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exclusive interview‘we need multi-role force capabilities wherein conventional and subconventional capabilities can be balanced to respond across the spectrum of conflict’

General Bipin Rawat took over as the new Chief of the Army Staff on January 1, 2017. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces, he gave his candid views on a wide range of subjects and the major challenges confronting the Indian Army and how these are being tackled institutionally. Excerpts from the interview.

Page 6a Brief History of indian army — post-independenceThe Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of the policy of appeasement of the Chinese and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

lt General v.K. Kapoor (retd)

Page 8curbing militancy and terrorism in Jammu and KashmirMilitancy is generally associated with politico-socio-economic problems but in the case of J&K, the Pakistan factor (now fully backed by China) outweighs all other factors.

lt General p.c. Katoch (retd)

Page 9civil-military relations — widening GapThe military-people relationship in most liberal democracies reflects a commitment in the former and pride, faith and trust in the latter, for each other.

Brigadier s.K. chatterji (retd)

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It is high time that a Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)/Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is established as first among equals to provide single point military advice to the political leadership and to prioritise the entire capability build-up plan for the three Services apart from other duties in his charter

In ThIs Issue

Volume 13 No. 6December 2016-January 2017

priority areas for army modernisation —the current scenario

Lt GEnEraL V.K. Kapoor (rEtd)

indian army as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century is likely to face four types of challenges/threats including traditional threats from China and Pakistan, con-temporary threats in the form of terrorism (including home grown, state sponsored and international terrorism), internal

challenges including home-grown insurgencies and contingency threats which may demand military action in the wider neigh-bourhood. in essence india faces a far greater threat than any other country in the world because of a highly volatile strategic neighbourhood. However in view of nuclearisation of the region, in the interim, we are most likely to be called upon to fight low intensity conflict operations that include insurgency/counter-insurgency operations, terrorism, proxy wars and limited border wars. Full scale conventional conflicts seem unlikely at present.

yet it is evident that india, given its size and geographical loca-tion and the type of challenges and threats that it faces, its armed forces have to be organised, equipped, trained and prepared to fight any type of a conflict covering the entire spectrum of war ranging from low-intensity conflicts to full-scale conventional wars under the nuclear shadow. moreover with india’s vibrant economic growth, it would naturally have to assume additional responsibility as a stabilising force in the region. it is encourag-ing to note that india’s security concerns have, for the first time, converged with international security concerns which makes global community understand the need for india to develop and modernise its military capabilities.

Chairman COSC/CDS for Prioritising Defence Expenditure defence of a nation and development are complementary. if india wishes to secure itself against the dangers looming on the horizon

T-72 tanks have now started getting modified with thermal imaging night sights integrated with the new fire control systems

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and wishes global recognition as a strong and responsible nation who is capable of looking after its own national interests, it has to modernise its military to be prepared to fight future wars on digital battlefields and confront future challenges whose contours presently are vague and uncertain. therefore the defence budgets must be reflective of the transformation and modernisation required by the services. However, not withstanding this aspect, considering the inadequacy of defence budgets currently, the army has to prioritise its modernisation to achieve time bound capabilities as per perceived threats and challenges. this prioritisation must also take into account capabilities being acquired by the other two services namely the indian air force and the indian navy. in view of these considerations it is high time that a per-manent Chairman Chiefs of staff Committee (COsC)/Chief of defence staff (Cds) is estab-lished as first among equals, to provide single point military advice to the political leader-ship and to prioritise the entire capability build-up plan for the three services by ruth-lessly cutting down on duplicate and over-lapping capabilities and weaponry including superfluous manpower, both civilian and military, and to ensure judicious and timely expenditure of allocated funds.

india is already a regional/global eco-nomic power, and has aspirations of sitting on the high table in the Un security Council. this itself mandates that its military power must reflect its ability to protect its national interests both within and outside the coun-try. in this context, the transformation of the indian military for the future, through tech-nological improvements and modernisation coupled with new doctrines and innovative operational art should aim to give india a dis-

tinct advantage over its potential adversar-ies, which is vital for preserving india’s sov-ereignty and furthering its national interests.

Doctrinal Integrationin the absence of a permanent COsC or a Cds, the publication of a Joint air Land Battle doc-trine in the June 2010, by Headquarters of integrated defence staff at best represents a minimal consensus between the two services in integrating air power with land power. it is believed that another document of joint air-naval operations also exists, however what is missing is a pragmatic joint approach to war-fighting by the three services, a vital neces-sity for the future. a joint doctrine dating back to 2006 exists; but the tranquillity that followed and lack of adequate debate and the fact that additional/supplementary doctrines have been necessitated reflects on the lack of credibility of the 2006 publication. the scope for doctrinal integration in undeniable and would be among the high priority tasks of the Chairman COsC/Cds as when he is nomi-nated. From the joint war-fighting doctrine of the three services must flow the short- and long-term perspective plans to ensure that priority is given to building up those capabili-ties that are required early based on the exist-ing and estimated threats and challenges.

there is a need for understanding the requirement of a Joint military doctrine. in this respect we can study the experience gained by the Us armed forces who have ostensibly achieved a high degree of jointness in planning and executing such operations.

Joint Military Doctrine of US Armed Forces: Definition and Purpose Us military describe the purpose of joint doctrine as:

Joint doctrine serves as a common per-spective.

it is an authoritative guidance for Us forces.

it provides focus for systems application and technology.

it fundamentally shapes the way Us armed forces plan, think and train for military operations.

the new (joint) operational concepts provide the foundation for evolution.

it is a critical ingredient for success because the organisational synergies to be gained from joint endeavours would be as important as the technology used for future operations. the definition of joint doctrine as given

out by the Us dOd (department of defense)

dictionary for military and associated terms is “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more ser-vices in coordinated action towards a com-mon objective. it will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff (in Us context), in coordination with the Combat-ant Commands, services, and Joint staff.” in a larger sense, it is a reservoir or a pool of distilled wisdom gained from history of war-fighting, lessons learnt and the factors con-sidered which went into losing or winning of a war. it assists the military commanders in “how best to employ the national power.”

Indian Contextlt also help us in designing our future capa-bilities and our long-term perspective and procurement plans thus ensuring that capabilities required are built-up in a timely manner and also avoiding wasteful expen-diture in duplication and overlap in our weapons procurement. Our past experience has been that each of our service plans on its own and then asks the other service for assistance but without consulting the other service during the planning stage. the com-mon perspective is missing. this type of planning is dangerous for future conflicts because it would mean delayed decision making and delayed execution.

One example of single service planning is the Cold start doctrine of the army which envisages early launch of limited offensives which are within the capability of the pivot/holding corps of the army. However, would the air force be in a position to ensure air superiority in the sector of early launch? the air force on the other hand sees a strategic

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The year 2016 has been an event-ful year for the Army, especially on the line of control (LoC) on the India-Pakistan border and both the government and the army must have learnt many lessons from these events/incidents, we hope. The border incidents have propelled the government and the army to adopt new tactics and techniques to confront the terror-ists who are launched from across the LoC from time to time and neutralise them.

Since 1989 Pakistan has waged an unrelenting asymmetric war on India which we call “Proxy War”. This is in keeping with their strategy of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts” adopted since the past three decades or so. Currently their targets are mostly security forces personnel (Indian Army, J&K Police and Central Armed Police Forces deployed in J&K). By so doing their intention is to keep the Indian Army engaged on the borders to wear them down physically and mentally, and if possible demoralise them, which is an important overall aim both for Pakistan and for China and hence the latter is supporting Pakistan in

many ways. Pakistan considers these jihadi tanzims as their strate-gic assets to be used suitably both in peace and in war. This suits China too who are opening up a China-Pakistan Economic Corri-dor (CPEC) to Gwadar Port via the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) for which large amounts of funds are being invested by China to the tune of $46 billion.

The Indian Army deployed along the LoC has a well co-ordinated counter terror grid to neutralise the infiltrated terrorists while other security forces have been managing the insurgency in the hinterland within Kashmir which had by 2014-15 waned to an insignificant level and perhaps that was the reason to create the civil unrest in the Kashmir Valley in order to ensure a favourable sit-uation once again for the renewed infiltration of terrorists across the LoC along with a spurt in the insur-gency within Kashmir. The surge in terrorist actions in 2016 is attrib-uted to this phenomenon among other reasons.

Five major attacks have been launched by the terror groups in Pakistan since January 2016 in-cluding Pathankot Air Force base on January 2, 2016, Pampore at-tack on June 25, 2016, Poonch attack on September 11, 2016, Uri attack on September 18, 2016, and Nagrota attack on No-vember 29, 2016. Following the Uri attack in which the army had suffered considerable casualties, surgical strikes were launched 10 days later by the Indian Army on the night of September 28/29

by India’s Special Forces (SF) on the terrorists who had concen-trated in their advance positions close to the LoC for infiltration. This operation resulted in causing the elimination of about 40 ter-rorists in PoK. Relentless opera-tions by the Army along the line of control and in the hinterland in concert with other security forces have thwarted the designs of the Pak Army-terror group’s nexus to give a fillip to the proxy war being waged against India.

A surgical strike was also car-ried out earlier in the year across the international border in Myan-mar against the insurgents com-prising NSCN (K) cadres and oth-er militant groups who are based there. This was consequent to the June 4, 2016, ambush on an Army convoy in Chandel district of Manipur which killed 18 soldiers of the army in the deadliest attack in two decades.

Apart from asserting the strength of the Indian state, the surgical strikes and the “hot pur-suit” operations have also sent a crucial message to Pakistan and China, as the latter has, accord-ing to Indian intelligence sources, been supporting varied militant ultras in the North East. It also in-dicates a shift to a more aggres-sive stance by India against insur-gency, terrorism and proxy wars waged against the Indian state.

During the year 2016 Indian Army has held a large number of joint military exercises with friendly foreign countries includ-ing France, United States, Russia, China, Indonesia, Thailand and

Nepal. The aim of all the exer-cises was to practise countering international terrorism and coun-ter-insurgency operations and other operational activities under the United Nations mandate. The conduct of joint military exercises is also an important step to uphold the values of peace, prosperity and stability in the region.

General Bipin Rawat has been appointed as the new COAS on December 31 (AN) and has taken over his duties since then. An outstanding General with a remarkable track record he brings new dynamism to the office of COAS. With his appointment the issue of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff / Permanent Chair-man to the Chiefs of Staff Com-mittee has once again erupted and it seems that the government is seriously contemplating the creation and establishment of a fourth four-star general who will be the first among equals. The nature of future wars mandates a superior level of jointness which is currently lacking along with many other advantages that will accrue as a result of obtaining a single point military advice from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff has already been established and they will act as the staff for the CDS/Permanent Chairman COSC.

The new Defence Procure-ment Procedure (DPP) 2016 was promulgated for capital procure-ments and came into effect from April 1, 2016. DPP 2016 has a focus on achieving the ‘Make in

India’ vision by according prior-ity to ‘Buy Indian IDDM’ (Indian Designed, Developed and Manu-factured) and ‘Buy (Indian)’ cat-egories. It also focuses on en-hancement and rationalisation of indigenous content.

The Ministry of Defence has also issued guidelines for pen-alties in business dealings with entities which have come into effect from November 21. The guidelines are available at http://mod.nic.in/writereaddata/gui-deentities.pdf.

To expedite capacity building as well as offensive capabilities of the armed forces, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the apex body of the Ministry of De-fence in matters of acquisitions, have cleared different critical and high-end defence procurement proposals to the tune of more than `1,00,000 crore. As regards the modernisation and equipment requirements of the army, this is-sue of SP’s Land Forces contains an article on “Priority Areas for Army Modernisation”. The other articles included are “Civil-Military Relations—A Viewpoint”; “Curb-ing Militancy and Terrorism in J&K”; A Brief History of the Indian Army—Post-Independence”.

We wish all our readers a Very Happy New Year!

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Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)

india is already a regional/global economic power, and has aspirations of sitting on the high table in the un security council. this itself mandates that its military power must reflect its ability to protect its national interests both within and outside the country.

Continued on page 4...

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36/2016 sp’s land forces

RELENTLESS JOURNEY OF EXCELLENCE SINCE 1964

intErViEw

sp’s land forces (sp’s): Having taken over the reins of our illustrious indian army at the start of the new year 2017 and with a fairly reasonable tenure of three years you are in a position to make substantial changes within the force and in maintain-ing a cordial civil-military relationship. what will be your key result areas that you may have chalked out for yourself?chief of the army staff (coas): the vision statement and thrust areas have been enun-ciated by my predecessor. i find these are all encompassing, well defined and we need to continue with our efforts in realising these. an abrupt change would only cause confu-sion amongst the rank and file of the army. these are reiterated as under: Vision. Ensure capability enhance-

ment and operational effectiveness of the army to meet all contemporary and emerging challenges.

Key Result Areas – Ensure the highest standard of opera-

tional preparedness to meet present and emerging challenges.

– Ensure force modernisation incorpo-rating relevant contemporary tech-nologies.

– make up critical deficiency of weap-ons and equipment at the earliest.

– develop requisite capacities and infra-structure with special emphasis on our northern and north-eastern borders.

– Enhance inter-services jointmanship at all levels in letter and spirit.

– Ensure the highest level of security consciousness amongst our rank and file.

– Optimally enhance human resource development to fully exploit the inher-ent strength of the indian army.

– improve the quality of life and living conditions of all ranks with special emphasis on the soldier.

– Foster an organisational climate based on mutual respect and camara-derie amongst all ranks.

– Ensure requisite welfare measures for ex-servicemen and Veer naris.

sp’s: the external threats and challenges to india’s sovereignty are evolving at a rapid rate and the nature of wars has changed. as you have seen these develop-ments taking place in your service in the

army, what do you think should be done to arrest the decline and to restore the army’s modernisation status? in your view which are the priority areas for modernisation?coas: army is doing its best to expedite the procurement and maximise opera-tional readiness. We have set achievable targets and we are making steady prog-ress. in-house measures have been initiated to reduce procurement timelines. these include strengthening of the procurement organisations, ensuring concurrent pro-curement activities, faster decision making and establishment of a robust monitoring mechanism. With concerted focus and spe-cial impetus on indigenisation, as reflected in the defence Procurement Procedure (dPP) 2016, the situation will improve in the coming years. Government has imple-mented several policy initiates such as

liberalisation of Fdi policy and industrial licensing policy, simplification of export procedures, creating level playing field for indian private and public enterprises, streamlining of offset implementation process and providing preference to ‘Buy (indian)’, ‘Buy and make (indian)’ catego-ries of capital acquistion over ‘Buy (Global)’ category in dPP to make the country self-reliant in defence production.

the indian army has identified 24 prior-ity proposals which are critically required; the procurement for the same is being pur-sued on fast-track basis with support from the government. Broadly, these schemes address modernisation of our mechanised fleet, night enablement, replacement of avi-ation assets and empowerment of the sol-dier by improving battlefield transparency and facilitating decision making process.

i am quite satisfied with the progress. With much coordinated effort, we have been able to ink the contract for procurement of 145 ULHs (ultra light howitzers). We have also initiated a large number of cases which are at trial or Gs evaluation stage. Overall, i think we are moving well. minor glitches will always be there and those have to be overcome.

sp’s: considering the current threats and challenges confronting india and the nature of wars in our context in the future what major changes do you foresee in the force structuring and re-organisation of the armed forces?coas: Force structuring is a dynamic pro-cess and future security scenarios need to be benchmarked against appreciated timelines and security implications. these need to be evaluated from the perspective of national interests and its concomitant requirements on military as an instrument of national power.

in the present day, our principal regional and extra regional threats are from across the land frontiers. the threats need to be deterred by maintaining requisite ‘strike for-mations’. the active borders characterised by harsh and inhospitable terrain mandate a 24 x 7 x 365 vigil with ‘boots on ground’. these threats need to be deterred by maintaining combat ready ‘strike formations’ thus trans-lating into force structure imperatives.

We need multi-role force capabilities wherein conventional and subconventional capabilities can be balanced to respond across the spectrum of conflict, with mini-mum restructuring and at optimum costs. We need to make a transition from the present ‘threat-cum-capability based force structuring’, which has its underlining theme as ‘war prevention through deter-rence’, towards a ‘capability based modular and responsive structure’ based on envis-aged future force application scenarios. right-sizing commensurate to ongoing modernisation is also a key imperative that impacts current and future force structures.

With emerging technologies, we must ensure that our weapon systems and equip-ment incorporates technology upgrades and are capable of operating in a digitised networked environment. SP

For the complete interview, please refer to: SP’s Military Yearbook 2016-2017

After taking over as the Chief of the Army Staff, In his first press conference on January 13, 2017, General Bipin Rawat answered a few questions posed by SP’s Land Forces: China vs Pakistan‘China a bigger threat.’ Reactive/Proactive ‘We need to be proactive and be offensive rather than only being reactive with any hostile activities of adversaries.’ Future Soldier Programme‘We need to empower our soldiers with necessary gadgets, NVGs, network- centric capabilities.’ Induction of Latest Technology‘We are buying some hundreds of UAVs. Will buy almost a 100 more UAVs.’

General Bipin Rawat took over as the new Chief of the Army Staff on January 1, 2017. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces, he gave his candid views on a wide range of subjects and the major challenges confronting the Indian Army and how these are being tackled institutionally. Excerpts from the interview...

EXCLUSIVE

‘we need multi-role force capabilities wherein conventional and subconventional capabilities can be balanced to respond across the spectrum of conflict’

PhOTOgrAPh: PIB

PhOTOgrAPh: PIB

General Bipin Rawat reviewing the Army Day parade in New Delhi on January 15, 2017

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role for itself by wanting to achieve air domi-nance in the entire region through attrition of opponents, assets first which would take considerable time thus relegating the sup-port to the land forces to a lower priority in the beginning. On the other hand, the army feels that if it does not achieve its laid down objectives across the border at the earliest it would imperil the entire mission. these issues can be resolved amicably when there is a supervisory authority on top, directing the doctrine towards a common perspective for achieving national aims and objectives and not parallel wars for achieving individual service perspective which would amount to suboptimal use of military/national power. moreover, wars are national efforts in which many agencies/establishments would assist in the war effort. it would start with the political leadership spelling out the political aims of war and thus political aims would require to be converted to military aims and objectives of war. this would entail coor-dination of diplomacy, intelligence opera-tions, psychological operations, information operations and deception operations with the military effort. so our doctrine must be holistic and not constrained by a single ser-vice perspective.

Priority Areas for Modernisation & Transformation in the Armysome priority areas for modernisation, for reform and for induction of new technolo-gies are:Doctrinal Changes. in the method of

war-fighting necessitating a new Joint War Fighting doctrine tailored to the indian conditions.

Long Range Precision Firepower.– 155mm howitzers, comprising the

towed, mounted and self-propelled variety are required to replace the medium guns held at present in the field formations (divisions) which are more than three to four decades old. induction of 155mm howitzers is at various stages of indigenous develop-ment and procurement.

– Government has placed an indent on Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) for procurement of Qty. 114 155mm dhanush artillery guns.

– 155mm, m777, ultra light howitzers (145) for the mountains is being pro-cured from the Us in a direct govern-ment-to-government deal. the deal has been finalised by both the gov-ernments and the first two guns are expected to arrive in the early part of 2017 so that the army can generate its own range tables based on india ammunition that it is going to fire ultimately. the deal has an impor-tant ‘make in india’ component with mahindra expected to bag a share of the contract. Under the terms of the letter of offer and acceptance (LOa) signed with the Us Government for supply of 145 ULH, 25 guns will be inducted in fully formed condition and the balance 120 guns will be assembled in india.

Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS). this was initiated to make the infantryman a weapon platform with situational awareness, increased lethal-ity and sustainability in the digitised battlefield. F-insas was to be effected in three phases: Phase i included weap-ons, body armour, clothing and indi-vidual equipment; Phase ii comprised the target acquisition system and Phase iii comprised the computer subsystem, radio subsystem, software and software integration. none has been achieved so far. in fact the project has not even started and the infantry modernisation is in a pathetic state and even the first phase has not been completed.

Special Forces (SF).– they conduct special operations as

they are trained and imparted spe-cial skills to conduct such operations. such operations are usually small scale, covert or overt operations of the unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve signifi-cant political or military objectives in support of national policy.

– in the future they would be the most appropriate instrument for wield-ing force selectively and discriminately to achieve operational and strategic (political) aims of a conflict with least amount of collateral damage.

– Organisation of a special Operations Command would increase india’s strategic flexibility and options for dealing with future settings.

– specialised weaponry for the sF must be procured on priority.

Replacement of current fleet of light observation and utility helicopters.– a `6,800-crore project to manufac-

ture 200 Kamov Ka-226t helicop-ters has not picked up momentum and the project is yet to kick off while the pilots and passengers of the old Cheetah and Chetak are meeting with accidents frequently due to the obso-lescence of these machines. this is well known to the government which needs to be more dynamic in this sphere of modernisation.

– the army is also looking at inducting attack/armed helicopters. However, a major shortcoming with the rudra, the current armed helicopter and the under development light combat helicopter (LCH), is that in their cur-rent configuration they do not have a suitable anti-tank guided missile (atGm), the main weapon system of an attack/armed helicopter. the air version of the indigenously developed nag atGm, the Helina being devel-oped by the defence research and development Organisation (drdO) is not likely to be ready in the near future leaving a critical void in the opera-tional capability of these two helicop-ters. as an interim measure the mod had cleared the fitment of three initial rudra units with an atGm ex import. accordingly trials were conducted and completed about three years back but nothing seems to have come of it — in contention were the Pars 3 of mBda France and spike of israel. this issue needs to be addressed on priority.

Upgrading of T-72 tanks. these tanks presently constitute the mainstay of indian armour. they need to have new upraded engines, better protection, inte-grated fire control systems with night-fighting capabilities.

Future Infantry Combat Vehicles. a project to build 2,600 future infantry combat vehicles (FiCV) costing approxi-mately ̀ 60,000 crore has been approved by the government. the 22/24-tonne FiCV will be indigenously designed and manufactured. among others, Larsen & toubro (L&t), the mahindras and the tatas have shown interest.

Air defence guns and missiles. the guns and missiles currently held by the army are obsolescent. Kvadrat (medium-range) and Osa-aK (short-range) ground-to-air missiles are at the end of their life-cycle. they were to be replaced by akash and trishul surface-to-air (sam) missiles. trishul has been foreclosed and akash is being inducted for static and semi-mobile roles. For air defence of mechanised units, it has been planned to acquire medium-range sam (mrsam) and quick reaction sam (Qrsam) systems. However, none of the projects has started.

Night-fighting Capabilities.– these are totally lacking on the

infantry weapons held currently. all future procurements and those envis-aged through ‘make in india’ projects must look into the night-fighting capability of infantry soldiers and sF personnel who will otherwise be severely handicapped for operations by night. the current status is opera-tionally unacceptable.

– t-72 tanks, the mainstay of the armour in the army have now started getting modified with thermal imag-ing night sights integrated with the new fire control systems procured from Elbit of israel. the process needs to be hastened. t-90 are already fitted with integrated fire control systems with thermal sights. arjun mk ii must be kitted similarly.

CIDSS. or Command information and decision support system (Cidss) is in effect the hub of tactical C3i systems (tactical command, control, comput-ers and intelligence system) and is the most important component located at the Headquarters. this system will com-prise all sensor and shooter systems at each level of hierarchy which will be connected to it. the major subsystems which will get connected as and when they are completed are:– Artillery Combat Command and

Control System (ACCCS). for auto-mation of all artillery tasks in the field which includes preparation and exe-cution of fire plans, direction, control and correction of fire, and functions at the artillery command post and at the gun end. this system has been fielded and has been introduced in a large number of formations already.

– Tactical Communication System (TCS). is a vital communication link which will connect the corps head-quarters forward to the battalion headquarters and will have the abil-ity to reach down to subunits also. thus the tactical C3i system will ride on the tactical communication sys-tem. tCs is a ‘make in india’ project that has been given to a consortium of L&t and tata Power who have sub-mitted the draft project report which is currently being considered. in the interim the tCs will rely on satel-lite communications, and upgraded arEn communications which rely on radio relay equipment and other modes of communications which will allow for static and mobile operations.

– Battle Management System (BMS). the important link forward of the tCs will be the Bms which is being designed to operate at the unit level and below and will synthesise the battle picture for the unit commander whether it be an infantry unit or an armoured regiment. tanks and selected infantrymen will become situational awareness platforms. this project has been allocated to two con-sortiums. L&t and tata Power is one of them and rolta and the Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is the sec-ond one. Bms is in a more advanced stage of development and the gov-ernment is funding the production of the prototype to the extent of 80 per cent. this project is being pushed at a faster rate as this constitutes the cutting-edge of the army’s Cidss pro-gramme. F-insas, which is a part of this project, is being progressed by the infantry directorate but will be a part of the overall Bms.

– BSS. Battlefield surveillance system will integrate all surveillance resources of the army, including, radars, UaVs, electro-optical systems, photographic and visual systems to provide a coher-ent picture to the commander. this project is in the test bed stage currently.

– AD C&R. air defence Control and reporting system will automate the detection, identification, designation and destruction tasks of the army air defence artillery. this project is called akash tir and is currently underway as a ‘make in india’ project by BEL. the project is in the test bed stage of development.

the work on the army’s Cidss and many of its projects had started few decades ago. However, a fresh impetus needs to be injected into the above projects. We could seek the experience of the Us forces in iraq and afghanistan and the combined effects of digitisation of the battlefield with the stand-off, multi-spectral sensors that give situational awareness about enemy and own troops. this will lend greater clarity to our capability and equipment development in this field.

Conclusionthe overall progress of modernisation in the army is extremely slow despite some dynamism shown by the present defence minister. Considering the challenges and threats posed to india presently and more so in the future, the necessity of hasten-ing the process of modernisation through increased budgets and dynamic policies is vital. moreover the need for establishing a seamless digitised communication network within the army which is capable of picking up information from the sensors deployed in the battlespace and passing it on a need-to-know basis to all concerned commanders in the field, is critical to successful conduct of network-centric operations in the future. SP

Ka-226T light multi-role helicopter

priority areas for army modernisation...continued from page 2PhOTOgrAPh: russian helicopters

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miLitary history

Lt GEnEraL V.K. Kapoor (rEtd)

strEnGtH OF tHE indian army in august 1947 was 4,00,000 but the political leadership was keen to reduce the strength to save defence expenditure and

hence it was decided to bring down the strength of the army to 2,00,000 after the J&K Operations which would involve the disbandment of many units. a new ter-ritorial army act was passed in 1948 and infantry and artillery units with a nucleus of regular officers were raised in 1949. many other changes occurred during the period from 1948 to 1960. the designa-tion of Commander-in-Chief ceased to be in use from 1955 and the three Chiefs (army, navy and air Force) were made equal and independently responsible for their respec-tive service. Every function of the defence services was duplicated in the ministry of defence where civilian bureaucrats not only ensured financial and administrative control but also gradually took over the decision making powers of the defence ser-vices. the standing of the military reached an all-time low during the time of V.K. Krishna menon as defence minister when decisions concerning matters of major mili-tary importance were taken without con-sultation of the concerned service.

Nehru’s Bias against the MilitaryPrime minister Jawaharlal nehru’s bias against the military was well known in the services. the clearest example of this is when General K.m. Cariappa outlined his plan for the security of nEFa, after China had occupied tibet, nehru flared up and thumping the table said: “it is not the busi-ness of the C-in-C to tell the Prime minister who is going to attack us where. you mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” nehru contin-ued to appease the Chinese and the untimely death of sardar Vallabhbhai Patel took away all opposition to nehru’s views. the sino-indian War of 1962 and the national humil-iation was the result of this policy and the bias against the military. the military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

From Trauma to Victory (1961 to 1971)the period 1961 to 1971 was one of the most traumatic periods of the indian army. the defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of the nation and the armed forces. the army began to introspect to overcome its weak-nesses. the 1965 war helped the army to redeem itself but revealed embarrassing weaknesses in its equipment and its training and even leadership at various levels. these two wars spurred the political leadership to modernise and expand the services. as 1970 came to a close, the indian army was now ready to face new challenges emerging on the horizon.

the 1971 war with Pakistan resulted in creation of a new nation — Bangladesh and a decisive military victory in which 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. While many books have been written to describe each

battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery during this campaign that deserves men-tion. in the words of sydney schanberg of New York Times, who accompanied indian troops in two sectors! ‘i don’t like sitting around praising armies. i don’t like armies because armies mean wars — and i don’t like wars. But this [the indian] army was something….they were great all the way. there was never a black mark….i lived with the officers and i walked, rode with the jawans — and they were all great.…and they were the most perfect gentlemen- i have never seen them do a wrong thing — not even when they just saw how bestial the ‘enemy had been.”

Steady Modernisation (1971 to 1998)the period after the 1971 indo-Pak war saw the steady modernisation of the indian army with new equipment for modern wars. the Experts Committee under the chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna rao submitted its report in 1976. some of its major recommendations started getting implemented in the 1980s. the expansion of mechanised forces was achieved as a result of this report.

On aprirl 13, 1984, some 34 soldiers of the indian army were landed by 17 sorties of helicopters at a point three kilometres short of Bilafond La, a pass on the soltaro ridge, West of siachen Glacier. the soldiers occupied the pass. this was the opening move in what is referred to as the siachen conflict between india and Pakistan which continues till date. this period also saw the army operation in the Golden temple on night June 5-6, 1984, at amritsar to clear the complex of the militants who had based themselves in the temple. the operation was code-named ‘Blue star’ By the first night of June 7, 1984, the Golden temple complex had been cleared of militants but it left, in its aftermath, a wave of anguish and anger among the sikh community and the nation faced the assassination of the then Prime minister mrs indira Gandhi by her sikh security guards.

Sri Lanka Operationsthe period July 1987 to march 1990 saw the indian army fight tamil militants in sri Lanka with one hand tied behind their back. the indian Peacekeeping Force (iPKF) moved to sri Lanka to carry out peacekeeping duties as generally assigned during Un operations and to separate the warring factions, ie Lib-eration tigers of tamil Eelam (LttE) and sri Lankan armed forces but ended up enforc-ing peace and conducting military opera-tions against LttE. What the indian army achieved is best described in the words of rajan Wijeratrie, at one time the state minis-ter of defence in sri Lankan Government. He is reported to have said, “the iPKF had virtu-ally finished them off. they were gasping for breath in the jungles. it was we who provided that oxygen to them.” this summed up what iPKF had achieved before de-induction.

Maldivesduring the 1980s the indian army also con-ducted the operation in maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the Govern-ment of maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the world the speed and efficiency with which the indian armed forces could react. this period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

Kargil War (May-July 1999)Kargil sector is 168 km along the line of control (LoC) stretching from Kaobal Gali in the west to Chorbat La in the east. the sector was vast and the line of control runs along the watershed along heights 4,000 to 5,000 metres high. the frontage and the nature of terrain ensured large gaps between defended areas. the deployment included one infantry battalion at dras; two infantry battalions and a Border security Force (BsF) battalion covering Kargil while Chorbat La was held by Ladakh scouts. as indications of Pakistani intrusions came in starting from may 3, 1999, it became clear that armed intruders had occupied heights

in the gaps between all defended areas in the sector. it was established that india was facing an attempt by the Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. the com-placency of the local army formations in not conducting even routine surveillance in the winter months stood out. Having been surprised the initial reactions were unsat-isfactory leading to poorly planned patrols and attacks. While these did fix the enemy, success came their way only when the whole act was put together. air and artil-lery (155mm howitzers) were employed with devastating effect to allow the indian soldier, the infantryman to live up to his reputation of fortitude under adversity and courage and determination in the attack.

Operation ParakramOperation Parakram, which means “valour,” was a momentous event which could have unleashed a major war on the subcontinent. it involved a massive build-up indian army ordered in the wake of the december 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Parliament House. this 10-month-long mobilisation from January to October 2002, along the border with Pakistan gen-erated high levels of tension in the relations between the two south asian neighbours, and raised the prospects of a major war. the operation was a major effort in coercive diplomacy by new delhi, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the indian Parliament on december 13, 2001, and while the gov-ernment claims that their strategic objec-tives were met by mere posturing which avoided a war, military analysts are of the view that gains were not commensurate to the mammoth exercise in coercive diplo-macy by india. However it led to some posi-tive changes in india’s military doctrine and it hastened military modernisation together with organisational changes.

Army’s Equipment and Modernisation Schemesthe decade of governance of the United Pro-gressive alliance (UPa i & ii from 2004 to 2014) regimes saw complete apathy and col-lapse of defence modernisation. this era has severely degraded the war-fighting capabili-ties of the indian army. the army’s ‘critical shortages’ and obsolescence of its current equipment include night-fighting aids and capability, 155mm artillery howitzers, light utility helicopters, attack helicopters, air defence assets, various categories of ammu-nition, anti-tank and ad missile systems, close quarter battle (CQB) carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, anti-mate-riel rifles, and other urgently needed weap-ons and equipment by the special Forces.

adding to the existing shortages is the new raising of the mountain strike Corps for our Eastern theatre, which is expected to reduce the army’s reserve stocks called “War Wastage reserves” in terms of equip-ment and munitions further. the present government is trying to ameliorate the dif-ficulties being faced by the army but nearly three decades or more of neglect and the poor performance and neglect of UPa Gov-

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of the policy of appeasement of the Chinese and the bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

a Brief History of indian army — post-independence

PhOTOgrAPh: Indian Army

Indian Army soldiers firing Bofors gun during Kargil War

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ernment of a force of the size of indian army cannot be undone in a short time frame because when voids and obsolescence start increasing year after year the situation gets out of control and directly impacts the combat efficiency of the army.

Terrorism Fomented by Pakistan-based Terror Groupsthe threat of terrorism from Pakistan has not diminished. Pakistan-sponsored terror groups struck five times during the 2015-16. First, attack took place in Gurdaspur district of Punjab on July 27, 2015, wherein seven persons were killed and 19 injured. three terrorists were also killed. the second attack was on January 2, 2016, by a heav-ily armed group attacking Pathankot air Force station. Five attackers and six secu-rity forces personnel were killed during the operations. this was followed by another terrorist attack in Pampore in which a bus carrying over 40 Central reserve Police Force (CrPF) officers, killing eight officers and injuring over 20 others critically. in the ensuing gun battle, two of the militants were killed. the fourth major incident took place in the early hours of september 18, 2016, when four terrorists from Pakistan struck a brigade headquarters administra-tive base at Uri in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and killed 17 unarmed and unsus-pecting soldiers in their tents, the nation’s anger at this dastardly act was visible and perceptible. the riposte from indian army came 10 days later and on the night of sep-tember 28/29 when indian army’s special Forces struck at seven launch pads of the terrorists across the line of control along a frontage of about 200 km in two different

Corps Zones thus achieving complete sur-prise over the Pakistani military establish-ment and inflicted considerable casualties on the terrorists this action by itself proved to be a manifestation of the new overall strategy of the Government of india to deal with the “proxy war” waged by Pakistan against india since 1989.

On november 29, 2016, a fifth attack by three terrorists from Pakistan breached the army base in nagrota near Jammu in police uniforms and attacked the 166 Field regi-ment, an artillery unit. it was two young majors in their early 30s who fought them — and ultimately died in the line of duty. majors Gosavi Kunal mannadir and akshay Girish Kumar led Quick response teams, each with about 15 men, to counter the terrorists, of whom three were killed after a five-hour gun battle. Five soldiers and two officers of the army died in this operation.

Following the terror strikes, a range of themes highlighting issues of strategic han-dling of such situations, types of forces to be employed and their command and control, border guarding, perimeter defences, use of technology, ability of local police to follow-up the specific intelligence inputs to inter-cept the terrorists before the strike and the lack of community involvement were widely debated in the media and among the secu-rity experts. Hopefully, lessons were learnt!

summer of 2016 also saw an unprec-edented unrest in Kashmir. it refers to a series of violent protests in the Kashmir Valley aided and supported by Pakistan and consequent action by Police and CaPFs (Central armed Police Forces) resulting in many deaths and injuries. situation turned ugly following killing in an encounter of

Burhan Wani, a terrorist commander of Hizbul mujahideen on July 8, 2016. Protests started in all ten districts of the Kashmir Val-ley. the protests lasted more than 120 days and were halted when the demonetisation of the currency was announced on novem-ber 8, indicating once again that the unrest was being fuelled by money being pumped in from across the border in Pakistan to pay the stone-pelters involved in the unrest.

The Way Forwardthe indian army is likely to face four types of threats and challenges in the future includ-ing traditional threats from China and Paki-stan; contemporary threats in the form of terrorism; internal challenges; and out of area contingency threats. this implies that india faces a two-front threat as far as con-ventional conflicts are concerned and these may be large-scale conflicts or even border wars under the nuclear shadow. it also faces other challenges in the form of interna-tional terrorism, home-grown insurgencies aided and abetted by some of its neighbours, and out of area challenges whose contours are hazy at present. many feel that conven-tional conflicts in the present circumstances when the region has become nuclearised are unlikely, however can Kargil-type bor-der wars be precluded, considering that we have unresolved borders in the form of line of control with Pakistan and the line of actual control with China? is there an assur-ance that the border wars will not escalate to larger conflicts involving more than one sector facing two different adversaries? Hence the element of strategic uncertainty is introduced into the entire operational planning which has a direct impact on over-

all force levels and capability build up. One fact which is undeniable is that should there be another war it will be of “hybrid” nature and it may involve fighting the enemy simul-taneously on two fronts, in varying terrain, at the borders while countering terrorism and/or insurgency in the hinterland. there are a large number of studies that have been done in the army in this context and these can be updated and fruitfully utilised to get an insight into the operational prepared-ness and budgetary support required.

the time has come for the government to seriously consider the transformation of the indian military for the future, through tech-nological improvements coupled with new joint operational doctrines and innovative operational art along with joint operational training which should give india a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving india’s sover-eignty and furthering its national interests.

Following the establishment of the modi Government with the strongest mandate ever, a lot was expected by the armed forces regarding the hastening of the modernisa-tion process. However, the expected change has so far not manifested itself on the ground and the army is the worst off as far as the modernisation is concerned because it needs replacements for nearly every weapon and equipment that it currently has in its inven-tory starting from assault rifle to the artil-lery and air defence weapons, night-fighting equipment, surveillance devices and a new helicopter fleet comprising various catego-ries of helicopters, just to name a few. in the current state of army’s modernisation it would be difficult to envisage accomplish-ment and success in future wars. SP

miLitary history

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intErnaL sEcurity

Lt GEnEraL p.c. Katoch (rEtd)

aFtEr OVEr 100 days of violence post the killing of Burhan Wani, Jammu & Kashmir, particularly south Kashmir, is somewhat limping back towards normalcy.

Pakistan was waiting to stoke the fires and used the trigger of Wani’s death. ironically, by default or design, the mehbooba mufti-led J&K Government played into the Pakistan’s inter-services intelligence (isi’s) hands; just four days earlier, some 634 stone-pelters were granted amnesty and released from jail. this, despite the fact that when jailing them there was clear evidence they had been indulging in stone-throwing on behest of the isi. significantly, israel has passed legisla-tion that caters for minimum three-year jail term for stone-pelting and cessation of state benefits for such individuals. then came the phase of stone-pelting mobs attacking secu-rity forces, attacking and ransacking police stations and looting weapons with police deserting at many places and eventually, the army deployed in south Kashmir to establish the rule of law in the face of unprecedented and complete loss of administration and state control. these stone-pelters comprise unemployed youth who are reportedly being paid `500 daily for violent acts. Pakistan had a field day launching a disinformation cam-paign to incite the youth, even distorting the effective surgical strikes inside the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) undertaken by india in response to Pakistan-sponsored attack on the army base at Uri. the Hurriyat separat-ists were fully exploited by the isi to create instability, and this continues to date. as the last count, the number of schools burnt or ransacked in J&K has reached 34 under the isi diktat, even as ceasefire violations by Pakistan continue unabated. the fact that a very high number of children appeared in the recent exams defying Hurriyat’s boycott call was perhaps one of the best things that has happened in recent times.

The Pakistan Factormilitancy is generally associated with polit-ico-socio-economic problems but in the case of J&K, the Pakistan factor (now fully backed by China) outweighs all other factors. adop-tion of the wahabi-salafi culture in Pakistan has been institutionalised in Pakistan past several years. Pervez Hoodbhoy, nuclear physicist at Qaid-e-azam University, islam-abad, wrote in 2008, “the promotion of militarism in Pakistan’s schools, colleges and universities has had a profound effect on young people. militant jihad has become a part of the culture in college and univer-sity campuses, with armed groups inviting students for jihad in Kashmir and afghani-stan”. it is this same wahabi-salafi culture that Pakistan has been able to induce in the Kashmir Valley, gradually but consistently, using clerics and Huriiyat separatist leaders — infiltrating trained terrorists, arms, nar-cotics and money. insistence of our intelli-gence agencies over the years that Hurriyat separatists are “irrelevant” has helped Paki-stan’s isi. isis and Pakistan flags were being waived and hoisted periodically during Fri-day prayers and during anti-india rallies

without any action against any individuals and Hurriyat separatists were visiting and getting briefed by abdul Basit at the Paki-stani High Commission. Pakistan therefore practically had a free hand to wage psycho-logical war to inflame the youth of J&K.

it is an open secret that militants in J&K are being financed by China and Chinese have established huge control over Kash-miri separatist leaders. the recent discovery of Chinese flags from terrorist hideouts in Baramulla and appearance of the People’s Liberation army of China (PLa) soldiers on Pakistani posts on the line of control (LoC) provides further evidence of China’s nefari-ous designs. China supports Pakistan’s anti-india jihad and the fact that Pakistan continues to link the situation in afghani-stan with Kashmir without any basis what-soever, indicates Pakistan will continue to stoke the fires in J&K to the best of her abil-ity. this also helps divert attention from the instability within Pakistan.

Terror Funding and Demonetisationindia’s permanent representative to the Un, syed akbaruddin recently told the Un Gen-eral assembly that Pakistan has pumped in some `60 crore into J&K for terrorism. But then look at the way india has been pam-pering the Hurriyat separatists, which any self-respecting country would never do. Earlier, the national investigation agency (nia) reports of 2013 revealed that Kash-miri terrorist groups had received $100 mil-lion for terror operations in past two years, over the past 10 years some ̀ 600 crore were diverted to J&K terrorism from within india, some `98 crore were diverted in one single year from the J&K affectees Fund, and that the J&K affectees relief trust (JKart) has been facilitating Pakistani infiltration into J&K. Besides, goods sent through trucks to PoK were intentionally overpriced two to three times in the vouchers and additional money received was diverted for terrorist operations. it is unthinkable that J&K politi-cians did not get share of this..

Under the nia act, the nia can take over any case related to terror suo motu except in

J&K where it needs the state government’s permission before it can start any investiga-tion. Last year, J&K Governor n.n. Vohra had suggested that the ranbir Penal Code be brought under the nia act, but whether this has been affected is not known. so, ter-rorist funding in J&K apparently is easier than the rest of india, even though transac-tions of some `38 crore from 17 accounts in four banks of south Kashmir were under the nia scanner in august last year for suspected terror links. Why we continue to pamper the separatists is also a mystery. according to 2015 media reports, the J&K Government spent over `506 crore on Hur-riyat separatist in last five years including travel, hotel stay and meetings with abdul Basit and his cohorts at delhi. in addition, the Centre reportedly spent around `7,207 crore on security related issues — and Hill-ary Clinton once accused Pakistan of breed-ing snakes in the backyard!

demonetisation has brought relative peace to J&K, for whatever period of time, because the separatists are unable to pay daily stone-pelting wages to their ‘street gangs’. But significantly the police have recovered not only fake `100 notes but also machines owned by local criminal gangs for printing fake currency. so if `100 notes too are being faked, then these could be used for stone-pelting, even if the number of ‘employees’ reduces. Besides, payments received via hawala are generally never traced, as per police officials. addition-ally, production of fake indian currency in Pakistan is in government mints. no mat-ter which paper and ink used in the new `2,000 and `500 notes, these being faked by Pakistan at a future date can hardly be ruled out. Chinese assistance to Pakistan in faking our new currency notes can also be taken for granted, being within ambit of the Chinese concept of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’.

Governance DeficitGeorge Fernandes as defence minister once arriving at srinagar was informed that a large crowd had gathered at Baramula and was chanting “azadi, azadi”. in his charac-

teristic style, he decided to drive down with minimum security to meet the crowd. the crowd grew restive on sighting him and the shouts got louder. He listened to them for sometime before raising his hand to indi-cate he wanted to speak. He then told them, “Hamen bhi azadi chahiye” (we also want free-dom). there was stunned silence hearing the defence minister say so. Fernandes then amplified “Hamen bhi azadi chahiye corrup-tion aur berozgari se” (we also want freedom from corruption and unemployment). now the question is which government in J&K has addressed unemployment, made efforts to industrialise the state; defined a roll on plan to create jobs, explained to youth stable environment essential for industrialisation in order to create jobs and articulated con-ditions and unemployment in PoK and rest of india versus conditions in J&K. sure Val-ley youth want employment but then mao-ists too pasted posters (on July 20, 2016) demanding employment for local masses, simultaneous to triggering bomb blasts at the under-construction Constable train-ing Centre in the Jadugora police station area in Jharkhand. the J&K state govern-ment needs giant steps to improve admin-istration, connect with the population and counter isi plans. Lack of governance and lack of contact with the grassroots certainly would not help improve the situation.

De-RadicalisationCognisance must be taken of the anti-india venom being broadcast from loudspeakers atop mosques. is it the voice of some rabid mullahs or is it others who hold the cler-ics hostage? What about the daily separat-ist diktat in the vernacular dailies? What exactly is the J&K state government doing to stem the replacement of the sufi culture by hardliner wahabi-salafi preaching? Has direct and periodic dialogue opened with the clerics? Operations are essential against the hardcore but military solution is not the key, population being the centre of gravity. true blending of development with educa-tion, protecting population from violence, counter narrative to external information war and taking proxy war into sponsor’s territory are essential.

de-radicalisation must be well thought out strategy that should be employed on continuous basis at personal level, aided by modern technology. de-radicalisation programmes must have separate focus for select communities/regions, teachers/reli-gious teachers, youth, girl child/mothers, apprehended terrorists plus population at large liable to support terrorism. discourse of muslim leaders should be part of the de-radicalisation programmes. the education system must be integrated into the national mainstream. Ethics and true nationalism should form part of the education system. introduction of nCC in most schools and colleges would be fruitful. Communities must be kept informed and empowered to challenge radical ideology. Psychological operations should include exposing terrorist abuses, conditions in PoK vis-à-vis J&K, and that Pakistan as the epicentre of terrorism

Militancy is generally associated with politico-socio-economic problems but in the case of J&K, the Pakistan factor (now fully backed by China) outweighs all other factors

curbing militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir

PhOTOgrAPh: bsf.nic.in

A BSF jawan on vigil in the Kashmir Valley

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ViEwpoint

BriGadiEr s.K. chattErji (rEtd)

in tHE EarLy HOUrs of september 18, 2016, Pakistani militants staged an attack on an indian army camp at Uri in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). the attackers used incendiary grenades

to light up tentage housing soldiers lead-ing to 17 deaths instantaneously and two more thereafter. all four terrorists were also killed. a pall of gloom descended on the nation. Every indian was also itching for an appropriate response. the riposte, 10/11 days later, surprised both the indian citizen and the Pakistani establishment. seven ter-rorist launch pads located across the line of control (LoC) that divides J&K and Pakistan occupied Kashmir, spread over a 250-km frontage, were near simultaneously assaulted by india’s special Forces. the burning trail left behind by the forces as they executed a clean extrication was approximately 30 dead terrorists and Pakistani military personnel.

the indian political establishment forever at each other’s throat in a country perenni-ally in the election mode, fortunately unified behind the government’s decision. When the roots of such unusual cohesion are ana-lysed, the conclusions again point to a sharp eye that politicians have on their vote banks. there would barely be a voter on the elec-toral lists who would have voted for a politi-cal party critical of the indian armed forces at this juncture. such is the linkage between the indian people and the armed forces.

Military-People Relationsthe military-people relationship in most lib-eral democracies reflects a commitment in the former and pride, faith and trust in the latter, for each other. it’s the people giving their military a very special social standing that have armed our young officers and sol-diers to brave the risks of being constantly in operations (wars and insurgencies) since independence. this includes the operations along the LoC to fight the terrorists trying to infiltrate from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) an intensive ongoing operation since 1989 when Pakistan decide to follow the strategy of “bleeding india with a thousand cuts”. While induction of modern technology and equipment upgradation of the armed forces are extremely important for achieving operational capabilities, the morale of the men who man the equipment is the ultimate battle-winning factor; an old adage that is as good as an axiomatic truth. in the words of sun tzu, the famous Chinese scholar, “He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.”

Politico-Military RelationsHaving established the relationship between the people and the military briefly, it’s time to shift the focus to the government; both the political leadership and its executive machin-ery — the bureaucracy. in the indian con-text, the armed forces are quite divorced from policy formulation. the intimate interaction of the national leadership with the armed forces so prevalent in the functional models of developed countries, is not followed in our context. the meetings of the three service Chiefs with the Prime minister are occasional

at best. the chasm that it creates allows greater manoeuvre space to the bureaucracy whose penchant at creating mischief and going against its own military is well known. While all ministries generally support their own departments, the ministry of defence (mod) is famous for taking decisions to the detriment of the military. a recent case in point is the letter number a/24577/CaO/CP Cell dated October 18 issued by mod which further downgrades military ranks and has raised a huge controversy as reported by the Hindustan Times on October 25, 2016. the letter has, it seems, been issued with the sanc-tion of the defence minister. Whom should the military approach in the instant case?

the fallout of such distancing was also laid bare by the report of the seventh Central Pay Commission which has been unfair to the military and has put the military on par with the Central armed Police Forces. the effort

at down-gradation commenced in the third Pay Commission and has continued down-wards since then. most citizens wouldn’t be aware of the existence of such disparities as they are never informed about the back-ground because the media too reports from the Pay Commissions report which itself is faulty because the armed forces views are never taken seriously in bureaucracy con-trolled committees. it must be equally difficult for our citizens to comprehend that a civil-ian bureaucrat’s allowances in shillong can be twice that of a service officer in siachen! the equation is so grossly mismatched as to require an orchestrated campaign to educate the common citizen of such stark anomalies that have been gradually introduced into the system by the civilian bureaucracy. needless to say that the political leadership and some chiefs of the armed forces at the helm have also uncaring through the years!

the third Pay Commission reduced the pension of jawans to 50 per cent from 70 per cent prevalent then. the Fifth Pay Commission fixed the pay of deputy inspec-tor General of the police forces between a Lt Colonel and a Colonel. the Fourth Pay Commission brought the diG at par with a Brigadier. the seventh Pay Commission recommends higher scales for a diG as com-pared to a Brigadier. Where are we headed? Can we put together the quality of armed forces that will be able to drive our geopo-litical aspirations with such degradation in status and payoff its officers and men?

the seventh Pay Commission has intro-duced wide and unusual anomalies as far as the armed forces are concerned. non-Functional scale Upgradation has not been granted to the armed forces unlike the other cadres. military service Pay for Junior Com-missioned Officers and Other ranks on the

same scales is a joke. disability pensions have been tampered with to a pronounced disadvantage for deserving cases. When viewed in the context that such benefits are given to those wounded or aggravated due to operational reasons, the recommendations seem preposterous. a comparison with what a bureaucrat will be given for disability, the whole exercise looks like a big farce.

the defence minister has appointed a committee to go into the various aspects, however most of these anomalies are so bla-tant as not to require another commission to study and provide the answers. an erudite defence minister and non-partisan bureau-cracy can take a decision by themselves. most such committees in the past have languished without any substantial contribution.

Professional Military Advicein the current context the methods of wag-ing wars have changed. today we talk about conventional wars, fourth-generation wars, asymmetric, hybrid and proxy wars; all of them call for professional militaries to pro-tect their nation’s borders, people, institu-tions and values. this protection is a com-plex task and is to be undertaken through deliberate planning and strategy formu-lation for various types of contingencies. responsible national leaderships of demo-cratic nations that face complex threats and challenges take steps to protect their interests by obtaining professional military advice at the highest levels. Let us take the example of the americans. the Chairman Joint Chiefs of staff has direct access to the Us President. the Pentagon officials brief the Us senate Committee on armed forces in their hearings regularly. the same holds true for testimonies by commanders in com-bat zones like afghanistan, iraq and syria.

We have an institutionalised system in place but it does not work. though the defence minister does meet the three Chiefs regularly or whenever required, the Chiefs have hardly any interaction with the Prime minister. in the bargain, neither are the requirements for operational readiness directly conveyed to the Chief Executive who is the Prime minister nor are issues that affect morale of men like pay and allowances and status of the armed forces personnel brought to his notice. to expect the defence minister to convey it all to the Prime minister is hardly possible given the wide ranging duties and responsibilities of the Prime minister, and often, a limited grasp of the issues concerned.

the supreme Commander of armed Forces is the President of the nation! the nation still awaits the supreme Commander ever championing the forces on such cru-cial issues.

Lack of Military Representation deliberately isolating the military from the issues which effect their functional efficiency and their motivation is detrimental to over-all military effectiveness and efficiency. it is a fact that the armed forces which represent one of the largest organised body of govern-ment employees has not had a single member in the pay commissions since independence, and thus wide disparities have crept into the

The military-people relationship in most liberal democracies reflects a commitment in the former and pride, faith and trust in the latter, for each other

civil-military relations – widening Gap

PhOTOgrAPh: PIB

in the indian context, the armed forces are quite divorced from policy formulation. the intimate interaction of the national leadership with the armed forces, so prevalent in the functional models of developed countries, is not followed in our context.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the officers and jawans of the Indian Army at Siachen Base Camp

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10 sp’s land forces 6/2016

ViEwpoint / intErnaL sEcurity

has brought ridicule to muslims and islam globally. alternatives to expend youth ener-gies and employment opportunities must be part of the programme. Finally, the de-radi-calisation programmes must be periodically reviewed in relation to the ongoing radical-ization, to ensure it is effective and course corrections made where required.

at the Herat security dialogue held in October 2015 in afghanistan, salman Khurshid (former External affairs min-ister) giving keynote address spoke of inter-regional civilisation influences and explained that Hinduism is a way of life that embraces all and that “india has mus-lim Hindus, Christian Hindus, Buddhist Hindus, Jain Hindus etc, which is com-mon phenomenon.” dr ali akbar shah (delhi University), said, “islamic countries should learn from india where mysticism of all religions including of islam have been amalgamated and absorbed. as for islam, india has absorbed both the islam brought by invaders as well as by sages like Khwaja moinuddin Chishti,” adding “there is need to revive the true spirit of islam and while everyone knows what has gone wrong, we need to act to set it right.” such exposures to the J&K youth would be useful.

Public ParticipationCivil society can contribute greatly in pre-venting and countering terrorism rather than encourage terrorism especially since it gives voice to the marginalised and vulner-able people and victims of terrorism, gener-ating awareness and providing constructive outlet for redress of grievances. non-tradi-tional actors like nGOs, foundations, chari-ties, public-private partnerships and private businesses are capable and credible partners in local communities. despite Pakistani spon-sored propaganda, public needs to be sensi-tised that our army respects human rights far more than Pakistan where aerial bomb-ings and artillery barrages are used periodi-cally with scant regard to collateral damage.

Sealing the Borderthe army has erected 407-km border fencing in J&K in high threat areas but gaps between posts can only be covered through patrol-ling or ambushes which spreads the security

forces thin on the ground and is not 100 per cent foolproof despite best efforts espe-cially in hours of darkness, fog and adverse weather. Pakistan has been employing heavy cross-border firing to assist infiltration and terrorists have also been using explosives to make gaps in the fencing or dig holes under the fence. in addition, heavy snow buried the fence especially in north Kashmir and large portions are also destroyed annually because of avalanches. We need to optimise the best technology. modern electronic sur-veillance involves detection of movement, and is largely based on seismic, acoustic, inductive sensors, and infrared sensors. seis-mic sensors can distinguish between people and vehicles. inductive sensors detect metal in an object that is moving, while an infrared sensors can detect human body heat from a distance of up to 100 metres. the unat-tended ground sensors (UGs) in use by army are mostly imported and primarily meant for guarding houses/premises. these are ineffec-tive with snowfall and the defence research and development Organisation (drdO) has not been able to come up with one suitable for snow conditions.

However, despite smart fence fitted with cameras and consoles with commanders, limitations of adverse weather and visibility

conditions will continue. this needs to be beefed up with night-vision devices (nVds), night-vision goggles (nVGs) and hand-held thermal imagers (HHtis) which are in very limited numbers. the army post at Uri, which recently suffered ghastly terrorist attack, did not have a single thermal imager despite being under enemy observation from three directions. Use of radars, as done abroad to detect smugglers along the Us-mexico bor-der, has the danger of giving away the elec-tronic signatures of the equipment to the enemy. Besides, radars also have a dead zone. mix of electronic surveillance and dogs are very successful. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UaVs) are being used for surveillance but in limited numbers due to paucity and restric-tions on flying multiple UaVs simultaneously in the same zone. induction of the Battle-field surveillance system (Bss), Battlefield management system (Bms) in the army, and equipping infantry with hand-held mini aer-ial vehicles (maVs) must be speeded up. With excellent achievements of the indian space research Organisation (isrO), we must also go for 24 x 7 satellite surveillance along our borders with Pakistan and China.

Government must also seriously consider reraising army’s technical support division (tsd) that the UPa Government disbanded to great advantage of Pakistan’s isi; few bor-der villages in J&K have house very close to the LoC that are used by infiltrators for night halt. then Chief minister of J&K Farooq abdullah addressing the national defence College course in 2000 was asked by a for-eign student why the few border villages very close to the LoC could not be relocated in hinterland J&K. He replied he had thought about it and had already asked the Centre for `120 crore to shift the first village. Govern-ment needs to examine this issue. Creating a vacant belt would deter infiltration since any movement can be engaged by fire; we may not mine the LoC but certainly patrols can keep adding iEds, and; the principle of ‘One Border, One Force’ must be strictly followed.

Proactive Approachadoption of proactive approach in counter-ing proxy wars is imperative for establish-ing effective deterrence, and for controlling enemy fault lines instead of enemy control-

ling ours. this should include a dynamic information warfare strategy. the situation in J&K sure needs a national response but the J&K state government has a major role to play in this and can’t simply depend on security forces for return of normalcy. strict action is also required against those funding terror, spreading radicalism and assisting terrorism within the country.

Conclusionmilitancy and terrorism in J&K has been rag-ing for past 27 years, having commenced in 1989 follwing the rigged up state elections. Unfortunately, lackadaisical approach at the state and to some extent at the Centre level has let the situation deteriorate despite consistent Pakistani efforts to destabilise the region. Consistently sincere efforts are needed to normalise the situation.

modern maVs with forward looking infrared sensors can identify objects at extremely long distances. america’s mQ-9 reaper UaV used for homeland security has cameras capable of identifying an object the size of a milk carton from altitudes of 60,000 feet, forward looking ir detecting humans at distance of 60 km. maVs are also being weaponised. Us military is devel-oping swarms of tiny unarmed drones that can hover, crawl and even kill targets. these micro UaVs will work in swarms to provide complex surveillance of borders and battle-fields. aside from a laser weapon they can also be armed with incapacitating chemi-cals, combustible payloads or even explo-sives for precision targeting.

China already has 24 x 7 satellite sur-veillance along the line of actual control (LaC) with india. recent media report of a 45-km deep Chinese incursion in arunachal points to this critical void. iran is building a 700-km, 10 feet high, three-feet thick wall along its border with Pakistan, which is still not complete. if we are going for a similar 3,323-km-long indo-Pak border wall with israeli assistance, it is unlikely to be com-pleted by december 2018. nevertheless, it would be a good beginning and we must ‘not’ neglect other borders especially border infra-structure in the north East, which remains pathetic because of gross neglect over a decade by the previous government. SP

china supports pakistan’s anti-india jihad and the fact that pakistan continues to link the situation in afghanistan with Kashmir without any basis whatsoever indicates pakistan will continue to stoke the fires in J&K to the best of her ability

salary and allowances structure of the armed forces over the years. the impact of pay and allowances on the quality of manpower that a volunteer army can attract is an important facet with today’s generation of technology savvy youth. in a world transforming more and more into materialistic societies, it would be most imprudent to expect the best/better talent to join the armed forces without com-petitive compensation packages. such pack-ages have, in a generic sense, also come to define social status.

Control over the Militaryit’s the responsibility of the political lead-ership to exercise control over the military. according to samuel Huntington in his seminal 1957 book on civil-military rela-tions, The Soldier and the State, states that this control is indicated by the following factors: (1) the military’s adoption of professional ethos and their recognition of boundaries of professional roles: (2) Effective subordina-tion of the military to civilian political lead-ership that formulates strategic directives on foreign and military policies: (3) recogni-tion and approval from political leaders to the professional authorities and autonomy of the military: (4) minimal intervention of the military in politics and of politicians in military affairs.

in indian context the civil bureaucracy seem to exercise this control and also takes

vicarious pleasure to downgrade the stat-ure of the military from time to time while our political leadership remains aloof and uncaring. it is the most glaring and notori-ous aspect of civil-military relations in india.

People and the Armed Forcesthe political leadership is responsible for creating a mutually supportive bond between the people and the armed forces. the bureaucracy needs to facilitate such an objective. it can be achieved by ensuring that the military has enough representation of all classes of the citizenry. While the per-sonnel below the officers’ cadre represent the man on the street, the officer cadre has essentially to be from the same stock as the national leadership/top civil bureaucracy. if there be a lack of commonality in the roots between the lots that constitute the top civilian leadership and the armed forces, the synergised application of all elements of national power will remain a difficult proposition. at stake will be our national security and also in the quality of strate-gic decision making. today, students from the best schools/colleges are not headed for the armed forces officers’ selection boards. the qualitative differentiation between the armed forces officer cadre and the admin-istrative services officers is bound to have negative impact on national security.

the military-people relationship also

requires nurturing because the former is a unifying force for our nation. the armed forces are the best cohesive institutions pop-ulated by people from our multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual diversity. they also enjoy equal opportunities, zero dis-crimination and a status decided by military

rank achieved, rather than by dint of caste, creed or family lineage.

Status-related Issuesas far as the armed forces inter-se status with the civilian bureaucracy is concerned, the equations that we started off with on becom-ing a republic have been trashed with greater enthusiasm than most other areas of public policy. it’s an amazing feat to find an indian Police service officer with 15 years of service wearing the rank badges of a Brigadier who in the army would have at least 28 years of service. Even more astounding is a Joint sec-retary of the ias, again with about 15 years of service being equated to a major General with about 30 years of service or more. a state has come when the motivation provided by the adulation of the citizens is dwarfed by the down-gradation in equivalence of mili-tary ranks vis-à-vis the civilian cadre.

the appointing of a Chief of defence staff/Permanent Chairman Chiefs of staff Committee, who would have direct and fre-quent communication with both the Prime minister and the defence minister, is an immediate necessity. He will naturally be an effective watchdog over the rusted civil-mil-itary relations. the current dispensation at new delhi has promised a lot and has a lot to navigate as yet. they have the mandate to do it, but now it requires a political will to proceed ahead. SP

curbing militancy and terrorism...continued from page 8

the appointing of a chief of defence staff/permanent chairman chiefs of staff committee, who would have direct and frequent communication with both the prime minister and the defence minister, is an immediate necessity. He will naturally be an effective watchdog over the rusted civil-military relations.

>>

116/2016 SP’s Land ForceS

RELENTLESS JOURNEY OF EXCELLENCE SINCE 1964

Agni-V SucceSSfully TeSTed by dRdOAgni-V, the long-range surface-to-surface ballistic Missile, was successfully flight tested by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) on December 26, 2016, from Dr Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha. The full range test-flight of the missile has further boosted the indigenous missile capa-bilities and deterrence level of the country. All the radars, tracking systems and range stations tracked and monitored the flight per-formance and all the mission objectives were successfully met. This was the fourth test of Agni-V missile and the second one from a canister on a road mobile launcher. All the four missions have been successful.

dRdO SucceSSfully flighT TeSTS SmART AnTi-AiRfield WeApOnThe Defence and Research Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully flight-tested the smart anti-airfield weapon (SAAW) from an Indian Air Force (IAF) air-craft. SAAW, an indigenously designed and developed 120 kg class smart weapon, devel-oped by DRDO, capable of engaging ground targets with high precision up to a range of 100 km. The lightweight high precision guided bomb is one of the world class weap-ons systems.

SingApORe cOmmiSSiOnS neW pROTecTed cOmbAT SuppORT VehicleS fOR ARmyThe Singapore Ministry of Defence (MoD) commissioned new protected combat support vehicles (PCSV) to enhance Sin-gapore Armed Forces’ (SAF) precision manoeuvre capabilities. The commissioning of the Belrex PCSVs is in line with the army’s motorisation efforts and the SAF’s transfor-mation into an integrated third-generation fighting force. Developed by Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and Sin-gapore Technologies Kinetics (ST Kinetics), the vehicles provide combat support forces with enhanced firepower, protection and situational awareness.

uK lAuncheS £1.9 billiOn nATiOnAl cybeR SecuRiTy STRATegy TO pReVenT cybeR ATTAcKSThe UK Government launched its new £1.9 billion National Cyber Security Strategy, which will set out decisive action to pro-tect the economy and encourage industry

to avoid damaging cyber attacks. The new plan almost doubles the funding commit-ments of the first strategy, which ran from 2011, and outlines the way the UK will use automated defences to safeguard citi-zens and businesses against growing cyber threats. This plan also supports the coun-try’s growing cyber security industry and outlines strategies to deter cyber attacks from criminals and hostile actors.

lOcKheed mARTin ReceiVeS $1.45 billiOn cOnTRAcT fOR pAc-3 miSSileSDomestic and international orders the United States and allied military forces will upgrade their missile defence capabili-ties under a new $1.45-billion contract for production and delivery of Lockheed Mar-tin Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) interceptors.

The contract includes PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE missile deliveries for the US Army, and foreign military sales of PAC-3 intercep-tors, launcher modification kits, associated equipment and spares for Qatar, the Repub-lic of Korea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates.

indO-mAldiVeS jOinT miliTARy exeRciSeA 14 day joint training exercise of the Indian Army and the Maldives National Defence Force was held at Kadhdhoo, Lammu Atoll in Maldives. The training contingents com-prised of a platoon strength from Bihar Regi-ment and a similar strength of the Maldiv-ian National Defence Force.

Exercise Ekuverin 2016 was the seventh edition of joint exercise and is in continu-ation of a series of joint exercises between the Indian Army and the Maldives National Defence Force. The previous edition of the exercise was held at Thiruvanathapuram in 2015.

The aim of the joint exercise is to acquaint both forces with each other’s operating procedures in the backdrop of amphibious and counter-insurgency/ counter terrorism environment as also to enhance the existing military relationship between the Indian Army and the Maldiv-ian National Defence Force.

ViSiT Of SecReTARy Of defenSe cARTeR TO indiA

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter made an official visit to India at the invita-tion of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, marking the seventh interaction between the two leaders.

India-US defence relations in recent years have moved along a remarkable

upward trajectory. Marked progress on agreements, including the signing of a Defense Framework Agreement in 2015, have laid a blueprint for collaboration between the defence establishments and enabled deeper cooperation. Joint exchange opportunities — in both personnel and training exercises — have expanded and strengthened our bilateral cooperation. The recent signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) has facilitated additional opportunities for prac-tical engagement and exchange.

The visit finalised India’s designa-tion as a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States. The designation as a “Major Defense Partner” is a status unique to India and institutionalises the progress made to facilitate defencse trade and technology sharing with India to a level at par with that of the United States’ closest allies and partners, and ensures enduring coopera-tion into the future.

indiA SignS m777 hOWiTzeRSUnder the foreign military sales (FMS) pro-gramme, India and the US have agreed to sign deal wherein the latter will sell through BAE Systems 145 M777 ultra-light how-itzers. The deal when signed will be worth `5,000 crore and reportedly the howitzers will be deployed on the borders, particularly along the Chinese border.

“We look forward to providing the Indian Army with the combat-proven M777,” said Dr Joe Senftle, Vice President and Gen-eral Manager for Weapon Systems at BAE Systems. “Our plan to establish a domes-tic Assembly, Integration and Test facility, further demonstrates our commitment to ‘Make in India’ and remains a firm part of our strategy to work with the Indian defence sector across air, land, sea and security.”

BAE Systems signing the contract in the coming weeks with the US Department of Defense to supply the howitzers to the Indian Army. BAE Systems said that the M777 howitzers were half the weight of other 155mm towed howitzers. The M777 will provide rapid reaction capability. It has a proven pedigree that delivers decisive fire-power when needed most in sustained com-bat conditions.

The conclusion of this procurement pro-gramme will enable BAE Systems to make an investment of over $200 million in those defence suppliers.

indiA-bAnglAdeSh jOinT miliTARy exeRciSe SAmpRiTi 2016The sixth edition of India-Bangladesh Joint Military Exercise “Sampriti 2016” was held at Bangabandhu Senanibas, Tangail. Main focus of this edition of the 14-day joint exercise was on counter terrorism operations in mountainous and jungle ter-rain under the United Nations mandate. To achieve interoperability in joint operations the troops from both sides acquainted them-selves with respective approach of the two armies towards the conduct of such opera-tions. A company group of the Mahar Regi-ment represented the Indian Contingent. SP

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Lt General Sarath Chand took over as Vice Chief of Army Staff on January 13, 2017. Before taking over as Vice Chief of Army Staff, the General Officer was commanding South Western Command.

Lt General Sarath Chand was commissioned into the Garhwal Rifles in June 1979. He is an alum-nus of National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Pune, and Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. He is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington (Nilgiris), the Higher Command Course at Mhow, and the National Defence College course at New Delhi. He commanded his parent battalion, 11 Garhwal Rifles, and an Infantry Brigade in the desert sector. He later successfully commanded Counter Insurgency Force, KILO in the Kashmir

Valley. He went on to command the strategically important Gajraj Corps, in the Eastern theatre.

He has held a number of important staff as well as instructional appointments during his career including Colonel General Staff of a Divi-sion and Brigadier General Staff of a Corps, both in High Altitude Area along the Northern Bor-ders and in the Military Secretary’s Branch at Army Headquarters. His academic qualifications include M.Sc (Defence Studies), M.Phil in Defence & Management Studies and an M.Phil in Defence & Strategic Studies. He has served in the UN Mis-sion in Somalia (UNOSOM-II). He is recipient of UYSM, AVSM, VSM awards and Chief of Army Staff ’s Commendation Card on three occasions.

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