossessions in Africa; they are of no resource to England’s navy, and the com-merce in Negroes that she conducts there has no value for her unless she hasimmense plantations to cultivate in the continent of America.

26 Chapter IV

It is the urgent need of the metropolis to have large, dependent colonies con-suming manufactured goods, and an immense number of sailors. Up to thismoment, this need blindly obliged the English government to place the Amer-ican insurgents under the yoke; this is the need felt by the entire nation; it isthe reason for the efforts that it undertakes today and for the spirit of animos-ity that (in the opposition party at least) is felt for its rebellious colonies. If passion allowed for clear minds to reflect, the English government would haveexamined above all else what the nature of the colonies of the continent of America was like; it would have seen that it was unlike that of the other European colonies. In the Antilles for example, where a small number of whites—although weakened and nervous12 dominates a large number ofblacks and constantly needs foreign troops—the land only produces items of luxury and remains completely dependent on Europe for all the necessitiesof life. For such colonies, there is a certain need for protectors and masters, andthe day that would separate them [the colonies] from them [the protectors]would be the period of their ruin. The English colonies of the continent ofAmerica are under absolutely different circumstances; they are agriculturaland are populated by a majority of free men; they abound in all the commodi-ties of basic needs, and they have many others that place their metropolis intheir dependence. On the other hand, if this latter [the metropolis] caused themto be dependent on it because of its factories, it is by means of forced and pro-hibitive laws whose bonds they break by becoming free, by constructing fac-tories of the same type and of which they have the primary material in theirmidst, and by opening their ports to all nations; such colonies are thus evi-dently destined one day to form an independent state from Europe, and the na-ture of things always mastering the events in the long run, such a natural des-tiny must be accomplished sooner or later.

This is thus the inevitable point that must form the basis of the diplomacyof England; she must have felt that the independence of her colonies in thecontinent of America was an inevitable revolution and that she was able tosuspend it or delay it a few years by address or force but that there would ar-rive a time when no human effort could prevent it. Out of this, all of her diplo-macy must have attempted to procure establishments that might lessen theloss of this vast continent; she was only able to obtain these compensationsby attacking the House of Bourbon and by carrying off the Antilles. This con-quest assured her domination in this part of the seas of the new world. She ac-quired the exclusive property of several commodities—such as spices—thatluxury has made necessary for us as well as for the Dutch; she opened for herfactories an outlet nearly as abundant and secure as that of her formercolonies; she thus acquired some establishments that she was no longer able


to lose and guarded only with the assistance of her fleets without beingobliged to maintain costly garrisons there.

Nothing was easier for the English than to strike this great blow last year;we furnished them with a sufficient pretext to justify a war begun without anypreliminaries of a declaration. Our commerce was secure; our navy, whichhas made immense progress for two years, was ineffective; our colonies werenot in a state of defense, the six battalions of reinforcement that one has sincesent there had still not arrived; the English troops in America numbered50,000 men—an immense force in these areas and more than sufficient for allthe conquests to be had at the expense of the House of Bourbon; their armshad not suffered any great defeat. The congress, less proud, was able to ac-cept accommodating dispositions. Thus, whether England comes to termswith her colonies or whether she takes the position of limiting herself to anaval war, never has she had a more brilliant or fortuitous occasion to amendher losses.13 Because of a course of destiny that has favored us in such a re-markable manner for three years, this storm spared us; English generals con-ducted themselves even more poorly than their ministers, and from all sidesthe lot of our rivals was only mistakes and misfortune.

But the end of their blindness must have finally arrived; they can no longerdelude themselves about the fate of their American colonies; they must seethat this is not a false uprising conducted by some ambitious persons but aunanimous confederation of all the provinces founded upon the thoughtfulrecognition of their position and their interests; moreover, they can no longerreasonably suppose to vanquish them and to dictate a temporary peace tothem; they would not reduce them, and the inevitable loss of these rich pos-sessions would only be deferred for a few years.

If these reflections do not sufficiently open the eyes of the English minis-ter, the calculation of the resources that would be necessary to undertake afourth campaign in America will end in overwhelming them. It would be nec-essary to send no less than 30,000 men to the army of General Howe only toredress it on the footing where it was at the beginning of the last campaign;whatever are the resources either outside or within England to furnish suchreinforcement? There only remain 15,000 trained troops in the three realmsof Gibraltar, Minorca, and the Isle of Wight. Will she dismantle them underthe current circumstances? Will this be those new levies of troops, those reg-iments offered by subscription about which their gazettes have made so muchnoise?14

First of all, one knows that this movement of zeal has diminished greatly,but if it would subsist and if these levies would eventually be completed, is itduring the journey that they would be trained and hardened to war? Andwould they not be worth less upon arriving than the troops of the insurgents

28 Chapter IV

who—with already three campaigns of experience—combine the pride ofsuccess to the good spirit that is born of their cause and the advantage that onehas always had from fighting on one’s land?15

Will the English procure foreign troops? The last campaign especially dis-gusted the German youth. With the disaster of Bourgoin having ramificationsin large part upon the people of Brunswick, Hessse will not want to weakenherself; the landgrave received on this point very lively representations fromthe states of the country, and the Electorate of Hanover would easily have still10,000 to 12,000 men to furnish, but England feels that there are more press-ing and essential needs for which it is necessary to reserve them. The King ofPrussia is opposed to the departure of troops from Auspack, and finally, in thecrisis where the Empire finds itself, it is not the moment for England to con-clude new treaties. Given England’s impossibility to continue the war on landwith an army strong enough to suppress America, she could limit herself to anaval war mixed with destruction and incursions on the coast without at-tempting to penetrate any further into the country, but this type of war willoblige her to have at least 20,000 troops stationed in New York and the neigh-boring islands, Canada, Halifax, etc. It will oblige her to block the ports of theinsurgents and the entrance of the principal rivers and to maintain a largenumber of frigates to protect both her commerce and her operations. This newendeavor would be almost as costly as the one she renounced without ever be-ing able to ensure from this the benefit of subduing the country. Since a warof this nature only serves to sour the spirit instead of reducing it, the Englishwould soon become, with respect to the Americans, what the Genoese—locked up in a few places, hesitant to come out, and even scoffed in their entrenchment—were with respect to the Corsican masters of the entire inte-rior of their island. Thus, in the supposition that they might succeed in re-maining in these places by means of numerous garrisons and vessels for sup-port, they would be at least easily chased from all the flatlands that theymaintain in all the continent of America, such as in Canada, Florida, NovaScotia; it would be there that the insurgents would direct all their effort, andthus these three provinces would be irreparably lost to England because theywould not fail to enlarge the confederation and incorporate themselves intothe new Republic.

All types of war with her colonies thus necessarily being equally ruinousand useless for England, the most reasonable course of action that she mightable to follow would be to accommodate herself to them, but this very courseoffers the greatest difficulties. First of all, we could have acted before the En-glish, and our alliance with the insurgents creates great hindrances to theirvices and removes all types of resources from them. Even if our treaty was notratified, England could negotiate an accommodation; these accommodations


would be no less difficult, and in effect, what could the conditions of this beand what would its basis be? The insurgents will never renounce indepen-dence, and would the current ministry dare to recognize it? Would the nationforgive it for this? A portion of it believed up to now that honor is lost for En-gland. If she does not suppress America, a new ministry composed of mem-bers of the opposition directed by Lord Chatham himself will find no fewerdifficulties for an accommodation if independence is not the first article.

Lord Chatham spoke several times himself in his speech to parliament of atreaty of union; he said that it requires the English to form a familial packwith their American brothers—a remarkable expression that, alluding to ourfamiliar pact, positively indicates what the plan of this ex-minister would beif he were to return to the head of affairs. But how did Lord Chatham under-stand this pact? He did not explain if he wanted to speak of a treaty of unionon the model of that which subsists between England and Scotland—a for-mally insidious treaty to the disadvantage of Scotland and which convertedthe realm into a simple province of England.16 Certainly, the insurgents willreject it with disdain; it is evident that their success must not have weakenedtheir resolve not to have any community of fate, politics, or interest with theEnglish. The goal of those who fight is independence without compromise orrestriction; after learning about the proposal of Lord Chatham, DoctorFranklin said that one does not become brothers when one was a master.

The insurgents no longer have to consent to an exclusive treaty of com-merce in compensation of recognition of their independence. For such spiritsas those of Adams, Hancock, Franklin, and the other congressional leaderswho are so enlightened and advanced in the true principles of politics and ad-ministration, would one create illusions on a treaty of commerce that—if it isadvantageous for England—could only be detrimental to America? This isnot the effervescence of a moment, this is not fanaticism, this is not a feelingof vengeance or of persecution that placed arms into the hands of the insur-gents. To repeat, this is the thoughtful recognition of their situation and theirinterests. At the same time as they had recourse to arms, they declared them-selves free, and they drafted one of the best devised and most generally ap-proved plans of the Republic. Such people have made their decision. In ef-fect, they want to be free; they want to exist alone, and their plan ofcommerce is to open their ports to all nations. Consequently, everything mustlead England back to the first plan that her real interest dictates to her and thatshe should have undertaken last year—that of attacking the House of Bour-bon and recuperating from this the immense loss that is caused by the defec-tion of her colonies.17

This plan, as audacious and extreme as it can appear, is the only one thatmight save her, it would have been easier without doubt last year, but her mis-

30 Chapter IV

fortune only made it more indispensable the following year, and only a totalweakness might prevent it. By making this decision, peace with hercolonies—which we have demonstrated as so burdensome and so difficult tonegotiate—becomes easier and smoother; the English nation can thus withouthumiliation recognize the independence, her pride is sheltered behind the ne-cessity of the circumstances; she renounces separating herself from her chil-dren, her brothers, her compatriots in order to unite and turn against her nat-ural enemies who profited from her distress and against whom she will notfail to avenge her grievances. So will the consul of St. James speak to parlia-ment, and whether the ministry subsists such as it is or whether it will un-dergo a revolution that may create new members, the day that it will makethis great decision will be applauded with great enthusiasm. If it is the currentministry, one will forgive it for everything; if it is a new one, one will say thatit saved everything.

By recognizing the independence, by evacuating all that the English troopsoccupy in the United States of America, by not insisting upon any treaty ofprivileged commerce that is consequently contrary to the interests of the newrepublic, there are still some conditions that would make the peace very ad-vantageous to England. If she was able to secure it, such would be the prom-ise of congress: a complete neutrality with the House of Bourbon, guaranteesfor Florida and Nova Scotia—provinces acquired by England through theright of conquest and which do not form a part of the United States—and ex-clusive permission for all the nations of Europe to fish for cod.18

By allowing the American colonists access to it [the cod] for the suppliesof their continent, this accommodation will be simultaneously advantageousto the two contradictory parties; it would be so for England because it wouldstop her on the edge of an abyss into which the entire fortune of the nation ison the verge of falling; it would be so for the insurgents because, in spite oftheir success, they have need of peace in order to close the profound woundthat three years of war and devastation have created in their country; theyhave need of it in order to give free reign to the export of their commoditiesthat have accumulated in their warehouses and have fallen a third below thevalue that they had prior to the war; they especially need it to consolidate theirgovernment and their legislation. Feeling how dangerous it is for public lib-erty to keep a large army in a state of preparedness for too long a period, theenlightened minds and good spirits that set the foundation of this nascent statemust especially fear those individuals who grow accustomed to the easy reg-ularity of military allowances and the insupportable license of war later, whohave trouble returning into peaceful or laboring classes of the other orders ofcitizens. They must particularly fear those heads of the army who have grownaccustomed to the honors and the rights of command and who are likely to be


always tempted because of this to dominate the congress or to become thefirst subjects of a master that would shower them with dignity and riches. Tothis general interest that must cause the congress to lean toward an accom-modation, it is necessary to add that other interest born of the bonds of blood,language, nation, correspondence, and habit that the war did not generallybreak and that could regain their influence as soon as England will offer bothliberty and peace.19

Perhaps we have prevented this event by conducting a treaty of alliancewith the insurgents. One even believes that this is assured. We will return toit while dealing in the second part of this memoir with the situation and theinterests of France, but while supposing that this treaty exists, it cannot belong before it is discovered, and England will only have more motives still togo to war against us; she will attack us out of a desire for vengeance, and herpassion will thus be brought to an extreme; she must do this because of self-interest and common sense in order not to allow this alliance the time to so-lidify and unite its forces.

England20 has an interest in attacking France as soon as she is able to doso. Apart from the crisis in which she finds herself in relation to her colonies,there is a reason that must suffice alone to influence her. This is the progressof our navy; today we have fifty vessels of the line; in one year we will havesixty; in two years a replacement navy will fill our arsenals and our ware-houses. She must fear the same progress on the part of Spain; the same poli-cies can engage her [Spain] to undertake the same efforts. For a century, thisis the first and the most essential object of the jealousy and the just worriesof England; this is what made her go to war in 1755 and what in effect deter-mines her because her role as a great power in Europe can only exist throughher maritime superiority. Could she suddenly see herself deprived of it? Onemust admit that this must not be presumed. It remains to examine what Eng-land can hope to accomplish in attacking the House of Bourbon and what re-sources she has to do it.21

One has already shown that it had to be the goal of England to acquire newcolonies and that she was only able to do this at the expense of France andSpain and particularly by undertaking the conquest of all the Antilles. Thisconquest—which would have just been an easy invasion for her last year ifshe had suddenly employed all the forces that she had in America without adeclaration of war—would be without doubt more difficult today, but it is stillquite necessary that this should be impossible for her. In effect what do wehave to oppose her with in the Antilles? Twelve weak battalions; a few poorlydisciplined colonial troops without any war experience; some rough and per-haps poorly maintained fortifications; a system of defense that relies on falseprinciples because we seem to believe that one can prevent incursions and our

32 Chapter IV

forts, our magazines, and all our resources are consequently on the coast;colonists who are weakened by inaction but who might have been disposed tosacrificing their fortune and their lives in several circumstances and whomone has often attempted to persuade that it was in their interest to belong to apreponderant sea power that will assure them in all occasions of the assis-tance of Europe and the outlet for their goods.

Deciding to go to war against France, England can cover her plans until themoment that she will put them into action; she can send only seven to eightthousand men of reinforcement to this part of the world under the pretext ofcontinuing [the war] in America, and can thus employ with these forces—which would be reunited or combined with the remainder of those of Howe—approximately 23,000 men in the invasion of our islands. This attack—certainly more to fear several months ago—could be still undertaken withsufficient secrecy and quickness that the news might not reach us in Franceuntil the moment of its execution; let us remember what they did in Havanaand in Martinique with 14,000 landing troops and seventeen or eighteen ves-sels. Our islands were garrisoned with an equal number of troops as of today;St. Dominique was even more so garrisoned. Spain had a flotilla of twelvevessels in the port of Havana, and we had a squadron of eight vessels in SantaDomingo.22

Our colonies in Asia were even more at the mercy of the English than [are]those in America. Pondicherry is open and without defense; our warehouseson all the coasts of India only exist as a result of their permission, and we buytheir scraps at the price of gold and humiliation. The Isles de France and deBourbon are without troops, position, artillery, or munitions. Four Englishvessels on the high seas with a landing party of two thousand European sol-diers and three or four thousand Cipayes (foot soldiers) whom they will pickup at Madras and the other possessions can take from us our weak establish-ments in these regions and irreparably close to us the seas of Asia, and a sim-ple summons will suffice to steal from us that which we retain in this part ofthe world.

With much probability and success, this is what England can undertakeagainst us. With the exception of Havana, with which the court of Madridseems to be greatly occupied, the Spanish colonies offer them perhaps stillmore of a prize; they are almost all without resources, and the example of thePhilippines will be repeated everywhere without doubt. Here is such a planthat cannot only hinder the English and prevent them from thinking aboutthese conquests but that even cause them to tremble.23 The purpose of thisfirst memoir is not to develop it (the plan), it was first necessary to presentthe possibilities and the hopes that must determine the English for war, andone will continue in the same vein.


The English can attack us in America and in Asia without being obliged toemploy new measures herein since it is not necessary to take into account thefour or five vessels that they will need in the seas of Asia and the six to seventhousand men that they can send to General Howe and that will only be thefirst shipment of reinforcement that they seem to have destined for the waragainst the colonies. They still have a considerable navy to use against us, andtheir use of it is assuredly dictated to them by our situation; the objective mustbe to contain us in our ports and to prevent the conjunction of our reinforce-ments. It is established and according to reports worthy of faith that they haveforty vessels prepared or on the verge of so being and perhaps even more;they only have to send a portion of them before Brest and the remainder toCabo de Finisterre; they will occupy all at once our navy at Brest and that ofSpain; they will prevent the junction of our squadron at Toulon if one delaysany longer to send it to sea. Thus will they have—with two large flotillas sta-tioned as one just described—the advantage of two skillful armies that havetaken the offensive and have maneuvered in order to assist one another overforces that are perhaps superior but broken in five or six places and reducedto assembling under the hazards of combination and events. It is necessary toadd that the English navy is surely superior to us in the art of grasping thewind and the sea and of having in abundance the means of replacement. Shemaintains herself [in such a state] in all varieties of weather and seasons. Fi-nally, provided that—by starting the war—they succeed through this offen-sive approach in holding us in our ports for only three months—they havetheirs [vessels?] executing their planned invasion of our American islands andour establishments in Asia; it is necessary to repeat that one does not debatehere that which the English are capable of doing, and this is in order to provethat it is never without the hope of success that they will decide to go to warwith us; that which we are able to oppose them with will find its place else-where; let us come to the proof of the resources that is freely pleased to op-pose them with.

One emphasizes that the English are without sailors, that they have neverbeen able to form the crews of their observation flotillas, and that the forcedenlistment of recruits has been attempted for eighteen months in their coun-try without much success. It is necessary to keep on guard against creating ex-tensive illusions on this supposed scarcity. The English have difficulties find-ing sailors at this actual moment because all their efforts are directed towardcommerce, but—whether war might delay them or slow them down; whetherthe government places an embargo on the crews of the India company andcoastal traffickers; whether it has more decidedly supported the forced enlist-ment act—instead of the attractiveness of travel; whether Danish, Swedish,Dutch, Italian, and even French sailors are attracted, as it will not fail to hap-

34 Chapter IV

pen, by the promise of booty, compensation, and wages that are three timesgreater than ours and that they give to them at a moment of a great effort;whether in order to succeed they undertake a general invasion on all the seasin all seasons of departure without a declaration of war; whether they steal asin 1755 all the merchant vessels that we have at sea; finally, whether the na-tional pride that resentment inspires is the result—one will see if their navywill lack in arms.24

By accommodating herself with the insurgents or by renouncing the wareffort against them on land and consequently having use of this prodigiousquantity of transport vessels that one maintains there today, would she [En-gland] not immediately have at the disposition of her military navy the 25,000sailors that she keeps for years at sea and who must be the most war-hardenedand formidable crews that exist on the globe.

It will be the same for the infantry as for the sailors; whether Englandcomes to an agreement with her colonies or whether she only renounces thecontinental war with them, her infantry will thus suffice; what exhausts herand is beyond her means is this army of conquest that no other power wouldbe capable of feeding and maintaining at the distance at which it operates;with the same subsidies that she consumes in buying twenty-five thousandGermans to employ them in America, she would hire double that in Europe.Without doubt, she is not in a position to renew the efforts that she made onthe continent, and the pompous show that public papers make on this accountis only a ridiculous ostentation, but she will find resources as soon as it willno longer be a question of forming an army for the defense of England.Whether she assembles her militia, whether she calls up ten to twenty thou-sand Hanoverians who are still at her disposition, whether she places at thehead of this army a general whose reputation inspires some confidence, shewill find herself in a state of defense. One does not conclude from this how-ever that England is shielded from an invasion on the part of France, but thisinvasion will require on our part greater preparations than in the current state,in which she [England] would have to fear not being able to resist mediocreefforts.25

The common opinion on the weakening of the finances of England is per-haps also a little too exaggerated; without doubt, England has a debt that isnearly three times that of ours with a legal-tender value half as considerable,but her credit subsists, and it has still not suffered any setbacks; loans are madeat four percent, and the Dutch and foreigners still invest there with confidence.As long as things remain in this state, one will not be able to fool oneself inseeing the English succumb to the efforts of their enemies as a result of pecu-niary measures; even with France able to see that her credit and her resourcesin this area do not give her a real and marked advantage over England.


According to what one believes, such is the strongest idea that one can haveon the situation of England and of her real interest in the great crisis in whichshe finds herself engaged. All that one has said in this regard is summarized inthe following arguments.

It is impossible to continue the type of war that England maintains inAmerica today; it consumes her interest and her funds and can never procurefor her a proportionate and durable compensation; that which England wouldsubstitute by attacking the House of Bourbon will hardly be more expensive,and if fortune is favorable to her—especially if we fail to prevent or stop itsprogress—it will provide her with the resources of repairing all her losses.Thus, cost for cost, hazard for hazard, she must prefer one to the other.

However proven this interest may be, it is however in the order of possi-bilities that the English ministry—not experiencing revolution at all and con-tinuing to be struck with the spirit of pride and dizziness that has conductedit up until now—might adopt certain resolutions that may be completely op-posed to it [the interest of England];26 everything seems to announce that thiswill not be, but the chance exists, and in this situation, it can still be prudentto prepare this trap for the blindness of the English and to anticipate the event;this what one is going to examine by discussing in turn the situation and theinterests of France in the present circumstances.

SITUATION AND INTERESTS OF FRANCE27

To have proven that England cannot withdraw except by going to war is tohave already almost sufficiently shown the interest that France would have toprofit from the distress of her natural enemy in order to achieve her defeat because—between two rival nations—whatever lifts one necessarily has tolower the other. Never has the comparison of counter points been able to ap-ply in such a true manner; England has need of war with France in order tocompensate her losses; France has need of this to prevent her own [losses];for one, it is a war of compensation, for the other, [it is a war] of conserva-tion. Independently of this last motive, France has past injustices to avenge;she has to retake from England the superiority that nature so evidently in-tended to be hers.

This is the simple and evident interest that has struck the eyes of the entirenation for . . .28 years and raised among a portion of its speculations the vowof attacking England; but there can be herein several circumstances and re-flections that differently complicate the question in the eyes of the governmentand that might force it to accept another political war; the administrators havetheir secrets and to judge their comportment on that which is apparent is an in-

36 Chapter IV

discreet and often unjust precipitation. Thus, one will agree that peace is a verygreat and real asset for a nation, so necessary for France in a state of financialexhaustion,29 which, by an inevitable fatality, sixteen years of peace have onlyincreased; it is simple and even wise that the desire for its conservation be thebase of the government. Moreover, men who voted without reflection andwithout examination for war for the past two years undoubtedly do not knowthat our navy did not exist three years ago, that one lacked wood and all typesof equipment, and that it was necessary to create, repair, and order everything.War in such a state was thus impossible, and when politics would have moreevidently required it, it would have been dangerous to undertake it.

The mistakes of the English have happily led to giving us the leisure andmeans of exiting the state of weakness that this branch of our forces was in.It is starting to become more respectable; our arsenals, magazines, and depotsare garrisoned, and if the English commit the error of giving us still anotheryear of rest, the stability of the French navy will have become real. There isthus a decisive reason for not being the aggressor right now. In spite of ap-pearances to the contrary, the English are capable of making the mistake ofleaving us be; they can add to this that enormous [error] of engaging in afourth campaign in America; this fortune—although unlikely—would be tooadvantageous for us to neglect in the present state of things. From the pointof view of the insurgents, the question is reduced to this alternative: either ourtreaty is made with them, or it is not; if our treaty is concluded and if our min-istry believed that it had to seize the moment for this and profit from the needthat the insurgents can have of us, the great advantage that we will take from this will be to have acted before the English and to have removed fromthem all possibility of accommodation with their colonies in revolt.30 But onemust not count infinitely on the help of the rebels in the war between Englandand us; they have their wounds to heal and their government to consolidate.

If our treaty with them is not made, we have to fear that the English maymake their own. It is a difficult problem to resolve if the congress preferspeace with England and her independence recognized by the metropolis overany type of alliance with us. Through the peace with England, America ac-quires a sense of calm and abundance and the return of its commerce. Alliedwith us and consequently taking part in our war with England, she [America]continues to be in a tiring and dangerous agitation; she can fall prey to inter-nal factions, to the prolongation of the evils of war, or—with malcontents inthe country—to personal interests in opposition to the general interest. The al-liance with France was of the greatest utility last year. They still did not knowtheir strength, and they were menaced by a formidable army; today, this armyis nearly destroyed, and England is in a state of rehabilitating it. The insur-gents know this as well as we do; they thus have to negotiate today with


France only in terms that are absolutely to their advantage. With the nature ofthings making us the certain enemy of England, it does not suffice to insurethem of our disposition toward that power and—in necessary consequence—of the greatest desire31 to cooperate effectively on all that will be useful andadvantageous to them; if our navy does not have superiority on the seas, theywill assuredly require subsidies from us in the event of war; they will not evenbe able to conduct the intercity commerce with us that furnishes them and as-sures them of the outlet for a part of their commodities. The small navy thatthey were able to build and that was only a navy of pirates and buccaneers isdestroyed; they will form one from this in time without doubt; their situation,their abundant fisheries, and their beautiful rivers, capable of being enteredby warships up to thirty leagues (75 miles) inland—an advantage that not asingle of our rivers in Europe has—invite them and destine them to becomeformidable on the seas one day, but they still require more time, and it is onthe actual moment that we negotiate. Such as they are today, they cannot evenguarantee our colonies in the Antilles. There is still some time before they candefend themselves in their country or bring war to the islands that are threehundred leagues (750 miles) from them. The power of nations has markedages, and theirs is hardly in its infancy; it will be capable of making very largesteps. The Antilles will perhaps one day be counted amongst their colonies. Anew order of things will follow from this in commerce and in the politics ofEurope, but this is useless to the present question.

One has proposed the possibility of a commercial treaty as the basis andthe great objective of our alliance with the insurgents, but this treaty willbe, (1) a declaration of war against England as soon as it will be public;this deserves a lot of attention on our part; (2) it is necessary to be carefullest it be illusory and with no effect on the future because the interest ofthe United States of America is not to agree on conditions of privileged andexclusive commerce with France any more than with England; they will ar-gue against it at the very first moment of tranquility and affirmation oftheir power and would return to the healthy and extended policies as theirbrilliance so dictates to them to trade with all Europe and to open theirports to all nations;32 this treaty would not be as useful for the moment ifour fleets do not dominate the seas, and the commerce that the insurgentswould conduct with us could not take place except with a lot of trouble anddanger; thus, the actual crisis is such that, no matter what policies onemight be able to adopt, it appears evident that war alone can and mustbring an end to this. For England, it is a question of perishing or of risingup, and [it is a question] for the House of Bourbon of conserving thecolonies, of lowering England, or perhaps of running the risk of being re-duced only to its holdings on our continent.

38 Chapter IV

In this state, what must France do? [She must] first of all present [our po-sition] to Spain and make her understand it. Our ministry has undoubtedly al-ready seen to this; thus,33 the two courses—united in their approach to thecommon interest—can still wait since the passion that has until now blindedthe English ministry can—by directing her to war in America—combat for usbetter than we can; at the same time, however, the two united courses must beprepared for war, double their activity and efforts, and be prepared for a strictand limited defensive plan; at the same time [they must be prepared for] agreat and well concerted offensive plan that, at the first hostile movement ofEngland, can thus prevent her on one hand from invading our colonies and onthe other hand cause her to fear for her home. The topic of the followingmemoir will be the discussion of these preparations and this great plan.

One will follow this by observing that all that is treated in relation to theactual position of England, the insurgents, and ourselves must be consideredas susceptible to modifications and even to changes since it is not from gen-eral knowledge that one was able to draw the picture;34 however, one believesthat the principal bases are not very distant from the truth and that one has notrun the risk of going afar by adopting them as real.

SUPPLEMENT TO THIS MÉMOIRE

With this memoir barely transcribed, a part of the suppositions that it outlinedbegins to be realized. The English are realizing the impossibility of continu-ing the war in America and are determined to open negotiations with the in-surgents; the commissaries are named, and one waits for the message of thenews of their departure.35 If the instructions and the full powers that are givento them only authorize them to negotiate on the basis outlined in the discourseof Lord North, this approach will not have any effect because of the expecta-tion that the insurgents—victorious and convinced of the impossibility ofEngland to continue to wage an inland war against them—might want to re-nounce independence, but the commissaries under secret instructions canhave a wider approach; their first approaches will soon reveal it.

There is a great question to consider but which will lead us too far astray—to wit, if England should not be content with concluding a treaty of neutral-ity with the United States after having recognized their independence and ifthe insurgents themselves should not prefer this36 to a stricter alliance with theEnglish than with us.37

Whether they take one of these three possibilities—to ally themselves withFrance or England or to maintain a state of neutrality with the two powers andto open their ports equally to them—one will be content with observing that


the result of these possibilities is always as inevitable and near war betweenEngland and us. But let us gain some time; let us fortify ourselves; let us pre-pare ourselves; let us be in the position to conduct a vigorous war againstEngland at the first sign of hostility on her part; let us not even wait for themif we have made and concluded a treaty with the insurgents. Its publicationwill be considered in London as a manifest. The past mistakes of England andthe state of exhaustion in which she finds herself—still engaged in a crisisfilled with inconvenience and difficulties—all these presumptions are in ourfavor, but let us seize the proper moment. If it escapes from us, we will neverfind it again.

NOTES

1. The translation incorporates information presented in Broglie’s first submis-sion in 1765 and his revised submission made in 1777. If a different word or phrasewas used in the text in the first submission, this will be indicated through the endnoteas reference to document #1, which means the first submission. The revised submis-sion will be referred to as document #2.

2. Broglie, Plan of War. . . , 1–7.3. #1 adds: “that is to say,” 24. #1 gives: “vice,” 35. #2, 36. #1 gives: “enlisting,” 67. #1 adds: “current,” 68. There appears to be a missing page from #1 at this point; however, my own

numbering of the pages of #1 does not take the missing page into consideration, andI continue to number the pages consecutively. Page 7 thus follows page 6.

9. #2, 410. Ibid, 511. Ibid, 712. #1 does not give: “and nervous,” 1113. #2, 914. #1 begins a new paragraph here15. #2, 1016. Ibid, 1217. Ibid, 1318. Ibid, 1419. Ibid, 1520. #1 adds: “thus,” 2321. #2, 1622. #1 begins a new paragraph here23. #2, 1824. Ibid, 20

40 Chapter IV

25. Ibid, 2126. Ibid, 2227. Ibid, 2328. In place of the ellipsis, #1 gives: “several,” 3429. #2, 2430. Ibid, 2531. #1 adds: “on our part,” 3732. #2, 2733. #1 gives: “then,” 3934. #2, 2835. #1 states a new paragraph here36. #2, 2937. #1 gives: “or with us:” 41


42

MILITARY MEMOIR RELATIVE TO OUR CURRENTSITUATION WITH ENGLAND1

War is like a business; there is no success without a plan. This is what weessentially lacked in the last war, and it is good to hope that we do not lackone in the one [war] that threatens us. One would be even less excusablein that never has war approached in a less sudden manner. For two years,the two nations have been in a tacit state of war and in an open display ofarmament. Today, the crisis appears closer than ever; the slightest event, astep, a word, a misunderstanding can set us off. Never, thus, was it morenecessary to form a plan. It is likely that the government has one, and ifone dares to place this one before the eyes of his Majesty, it is only a zeal-ous homage that can however place him in the state of company [?]. Theconclusion of the preceding memoir on the political situation of France inrelation to England was that, given the blindness that has until now mis-guided the English and the seeming possibility although not likely thatthey will persist in this, it was necessary not to go to war but only to pre-pare for it in the manner of being able to go into action at the first indica-tion that it would be necessary. According to this result, it is a matter oftracing out a general plan that, defensive for the moment,2 might be capa-ble of becoming offensive as soon as war breaks out. This discussion is tooimportant not to be treated with all the method and depth that it demands;one will thus begin by resolving several preliminary questions that are re-lated to their situation3 will thus become the basis of the plan that one mustformulate.

Chapter V

Broglie’s Second Mémoire

SITUATION OF OUR NAVY COMPARED TO THAT OF THEENGLISH AND OF THE MANNER OF USING IT

One will not enter any detail on the material of our navy compared to that ofthe English navy. The government must know what to do on this account; itknows the secrets of our real situation, our depots, our arsenals, and our mag-azines, and it must have also procured those of the English. One will thuslimit oneself here to a few results supported on the past facts and on the rec-ognized truths in order to attempt later to infer from this the plan of operationthat seems to be the most advantageous for our navy to adopt.4

This branch of our forces has made immense progress for two years, andevery day this increases. A spirit of competition and activity has succeededthat of languor and—one dares to say—of discouragement; but it is on thesea, with the great results of practice, that the English wait for us; that whichwe lack, and the points on which they are perhaps still superior to us, is thecustom of navigation; it is the hardening in campaigns of long duration anddifficult posts; it is the art of spreading and holding great hopes everywhere;finally in the midst of many officers it is having those who have commandedsquadrons and flotillas.

In this situation, any sort of situation5 does not suit without doubt equallyour navy; it appears that one must avoid all those that will cut up our forces,divide them, or compromise them either in particular skirmishes or periloussituations or expeditions of long duration. The experience of the past twowars has only exceedingly confirmed this principle; one wanted to make adisplay of force everywhere and cover everything and [was] everywhereweak, everywhere inferior in force as well as in maneuvers and perhaps in ca-pacity; one was everywhere beaten or forced to retreat to ports which is thesame since operations were nullified because of this. After three campaigns,one wanted to return to the system of reuniting forces, and there was nolonger any time. The squadron of Toulouse, just as will always happen everytime that one will not act before the English [do], was not able to join theocean fleet; this one, hardly equal to the English fleet while it could have beensuperior if the conjunction had been made, wanted to set sail. One knows theresult of this combat, and since then our colors do not dare to show them-selves. Louis XIV did not at all use them thus during the two years of triumphwhen he had the empire of the sea; he had large fleets, and he used them to-gether. If he experienced a large defeat at La Hogue, it is incorrect if one saysthat this battle was the tomb of the navy because the following year he placeda fleet of eighty vessels to sea. What caused the navy to topple was that it wasnot at all endowed with considerable navigation. Consequently, it was merely

Broglie’s Second Mémoire 43

factitious and offered an ephemeral effort of its strength. Finally, with cir-cumstances having forced it to devote all its expenditures and attention towars on land, it was slowly and finally totally neglected.6

This is the system that one will propose for our navy: no small squadrons orno distant expeditions but large fleets, all our forces in a single sea, a naval bat-tle delivered at the start according to and with a great objective, a lively and shortwar. In the actual state it would be dangerous for us to believe we are able to de-fend our colonies and protect our commerce during the war with squadrons. SixFrench ships sent to the seas of Asia at the same time as six English ships at theend of a year would find themselves in a seriously inferior state to the latter withthe disadvantage of our navy in the long, difficult, and distant trajectories.

By assembling the greatest part of our forces at Brest, we will much moreeffectively protect our commerce and our colonies because we oblige theEnglish to keep not only equal but superior forces in the ocean and in the En-glish Channel; in effect, they must not risk the fate of England whose inva-sion would become easy—to the hazard of a battle given on equal terms; thus,if there is an operation that we could and should attempt, it is this battle be-cause on one hand it can end the war in a single strike and on the other, bylosing it, we do have the same risks to run, and this game is consequently veryunequal for the English.7

A great reason requires moreover that we prefer decisive actions to allthose that could cause the war to endure; because of our navy—still not at allconsolidated; not having at all for its support, as do the English, any maga-zines [or] arsenals filled with the means of re-supply; not being able to havewithout pause, as they do, fresh vessels to replace those that we will lose orthat the sea will damage; being less within the reach than they are of retriev-ing from the north all the materials for replacement—we necessarily weakenourselves through the duration of the war; furthermore, they have for them-selves the chance that foreign events will arrive to distract our attention and our resources, and—as with the force of subsidies, negotiations, and intrigue—they are clever enough to give rise to them [foreign disturbances];unfortunately, they have never lacked this talent.

It finally remains, in order to weigh the decision to take, to begin with ournavy with large measures and never to allow ourselves to become consumedwith details and the seasons, reasons taken from the character of the nation.Everything that concerns affairs of constancy disheartens her [the nation], tiresher, discourages her even with time, all that concerns the character of hardinessand vigor lifts her and communicates it to her. A portion of the naval officers maybe opposed to the system, but it is necessary to observe that it is their personalinterest that involuntarily leads this operation; the zeal and the great emulationthat reigns in this moment among them must redouble it [?]. They want to act on

44 Chapter V

their account; they desire particular commands, and it’s a type of occasion thatwill raise for them the system that one proposes, it is up to the government to ap-praise these views and not allow itself to be carried along by them. One will belimited here to general principles, the applications that derive from it [them?]and will be found in the plan that is the topic of this memoir.

NECESSITY OF CONCERTING THE WAR PLAN WITH SPAIN:BASES ON WHICH THIS CONCERT MUST BE PLACED

The necessity of concerting our plan with Spain is evident; it suffices to stateit in order to demonstrate it [the necessity], but this concert cannot be easy toestablish. There must be presented here an infinity of obstacles taken from thedifference of minds, characters, national prejudices, and private interests thatall, without a major force or a well thought out or convenient plan that ralliesthem and contains them, will act in a contrary sense. Between the two pow-ers there should necessarily be a plan so combined in all its branches that allthe respective advantages might be recognized in it, that all offensive and de-fensive views might be developed in it, that it be determined in it what eachpower can and must do in each supposition, that which one can have to fearof the enemy, that which will be necessary to oppose him against these dis-positions;8 finally, it would be necessary that such a plan would be guaranteedin all circumstances by the determined will of the two sovereigns.

A great advantage for the formation of this plan is that never has the inter-est of the two nations had to lead as evidently toward a common good as inthe present circumstances; it is a question for Spain as well as for France todefeat the maritime power of the English and at the very least to prevent thisnation, desperate from its losses and struggling in its distress, from attempt-ing to seek compensation from the colonies of the two crowns. The most de-cided political interest thus dictates to the cabinets of Versailles and Madrid9

that it is not at all a question here of separating its defensive and offensive ef-forts each on its own account; since beyond that this false plan would be veryadvantageous to England in that it would permit her to face alternately eachof her enemies; isolated and mediocre successes would never be decisive. Alarge strike is necessary to beat England, and this strike can only be dealtagainst her in England herself, in a word, it is necessary to dictate to her theterms for peace if one wants it to be advantageous and durable.

It consequently follows from this that it is up to France to assume the bur-den of the principal offensive role; the preponderance of her power and hermeans, her proximity to the principal point of attack all imposes upon her;that of Spain must be to support her; she must not lose sight of the fact that


by France’s triumphing and giving the law to England, her commerce and hercolonies are forever assured to her, whereas beaten and humiliated she[France] would drag her [Spain] to her ruin even if she would have had somesuccess on her own. What the two powers, in order to give more vigor andconstancy to their plan, must promise each other in the most solemn manneris not to separate their interests at the conclusion of the peace any more thanin the conduct of the war and to remain reciprocally allied in their losses aswell as to gain a common benefit from their successes.

Such must be the general views of the plan that is to be concerted betweenFrance and Spain and without which the two powers can acquire from theirunion only a mediocre and perhaps worthless effort. One will discuss after this,what the defensive as well as the offensive operations of this war offer to the twocrowns and it is according to this discussion that one will establish the most ad-vantageous plan for the common cause. By speaking of combining the strategiesof the two nations in the general plan, one does not mean that it might be neces-sary to unite their forces at the same points for this; on the contrary, it is neces-sary to have them always act separately but toward the same goal or in the viewsthat lead to the execution of the general plan; thus, in order to develop this idea,in which the Spanish will be charged with a portion of their navy in the defenseof the seas of America, they will coincide in effect with our offensive views sincethey will permit us by this effort to assemble all our forces in the ocean when wethus undertake a landing in England. By undertaking the second landing with adivision in Ireland or in Bristol channel, Spain does not unite its forces with oursat the same point, but she does not contribute any less effectively to the same ob-ject; these indications are no more than examples because one does not want toanticipate those details that will find their place elsewhere; by assigning also toeach nation the separate points of operation, they will act together with morevigor; they cannot leave anything to the other; and there will be no occasion forthose discussions that end up by dampening alliances and often cause all enter-prises to fail; it is also in relation to the navy of the two nations that one will bewell off; from this important principle, it will suffice to confirm this recalling theexample of the battle of Toulon.

EXAMINATION10: THE DIVERSE OPERATIONS ANDSTRATEGIES THAT CAN ENTER IN THE FORMATION OF A

WAR PLAN CONCERTED BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAINAGAINST ENGLAND

The strategies and operations that France and Spain have to plan against En-gland are of offensive and defensive sorts. We will begin with the latter.

46 Chapter V

DEFENSIVE: FROM THE COASTS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN

The possibility of any serious undertaking on the part of England on thecoasts of France and Spain is too devoid of foundation for one to need topause for long on this article; it [the possibility] could exist only as long asthese two powers would find themselves engaged in a continued war thatwould employ all their land forces; this circumstance can no longer occur inSpain now that her peace with Portugal is confirmed, and it [the possibil-ity?/the undertaking?] appears unlikely to be realized in France at least forsome time, given the decision that she has made not to get involved in the af-fairs of Germany.

At no time has England had enough land forces to hazard a decisive expe-dition against states that are so superior to her; because of this, she can at thevery most undertake a few devastating incursions and miserable expeditionsand by which, not able to penetrate in the country nor attack here by land ourprincipal ports that begin to be in a sufficient state of defense, she wouldnever know how to fulfill the objective that could compensate for her the im-mense costs of her armament. Currently engaged in a ruinous war with Amer-ica and having carried nearly all her forces here, this type of expedition is noteven to be feared. Supposing finally that she uses up all her means, it wouldsuffice in order to remove any possibility of it [expedition] from her forFrance and Spain to form different camps of observation on their coastswithin the reach of their principal ports; this menacing disposition for En-gland will always oblige her to keep on hand the few troops that she could usein a foreign expedition.11

Such is thus the difference of the disposition of France and Spain fromEngland that these two powers never have to fear this enemy in “her” midstwhile she has to fear constantly for her own.12 The land forces of England arepractically worthless; her coasts are everywhere susceptible to debarkation;no place or great river defends the county. The capital is from one side a twoday march and from the other a four day march across land; this capital is theseat of their commerce, their richness, and their power; it is completely open;if we march there, she is done for; their naval establishment, their depots, andtheir arsenals are barely any longer capable of defense; let one then comparein order to see the parallel between France and Spain united against what theEnglish proudly call their three realms, thirty million men against seven oreight, and one will be confounded to see that in all foreign wars, with the ex-ception of that supposed army13 of the Philippines and the chimerical bargesof Marshal de Bellisle, one has never executed much less considered againsther a serious expedition and that of the three, it is always she who carried outthe offensive as the constant basis of her plans.14


If England cannot and does not even dare to undertake anything on thecoasts of France and Spain when they [coasts?/France and Spain?] will thusbe garrisoned with some defensive camps disposed in a manner to cause themto fear an offensive expedition on their own coasts, one will concur howeverthat she can risk a strike against some of our maritime cities or those at themouth of our rivers, and for this type of mission, a very determined navy witha landing crew of three or four thousand men suffices, and one would notknow how to deny them this advantage, which is all at once the result ofcourage and experience; the English will conserve this possibility as long asthey will be superior to us on the seas because, by forcing our fleets to beholed up in our ports, they are in proximity to all the parts of our immense de-fense, and our territorial superiority thus becoming worthless, she only offersa greater consolidation to their insults. One will thus treat in the general planthe defensive measures to take in our roadsteads and in the points of ourcoasts most exposed to naval attacks; the lack of positive and local knowl-edge on the points of the coast of Spain susceptible to this type of attack willnot allow one to enter in the same detail on what concerns them, but the sameprecautions are common to all countries, and the application is easy to do ac-cording to place and circumstance.15

There remains a vast portion of these coasts that, although not at all nomi-nally belonging to France and Spain, has however reason to interest these twopowers because it is under the dominion of a prince of the same blood and be-cause this prince, having consented to the familial pact, is in the situation ofsharing in the rupture with England; such is the realm of Naples and Sicily. Asuperior English squadron in the Mediterranean,16 as the English have had inthe last two wars, can at will affront, pillage, and ransom them. She can men-ace as far as Naples, and this capital as well as its sovereign must still recall17

Captain Martin forcing Don Carlos, with a loaded pistol and a watch in hishand,18 to sign a treaty.19

It is thus necessary that he [the prince] enter into the plans of the courts ofFrance and Spain and protect that of Naples from a similar affront by havingit [the court] open its eyes to its situation, the dilapidation of its military, andthe scarcity of its resources in all forms by having it adopt those [resources]that are presented in their entirety to remedy this. The King of Prussia and theemperor will never make an acquisition that does not contribute to the in-crease of its military forces, and only the House of Bourbon will neglect themeans that fortune has placed in its hands; a large country and a populationof thirty million men will be useless in its political balance and will add noth-ing to its forces. Let us leave these reflections that are however not at all for-eign to the subject, and let us pass to the examination of another preliminarypoint.

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DEFENSE OF THE COLONIES OF SPAIN AND FRANCE20

The same lack of knowledge that one has concerning the coasts of Spain be-ing still even greater in relation to her colonies, one will not speak of themeans of defending these; it is up to Spain to know them [the means] and howto employ them. France can do nothing here; because of this situation, she ischarged with the principal active role, and it is under this relation that we willconsider it [the role] in our plan of operation. Let us see what can be her[France’s] conduct relative to her own colonies. We will start with those ofAmerica. If the English do what they ought and what we have shown to betheir only resource in the first memoir, they will direct against our coloniesthe same efforts that they have used up until now against the insurgents; it isto be feared that they may come on the verge of suppressing them[colonies/insurgents?]. Martinique alone can be in a state of defending itselffor a few months. Santo Domingo, having just in its French section 180leagues [450 miles] of coast and a single fortified post at the harbor of St.Nicolas, which there is no need to attack in order to become master of thewhole island, cannot withstand a vigorous and well planned attack; Mr. deBelzune, Mr. d’Emery [?], and all the officers who have successfully com-manded here have announced this. Guadeloupe is capable only of a mediocreresistance; Cayenne, St. Lucia, and other small establishments such as St.Pierre and Miquelon will surrender at the first notice; it would be foolish tocount on these colonists for the defense of our colonies; several physical,moral, and public causes whose detail cannot find any place here equally con-trary to this [defense], one must thus decide on the momentary abandonmentof our colonies if the English take the initiative of employing at the beginningof the war all the forces that they can muster.

Once they become masters of our Antilles, the English can go about easierconquests if they do not want to engage themselves in the siege of Havana—which is the only island of these seas that may be capable of an obstinate de-fense—or if they want to content themselves with the assurance of having thisrich establishment fall through scarcity; the new world is known to them, andthey only have to choose the site that they will attack.

In the present situation, France must thus send for the defense of her is-lands neither squadrons nor reinforcements of troops; she must abandon themto their own fate because wanting to have a powerful defense in all her pointsis to eliminate the means of acting offensively in turn. It is not the same forSpain in the general war plan. She must not be charged in principle with theoffensive role. She can divide her forces and oppose the projects of the En-glish in America, but to achieve this, it is not necessary that she accept her-self the system of strengthening all the points of her vast defensive in this part


of the world. It is necessary that she unite all her forces in a central pointwhere she might be able to protect them all and cause the English to fear theoffensive. Havana appears to be this point. By maintaining constantly aflotilla of fifteen to twenty thousand men here, she first of all shelters this im-portant establishment from all the attacks on the part of the English, and sheprotects all at once hers and ours because she menaces Jamaica and she caneven effect with success this expedition if the English attempt to executetheirs.

With regard to our establishments in Asia, we can only recall what we havesaid about their state of weakness in the first memoir; to protect them effec-tively, there would only be one means; this would be to attack the English.The possibility of this project will be discussed by treating offensive opera-tions. One will limit oneself here to saying that simple defensive measureswould be our responsibility and would only guarantee them [Asian colonies]imperfectly.21 It was necessary to prepare for this from afar and not to neglectthem during sixteen years of peace. Today, one is no longer on time, and it isonly by occupying the English elsewhere that one can defend them [thecolonies]. This measure may be the only one that might save our colonies inthe two worlds. The basis of our war plans must be a vigorous offensive inEngland. This power will only thus hereafter think of defending herself, andif she neglects this, she would be lost without repair.

EXAMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FOR THETWO POWERS AGAINST ENGLAND

The offensive operations that can enter either as simulated or real in the warplan of Spain and France against England can have Gibraltar and Jamaica asthe objective of the Spanish. The establishments of Asia, Minorca, and finallyEngland [are the objective] of France; one is going to examine them succes-sively in order to weigh their difficulties, their possibilities, their advantages,and consequently the preferences that is required to be given to each one inthe arrangement of the general plan.

ATTACK ON GIBRALTAR

This conquest would deliver Spain from the most annoying and humiliatingfetter and would be all at once one of the sensible strikes that one can makeagainst the arrogance and power of the English. It suffices for this to observethat Gibraltar places in their hands the key to the Mediterranean and that

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nearly one third of their merchant marine is employed in the commerce of thissea. One thus senses the trouble and the resolution that an attack on this placewould cause in England and the immense harm that it would cause if it weresuccessful and at the very least the important diversion that would result fromit when it would only come about as a false attack in [conjunction with] an-other more direct offensive project.

The port of El Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena offers Spain all the facilities tomake promptly and surely the preparations for this attack. Out of two thingscomes one. Either the English would abandon Gibraltar to its own forces andthe attack would thus be pushed truly and vigorously made until the momentof complete success, or well informed of the preparations that one could evenmake with force and without hiding the goal of the armament, they wouldsend a flotilla of support. If this flotilla was weaker than the one that Spaincould employ to cover its operation, the siege should not at all be interrupted.If it was too strong, the Spanish flotilla could avoid combat, and in this lastcase, the diversion that she would have caused would favor the great opera-tion of France by diminishing the number the English would have to opposeher. Spain, moreover, either by menacing or attacking Gibraltar has for herflotilla an immense advantage over that of the English since she has ports andharbors on both sides of the sea. As far as the possibility of the siege and themanner of executing it, one will not treat this here; Spain must be informedof this.22 Mr. de Valliere, French lieutenant General, had been charged in 1762with conducting the reconnaissance and strategy for it. His memoir must ex-ist. One will add to this only that the result was that this mission was not asdifficult as one had always believed it to be and that it can be undertaken withevery appearance and possibility of success.

ATTACK ON JAMAICA

Here is the grand offensive operation that Spain must be charged with andwhich she must occupy herself with before all others, including that at Gibral-tar. It is through this that she can herself deliver a great defeat to the com-merce of the English in the Antilles and create a diversion from their offen-sive projects on our colonies and their own. It is at Havana that she mustprepare the means of this expedition, and it is from this point of view that inthe article on the defense of the islands one said that she had to send a flotillaand an army corps here. The conquest of Jamaica would be an immense lossfor England and an acquisition of the greatest importance for the Spanish.This island is in the middle of their possessions and continually deals in con-traband on the coasts of solid ground and conducts the attacks in the Bay of


Honduras. The assurance of conserving it [the bay] would thus be an attrac-tion that it would be necessary to convince Spain of in order to engage her inthis expedition. This is the richest possession of the English in America. Onlyone quarter of it is cultivated, and this part with only the personal estates andproperties of the colonists included is estimated at more than seven and onehalf million sterling.

Inspection of the map suffices to show the facility that the Spanish havefor undertaking this mission. They can leave from Cartagena and Campecheat the same time as from Havana. Our colonies in Santo Domingo and Mar-tinique can assist them. There are no strong points in Jamaica, and the incur-sion is easy. One knows of a memoir written by Mr. de Macarty, captain ofSpanish vessels, on the possibility and the means of this mission. He believesit to be infallible and only requests twenty warships, a few frigates, twogaliots with cannons, and five or six thousand landing troops in order to un-dertake it. The Marquis d’Ossun has knowledge of this project, which he pro-posed during the last war, and no one can give better information than heabout this project as well as about all that concerns Spain.

ATTACK ON INDIA

This attack, which concerns us, would still be one of the most deadly blowsthat one might make against the English because of their commerce in thispart of the world and the vast domain at Bengal, which is an immense sourceof richness both for the nation as well as for the government, but this attackhad to be prepared at a great distance; it was necessary to profit from the calmof the peace in order to form a great military establishment on the Isle deFrance; it was necessary to assemble provisions and artillery of all sorts in se-cret here, and unfortunately none of all this exists; one has spent eighty thou-sand [francs?] on this, and there is not a fort or a battery under construction;because of this shortage, we are not in the condition of being able to under-take a serious mission against India.23

The English are ahead of us there; they have no less than five or six thou-sand European soldiers and ten thousand Cipayes (foot soldiers) there; theyhave six warships or frigates there, and we do not have a single one. In theseregions, they have Madras, which, for India, is a prime place and a great pointof support, and we only have some warehouses without defense or troops andof which, at the first sign of war, they [the English] will not leave any vestige.In order to change roles and to become offensive and conquering in these con-ditions instead of passive and unarmed as we are, it would be necessary tosend not only a squadron of seven or eight ships with six to seven thousand

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trained troops to India but a prodigious quantity of gear and equipment, all ofwhich lack equally for the defensive as for the offensive.24 Such an effortcould only be accomplished by setting us back or weakening us in more im-portant and decisive operations; it is thus necessary to abandon our Asiancolonies to their destiny, and it is through other successes, such as those inAmerica, that it is necessary to defend them and try to acquire a better fate forthem in peacetime.

ATTACK ON MAHÓN

The preparations for an attack on Mahón, whether real or simulated, can onlyconcern France, but one believes that in no case would one of necessity thinkseriously about it; in effect, although the chance that placed it in our hands atone time would not favor us once again, one saw that this conquest was notof great usefulness to us in the last war and that it did not remove the empireof the Mediterranean from the English. This empire is destined to the flotillathat will be superior, and if this will, that of the English, Gibraltar and theports of Italy will suffice for them. Mahón can thus only be considered as apoint that it is necessary to menace in order to augment the trouble of En-gland and to distract a part of her forces and her attention from points whereone really intends to strike. The English can really believe that Mahón is sus-ceptible to capture a second time, and their commerce in the Mediterraneanis such an important issue for them that Mahón menaced could at least alarmthe nation and cause troubles for the English ministers.

MISSION IN ENGLAND

In all time, and especially in the circumstances in which England is found,this is the great operation that must form the basis of the war plan of Franceand Spain. Through this mission, one can deliver a blow to her from whichshe will never recover. One can dictate the peace to her in London and de-mote her to the rank that she must occupy in Europe, that is to say the secondor third power. France and Spain thus have a common interest in this missionsince, as long as English power will subsist as it is today, their [French andSpanish] navy, their commerce, and their colonies will always be in a precar-ious and passive state. Through the lowering of this power, the House ofBourbon necessarily climbs to the first rank; one only has to see what com-merce has done in one century to this isolated population and to what degreeit has raised itself, and one will judge what it [commerce] could add to a mass


of power as united and abundant in men, money, and real means as the Houseof Bourbon possesses.25

By undertaking this favorable mission in England, the war is decided in asingle strike. The contributions and the ransom that one can demand may payfor the costs of this mission. The English navy is destroyed in its ports, its ar-senals, and its magazines, that is to say in its source and its means of repro-duction. One dictates to England such peace terms as one judges appropriateto impose on her; one dictates them to her in all four corners of the globe; onetightens, diminishes, and limits her colonies such as this can be advantageousfor the security and the prosperity of our own. Finally, what ten years of navalwarfare have done on another level and what several similar wars accompa-nied by some success cannot produce, this single mission accomplishes it ina single moment without repair.

A great rationale taken from the political situation of Europe argues in fa-vor of this mission, and for this to be our war plan, the objective of our firstcampaign is the need to free ourselves as promptly as possible from the warwith England in order to survey over everything that is happening in Ger-many. Everything announces a war here. If it takes place, England will at-tempt to make us take part in it. Her negotiations and her subsidies will per-haps make her in two years from now the ally of one of the great powers thatcomprises Germany. She will throw herself into the arms of the one that couldbe angry at us and will neglect nothing in order to oblige us through this alliance—if we give her the time—to abandon our neutrality for a more deci-sive policy. It appears convenient to profit from this interval. Returning later,if necessary, to partake in the affairs of the continent with all the weight ofour forces and success, we can pacify everything, reconcile everything, andmaintain the existence of the Empire and its rights, which is such an impor-tant barrier to rendering peace unto us and Europe.

It is thus at the beginning of the war that it is necessary to strike a greatblow. To wait for the second campaign will be able to give the English thetime to consolidate her forces, to call foreign troops to their country, to as-semble and form their militias, to redeploy a portion of their troops fromAmerica, and finally to develop a defensive strategy, something that they stillhave not had an idea about since their confidence and their talent in the art ofground warfare have never caused them to envision their country under suchconditions.

One has just exposed the immense utility and advantage of this mission. Ifone envisions it from the perspective of cost, a single campaign at sea con-ducted under the usual plan and with simple defensive preparations will costjust as much, and it will necessarily lead to a second, third, and maybe evena fourth one. Long wars are ruinous, and to this inconvenience is added that

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of being indecisive and always leaving in peace time, or, more appropriately,in the truce that ends them, the germ of a new war. A great nation like Franceshould never lose sight of the example of the Romans; all the wars of theirbest days were short and lively, and one saw their end result. Let us pass tothe possibility and the explanation of this mission.

Of all the objections that are raised against a project of debarkation in En-gland, not one dares to claim its impossibility or even doubt its success oncethe landing is executed, and one has constantly diminished the inconven-iences and the difficulties of arriving at the moment of debarkation. This isthus the objective that one must resolve.

The partisans of the landing have two opinions relative to the possibility;some, and these are the greater number, as nearly all naval officers agree,think that in order to execute the mission in England, it is necessary to gainmastery of the English Channel with a superior or victorious fleet; some oth-ers have claimed that it was possible to rob an English fleet of passage withthe favor of the winds that reign in the English Channel. The winds thatwould carry us to the English coast necessarily forcing26 the English towardthe ocean, but when this hypothesis would be admitted, we will absolutelyalign ourselves with the opinion of the former group because what could beexecuted with the favor of the winds for a few ships and even a small armyflotilla would have the greatest inconvenience for a great army such as we be-lieve to be necessary to use in this expedition. It is necessary to embark on alarge number of ships leaving from several different points and which onecannot consequently compromise to the fate of a risky change of the wind, toobstacles, or to a simple delay in the execution of the debarkation and conse-quently to the return of an English flotilla that would come to trouble and ruinit. If one cannot cover the passage and the landing because of a decided su-periority or the gain of a naval battle, there is no execution. This is thus thebasis that we are establishing in the developed project of this memoir. Opin-ion is more shared on the force, the objective, and the place of the expedition.We are going to discuss all these points successively.27

Several strategies presented in diverse times by different people propose tolimit the objective of the landing in England to a simple expedition againstthe principal establishments of the English navy and to undertake it conse-quently with only fifteen thousand men, which they believe to suffice for thisoperation. The authors of this project rely on the possibility of hiding the ap-paratus of a minor armament from the enemy and being able to execute thisexpedition by surprise or without having to be compromised to the chance ofa naval battle. Finally, they say that destroying the principal establishments ofthe English navy must be the unique goal and that—if this goal is fulfilled—one may impose peace upon them as though one dictated it to them in


London, that a larger mission requires greater forces, and that it would be toorisky in the event of misfortune.

One is of a completely opposite opinion. First of all, with a mediocre ex-pedition, one cannot simultaneously undertake the attack of the three princi-pal establishments of the English navy at Portsmouth, Plymouth, andChatham. These establishments being too far from one another, one cannotattack them at the same time without separating his forces, which would bedangerous. If one attacked them one after the other, this would take too longand would give time to England to assemble troops and come to their aid. In-stead of being astonished and struck by a great, unexpectedly deliveredblow, the country would soon recuperate when it would see that this is nomore than a minor expedition that could penetrate neither to the capital norinto the heart of the country. By admitting even that one might take posses-sion of one of the principal establishments of the English navy, this strikewould not be desired.28

With the English navy having a fleet before Brest or in the English Chan-nel, it will also be difficult to conceal from them the departure of a small land-ing flotilla—much less one that would be even larger. It will likewise be im-possible to attempt the landing without having previously won a battle in thewake of which one can cover and assure the passage for this debarkation. Thesame maritime means are thus necessary as well as the chance of a naval bat-tle to protect a small expedition and to assure the re-embarkation and returnof the small army corps that one will have employed. Thus, it is necessary tobe the absolute master of the English Channel and consequently to have wonsuch a complete battle that it entirely removes from the English the possibil-ity of holding the sea and of risking a second one [battle].29

On the other hand, a major expedition undertaken with a large army onlyhas need of maritime protection for the passage. To debark in the country, itcan thus profit from the partial success of our navy or an indecisive battle af-ter which the English navy would only have to retreat into its ports for a fewdays. A large army will be able to maintain itself there, feed itself, and makeitself respected. It will conduct the peace terms in London, and all the En-glish vessels, masters of the channel, will only serve as a wage of its triumphand a means of return.30

No half projects and no partial expeditions—this is the conclusion of all thearguments made above and of many others that the project and the details ofa great expedition will even better cause to be felt. One can apply to all theseprojects and all those ideas of small expeditions that which we said about thesystem of fragmenting the navy and of having it act in separate theaters.31 Thesame points of view could have guided the authors and be the result of per-sonal opinions.

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It is only with an army—and with an army of sixty thousand men—thatone believes that a landing can be followed with a certain, glorious, and de-cisive success because in any strategy whatsoever it is necessary that the pas-sage be equally assured and covered by a superior and victorious navy. Whyrisk a success that can be demonstrated in positive and proven calculations?Why not profit from the superiority of our land forces? Why execute a weakand limited landing such that England could execute one on our coasts? Why,finally, attempt uncertain and timid strikes against an enemy that one can de-feat without repair in a single blow?

The diverse planners of landing projects are not any more in agreement onthe points of debarkation. Some would like to enter the Thames; others pro-pose embarking near Portsmouth or Plymouth; others say in the country ofKent or Suffolk. Most of them rely on chance according to projects that werenot conducted in the field or according to ideas that they attempted to takecredit for. The project that one adopted in this general plan is made to inspirethe most confidence; it is calculated on a great scale, and one believes that itleaves nothing to be desired in detail; it was even conducted in the field itselfby officers whose talent is known, of which it was the expressed mission, andwho saw everything with their own eyes. One determined the landing pointshere not only according to the apparent facilities of the coast but according tothe interior view of a plan of operations devised beyond London and conse-quently according to the topography of the country.

One thus examined with care the other diverse, proposed landing points,and one recognized that they could not fulfill the same objectives; hence,without elaborating on this in details that could only be the material of a spe-cific memoir, one rejected the plan of proceeding through the Thames ontoChernon, Chatham, Depford/Depfort, Woolwich, and London because of lo-cal difficulties that are presented; one rejected the plan of acting throughPortsmouth and Plymouth either simultaneously or sequentially because thisis impossible at the same time since, with these two points being too distantone from the other, the points of debarkation—especially with relation to Plymouth—are out of the reach of our coasts and since, by starting the mis-sion through them, success could be uncertain, whereas—once [the landingcrews gain mastery] of London and the country that lies before them and hasconsequently cut [the cities and villages] off from all assistance—they fall ontheir own. One rejected as well the other diverse propositions for an infinityof evident reasons made on the spot. Those which one selected are in thecounty of Sussex, the same ones where Jules Caesar, William the Duke ofNormandy, and William, Prince of Orange landed. These points offer at onceall the advantages that once can desire. First of all, the landings [are] verypractical. Second, one can march to London from there without coming


across any obstacles; one crosses the Medway/Medwin at its mouth; one de-feats and suppresses behind oneself during the early marches to the provincesof Kent, Sussex, and Suffolk; one finally arrives at London in five or sixmarches at the most, and one necessarily forestalls here all the troops that theEnglish could muster from their different defensive positions, nearly all these positions, and especially Portsmouth and Plymouth, where they wouldbe obliged to maintain the largest part, being farther from London than areour ports marked for the debarkation.

It would only remain now to talk about the possibility and the means of thegreat expedition, but one will return to this with the project itself; it will bepresented in the remainder of this memoir with enough clarity and, one willdare to say, with proof. In order to dispense with preliminary discussions, onewants to avoid repetition; this memoir is already voluminous enough, but itsinterest and its importance must excuse its length.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL DEFENSIVE ANDOFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENGLAND

Having determined in the preceding memoirs the bases on which it is neces-sary to establish a general plan, one is going to develop them hereafter by di-viding them into parts. One, current and applicable to the moment, will em-brace the defensive and preparatory circumstances as much to shelterthemselves from a sudden and unexpected attack as to put themselves in a po-sition to attack her [England] if circumstances render this advantageous ornecessary; the second part will be essential and applicable when, war beingdeclared, it will be necessary to go into action; consequently, it will embracethe specifics of the offensive operations.

FIRST PART: GENERAL PLAN FOR WHAT CONCERNS FRANCE

1. One will prevent in the next sailing seasons the departure of our merchantvessels for the seas of America, Asia, and the north, and one will end thesame orders to our colonies for all returning vessels; only the commerceof the Mediterranean sea will be able to remain free and open because thetrajectories are short and in the case of hostilities, our vessels will findasylum from all sides. One will be able to object that this precaution willharm commerce, will create alarm, will reduce funds, and will impose acharacter of timidity, but all these reasons must be of little consideration

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when compared to the important goal of protecting our sailors and pre-venting the English—making a general incursion into all the seas as in1755 and augmenting their fleet by force—from effectively ruining ourcommerce and destroying our means of equipping our fleets. For the rest,the circumstances the two powers, their respective work, their armament,and the movement of troops that we have just undertaken recently had toproduce—as far as the effects of opinion and the bias of papers—all thatone had to fear, and the precaution indicated above will add nothing. Fi-nally, even if the precaution would find itself taken a little too early andif the war would still not be begun yet be announced—inappropriately, ifone wishes, being that does not take place—our commerce will only loseone expedition at most, and in this case the interest of the state must haveprecedence over private interest.

2. Abandoned for two years, our American colonies will be provided withall that they may lack in order to create the best possible defense with theunderstanding that one will send to them at the same time all at once allthe recruits assembled on the Isle of Rhé/Ré [?] and destined to completethe troops that are there.

3. According to the plans and memoirs that are in the hands of the govern-ment, it is proven that a reinforcement of fifteen or eighteen hundred mencould suffice to shelter the Isle de France from an attack on the part ofthe English; one will risk sending there this reinforcement with a mancarefully selected to command it, and one will add to this the necessarymunitions and material. The Isle de Bourbon will be abandoned to itsown forces, and one will not develop at present any offensive against theEnglish establishments in India.

4. In order not to rouse the suspicions of the English concerning these ship-ments of provisions and munitions to the American islands and the Isleof France, it will be necessary to send them from different ports that arenot apparent and from which these sorts of expeditions do not ordinarilytake place. One could likewise ship them as simple expeditions of com-merce. Hence, what is necessary to avoid with care is sending large en-voys that require strong squadrons to escort them since there could thusbe no secret, and once warned, the English, if they are determined to goto war as there is much reason to suppose, must prevent them from ar-riving. The best reason32 is that one must not divide our navy, and it isnecessary to reserve it for greater missions.

5. Ten vessels from the department of Toulon would sail to Brest, and as aresult of this reinforcement, the naval army of Brest would rise to thenumber of forty vessels of the line, all equipped and ready to set sail, inaddition to a proportionate number of frigates and other war ships. This


envoy of ten vessels from the port of Toulon to Brest will take place aspromptly as possible in order that the junction not be hindered by theEnglish. For this result, one could not wait for the vessels of the Mediter-ranean to be completely armed; one will send them out successively andin proportion to their preparedness unless prudence recommends that itbe undertaken in its entirety because of specific advice or because of asortie of an English squadron from which one could expect hostilities. Inthis case, Spain could protect the junction by expediting at the same timethe squadrons from Cadiz and El Ferrol and accompanying ours for thedistance that one deems necessary so that it arrives in Brest in all secu-rity. This junction is one of the most essential and pressing objects to ful-fill for there will be no great offensive operation against the English ifone has at Brest a strong enough fleet to become master of the EnglishChannel; there is no longer any possibility of undertaking this junction ifwe leave time for the English to realize the consequences of it and pre-vent it.

6. If a few of the vessels or frigates that are at Rochefort or the Orient musttake part in the great forces prepared at Brest, one will have them arriveas soon as possible since the flotilla of Brest must be assembled in oneplace and since this assembly must not be risked to the fate of the winds,the stations that the English could take, or any other obstacles that mightarise.

7. The naval army of Brest will thus remain completely assembled in portif the basin does not suffice to contain it in the Landerneau; but in no casewill it be laid up either in whole or in part so that at the moment whenwar is declared it will be determined to have it leave for combat. This ob-jective is too important not to deserve some detail. The Brest Channel issusceptible to being forced by very determined vessels assisted by windsfrom the west, southwest, or northwest. They can thus pass in less thansix minutes and without the batteries of the two banks being able to pro-vide any obstacles. If a flotilla or squadron thus finds itself in any partwhatsoever in the roadsteads of the Brest, the same winds that would al-low enemies to enter the roadsteads would oblige this flotilla or squadronto combat on the coast or in the inlets and consequently with such an im-minent disadvantage that a number of inferior vessels could destroy it,and all the batteries that surround the harbor could thus not offer it anyprotection; whereas if the harbor is free, an enemy vessel could not main-tain itself there or even attempt to penetrate it because it would risk los-ing itself uselessly and without gain; one will say that a similar attackwould be very difficult and very hazardous, that it would demand a fa-vorable set of circumstances that are nearly impossible to unite, that the

60 Chapter V

enemy squadron or flotilla could lose several vessels upon entering, thatthe wind could change or falter, and that the small number of vessels thatwould have penetrated would be irreparably lost.33 All of this can be, butwhen fortune could be unique, why run risks freely? This would not bethe first time that the English would hazard similar attacks; one only hasto recall the destruction of the Spanish flotilla at Vigo by Admiral Rookeand two or three similar occasions in the war of 1700.34

One only has to recall the expedition of Du Guay-Trouin to RioJaneiro. M. de Vauban, who had fortified Brest and knew it better thananyone, was so persuaded of this possibility that he had convinced LouisXIV to remove the fleet from this port, for which he still feared a bom-bardment form the land, and to shelter it in the Landerneau. The verita-ble theater of a fleet when it is destined for combat is undoubtedly thesea, but prior to this, it is necessary to shelter it from all attacks, evenwhen apparently impossible; perhaps in a moment about to be realized by unexpected fate and sudden circumstances, all of our hopes would beruined.

8. By the same strategy of not dividing our navy and not compromising itin particular to defeat or to a hostile surprise on the part of the English, itis believed that in the current circumstances one must not at all set warvessels to sail and not to hold them above all in harbor and in bays wherethey could be attacked advantageously such as at Quiberon, where M. dela Mothe Piquet was for a few days, but it is necessary on the contrary tohave frigates on reconnaissance on all coasts in order to observe all thatcan leave from the ports of England.

9. There will be formed in the surroundings of Brest a camp of twenty bat-talions. These troops will serve on one hand to work vigorously and onthe other to support the roadstead and cover the Landerneau from theland in the supposition that the general fleet requires vessels to enterthere.

10. Sixty other battalions and thirty squadrons, composed of twenty-fiveDragons and five Hussars, will be redeployed in different camps fromMorlaix to Dunkirk.35

11. At the same time, one will conduct in all ports the necessary and propor-tionate storage of artillery, munitions, and provisions; it will be necessaryat least that these goods exist in the magazines and depots of the interiorof the maritime provinces in such a manner to be transported to the portswithout delay or inconvenience at the first order that will be given.

12. Under the pretext of the consumption of different camps, one will pur-chase the oxen necessary for pulling the artillery and the provisions of alanding army in the case of an invasion of England, and while waiting for


one to assemble enough horses to replace them in the field, these oxenwill be placed in different depots within reach of the camps; this portionwill serve in effect for their consumption, this consumption being re-placed with successive provisions with the result that the number will al-ways be ready at the first order.

13. In magazines, one will also store the necessary yokes, traces, and har-nesses with replacements for either, oxen or horses, as well as a certainamount of equipment for horses.

14. All posts, guards, and signals of the coast will be established with thegreatest of care from Dunkirk to Bayonne, or one will at the very leasttake the measures to establish them in first rate order by adopting to thiseffect a general plan according to the most recent surveys.

15. All the batteries of the coast will likewise be placed in preparedness ac-cording to a new general plan, and if they are not all sufficiently fur-nished with artillery and munitions, one will take measures to have thisarrive in the closest cities or ports.

16. With batteries of all sorts but especially with mortars and moreover withredoubts, boats armed with cannons, and all other means that will bejudged appropriate, one will strive more particularly to fortify the road-steads of Cherbourg, La Hogue, and others situated in the English Chan-nel that would be recognized, in the case of defeat, of being able to serveas a retreat and asylum for our navy.

17. One will not neglect the points of our coast that are the most susceptibleto a naval attack such as the entrance of our principal rivers, St. Malo, LeHavre, and the other cities that, being on the coast, can fear bombard-ment, and one will draw up for all these different points some defensiveinstructions that, at the first movement of the English, will be expeditedto the commanders of the closest provinces and troops.

18. One will prepare a general strategy for the assembly of coast guards;when first needed, this strategy will be preceded by an ordinance in or-der to constitute them in a regular and uniform manner; it [the ordinance]is all ready, but it will be necessary at the moment of their assembly notto neglect at least a few companies of officers taken from the troops ofthe line and capable of assembling them and having them serve and es-pecially [to attach] some directors of artillery charged with their inspec-tion, all necessarily being gunners. This last article is essential; the neg-lect of these first principles have always resulted in the coast guardsbeing negligible and in one not having any use for them in any instance.

19. All the rest of the vessels of the port of Toulon that will be susceptible tobeing armed will be prepared in addition to the frigates, to as many xe-

62 Chapter V

becs and bombing galiots as possible; twenty-five battalions will be as-sembled in the province and will camp in the vicinity of Toulon.36

20. On will thus prepare in silence and with the greatest of care for the exe-cution of the offensive operations that form the second part of the gen-eral plan in such a manner that if war were to render it necessary, onemight immediately enter into action without hesitancy, slowness, or un-certainty.

21. But in order to fulfill all these goals as perfectly as their importance de-mands, in order to survey the execution and accomplish the details of allthe parts of the general plan, it is important that the King and his Minis-ter confide its direction to two people superior in rank and capable of an-swering to this confidence; that would naturally find themselves suscep-tible to being divided in two parts.37

One would embrace all the coasts of the ocean from Dunkirk to Bayonne,which he would be charged with having under his orders a particular com-mand from the river of Nantes to Bayonne. The other part would stretch fromthe Gulf of Roussillon to Antibes. It would also be appropriate to choose, forbeing employed in different points where one will place troops, the generalofficers that the commander of the ocean coasts would propose as the mostproper to serve in the mission of the invasion of England. Under no circum-stances would it be no longer necessary to give the greatest attention to thischoice.

These arrangements are thus indispensable in the current circumstancesand in the supposition that one might adopt a plan because to the axiom thatwas established at the beginning of this memoir—that there was no chance ofsuccess without a plan—it is necessary to add that no plan can be executedwith success if its execution is not entrusted to the capable leaders who mightanswer for it to King and Minister.

NOTES

1. #2, 302. Ibid, 313. #1 gives “their solution,” 444. #1, new paragraph starts here5. #1 gives: “any sort of position,” 456. #2, p. 33. #1 starts a new paragraph here7. #1 starts a new paragraph here


Tabl

e 5.

1.Ta

ble

of t

he d

iffer

ent

expe

diti

ons

both

rea

l and

sim

ulat

ed t

hat

form

the

gen

eral

off

ensi

ve p

roje

ct t

o be

con

cert

ed b

etw

een

Fran

ce a

nd S

pain

aga

inst

Eng

land

acc

ordi

ng t

o th

e co

nseq

uent

ly p

repa

red

mem

oir

in w

hich

one

see

s th

e nu

mbe

r of

ves

sels

and

tro

ops

that

the

tw

o cr

owns

cou

ld e

mpl

oy in

thi

s an

d th

e nu

mbe

r th

at t

he E

nglis

h w

ould

of

nece

ssit

y ha

ve t

o op

pose

to

it. [

p. 6

8 #2

; p.9

1 #

1]

Num

ber

ofFo

rces

that

Eng

land

wou

ld b

e fo

rced

Ve

ssel

s or

Num

ber

ofto

hav

e in

ord

er to

mee

t the

seW

hat c

once

rns

Fran

ceFr

igat

estr

oops

dive

rse

oper

atio

ns, w

heth

er r

eal o

r si

mul

ated

1.D

esce

nt in

Eng

land

40 v

esse

ls

56,0

00 m

enin

the

ocea

n an

d in

in E

ngla

nd2.

Div

isio

n in

Sco

tland

20 fr

igat

es80

0 id

em.

the

Cha

nnel

to m

eet

rela

tive

toth

e fle

et o

f Bre

stdi

vers

e or

dere

dpo

ints

45 v

esse

ls40

,000

men

25 fr

igat

es5

or 6

,000

idem

3.D

ivis

ion

on th

e10

ves

sels

6 id

emin

Mah

ónM

edite

rran

ean

10 fr

igat

es15

,000

idem

to s

uppo

rt e

ither

4,50

0 m

enm

enac

ing

Mah

ón a

ndw

ithou

t cou

ntin

gM

ahón

or

Gib

ralta

rO

ne s

uppo

ses

effe

ctin

g la

ter

axe

becs

or

galle

ysan

d de

fend

the

that

they

will

not

port

ion

of th

e Ea

stM

edite

rran

ean

send

rei

nfor

cem

ents

In

dies

15 v

esse

lsof

troo

ps4.

Rei

nfor

cem

ent s

ent t

oTh

ey a

lrea

dy h

ave

4to

the

Indi

es, b

utTh

e Is

le o

f Fra

nce

byhe

reth

us {

“if”

#1}

the

vari

ous

ship

s de

part

edEa

rlie

r on

e sa

id 1

5ex

pedi

tion

that

fr

om d

iffer

ent p

orts

ve

ssel

s to

def

end

has

to b

e pr

epar

-ed

that

will

suc

cess

ivel

y th

e M

edite

rran

ean;

at T

oulo

n {“

ispr

ovid

e th

e ef

fect

s to

15

,000

idem

all i

s fu

lfille

dex

ecut

ed”

#1}s

hebe

gin

to g

ive

wor

ries

co

ncer

ning

this

[Eng

land

?] w

illan

d tr

oubl

es to

the

obje

ctfin

d {“

them

bey

ond”

Engl

ish

10[#

1:50

] ve

ssel

s86

,800

men

#1}m

easu

re50

frig

ates

[#1:

73,3

00]

64 Chapter V

Wha

t con

cern

s Sp

ain

1.A

ttack

on

Gib

ralte

rTo

mee

t the

Spa

nish

Gar

riso

n at

Squa

dron

sfle

et th

at m

ust

Gib

ralta

run

ited

from

cons

tant

ly r

emai

n in

Cad

iz a

nd20

,000

men

Hav

ana

and

men

ace

4,00

0 m

enC

arta

gena

Jam

aica

at l

east

19

vess

els

2.D

ivis

ion

in A

mer

ica

12 v

esse

lsat

Jam

aica

and

inha

ving

as

its o

bjec

t to

8 fr

igat

esth

e A

ntill

es a

t de

fend

the

isla

nds

and

8,00

0 m

enat

tack

Jam

aica

if th

eEn

glis

h le

ave

thei

r15

ves

sels

at C

abo

Gar

riso

n in

this

par

t of

15 v

esse

ls12

,000

men

de F

inis

terr

e to

in Ir

elan

dth

e w

orld

10 fr

igat

esob

serv

e th

e fle

et o

fEl

Fer

rol

10,0

00 m

en3.

Des

cent

into

Irel

and

1 fle

et fr

om15

,000

idem

100

vess

els

of th

ean

d th

e B

rist

ols

El F

erro

llin

e, n

ot c

ount

ing

72,0

00 m

en[B

rist

ol C

hann

el?]

15 v

esse

lsfr

igat

es10

frig

ates

42 v

esse

ls47

,000

men

28 fr

igat

es


66 Chapter V

8. #1 gives: “and the counter dispositions that would be necessary to oppose himwith,” 50

9. #2, 3610. Ibid, 3811. #1 gives the following two sentences (as cited in the text) continuing into the

next paragraph as a single, independent paragraph – from “Such . . .” to “. . . coun-try.”

12. It appears that “her” refers here to either France or Spain13. #1 gives: “supposedly invincible army,” 5614. #1 starts a new paragraph here15. #1 starts a new paragraph here16. #2, 4117. #1 adds here: “the English,” 5718. The two manuscripts, #1 and #2, give literally: “the lighted fuse.”19. #1 adds: “of neutrality,” 5820. #1 gives: “of France and Spain,” 5821. #2, 4422. #1 does not start a new paragraph at this point23. #2, 4824. #1 begins a new paragraph here25. #1 begins a new paragraph here26. # 1 states: “forces,” 7127. #2, 5328. Ibid, 5429. #1 begins a new paragraph here30. #1 begins a new paragraph here31. #1 states “to both of these,” p. 75. The text as iterated appears on document #2,

55.32. #1 adds “thus,” 8133. #2, 6234. Ibid, 6335. Ibid, 6436. Ibid, 6637. #1 gives: “this command and this inspection,” (meaning of “that” in #2), 89.

67

If one wants to reflect attentively on this table, one will see that nothing is ex-aggerated concerning the possibility of the resources that the two crowns canemploy on behalf of naval forces and more reasonably on behalf of landforces. It is quite possible1 that England might never be able to attain the pos-sibility of the means of defense that one has demonstrated above to be neces-sary for her at the actual moment; having 25,000 sailors occupied in theAmerican war, she could arm at the most only fifty or sixty vessels, and thisis very far from the one hundred that she would need to prepare and maintainthe defensive plan that one has just detailed.

As far as her land forces are concerned, the American war has left her witha still greater scarcity; in the three realms of Gibraltar, Mahón, and the Isle ofWight, she only has remaining fifteen thousand men to which she could addthirty thousand militia men for a total of forty-five thousand men. Would thisbe an army capable of resisting a vigorous mission such as one proposes inthe general plan that was the subject of this memoir?

Supposing finally that once peace is made with her colonies and a portionof these resources are consequently recalled to her, England would still not bein a state to prepare the defense that would be necessary in the case in whichshe would be attacked with all the means and in the manner that we have pro-posed because all her forces united would not reach seventy-two thousandmen, and with this supposition fulfilled, the distribution of forces done ac-cording to how it was just demonstrated would be indispensable; our projectcould still be executed with the greatest superiority on our part, for what willforty thousand men be to garrison all the points of the coast that would bemenaced?2

Chapter VI

De Broglie’s Observations

As far as their navy is concerned, their sailors employed in the Americanseas will not hardly suffice to complete the armament of vessels that wouldbe necessary for them; this is easily demonstrated by the adjoining calcula-tions. For the armament of hundred vessels of the line each requiring a crewof six hundred men, this would necessitate sixty thousand sailors to whichone must add at least twenty thousand for the frigates and escort ships, butEngland, in consideration of all the sailors of her commerce and sea trade, canfurnish no more than eighty thousand sailors, and these are two objectivesthat are so important for her that she cannot sacrifice them entirely to her mil-itary armaments because, without them, she cannot replenish her needs byherself or fulfill her public responsibilities or meet the war expenditures.

The result of this table is thus the most evident demonstration that one cangive of the necessity of conducting a vigorous war on a grand scale; any otherplan will allow her to breathe, to re-establish herself, to face us with inferiormeans, to take the offensive against our weak and open sectors, and to renewthus the example of the unfortunate wars that we had against her for the pastcentury.

One has made an approximate table, which was sent to the late King, onthe extraordinary expense that a similar expedition could occasion, and sup-posing a duration of six months, this detailed state would reach thirty million[francs?] for the land and sea together, but one would be reimbursed with in-terest by the English if we for once landed sixty thousand men in England.

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS RELATIVE TO SPAIN

1. Spain will take the same measures as France relative to her ships of com-merce; the same motives must in this regard be common to the two na-tions.

2. The Spanish colonies in all parts of the world will be, if they are not al-ready, furnished with everything that is necessary for their defense in sucha manner that they can be abandoned to themselves for two years.

3. The fleet as well as the army corps that are employed in Brazil will transferto Havana and will establish themselves there until further instructions in or-der to fulfill the defensive and offensive strategies of the present plan. Thisfleet will be composed of fifteen vessels of the line with the necessary frigatesand escort ships, and the army corps [will be composed] of twelve thousandtrained men without including the actual garrison of Havana.

4. His Catholic Majesty will maintain at Cadiz a squadron of nine to ten ves-sels and a few frigates with transport ships and a corps of twelve to fifteenthousand men camped within reach of this place.

68 Chapter VI

5. The camp of San Roque near Gibraltar will be composed of twenty thou-sand men,3 and one will make here as well as at Cadiz the same prepara-tions for the siege.

6. At the same time, there will be ten to twelve armed vessels and a few xe-becs in the port of Cartagena.

7. The remainder of the Spanish navy will be assembled at El Ferrol with thenecessary ships for embarking an army of twenty thousand men who willcamp in this place.4

8. The actual ties between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid do not seem toleave anything to fear for this, but for the greatest security, the remainderof the Spanish troops that will not be necessary for the defense of theMediterranean will be transferred to quarters, camps, or billets in theprovinces of León, Castile, Estremadura [in Portugal], and Andalucia.

9. Moreover, for the defense of her coasts, ports, and roadsteads as well asfor her supply of provisions, the expedition of her convoys, and the man-ner of employing her navy, Spain will take all the measures and disposi-tions corresponding to those of France according to the circumstances andthe places.

Such is the first general strategy in which one believes that the two powersmust await the events; this strategy must be entirely formed from now untilthe end of the month of May; it fulfills simultaneously all the objects that onecan expect; it shelters the two nations from a sudden attack on the part of Eng-land; for the insurgents, it is the most effective diversion because it menacesEngland and prevents her from directing her fleets against them; it obliges herto augment her armaments; by this, one weakens her finances and suspendsthe activity of her commerce; finally, if there is a means of avoiding war(which no one believes)? the passion and the interest of the English ministernecessarily carrying her away on all matters?, it would still be that of beingcapable of maintaining it [war] very vigorously and with menacing resources.

At the same time that France and Spain could adopt this attitude, they couldsimultaneously claim to England that this strategy is only preparatory and de-fensive and that they are quite determined not to begin the war but that theywant to conserve and protect their commerce and have their colors respectedon all seas without exception; and that they will consequently consider as aprovocation of hostility and declaration of war all insults, visits of vessels thatare armed, violations of the right of protection, colors, or batteries, etc., if it[the hostile act] is not solemnly disavowed and repaired by England as soonas the complaint will have been made.5

It is also likely that such a declaration might be considered by England her-self as a declaration of war if she is at the same time certain that we have a

De Broglie’s Observations 69

treaty with the insurgents.6 France and Spain can and must expect this, butthey will have at least thus conducted themselves as worthy of their power,and since the circumstances make war inevitable, is it not prudent, reason-able, and glorious to conduct it [the war] under such auspices.7

STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE CASE OF WAR

1. The expedition in England being executed conjointly by the two powerswill be the basis and principle objective of their offensive plan, and forthis result, all the other operations and strategies, whether real or simu-lated, will all have to lead to this.

2. With our American colonies abandoned to their own fate, the officerswho command here will be ordered to concert themselves with the com-mander of the fleet and [the commander] of the Spanish army in Havanafor the diversions that they will judge as advantageous and good to execute against the English colonies and particularly against Jamaica byassisting them with transport vessels for troops and provisions, this di-version being one of the most effective means of preventing or counter-balancing the success of the English in this part of the world.

3. Our Asian colonies will similarly be abandoned to their own fate for themoment.

4. The squadron of Toulon and the army corps of Provence will be preparedfor a mission somewhat similar to that of 1756 against Mahón. This mis-sion will only be simulated unless the English are totally determined toabandon this region. Its principal objective will be to increase the prob-lems of the English and to attract their attention in the Mediterranean. Aportion of this squadron and armament will thus be employed as one willstate below.

5. Spain will place herself in a position for the siege of Gibraltar. This op-eration will be real; she will employ all the forces that she will have as-sembled at Cadiz, Cartagena, and the camp of San Roque.

6. Five or six vessels from the fleet of Brest with seven or eight battalionsand the necessary transport ships will receive the order to prepare toleave for India, and one will consequently make with much fanfare all thepreparations tending to the destination of this armament; a sudden orderwill interrupt the departure of this squadron at the moment of its execu-tion, the object being only to create a diversion for the English and to en-gage them in dispatching seven or eight vessels into this part of the worldand to weaken herself as much as possible in the English Channel and theocean.

70 Chapter VI

7. One will attempt as far as it will be possible to deceive the public andEngland about the great mission, and for this, one will take care to cir-culate that one recognized its impossibility, that one prefers to expediteall forces for the support of our colonies and to undertake the operationsof Gibraltar and Mahón; to augment this probability, one will order tenvessels and a few frigates to stock provisions for six months by an-nouncing that this squadron is destined to reinforce the Spanish fleet atHavana, and one will speak of sending the fleet of Brest to join that of ElFerrol and Cadiz to undertake together and cover the siege of Mahón andGibraltar and to chase the English from the Mediterranean; as a second-ary plan it offers great advantages, and one will be able to reveal it afterall with a great appearance of probability in order to detract attentionfrom the true project.

8. As soon as one will have allowed these rumors and different strategiesenough time to effect the English preparations, of which the result willlikely be to divide their forces and weaken them in the ocean and in theEnglish Channel, one will immediately turn to the great mission whileguarding as much secrecy about it as possible and revealing it only withas little time as possible left before its execution.

9. One must repeat here that the practically assured result, as much for thefirst general strategy that will be undertaken by the two crowns before thewar as for the different preparations, illusions, and explanations givenabove, will necessarily be to lead to the division of the English forces atseveral points; in effect, the commerce of Great Britain all throughout theeast makes Gibraltar and Mahón so important to her that she will not dareto abandon them to their own fate and will be determined to send a fleetfor their support, and this fleet could not be any smaller than eighteen totwenty vessels.

Likewise, she cannot avoid sending to the Gulf of Mexico a fleet to ob-serve that of Havana. Twenty vessels will not be too much to fulfill thisgoal. The English lack ports that are as secure or well situated as those ofthe Spanish in this part of the world and consequently cannot maintainthemselves there without a clear superiority. Moreover, would they knowhow to prevent the effects of the intemperance of the climate and the airthat is more bothersome for them than for any nation in Europe? This di-vision, which will thus have to subsist for the entire duration of the war,will thus be for them all at once the object of a great consumption of menand money.8

The slight reinforcement that one will have sent to the Isle de Francewill suffice to cause fear in the English for some mission in the PersianGulf or against the Ganges and force them to dispatch a small squadron


there even if they would not have any offensive objectives in this part ofthe world. Remaining with the naval army of Brest will be that of El Fer-rol and the squadron of Cadiz, which will fix and necessarily share theprincipal attention of the English; these armaments menacing all at onceEngland and Ireland and that of Cadiz being able to cause concern forthem about their establishments in Africa and absolutely even those in In-dia, their attention will be even more divided by a small squadron of sixor seven frigates that it will be appropriate to assemble at Dunkirk andthat will have as its objective in the general plan to attempt a small di-version in Scotland.

Everything thus leads one to presume that the trouble and the uncer-tainty of England will be at the highest degree. If she decides to send afleet to the Mediterranean and one to America, she will remain incapableof resisting the large fleet of Brest and El Ferrol in the English Channeland in the ocean, and the great mission can be executed thus without anaval battle. If she decides to keep all her forces around herself, Spaincan thus vigorously undertake the mission against Gibraltar, and the fleetof Havana becomes master of the American seas. The invasion of En-gland can no longer in truth be executed without a naval battle, but onehad to consider every possible scenario, and this is the great event towhich it is necessary to commit oneself.

10. In the midst of all the movements that the war can bring about, such amoment can present itself when a great expedition against India (whichfirst of all does not enter into the general plan) will become advantageousand easy to execute. Such, for example, would be the case if all the En-glish forces assembled in the English Channel and in the ocean wouldleave all the other seas free; such would be the case in which the gain ofa naval battle would permit the great expedition to be accomplished andin which it would be necessary to profit from the hardships and the trou-ble of the English to defeat them all over at once. Such would also be thecase if we were to lose the naval battle and failed to undertake the inva-sion of England while the English would have nevertheless been obligedto assemble all their forces in the English Channel and the ocean and itwould be necessary to seek elsewhere the successes that might redeemthat which we will have lost. This is what the squadron of Toulon couldbe used for with a portion of the equipment and the five to six thousandmen and troops that would have been assembled in province to simulatean expedition against Mahón. This back-handed strike would only haveto be kept in great secrecy, and one could undertake it by claiming that itwas a reinforcement sent to the Spanish before Gibraltar. Once the straitsare passed, this squadron would necessarily have three or four months of

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advance on the assistance that the English could send, and its objectivebeing not to conquer the English establishments but to devastate themand to cut off this source of revenue, the mission would be accomplishedbefore they were in any condition to defend against it.

11. It results from the entirety of this plan that if it is undertaken with vigor,it is nearly impossible for the English not to undergo the greatest damagebecause if the invasion of England succeeds, they are forever defeated,and if it does not come about, it will have at least favored other second-ary operations whose success will still result in deadly strikes againstthem; to complete this plan, it remains to treat in detail the greatest ob-jective of this expedition, and this is what one is going to do in the fol-lowing chapter.

NOTES

1. #2, p. 69. #1 adds: “on the contrary,” 922. #2, 70.3. # 1 gives: “occupied by,” 954. #2, 725. #1 gives: “proventoire,” p. 97; #2 gives: “préventoire;” neither word is listed in

any of my French dictionaries; I think that “provocative” is probably the closest pos-sible meaning of the original word used.

6. #1 adds: “and thus her hostility will be her response,” 987. One departs here from the generally held supposition that Spain can arm fifty

vessels of the line; if this is not founded, it is necessary to make in this project the dis-positions and proportionate reductions but while always conserving the basis, whichmust be to have a fleet at Ferrol; in this case, Spain would not have a fleet at Carta-gena, and she would combine all her forces in the ocean. In #2, this note appears onpage 73 at the end of section entitled “General Strategies Relative to Spain;” in #1,the note appears somewhat earlier within the body of the section.

8. #1 (p.102) is worded slightly different here from #2, but the general meaning re-mains the same.


74

The invasion of England will be composed of three separate operations—

1. The actual landing executed in England2. A small diversion in Scotland; these two operations will concern only

France.3. A division in Ireland executed by Spain.1

4. With all the interior preparations of this project needing to be completedin advance as one so reads in this memoir, it only remains to speak hereabout the last preparations that are properly those of the execution.

LAST PREPARATIONS

One will begin by determining which season is best for this great enterprise;this can only be the period of the month of April or October, but one believesthe latter to be the most convenient under all considerations, whether with re-gard to the winds that reign thus or because this is the time when one willmore abundantly find provisions in Great Britain and when the English will,following the course of their commerce, have the greater number of ships andconsequently the greater number of sailors and equipment for defense abroad;it is thus this period, that is to say from 1 October to 15 or 20 November, thatit will be necessary to be in a state to profit from the favorable wind to leaveour ports and sail for the coasts of England. Let us now pass to the objectiveof these preparations.

Chapter VII

Execution of the Invasion of England

1. In consequence of the dispositions proposed in the first part of this work,one supposes that all our merchant vessels will have been retained in ourports; if this part had not generally been taken, it would be necessary onthat very day to place an embargo on all ships, whether they be national orforeign, that would be in the ports of the kingdom. Spain will have to takethe same measures on the same day.

2. Light ships will have to patrol all the coasts of the English Channel care-fully in order to prevent any news about what is happening here fromreaching the English.

3. At the same time, it will be ordered that all ship owners—be they nationalor foreign privateers or merchants—will have to release those ships oftheirs that will be ready to sail and to arm and prepare those that are not,to have two good boats as large as possible (there are replacements in allports), and to stock provisions for six weeks or two months. All the ex-penses relative to this cargo and these supplies will be negotiated at a goodprice that might both reimburse them and stimulate their seal; the namesof the owners who will have given the most and the best of their preparedships will be sent to the court to receive the thanks and even the grace pro-portionate to their activity and to the service that they will have rendered.2

4. Because of precise reconnaissance conducted on the spot, one has as-sumed that there was always in our ports many more ships than were nec-essary in order to transport to England an army twice the size of the onethat is destined for there in the present project. One joins here a conditionthat is proof of this and according to which it is easy to determine thequantity of ships that each port will have to furnish.

5. At the rate that transport ships from each specific port will be unloadedand armed, one will send them to the ports of assembly—Those of Picardyat Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne

Those of Normandy at Dieppe, Le Havre, Honfleur, and CherbourgThose of Brittany at St. Malo, Morlaix, the Orient, Vannes, and

Painbeuf [?]If there was need for a greater quantity, one could have supplemental

ships arrive from Poitou, Aunis, and Guyana, but as far as one can tellfrom the above conditions, the ships from the three provinces of Nor-mandy, Picardy, and Brittany will more than suffice.

6. While one will work on the armament of these ships and as they are as-sembled in the ports mentioned above, one will have transported artillery,provisions, and medical supplies to all the appropriate points, and one willdeliver them as necessary.

Execution of the Invasion of England 75

7. The army will carry provisions for only one month; these provisions willconsist of wheat and rice; there will independently be biscuits for fifteendays, and it is superfluous to say here that one limits the supplies and pro-visions of the army to the duration of six weeks because the invasion upto the moment of debarkation and even during the formation of the maga-zines assembled in the county itself does not require more than a month ofoperation and because England can later furnish provisions of all sorts intoany part that the army may travel.

8. Spread throughout the maritime provinces and their surroundings, all thetroops destined for the invasion will begin their march to come to camp orbillet within reach of the ports of assembly, and they will embark as soonas the transport vessels will be ready to receive them.3 The horses andoxen will also be loaded after a few days of rest. One will choose thesmallest ships for [the horses and oxen] as well as for the artillery so thatone might have them enter easily into the ports that are closest to the placewhere one will land and where much water does not rise.

9. It is at the moment and in the process of all these preparations that one willevidently feel what advantage it will be to have entrusted its preparation tothe general who will have to take command of this army. In advance, he willhave recognized and foreseen everything. He will have been personally in-terested in having all the preliminary dispositions well conducted and willknow the places, the equipment, the possibilities, and the obstacles. If onewere to imagine in place of this a man unfamiliar with all these preparationsand coming to take charge of the execution4 of a project that he will not haveprepared, one will see without any trouble all the inconveniences that mustarise from this. It is necessary to add that his arrival will betray the mysteryof everything whereas, having charged from the beginning with the prelimi-nary dispositions that will have appeared to be related just to an early defense,he will appear to act only through a continuation of earlier commission. Who-ever thus may be the general whom His Majesty will decide as appropriate tochoose for an operation of such importance, it is necessary that it be he who,in the actual moment, may be charged with the command and the general in-spection of all the coasts and maritime provinces at least from Dunkirk to thearea of Aunis, this part of the kingdom necessarily being the foyer of the greatexpedition against England.

FINAL COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY OF INVASION

The army will be composed of all the troops that will have been assembledfrom Dunkirk to Morlaix and will consist of eighty battalions each of six hun-

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dred and fifty trained men and will consequently have fifty-two thousand in-fantry men. Thirty squadrons of Hussars and Dragons consisting each of hun-dred men of whom fifty will embark with the best horses and fifty with sad-dles, reins, and the necessary equipment that one will use on the horses of thecountry [of England] as far as they [the cavalry men] will be able to procurethem; one will attach to these troops and consequently dispatch the compa-nies of riflemen from twenty battalions as large as possible which, beingplaced at one hundred and fifty trained men, will form a corps of one thou-sand and five hundred trained men, which form the first guard.

The artillery will be composed of hundred pieces of field cannon of four,eight, and as much as twelve [military terminology/measurements?], and onewill join to this an additional thirty pieces of sixteen and twenty-four andtwenty mortars or howitzers; because of this artillery, one will not attach can-nons to the battalions; one will augment the usual number of gunners for eachpiece so that they might be manned with as much activity as possible, espe-cially for the smaller pieces so that when necessary they can be maneuveredby hand as easily as possible. One will join to this a large detachment ofworkers as well as a few miners with tools, pontoon bridges, and all the nec-essary materials for a lively and rapid field war mixed with several siege op-erations. This last point can only be relative to Portsmouth and Plymouth,which the English have barely fortified.5

One will only take soldiers who are in a perfect state of serving. Allthose who are not in this state will be left in France with arrangements fortraining them. The army thus completed will be at a strength of fifty-sixthousand five hundred men without artillery. Only the necessary number ofgeneral officers will be attached to it, but it will be necessary to multiplythe number of officers of the General Staff and especially to choose themwell because there will never again be an opportunity to use them sepa-rately and as leaders.

The retinue of the Officer Generals will be fixed at the strictest necessityas well as for that of superior officers. There will be two soldiers’ tents andonly two kettles for all the officers of the same company, and there can onlybe three servants between them all. Each soldier will have in his knapsack justtwo shirts and two pairs of shoes.6 With the possibility of the invasion ex-tending into a rigorous season, the army will be provided with vests and blan-kets; one will not allow any women to follow the regiments with the excep-tion of those who will be indispensably useful under the title of laundressesor merchants of provisions [vivandières]. Infantry officers will march on footfor the entire beginning of the expedition and just until one might be able toprovide them successively with equipment on behalf of the country. The sol-diers will also carry their tents at the beginning.


PREPARATIONS FOR THE SEA

1. If the English have, as it is apparent, a considerable fleet in the EnglishChannel, they will take the measure of sending it before Brest or of hold-ing it in their ports to block us and to defend the English Channel at themoment that we will leave from Brest. In either case, a naval battle is theindisputable preliminary, for there is no possibility or security of the inva-sion or the landing as long as one is not absolutely the master of the En-glish Channel.

2. If the English fleet is before Brest, it is recognized that it cannot block oursthere; consequently, as soon as all the measures of the landing army willbe taken, it will leave to go to combat the English fleet. If it beats it, it isnecessary that it push it vigorously and that it attempt to repulse it into itsports to establish itself later across from the Portsmouth canal and coverthus the passage and debarkation.

3. In case of an unfortunate success and considerable defeat that will disposeof and ruin our fleet, it follows that all hope for the invasion will be lost,but in case of a partial success or a slight defeat, one could later regroupin the ports and test fortune once again; with the invasion not being ableto take place except in the event of a great advantage, one assumes thishere and will pass consequently to the ultimate details.

4. If the wind is favorable, the victorious fleet will immediately give the de-parture signal. Once it arrives at the closest point of the coast, the signalwill be repeated at once on land from St. Malo to Dunkirk, and one willplace from point to point small posts that will confirm the signals by send-ing successively the order of departure to every point in order to preventall inconveniences.

Formed in divisions that will be escorted by vessels, frigates, and otherlight ships detached from the fleet, the landing army will immediately setsail.7 Each division commander will have his instructions on the point whereit must debark, and all four [divisions] will thus go there by way of the short-est route to the coast of Sussex between Dangerest/Dengreck [?] and BeachyHead.

The 1st Division in the Port of RyeThe 2nd Division before Winchelsca/Winkelsey [Winchester?]The 3rd Division before HastingsThe 4th Division before Pevinzey/Perinzey [?]

One will immediately place the boats to sea, and the troops will prepare to de-bark.

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DEBARKATION

The grenadiers and riflemen of each division, with the benefit of the cover ofthe vessels and artillery ships, will begin the landing at the points indicated.Each soldier will have at least sixty shots to fire and two gun flints in reserve.

There will be two engineers and twenty carpenters for each advanced guardwith six boats loaded with diverse tools, racks, beams, girders, ropes, nails,sand bags, etc., so that one might be entrenched as soon as one will havelanded and can communicate from one point to another.

Each advance guard will have three pieces of light artillery if it finds thatit must disembark at a place that is too fortified with enemy troops.8 The ves-sels and artillery ships will fire arduously into the night with the entire appa-ratus of the landing, and thus with the continuation of this fire, the troops des-tined for the debarkation will descend at one of the points on the left or on theright where the landing will have succeeded, but there is reason to presumethat the landing will take place without great resistance on their part sincethere are neither forts or batteries that can hold out against the fire of the ves-sels in all this sector of the coasts of England and since—by virtue of the largenumber of divisions—one will have obliged the English to divide and dis-perse their troops.

As soon as the grenadiers and riflemen will have established positions onthe coast, one place ashore the Hussars and the Dragons who will move for-ward after a few hours of rest. The infantry will disembark with its tents andkettles, and the cavalry [will disembark] with bridles, saddles, and boots. Onewill work at all the necessary entrenchments, and one will then unload theoxen, the artillery, and half the provisions and medical supplies.

The transport ships will be anchored in the order of each division until onecan enter them into the ports or send them back. One will leave in each shiptrustworthy men who will be responsible for the equipment of the officers andwho will deliver it when one will ask for it. Rye, Winchelsea/Winkelsey[Winchester?], Hastings, and Pevenzey/Perenzey [?] will be entrenched andguarded in order to construct the army depots in security. Each division willmarch forward of these four points to await new orders there.

One will immediately spread in the country patrols led by intelligent andprudent officers in order to have news about the enemy and to disperse orraise the small parties that they will be able to have in the field. They willseize a few inhabitants, heads of family mayors, and principal magistrateswhose conversation concerns the country and whose safety will depend onthe obedience and the submission of their respective districts in the furnish-ing of the different contributions that will be imposed on them. These patrols


will assemble at the same time all the horses, oxen, and carts that they will beable to find.

Because only very little cavalry is required for the war in England becauseof the nature of the country, the fifty Dragons in squadrons that will be on footwill be mounted only to the extent that one will find horses that will be properfor them as long as the General will judge this necessary. While waiting, theywill serve on foot with the advanced guards and the riflemen detached fromthe ten regiments remaining in France.

WAR IN THE COUNTRY

All the marches and positions specified below were recognized in the sameand are indicated on a map drawn specifically for this. It is necessary to ob-serve that the eight marches for arriving in London can be easily reduced tofour, and this will depend on the circumstances and movements of the enemy.

FIRST MARCH

Leaving from Rye and reinforced with two thousand men, the advanced guardwill march to Nosthyan/Northiant [?] on the Rothiar/Rothar [?], from whichit will push its troops on Terdendren [?] and Croanbrook/Craonbrok [?].

Leaving from Winchelsea/Winkelsey [Winchester?] and Hastings, the twoadvance guards of the center will march to Battle/Batle [?], and their lighttroops [will march] to Salshurst/Salehourt [?].

Followed by a detachment of four thousand men, that of the left will marchto Lellugley/Hellugley [?] on the Kormerk/Kormerik [?] and will push itslight troops to Waldron [?]. It will send a patrol to Lewa [?] to occupy this cityand to observe the side of Steining/Steyming [?]. The divisions will stay en-camped at the point where they will be disembarked.

SECOND MARCH

The advanced guard of the right will march to Craonbrook/Cambrook [?]; itslight troops will move on to Beula [?]; those that will have occupied Ender-dren/Terdendren [?] will march to Ashford [?].9

The advanced guard of the center will march to Salshurst/Salhourt [?] andits light troops will to Flinwel/Flaineville [?].

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The two divisions of the right will move to occupy Northian [?] and thatof the left to the heights of Battle and before this village. The advance guardof the left will march to Maresiole/Marsfield [?], and its light troops will oc-cupy the mount of Hanover Hill [?], from which one has a distant view ofthe country.

THIRD MARCH

The right advance guard will go to camp on the Beula [?], and its light troopswill move to Maidstones/Maldtonvil [?]. A patrol will be sent to occupy Ashford/Hertford [?] with the order to dispatch a few small troops to Canter-bury to have news of the enemies in this point of the country of Kent.

The advance guard of the center will advance on Lamberhust/Camsber-shure [?], and its light troops [will march] to Woodgate [?].

The divisions of the right will march to Flimwell/Flainville [?], and thoseof the left [will march] to Salshurt/Salshurst [?].

The advance guard of this left will occupy the mount of Hanover Hill [?]and will advance its troops on the Medway [?]; the patrol of Lewes will con-tinue to observe from the side of Steining [?] and Chischester/Chichister [?].

FOURTH MARCH

The advance guard of the right will march to Maidstone; its light troops willgo up in part to Rochester and in part to Welmsking/Westminister [?]. The pa-trol of Ashford/Hertford [?], without occupying Canterbury, will observefrom the side of Dover and the Thames and will communicate with Maidstoneand Rochester; the advance guard of the center will advance to Tumbridge[Tonbridge?], and its light troops will go to Sevenoaks or will remain on themount of Riversalt [?].

The divisions of the right will camp at Woodgate [?], and those of the leftwill come to Flimwell/Flaineville [?].

The advance guard of the left will march to Ginstead/Ginhead [?]; it willsend its light troops to Alendley-head [?].

FIFTH MARCH

The advance guard of the right will go to camp at Wrotham/Wrothant [?], andits light troops will advance from West-Maling [?], Alings [?], Domstréal [?],


and from Rochester to Gravesend [?] and in part to Cantorbery [Canterbury?]and will stay in the vicinity of this city10 to observe and give news about whatis happening on the Thames and from the side of Dover.

The advance guard of the center will go to Seven Oaks [?]; its light troopswill advance to the heights of Madamscouth/Madanscourt Hill [?]. The fourdivisions of the army will camp at Tunbridge/Tambridge [Tonbridge?]. Theadvance guard of the left will march to Wlethingley/Welchingley [?] and willsend its light troops to Kobherant/Koberant [?].

SIXTH MARCH

The advance guard of the right will camp at Foolseray [?], and its light troopswill advance to Athant/Atham [?] and Crayfort/Brayfort [?]; that of the cen-ter will march to Fornborough/Fourtanbouroug [?], and its light troops toBromley/Bromby [?]. The army will camp at Sevenoaks [?]. The advanceguard of the left will go to Croÿdon [?], and its light troops to Lorhn-Hill-Head/Thorn-Hill-Head [?].

SEVENTH MARCH

The advance guard of the right will camp at Septon/Sepfort [?], and its lighttroops will advance as near to London as possible. That of the center willmarch to Lewksan/Lewksausen [?], and its light troops [will march] on Lon-don. The army will march to Bromley/Bronchy [?]. The advance guard of theleft will go to camp at Ducwick/Derwick [?]; its light troops will march toLondon and on Wandernorth [?].

EIGHT MARCH

The army will advance on London and will take a position on the heights thatare between Deptfort/Depfort [?] and Haltersen [?]. The advance guard wouldcamp on the flanks and in front of the army; its patrols will be recalled anddispersed according to the demands of the circumstances.

The objective of these marches being to arrive in London in order tocover and defend this capital and conquer the province of Kent at the sametime and all those in the middle of England and to cut these off from theThames before the enemy can assemble his forces, one easily conceives

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that it is essential for these marches to take place with as much speed andorder as possible.11

If the enemy insists on remaining in the county of Kent, or if he allowshimself to be too closely approached there, one would sufficiently reinforcethe corps on the right and would attack him; except for a considerable defeaton the right, this would not prevent the army or the corps of the left from ad-vancing to London in order to force the advantage on them, to deprive themof the time to realize their situation and recover, and to spread terror and fearto the capital.

If it happens that the enemy may have the time to entrench himself and toassemble a few troops and that one may not want to sacrifice too many peo-ple in attacking them and expelling them from their entrenchments, one willhave a detachment of seven or eight thousand men cross the Thames in orderto act against the capital from the left of the river, and one will profit from thediversion to gain mastery of it from the right.

In whatever manner one arrives at taking possession of London and of theTower, with this operation completed, one will leave a corps of ten to twelvethousand men in a camp that one will pitch in this city, and the army will takea position from the side of Windsor in order to be equally within reach ofLondon and Oxford.

If necessary, the corps of the left will be reinforced and will march imme-diately on Oxford in order to gain mastery of it. All the bridges and passagesof the Thames and Lisis [?] that are between this city and London will beguarded or destroyed.

Once in control of Oxford, the army will camp beneath this city while leav-ing a corps of three to four thousand men at Windsor in order to reconnoiterhere and communicate with London and the army.

The corps of the left will go to Gloucester and will remain encamped here.All the bridges and all the passages of Lisis [?] and Churchill from Oxford toExcester [Exeter?]—where one will leave a small corps of observation—willbe guarded or destroyed according to whether it will be judged possible ornecessary. With the army reduced to thirty or thirty-five thousand men in itsposition on Lisis [?], and sufficing for the defense of the passage of this riverand the Thames in all places that the enemy would want to test it and in or-der to support London and Gloucester if there was need, one would create de-tachments from the remainder in order to attack the port of Dover,Portsmouth, and Plymouth and to gain control of these as well as of the prin-cipal places of the central provinces, which will be the objective of the firstcampaign and certainly the end of the war in England.

It seems quite pointless to say that as soon as one enters London, it will benecessary to gain control of the Treasury, the Bank, and all the registries that


one will find there, the houses of the principal bankers or negotiators andeven their record books, Town Hall, and the arsenal that is in the Tower ofLondon, and one will gain control through this of all the public fortune of England and that of its citizens; one will place oneself in the position of dictating the peace that one will want, which must be the objective of this expedition.

In consideration of all the ports, depots, arsenals, magazines, rope manu-factures, foundries, and generally all sorts of military establishments, not asingle one will be spared; if one is master of the sea, one can employ thetransport ships and bring back the spoils to France. If not, it will be necessaryto burn or destroy everything, and one will do the same for all the material ofall the establishments.12 No thought must prevent this; this is a mortal blowthat it is necessary to strike against England and from which nothing canreestablish her.

As far as one will act with rigor and inflexibility in the destruction of allpublic resources relative to the military—because this is in keeping with therights of war and the laws of prudence and necessity—one will double thecorrect order and discipline in the country with regard to individuals; but atthe same time, the General will be authorized to use the contribution to re-ward advantageously the officers and soldiers relative to their rank and pro-portionally to distinguished and special services; and it will be appropriate toannounce this measure at the moment of embarkation such as the English didat Havana and as the Romans, Greeks, and people—who are concerned withglory as we are—used to do. A vehicle of common interest is necessary forman. In spite of this conduct, if thrift and unselfishness are well observed bythe General and the principal administrators, the interests of the governmentand the reimbursement of the people in such an operation will still be amplyprovided without speaking of the glory of success and the priceless advantageof peace that will result from this and from the eternal damage done to England.

This rite of victory, this conduct in the country after having invaded it,this firmness, and this intelligence—necessarily combined to destroy con-serve, or benefit according to the circumstances of the maintenance of thestrictest discipline at the same time as the right of reparations for the armyfrom a portion of the fruits of the conquest—will not render all men (mil-itary quarter excepted) proper to the conduct of a similar expedition; it isnecessary to follow it [the conquest] and use it to the very end with pru-dence, wisdom, and integrity.13 It is necessary to derive from it the mosthonorable and useful conduct possible for the nation, and this double ob-jective requires the union of virtue and talent, which is often sadly difficultto assemble.

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DIVERSION CREATED BY SPAIN

The fleet of El Ferrol (which one assumes as necessarily being from twentyto twenty-five vessels together with the proportionate number of frigates andaccompanying ships as well as the army corps of eighteen to twenty thousandmen) will be used to create this diversion, which can have two objectives—either an expedition to Ireland in order to incite a rebellion there or to detachit perhaps from England, or a landing in England in the Bristol Channel itselfin order to support there the operations of the French army in the case that itmight have executed its landing.

All indications must lean to giving favor to the expedition in Ireland. If onehopes to cause a rebellion there—and this is what one must gage in advanceby means of emissaries and intelligence that it is necessary to conduct in thecountry—then interest, liberty, and religion are the motives that can lead Ire-land to rebellion when one offers her a favorable occasion to shake off the yoke of England.14 Commerce there is passive and subordinate to that of the metropolis. The country is treated as a conquered province. The acts ofthe London Parliament make the law there. All the ancient houses there werepillaged of their wealth, and they guard the memory of this. Catholic religionis oppressed there. Not a single one of them [Catholics?] can hold civil or mil-itary positions. Everyone is disarmed, and there are in this kingdom at leastsix Catholics to every Protestant. The spirit of discontent and sedition has notceased to germinate. One must recall the troubles that arose there a few yearsago under the name of “White Boys.” The troubles were only quieted at first;they could very well be revived. Hence, the example of insurgents must nec-essarily inspire the Irish, and it would likely suffice to develop their senti-ments by supporting them with a landing and with the assistance of men andmoney, but the best way to excite their will would not be to propose that theydepose the King and call the Prince of the House of Bourbon to their throneas one suggested last year but rather to propose that they form a republic un-der the protection of France and Spain.

The ease of the project appears equally probable as useful. The coasts ofIreland are everywhere susceptible to landings. At the present moment, theEnglish only have four regiments there. It would be easy to prove within threemonths with the positive and local identification of the place where it wouldbe best to land and with the plan of operation that it would be necessary tofollow according to the notes that one has before us and according to the mil-itary ideas that the geography and topography can furnish. It appears that itwould be necessary to enter by way of the St. George’s Channel and evenDublin, and two essential reasons must cause one to prefer this point. One is certain of the influence that the invasion of the capital would have on the


conquest of the rest of the country; the other is the proximity of the commu-nication of this part of Ireland with Bristol county, and consequently the ad-vantage that the two armies would have operating in the two kingdoms atvery proximate points that would allow them if necessary to combine their ul-timate movements. Such are the advantages that appear to decide in favor ofthe expedition in Ireland. It would be up to the circumstances and the resultsof actual and future reconnaissance and intelligence to determine if these ad-vantages must have precedence over [the plan] in which one would prefer toexecute the landing of the Spanish in England. In order to accomplish the in-vasion of the kingdom with greater speed and security, two reasons argue infavor of this last idea. The first is that England is the principal objective andthe center of the English power and that it is consequently against her that itis necessary to unite all one’s efforts. The second reason is that once Englandin invaded, Ireland will separate herself thus on her own, and the slightest as-sistance would suffice to convince her.

On the assumption that one might decide on the ideal of the diversion inEngland, it must take place in the Bristol Canal, where all the possibilities ofthe landing and the operation were recognized. Consequently, it results thatwhether one operates in Ireland or in England, the points of Dublin and Bris-tol are so close that the route of the Spanish fleet will always be through St.George’s Channel and that one will still remain in control in the end. Follow-ing the advice that one will have from our progress in England or of themovements in Ireland, [one will] decide for one or the other, but in any case,one sees the importance of the diversion of the Spanish, even if it only dis-tracts the attention of the English and diminishes the force that they wouldhave opposed to the fifty-six thousand Frenchmen landing on the centralcoasts of England.

It only remains to speak of the departure and the moment of the departureof the Spanish fleet. If the English decide to send a fleet to Cabo de Finisterreto survey the movements of Spain, this fleet can only be inferior to that ofSpain in consideration of their obligation to have a fleet of at least forty ves-sels to defend against ours in Brest. In this case, the Spanish fleet will haveto depart, combat it, and, assuming it to be victorious, attempt to repel it to-ward the coasts of England, following it with vigor to come in position abovethe fleet of Brest, which will thus have to come out to combat in the ocean orthe English Channel.

With regard to the Spanish army corps that will have embarked like ourlarge invasion army, it will not put to sea until the two fleets will have eitherindependently, coordinately, or—if the circumstances so require—, con-jointly chased the English fleets permanently from their ports. The diversionwill thus be linked to the principal operation, and it will take place only as far

86 Chapter VII

as the other will be in a position to have an effect. If the Spanish fleet suffersa defeat in the ocean, whether this be separately or in sharing that which wewould have had ourselves, it will have to try thus to retreat to our ports ratherthan return to its own, the objective being to keep its forces united in order toattempt a second effort if possible.

DIVERSION IN SCOTLAND

There are few things to say about this diversion. It will be undertaken withthe six or seven frigates and twelve or fifteen hundred men of the debarkationtroops leaving from Dunkirk. As its objective, it will trouble the eastern coastof England, and to show itself on the coast of Scotland is a diversion in the simple meaning of the word and whose goal will only be to trouble theEnglish further. It actually remains to examine what the current state of our


Table 7.1. Table on the Current Situation of Our Land Forces and The SuccessiveProject of Augmentation15

Battalions Men

79 Regiments of French infantry forming 160 Battalions of 572 men 160 91,520

12 Foreign Regiments of the same force 24 13,72711 Regiments of Swiss at 523 men

per battalion 22 11,704French guards 6 3,360Swiss guards 4 2,246

218 122,827

Squadrons Horses Men

23 Regiments of cavalry each with 500 men and 350 horses 115 8,050 11,500

24 Regiments of Dragons each with 500 men and 300 horses 120 7,200 12,000

4 Regiments of Hussars with530 mounted men 20 2,120 2,120

Riflemen 8 1,160 1,160Gendarmarie 8 896 896Guards 1,200 1,200

271 20,626 28,876

Note: One has just decided upon an augmentation of 2,600 horses both for the cavalry and the Dragons,but these increases have still not been completed; it is necessary to consider it presently as not accom-plished.

88 Chapter VII

military means are for fulfilling the plans that one has just developed. Thoseof our navy are already partially sufficient provided that one continues as onedoes. It is thus our land forces that we must occupy ourselves with and whichwill be the subject of this last chapter.

Similarly, one has just reestablished one hundred and five battalions un-der a new form by proposing to attach one of these battalions to each of theseventy-nine regiments of French infantry to serve as the garrison battal-ion and by withholding the decision on the placement of the remainingtwenty-six battalions. These one hundred and five battalions must be raisedand assembled by the upcoming June 1. One can only approve the firstconsiderations of the plan, with the internal details undoubtedly comingabout.

Consequently, sixty battalions and two hundred and twenty squadrons, notincluding in reality the third battalion, are all that it remains for us to com-plete all the other objectives such as the garrisons of our borders fromDunkirk to Landau and those of Dauphiné and Provence to Antibes and the

Table 7.2. Army of the Ocean Destined for the Descent in England and Placed fromDunkirk to Brest16

80 Battalions 30 SquadronsDefensive along the coasts of Aunis, Poitou, and French Guianato Bayonne

14 Battalions 15 SquadronsIn Languedoc and Roussillon

10 Battalions 10 Squadrons


80 Battalions 30 SquadronsDefensive along the coasts of Aunis, Poitou, and French Guiana

14 Battalions to Bayonne 15 Idem

10 Battalions to Languedoc and Roussillon 10 Idem

104 Battalions 55 SquadronsArmy Corps in Provence

24 BattalionsIsland of Corsica in the case of war

16 BattalionsAmerican colonies

12 Battalions



formation of an army of observation between the Meuse and the sea or on theRhine.

In consideration of the state of our forces, it evidently results that wecannot all at once conduct a vigorous war against England at the same timeas the continental war, however insignificant this might be. In effect, bysupposing the latter, it is no longer possible to think about executing thegreat offensive plan that would use more than hundred battalions either forthe landing army or for the simulated expedition. It would then be neces-sary to leave on the coasts only the number of battalions indispensable fortheir defense. It would be necessary to submit to a drawn out war that willhave no effect but will, by dragging on and preparing ourselves every-where for the requirements of defense, cost us more than a short and livelywar after considering all the results.

Thus, it is shown that in order to strike a great blow against England, it isnecessary to profit from the moment that one will have no entanglements onthe continent. If one delays and deliberates, the moment will be lost forever;thus, by admitting that the rupture with England must take place in the spring-time or in the midst of the summer, it would be in the month of October thatit would be necessary to execute the offensive part of the great plan; nextyear, there will be more difficulties. The English will have had the time tostudy the situation, to prepare themselves to create diversions, and perhaps tohave great successes.

The map of Europe can change; the English can take advantage of the for-tune that leans today in our favor; in either case, our land forces do not suf-fice, and it seems indispensable to augment them. These augmentations donot have to be sudden or great; they have to be proportionate to the circum-stances and events. There is only one point to which it is necessary to bringthem without delay, whether to have the possibility of acting offensively or toacquire a more respectable situation with regard to the powers of the conti-nent. One is going to work on the measures to take in order to reach this point;these are the ones that the moment demands and are consequently applicableto the present memoir.

INFANTRY

From now until September 1, the entire infantry will be increased to six hun-dred and fifty men per battalion. This will allow for an increase of one hun-dred and fifty-six men and will consequently increase the two hundred andsix battalions—without counting the ten battalions of the Guards—to133,900 men. If the eighty battalions destined for the major invasion were

not completed with the augmentation above at the moment when it takesplace, they would be completed by means of the garrison battalions.

This year, the garrison battalions will receive all the material that it will bepossible to give to them, and as a result, they would be assembled in less thanthree weeks even in the assumption that war might not have broken out. If ithas broken out, it naturally follows that they would be assembled in part or inentirety over a longer period and that one would use them for the defense ofthe coasts as well as for the garrisons of our borders, and as long as we willonly be at war with England, it will certainly be useful to have recourse to thetotality of these battalions, and it will suffice to assemble some of them alter-natively, but as soon as we will be menaced with a continental war, it is nec-essary that they be assembled in their entirety and placed in a permanent statein the rear of their regiments and within reach of the borders where these reg-iments will be in action. It is by this excellent supplement that one will beable to maintain the front-line troops on an intimidating footing and be in astate of pursuing the war vigorously. For the present, it will suffice to createthe provincial battalions each on a footing of five hundred men; in the case ofa continental war, one will augment them successively according to the circumstances.17

THE CAVALRY

It is this part of our military that is the most outdated and in all honesty doesnot really exist. In a war with England, this arm is without doubt useless, butit is surely not on a peacetime footing, and no matter what the price can be,this is at least something that it is necessary to bear. A continental war cansurprise us, and then there would be neither effort nor money that mightplace it on a war footing. If one leaves it in its current state, the footing thatone is going to propose thus for it is not relative to any use in war; it is a mat-ter of giving it its first constitutional base; it is its simple and passive statein peace time. It will still be inferior to that in which foreign powers keeptheir own, but this first basis can suffice, and one will indicate below themeans of using it in the case of war. All the regiments of Dragons18 will fromnow until September 1 be brought up to the complete number of one hun-dred and six men for each squadron and five hundred and thirty for mountedregiments.

If this term is too short for the augmentation of the horses, one will be ableto postpone it for six months at the most, but it will be dangerous to push thisdelay any further back; in this regard, there are no calculations for spendingthat ought to delay.

90 Chapter VII

This augmentation of troops will create six additional men and thirty-six ad-ditional horses for each squadron of cavalry and six additional men and forty-sixadditional horses for the Dragons. One consequently brings the two hundred andfifty-five squadrons to 27,030 mounted men, without counting riflemen, gen-darmes, or guardsmen. The augmentation of horses proposed above being for thecavalry and the Dragons of nine thousand six hundred and sixty men and its re-sult merely placing the regiments on a peacetime footing, one must judge the in-convenience that there would be to allow oneself to be caught ill-prepared forthe immense and sudden augmentation that war would require if one remainedin the current state. In effect, by undertaking this first increase, one would stillhave to augment the squadrons by thirty-four houses in order to be placed on aproper war footing if a land war was to occur. That is one hundred forty men andone hundred forty horses because in no case can one attain—and it is useless todream so—the complete number of one hundred seventy one men per squadronas indicated by the last calculations, which would make the squadron too strongand would give the King a cavalry beyond his means and needs. The two propo-sitions admitted above for the cavalry in peace time and in war time form in bothcases a reasonably constituted cavalry.19

ARTILLERY20

The artillery corps such as it is can suffice provided that the regiments thatlack nearly two hundred men per battalion are promptly completed. Its distri-bution will have to be completed according to the above proposed war planagainst England, and there is no need to enter into any details for this. In thecase of a land war, a few increases would thus be necessary, and this objec-tive would be easily fulfilled with the resources of the provincial battalionsthat one can bring into its service.

In this state, one did not include the artillery—not being front-line troops—or the flanking guards that are not on foot but that are certainly necessary toreestablish. With such forces, one can undertake a vigorous war against En-gland without fearing being unprepared for a continental war, and in the casethat it would occur, here is an idea to consider and the distribution of troopsthat one will be able to undertake.

The invasion of England needing to be thus undertaken to avoid failure, thedefense of the coasts would not require more than approximately fifty garri-son battalions with the coast guards, who, in our new formation, must all begunners commanded and inspected by the artillery directors spread through-out the maritime provinces. For the land war, we would still have one hundred thirty or one hundred forty thousand men, without counting the


92 Chapter VII

Table 7.3. The Table of Our Land Forces with the Increases Announced Above WillThus Be as Follows

Infantry206 battalions of French infantry at 650 men 133,90010 battalions of guards 5,87679 garrison battalions attached to 79 French regiments at 500 men each 39,50026 militia battalions whose use is still not indicated 13,000

192,276Cavalry255 squadrons of cavalry, Dragons, and Hussars at 106 men per squadron 27,0308 squadrons of riflemen 1,1608 squadrons of gendarmes 896Guardsmen 1,200

30,286RecapitulationField infantry, including the house of the King 139,286Garrison and militia infantry 53,500Cavalry, Dragons, and Hussars 30,286

222,072

remainder of the infantry garrison, nearly all the cavalry, and the necessarybattalions for our colonies and Corsica. One will be able to place the field bat-talions destined for the army successively at seven hundred, seven hundredfifty, and up till eight hundred men as the last limit of their force since a bat-talion beyond this number becomes too large and too difficult to control.

Turning to the regiments destined to serve the army, one would likewise con-duct a successive augmentation in the regiments of the cavalry, Dragons, andHussars. It would be necessary to talk here about an infinity of military prepara-tions that it is important to see to, such as the supplying of provisions, tents, ket-tles, tools, and all sorts of field utensils that prudence would prefer that one al-ways has a certain quantity in all magazines. Such are in all times the Austrianand Prussian armies which even have their horses for their artillery and the pro-visions marked for the province. Beyond the priceless advantage that they havein this to be able to enter into action at the first sign, it follows that all these sup-plies prepared in the calm of peace time are collected with much more thrift andfirmness. When war arrives in France, it always appears as an unexpected event.All needs explode at once. Time is short; money lacks; one is obliged to placeoneself in the hands of entrepreneurs, and one thus pays with a destructive usurythe negligence of peace time. It would be time to change this system and to adoptwith this regard that of our neighbors. They get this example from Louis XIV inhis best days. It is through the wise foresight of M. de Louvois and through thatabundance of well prepared resources21 of all types and in all times that we al-


ways forestalled our enemies. The French armies thus had this advantage overall armed strangers; we lost it; our neighbors did not allow it to disappear. Byadapting [this advantage] to constitutions that are more militaristic than ours wasand perhaps is today, they have made a more perfect and detailed art out of it.

It is superfluous to calculate here what all these preparations must cost.Whether it be the augmentation of troops or the preparation relative to ourland forces, this would be to raise the problem if—and up to what point—theymust be undertaken. One has proven that they were indispensable. One hasrestricted them to what prudence, the strictest economy, and the most healthypolitics would require. Next to this urgent need and right of the state, it mustno longer be a question of balancing the inconvenience of spending and allthat one can do to lessen the use of finances or of having the most severe andwidespread thrift reign over the details of execution. One has been led to thislatest memoir even though it may not be uniquely relative to the former workon an invasion of England that had been placed before the eyes of the lateKing and whose original was corrected in several places by his own hand.22

But, when speaking of a project as important as this, it is impossible not toexpand to all that ends to the means that must assist in its execution. Thesemeans reside in our navy and land forces. With an infinite amount of success,one was greatly occupied with the navy. With our contribution being greatlyneglected at the least, it was difficult to resist several details to this regard,such as what concerns the preparations that must precede the war. One ismoreover persuaded that everything was foreseen and ordered.

N. B. We will add here a reflection that should have been placed with thesection on the infantry. It is a great problem to resolve the uses that one mustmake of the provincial battalions. Will one destine them to recruit the frontline battalions during the war, or will one be content with placing here in re-serve the recruits conscripted by the corps in order to summon them when[the battalions] would be formed and would have acquired a little more force?Finally, will one be content to recruit the cavalry with provincial soldiers, andwill one give them to the infantry only after extraordinary details or circum-stances? This is such a difficult question to decide that it would be necessaryto treat it separately and on all the different points of view under which itmust be imagined. Or will [one] be content with saying that the resource ofprovincial battalions must be used sparingly, and if the King rendered thecompanies to the captains, the occasions to have recourse to them would be-come less frequent. By pressing this last point, it would be indispensable todouble the companies, thus there would be ten instead of five for each battal-ion as well as in proportion to the cavalry. This would not create in one or theother any increase or decrease of officers unless one may judge that with thecurrent constitution there might be too few of them in the time of war.

94 Chapter VIITa

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NOTES

1. #1 gives: “a diversion,” p. 107, which seem to be more appropriate in rele-vance to the original plan.

2. #2, 803. #2, 824. #1 gives: “examination,” 1115. #2, 846. This sentence is part of the preceding paragraph in #1.7. #2, 868. Ibid, 879. #1 gives: “will occupy Hartfort,” 120

10. #1 gives instead: “its light troops will advance to Westmoling [?], to Lings-donstréat [?], and from Rochester to Gravesend [?], and will leave from CantorberyCanterbury?] and will stay in the vicinity of this city,” 121

11. #2, 9212. Ibid, 9413. Ibid, 9514. Ibid, 9615. Ibid, 10016. Ibid, p. 101; #1 gives this table in 13317. Ibid, 10418. #1 adds “and cavalry,” 13719. #2, 10520. Ibid, 10721. #1 document abruptly ends here22. #2, 11023. In #1, this Table begins at the start of section entitled, “Execution of the Inva-

sion of England,” p. 106.

96 Chapter VII

97

Letter of M. le Comte de Broglie to the KingDecember 17, 1778

Sire,Your Majesty may recall that, during the last audience that he had the kind-

ness to grant me in 1775, he sincerely wanted to permit me to address directlyto him the reflections that I thought would interest his service and even to re-quest his kindness for objects that could concern me personally. I hope thatyour Majesty will allow me to benefit today from this permission to addressto him a work whose circumstances can prove important. This is the samework that had been one of the objectives that I had to treat for the twenty-three years that had lasted the secret correspondence that the late King andgreat Father of your Majesty had felt it appropriate to charge me with.1

This work must have been located among the papers that he left at hisdeath, but since they may have been dispersed or lost and since the situationof the affairs took another direction, I believed it to be my task to recreatethem and to think about them with new care and to adopt it [the plan?] to thecurrent circumstances in order to place it before the eyes of your Majesty.

I ardently desire that he judge it worthy of his attention, and if after havingread it, he thinks that it deserves to be examined and discussed, I will be veryeager to give to the Ministers whom he will charge with its examination allthe explanations that they can ask for since such a discussion can only con-tribute infinitely to the perfection of this work.

In order not to waste the precious time of your Majesty, I would havegreatly desired to present it to him in a more concise form. I deleted muchfrom the original work in the hope that his Majesty will find in the papers of

Chapter VIII

The Honorable Last Word

the late King the memoirs, plans, and maps that I had had the honor of send-ing to him.2

It only remains for me, Sire, to hope that the proof of my zeal may beagreeable to your Majesty and may convince him that he does not have amore faithful subject to his glory and service than me. I am etc.

NOTES

1. Louis XVI succeeded Louis XV in 1774. De Broglie was the most importantpersonage in the clandestine group of ministers of the Secret du Roi, which existedoutside of the official royal cabinet of Louis XV’s administration.

2. This partially explains the disparity in the text of the original document #1 andthe revised document #2. Also, no maps exist with the submitted documents. It is pos-sible that some leaves from the submitted document which included maps are mis-placed or lost.

98 Chapter VIII

99

An offensive on the part of France is absolutely necessary in 1778 since it wouldact as a preventive war. The English, an extirpating and avaricious race, seekingto establish an universal monarchy, would soon aggrandize at the expense ofFrench and Spanish possessions in America, in the Antilles, and in Asia. BeforeEngland can secure the advantage, France and Spain should strike, taking theadvantage of England’s preoccupation with her North American Colonies.1

In these words, Broglie had emphasized that no thought ought to prevent theplanned offensive against England. It is necessary to strike against England,he wrote, and it will be a mortal blow from which nothing can reestablish her.Broglie had laboriously explained in his first memoir the rationale for an in-vasion, and in his second he had mapped the details of the plan with a dis-cussion of strategy, deployment, and distribution of resources to support hisobjective. Historically however, the merit and feasibility of Broglie’s planwas never put to the test.

An “invasion” was planned in mid-1779, which entailed occupying the Isle ofWight and raiding the Portsmouth docks, but it was cancelled as the year turnedout to be unpropitious for French military efforts. The effort to organize an in-vasion collapsed due to the cumulative effect of insufficient French naval logis-tics, poor combined naval operations with the Spanish, and an outbreak of dis-ease. In the same year, Vice-Admiral d’Estaing2 undertook some navaloperations in the West Indies and in the American continent, during which heparticipated in some very disappointing combined military operations with therebel colonists. The reverses fraught with heavy losses may have also disheart-ened French military advocates from undertaking a more aggressive plan of in-vasion. Thus, the suspension of the plan to invade England became clear and de-finitive when France signed a Treaty of Commerce and a military alliance pact

Conclusion

with the American colonists in February 1778. The treaty indicated France’s firstdiplomatic recognition of the United States and its commitment to openly assistthe Americans in their war of independence.

This was the political setting in 1780, when the Marquis de Lafayette3 re-turned from America to argue for a substantial deployment of French armedand naval forces to fight alongside with the American colonists. His power-ful persuasion matched the propensity of French diplomacy and a large armyand navy under the leadership of Count Rochambeau4 and Admiral de laGrasse5 sailed across the Atlantic to America. Thus, the objective of weaken-ing England followed a different course. The strategy in America appeared asmore feasible in fulfilling the primary objective of eighteenth century Frenchdiplomacy. The plan of an invasion of England which had long been projectedas a turning point in French diplomacy avoided the turn that Broglie had en-visioned to maneuver in the years from 1765–1778.

The change in the direction of French foreign policy in 1778 was in-evitable. Previously in 1764 and 1768, Choiseul had entrusted secret agents,M. de Pontleroy and Colonel de Kalb to survey the political situation in Eng-land’s North American colonies. On receiving reports in both investigationsthat Americans were averse to seeking foreign assistance at the time, Choiseulchanged his focus to avenging French pride through an invasion of England.He gave extensive consideration to Broglie’s plan of an invasion of the islandand nurtured the idea of a short and decisive naval offensive. However, thesituation altered in 1778. Americans were eager for foreign assistance aftertheir victory against the British at Saratoga in 1777. The American delegationunder Ben Franklin which came to Paris to seek French assistance left littledoubt in the mind of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes (French foreignminister, 1774-1787) about the mutual benefits underlying the proposed al-liance. Vergennes believed that defeating England in America through directassistance to the American colonies was a sound consideration and a betterstrategy, and French policy followed his directive.

The appeal of American independence and Vergennes’ patronage of theFrench plan to intervene in favor of the thirteen American colonies mostlikely lay in considerations of its probable effect on the European balance ofpower, and also on an analysis of the relative strength of the French navy in1778. From the continental perspective, if England was sufficiently weakenedby the loss of her thirteen American colonies and her lucrative Americantrade, she (England), at the very least, could no longer provide subsidies toeastern powers like Russia; at best, a chastened England might become morecooperative with French desires in Eastern Europe.6

The rebellion in America was once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to strike atEngland and raise France to her rightful “superiority of consideration and in-

100 Conclusion

fluence.”7 England, Vergennes had discerned, was most vulnerable and ex-posed in America and the American Revolution was in his analysis, the mo-ment le plus beau.8 Additionally, in spite of an accelerated program of navalreform and reconstruction, the French navy in 1778 was still weaker than thatof the English.9 Shortage of ready cash in the aftermath of the Seven Years’War also slowed down the arms and naval build-up program and prevented itfrom reaching its target figure.10 It would not be possible to fight England si-multaneously on several fronts in the Americas, in England, and in India inspite of the concerted action of the two Bourbon powers.

It is impossible to know all that transpired in the ivory towers of Frenchdiplomacy on this change of strategy. However, it may be hypothesized thattwo main factors may have influenced French decision to intervene directlyin America instead of undertaking the invasion of Britain as the primary of-fensive. One, that the Saratoga victory in October 1777 seemed to promise ul-timate American success, and the other, that the French government was fear-ful lest England should acknowledge American independence, win the newRepublic’s alliance, and then, reinforced with the fresh supply of men and re-sources from her new ally, she would turn against the Bourbon powers ofFrance and Spain and crush them. Edward S. Corwin has argued that the rai-son d’être which propelled Vergennes to enter the war directly was that an in-dependent America would be a total loss for British interest leading to adiminution of British power. Since Britain and France were rivals, whateverabased the power of Britain would elevate the power of France.11

As marked by destiny, Broglie’s prognosis of a chastened England as theveritable outcome of a successful French invasion of the British Isles was notto be borne out by history. His planned Armada was blown away by the pow-erful wind from America. Broglie’s passion and patriotism to see his countryavenged through the major land and naval offensive in the English Channeldied with him. Intervention in the American Revolution thus took precedenceover an all-encompassing invasion of England. Broglie’s invasion plan wsplaced in abeyance; but it left a fascinating rubric for later invasion plans tobuild upon that would take birth during the tenure of the French Directory andthe Napoleonic regime.

NOTES

1. See Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l’establissementdes États-Unis d’Amérique. Tome II. Paris Imprimerie Nationale, 1884–89, 668.

2. Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector, Comte d’Estaing (November 24,1729–April 28, 1794) was a French admiral, appointed as a vice-admiral during the

Conclusion 101

naval operations undertaken by France to assist the American colonists between1777–1779.

3. (1757–1834). He was a great French general who championed the cause of theAmerican Independence, and influenced the French government for rendering themaximum assistance possible to the rebel colonists.

4. Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau (July 1, 1725–May10, 1807) was a French aristocrat, general, and a marshal of France who participatedgallantly in the American Revolution. His battalion of 5,000 French soldiers assistedGeneral Washington effectively to compel the surrender of the British forces underLord Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781.

5. François Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse Tilly, Comte de Grasse (1722–1788)was a French admiral who defeated the British navy in the Battle of the Chesapeakein September 1781. His fleet of three thousand assisted General Washington andRochambeau to compel the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, in1781.

6. Murphy, Orville T. Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacyin the Age of Revolution, 1719–87. Albany: State of University of New York Press,1982, 260.

7. A.E./M.D. États-Unis, I, 289-95. Quoted in O. T. Murphy, 260. See also LouisR. Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution. Chicago, 1942,61.

8. See, C. H. Van Tyne, “Influences which determined the French government tomake the treaty with Ameica, 1778.” American Historical Review, 21 (1915–16), 532.See also, “Précis des faits relatifs au traité de la France avec les Americains,” 18 Mars,1778. A.E./C.P., Vol. 529–Angleterre, 1778, 183–186.

9. See Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. YaleUniversity Press, New Haven, London, 1985, 110.

10. See Robert D. Harris, “French Finances and the American War,” Journal ofModern History 48 (1976): 233–258.

11. See E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance. Princeton; Prince-ton University Press, 1916.

102 Conclusion

103

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113

Abbé de Terray, 9Admiral Rooke, 61Africa, 26, 72Aiguillon (Duke of), 18Alendley-Head, 81America (United States), 24, 26–27, 31,

34–35, 37–39, 46–47, 49, 54, 58, 72,99, 100–101

American Revolution (War of theAmerican Independence), 3, 6, 8, 9,15, 18, 101

Andalucia, 69Antibes, 63, 88Antilles, 26–27, 32, 38, 49, 51, 99Ashford, 80–81Asia, 26, 44, 50, 58, 99Atham, 82Aunis, 75–76Auspack, 29

Batle (Battle), 80–81Bay of Honduras, 52Bayonne, 17, 62–63Beachy Head, 17, 78Bellisle (Marshal de), 47Belzune (M. de), 49Bengal, 52Benjamin Franklin, 30, 100Beula, 80–81

Béville (M. de), 18Bonaparte (Napoleon), vii, xiBoulogne, 19, 75Brayfort, 82Brazil, 68Brest, 17, 19–20, 34, 44, 56, 59–61,

70–72, 78, 86Bristol, 46Bristol Channel, 85–86Brittany, 75Bromley, 82Broglie, Charles François, vi–viii, xi-

xiii, 1–3, 7, 9, 14–20, 22, 24–25, 97,99–101

Broglie, François Marie, 1Broglie, Victor François, 1Broglie, Victor Maurice, 1Brunswick, 29

Cabo de Finisterre, 34, 86Cadiz, 51, 60, 68–72Calais, 19, 75Cambrook, 80Campeche, 52Canada, 29Canterbury, 81–82Cartagena, 51–52, 69, 70Castile, 69Cayenne, 49

Index

Chatham, 56, 57Cherbourg, 19, 62, 75Chernon, 57Chichister, 81Choiseul, Étienne François (Duke of),

2–8, 14–15, 17–18, 100Choiseul-Praslin, 8–9Churchill, 83Corsica, 92Croydon, 82

Dauphiné, 88De Kalb (Colonel), 100Depford, 57, 82Derwick, 82Dieppe, 19, 75Domstréal, 81Dover, 81–83Dublin, 85–86Dunge Ness, 17, 78Dunkirk, 5, 17, 19, 61–63, 72, 75–76,

78, 87–88Dutch, 27

El Ferrol, 51, 60, 69, 71, 72, 85Emery (M. de), 49Enderdren, 80England (Great Britain), xii–xiii,

4–9, 14–18, 22–33, 35–39, 42,44–48, 50–51, 53–58, 61, 63, 67,68–77, 79–80, 83–91, 93, 99, 100,101

English Channel, 8, 18, 44, 55–56, 60,62, 70–72, 75, 78, 86, 101

Estaing (Vice Admiral de), 99Estremadura, 69Exeter, 83

Falkland Islands, 8Family Pact (with Spain), 8Flaineville, 80–81Flanders, 15Florida, 29, 31Foolseray, 82

Fornborough, 82France, xii, 4–9, 14–15, 18, 20, 23–24,

26, 32–33, 35–39, 42, 45–51, 53, 55,58, 68–70, 74, 77, 80, 84–84, 92, 99,100–101

French Directory, vii, xi, 101

Ganges, 71General Howe, 28, 33, 34Germany 47, 54Gibraltar, 17, 28, 50–51, 53, 67, 69–72Ginhead, 81Gloucester, 83Gravesend, 82Guadeloupe, 5, 7, 49Guay-Trouin (Admiral de), 61Guiana, 75Gulf of Mexico, 71Gulf of Rouissillon, 63

Halifax, 29Haltersen, 82Hanover, 29Hanover Hill, 81Hastings, 17, 20, 78–80Havana, 17, 33, 49–52, 68, 70–72, 84Hesse, 29Honfleur, 19, 75House of Bourbon, 28, 30–32, 36, 38,

48, 53–54, 85Hugel, 18

India, 5, 7–8, 15, 17, 33, 52–53, 71,101

Ireland, xiii, 46, 72, 74, 85–86Isle of Réunion, 59Isle of Wight, 28, 67, 99Isles of France and Bourbon, 7, 17, 33,

52, 59, 71Italy, 53

Jamaica, 17, 50–52, 70John Adams, 30Jules Caesar, 57

114 Index

Kent, 57–58, 81–83Koberant, 82Kormerik, 80

La Grasse (Admiral de), 100La Hogue, 43, 62Lafayette (Marquis de), 100Lamberhust, 81Landau, 88Landerneau, 60, 61Le Havre, 19, 75Lellugley, 80Léon, 69Lewes, 81Lewksan, 82Lisbon, 69Lisis, 83London, 14, 53, 56–58, 80, 82–83Lord Chatham, 30Lord North, 39Louis XIV, 1, 43, 61, 92Louis XV, 2, 5, 7–10, 14–16, 18Louis XVI, 3, 15, 18, 22, 42Louvois (M. de), 92

Macarty (M. de) 52Madanscourt Hill, 82Madras, 33, 52Madrid, 69Mahon, 15, 53, 67, 70–71Maidstones, 81Marsfield, 80Martinique, 5, 33, 49, 52Mediterranean, 15, 48, 50, 53, 58, 60,

69–72Medway, 81Medwin, 58Mesnil-Durand (M. de), 18Meuse, 89Minorca, 28, 50Miquelon, 49Morlaix, 19, 61, 75–76Mothe Piquet (M. de), 61Muy (Marshal de), 22

Nantes, 63Naples, 48New England, 17Normandy, 75Northiant, 80–81Nova Scotia, 29, 31

Ornay (M. de), 18Ossun (M. de), 52Oxford, 83

Painbeauf, 75Paris, 100Patrick Hancock, 30Persian Gulf, 71Pevensey, 17, 20, 78–79Philippines, 47Picardy, 75Pierre Étienne, 9Plymouth, 17, 56–58, 77, 83Poitou, 75Pondichérry, 33Pontleroy (M. de), 100Portsmouth, 17, 20, 56–58, 77–78, 83,

99Portugal, 47Provence, 70, 88Prussia, 29, 48

Quiberon, 61

Rhine, 89Rio de Janeiro, 61Riversalt, 81Rochambeau (Comte de), 100Rochefort, 17, 60Rochester, 81–82Rothiar, 80Rozière (M. de la), 15–16, 18Russia, 100Rye, 17, 20, 78–80

Saint-Germain (Comte de), 18Saint-Malo, 19, 62, 75, 78

Index 115

Salshurst, 80–81San Roque, 69–70Santo Domingo (St. Dominique), 33,

49, 52Saratoga, 100–101Scotland, xiii, 15, 30, 72, 74, 87Sepfort, 82Sevenoaks, 81–82Seven Years’ War, xi, 4–7, 9, 101Sicily, 48Spain, xii, 7–8, 15, 17–18, 24, 26,

32–34, 39, 45–53, 60, 68–70, 72,74–75, 85–86, 99, 101

Spanish Armada, viiSt. George’s Channel, 85–86St. Lucia, 49St. Nicolas, 49St. Pierre, 49Steining, 81Steyming, 80Suffolk, 57–58Sussex, 20, 57–58, 78

Thames, 57, 81–83Thorn-Hill Head, 82

Toulon, 34, 46, 60, 62–63, 70, 72Treaty (Peace) of Paris, 4, 14Treaty of Utrecht, 4–5Tunbridge, 82

Vallierre (M. de), 51Vannes, 75Vergennes (Comte de), 3, 15, 18,

100–101Vigo, 61

Waldron, 80Wandernorth, 82Welchingley, 82West Indies, 99West-Maling, 81Westminister, 81William Pitt (the Elder), 6Winchelsey, 17, 20, 78–80Windsor, 83William, Duke of Normandy, 57William, Prince of Orange, 57Woodgate, 81Woolwich, 57Wrotham, 81

116 Index