de santos vs. angeles

206 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

De Santos vs. Angeles

G.R.No.105619.December12,1995.*

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON.ADORACIONG.ANGELES,JUDGE,REGIONALTRIALCOURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 andCONCHITATALAGDESANTOS,respondents.

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Marriages; IllegitimateChildren; A child’s parents should not have been disqualified tomarry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a“natural child.”—Article269oftheCivilCodeexpresslystates:“Art.269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children bornoutsidewedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionoftheformer, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry eachother, are natural.” In other words, a child’s parents should nothavebeendisqualifiedtomarryeachotheratthetimeofconceptionforhimtoqualifyasa“naturalchild.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The marriage under question isconsidered “void from the beginning” because bigamous, contractedwhen a prior valid marriage was still subsisting.—In the case atbench, the marriage under question is considered “void from thebeginning” because bigamous, contracted when a prior validmarriagewasstillsubsisting.Itfollowsthatthechildrenbegottenofsuchunioncannotbeconsiderednaturalchildrenproperforatthetime of their conception, their parents were disqualified frommarrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsistingmarriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The status of a marriage determinesin large part the filiation of its resultant issue.—Atthecoreoftheinstitution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition andculture, lies the “inviolable social institution” known as marriage.Thisunion,absentanyformalorsubstantialdefectorofanyviceofconsent, is virtually adamantine. On the whole, the status of amarriagedeterminesinlargepartthefiliationofitsresultantissue.Thus,achildbornwithinavalidmarriageis legitimate,whileoneborn outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter’sparentswere,atthetimeofthechild’sconception,notlegallybarredfrom marrying each other and subsequently do so, the child’sfiliation improves as he becomes legitimized and the “legitimated”childeventuallyenjoysalltheprivileges

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*ENBANC.

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VOL.251,DECEMBER12,1995 207


and rights associatedwith legitimacy.Without suchmarriage, thenatural child’s rights depend on whether he is acknowledged orrecognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of alegitimatechildinthemannerthatthelegitimatedchilddoes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and legitimated childrenare entitled to use of surname, succession and support.—TheCivilCodeprovides three rightswhich, in varyingdegrees, are enjoyedby children, depending on their filiation: use of surname,succession, and support. Legitimate children and legitimatedchildren are entitled to all three. Thus, they “shall principally usethe surname of the father,” and shall be entitled to support fromtheirlegitimateascendantsanddescendants,aswellastoalegitimeconsistingofonehalfof thehereditaryestateofbothparents,andto other successional rights, such as the right of representation.“Theserightsaseffectsoflegitimacycannotberenounced.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Natural children recognized by bothparents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally usethe surname of the father.—Natural children recognized by bothparents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally usethesurnameofthe father.Ifanaturalchild isrecognizedbyonlyoneparent, thechildshall followthesurnameof suchrecognizingparent.Both types of childrenare entitled to receive support fromtheparentrecognizingthem.Theyalsocannotbedeprivedoftheirlegitime equivalent to onehalf of that pertaining to each of thelegitimate childrenordescendantsof the recognizingparent, tobetakenfromthefreedisposableportionofthelatter’sestate.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unrecognized illegitimate childrennot entitled to any of the rights above mentioned.—Unrecognizedillegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights abovementioned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimation; Legitimation is aprivilege available only to natural children proper.—Legitimationisnot a “right” which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,availableonlytonatural children proper,asdefinedunderArt.269.

HERMOSISIMA,JR.,J., Separate and Concurring Opinion:

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Marriages; IllegitimateChildren; The law tenders in no unpretentious terms the basis torule that private respondent’s children, being adulterous children,have no right to be legitimated under the New Civil Code.—Alltold,thelawtendersto

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us in no unpretentious terms the basis to rule that private

respondent’s children, being adulterous children, have no right tobelegitimatedundertheNewCivilCode.Sucharulingisnotonlyinaccordwiththeexplicit,unequivocallanguageofArticle269butmoreimportantlyanimatesandupholdsthepublicpolicyasregardstheinstitutionofmarriageasthefoundationofsociety.

VITUG,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Marriages; IllegitimateChildren; If under Article 269 in relation to Article 270 of the CivilCode acknowledged natural children are given the right to belegitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents the law mustby virtue of Article 89 likewise extend unqualifiedly to naturalchildren by legal fiction.—Ivotetoresolvethecontroversyinfavorof thechild. I take it tobethe legislative intentthatthepertinentprovisionsoftheCivilCodeonchildreninthebookonpersonsandfamily relations are meant to enhance the child’s interest andwelfare.This intent finds exemplification inArticle 89 of theCivilCode by explicitly providing that natural children by legal fiction(amongthemthoseconceivedorbornofvoidmarriagesbecausetheparents suffer froman impediment tomarry) shall have the samestatus, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children.IfthenunderArticle269,inrelationtoArticle270,oftheCivilCode,acknowledgednaturalchildrenaregiventherighttobelegitimatedbythesubsequentmarriageoftheparents,thelawmust,byvirtueof Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly to naturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

KAPUNAN,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Marriages; IllegitimateChildren; By virtue of Article 89 in relation to Article 270 theprivate respondent’s children were deemed legitimated by thesubsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in1967.—Since the decedent’s 1951 marriage in Tokyo with theprivate respondent was invalid, being one of those marriagesclassifiedasvoidfromtheverybeginningundertheCivilCode,thestatusofherchildrenclearlyfallsunderArticle89whichputsthemon par, at least in terms of rights and obligations, withacknowledged natural children. Since the rights of acknowledgednaturalchildrenincludetherightoflegitimation—underArticle270of the Civil Code—by the subsequent valid marriage of theirparents, it thereforeplainly follows thatbyvirtueofArticle89, inrelation to Article 270, the private respondent’s children weredeemed legitimated by the subsequent valid marriage of theirparentsinthePhilippinesin

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1967.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The weight of authority in thiscountry recognizes that under the Civil Code, Article 89unequivocally furnishes an exception to the rule that only

acknowledged natural children or those who by law have beendeclared natural children by final judgment can belegitimated.—Clearly, the weight of authority in this countryrecognizes that under the Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocallyfurnishesanexceptiontotherulethatonlyacknowledgednaturalchildrenor thosewhoby lawhavebeendeclarednatural childrenby final judgment can be legitimated. This exceptionwas, in fact,acknowledged by the Family Code Revision Committee in itsMeetingofAugust24,1985,whenitdecidednottoaccordthesameprivilege extended by Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimatechildren (under the Family Code’s simplified classification) in theprovisions of the new code.However, for children born under theCivilCode,theexceptionisalegalfactwhichcouldnotbeignored.If under Article 269, in relation to Article 270 of the Civil Code,acknowledgednaturalchildrenaregiventherighttobelegitimatedbythesubsequentmarriageoftheparents,thelawmust,byvirtueofArticle89,alsoextendunqualifiedlytonaturalchildrenbylegalfiction. This not only harmonizes Article 89 with the Civil Codearticles on the rights of acknowledged natural children and thearticlesonlegitimationbutalsoleadstoaresultwhichenhancesthewelfareandinterestofthechild.

PANGANIBAN,J., Dissenting:

Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Marriages: IllegitimateChildren; While Art. 89 of the New Civil Code has been repealed bythe Family Code, nevertheless, it was the law in force at the time thelegitimation in the case at bench took place, hence it should governthe present controversy.—Art. 89 has been repealed by theFamilyCode(ExecutiveOrderNo.209)whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988(Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,178SCRA684[1989];Atienza vs.Brillantes, A.M.No.MTJ92706,March 29, 1995). Itwas one oftheprovisionsunderTitleIII,BookIof theNewCivilCodewhichhavebeenomittedfromthetextofthepresentFamilyCode.Butitwasthelawinforceatthetimethelegitimationinthecaseatbenchtook place and should, consequently, govern the presentcontroversy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Children, born and reared innocentin this world, should benefit by every intendment of thelaw.—Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social andsuccessional prejudice against children who had no fault in norcontroloverthemarital

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impediments which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims,nottheperpetrators,ofthesevagariesoflife.Whythenshouldtheysuffertheirconsequences?Inthefinalanalysis,therearereallynoillegitimate children; there are only illegitimate parents. And thisdissentfindsitsphilosophyinthis:thatchildren,unarguablybornand reared innocent in this world, should benefit by everyintendment of the law, particularly where—as in this case—theirparents,whooriginallysufferedfromamarital impediment,would

now want to overcome the improvident social and successionalconsequences of such condition. Therefore, it is most unfair thattheseinnocentchildrenshouldbecondemnedtocontinuesufferingthe consequences of the impediment theydidnot cause,when theveryimpedimentitselfhasdisappeared.

PETITION for certiorari to review a decision of theRegionalTrialCourtofCaloocanCity,Br.121.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.Antonio Quintos Law Officeforpetitioner. Cuevas, De la Cuesta & De las Alas for private

respondent.

ROMERO,J.:

Cannaturalchildrenbylegalfictionbelegitimized?There being no explicit provision of law in point, the

Courtiscalledupontocastilluminationinagrayareaevenasit fillsupunintentional interstices inthefabricofCivilLaw with overlays of philosophical, historical andsociologicalstrands.Foranunderstandingofhowtheissuearose, we now proceed to unravel the pertinent factualbackground.

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos marriedSofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,hereinpetitionerMariaRosariodeSantos.Aftersometime,their relationship became strained to the breaking point.Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,ConchitaTalag,privaterespondentherein.Antoniosoughta formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining adivorcedecreefromaNevadacourtin1949.

Obviouslyawarethatsaiddecreewasaworthlessscrapof paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did notrecognize

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divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 tomarry private respondent, with whom he had beencohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. Thisunionproducedelevenchildren.OnMarch30,1967,Sofiadied inGuatemala.Less than amonth later, onApril 23,1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted amarriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippinelaws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leavingpropertieswithanestimatedvalueofP15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court1

asking for the issuance of letters of administration in herfavor in connection with the settlement of her latehusband’sestate.Shealleged,amongotherthings,thatthedecedentwassurvivedbytwelve legitimateheirs,namely,herself, their tensurvivingchildren,andpetitioner.Therebeingnoopposition,herpetitionwasgranted.

After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,however,petitionerdecidedtointervene.Thus,inamotionshefiledsometimeinNovember1987,shearguedinter alia

that private respondent’s children were illegitimate. Thiswas challenged by private respondent although the latteradmittedduringthehearingthatallherchildrenwerebornpriortoSofia’sdeathin1967.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of privaterespondent’saccountofheradministration,thecourta quopasseduponpetitioner’smotion.Thecourt,citingthecaseofFrancisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23SCRA99[1983]),declaredprivaterespondent’stenchildrenlegitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,alongwithpetitionerandprivaterespondent,astheheirsofAntoniodeSantos.

Petitionersoughtareconsiderationofsaidorderbutthiswasdeniedinthecourt’sorderdatedJanuary9,1992.

Hence,shefiledtheinstantpetitionforcertiorarionJune16,1992,contendingthatsinceonlynaturalchildrencanbelegitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared aslegitimatedherhalf

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1 Special Proceeding CaseNo. C851 filed before Branch 121 of the

RegionalTrialCourtofCaloocanCity.

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brothersandsisters.Thisargumentistenable.Article269oftheCivilCodeexpresslystates:

“Art.269.Onlynaturalchildrencanbe legitimated.Childrenbornoutsidewedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionoftheformer, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry eachother,arenatural.”

In other words, a child’s parents should not have beendisqualifiedtomarryeachotheratthetimeofconceptionforhimtoqualifyasa“naturalchild.”

In the case at bench, there is no question that all thechildrenborn toprivate respondentanddeceasedAntoniodeSantoswereconceivedandbornwhenthelatter’svalidmarriage to petitioner’s mother was still subsisting. Thatprivate respondentand thedecedentweremarriedabroadafter the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree ofdivorcefromhislegitimatewifedoesnotchangethisfact,fora divorce granted abroad was not recognized in thisjurisdictionatthetime.Evidently,thedecedentwasawareof this fact, which is why he had to have the marriagesolemnized inTokyo,outsideof thePhilippines. ItmaybeaddedherethathewaslikewiseawareofthenullityoftheTokyomarriage for afterhis legitimate, though estrangedwife died, he hastily contracted another marriage withprivaterespondent,thistimehereinTagaytay.

ItmustbenotedthatwhileArticle269,whichfallsunderthegeneralheadingof“PaternityandFiliation,”specificallydealswith “LegitimatedChildren,” Article 89, a provision

subsumed under the general title on “Marriage,” dealsprincipally with void and voidable marriages andsecondarily, on the effects of said marriages on theiroffspring. It creates another category of illegitimatechildren, those who are “conceived or born of marriageswhicharevoidfromthebeginning,”butbecausetherehasbeen a semblance of marriage, they are classified as“acknowledgednaturalchildren”and,accordingly,enjoythesamestatus,rightsandobligationsassuchkindofchildren.In the case at bench, the marriage under question isconsidered “void from the beginning” because bigamous,contractedwhenapriorvalid

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marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the childrenbegotten of such union cannot be considered naturalchildren proper for at the time of their conception, theirparentsweredisqualifiedfrommarryingeachotherduetotheimpedimentofapriorsubsistingmarriage.

What term should then be coined to distinguish themfromnaturalchildrenproper(those“bornoutsideofwedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionoftheformer,were not disqualified by any impediment to marry eachother”)? A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that devicecontrived by law to simulate a fact or condition which,strictlyandtechnicallyspeaking,isnotwhatitpurportstobe.Inthiscase,theterm“naturalchildrenbylegalfiction”was invented, thus giving rise to another category ofillegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with“naturalchildren”asdefinedunderArt.269butbyfictionoflawtobeequatedwithacknowledgednaturalchildrenand,consequently,enjoyingthestatus,rightsandobligationsofthelatter.Doesthisclusterofrightsincludetherighttobelegitimated?

UndertheCivilCode,thereexistsahierarchyofchildrenclassifiedonthebasisofrightsgrantedbylaw,whichmustbe preserved by strictly construing the substantiveprovisionsofthelawinforce.

Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may beconsidered“old”inlightofthenewprovisionsoftheFamilyCode on “Persons”), much emphasis is laid on theclassification of children visavis their parents, and thecorresponding rights they are entitled to under the law.Thus, the title on “Paternity and Filiation” devotes twowholechapterstolegitimatechildrenalone,andonechapteronthosedeemedbylawtobepossessedoftherightsoftheformer, such as legitimated children, because of theircompliance with certain requisites laid down by law; twoother chapters dealwith illegitimate children composed ofrecognizednaturalchildren,andthoseotherthannatural,or spurious, whether recognized or not. The wellordereddelineation of such distinctions among these groupsdemonstrateaclearintentonthepartoftheframersoftheCivilCodetocompartmentalizeandseparateonefromthe

other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines thesubstantiverightsaccruingtothedifferent

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categoriesofchildren.ItmustbenotedthatbeforesaidCodewasenacted,other

classes of illegitimate children were recognized, such as,“manceres” or the offspring of prostitutes and the“sacrilegious” or children of those who had received HolyOrders.Subsequently,theCivilCode,inanefforttokeepinstep with modern times, limited illegitimate filiation tothosewhichareincestuous,adulterousandillicit.

At the core of the institution of legitimacy heldsacrosanct by Spanish tradition and culture, lies the“inviolable social institution” known as marriage. Thisunion,absentanyformalorsubstantialdefectorofanyviceofconsent,isvirtuallyadamantine.Onthewhole,thestatusof amarriage determines in large part the filiation of itsresultantissue.Thus,achildbornwithinavalidmarriageis legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock isillegitimate. If, however, the latter’s parents were, at thetime of the child’s conception, not legally barred frommarrying each other and subsequently do so, the child’sfiliation improves as he becomes legitimized and the“legitimated”childeventuallyenjoysalltheprivilegesandrights associatedwith legitimacy.Without suchmarriage,the natural child’s rights depend on whether he isacknowledgedorrecognizedbyhisparents,buthedoesnotrisetothelevelofalegitimatechildinthemannerthatthelegitimatedchilddoes.

Achildconceivedorbornofamarriagewhichisvoidabinitiooronewhichisdeclaredanullityisillegitimatesincethere is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law whichaccordshimtherightsofanacknowledgednaturalchild.

Finally,thereareillegitimatechildrenwhoarereferredto as “spurious” or derisively denominated as “bastards”because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage—valid or otherwise—which would give any semblance oflegality to the child’s existence. Nothing links child toparent aside from the information appearing in the birthcertificate.When such child is recognized by one or bothparents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approachingthoseofhislegitimatecounterparts.

TheCivilCodeprovides three rightswhich, invaryingdegrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on theirfiliation:useof

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surname,succession,andsupport.

Legitimatechildrenandlegitimatedchildrenareentitledtoallthree.

2Thus,they“shallprincipallyusethesurname

of the father,”3 and shall be entitled to support from their

legitimate ascendants and descendants,4 as well as to a

legitime consisting of onehalf of the hereditary estate ofbothparents,

5andtoothersuccessionalrights,suchasthe

rightofrepresentation.“Theserightsaseffectsoflegitimacycannotberenounced.”

6

Naturalchildrenrecognizedbybothparentsandnaturalchildrenbylegalfictionshallprincipallyusethesurnameofthe father.

7 If a natural child is recognized by only one

parent, the child shall follow the surname of suchrecognizingparent.

8 Both types of children are entitled to

receive support from the parent recognizing them.9 They

alsocannotbedeprivedoftheirlegitimeequivalenttoonehalfofthatpertainingtoeachofthelegitimatechildrenordescendantsoftherecognizingparent,tobetakenfromthefreedisposableportionofthelatter’sestate.

10

Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, orspurious issues, are, in theirminority,under theparentalauthorityof theirmothersand,naturally, takethe latter’ssurname.

11 The only supportwhich they are entitled to is

fromtherecognizingparent,12andtheirlegitime,alsotobe

taken from the free portion, consists of fourfifths of thelegitimeofanacknowledgednaturalchildortwofifthsthatofeachlegitimatechild.

13

_________________

2CivilCode,Articles264and272.3Ibid,Article364.4Id.,Article291(2).5Id.,Article888(1stpar.).6 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law,

Vol.I,1965,p.248,citingArts.301,905,and1347.7CivilCode,Articles366367.8Ibid,Article366.9Id.,Article291(3)and(4),inrelationtoArticle89.10Id.,Article895,inrelationtoArticle282.11Id.,Articles288and368.12Id.,Article291(5).13Id.,Article895(2ndand3rdpars.).

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It must also be observed that while the legitime of alegitimatechildisfairlysecuredbylaw,

14thelegitimeofany

recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the freeportionofthehereditaryestatewhichthechildshareswiththe surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceedsaidportion.

15

Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled toanyoftherightsabovementioned.

16

These distinctions gain more relevance if we were toconsiderthatwhilealegitimatedchildmayenjoythesame

successionalrightsgrantedtolegitimatechildren,anaturalchild by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that towhich anacknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as hishereditaryrightsareconcerned.

Itisthusincongruoustoconclude,asprivaterespondentmaintains,thatpetitioner’shalfsiblingscanrisetoherlevelbythefactofbeinglegitimized,fortworeasons:First,theyfailedtomeetthemostimportantrequisiteoflegitimation,thatis,thattheybenaturalchildrenwithinthemeaningofArticle269;second,naturalchildrenbylegalfictioncannotdemandthattheybelegitimizedsimplybecauseitisoneoftherightsenjoyedbyacknowledgednaturalchildren.

Itmaybearguedthatlegitimationisarightvouchsafedto acknowledged natural children and, therefore, by thesame token, to natural children by legal fiction. Thisconclusionisarrivedatthroughasyllogismassimpleasitisdeceptive,whichrunsasfollows:

Therespondent’schildrenarenaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.Therefore, theyhave thesamestatus, rightsandobligationsas

acknowledgednaturalchildren.

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14Id.,Article886.

15Id.,Article895(3rdpar.).

16Reyesv.CourtofAppeals,No.L39537,March19,1985,citingAlabat v.

Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 (1967); Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 (1954);

Magallanesv.CourtofAppeals,95Phil.797(1954);Canalesv.Ugarte,91Phil.

6(1952);Malondav.Malonda,81Phil.149(1948);Buenaventurav.Urbano,5

Phil.1(1905).

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Acknowledgednaturalchildrenhavetherighttobelegitimated.Ergo, respondent’s childrenhave the right tobe legitimated (as

in fact they were “deemed legitimated” by the subsequent validmarriageoftheirparentsinthePhilippinesin1967).

TheabovelineofreasoningfollowstheEuclidiangeometricpropositionthatthingsequaltothesamethingareequaltoeachother.Thismayholdtrueintherealmofinstructional,asopposedtodescriptivescience,wheretheformercallsforthe application of absolute, mathematical rules withprecisionbutnottothelatter,particularlythosewhichdealwith the social sciences where human relationships arecentral to a studywhosemain concern isnot to leave outanythingof significance.The formerdealswith inanimatethings, thosewhich a scientist has described as the “deadaspect of nature,” excluding all factors regarded assuperfluoustoobtainingabsoluteresultsandnothingmore.Itdoesnotconcern itselfsomuchwiththewhole truthaswith those aspects or parts only through which theinexorableresultcanbeobtained.Toapplythestrictrulesof syllogism, where the basic premise is defective, to thearena of paternity and filiation, especially in the

determinationofthestatusandrightsofthedifferentlandsof illegitimate children visavis the legitimate ones, isboundtospawnmischiefandresultsneverintendedbytheframersoftheprovisionsofthelawunderreview.

Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it mayeventually be postulated that “adulterous children shallenjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimatechildren,”adoctrinewhichnomoralphilosophyunderoursocialandculturalmilieucancountenance.

This conclusion not only presumes that children otherthanthosewhoare“natural”canbelegitimizedinthefirstplace,butalsograntsacknowledgednaturalchildren(and,consequently,naturalchildrenbylegalfiction)a“right”tobelegitimizedwhennosuchrightexists.Legitimationisnota“right”which isdemandablebyachild.It isaprivilege,availableonlytonatural children proper,asdefinedunderArt. 269. Although natural children by legal fiction havethe same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is aquantumleapinthesyllogismtocon

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clude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to belegitimated,whichisnotnecessarilyso,especially,asinthiscase, when the legally existing marriage between thechildren’s father and his estranged first wife effectivelybarreda“subsequentmarriage”betweentheirparents.

Thequestion thatmustbe confrontednext is:Howaretheoffspringofthesecondunionaffectedbythefirstwife’sdeath and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriagebetweenherwidowerandhisostensiblesecondwife?

Naturalchildrenbylegalfictioncannotbelegitimizedinthisfashion.Ourarchaiclawonfamilyrelations,patternedas it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegalrelations such that the benefits of legitimation underChapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were theyintended to extend, to natural children by legal fiction.Article269itselfclearlylimitstheprivilegeoflegitimationto natural children as defined thereunder. There was,therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude childrenconceivedorbornoutofillicitrelationsfromthepurviewofthelaw.

Anotherpointtobeconsideredisthatalthoughnaturalchildren canbe legitimized, andnatural childrenby legalfiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children,thisdoesnotnecessarilyleadtotheconclusionthatnaturalchildrenbylegalfictioncanlikewisebelegitimized.Ashasbeenpointedout,muchmoreisinvolvedherethanthemereprivilegetobelegitimized.Therightsofotherchildren,likethe petitioner in the case at bench, may be adverselyaffectedashertestamentarysharemaywellbereducedinthe event that her ten surviving half siblings should beplaced on par with her, when each of them is rightfullyentitledtoonlyhalfofhershare.

Theprovisionsoflawinvokedbyprivaterespondentare

couched in simple and unmistakable language, not at allsubject to interpretation, and they all point to thecorrectnessofpetitioner’sclaim.Ifitshouldbeassertedthatwe now trench on a gray area of law that calls forinterpretation,oralacunathatcriesforfillingup,thenwehave to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by theletterofthelawandexposeitsspiritasevincingintent,inthiscaseonewhichdecidedlyfavorslegiti

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macy over illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children sopainstakingly erected by law and the correspondinggradation of their rightsmay conceivably be shattered byelevating natural children by legal fiction who areincontestably illegitimate children to the level of naturalchildren proper, whose filiation would otherwise belegitimatehadtheirparentsblessedtheirunionwithavalidmarriage.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that thiscase has been decided under the provisions of the CivilCode,nottheFamilyCodewhichnowrecognizesonlytwoclasses of children: legitimate and illegitimate. “Naturalchildrenbylegalfiction”arenothingifnotpurefiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herebyGRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a quo datedNovember14,1991andJanuary9,1992,areNULLIFIEDand SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos ishereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of thedecedentAntoniodeSantosand,assuch,entitledtoalltherightsaccordedtoherbylaw.

SOORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno andMendoza, JJ.,concur.

Narvasa (C.J.), I join in theDISSENTofJusticesVitug&Kapunan.

Padilla, J., I join Mr. Justice Kapunan in hisdissentingopinion.

Bellosillo, J.,IjoininthedissentofJ.Kapunan&J.Vitug.

Vitug, J.,Pleaseseedissentingopinion.Kapunan, J.,Seedissentingopinion. Francisco, J., I join Justice Kapunan in his

dissentingopinion.Hermosisima, Jr., J.,Withconcurringopinion.Panganiban, J.,Pleaseseedissentingopinion.

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SEPARATE & CONCURRING OPINION

HERMOSISIMA,JR.,J.:

Do children born out of adulterous relationships have theright to be legitimated under theNewCivilCode?This Ibelieveistheresultantissueinthiscase.

Indeclaringwhatthelawisonthismatter,wecouldnotbesounmindfulofthehighestregardthatoursocietyplacesontheinstitutionofmarriageandthemaintenanceofwhichin its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is thefoundation of the family and of society. Without it therecouldbeneithercivilizationnorprogress.

1Nolessthanthe

Constitution, of which we should be the staunchestvanguard as we are its ablest defender, marshals us toprotectmarriageasaninviolablesocialinstitutionandthefoundation of the family,

2 for it cannot bedenied that the

welfare of society is served and nurtured by a court thatexercises its judicial prerogatives not in a vacuum of coldlogic but in the context of the loftiest andmost enduringsocial values which the citizens, albeit struggling andfumbling in theirdaily living, try to approximate in theirownlives.Thecitizens,afterall,areourconstituents;

3and

sotheirbestinterests,embodiedinthescaleofvalueswhichtheyextol,areanintegralpartofthegreatfluxthatisthelaw.Asweareconcernedwithitsexposition,wemuststrivetocontinuouslyrefurbishtheimageofthelawvisavisthewelfare of society, to keep it bright, and to subject it toconstantreanalysissoastokeepitintouchwithwhathasalways been right, what is just and fair under presentcircumstances, and what is most beneficial for the futuregenerations.

4

It is in this light thatweappreciate this casewith thefollowingantecedentfacts:

Dr.AntoniodeSantosmarriedSofiaBonaonFebruary7,1941.Outofthisunionwasbornin1942petitionerMaria

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1Ramirezvs.Gmur,42Phil.855,864.2Sec.2,Art.XV,1987Constitution.3Davies,Jack,Legislative Law and Process,1986Edition,p.324.4Lloyd,Dennis,The Idea of Law,1981Edition,p.327.

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Rosario de Santos. However, Antonio and Sofiasubsequently parted ways.While separated de facto fromSofia,Antonio,in1949,securedadivorcedecreeagainstherinNevada,U.S.A.HethenmarriedprivaterespondentDr.Conchita Talag in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951. Antonio andConchita had eleven children who were all born betweentheyears1951to1967.

OnMarch30,1967,SofiadiedinGuatemala.Thereafter,Antoniomarriedprivaterespondent,forthesecondtime,inTagaytayCity.AntoniothendiedonMarch8,1981attheCapitolMedicalCenter.

In special proceedings filed by private respondent onMay15,1981,beforetheRegionalTrialCourtofCaloocanCity, the court granted her petition for letters ofadministration since such petition was unopposed. In thecourse of the proceedings, however, petitioner intervenedalleging, among others, that the ten surviving children ofprivaterespondentwereillegitimate.

After the approval of the Income and ExpensesStatementofthedecedent’sestatepursuanttoSec.1,Rule90oftheRevisedRulesofCourtonMay6,1991,thetrialcourtissuedanorderonNovember14,1991declaringthatthe ten children of the deceased and private respondentmust be deemed legitimated and therefore entitled toinheritaslegitimateheirs.

Consequently,thesoleissueraisedintheinstantpetitionfor certiorari is whether or not said children can belegitimated.

A logical cold deduction based on some pertinent lawswouldappeartoanswerthisissueintheaffirmative,inthiswise:

Article80oftheNewCivilCodeconsidersasmarriagesvoid from the beginning, bigamous marriages not fallingunder Art. 83(2). Article 89 of the same Code, in turn,bestowsuponchildrenconceivedorbornofmarriagesvoidfromthebeginning,referredtoasnaturalchildrenbylegalfiction, the status, rights and obligations of acknowledgednaturalchildren.AmongtherightsofacknowledgednaturalchildrenistherightoflegitimationgrantedtothemunderArticle 269 in relation to 271 of the same Code. Sinceprivate respondent’s children were all born after hermarriagetothedeceasedinTokyoin1951,whichmarriageis considered bigamous, hence, void from the beginning,because of its celebrationwhile themarriage between thedeceasedandhis

222



first wife, Sofia Bona, still subsisted, said children arenatural children by legal fiction who have the rights ofacknowledged natural children, including the right to belegitimated, and theymay now be considered legitimatedsincethedeceasedandprivaterespondentvalidlymarriedforthesecondtimeafterSofia’sdemise.

Ithappensthatthelawmayloseitscharacterofbeingalawbyanexcessofcapriceinitsadministration,butitcouldhardlyceasetobelawbecauseofitsrigidlogicalapplicationaccording to its tenor. When its rigid logical application,however, amounts to absurdity, the law not only becomesincapable of just administration but may also become aninstrumentoflegalinjustice.Clearlyforustoreadthelawin the aforegoingmanner is to dangerously teeter on the

fulcrum of legal folly for there is no scaling down itsunacceptableimplications.

Ifchildrenbornoutofanextramaritalrelationship,butwhose parents contracted a bigamous marriage and stillanothermarriagesubsequenttheretouponthedeathofthefirst spouse of the adulterous parent, may eventually belegitimated, then children of adulterous spouses, by theexpedientcontrivanceofabigamousmarriage,maylateronbe legitimated. The adulterous spouse may still provehimself virtuous and heroic by risking prosecution forbigamyifonlytogivehischildoutofwedlockthechance,that slim chance, to be legitimated, that is, if he praysenoughthathisfirstspousediesaheadofhimsohecouldeventually validly marry his paramour. As such, in themildestterms,thelawwouldseemtocondoneextramaritalrelationships by providing the seemingly confessantadulterer a way to be a conscientious parent to hisillegitimate children without having to give up his illicitrelationswiththeirmother.Atitsworst,suchareadingofthelawamountstoamockeryoftheinstitutionofmarriage,which is, under our Constitution and family laws, aninviolablesocialinstitutionimbuedwithpublicinterestandtraditionally and constantly held to be a priority in ourculture’s scale of values, fornothing stops thepublic fromconcludingthatmarriageandabigamousmarriageatthat(withitsaccompanyingcriminalconsequences),isactuallyabackdoortolegitimatingadulterouschildren.

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The letter of Article 89 of the New Civil Code must betranscended and the absurd and sheepishly grotesqueconsequencesofitsapplicationintheinstantcase,rejected.It is not enough that the law exists to be administeredjustly; inadditionandmore importantly, the lawneeds topossess a just content. The lawmust by itself aim at andendeavor to conform to, some criteria of rightness whichrepose on values espoused by the very society it seeks toserve.Asitisourdutytodeclarethelawasitis,thereifnoescaping the task of revealing the justness of the law inaccordance with society’s avowed values. Consequently, ithas been called a golden rule of statutory interpretationthat unreasonableness of the result produced by onepossible interpretation of a statute is reason for rejectingthatinterpretationinfavorofanotherwhichwouldproduceareasonableresult.

5

In resolving the issue at hand, I believe the emphasisshouldbeonArticle269whichis,afterall,thelawsquarelyinpointunderthepremisesofthiscase.TakingtheletterofArticle 269 as it is, it clearly prescribes the limits of itsapplicabilityupononlynaturalchildren.Surelythereisnocanonagainstusingbothcommonsenseandcommonwealinconstruingthelawassayingwhatitobviouslymeans:

“Chapter3

Art. 269.Only natural children can be legitimated.Children bornoutsidewedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionoftheformer, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry eachother,arenatural.

xxxxxxxxxArt.271.Onlynaturalchildrenwhohavebeenrecognizedbythe

parentsbeforeorafterthecelebrationofthemarriage,orhavebeendeclared natural children by final judgment, may be consideredlegitimatedbysubsequentmarriage.”(Italicsours)

Legitimation is a right granted by law only to naturalchildren who, because their parents could have legallymarriedatthe

_______________

5Sands,C.Dallas,Sutherland Statutory Construction,1972Edition,

p.37.

224



time they were conceived, cannot be substantiallydifferentiatedfromlegitimatechildrenoncetheirparentsdomarry after their birth. This is because said parents canmarry any time, there being no legal impedimentpreventing them from validly contracting marriage. Thesituation obtaining respecting legitimate children andlegitimatednaturalchildreniscertainlydistinct fromthatrespecting adulterous children because the parents ofadulterous childrenareadmittedly incapacitated tomarryeachotheratthetimesaidchildrenwereconceived.Itmayeasily be said, thus, that to interpret the law as allowingadulterous children to be put on equal footing with thelegitimate children, would be putting a premium onadulterous relationships, which is frowned upon by thesociety itself. Even the law on succession under the NewCivilCodedistinguishestherespectivehereditaryrightsofthe different kinds of children and significantly assigns adiminishing share in accordance with the degree ofillegitimacy of the child concerned. Thus, Article 895provides that the legitime of each of the acknowledgednaturalchildrenandeachofthenaturalchildrenbylegalfictionshallconsistofonehalfofthelegitimeofeachofthelegitimatechildrenordescendantsandthatof illegitimatechildren who is neither of the above, fourthfifths of thelegitimeofanacknowledgednatural child. It is, therefore,evidentthatthetreatmentaccordedchildrenundertheNewCivilCodeisdeterminedbythecircumstancesunderwhichthey have been conceived and born, particularly, thecapacitytomarryoftheirparentsatthetimethattheywereconceived.

Private respondent’s childrenwerepreciselybornwhentheirdeceasedfatherwasstilllegallymarriedtoSofiaBona.The marriage of the deceased and private respondent inTokyo,Japan,in1951couldnothavegivenasemblanceof

legitimacytotheirsubsequentcohabitationandtheirissuessincesuchmarriagewascontractedduringthesubsistenceof the deceased’s marriage with Sofia Bona. Therelationshipbetweenthedeceasedandprivaterespondent,therefore, was no less adulterous notwithstanding anattempt to legitimize the same through a bigamousmarriage. There is no other way to put it but that thedeceased and private respondent were having illicitrelations; they were fully aware of the legal and moralconsequencesof

225



theiractions,andtheyseemingly,inbadfaith,attemptedtocircumventthelawintheirfavorbycontractingabigamousmarriage to the prejudice of the legitimate issue in thepersonofthepetitioner.Thereisnoquibblingthatprivaterespondent’schildrenareadulterouschildrenwhosestatus,bythesimpleexpedientofabigamousmarriagecontractedby parties fully aware of their incapacity tomarry, couldneverhavebeenintendedbythelawtobeequatedtothatofpetitionerwhoisthelegitimatechildofthedeceasedinviewof the public policy involved in preserving the sanctity ofmarriage and preventing the proliferation of illegitimateissues.Astheearlierinterpretationhasbeenshowntoleadtounreasonableresultswithsociallyvirulentimplications,and the same originates from two provisions, namely,Article 89 andArticle 269 of theNewCivil Code,we arewont to state that they are irreconcilable provisions. Andthe applicable statutory rule is that where there is anirreconcilableconflictbetweenthedifferentprovisionsofastatute, theprovision last in order ofpositionwillprevail,sinceitisthelatestexpressionofthelegislativewill.

6More

than that Article 269 is the latest expression of thelegislativewill,however,Article269onitsfacespecificallystates the law on legitimation, limits its applicability tonatural children, and is resonantly silent on the right ofadulterous children to be legitimated in the sameway aschildrenborntoparentswho,atthetimeoftheirconception,werelegallycapabletomarryeachother.

Alltold,thelawtenderstousinnounpretentioustermsthe basis to rule that private respondent’s children, beingadulterouschildren,havenorighttobelegitimatedundertheNewCivilCode.Sucharulingisnotonlyinaccordwiththeexplicit,unequivocal languageofArticle269butmoreimportantly animates and upholds the public policy asregards the institution of marriage as the foundation ofsociety.

Needless to say, such ruling sits well with the need toobviate any legal injustice and social absurdity thatmayresultifweweretoruleotherwise.

______________

6 Crawford, Earl T.,The Construction of Statutes, 1940 Edition, p.

263.

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“Thefinalcauseoflawisthewelfareofsociety.Therulethatmissesits aim cannot permanently justify its existence. ‘Ethicalconsiderationscannomorebeexcludedfromtheadministrationofjusticewhich is theendandpurposeofallcivil lawsthanonecanexcludethevitalairfromhisroomandlive.’”

7

Thefinalrenderingofthemeaningofastatuteisanactofjudgment.

8Thiscourthassojudgedthiscaseatbench,and

sowewillperhapsbejudgedthereby.I, therefore, vote to grant the petition, set aside the

assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, and remandtheretothecaseforfurtherproceedings.

DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG,J.:

Ivotetoresolvethecontroversyinfavorofthechild.ItakeittobethelegislativeintentthatthepertinentprovisionsoftheCivilCodeonchildreninthebookonpersonsandfamilyrelations are meant to enhance the child’s interest andwelfare.ThisintentfindsexemplificationinArticle89oftheCivilCodebyexplicitlyprovidingthatnaturalchildrenbylegal fiction (among them those conceived or born of voidmarriagesbecausetheparentssufferfromanimpedimenttomarry)shallhavethe same status, rights and obligations asacknowledged natural children.IfthenunderArticle269,inrelation to Article 270, of the Civil Code, acknowledgednaturalchildrenaregiventherighttobelegitimatedbythesubsequentmarriageoftheparents,thelawmust,byvirtueof Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly tonaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

Nomatterhowwelllegalcalisthenicsareplayed,thereis,I must point out, not a single provision of the Code thatlimits or

________________

7 Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921

Edition,p.66,citingDillon.8Frankfurter,Felix, “SomeReflectionsontheReadingofStatutes,”

inStatutes and Statutory ConstructionbyC.DallasSands,Vol.3,1973

Edition,p.414.

227



circumscribes the scope and application of Article 89. The

law, I respectfully submit, should be so construed as toattaincongruity,ratherthanadivision,amongitsseveralprovisions.Theruleisexpressedinthemaximinterpretareet concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi upon thetheorythatthelegislatureispresumednottohaveenactedconflicting provisions of law but that, on the contrary, itmusthavemeanttogivethemsuchparityandconsequenceasauniformjurisprudentialsystem.

Mostregrettably,Istillperceivecoolness,ifnotoutrighthostility, towards illegitimate childrenwhohavenot beenfortunate enough to be conceived or born under a betterfamilycircumstance.Itisnotenoughthattheyareunjustlyostracized by a segment in society; they are also callednames—bastards, outcasts, adulterous, spurious—thatcertainlytheydonotdeserve.Ifatall,theirsituationneedssympathy,nothatredorcondemnation.

Anyconflictofview,however,wouldsoonbea thingofthepast,forassokeenlyobservedbyMme.JusticeFleridaRuthP.Romero, theFamilyCode,whichbecameeffectiveon 03 August 1988, has deleted any reference to naturalchildren by legal fiction. The Family Code presentlycategorizeschildrenofvoidmarriages into twokinds—thelegitimates which include those conceived or born of voidmarriages under Article 36 and Article 52 of the FamilyCodebefore the judicialdeclarationofnullityofsuchvoidmarriages and the illegitimates or children conceived orbornofallothervoidmarriages(butevidentlymaintaining,for legitimation purposes, the distinction between thosewhose parents, at the time of conception, were notdisqualified to marry and those whose parents weredisqualified).

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN,J.:

Theprincipalissueinthecaseatbenchmaybecapsulizedastowhetherornotthetrialcourtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoalackorexcessofjurisdictioninconsidering the private respondent’s children legitimatedunder the facts established herein, and in declaring andinstitutingsaid

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childrenasheirsofthedecedent.Asthelawunequivocallygives them such a right, I respectfully dissent from themajority.

Ibeginbyobservingthat,takingtheircuefromthelowercourt’s inappropriate lifting of an editor’s precis orstatementfromthesyllabusofthecaseofTongoy vs. Courtof Appeals,

1bothpartiesinthecaseatbenchhaveplacedtoo

much emphasis and reliance on the case of Tongoy,2 the

factsandcircumstancesofwhicharenotexactlyonallfours

with those obtaining in the case at bench. The italicizedportion of the syllabus of cases appearing in official orunofficial reports of Supreme Court Decisions orResolutions

3 generally reflect the editor’s summary of a

discussionofanissueoraspecificpointinacase,and,takenout of context, could be misleading and inappropriate forcitation. Judges should strive to read cases which mighthaveabearingoncasesbeforethemintheirentirety,andquoteorobtaintheircitationsfromthebodyofthedecision,notthesyllabus.

TheprincipalissueinTongoy,4hinged“ontheabsenceof

anacknowledgment(bythefatherpriortohisdeathofhisillegitimatechildren)throughanyofthemodesrecognizedby theOldCivil Code.”

5 It is not, however clear from the

Court’s discussion of the facts of the case, whether theillegitimate children were sired during the subsistence ofthefirstmarriageorafterthedeathofthefirstwife.Onthesoleissueofthefather’sacknowledgment,theCourtthereintook a liberal view, recognizing the fact that the children“wereincontinuouspossessionofthe

_______________

1123 SCRA 99 (1989). The lower court partly based its decision on

thefollowingstatement,quotedfromthesyllabusofthedecision,which

doesnotappear in thebodyof thedecision itself: “The Supreme Court

now takes a liberal attitude on the status of children born out of wedlock

such that if a person while married begets children with another woman

whom he later marries after he becomes a widower, and during his

lifetime he showered such children with all paternal affections and

favors, then they should be deemed as legitimated, even in the absence of

an action for recognition.2Id.3 For e.g., Philippine Reports and the Supreme Court Reports

Annotated.4Id.5Id.,at125.

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status of natural, or even legitimated, children”6 and that

theywere“treatedaslegitimatechildrennotonlybytheirparents but also by the entire clan,”

7 in declaring, on

equitablegrounds,thatthechildrenthereinwerelegitimateheirs.

For better appreciation of our ruling inTongoy, letmequotethefollowing:

The remaining assignment of error dwells on the question ofwhether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano andNorberto, all surnamedTongoy,may be considered legitimated byvirtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco Tongoy andAntonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly beforeFrancisco died on September 15, 1926. Petitioners maintain thatsince the said respondents were never acknowledged by their

father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequentmarriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from theestateoftheirfather,thepredecessorininterestofLuisD.Tongoy,whoisadmittedlythehalfbrotherofthesaidrespondents.

Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court havefoundoverwhelmingevidence to sustain the following conclusions:thatAmadoP.Tongoy,RicardoP.Tongoy,CresencianoP.TongoyandNorbertoP.TongoywerebornillegitimatetoAntoninaPabelloonAugust19,1910(Exh.A),August12,1922(Exh.B),December1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C1) and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D),respectively; that Francisco Tongoy was their father; that saidFrancisco Tongoy had before them and Antonina Pabello twolegitimate children by his first wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy andPatrick) D. Tongoy; that Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabellowere married sometime before his death on September 15, 1926(Exh. H); that shortly thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D.TongoyexecutedanExtrajudicialDeclarationofHeirs,leavingouttheirhalfbrothersAmado,Ricardo,Cresenciano,andNorberto,whowere then still minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo,CresencianoandNorbertowereknownandacceptedby thewholeclanaschildrenofFrancisco;thattheyhadlivedinHaciendaPulowiththeirparents,butwhentheywenttoschool,theystayedintheoldfamilyhomeatWashingtonStreet,Bacolod,togetherwiththeirgrandmother, Agatona Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod knewthemtobepartoftheTongoySonoraclan;andthatLuisD.Tongoyas

______________

6Id.,at126.

7Id.

230



administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the education ofRicardoTongoyuntilhebecamealawyer;andthatevenpetitionersadmit the fact that they were halfbrothers of the late Luis D.Tongoy.

The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of anacknowledgment throughany of themodes recognizedby theOldCivilCode (pleaseseeArticles131and135of theOldCivilCode),such that legitimation could not have taken place in view of theprovisionsofArt.121ofthesameCodewhichstatesthat ‘childrenshall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage onlywhentheyhavebeenacknowledgedbytheparentsbeforeorafterthecelebrationthereof.’

Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondentCourt of Appeals conclusively shows that respondents Amado,Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuouspossession of the status of natural, or even legitimated children.Still,itrecognizesthefactthatsuchcontinuouspossessionofstatusis not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground tocompel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1379; Pua vs.Chan,21SCRA753;Larenavs.Rubio,43Phil.1017).

Be that as itmay,WE cannot but agree with the liberal viewtakenbyrespondentCourtofAppealswhenitsaid:

x x x It does not seem equally manifest, however, thatdefendantsappellantsstandonapurelytechnicalpointinthelightof overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural children ofFrancisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were treated aslegitimatechildrennotonlybytheirparentsbutonlybytheentireclan.Indeed,itdoesnotmakemuchsensethatappelleesshouldbedeprivedoftheirhereditaryrightsasundoubtednaturalchildrenoftheir father, when the only plausible reason that the latter couldhave had in mind when he married his second wife AntoninaPabello just over amonth before his deathwas to give legitimatestatus to their children. It is not in keepingwith themore liberalattitude takenby theNewCivilCode towards illegitimatechildrenandthemorecompassionatetrendoftheNewSocietytoinsistonavery literal application of the law in requiring the formalities ofcompulsory acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustlydeprive children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights.From the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected ofappellees, having been reared as legitimate children by theirparents and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action tocompeltheirparentstoacknowledgethem.InthehithertocitedcaseofRamosvs.Ramos,supra,theSupremeCourtshowedthewayoutof patent injustice and inequity that might result in some casessimply because of the implacable insistence on the technicalamenitiesforacknowledg

231



ment.Thus,itheld—Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever

(Buenaventuravs.Urbano,5Phil.1;Siguiongvs.Siguiong,8Phil.5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo vs.Macadaeg, 94Phil.862).Thefactthattheplaintiffs,asnaturalchildrenofMartinRamos, received shares in his estate implied that they wereacknowledged.Obviously,defendantsAgustinRamosandGranadaRamos and the late Jose Ramos and members of his family hadtreatedthemashischildren.Presumably,thatfactwaswellknownin the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos andGranada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped fromattacking plaintiffs’ status as .acknowledgednatural children (SeeArts. 283 [4] and 2666 [3], New Civil Code). [Ramos vs. Ramos,supra].

Withthesamelogic,estoppelshouldalsooperate inthiscase infavorofappellees,considering,asalreadyexplained indetail, thatthey have always been treated as acknowledged and legitimatedchildren of the secondmarriage of Francisco Tongoy, not only bytheirpresumedparentswhoraisedthemastheirchildren,butalsobytheentireTongoySonoraclan,includingLuisD.Tongoyhimselfwho had furnished sustenance to the clan in his capacity asadministratorofHaciendaPuloandhad in fact supported the lawstudiesofappelleeRicardoP.Tongoy inManila, thesamewayhedidwithJesusT.Sonorainhismedicalstudies.Asalreadypointedout, evendefendantsappellantshavenot questioned the fact thatappelleesarehalfbrothers ofLuisD.Tongoy.Asamatter of fact,theyarereallychildrenofFranciscoTongoyandAntoninaPabello,and only the technicality that their acknowledgment as natural

childrenhasnotbeenformalizedinanyofthemodesprescribedbylawappearstostandinthewayofgrantingthemtheirhereditaryrights. But estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendantsappellantsfromattackingappellees’statusasacknowledgednaturalorlegitimatedchildrenofFranciscoTongoy.Inadditiontoestoppel,thisisdecidedlyoneinstancewhentechnicalityshouldgivewaytoconscience, equity and justice (cf.Vda. deSta.Ana vs.Rivera, L22070,October29,1966,18SCRA588)[pp.196198,Vol.I,rec.].

It is time thatWE, too, take a liberal view in favor of naturalchildrenwho,becausetheyenjoytheblessingsandprivilegesofanacknowledgednaturalchildandevenofalegitimatedchild,foundifrather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action forrecognition against their natural parents, who, without theirasking, have been showering them with the same love, care andmaterialsupportasareaccordedtolegitimatechildren.Therighttoparticipateintheir

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father’sinheritanceshouldnecessarilyfollow.8

However, acknowledgment is clearly not at issue here.Petitioner makes no pretense that private respondent’schildrenarenotentitled tohereditary rights.

9 She herself

admitsthatthedecedentacknowledgedhispaternityoftheprivaterespondent’schildrenandthattheyareindeedherbrothers and sisters.

10 What herein petitioner claims she

opposes “is their being judicially declared legitimated (bytherespondentcourt)soastoentitlethemtoenjoythesamerightsasalegitimateheir,”

11toherprejudice.CitingArticle

269oftheNewCivilCodeas“thelawinpoint”inthecaseatbench,shecontendsthatthetrialcourterred indeclaringherhalfbrothersandsisterslegitimatedbecauseundertheNewCivilCodeonlynaturalchildrencouldbelegitimated.Ifind this contention, towhich themajority of this dividedCourtagrees,absolutelyuntenable.

The New Civil Code appears to limit the right tolegitimationonlytothosechildrenconceivedbyparentsnotdisqualified by any impediment to marry each other,bestowinguponthem,priortosuchlegitimation,thestatusof natural children. Article 269 which provides thecornerstoneforthemajority’sholdingtodaystatesthat:


The rule is, however, not absolute because even childrenconceived or born out of marriages void from the verybeginning under the Civil Code possess the status ofnaturalchildrenbylegalfictionandenjoythesamerightsasacknowledgednaturalchildren.Article89provides:

______________

8Supra,note3.9Rollo,p.79.10Id.11Id.

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Art.89.Childrenconceivedorbornoutofmarriageswhicharevoidfrom the beginning shall have the same status, rights andobligations as acknowledged natural children, and are callednaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree ofannulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceivedthereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations asacknowledgednaturalchildren,andarealsocallednaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

Article 89, a creature of legislation (through the CodeCommission)whichhasremainedunmolestedsince1950Imuststress, isnotanaccidentalprovision.TheCivilCodeCommissionclearlyintendedArticle89,notwithstandingitslocationintheCode,asapieceofreform,anexceptiontotherulefurnishedbyArticle269.Moreimportantly,Article89(unlikeArticle269whichcamefromtheSpanishCivilCodeof1889)wasanewprovisiondeliberatelyintroducedbytheCodeCommissionasoneofitsrevolutionaryreformsthirtyfiveyearsago.Anydoubtabouttheintentionofthispieceoflegislation should have been laid to rest by the followingexplanationfromtheCodeCommission’sReport:

Thisproposed reform is based on the fact that such childrenhavebeen brought into this world through no fault of their own, butthrough that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them ismostunjust.Moreover,thoughthemarriageisvoid,orvoidable,atleasttherewasasemblanceof legalitytotherelationshipbetweenthe parents. This circumstance should cast a mantle of protectionover the children, who by legal fiction should be treated asacknowledgednaturalchildren.

12

Since the decedent’s 1951 marriage in Tokyo with theprivate respondent was invalid,

13 being one of those

marriagesclassified

______________

12REPORTOFTHECODECOMMISSION,81.13 The third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 15 (on

personal status and capacity) of the Civil Code provides: “Prohibitive

laws concerningpersons, their acts orproperty, and thosewhichhave

fortheirobjectpublicorder,publicpolicyandgoodcustomsshallnotbe

renderedineffectivebylaws

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asvoidfromtheverybeginningundertheCivilCode,14the

status of her children clearly falls underArticle 89whichputsthemonpar,atleastintermsofrightsandobligations,with acknowledged natural children. Since the rights ofacknowledged natural children include the right oflegitimation—underArticle 270 of theCivilCode—by thesubsequent valid marriage of their parents,

15 it therefore

plainly follows that by virtue of Article 89, in relation toArticle270,theprivaterespondent’schildrenweredeemedlegitimated by the subsequent valid marriage of theirparentsinthePhilippinesin1967.

Thispositionishardlyanisolatedone.Virtually all Civiland Family Code commentatorsareunitedinthebeliefthatArticle 89 furnishes an escape valve for children foundunderthecircumstancesexistinginthecaseatbench.Dr.ArturoTolentino,inhiscommentaryontheCivilCode,forexample,writes:UnderArticle89,naturalchildrenbylegalfiction“shallhavethesamestatus,rightsandobligationsasacknowledgednaturalchildren”

Theoretically therefore, natural children by legal fiction can belegitimated.xxx.

The followingchildrenby legal fictioncanbe legitimated:xxx(2) thoseborn of a bigamousmarriage, for theparents canmarryeach other again upon thewidowhood of the parentwhomarriedtwice.xxx.

16

Inthesametoken,Prof.ErnestoL.Pineda,amemberoftheFamily Code Revision Committee acknowledges thisexceptiontherule,statingthat:

Bywayofexception,somenaturalchildrenbylegalfiction(Art.89,NCC) can be legitimated such as—(a) those born of couples whomarriedwhilebelowtheallowablemarryingagebutwhocontracteda

____________

orjudgmentspromulgatedorbydeterminationsorconventionsagreedupon

inaforeigncountry.”

14CivilCode,art.80(4).

15 Civil Code, art. 270, provides: “Legitimation shall take place by the

subsequentmarriageoftheparents.”

16 TOLENTINO, I COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE

CIVILCODEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,570(1987).

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new marriage after reaching the proper age; (b) those born ofbigamous marriages but where the parents married each otherupon the widowhood of the disqualified parent; (c) those born ofparents who got married before an unauthorized officer and theparents contracted a newmarriage before an authorized one; (d)those born of parentswho gotmarriedwithout amarriage license

(where license was required) and the parents contracted asubsequent valid marriage; and (e) children conceived after (notbefore)thedecreeofannulmentofavoidablemarriage.

17

Justice Alicia V. SempioDiy, writing on the New FamilyCode

18underscoresthedifferenceintreatmentofthesubject

oflegitimationbetweentheFamilyCodeandtheCivilCodethus:

Under the Civil Code, children of bigamous marriages, who arenatural children by legal fiction, can be legitimated, since theparents can marry each other upon the death of the first husband orwife of the parent who married twice. Unfortunately for suchchildren,theycannolongerbelegitimatedundertheFamilyCode,whichhaslimitedthekindofchildrentolegitimateandillegitimateandabolishedthecategoryofnaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

19

“Parenthetically,” another commentator on the FamilyCode, Prof. Melencio Sta. Maria writes, “under the CivilCodeprovisionsoflegitimationwhichwererepealedbytheFamilyCode,”therecanbeaninstancewheresuchchildrencould be legitimated.

20 Elaborating on these provisions in

his1995commentary,hestates:

ThisissobecauseaccordingtotherepealedArticle271oftheCivilCode only acknowledged natural children can be legitimated, andalso according to the repealedArticle 89 of theCivilCode, a childborninsideavoidmarriagewasconsideredanaturalchildbylegalfictionwithalltherightsofanacknowledgednaturalchild.Since anatural

______________

17 ERNESTO L. PINEDA, THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ANNOTATED,271(1992).

18ALICIAV.SEMPIODIY,HANDBOOKONTHEFAMILYCODEOFTHE

PHILIPPINES,251(1991ED.).

19Id.

20MELENCIOS.STA.MARIA,JR.,PERSONSANDFAMILYRELATIONS

LAW485(1995).

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child by legal fiction has all the rights of an acknowledged naturalchild and the statutory right to be legitimated was one of the rightsof an acknowledged natural child, the subject child therefore can belegitimated if the parents subsequently validly remarried.

21

Clearly,theweightofauthority inthiscountryrecognizesthat under the Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocallyfurnishesanexceptiontotherulethatonlyacknowledgednatural children or thosewho by law have been declarednaturalchildrenbyfinaljudgmentcanbelegitimated.Thisexception was, in fact, acknowledged by the Family CodeRevision Committee in its Meeting of August 24, 1985,when itdecidednot toaccord thesameprivilegeextendedby Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimate children

(under the Family Code’s simplified classification) in theprovisionsofthenewcode.However,forchildrenbornundertheCivilCode,theexceptionisalegalfactwhichcouldnotbeignored.IfunderArticle269,inrelationtoArticle270oftheCivilCode,acknowledgednaturalchildrenaregiventheright tobe legitimatedby the subsequentmarriageof theparents, the lawmust,byvirtueofArticle89,alsoextendunqualifiedly tonatural childrenby legal fiction.ThisnotonlyharmonizesArticle89withtheCivilCodearticlesontherightsofacknowledgednaturalchildrenandthearticleson legitimation but also leads to a resultwhich enhancesthewelfareandinterestofthechild.AsJusticeVituginhis1993Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudencewrites:

The provisions of Art. 269 and 271 of the Civil Code, in a literalsenseappeartolimitlegitimationinfavorofacknowledgednaturalchildrenor thosewhoby lawhavebeendeclarednatural childrenby final judgment.Considering,however, thatnaturalchildrenbylegal fiction (such as those born of void marriages because theparents suffer from an impediment tomarry) are expressly giventhe same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged naturalchildren (Art. 89 Civil Code), and because all doubts should beresolved in favor of the child, it is submitted that the rules onlegitimationshouldlikewiseextendtosuchchildren.

22

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21Id.,at485486.22 JOSE C. VITUG, COMPENDIUM OF CIVIL LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE,86(1993).

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Indeed, ithardlymakessense that the childrenofprivaterespondentshouldbedeprivedoftheirfullhereditaryrightsaslegitimatedchildrenwhenthefactsandcircumstancesofthe caseat bench clearly show thedecedent’s intention toremove, once and for all, all manner of legal and moralobstacles tohis secondandapparentlyblissfulunionwiththeprivaterespondent.ForimmediatelyafterthedeathofhisfirstwifeinGuatemalain1967,thedecedentwastednotime inobtainingaPhilippinemarriage inTagaytaywithhissecondwife.Withafairlyconsiderableestate,itwasnotentirelyremotethatthedecedenthadinmindnotonlytheintention to legitimatize his union with the privaterespondentbutalsotheintentiontoaccordlegitimatestatusto his children with his second wife. Given the nature oftheir relationship and the clear intendment of the CivilCode under Article 89 to place natural children by legalfiction on equal standing with acknowledged naturalchildren, a patent injustice and inequity will result if weuphold herein petitioner’s implacable position. Given theclear intendment of the legislature in enacting the newprovision (Article 89) over thirty yearsagowhenmany ofthe members of this Court were still law students, the

majority’sholdinginthecaseatbenchamountstoabelatedjudicialvetoofavalidpieceoflegislation.

IvotetoDENYtheinstantpetition.

DISSENTING OPINION

PANGANIBAN,J.:

With all due respect, I dissent from the wellwrittenponenciaofMme.JusticeFleridaRuthP.Romero.

Thepertinentportions ofArts. 89, 269, 270and271oftheNewCivilCodewhicharethecodalprovisionsinpoint,readasfollows:

Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are voidfrom the beginning shall have the same status, rights andobligations as acknowledged natural children, and are callednaturalchildrenbylegalfiction.

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Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequentmarriageoftheparents.

Art.271.Onlynaturalchildrenwhohavebeenrecognizedbytheparentsbeforeorafterthecelebrationofthemarriage,orhavebeendeclared natural children by final judgment, may be consideredlegitimatedbysubsequentmarriage.xxx

Art. 89hasbeen repealedby theFamilyCode (ExecutiveOrder No. 209) which took effect on August 3, 1988(Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684 [1989];Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ92706, March 29,1995).ItwasoneoftheprovisionsunderTitleIII,BookIoftheNewCivilCodewhichhavebeenomittedfromthetextofthepresentFamilyCode.But itwasthe lawinforceatthetimethelegitimationinthecaseatbenchtookplaceandshould,consequently,governthepresentcontroversy.

Art. 89 was a new provision in the sense that, unlikeArticles 269 to 271, aforequoted,which all came from theSpanishCivilCodeof1889,Art.89wasoneofthereformsinstituted by the Code Commission that drafted the NewCivilCode.TheCodeCommissionjustifiedthisnewarticleinthiswise:

“Thisproposedreformisbasedonthefactthatsuchchildrenhavebeen brought into the world through no fault of their own, butthrough that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them ismostunjust.Moreover,thoughthemarriagewasvoid,orvoidable,at least there was a semblance of legality of the relationshipbetween the parents. This circumstance should cast themantle of

protectionoverthechildren,whoby legal fictionshouldbetreatedasacknowledgednaturalchildren.”(ReportoftheCodeCommission,atp.81.)

In conferring upon natural children by legal fiction thesamestatus,rightsandobligationsofacknowledgednaturalchildren,theclearintentionofthelawwastoputthematparwiththelatteralthough in fact they are not.Theyarenot in fact natural because they were conceived in thepresence, not absence, of an impediment between theparents.Theyarenaturalonlyby

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figment of law. Thus, the name natural children by legalfiction.

Butthis legal fictionpreciselyoperatestoexemptthemfrom the requirement under Art. 269 that there be noimpediment between the parents at the time of theconceptionaswellasfromtherequirementofrecognitionbybothparentsunderArt.271.Plainly,thisistheconclusionthat can rationally be given to the express, unequivocaldeclarationinArt.89thatnaturalchildrenbylegalfiction“shall have the same status, rights and obligations asacknowledged natural children”—neither imposing anycondition nor subjecting the grant of status to anyqualification or exception of any kind. Had the intentionbeen to deprive them of the right of legitimation, the lawwouldhave said so.Or itwouldhave inserteda conditionthat they could be legitimated only if they can showcompliancewithArts.269and271oftheCode.Thefactthattheseinsertionswerenotmadecanonlymeanthatthelawintended to exempt this special class of natural childrenfromthestrictrequirementsnormallyimposedonordinarynaturalchildren.

UndertheprovisionsoftheNewCivilCode,legitimationtakesplacewhenthreerequisitesaremet:(a)thatthechildbeanaturalchild;(b)thatheberecognizedbybothparentseitherbeforeorafteravalidmarriage;and(c)thattherebeasubsequentvalidmarriageoftheparents(cf.Paras,CivilCode of the Philippines Annotated,1984Ed.,Vol.I,p.651).A natural child by legal fiction possesses the first tworequisitesfrominceptionbyvirtueofArt.89,whichplaceshimonthesameplaneasanacknowledgednaturalchild.Inthat sense, he has an advantage over a natural child asdefined by Art. 269, for the latter would still need to berecognizedbybothparentsinordertohavethestatusandrights of an acknowledged natural child. Thus, for thepurpose of legitimation, the natural child by legal fictionneedstofulfillonlythethirdrequisite:avalidsubsequentmarriage between his parents (cf. Paras, op. Cit., p. 651;Tolentino,Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Reprinting,Vol. I, p. 570). Where the impediment is permanent orperpetual,suchasincestorthefactthatoneorbothofthepartieshavebeenfoundguiltyofkillingthespouseofoneof

them, no legitimation can ever take place as no validmarriagecaneverbemadebetweentheparents(Tolentino,op cit.,p.570).Butthebigamouscharacterofa

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marriageisterminableby,amongothercauses,thedeathofthefirstspouse,makingasubsequentmarriagevalid.Andthatsimplywaswhathappenedinthecaseatbench.

PriortotherepealofArt.89bytheFamilyCode,itwassuggested by some civil law scholars that a distinctionshould bemade between natural children by legal fictionwhowereconceivedduringtheexistenceofanimpediment,on the one hand, and thosewhowere conceived after thedisappearance of such impediment, on the other. Theirtheory was that only the latter would qualify forlegitimation. Such a stance would have been juridicallysoundwereitnotforthefactthatArt.89doesnotclassifynatural children by legal fiction into the two suggestedcategoriesbasedonthepresenceorabsenceofimpedimentatthetimeofconceptionofthechild.Ubi lex non distinguitnec nos distinguere debemus; where the law does notdistinguish, we should not (Gesolgon vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA553, 556 [1961];Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17, 33 [1972];Guevarra vs. Inocentes,16SCRA379,385[1966];Robles vs.Chromite Mining Co.,104Phil.688,690[1958]).Besides,asalreadypointedout,theconfermentonnaturalchildrenbylegal fiction of the same status, rights and obligations asthoseofacknowledgednaturalchildrenunderArt.89,NewCivil Code, evidently exempted the former from therequirements imposed upon ordinary natural children byArts.269and271ofsaidCode.And,finally,Art.220ofsaidCode fortifies this conclusion, because said provisiondeclares that in caseofdoubt, every intendmentof laworfact leans toward, among other things, “the legitimacy ofchildren.” The doubt—if there be such at all—shouldtherefore be resolved in favor of sustaining the right tolegitimation of the eleven (11) offsprings of the decedentwithprivate respondentConchitaTalag, regardless of thepresenceorabsenceofanimpedimenttomarryonthepartoftheirparentsatthetimeoftheconceptionofeachofthem.

Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create socialand successional prejudice against children who had nofault in nor control over the marital impediments whichbedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not theperpetrators,ofthesevagariesoflife.Whythenshouldtheysuffer their consequences? In the final analysis, there arereally no illegitimate children; there are only illegitimateparents.Andthisdissentfindsits

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philosophy in this: that children, unarguably born andreared innocent in this world, should benefit by everyintendmentofthelaw,particularlywhere—asinthiscase—their parents, who originally suffered from a maritalimpediment,wouldnowwanttoovercometheimprovidentsocial and successional consequences of such condition.Therefore, it is most unfair that these innocent childrenshould be condemned to continue suffering theconsequences of the impediment theydidnot cause,whentheveryimpedimentitselfhasdisappeared.

The mere fact that such legitimation would impactadversely upon the petitioner’s successional rights as thelone legitimate child of the firstmarriage is no reason todenythechildrenofthesecondmarriageoftheirownlegalright to be deemed legitimated. Precisely, legitimationproduces such an effect—i.e., diminution of successionalrightsofthelegitimatechildren.Art.272oftheNewCivilCodeprovidesinfactthat“(c)hildrenwhoarelegitimatedbysubsequent marriage shall enjoy the same rights aslegitimatechildren.”Whenthelegislaturedecidedtograntto children of voidmarriages the same status, rights, andobligationsasthoseofacknowledgednaturalchildren,itispresumed to have carefully weighed precisely theseconsequences upon the rights of the other children in thefamily.Thepolicy thenwas to castamantle ofprotectionupon children of void marriages. That policy is evidentlyenforced by enabling them to get legitimated in the samemannerasacknowledgednaturalchildren—namely,bythesubsequent validmarriage of their parents. If theFamilyCode,byrepealingArt.89of theNewCivilCode, is tobeviewed as having reversed or denigrated that policy(although,byandlarge,itappearstohavemaintainedthepolicyinmanyotherareasoffamilylaw),suchreversalordenigration should not, and cannot, in any case impairrightsalreadyacquiredbyand thusvested in theprivaterespondents.

One last point. Both petitioner and private respondentadmit that the eleven (11) children of the decedent withprivate respondent Conchita Talag were born after thecelebrationofthebigamousmarriageonJuly25,1951.(SeePetition,item6,page5;Rollo,p.6.)Ifanyoneofthemwasbornpriorthereto,suchchild,notbeinganaturalchildbylegal fictionbut spurious, cannot claim the special benefitgrantedunderArt.89oftheNew

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Hagad vs. GozoDadole

CivilCode.Unlikehisbrothersandsisterswhoarenaturalchildrenbylegalfiction,hecanonlyinheritbyshowingthathe has been recognized by the decedent as the latter’sillegitimatechildeithervoluntarilyorbyfinaljudgmentinaproperpaternitysuit(Paterno vs. Paterno,20SCRA585;Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104;Clemena vs. Clemena, 24SCRA 720; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307;Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987

Reprinting,Vol.I,pp.616617.)Petition granted. Assailed orders nullified and set aside.

Petitioner declared sole legitimate child of decedent.

Note.—An unrecognized spurious child has no rightsfromhisparentsortotheestate.(Ilano vs. Court of Appeals,230SCRA242[1994])

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