decentralization and local democracy in the world

2008

Decentralization and local democracyin the world

First Global Report byUnited Cities and Local Governments

Decentralization and local democracy in the world

First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments

UCLG wishes to acknowledge the Support of:

Generalitatde Catalunya

United Cities and Local GovernmentsCités et Gouvernements Locaux UnisCiudades y Gobiernos Locales Unidos

First

Global

Report

Decentralization and local democracyin the world

2008

A co-publication of the World Bank and United Cities and Local Goverments

© 2009 United Cities and Local GovernmentsAvinyó 1508002 Barcelona - SpainTelephone: +34 933 428 750Internet: www.cities-localgovernments.orgE-mail: [email protected]

All rights reserved

1 2 3 4 5 13 12 11 10 09

This volume is a product of an international network of experts associated with UnitedCities and Local Governments initiative. The findings, interpretations, and conclusionsexpressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors ofThe World Bank, nor all the members of United Cities and Local Governments.The World Bank and United Cities and Local Governments do not guarantee the accuracyof the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and otherinformation shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of TheWorld Bank and United Cities and Local Governments concerning the legal status of anyterritory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Rights and PermissionsThe material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or allof this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The World Bank andUnited Cities and Local Governments encourage dissemination of its work and willnormally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly.For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, or queries on rights andlicenses, please send a request with complete information to the to the CopyrightClearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com.All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressedto the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433,USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: [email protected].

ISBN: 978-0-8213-7734-5eISBN: 978-0-8213-7735-2

Design and Layout MIS ProductionsProofreaders William Bank & Judith Fiorilli-ConnettPhotos UCLG archives and Rafael Escudé, Antonio Lajusticia

& Francisco Ontañón

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Decentralization and local democracy in the world : first global report by United Cities andLocal Governments, 2008.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8213-7734-5 -- ISBN 978-0-8213-7735-2 (electronic)1. Decentralization in government. 2. Local government. I. United Cities and LocalGovernments. JS113.D426 2008320.8--dc22

Printed in the U.S.A.

Coordinated by the Research Network

on Local Government in Europe (GRALE)

Under the scientific direction of Gérard Marcou, Professor at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Director of GRALE

Foreword 8

Preface 10

Editorial Project 12

Acknowledgments 14

Introduction 18

Africa 22

Asia-Pacific 50

Eurasia 94

Europe 128

Latin America 168

Middle East and Western Asia 204

North America 234

Metropolitan Governance 256

Conclusion 284

Postface 308

Bibliography 318

CONTENTS

CONTENTSDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 7

FOREWORDDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World8

FOREWORDDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World

This publication of the UCLG on Decentrali-zation and Local Democracy comes at atimely moment. The world has just passed asignificant threshold: it is now more urbanthan rural, with a greater number of peopleliving in cities than at any time in history.Furthermore, over the next 30 years mostworld population growth will be in develo-ping country cities. Highly visible mega-cities will continue to grow, but more slowlyon the whole, while cities under 1 million insize are projected to absorb a populationincrease of nearly one half billion in the next15 years.

This demographic shift constitutes thematuration of the urbanization process andposes a tremendous challenge for poor andmiddle income countries. The challenge is toprovide the services that are essential to thehealth, education, prosperity, and well-being of people living in cities, and to do sosustainably in the face of global challengessuch as climate change.

Many developing countries seeking to res-pond to the challenge posed by thesedemographic shifts will choose decentrali-zation and local democracy in variousforms as one tool to achieve basic socialends. Regardless of the degree of decen-tralization, in an increasingly urbanizedworld governance and management incities and towns will take on heightenedimportance. The World Bank applauds thework of the UCLG in underscoring thesekey functions and we welcome this Report

as input to our collective thinking on thesubject.

While many of the problems facing citiesand towns may be global, the solutions will,in large measure, be local and unique to thespecific circumstances on the ground. Goodsolutions will result from a smooth collabo-ration amongst various levels of govern-ment that is crafted pragmatically to getresults. We look forward to a strong part-nership with UCLG.

1st UCLG World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Foreword

Katherine Sierra

Vice President, Sustainable Development

The World Bank

9

PREFACEDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World10

PREFACEDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 11

It is my great pleasure, as President of theWorld Organization of Local and RegionalAuthorities, to present the first World

Report on Decentralization and Local

Democracy, published in cooperation withthe World Bank and Cities Alliance.

I hope that this Report, which is the first ofits kind, will contribute to deepen andstrengthen knowledge about the role oflocal governments in the contemporaryworld, and to enrich national and internatio-nal discussions on the relationship betweendecentralization and development.

The present Report clearly shows that theworld is undergoing a quiet democratic

revolution. Therefore, even if importantaspects of this process have yet to beaccomplished, especially in countries in con-flict (in the Middle East, Asia and Africa)local democracy is gaining momentum allover the world: from the African savannavillages, the highlands of Latin America tothe barangay in the Philippines.

In a world where more than half of humanitynow lives in cities, local authorities are alsothe key to the solution of major contemporarychallenges of all kinds: democratic, as it is inthe local sphere that the sense of citizenshipis reinforced and identities are constructed todeal with globalization; environmental, sincethe preservation of our planet and the fightagainst global warming depends to a greatextent on finding sustainable solutions totransform current models of production andconsumption, particularly in the urban areas;economic, given that large amounts of wealthand opportunities, as well as extreme inequi-ties are generated within the cities and intheir surroundings; and, social, as it is at thelocal level where the grounds need to be set

for creating social inclusion, managing cultu-ral diversity and ensuring human security.

This publication follows the adoption by Mem-ber States of the UN Habitat Governing Coun-cil of the International Guidelines on

Decentralization and Strengthening of Local

Authorities: the first international corner -stone reference to “outline the main princi-ples underlying democratic, constitutional,legal and administrative aspects of localgovernance and decentralization1”.

Both the guidelines and this Report are thefruition of longstanding efforts by localgovernments and their partners which Ihope will complement each other promotingthe ownership and implementation of theGuidelines by States and local authorities allover the world. The Report constitutes thefirst stage of the World Observatory of

Decentralization and Local Democracy

project launched by United Cities and LocalGovernments and supported by the UNHabitat Governing Council.

I am convinced that this publication –the firstof regular triennial reports– will enable Uni-ted Cities and Local Governments to become“a major world source of information andintelligence on local government” as anticipa-ted by its members.

Preface

Bertrand Delanoë

Mayor of Paris

France

President of CGLU

1. UN Habitat, 21st

Governing Council,

Decisions and

Resolutions, Nairobi,

16-20 April 2007:

Resolution 21/3.

EDITORIAL PROJECT12 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

EDITORIAL PROJECTDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 13

UCLG Steering Committee • Jean Pierre Elong Mbassi, Secretary General, UCLG Africa

• Christopher Hoene, National League of Cities, USA

• Béchir Odeimi, Director of UCLG Lebanon and Jordan, Lebanon

• Josep Roig, Secretary General, Metropolis

• Rashik Sagitov, Secretary General, UCLG Eurasia

• Jeremy Smith, Secretary General, Council of European Municipalities and Regions(CEMR)

• Guillermo Tapia, Secretary General of FLACMA, Latin America

• Peter Woods, Secretary General, UCLG Asia-Pacific

• Selahatim Yildirim, Secretary General, UCLG Middle East & Western Asia

Responsibility for the Publication• Director : Elisabeth Gateau, Secretary General, UCLG

• Overall Coordination: Edgardo Bilsky, Director for Programs and Research, UCLG

• Advisor: Emilia Saiz, Director for Statutory Issues and Institutional Relations, UCLG

• Support team from UCLG: Hélène Abet, Dominique Arrestat, Mohamed Boussraoui,Orla de Díez, Sara Hoeflich de Duque, Grégoire Husson, Thomas Meekel, Olivia Paton,Marie Laure Roa, Virginia Molina, Marcus Mayr, Renske Steenbergen

Scientific Direction • Gérard Marcou, Professor at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Director of

GRALE, France

Editorial Committee• Mustapha Adib, Professor at the Lebanese University and at the French-Lebanese Uni-

versity Center of Technology, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in the MiddleEast (CESMO), Lebanon

• Alex B. Brillantes, Professor and Dean of the University of the Philippines, EasternRegional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA), Philippines

• Adrian Campbell, Senior Lecturer at the University of Birmingham, School of PublicPolicy, United Kingdom

• Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, Research Director of the CNRS, Director of SPIRIT(CNRS), Institute of Political Studies of Bordeaux, France

• Talia Iaroulovna Khabrieva, Professor, Director of the Institute of Legislation and Com-parative Law of the Government of the Russian Federation

• Biram Owens Ndiaye, Director, Municipal Development Partnership, Benin

• Jefferey Sellers, Professor at the University of Southern California, USA

• Salvador Valencia Carmona, Professor at the Nacional Autonomous University of Mexi-co (UNAM), Director of the Center of Legal Research, Mexico

EDITORIAL PROJECT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS14 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 15

Main authors1 by chapters:

Africa:

• Mustapha Ben Letaief, Professor at theUniversity of Tunis 1, Faculty of Law,Director of the Public Law Department,Tunis

• Charles Nach Mback, Expert, MunicipalDevelopment Partnership, Benin

• Jean-Pierre Elong Mbassi, SecretaryGeneral, UCLGA

• Biram Owens Ndiaye, Director, MunicipalDevelopment Partnership, Benin

Asia-Pacific:

• Andrew Nickson, Lecturer, School ofPublic Policy, University of Birming-ham, United Kingdom

• Alex B. Brillantes, Professor and Deanof the University of the Philippines, Eas-tern Regional Organization for PublicAd ministration (EROPA), Philippines

• Wilhelmina L. Cabo, EROPA, Professorat the University of the Philippines

• Alice Celestino, EROPA, University ofthe Philippines

• Nick Devas, Lecturer, School of PublicPolicy, Director of the InternationalDevelopment Department, Universityof Birmingham, United Kingdom

Eurasia:

• L.V.Andrichenko, PhD, Institute ofLegislation and Comparative Law of theGovernment of the Russian Federation

• Talia Ia. Khabrieva, Professor, Directorof the Institute of Legislation and Com-parative Law of the Government of theRussian Federation, Team leader

• V.I.Lafitsky, Professor at the Institute ofLegislation and Comparative Law of theGovernment of the Russian Federation

• A.V. Pavlushkin, PhD, Institute of Legis-lation and Comparative Law of theGovernment of the Russian Federation

• A.E.Postnikov, Professor at the Instituteof Legislation and Comparative Law ofthe Government of the Russian Federa-tion

• N.V.Putilo, PhD, Institute of Legislationand Comparative Law of the Govern-ment of the Russian Federation

• Y.A.Tikhomirov, Professor and Vice-Director of the Institute of Legislationand Comparative Law of the Govern-ment of the Russian Federation

• V.A.Vasiliev, Professor at the Institute ofLegislation and Comparative Law of theGovernment of the Russian Federation

Europe :

• Gérard Marcou, Professor at the Univer-sity Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Direc-tor of GRALE, France

• Hellmut Wollmann, Professor emeritusat the Humboldt-Universitaet Berlin,Germany

Latin America :

• Mario Rosales, Director of Studies, Asso-ciation of Municipalities of Chile

• Salvador Valencia Carmona, Professor atthe Nacional Autonomous University ofMexico (UNAM), Director of the Center ofLegal Research, Mexico

Middle East & West Asia:

• Mustapha Adib, Professor at the Leba -ne se University and at the French-Le -ba nese University Center of Tech nology,Director of the Center for Stra tegicStudies in the Middle East (CESMO),Le banon

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. Alphabetic list. If a

person is quoted

several times, titles

and functions are

mentioned only with

the first quotation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World16

North America

• Jefferey Sellers, Professor at the Uni-versity of Southern California, USA

Metropolitan governance:

• Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, ResearchDirector of the CNRS, Director of SPIRIT(CNRS), Institute of Political Studies ofBordeaux, France

• Jefferey Sellers

Conclusions

• Tim Campbell, PhD, Urban Age Institu-te, USA

Postface

• Gérard Marcou

Other contributors2:

Africa :

Chabane Benakezouh (Algeria), MustaphaBen Letaief (Tunisia), Hassan OuazzaniChahdi (Morocco), Jose Chivava (Mozambi-que), Lilian Dodzo (Zimbabwe), ElogneKadja (Côte d’Ivoire), Georges Kasumba(Uganda), Sylvana Rudith King (Ghana),Djenabou Kone (Guinea), Nadjombe Gbe-ou Kpayile (Togo), Aliou Maguiraga (Mali),Albert Malama (Zambia), Jossy Materu(Kenya & Tanzania), Charles Nach Mback(Rwanda), Issa Moko (Benin), MahamadouNdriandy (Madagascar), Nneka UdummaNkpa (Nigeria), Jean Charles Simobang(Gabon), Enone Théodore (Cameroon),Ibrahima Thioye (Senegal), Khaled Zaki(Egypt), Bureau d’études & d’ingénierieConseil CERDDEA (Niger), Cabinet Ramm-ble Consultancy – Leola Rammble (SouthAfrica)

Asia-Pacific:

Andy Asquith (New Zealand), Chris Aulich(Australia), Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro

(Indonesia), Alice Celestino (Philippines),Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana (Thailand),Musharraf R. Cyan (Pakistan), Gao XiaoPing (China), Mathew John (India), Ngu-yen Ngoc Hien (Vietnam), Park In-soo(Republic of Korea), Qiao Jingjing (Chi-na), Yasuhiro Sagawa (Japan), ArkajaSingh (India), Fauziah Swasono (Indone-sia), Mike Tumanot (Philippines), RogerWettenhall (Australia), Ahmad JailaniMuhamed Yunus (Malaysia)

Eurasia:

L.V. Andrichenko (Russia), Alexander V.Batanov (Ukraine), N.A. Ignatyuk (Russia),Leïla T. Januzakova (Kazakhstan), Artur G.Kazinian (Armenia), A.V. Pavlushkin (Rus-sia), A.E. Postnikov (Russia), N.V. Putilo(Russia), Vage V. Rafaelian (Armenia),Nizami Safarov (Azerbaijan), Akmal Kh.Saidov (Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Turkme-nistan, Uzbekistan), Kiamran Shafiev(Azerbaijan), Edgar E. Shatirian (Arme-nia), V.A. Sivitsky (Russia), Paata Tzino-vadze (Georgia), Grigorij A. Vasilevitch(Belarus), V.A. Vasiliev (Russia)

Europe:

Yves Cabannes (United Kingdom), AdrianCampbell (United Kingdom), Carlo Iannello(Italy), Gerardo Ruiz-Rico Ruiz (Spain),Mayte Salvador Crespo (Spain)

Latin America:

Luciana Albuquerque Lima (Brazil), PinoAlonso (Cuba), Paola Arjona (Colombia),Michel Azcueta (Peru), Felix Barrios (Guate-mala), Juan Carlos Benalcazar Guerrón(Ecuador), Antonio Cararello (Uruguay),Salvador Valencia Carmona (Mexico), Fer-nando Carrión (Ecuador), Jesús MaríaCasals Hernández (Venezuela, R. B. de),Rokael Cardona Recinos (Costa Rica, El Sal-vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,Panama), Daniel Cravacuore (Argentina),Ramón de la Cruz Ochoa (Cuba), RubenHernández Valle (Costa Rica), Carlos Eduar-do Higa Matsumoto (Brazil), Eduardo Klin-

2. The majority of the

contributors

mentioned below

compiled the UCLG

Country Profiles

(2007). These

profiles are available

at:

http://www.cities-

localgovernments.

org/gold/

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 17

ger (Dominican Republic), Antonio MoreiraMaués (Brazil), Dalia Moreno López (Mexi-co), Andrew Nickson (Bolivia & Paraguay),Martha Prieto Valdés (Cuba), Mario Rosales(Chile), Alejandro Socorro (Cuba), NéstorVega (Ecuador), Alicia Veneziano (Uru-guay), José Luis Villegas Moreno (Venezue-la, R. B. de.)

Metropolis:

Philip Amis (United Kingdom)

Middle East & West Asia:

Mustapha Adib (Lebanon), Najem Al Ah -mad (Syrian Arab Republic), MohammadDjalali (Islamic Rep. of Iran), Ye se ren Elicin(Turkey), Mohammad Hachemi (IslamicRep. of Iran), Adnan M. Hayajneh (Jordan),Aude Signoles (West Bank and Gaza)

North America:

Jean-Pierre Collin (Canada), Jefferey Se -llers (United States)

Special acknowledgments forfinancial and advisory support:

Generalitat de Catalunya

Diputación de Barcelona

Pays de la Loire

INTRODUCTION18 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

INTRODUCTIONDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 19

“Local self-government denotes the right and

the ability of local authorities, within the limits

of the law, to regulate and manage a

substantial share of public affairs under their

own responsibility and in the interests of the

local population”.

(European Charter of Local Self Government,

Part I, Art. 3)

One of the goals of United Cities and Lo -

cal Governments since its creation in2004 has been to create a Global Observa-tory on Local Democracy and Decentraliza-tion “in order to analyze on a regular basisthe advances and possible reverses to localdemocracy and decentralization aroundthe world, to anticipate potential changesand to analyze the obstacles faced and thesolutions required to overcome them” (UCLGExecutive Bureau, June 2005).

This First Global Report, as we present ittoday, is one of the results of that initiative.It is also the first global attempt to offer acomparative analysis of the situation of localauthorities in every region in the world. Thelocal elected representatives who are mem-bers of the governing bodies of UCLG sharecertain core values regarding local gover-nance issues and support the principle ofsubsidiarity, whereby decisions should bemade at the level of government closest tothe citizens. This Report will contribute todeepening reflection of these values.

The Report, drawn up by a network of expertsand university academics on every continent,under the scientific direction of GRALE (Rese-arch Group on Local Administration in Euro-pe)1, is not intended to be exhaustive,although a majority of states around the worldare examined. Among the countries that werenot included in the Report were those withinsufficient information sources and/or failedstates lacking local institutions or affected byarmed conflict. The Report focuses strictly onthe municipal level (or equivalent), or theintermediate tier of go vernment when it is themain level responsible for local government.Relations between the local level and otherlevels of territorial administration are alsotaken into account.

The Report takes readers through the se -ven regions of the world, defined in accor-dance with the continental sections thatmake up the structure of UCLG. Each chap-ter deals with three main themes:

a) the evolution and development of terri-torial structures;

b) powers, management and finance; c) local democracy.

An eighth chapter examines the forms ofgovernance of the metropolises, whererapid growth presents significant challen-ges, particularly in countries of the globalSouth and above all in Asia. This chapter isof particular interest to the metropolitansection of UCLG.

INTRODUCTION

1. GRALE is an international scientific network attached to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (French National Science Research Center)

in Paris. It was set up in accordance with an agreement between the following French universities and other bodies: the Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne

University, the University of Reims-Champagne-Ardenne, l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (the Institute of Political Studies) at Aix-en-Provence, the

French Ministry of the Interior, the French National Assembly, the Inter-Ministerial Delegation on Regional Development and Competitiveness and

the Compagnie Générale des Eaux. Dozens of research centres in France and abroad are members of the network. The eight specialist academic

centres that are GRALE partners are: CESMO (Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques du Moyen Orient – Center for Middle-East Strategic Studies) in Lebanon,

the Institute of Comparative Law and Legislation in Moscow, Russia, the Institute of Political Sciences in Bordeaux, France, the EROPA (Eastern

Regional Organization for Public Administration) in the Philippines, the Partnership for Municipal Development in Benin, the Autonomous University of

Mexico, the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, and the University of Southern California in the United States.

INTRODUCTIONDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World20

Drafting the Report raised numerous me tho -dological and practical difficulties. In the com-parative work, the terms used and above allthe concepts they express often conceal diffe-rent meanings and connotations that simpletranslation does not uncover. In-depth analy-ses are required, notably of the essential no -tions: “The Global Report calls for, and at thesame time makes possible, an effort to clarifythe essential notions,” as expressed byGérard Marcou, the scientific co-ordinator,who raises the key question as to “What dowe understand by decentralization, local de -mocracy or even local self-government?” Anattempt to clarify these matters is given in thepostface to the Report.

As the Report clearly shows, in the last 20years decentralization has established itself asa political and institutional phenomenon inmost countries around the world. These coun-tries have local authorities, consisting of localassemblies elected by universal suffrage andan executive, both of which are expected, todifferent degrees, to respond to their citizens.As is shown by widespread legislative or cons-titutional reform, the global process has resul-ted in wider recognition of the role andposition of local authorities as well as a signifi-cant increase in their powers and financing,notwithstanding the many differences betwe-en countries. The emergence of new politicalleadership at the local level is reflected almosteverywhere in the creation of associations ofelected members or local authorities in morethan 130 countries (virtually all members ofUCLG).

“The notions of ‘autonomía local’, ‘local self-government’, ‘Selbstverwaltung’ and ‘libre ad -

ministration’ have gradually become the normin territorial administration in every region.

However, the picture that emerges fromthe research contains sharp contrasts. Inmany countries, these reforms are eithervery recent or are facing difficulties in theirimplementation. Two issues come into viewof particular concern for local authorities,especially in countries of the South: finan-cing and staff.

Hence, the fundamental issues and ques-tions of the growing debate are: What hap-pens to local autonomy when the level offinancial autonomy is deficient or non-exis-tent, given the tendency of central govern-ments to absorb a larger share of theresources? What is the adequate proportionof local authorities’ own resources and statetransfers? What happens when interven-tions by higher tiers of government withinthe state weaken the ability of local authori-ties to freely choose the ways they managetheir services and administrative structu-res? More broadly, to what extent do decen-tralization and subsidiarity enable localauthorities and their communities to impro-ve access to services and to work towardsdevelopment? Moreover, how can we gua-rantee good quality services expected bycitizens?

These debates explain the rising interestamong local authorities and internationalorganizations in the definition of the uni-versal principles that serve as a referenceon a worldwide scale. The approval by UN-HABITAT of the Guidelines on Decentraliza-

tion and the Strengthening of Local

Authorities in April 2007 was a major stepfor ward in this direction, for which UCLGhas worked very hard.

The Guidelines recognize that sustai nabledevelopment is made possible by “the effec-tive decentralization of responsibilities,policy management, de cision-making aut-hority and sufficient re sources, includingrevenue collection authority, to local autho-rities, closest to, and most representativeof, their cons tituencies.” The Guidelines areconceived as guidance on reforms but donot im pose a uniform, rigid model. The gui-delines integrate notions of governance andde mocracy, representative democracy andparticipative democracy; they define theprinciples that govern the mandate of lo -cally elected authorities and the powers andresponsibilities of local authorities, ba sed onsubsidiarity. The Guidelines also call for theintroduction of constitutional and legislativeguarantees to protect lo cal autonomy and to

INTRODUCTIONDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 21

ensure that local authorities have sufficienthuman and fi nancial resources to meet theirres pon sibilities. The Guidelines draw theirinspiration from the European Charter of

Local Self Government, to which the Euro-pean section of UCLG contributed. TheCharter, adopted in 1985 by the Council ofEurope and today ratified by 46 countries, isthe first document of a le gal nature at aninternational level concerning the statusand rights of local authorities2.

The Global Report will allow the readerto consider the problems that may arisein the implementation of these princi-ples and the way in which these difficul-ties may be surmounted. We thereforeinvite local authorities and their natio-nal, re gional and international associa-tions to en gage in action with UCLG inor der to:

• Circulate this Report and to press aheadwith the dialogue with states on theimplementation of the Guidelines on De -

centralization and the Strengthening of

Local Authorities.

• Ask national governments to supportthe adoption of the Guidelines on De -

centralization and the Strengthening

of Local Authorities by the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations.

• Ensure that the principles of the Guideli-

nes are supported by the regional insti-tutions in every continent, therebycontributing to their implementation by

member states.

• Contribute to furthering global reflectionon local government systems of fi nancingand management of human resources,which UCLG intends to pursue.

We would like to thank the experts anduniversity academics who have contributedto this Report, in particular GRALE, whichhas co-ordinated the work and ensured thescientific quality of the project as a whole.

Mention must also be made of the supportgiven by UCLG’s regional and metropolitansections, which, through their secretariats,have constantly defended the direction andapproach of the project.

We would also like to express our gratitudeto those institutions and local authoritiesthat have contributed to the production ofthis Report, in particular the Generalitat de

Catalunya, for their continued supportthroughout the project, the Diputació de

Barcelona, the Conseil Régional du Pays de

la Loire and the Groupe DEXIA.

Without the commitment and collaborationof all these partners, the Report would nothave been possible.

World Secretariat

United Cities and

Local Governments

2. The European Charter of Local Self-Government focuses mainly on the following principles:

· Regulation and management of a substantial share of public affairs by local authorities, through local elected representatives and

citizen participation;

· Right of local authorities to exercise their initiatives with regard to any matter included in their powers and responsibilities and not

assigned to any other authority;

· Selection and recruitment of local government staff according to merit and competence;

· Conditions of office of local elected representatives to allow free exercise of their functions;

· Local authorities' financial resources to correspond to the responsibilities determined by the constitution and law, of which they may

dispose freely within the framework of their powers;

· Administrative supervision of local authorities only to be carried out according to procedures determined by the constitution or by statute;

· Entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests;

· Legal protection of local self-government

AFRIC A

MUSTAPHA BEN LETAIEF

CHARLES NACH MBACK

JE AN-PIERRE ELONG MBA S SI

BIRAM OWENS NDIAYE

AFRICADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World24

AFRICADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 25

I. Introduction

Africa encompasses some 31 millionsquare kilometers and, according torecent estimates, houses a population ofmore than 933 million.1 This rapidly grow-ing population (2.5% per year), charac-terized by its extreme youth (medianage: 20), is a mosaic of peoples speakingmany languages. Moreover, the region issubject to rapid urban development; therate of urbanization in African countriesranges from 40% to 70%. There arethirty-four metropolises with more thanone million inhabitants; most are besetby the rapid growth of impoverished sub-urbs, as well as deficiencies in infrastruc-ture, public transportation and basicurban services. Literacy rates on averagerange from 40% to 60%. Civil disorderand military conflict are commonplace ina few regions, and in some countries asizeable percentage of the po pulation suf-fers from pandemics such as HIV/AIDS,malaria and tuberculosis.

In economic terms, after some 20 years ofimplementing structural adjustment poli-cies, African countries are becomingfinancially sound again, achieving anaverage annual growth rate between 4%and slightly more than 6% in 2005.Despite these positive signs, Africa is stilleconomically underdeveloped. With near ly15% of the world population, Africaaccounts for only 2% of world trade, andreceives only 3% of direct foreign invest-ment. (China received about 22% of for-eign investment). Of the world’s 47 leastdeveloped countries, as identified by theUnited Nations, 18 are in sub-SaharanAfrica. The New Partnership for AfricanDevelopment (NEPAD) has not yet beenable to attract significant aid and invest-ment to the continent, or to mobilizeAfrican savings of which 40%, accordingto experts, is invested outside Africa. Nev-ertheless, some of the measures taken bythe international community, especiallythe enhanced Heavily In debted PoorCountries Initiative (HIPC), should help to

increase the financial and policy capacityof public authorities and local govern-ments in certain countries, especially incombating po ver ty, providing access toservices and im pro ving living conditions.

There has been a substantial rise in thenumber of democratic political systemssince the 1990s, in marked contrast to the1950s and 1960s, the two decades follow-ing African independence. During that ti -me, one-party political systems predo -minated, and access to state power wasoften gained by means of coups d’etat.

In some areas, political and institutionalsystems remain fragile. Considerable ten-sion still exists in parts of Central Africa(Democratic Republic of Congo, CentralAfrican Republic and Chad), West Africa(Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea Bissau,Sierra Leone and Togo) and East Africa(Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan).

Most political systems are now multi-party,and leaders are chosen by universal suf-frage. Some categories of local officials(re gional governors, walis in Al geria, Mo -rocco and Tunisia, mouhafidhs in ArabRepublic of Egypt, and go vern ment repre-sentatives in Cameroon) are stillappointed. Over the past five years, Africahas seen 35 electoral contests, including20 presidential elections, five parliamen-tary elections, four constitutional referen-dums2 and six local elections.3 The major-ity of states are unitary republics; three ofthese, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africahave federal systems. Lesotho, Moroccoand Swaziland are kingdoms. Comparisonsof constitutional systems reveal the pre -dominance of presidential systems. SouthAfrica has a mixed parliamentary andpresidential system, Niger has a semi-presidential system and Morocco has acons titutional monarchy.

The table below provides baseline data onthe geographic, political and economic po -sition, and territorial organization of Afri cancountries.

The majority of

states are unitary

republics, but there

are also three

states with federal

systems (Ethiopia,

Nigeria and South

Africa) and three

kingdoms

(Lesotho, Morocco

and Swaziland)

1. Internet world stats

http://www.internet

worldstats.com/stats

1.htm.

2. Algeria, Egypt,

Kenya, Mauritania,

Tunisia.

3. Data current at 20th

December 2006.

AFRICADecentralization and Local Dem

ocracy in the World

26Country Political Type of state Regional level Provincial level Supra communal level Municipality/Metropolitan levelPopulation / land area system

Algeria Presidential Unitary 48 Wilaya 1541 municipalities33.4 m /2,381,741 km2

Benin Presidential Unitary 77 municipalities8.2 m / 112.622 km2

Cameroon Presidential Unitary 10 regions 2 metropolis 11 urban municipalities16.3 m / 475,412 km2 11 districts 316 rural municipalities

Arab Republic of Egypt Presidential Unitary 26 Mouhafasats 217 cities and Luxor 4617 towns76.7 m / 1,001,450 km2 (both decentralized and (Special Status)

deconcentred structures)

Gabon Presidential Unitary 47 departments 50 municipalities1.4 m / 267,670 km2

Ghana Presidential Unitary 166 district21.1 m / 238,540 km2 assemblies

Guinea Presidential Unitary 38 urban municipalities 9.5 m / 245,860 km2 303 rural municipalities (CRD)/ 1 city (Conakry)

Côte d’Ivoire Presidential Unitary 19 regions 58 departments 197 municipalities and 2 cities: Abidjan with 10 municipalities17.9 m / 322,463 km2 and Yamoussokro with town councils

Kenya Presidential Unitary 8 provinces including 175 Local Authorities (municipal councils, town councils and 35.1 m / 580,370 km2 the City of Nairobi county councils) and 3 cities: Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumi

Madagascar Presidential Unitary 22 regions 1557 municipalities, including 45 urban municipalities, 18.6 m / 587,051 km2 (Faritany) 3 cities with special status:

Antananarivo with six districts- Nosy Bé - Sainte Marie

Mali Presidential Unitary 8 regions 49 cercles 703 municipalities13.9 m / 1,267,000 km2 Bamako district (with six

town councils) governed by special regulations

Table 1 Geographic, Political and Economic Position and Territorial Organization of Each Country


ocracy in the World

27

Country Political Type of state Regional level Provincial level Supra communal level Municipality/Metropolitan levelPopulation / land area system

Morocco Constitutional Unitary 16 regions 49 provinces 1497 municipalities32.2 m / 446,550 km2 Monarchy 13 prefectures (urban areas)

Mozambique Presidential Unitary 10 provinces 33 urban municipalities19.8 m / 801,590 km2 1042 localities (rural municipalities)

Niger Semi Presidential Unitary 8 regions* 36 departments* 4 urban communities 265 municipalities, including 213 rural and 52 urban 13.2 m / 1,267,000 km2 (with Niamey) and 5 sedentarized nomadic groupings

Nigeria Presidential Federal 36 Federated 774 municipalities131.5 m / 923,770 km2 States

Senegal Presidential Unitary 11 regions 67 municipalities, 43 innercity municipalities (in 4 cities), 11.4 m / 196,722 km2 2 metropolitan point authority, 321 rural municipalities

South Africa Mixed parliamentary Federal 9 regions 47 municipal district councils 231 including 6 metropolitan municipalities47.4 m / 1,221,041 km2 and presidential

Tanzania Presidential Unitary A self-governing unit 92 rural district councils 1) 22 urban councils, 92 rural councils, 3 townships, 38.8 m / 945,090 km2 that is not federated, Zanzibar 2) within the districts: 10,075 registered villages

Togo Presidential Unitary 6 regions* 30 préfectures* 30 urban municipalities6.15 m / 56,790 km2

Tunisia Presidential Unitary 24 governorates 264 municipalities10.100 m / 163,610 km2 (Wilaya, (both decentralized

and deconcentred structures)

Uganda Presidential Unitary 79 districts 1 city council , 13 municipalities in urban areas - 34.2 m / 241,040 km2 87 town councils

Zambia Presidential Unitary 54 rural district councils 1) urban areas: 4 city councils, 14 urban district councils10.6 m /752,614 km2 2) rural areas: none

Zimbabwe Presidential Unitary 58 rural district councils 1) urban areas: 6 city councils, 28 urban councils, 10 municipal 13.01 m / 390,760 km2 councils, 8 town councils, 4 board councils

2) rural areas: none

Regarding territorial organization, this table highlights only local governments in these countries and not the administrative jurisdictions.

* Provided by the law, regions, departments or prefectures, as well as rural municipalities in Niger, have not been established by norm.


The view of decentralization in African gov-ernments seems to fluctuate betweenregarding it as a technique of administrativeorganization and –more rarely– as a genu -ine long-term policy. If decentralization is apolicy, it can help to change the operationof existing political systems. If, on theother hand, it is thought of primarily as anadministrative technique, it is likely to leadonly to rationalization of administrativestructures and their effectiveness.

In practice, decentralization in Africa hasmost often been conceived and imple-

mented as an adminis-trative technique.Indeed, when colonialpowers controlled mostof Africa, they oftensought to disrupt tradi-tional ties in order toconsolidate their cen-tralized po wer. In some

cases a colonial power did try to preserve anexisting administrative model, but thisapproach too was adopted primarily tostrengthen colonial power, rather than fosterself-governance. Predictably, local po -pulations perceived the few decentralizedstructures set up by colonizers as tools forreinforcing the colonial presence. In allcountries in the region, this colonial legacyof an ad hoc and often contradictory combi-nation of centralization and decentralizationformed the foundation of post-colonial terri-torial administration. Following independ-ence, embryonic national administrationsrelied on the familiar centralized model asthey confronted urgent problems ofresources, administrative management andthe establishment of state structures. Thecontinuation of centralized power was seenas expedient not only to control data andpolicy orientation, but also to deal with theshortcomings and failures of new govern-ments struggling to establish nationalauthority.

This explains why, particularly in francoph-one African countries, the centralizingmodel inherited from the colonial power

was adopted. For internal territorialadministration, however, the preferredapproach tended more toward decentral-ization, though not to an extent that couldundermine an overarching philosophy ofcentralization. Decen tralization was stillfeared and deliberately avoided if it threat-ened to move beyond administrative tech-nique toward political substance and anydemocratic content. The concern of thenew governing elites was to consolidatetheir power. From this perspective, thequest for national unity –seen as a way ofcombating potentially damaging tribal,local or regional affinities– was given ahigh profile. Modernization, economicdevelopment and national unity becamethe favoured slogans.

In African countries, the concepts of politi-cal and administrative decentralizationdeveloped along the lines of the Frenchdéconcentration –state representatives atthe local level rather than locally electedbodies. From the outset they were strate-gic instruments intended primarily toensure uniform administration of the terri-tory by the central government. The idealof centralization predominated for a longtime, relegating the more democraticmodel of decentralization to the backburner.

The constraints on putting decentralizationinto practice have been apparent for a longtime, though such restrictions ha ve occa-sionally undergone nominal modifications todisarm critics. For the most part, suchsuperficial alterations, however highlyapproved or formally en shrined in the legalsystem, amounted to little more than cos-metic palliatives.

Today, the legal status of decentralizationpolicies in most African countries is stipu-lated in one of two ways: explicitly in aconstitution, or by lower-level laws andregulations. To date, less than 40% ofAfrican constitutions mention local gov-ernments as a specific level of gover-nance. In countries where decentralization

In practice, decentralization in Africa

has most often been conceived and

implemented as an administrative

technique


Table 2 Local Governments: Demography and Urbanization

Regions Population (millions) Rate of urbanization (%) Municipalities (number)

North Africa 154 62 4200

West Africa 264 40 3000

Central Africa 98 47 1000

East Africa 245 31 1900

Southern Africa 148 36 1300

Africa as a whole 909 38 11400

Source: PDM, 2006.

and local governments are defined instatutes of a lower rank than the consti-tution, three main tendencies can beseen. Some countries have relativelyelaborate legislation with many regula-tions, decrees and ordinances for imple-mentation. This model is found primarilyin francophone countries. The profusionof statutes complicates the implementa-tion of decentralization and slows thingsdown, causing substantial delays betweenconfirmation of legality, and actualenforcement; delays of 10 years are notunusual. The second legislative tendencyinvolves a relatively small number of lawsand regulations on decentralization. Typi-cally, only about half a dozen statutescover the various aspects of implement-ing decentralization. The majority ofcountries in this category are formerBritish colonies. Somewhere between theFrench and British models is North Africa,where there has never really been amajor break in the decentralization policy.The process there seems to have takenroot in the colonial era, and has pro-gressed to this day with a kind of slow,sometimes imperceptible, continuity.Some of the earliest North Africanstatutes date back to the middle of the19th century (Tunisia, 1858). However,

there have been major territorial reforms,including the 1984 Algerian law, andMorocco’s 1996 constitutional reform and1997 law on regions. Despite the long expe-rience of North African countries withdecentrali za tion, the autonomy of local gov-ernment there is still restricted overall in re -lation to the central state.

A complex picture thus emerges of mul-tiple historic, sociological, cultural, eco-nomic, political and legal influences inAfrican governments. Nevertheless,move ment toward decentralization andlocal democracy can be discerned.

The first major tendency, if not an actualtrend, is quantitative. Since independence,in nearly every part of the continent therehas been noticeable, continuous growth inthe number of local governments and inthe territory they administer. This growthis especially noticeable in the Africanurban environment. Diversification and amore refined and complex hierarchy ofstructures and territorial tiers of decentral-ization can also be seen.

The table below compares population fig-ures, rates of urbanization and the numberof local governments by African region.


The second major tendency is qualitative,an increasing acceptance of the substanceof decentralization as a policy.

Although in most African states decentrali -zation has long been regarded primarily as an organizational and administrative man-agement technique, it now seems to begaining true political substance in manycountries. However slowly and gradually,decentralization is gaining recognition as aneffective way to give increasingly robustindependent decision-making powers tolocal governments. This gradual consolida-tion of local electoral legitimacy alsoenhances the credibility of the decentralizedauthorities. This trend is by no means dom-inant; in some areas decentralizing activi-ties seem to be mixed with traditional sys-tems and, as in Algeria, challenged to thepoint where it is virtually non-existent.

Many countries, especially Niger, Senegal,South Africa and Uganda, have alreadyundertaken decentralizing reforms in theorganization of state and public life. Thesecountries have organized local elections,and have seen local authorities emergingas new public authority figures alongsidenational authorities. Admittedly, in most ofthese countries, the division of publicauthority has caused problems. In part,this may simply be because such a majorinstitutional change can be absorbed onlyslowly by many incumbent nationalauthorities.

Implicitly, implementation of the decentral-ization process has rarely been properlyplanned. While North African countries havea longstanding policy of decentralization,the pace of imple mentation there is notaltogether uniform. In West and Central

Africa, apart from Senegal and BurkinaFaso, there is no real plan to implementdecentralization. Rather, moves to decen-tralize in this region seem to rest on policyannouncements made in the speeches byheads of state. In East and Southern Africa,the history of decentralization is closelyrelated to the end of recent social and polit-ical crises. There, implementation of de -centralization has a high priority in govern-ment action plans and seems to be subjectto a pre-established, regularly assessedtimetable. The most exemplary case isSouth Africa, where the end of theapartheid policy imposed a new approach togovernance that involves the entire popula-tion in public management at all levels. Thispolicy of transformation is en shrined in theReconstruction and Deve lopment Program(RDP) whose entire philosophy can besummed up in the slogan "A better life forall." With the Local Government TransitionAct (1993), adopted to govern the transi-tional period, the Municipal System Act(2000) and the Municipal Property RatingAct (2004), the South African governmentgave itself 11 years to set up a system oflocal governance that is almost revolution-ary compared with previous practice.

Apart from South Africa, African govern-ments have not relied on rigorous planningto implement decentralization policies. It isnot surprising, therefore, that most ofthem have no mechanisms to assess theconduct and establishment of such poli-cies. This is why United Cities and LocalGovernment of Africa (UCLGA) is askingthat local governance be included in thegood governance criteria selected by thePeer Review Mechanism of NEPAD.

Despite resistance, decentralization is movingforward in the region. More substantialprogress may be expected as the number oflocal governments increases, and their capac-ities are enhanced. Under standably, the vari-ous decentralization policies have not devel-oped in the same fashion, or in accord withthe same timetable. Implementation as wellas the content of policies is strongly influ-

In East and Southern Africa, the history of decentralization is

closely related to the end of social and political crises


enced by the historical context from whichthey emerged, and the administrative tradi-tion inherited from the colonial era.

The third tendency consists of a relativeincrease in the responsibilities of local go vern -ments in many countries. In principle, thisincrease bears witness to greater decentraliza-tion, and fits within the logic of di s engagementof the state and central ad ministration. In prac-tice, however, it has proved problematic andeven counterproductive in the absence of anyreal transfer of powers and financial resources.In virtually all cases, the central governmentretains control of local funds and taxation, aswell as its monopoly on foreign aid and financ-ing.

The fourth tendency, which is still at anembryonic stage, looks to enlist local andforeign private-sector resources to provideand manage a certain number of urban serv-ices, such as the collection of household orindustrial waste (Tunisia, Benin, Burkina Fasoand South Africa), drinking water (Morocco),or urban transport and sanitation.

The fifth tendency, which is gradually tak-ing shape, involves setting up networks oflocal authorities to foster decentralized co-operation. The creation of national associ-ations of local governments, including theUCLGA, and the reinforcement of their roleat the national level, reflects this tendency.Such associations provide tools to enhancethe credibility of local authorities as rele-vant actors in the dialogue on develop-ment and co-operation in Africa. In SouthAfrica, the association of local governmentauthorities, SALGA, is recognized as a pub-lic institution. Elsewhere, national associa-tions of local governments have the statusof associations under private law, althoughsome, such as the Association of Munici-palities in Burkina Faso (AMBF), may beacknowledged as acting on behalf of publicinterest.

The sixth tendency now emerging and cer-tainly varying from one country to another,is a modest relaxation of the control

exerted over local governments. There is adiscernible retreat from practices reminis-cent of the exercise of power from the topdown, and a move toward restricting over-sight to strictly legal aspects, allowinggreater local autonomy. However, it is alsotrue that, in a few African countries, thesituation is less fluid, and there have infact been some setbacks.

These various movements, obvious and tan-gible to varying degrees, and often verygradual with pauses, checks and less fre-quently, qualitative leaps, can be seen (i) atthe structural level, (ii) at the material andfunctional levels of responsibility and ma na -gement, and (iii), more globally and sub-stantially, in the progress and limits of localdemocracy.

II. Changes at Structural Levels

Municipal structures emerged in the 19thcentury, particularly in Senegal, Egyptand Tunisia. In the 20th century, munici-palities were established and gainedground in all colonial territories. Far fromrespecting principles of local participa-tion, the system was designed to ensurethe colonizers' control over the territory,and their ability to oversee the local pop-ulation. Before independence, municipaladministration in African colonies differedsomewhat, depending on the model pre-ferred by the controlling Europeannation: the French system of "com-munes," the British local governmentsystem, and Portuguese "municipios." Inall cases, decentralization tended to bepurely administrative. Few local bodieswere elected; local executives were usu-ally appointed and had only limited orconsultative powers. Such decentraliza-tion also enabled administrators andcolonists in rural areas to be governed bythe same arrangements as their compa-triots in colonial capitals and in Europe.

Overall, two systems, direct and indirectrule, predominated in sub-Saharan Africa.Direct rule was favored in countries colo-


nized by France, Belgium and Portugal.Direct rule meant administrative oversightof colonial territory organized into “cer-cles,” subdivisions and cantons under theresponsibility of the colonial administra-tors. Local authorities played only a con-sultative role.

Indirect rule, established primarily inBritish colonies, allowed local people somefreedom to manage their own affairs, suchas the administration of justice or the col-lection of taxes –to be shared with thecolonial government. Indigenous customsand authority were more or less ignored aslong as local leaders protected the inter-ests of the colonial power. This systemsowed the seeds of future decentralizationin these countries.

In North Africa, the colonial administrativeprocess was more complex. In this region,18th and 19th century colonial powersencountered many established state struc-tures. For the most part, colonial municipaladministration under European nationsrested on old, indigenous structures, albeitheavily influenced by the recent, Europeanoccupying power. Both the British in Egyptand Sudan, and the French in Algeria,Morocco and Tunisia sought such accom-modation.

When African countries achieved inde-pendence, the new governments chose toretain the structure inherited from thecolonial power, rather than move imme-diately toward decentralization. From the

outset, the old systems were seen asinstruments for extending central powerover local communities. It was not untilthe 1980s and the ensuing wave ofdemocratization in the 1990s that a newdirection gained momentum. CentralizedAfrican governments showed renewedinterest in decentralization. Gradually,local governments began taking chargeof more local matters. In fact, changes inadministrative structure went hand-in-hand with moves toward decentralizationin all endeavors to modernize the state.This widespread change in public policyin Africa was expected to lead to accept-ance of "local democracy" as a key pillarof territorial administrative organiza-tions. Since the mid-1980s, several fac-tors have pushed African governmentstoward economic liberalization andadjustment policies. These factorsinclude: budget difficulties generated byshrinking re sources, challenges to inter-ventionist public administration systems,the resurgence of liberal ideas advocat-ing the rehabilitation of market mecha-nisms, the disengagement of the state,and the changing roles of the public sec-tor and private initiative. These new con-siderations implied taking part in global-ization and international competitionrequired genuine policies of reform andrestructuring, and this rationale affectedall subsequent reforms relating to local go -vern ment and urban policy.

However, not all African countries chosethe same route in adopting and imple-menting decentralization policies. In themajority of countries, decentralizationpolicies were adopted following citizens’demands for increased participation. Thiswas strongly expressed by local communi-ties in pro-democracy movements duringthe 1990s. Because of the connectionbetween democratization and decentral-ization, some people saw the adoption ofdecentralization reforms as a corollary tothe democratization and liberalization thatsome financial partners of African govern-ments were imposing as a condition for

In fact, changes in administrative structure went hand-in-hand

with moves towards decentralization, which formed the core

of all endeavors to modernize the State and with it public

policy in Africa, supposedly leading to "local democracy" as

a key pillar of the entire territorial administrative organization


providing aid. In some cases, central gov-ernments made the adoption of decentral-ization policies appear to be the result ofdonor conditions. In Mali and Niger, decen-tralization was a response to localdemands, including some violent demon-strations and threats of secession. In othercountries, decentralization provided anopportunity to over come or even eliminatethe stigma of a previous political andadministrative organization, as in the caseof South African apartheid.

In North Africa, changes in local govern-ment structures seem to have come aboutmore slowly, and the reforms to have beenless thorough. In all countries in this re -gion, the territorial administrative struc-ture seems to be fixed, tied to the struc -ture of the governorate (Wilaya in Algeria,Tunisia and Morocco, Mouhafadha inEgypt), which is more a tier of administra-tive de cen tralization.

Nevertheless, almost everywhere thedecentralization option is perceived asprogress and is expected to:

• Mobilize communities to work for sus-tainable local development andimproved living conditions;

• Help democracy to take root and spreadat the local level;

• Reform the state and rebuild the legiti-macy of public institutions from thebottom up;

• Constitute the starting point forregional integration genuinely rooted inAfrican realities.

To achieve this, local governments are beinggiven general notional authority over theterritory for which they are responsible.Some have exclusive powers as well as pow-ers they share with other levels of publicgovernance. In North Africa, the powers oflocal governments must compete with thecentral administration and various nationalpublic enterprises for service delivery (edu-cation, health, transport, sanitation, drink-ing water and electricity).

The theory and content of decentralizationpolicies tends to be different in federal statesand unitary countries. The decentralizationconcept also varies in accordance with theadministrative tradition inherited from thecolonial period. In federal states, local gov-ernments come under the remit of federatedstates; these federated states define thecontent of the local government system andits administration. This can lead to a widerange of methods of organizing local govern-ment –a circumstance which does not facili-tate a comparative interpretation of localgovernance. In unitary states, the organiza-tion of local go vernments is usually the samethroughout the national territory. However,the actual powers granted to local officialsare, again, influenced by the administrativetradition inherited from the colonial era.

In francophone countries, the organizationof local governments corresponds in princi-ple to a division of powers between centraland local authorities, the latter being rep-resented by an elected deliberative bodyand an elected or appointed executivebody. Municipal terms of office are usuallysimilar to those of national institutions(four or five years) and re-election isallowed. In these countries, the municipalexecutive, mayor or top administrator typ-ically has real decision-making power inlocal management, the powers of this officebeing defined by law. However, this nomi-nal decision-making power is oftenrestricted by the practice of pooling funds;that is, all public resources are held in theTreasury under the control of the Ministerof Finance. Thus, the representatives of theMinistry of Finance, such as the comptrol-ler and municipal tax collector, have effec-tive power over local governments. Manymayors consider such fiscal power exces-sive because ministry representatives canblock expenditure even if it has been com-mitted in accordance with all laws and reg-ulations. It is therefore a claim of nationalassociations of local governments to relin-quish or even suppress the principle of uni-fied treasury. However in Senegal the lawmakes it possible to deviate from this rule:


local governments may be authorized todeposit all or only part of their availablefunds with the Treasury.

In countries with a British administrativetradition, local governments also haveelected deliberative bodies; executive bod-ies are either elected or appointed. Theterms of office of deliberative bodies are

similar to those in fran -co phone countries, butthose of the executivebody –one to threeyears– are shorter.Furthermore, re-elec-tion is not al ways per-mitted. Ma yors ge ne rallyhave a cere mo nial ratherthan exe cutive role. Realexe cutive po wer is

actually held by another public official, theTown Clerk or Chief Executive Officer, whomore often than not is appointed at thenational level by the Minister for Local Go -vernment. As they do in francophone coun-tries, national associations supporting localgovernments seek further decentralizingreforms in anglophone countries, in cludingthe establishment of true executive powersfor mayors, and an extension of mayors'terms of office.

Governance of major cities

Most countries on the African continent areexperiencing a marked trend towardurbanization, the gradual movement ofrural populations into the cities. This phe-nomenon is considered a vector of mod-ernization and competitiveness, not onlyfor cities, but also for the surrounding ter-ritories.

In most parts of Africa, the organization ofmajor metropolises –particularly capitalcities– tends to display specific features.Such features can be identified in politicalcapitals such as Rabat (Morocco), Lusaka(Zambia), Dakar (Senegal), Tswane(South Africa), Yaoundé (Cameroon),Accra (Ghana) and Algiers (Algeria). Com-

mon elements are also apparent in bigcities whose importance is determined bydemographic or economic weight, such asJohannesburg (South Africa), Douala(Cameroon), Ku masi and Shama-Ahanta(Ghana). All such ma jor cities are gov-erned by distinct legal arrangements thatconstitute important organizational andmanagerial exceptions to the more com-mon laws of municipalities.

In Morocco, the new commune char-ter of October 3, 2002 made specialarrangements for cities with morethan 500,000 inhabitants. Thesecities are managed by a single com-mune with arrondissements that arenot legal entities. Morocco modeledits system on the French politicalconfiguration of Paris, Lyon and Mar-seille (known as PLM Law).The Moroccan charter also decreedspecial status for the urban communeof Rabat, the capital, and the Me -chouar communes where the royalpalaces are situated.

Typically, major African cities are dividedinto sub-urban administrative units, whichmay be separate legal entities. The latteris the case for the urban arrondissement

communes in Douala and Yaoundé inCameroon. Sub-metropolitan communescreated in this way are governed by thecommon law of municipalities. Conversely,in some countries sub-metropolitan unitsremain sub-municipal bodies withoutadministrative autonomy; this occurs inAccra and Kumasi in Ghana, and Cotonouin Benin.

Elections also differ somewhat in majormetropolises; the deliberative body iselected by direct universal suffrage, as forexample in Algeria, Nigeria, Gabon andMadagascar. Those elected then appointone of their fellow representatives asmunicipal executive. Another method ofse lection is appointment by indirect universal

More generally, African decentralization

sys tems classify lower-tier local

authorities according to their level of

development or urbanization


suffrage. Metropolitan councillors areelected by the deliberative bodies of thesub-metropolitan units; most candidatesare members of that deliberative body, asis the case in Cameroon. As for the distri-bution of powers, sub-urban units areresponsible for local community services,and are forums for participatory democ-racy. Federative services of importance tothe entire city are provided by the larger,central government of the city.

Many African decentralization systemsclassify lower-tier local authorities accord-ing to their level of development or urban-ization. For example, in decreasing rank ofurbanization Cameroon has urban commu-nities, urban communes under a specialscheme, urban communes and rural com-munes. In South Africa, classification takesthe form of an alphabetical hierarchy withcategory A, B and C municipalities. Such dif-ferentiation makes it easier to identify themost disadvantaged authorities and, througha process sometimes called equalization, tofocus on their development with specific sup-port policies.

The governmental variations observed inmajor cities point up the need to define theminimum common content of over-archingAfrican decentralization policies. In fact,an African local government charter thataddresses this need for more standardiza-tion is currently being mooted. The debateis being driven in particular by the UnitedCities and Local Governments of Africa(UCLGA) and the African Conference onDecentralization and Local Development(CADDEL).

III. Responsibilities, Managementand Finance

Undeniably, there is a trend towardstrengthening the responsibilities of localgovernments. However, the transfer ofresponsibility may not be accompanied bya transfer of the money or other resourcesrequired to fulfill the added duties. Most

African local governments continue toexperience very serious financial con-straints on their resources and powers.

The administrative capabilities of localgovernments are also restricted by ashortage of qualified personnel and thewherewithal to train employees properly.In part, it is this dearth of skilled officialsthat has lead to inefficient and ineffectivelocal management, particularly in theareas of strategic planning, urban develop-ment, economics and social development.Lack ing qualified personnel, some localand urban governments have turned to theprivate sector for help in the managementof local affairs, public services and prop-erty. Recently, several African cities havealso sought private assistance with mod-ern information and communications tech-nology.

III.1. Responsibilities

One of the most important aims of decentral-ization is to provide an effective, appropriateresponse to the needs of local communitiesfor public services. The density and efficiencyof public services are among the most impor-tant indicators of the vigor of decentraliza-tion, and provide a vital source of legitimacyfor local governments. Unfortunately, suchservices seem unsatisfactory in virtually allcountries. The prerogatives of local govern-ments also vary from country to country,with two notable tendencies:

• Increased responsibilities of localauthorities for local services and urbanmanagement.

• More private-sector management of localpublic services by means of variousforms of devolution, such as delegation,licensing and partnerships.

Table 3 shows that a majority of countriesgrant many important powers to local go -vernments. The scope of responsibility co -vers social investment –infrastructure andsocial facilities, health, education, leisure–


and the provision of goods and services foreducation, health, culture, leisure, trans-port, water and sanitation. Local responsi-bilities also cover administration, urbanplanning and management, and local de -ve lopment.

Successful decentralization depends on themanner in which power is transferred tolocal governments. Invariably, transfer ofauthority provokes resistance from man-agers within larger regional and nationalministries. In North Africa, transfer ofpower may be considered only nominal. Inthis region, national ministries typically

retain control of local services, or delegatethem to the private sector. Sectors such aseducation and health are managed directlyby the corresponding ministries, whiledrinking water, sanitation and energy areeither state monopolies, or are providedby private concerns. In virtually all cases,the private providers are under contract tothe state, rather than to local authorities.This tendency can also be observed inWest and Central Africa, although basicservices there for education, health, water,sanitation and transportation are generallyacknowledged as local concerns. Even so,the ministries in this region also tend tobypass local governments in implementinglong-range sectoral policies. The ministriesare often encouraged by their private part-ners to minimize larger policy discussionswith local authorities. It appears to be ofsmall concern to private developers howtheir pressure for increased central controlmight affect a national momentum towarddecentralization.

Nevertheless, there are promising devel-opments in several eastern and southern

African countries, as well as a few anglo-phone countries in West Africa. In thesecountries, sectoral ministries are graduallydisengaging from the implementationphases of their programs. The result: localgovernments are taking over the localdepartments that previously came underthe territorial jurisdiction of sectoral min-istries. This transfer of authority, seen inGhana, South Africa and Uganda, necessi-tates changes in staff, budget resources,assets, and decision-making power. Inthese countries, central governmentdefines strategic guidelines for sectoralpolicies regarding health, water and edu-cation. Local governments, however, areresponsible for implementation. Whereversuch territory-wide measures have beenundertaken, as in the case of water andHIV/AIDS policy in Uganda, the effective-ness of these policies has increased sub-stantially. However, the decentralizationprocess is often hindered by national sec-tor-based policies that tend to privilegedeconcentration (limited transfer ofresponsibilities). One of the recurrentclaims of African local authorities is thatsector-based policies should be territorial-ized and thus more decentralized, as inGhana, Uganda or South Africa, and thatlocal authorities should be fully responsiblefor their implementation.

While public assertion of the new nominalpowers of local governments is widespread,the actual transfer of real executive andoperational powers is still rare. The chal-lenge remains to resolve the problem ofeffectively transferring the real financial andmanagerial powers from the centralizedministries to local authorities. Financialmanagement is, of course, the crucial factor.

III.2. Financial Management

Local government finance comes from twomain sources –local taxes and state grants.In some places, local governments sharelocal tax revenues with the central govern-ment. The state also makes financial trans-fers to local governments in the form of con-

The ministries concerned tend to bypass local governments

in implementing sectoral policies. They are encouraged

to a greater or lesser extent in this by the practices

of development partners who are often in ignorance of the

consequences of applying such policies


ocracy in the World

37

Table 3 Responsibilities of Local Authorities

COUNTRY POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (COMMUNES/MUNICIPALITIES)Planning and support to Drinking water, Security (administrative Town planning Basic services (health, Sport Culture Energy Transportthe local economy waste, sanitation police and CID) and habitat basic education) and leisure and tourism

Algeria X X X X X X X

Benin X X X X X X X X

Cameroon X X X X X X X

Egypt, Arab Rep. of X X X X X X X X

Gabon X X X X X X X X

Ghana X X X X X X X X X

Guinea X X X X X X X X

Côte d’Ivoire X X X X X X

Kenya X X X X

Madagascar X X X X X X

Mali X X X X X X X X X

Morocco X X X X X X X X X

Mozambique X X X X X X

Niger X X X X X X X X

Nigeria X X X X X X X X

Senegal X X X X X X X X

South Africa X X X X X X X X X

Togo X X X

Tunisia X X (waste only) X X X X X

Uganda X X X X X X X X

Zambia X X X X


ditional or unconditional grants, and othertypes of state financial contributions. Thespecific method of funding local developmentvaries from country to country. The capacityto mobilize “own re ve nues” is one of the fun-damental principles of decentralization.

III.2.1. Local resource mobilization

Legislation allows African local govern-ments to raise a panoply of resources intheir own territory from direct or indirectlocal tax revenues, service tax, fees col-lected from the operation of services,economic activities or municipal assetma nagement. Unfortunately, the lawdoes not always list the necessary localgovernment taxing powers to alter thevolume of their revenues; which meansthat municipal incomes generallyregarded as “own resources” are in factcontrolled by central government.

This imbalance can be seen most clearly inthe numerous countries that apply theFrench administrative model, where, intheory, there is a more diversified localtaxation system, yet in practice, local gov-ernments remain devoid of taxing powers,as tax rates are set out in the law orimposed by central government. Localgovernments do not administer local taxa-tion systems as such, rather they dependon taxes transferred from the state, whichin some cases have become state-sharedtaxes (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Ca meroon). Thetaxing powers of local governments inGabon, Niger and Togo are the exceptionto this tendency. Except for local govern-ments in Senegal, local governments arealso not empowered to set service feesand tariffs. Only in exceptional instancescan local governments collect duties oncertain local services or activities (as inTogo, for example) with the prior approvalof the overseeing state authority.

Local governments in anglophone countriesgenerally enjoy broader taxing powers andgreater freedom to set service rates andother indirect local tariffs; such as real es -

tate tax in Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania,Zam bia and Zimbabwe, and service fees inthe afore-mentioned countries and Nigeria.Nonetheless, local taxation in some coun-tries is negligible (e.g. Nigeria and Uganda,where tax revenue as a percentage of totalrevenue dropped from 30% to 11% in fiveyears after the removal of the more produc-tive “graduated tax”). Local governmentpowers to create indirect duties or tariffs onlocal activities are also exceptional (e.g. inZambia and Mo zambique). It is however,necessary to re lativize the importance ofthese local taxing powers, bearing in mindthe decisive control of central governmentsover revenue mo bilization (such as the priorapproval re quired for rates and tariffs inZambia), the low levels of own source rev-enues (see the case of Ghana in Figure 1)and the per centage of own revenues makingup a small share of the whole budget (30%on average, except in Zambia –77%– andSouth Africa -90%-).

The level of government responsible forcollecting the revenues also variesbetween countries: in some locations themunicipalities ensure the collection oftaxes, while in others the state collectsthe taxes and later distributes the rev-enues among local governments. Africanfrancophone tax revenue systems aregenerally centralized, although someduties may be collected locally (e.g. Mali,Morocco, Senegal) and some countriesmay present certain exceptions to thisrule (as is the case in Tunisia for the col-lection of certain taxes). However,regardless of the system in place the taxcollection rates remain low in all thecountries: approximately 50% in Kenya;lower still in Nigeria; 20% of real estatetaxes in Tunisia (collected at the locallevel); and between 45-50% on averagein Côte d’Ivoire or Níger (where the stateen sures the collection of revenues).

The use of a shared tax system is slowlyspreading as the main source of localgovernment budget funding. Value AddedTax (VAT) is a major component of


shared taxation. VAT has been estab-lished in almost all countries, and isdivided between the state and local gov-ernments in proportions that vary fromone country to another. In Morocco, forexample, local governments have beenreceiving 30% of the revenue since1986, and about 25% in Nigeria. InMozambique, 75% of the vehicle tax and30% of the tourist tax goes to the localgovernments. In Cape Verde, there is aset of unallocated taxes, and local gov-ernments receive 7% of that revenue.

The two most pressing problems arisingfrom this tax system management arethe terms of the division, which are oftenvery unfavorable to local governments,and the regularity of payments. Themanner in which the share allocated tolocal governments is distributed variesconsiderably. In some countries, thereare legal rules about the timing andamount of fund transfers. However, inmost countries the central administrationhas discretionary decision-makingpower; the state may take years to paythe agreed-upon share to the local gov-ernments. Typically, the local authoritieshave no legal recourse to counter suchdelays. Over and above these difficulties,shared tax systems cannot be consideredto be own revenues, as local govern-ments hold no power over setting the taxbase and rate; these resources, fromboth a political and economic point ofview, are similar to general transfers.

III.2.2. State financial transfers to local governments

Grants are organized in many ways, andalso vary from country to country. Simi-larly, the process of transferring grantfunds varies. In general, transfers can beunconditional (local governments aregiven free use of revenues), or conditional,in which case central government transfersare either based on pre-established objec-tive criteria or have a certain margin ofdiscretion (for local spending).

The principles of intergovernmentaltrans fers are sometimes listed in theConstitution (including procedures andcalculating criteria). For instance, theGhanaian Constitution envisages theexistence of the District Assemblies Com-mon Fund, which should receive 5% ofthe total national revenue, to be distrib-uted among the districts through a for-

mula approved by Parliament (art. 252).This is a unique case. Apart from practi-cal difficulties, this system has increasedthe financial dependency of local govern-ments on central go vernment. The 1999Constitution in Nigeria provides that atleast 13% of the country’s revenueaccruing to the Federation Accountderived from natural resources should bedistributed among the states, based on asharing formula that takes the principleof origin into account (in relation to thevolume of production of each state). It isup to each state legislature to determinethe amount of resources that will be dis-tributed among local governments, andto institute a joint account between theFederation and the state where Federa-tion and state contributions for local gov-ernment transfers are deposited (art.162). With no direct constitutional safe-guards over the volume of revenues ear-marked for local government transfers,the Federation decided to make directtransfers to local governments and allo-cated a portion of VAT for this purpose.

However, in most countries the central administration

has discretionary decision-making power;

the state may take years to pay the agreed-upon

share to the local governments


Sometimes the law provides a formula forgrant allocation. One of the best examplesis that of South Africa governed by articles213 and 214 of the Constitution. All moneyreceived by national government is paidinto the National Revenue Fund (art. 213).The Division of Revenues Act providesannually for the equitable distribution ofrevenue amongst national, provincial andlocal spheres of government, and balanceddivision of tasks to be financed. The Act alsodefines the distribution of re ve nuesamongst the provinces (regions), andfinally, sets the amount of conditional pur-pose-specific grants for provinces and localgovernments, financed through the fund.The division of these grants are regulatedby formulas that are also defined by law.Paragraph 2 of Article 214 in the Constitu-tion contains the criteria to be applied to therevenue-sharing formula amongst localgovernments and provinces (in principle,the structure is determined every five

years). While province finances dependessentially on transfers, local governmentfinances mainly rely on own-source rev-enues (taxes, tariffs and service charges).

The situation in other countries is a lot lessfavourable. The guarantees offered to localgovernments to access revenues also varyfrom country to country. Sectoral grants areroutine in some countries, usually condi-tional or purpose specific. These grants areeasily controlled but involve central govern-ment monitoring of local governments. Thisis the case in Uganda and Zimbabwe. InTanzania the government is likely to intro-duce calculation of grant amounts on thebasis of fixed formulas. In Zambia, centralgovernment also transfers funds throughsectoral grants that are not calculatedthrough a set formula; these transfers rep-resent only 3% of local budgets. In a sec-ond group of countries, central governmenttransfers mainly consist of general dis-

Source: (i) Regard sur les finances locales dans les pays de l’UEMOA (2001-2004) ;

( ii) NALAD, Fiscal Decentralization and Sub-National Government Finance;

(iii) Fiscal decentralization in South Africa, Ismail Momaniat.

The figure shows that, in most countries, local government finance represents less than 1% of

GDP and 5% of state-level (sub-national) expenditure.

Figure 1 Local Resources/GDP

Benin

Burk

ina Fa

so

Côte

d’Ivo

ire

Mali

Nige

r

Sene

gal

Togo

Ghan

a

Sout

h Afri

ca

Ugan

da

Zimba

bwe

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00


bursements to local governments for oper-ations or transferred functions, whileinvestments are covered by occasionalgrants. Global transfers offer local govern-ments more freedom over spending, thoughthe allocation criteria are usually vague, asin the case of Algeria, Tunisia, Gabon,Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and also inKenya (where the global transfers are com-bined with a sectoral grant for road works).In Algeria, the allocation of the solidarityfund grant (95% of the resources from thisfund) is managed with clear eligibility crite-ria: for communities where wealth indicesare lower than the national average. Finally,there are countries that do not have anorganized system of transfers: in Niger andTogo, intergovernmental transfers are inter-mittent and dependent on the political situ-ation. Similarly, particularly in UEMOA(West Africa Economic and Monetary Union)and CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Com-munity of Central Africa) countries, govern-ments are often resistent to decentralizingthe financial resources in keeping with thesectoral policies that absorb, even so, largeflows of aid and public investment.

III.2.3. The financial weight of local governments

Two indicators usefully measure the finan-cial significance of local government: theshare of the nation’s Gross Domestic Prod-uct (GDP) allotted for local authorities, andthe actual amount of money that comesunder the control of local governments. Fig-ure 1 (p. 40) shows the actual financialweight of local governments. The sample issmall because reliable data were availableonly for certain years in certain countries.Even so, this sample of countries at differ-ent levels of development is quite represen-tative.

In the UEMOA countries (West Africa Eco-nomic and Monetary Union), total municipalexpenditure of the area amounted to FCFA150 billion (€228 million) in 2004, i.e. 4.8%of State expenditure of around FCFA 3103billion (€4.7 billion). A World Bank study on

the experience of decentralization in 30African countries revealed that expenditurecontrolled by local governments is around10% in South Africa, between 5 and 10% inNigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe andbetween 3 and 5% in Kenya, Ghana, Sene-gal, Mozambique and Zambia. Generallyspeaking, the average ratio between localexpenditure and national budget resourcesexcluding donations is below 5% and theratio between local expenditure and grossdomestic product (GDP) less than 1%.

In addition, with the exception of SouthAfrica and North Africa, local governments’resort to borrowing in other countries is ata very early stage.

In view of the weakness of their own in -come (the insufficient flow of intergovern-mental transfers is further exacerbated bythe allocation modalities and constraintson access to loan markets), it cannot bedenied that African local governments willhave trouble in meeting on their own thecosts of their ordinary activities and thetransferred powers, not to mention theirresponsibilities in local development andcombating poverty.

One of the explicative factors is that owntax revenue and local finance depend on themacroeconomic framework –and centralgovernments in sub-Saharan Africa facesevere financial constraints. The povertyaffecting large segments of the populationplaces limits on the tax take. On top of thiscomes the frequent lack of political will toredistribute the tax to ensure a better sup-port to local governments and more effec-tive management of the fiscal chain par -ticularly in the collection of taxes. One ofthe top priority claims of elected bodies is abetter distribution of resources, with theaim of taking the share of own tax revenuesin relation to GDP to 2% and increasingfinancial transfers by 5 to 10%, whichwould make it possible to double or eventriple local resources, the current level ofwhich jeopardizes the positive falloutexpected from decentralization.


The weak financial capacity is exacerbatedby persistent limitations and failings inadministrative capacities and human re -sources.

III.3. Administrative Capacity

III.3.1. Human resources

The advent of decentralization has revealeda shortage of trained personnel in Africancountries, all of which lack qualified staff inlocal administrations. This dearth of trainedpersonnel makes it all the more difficult forlocal governments to handle additionalpowers transferred to or granted them.

A lack of information about the qualifica-tions of local government staff membersprecludes a comprehensive accounting ofstaff numbers and skills. Still, data providedby several countries provide an instructivesample. Data from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire,Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia show a verylow percentage of the population holdingstaff positions in local government. In thesecountries, the percentage of citizens in alllevels of government ranges from 0.49% to3.11%. At the local level it varies from0.012% to 0.46%: below one staff memberper 100 inhabitants. For the countries pro-viding data the percentages are:

• Benin: 0.49% at the national level,0.012% at the local level.

• Côte d’Ivoire: 0.69% at the nationallevel, 0.029% at the local level.

• Senegal: 0.73% at the national level,0.06% at the local level.

• Morocco: 1.7% at the national level,about 0.46% at the local level.

• Tunisia: 3.86% at the national level,0.2% at the local level.

Remedies proposed to date fall into one oftwo categories: capacity-building withinlocal governments themselves, and trans-ferring state personnel to local govern-ments.

Table 4 illustrates the position.

III.3.2. Existence and level of training of the principal municipal officials

Most local governments need a minimumteam to assist the mayor with his or herfunctions. This administrative core is madeup of the secretary-general for generaladministrative and personnel management,the director of technical services, and thedirector of financial services. Municipalitiesin the major urban centers typically havesuch a team, or the means to recruit it.

The financial weakness of municipalitiesresults in weaknesses in human resourcesand management skills in local government.This is a severe drawback for the implemen-ta tion of decentralization policies. Strengtheningproject management capacities of localgovernment should be a crucial part of alldecentralization support programs.

III.3.3. Status of local government personnel

The most common method for addressingthis shortfall of personnel is to transfer statesenior civil servants to local governmentsby secondment or by granting leave ofabsence. Consequently, in many countriesthe mayor's technical team is comprised ofsenior officials drawn from the state.

Some countries, such as Morocco and Mali,have established a territorial civil service withthe aim of making local jobs look more attrac-tive, and of conferring on local governmentstaff all the advantages granted to state civilservants. This strategy is designed to stimu-late interest in local jobs that are perceived assecond-rate positions. In many countries,state civil servants regard appointment tolocal jobs as a punishment or a disgrace.

Some countries such as Morocco and Mali

have opted to establish a territorial civil service,

with the aim of making local jobs look more attractive

and of conferring on local government staff all

the advantages granted to state civil servants.


ocracy in the World

43

COUNTRY Number of state Number of local Level of qualification Legal system (public or private Recruitment procedure Existing trainingcivil servants government staff law, or mixed system)/ career (especially for higher positions) programmes

job positions

Benin

Côte d’Ivoire

Morocco

Senegal

Tunisia

Training is organized by developmentpartners. Moreover, each communeorganizes its own training plan. Thereis no training initiated by the lineministry.

- initial training at training centresapproved by the administration

- further training- ongoing training to achieve

promotion- advanced training courses- missions abroad

Competitive examination or applications or qualifications- graduates of approved

training centres

Public54 % managerial staff, including 70%male and 30% female26% junior staff

25,000 including 18,000 manual workers

390,000 including80,000 manual workers

Ad hoc training programmes depending on support from development partners

Commune staff recruited at thediscretion of the local authorities

Public law for seconded State employees and private law for staffrecruited by local governments

Approx. 3% senior officials / 4% middle management + 90% backup and support staff

684671,694 (2004)

Regional training centres/Training division of the Ministry of the Interior/Elected local officials' initiatives

Competitive examination – secondment - automatic appointment by Ministry of the Interior

Public and private law (employmentcontracts)

Senior management: 12,109Middle management: 25,020Junior staff: 31,382Manual workers: 76,982Other: 223

145,736 537,166

The line ministry appoints publicemployees. For other officials, eachcommune follows its own recruitmentpolicy depending on analysis of thefunction and needs expressed.

Mixed system. Governed by the service regulations for public employees and the law establishingservice regulations for territorialauthority staff in the case of publicemployees and the labour code plusthe law establishing service regulations for territorial authoritystaff in the case of other officials.

Category A4 (engineers, administrators) Category B3 (administrative secretaries, senior technicians, bookkeepers)

47,325112,707 (1994)

There is no specialist institution fortraining local officials

Former employees of the prefecturesredirected to communes

Mixed legal system7% qualified for conceptual and supervisory work. The remainder at average level.

4000 from which 94% aresupport staff and 6% belongto management.

32,882 (1995)

Table 4 Human Resource Situation


Even secondment and other stop-gapstrategies must be considered partial,short-term solutions. The essential issueis the lack of financial resources to payfor qualified, high-level staff in local gov-ernments.

The financial weakness of local govern-ments leads inevitably to weak humanresources and limited managementcapacity —both are grave handicaps inimplementing decentralization policies inAfri ca. Building local government projectmanagement capacity should thereforebe one of the priorities in all measuressupporting decentralization and betterlocal government in Africa.

IV. Local Democracy

The following table gives a picture of localdemocracy in each country.

IV.1. Local Political System

When putting democracy into practice atthe community level, local governmentsoften face the same difficulties as mod-ern state systems —a variety of local,tribal and family loyalties and traditionsthat influence civic behavior. For exam-ple, there may be a tendency to rejectthe notion that "people from outside"might have a right to stand for electionlocally "when they are not from aroundhere". In other places, such as Senegal,electoral law requires candidates to haveparty affiliation in local elections. Thisaffiliation with established partiesincreases the risk that standing for elec-tion will have more to do with nationalparty politics than with the needs andpreferences of local voters. Despite suchdifficulties, local democracy has madeundeniable progress. In many countries,one sign of increased vitality is anincrease in turnover of municipal teamsfrom one local election to another. Thisturnover is apparent even in countrieswhere change in political power is rare at

parliamentary, presidential or centralgovernment levels. And indeed, the livelyturnover of power increasingly seen inlocal elections re mains almost unthink-able at top go vern ment levels in themajority of African nations.

Participatory democracy can be fosteredonly if the cultural bedrock already favorsconsultation, debate and participation incollective decision-making. In this regardthe picture in Africa is mixed, with sub-stantial progress in many countries butno movement in others, the latter includ-ing Egypt, Togo, Tunisia, Central AfricanRepublic and Chad. Overall gains intransparency and accountability remainfragile.

The first indicator of progress is the con-sensus regarding universal suffrage. Notonly has the principle of election becomewidely accepted for local offices, butAfrican local elections are also being heldwith a regularity unprecedented in thehistory of Africa4.

Another indicator regards the possibilityof holding several local mandates at thesame time, or holding a local mandatealongside a national one. This is highlyrestricted and may even be entirely for-bidden. In most countries political partiescontinue to monopolize local and nationalpolitics, but many countries do allowindependent candidates in local elections.Those nations include Mozambique, Be -nin, South Africa and Mauritania. In Gha -na political parties are excluded fromlocal elections entirely; the list is openonly to independent candidates.

IV.2. Citizen Participation

Signs of progress toward representativede mocracy include publicizing officialmeetings and encouraging local peopleand community organizations to take partin open discussion of local issues. Forexample, in Zambia, residents areinvolved in the implementation of certain

Various

mechanisms have

been tried to bring

local

people and

community

organizations into

local public

management,

ranging from

publicizing the

meetings

of local

government

bodies, required by

law in many

countries, to

various types of

debates and

consultation

between those

bodies and local

people

4. For instance, with

the exception of Mali,

where elections have

been postponed, the

electoral timetable

has been respected

over the last three

years in Burkina

Faso, Niger, Guinea,

South Africa and

Mozambique.


ocracy in the World

45

Table 5 Portrait of Local Democracy in Each Country

Country MUNICIPAL COUNCIL LOCAL EXECUTIVE DIRECT Voting system Term of Rounds of Method of Terms of Mayor Collegiate Rounds of Vote of no DEMOCRACY(majority/ office voting appointment office voting confidenceproportional /removal or mixed) from office

Benin Mixed (majority 5 years 2 rounds Indirect 5 years No Yes Several Yes Noand proportional)

Cameroon Mixed (majority 5 years 1 round Indirect 5 years No Yes 2 for the Mayor Yes Noand proportional) and 1 for deputies

Egypt, Arab Rep. of Relative Majority 4 years 1 round Nomination No No

Gabon Proportional 5 years 1 round Indirect 5 years No Yes Yes No

Ghana Majority 4 years 1 round Indirect 4 years No Yes

Guinea Majority 5 years 1 round Indirect 5 years Yes No

Côte d’Ivoire Majority 5 years 2 rounds Indirect 5 years No Yes Yes No

Kenya 5 years 1 round Indirect

Madagascar 4 years Direct 4 years

Mali Majority Indirect No Yes Yes No

Morocco Majority 6 years 1 round Indirect 6 years No Yes Yes No

Mozambique Proportional 5 years 2 rounds Direct 5 years Yes 2 rounds No No

Niger Proportional 5 years 1 round Indirect 5 years No Yes Yes No

Nigeria Majority 3 years 1 round Direct 4 years No Yes No

Senegal Mixed (Majority/Proportional or mixed) 5 years 1 round Indirect 5 years Yes No Yes No

South Africa Proportional 6 years 1 round Indirect 6 years No Yes 1 round No

Tanzania 5 years Indirect 5 years No Yes

Tunisia Mixed 5 years 1 round Indirect Yes Yes 1 round No No(predominantly majority)

Uganda 4 years 1 round Direct 4 years Yes Yes 1 round

Zambia Mixed 5 years 1 round Direct 5 years Yes No 1 round No


development projects in basic servicesectors, such as health and education.In Uganda, participation sometimesextends as far as cooperation agreementsbetween the municipality and civil societyassociations; the latter are givenresponsibility for running a project or formonitoring and evaluating such projects.In some municipalities of Benin, BurkinaFaso, Mali and Mozambique, elected offi-cials increasingly use community radio tokeep in touch with the local populationand continue exchanging views with themabout local development issues. Theseexchanges provide an opportunity forcommunity and religious leaders, teach-ers and civil society activists to play a rolein guiding local people, and in improvingcommunication between officials and res-idents. To make local government bodiesmore representative, countries such asGhana and Niger, Uganda and SouthAfrica have been developing instrumentsto bring social, economic, or culturalforces into local councils, ensuring that allsociological components of the local com-munity are involved in the local gover-nance system.

To ensure the representation of women,several countries have set quotas by law.In Niger, at least 10% of seats on localcouncils are reserved by law for femalecandidates. In Mozambique, the represen-tation of women within local bodies hasrisen from 23% after the 1999 elections to28% in 2004. South African legislationfavors a minimum of 50% female candi-dates on competing lists. In Uganda, thelaw requires that at least one third of localcouncil seats should be occupied bywomen. Women are not, however, the onlydemographic group whose specific repre-sentation is promoted by decentralization.

IV.3. Relationship between Central and Decentralized GovernmentAuthorities

In the majority of African countries,decentralization was imposed from the top

down, making it more a tool used bycentral government to control territoryand urban populations and ensure thecontinuity of its own structures and pol-icy than a framework for teaching andempowering residents with the goal ofstrengthening independent local govern-ments.

Consequently, despite constitutional orlegislative provisions and safeguards,the autonomy of local governments isrestricted by central government over-sight of local government bodies andtheir actions. However, positive develop-ments can be seen in many countriestowards slackening controls and refocus-ing them on legal aspects.

Local administration in Africa restsessentially on two political pillars: adeliberative body, the council, and anexecutive body comprised of a mayorassisted by one or more deputies. Suchlocal bodies exercise their functionsunder the control of the state. These fea-tures are the norm in all African countrieswhere decentralization is on the agenda.The differences lie in the way local bod-ies are appointed, and the degree offreedom allowed by the state, which con-trols local government bodies and theiractions. In West and Central Africa, stateoversight of local governments is beingrelaxed. However, in North Africa centralcontrol over all the activities of local gov-ernments persists with little change. For-mer colonial systems of centralized con-trol are giving way to models modified byindependent governments. This is a pos-itive development in principle eventhough important matters such as budg-ets and land allocation are still subject toold, colonial-style control. Neither isjurisdictional control properly organized.

Regarding the transparency of local ma -na gement and accountability, manycountries have enshrined classic controlmechanisms in formal statutes. In suchcases, councils adopt budgets and re -


view and approve executive bodies' ad -mi nistrative and management accounts.These accounts must also be approvedby supervisory authorities. In somecountries, specialist institutions, such asthe Committee on Local Government andChiefs' Affairs in Zambia, monitor andoversee local government management.In Uganda, the amounts of financialtransfers from central to local govern-ment, as well as the local developmentsectors for which the funds are intended,are made public. The government thenencourages local people to ensure thatthe transferred amounts are used prop-erly. More than that, the web site of theministry for local government provides apublic forum for discussion; citizens areencouraged to state their opinions onany aspect of local authority manage-ment.

However, in some countries, there is alarge gap between legal procedures andmethods of operation in practice.

IV.4. Role of Local Government Associations

Establishing associations of elected localbodies, often called Local GovernmentAssociations, (LGAs) has become themethod of choice for advancing the mutualinterests of local governments in Africa.Such associations exist in almost all coun-tries on the continent. Membership may berestricted to mayors and deputy mayors,the municipal executive, or the localauthority as an institution.

LGAs may sometimes be set up in accordwith categories of local government (com-munes and cities, regions, rural communi-ties) and typically have a three-foldcharge:

• Representing member authoritiesspeaking with a united voice,

• Providing capacity-building services tolocal governments,

• Defending and promoting the interestsof their members.

LGAs provide a platform for exchangingviews and discovering opportunities formembers. Their aim is to promote decen-tralization by lobbying the state as well asinternational development partners. Inmany countries, they help to implementdecentralization by bringing the point ofview of local officials to the attention ofhigher government in reports and propos-als.

However, LGAs also experience resourceconstraints in many countries. They haveto rely on contributions from their mem-bers to cover costs. The uncertainty ofsuch resources necessarily limits the scopeof the LGA’s efforts.

In eastern and southern Africa, LGAs aregenuine administrative bodies, but some inWest Africa and Central Africa have nooffice or permanent staff. Where resourcesare minimal, LGAs are less effective inimplementing decentralization.

Regional LGAs have also been set up inCentral, East and Southern Africa. Some ofthese regional organizations are moreeffective than others. For example, TheAssociation of Central African Mayors(AMAC) presently exists in name only, butthe association of East African local gov-ernments is comparatively dynamic, offer-ing a regional platform for exchangesbetween elected officials from membercountries.5

IV.4.1. United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA)

The organization known as United Citiesand Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA)is the Pan-African local government organ-ization. The UCLGA represents a combina-tion of three African local governmentorganizations previously divided along lin-guistic lines: the African Union of LocalAuthorities (AULA) for local governments

5. The East Africa

representative on

the UCLGA executive

committee was

appointed during an

extraordinary

meeting of that

association, held in

Kigali (Rwanda).


from anglophone countries, the Union desVilles Africaines (UVA) for francophonecountries and the União dos ciudades y Ca -pitaes Lusofono Africana (UCCLA) for Por -tuguese-speaking countries.

This initiative reflects a recognition of in -creasing globalization, a comparativelynew phenomenon that cannot fail to affectlocal governments.6 The UCLGA foundingcongress took place in Tshwane in May2005, marking the starting point of theunified African municipal movement. TheUCLGA represents all local governments inAfrica and seeks recognition from theAfrican Union as the voice of African localgovernments within the Pan-African organ-ization.

IV.4.2. African Conference on Decentralization and Local Development (CADDEL)

In the spirit of African unity, African minis-ters set up a Pan-African platform for dis-cussion and sharing experience on de - centralization and local development inAfrica.

Meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, at the se -cond Africités summit in May 2000, AfricanMinisters for Decentralization and fi nance

ministers decided to move the de cen -tralization process forward in Africa by set-ting up a political body at continental levelknown as the African Conference on De -centralization and Local Development(CADDEL).

At that meeting, proponents of decentral-ization expressed the wish that the AfricanUnion should be the reference body for thenew platform.

They set CADDEL the following objectives:

• Persuade governments to list decentral-ization among their priorities and pushfor greater awareness on the part ofboth leaders and citizens of the centralrole played by decentralization in theeconomic development process;

• Keep decentralization and local devel-opment on the national policy agendasof member states, and at continentallevel within the African Union;

• Make sure that African states maintaintheir commitment to the decentraliza-tion process;

• Act as liaison between the organizationof African local government associa-tions and their central governments forall issues involving decentralization andlocal development;

• Mobilize resources from developmentpartners in order to implement decen-tralization and local development pro-grammes.

6. The first Pan-African summit “Africities” took place in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) in 1998, gathering together

various African municipal unions. During the 2nd Africities summit organized in Windhoek (Namibia) in

2000, the three main municipal organizations agreed upon the creation of an African Union of Cities. In

2003 a first founding assembly took place, during the 3rd Africities summit, in Yaoundé (Cameroon). The

common declaration of Yaoundé was adopted with the following principles:

· to promote to local authorities of Africa the founding congress of the association “United Cities and Local

Governments”

· to set up the statutes of the new Pan-African organization

· to decide on the definitive name of the organization and prepare its founding congress.

The UCLGA represents all local go vernments in

Africa and seeks recognition from the African Union

as the voice of African local governments within

the Pan-African organization


V. Conclusion

This overall picture of decentralization andlocal democracy in African countries showssignificant progress at the strictly institu-tional level. No country now publiclyopposes the implementation of decentral-ization policies. Local governments exist inall countries, and elections are held toelect local authorities

Not only are there more local governmentscovering ever-increasing areas, but thequalitative development of decentraliza-tion can also be observed in the form ofmore self-government and progresstoward local democracy in more Africannations. This trend is accompanied by anunprecedented increase in the responsibil-ities of local governments throughout mostof the continent.

The extent of such progress must, how-ever, be set against a number of persistentobstacles that continue to hinder a realprogression of decentralization in Africa.

Difficulties remain within states concerningthe transfer of financial resources neededto match the devolved responsibilities.Local governments also face difficulties inincreasing their own resources (aside fromstate-transfers and grants) at a fasterpace. Ensuring the availability of qualifiedhuman resources at the local level andimproving public access to local servicesare also fundamental issues of concern.

Tangible progress needs to be made in twokey areas: the transfer of responsibilities,with adequate human and financialresources, and entrenching a culture of cit-izen participation, transparency andaccountability. These areas of complicatedyet indispensable reform are crucial forprogress to be sustained, and for its inher-ent democratizing ideas to take root. Tothis end it is essential that all involved par-ties continue to mobilize high-level politicalcommitment at both national and Pan-African levels.

ASIA-PACIFIC

ANDRE W NICKSON

NICK DE VA S

ALE X B. BRILL ANTES

WILHELMINA L. CABO

ALICE CELESTINO1

ASIA-PACIFICDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World52

1. The final draft has been worked out by Andrew Nickson. The authors gratefully

acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Mr. Jose Tiu Sanco,

Ms. Frances Fatima Cabana and Mr. Prejean Prieto, research staff at the

National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the

Philippines.

ASIA-PACIFICDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 53

I. Introduction

The Asia-Pacific region comprises anenormous variety in the size of nationstates. This ranges from the two demo-graphic giants of the world, China and In -dia, which to gether account for one-thirdof global po pu lation, to the many islandstates of the Pa cific that have less than100,000 inhabitants. The region also dis-plays a great va riety in living standards,ranging from the high-income OECDcountries of Australia, Japan, Republic ofKorea and New Zealand to a number ofthe least-developed countries of theworld, including Bangladesh and Nepal.It al so includes some of the currentlyfastest gro wing economies in the world,nota bly Chi na, India and Vietnam, aswell as the country – Korea – that hasex perienced the most dramatic growth in

li ving standards in the world during thepe riod 1950-2000.

The Asia-Pacific region also embodiesgreat diversity of historical experience.Many of the countries incorporated colo-nial models of governance to a greater orlesser extent - British, in the case of Aus-tralia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, SriLanka, Malaysia and some of the Pacificislands, French in the case of Vietnam,Cambodia and Laos (but largely super-seded by communist models in thesecountries), Dutch in the case of Indonesiaand US in the case of the Philippines.Recent laws in Pakistan also reflect US,German and Japanese influences. Thesingle-party communist system adoptedby China, Laos, North Korea and Vietnamowes much to the Marxist-Leninist ideol-ogy of the former Soviet Union.

Table 1 Basic Development Indicators in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2004

Country Population Density People % Urban GNP per HDI (millions) per sq. km Population* head (US$) Ranking

Australia 20.1 3 88.2 26,900 3

China 1,296.5 139 40.4 1,290 81

India 1,079.7 363 28.7 620 126

Indonesia 217.6 120 48.1 1,140 108

Japan 127.8 351 65.8 37,180 7

Malaysia 25.2 77 67.3 4,650 61

New Zealand 4.1 15 86.2 20,310 20

Pakistan 152.1 197 34.9 600 134

Philippines 83.0 278 62.7 1,170 84

Korea, Rep. of 48.1 488 80.8 13,980 26

Thailand 62.4 122 32.3 2,540 74

Vietnam 82.2 252 26.4 550 109

Source: World Bank 2006; UNDESA 2006; UNDP 2006a.

* Data is for 2005.

ASIA-PACIFIC54

This chapter reviews the results of twelvecountry case studies of decentralizationand local democracy from the region:Australia, China, India, Indonesia,Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan,Philippines, Korea, Thailand and Viet-nam (Table 1). The sample reflects themore developed and faster growing na -tions of the region but also those wherethere is a more active program of decen-tralization, albeit of widely varying pat-terns. The chapter draws on other pu - blished material on these countries aswell as the authors' own knowledge of theregion.

The Asia-Pacific region embraces themost highly developed features of globalurbanization and already contains 23 ofthe 40 largest metropolitan areas in theworld (Table 2). Of the top 100 metropol-itan areas, China has 15 (with a combinedpo pulation of 96.2m), India has 9 (with acombined population of 80.1m) andJapan has 3 (with a combined populationof 49.1m).

With such a diversity of population size,per capita income, historical experienceand political system, it is not surprisingthat models of decentralization and sub-na tional governance should also varycon siderably. As a result of this lack ofho mogeneity, it is both difficult and ques-tionable to make sweeping generalizationsabout the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Infact, the recent experience of decentraliza-tion and local democracy in the region hasbeen quite diverse. Nevertheless, thereare some common themes and issuesacross the region, which are addressed inthis chapter. Four of the sample countries–Australia, India, Malaysia and Pakistan–have federal systems of government thataccord states a greater or lesser degree ofautonomy. Since, within a federal system,local government is generally a state mat-ter, this can produce a wide diversity ofpractice within a country with regard tolocal governance. This is certainly true inAustralia and India but less so in Malaysia

and Pakistan. The enormous size of Chinameans that, although it is a unitary state,there is a considerable diversity of practiceamong provinces. To a lesser extent, thisis also true in Indonesia.

II. Territorial Organization

II.1. Delineating Local Governments

While local governments are generally un -derstood as units of government res pon -sible for providing direct services to in -habitants in a given territorial jurisdiction,their classification and location in the sub-national government vary across the Asia-Pacific countries. The term ‘local go -vernment’ is generically used in allcountries to refer to these sub-sta te/sub-pro -vincial units. In a few countries, otherterms are used such as ‘councils’ in Aus-tralia and New Zealand, and districtadministration in Malaysia. In Japan, thepreferred term is ‘local autonomy’ toindicate freedom from central control inmaking decisions and self-responsibility inmanaging local affairs. Depending on pop-ulation size, income and location, localgovernments in the region are variouslycategorized as wards, districts, com-munes, shires, counties, municipalities,cities, prefectures and provinces. Andalthough all these forms are generally con-sidered local governments, their classifica-tion also varies such that a mu nicipal unitin one country (Indonesia) may be muchbigger than an interme diate local govern-ment unit in another one (for example aprovince in the Philippines or Vietnam).

In federal countries like Australia, India,Malaysia and Pakistan, local governmentsin general comprise the lowest level ofgovernment. In these countries, local go -vern ments are a function of the intermedi-ate level of government such as the sta tesin Australia, India and Malaysia andprovinces in Pakistan. While there may besome general provisions in federal consti-tutions concerning local governments, as

The term ‘local

government’ is

generically used

in all countries

to refer to

sub-state/

sub-provincial

units

Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World


Table 2 Global Ranking of Metropolitan Areas in the Asia-Pacific Region

Rank Name English name Country Population Remarks

1 Tokyo Tokyo Japan 33,600,000 (Greater Tokyo Area) incl. Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama

2 Seoul (Soul) Seoul Korea 23,400,000 incl. Bucheon, Goyang, Incheon, Seongnam, Suweon

5 Mumbai Bombay India 21,600,000 incl. Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Thane, Ulhasnagar

6 Delhi Delhi India 21,500,000 (National Capital Territory) incl. Faridabad, Ghaziabad

9 Shanghai Shanghai China 17,500,000

10 Osaka Osaka Japan 16,700,000 (Osaka Metropolitan Area) incl. Kobe, Kyoto

12 Kolkata Calcutta India 15,700,000 (Kolkata Metropolitan Area) incl. Haora

13 Manila Manila Philippines 15,600,000 (Metro Manila) incl. Kalookan, Quezon City

14 Jakarta Jakarta Indonesia 15,100,000 (Jabotabek Metropolitan Area) incl. Tangerang

15 Karachi Karachi Pakistan 15,100,000

16 Guangzhou Canton China 14,700,000 incl. Foshan

19 Beijing Beijing China 12,800,000

20 Dhaka Dacca Bangladesh 12,600,000

28 Shenzhen Shenzhen China 9,150,000

29 Krung Thep Bangkok Thailand 8,650,000

30 Wuhan Wuhan China 8,650,000

33 Nagoya Nagoya Japan 8,250,000

36 Tianjin Tiensin China 8,000,000

37 Lahore Lahore Pakistan 7,950,000

38 Chennai Madras India 7,850,000 (Chennai Metropolitan Area)

40 Bangalore Bangalore India 7,350,000 (BMRDA)

41 Hyderabad Hyderabad India 7,150,000

43 Hong Kong (Xianggang) Hong Kong China 7,100,000 (S.A.R.) incl. Kowloon, Victoria

44 Taipei (T’ai-pei) Taipei Taiwan 6,700,000 (Taipei-Keelung Metropolitan Area)

46 Chongqing Chungking China 6,200,000

Source: The principal agglomerations of the World (2007-09-03).

City population, http://citypopulation.de/World.html.

ASIA-PACIFICin the case of India and Malaysia, it is ge -ne rally left to the state or provincial gov-ernment to determine the scope of localgovernment in these countries. Thus, it isnot surprising that perceptible differ encesin local government practices exist acrossthe federated states within the same coun-try. The system of election for local coun-cils in Australia, for example, varies fromstate to state. In India, fiscal and adminis-trative decentralization is unevenly imple-mented across the states compared withpolitical decentralization, while localdemocracy is also at varying levels ofdevelopment across the Indian states. Incontrast, local government variation in Ma -laysia and Pakistan is slight.

Local governments in unitary states com-prise the only sub-national layers of go -vernment, thus putting local governmentdirectly under central government over-sight. Theoretically speaking, unitary go -vernments may incline towards centralismand constrain local autonomy. The experi-ence in the region shows that this is notnecessarily so. Robust local governmentsand local democracy exist in unitary sys -tems like Japan, New Zealand and Philip -pines, as is also the case in federal Australia.China, though unitary, exhibits a variety oflocal government practices betweenprovinces owing to the sheer size of thecoun try. This is true to a lesser extent inIn do nesia.

Local governments in all countries exercisepowers by virtue of ultra vires. The po wers,roles and responsibilities are set out in spe-cific legislation or acts promulgated bynational or state level government, withsome countries having more or fewer localpowers and functions assigned to them.Japan is markedly different on this as localgovernments in this country operate on thebasis of the general competence principle.But as reforms continue to characterizeintergovernmental relations in the Asia-Pacific countries, the political and func-tional bases of local government continue tobe redefined. Australia, for instance, is

moving to a less prescriptive approach inregard to the councils’ roles and functions,albeit subject to greater public accountabil-ity and stricter requirements for corporateplanning and reporting. The recent localgovernment reforms, particularly the LocalGovernment Act 2002, undertaken by NewZealand have broadened the responsibilitiesof local councils practically giving them thepower of general competence. Philip pinelocal governments have their powers andresponsibilities specifically defined in theLocal Government Code. Significantly, thegeneral welfare clause in the Code allowslocal governments to do practically what-ever they think will promote the well- beingof people and community, limited only byexpressed prohibition of law. In any case,the scope of powers and functions assumedby local governments in the region variesfrom country to country, and even amonglocal governments within the same country.These practices had been shaped by therespective country’s historical traditions,and increasingly by political, economic andfiscal considerations as evidenced by thedecentralization programs being imple-mented by countries in the re gion. In mostcountries, local governments perform wide-ranging functions to address local needsand promote economic and so cial well-being of citizens and local areas. The func-tions of local governments in the region willbe discussed at length in Section III.1.

II.2. Legal Framework for Local Government

The legal framework for local government inthe Asia-Pacific region is contained either innational constitutions or in separate laws.Major local government legislation in theselected countries is shown in Annex 1.Most countries recognize local go vernmentin their constitutions as well as having sep-arate laws for local government. However,local government in Australia is recognizednot in the Com monwealth Constitution butin comprehensive Local Government Actspassed by individual state parliaments andin a few cases, references are also made in

Each country of the

region has made

significant strides

over the past

several decades in

the creation of a

strengthened

institutional

framework

in support of

decentralization

Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World56

ASIA-PACIFICDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World

state constitutions. In New Zealand, whichhas no consolidated constitution, local go -vernment was greatly strengthened bynational legislation in 2002 granting it gen-eral competence power in marked contrastto previous restrictions imposed by ultravires. Despite not offering constitutionalpro tection, local governments in bothcoun tries enjoy substantial powers andresponsi bi lities that are not observed inseveral countries in the region that do pro-vide constitutionally for local governmentautonomy.

Each country of the region has made sig-nificant strides over the past severaldecades in the creation of a strengthenedinstitutional framework in support ofdecentralization. The framework is estab-lished va riously in the basic law of the landand in separate national and state statutesand laws. This is the case whether a nationis a multi-party democracy, socialist countryor military re gime. Even when local self-go -vernance is promoted as a national ob -jective, central government still intervenesto introduce and sustain these reforms.Such was the case in India where the 1950Constitution (Article 40) requires that“…states shall take steps to organize vil-lage panchayats and endow them withsuch powers and authority as may be nec-essary to enable them to function as unitsof local self-government,” but left the leg-islation of local self-government to thestates. Because the implementation of pan-chayats was uneven across the states,decentralization reforms were promotedby the 73rd and 74th constitutionalamendments in 1992. These require statesto hold elections for local bodies and totransfer fiscal and administrative responsi-bility for certain services and functions tolocal government in both rural and urbanareas. As a result there has been a dra-matic improvement in local democracy inmany parts of India but the constitutionalrequirements for administrative and fiscaldecentralization are still not complied withto the same extent by all states. This isalso the case in Japan with article 92 of the

constitution of 1946, followed by severalinstances of legislation to decentralize(namely 1947, 1995-1999).

Recent constitutions in the Philippines (1987,Article 10), the Republic of Korea (1987, Arti-cles 117 and 118) and Thailand (1997, Arti-cle 78) all provide for local governmentautonomy, but the constitutions of Chinaand Vietnam (see on the contrary: China,art.110; Vietnam: art.6). In the Philippines, the1991 Re public Act (Law 7160)–also knownas the Local Go vernment Code– fleshedout the constitutional provisions concerningthe principle of decentralization and localautonomy, transferring responsibility for thedelivery of many basic services to local gov-ernment and thereby fundamentally alteringcentral-local relations. In Korea the 1987constitution (Article 117) states that local go - vern ments "shall deal with matters pertain-ing to the well-being of local residents, shallmanage properties, and may establish theirown rules and regulations regarding localautonomy as delegated by national laws anddecrees.” However, this constitutional provi-sion remained unfulfilled until July 1995when the nation elected local governmentmayors for the first time in more than 30years. Until then local go vern ments wereno more than lo cal ad mi nis trative dis-tricts of the central go vernment. Theheads of local governments (in effect, solelyadministrative authorities) were appointedby the central government, and their capac-ity for autonomous decision-making was vir-tually non existent. In Thailand the 1997constitution requires the promotion ofdecentralization as a basic policy of the gov-ernment and this was followed by basic leg-islation in 1999 in the form of the Decentral-ization Plan and Procedures Act. As of June2003, eight enabling laws had been pro-posed in support of decentralization goals,four of which had been promulgated. Moregenerally, more tasks does not mean moreresponsibility; in India the two higher tiersof local go vernment are considered to be“implementing agencies of state govern-ment”, also after the 1994 constitutionalamendments2.

57

2. G. Rao / N. Singh

(2000), How to think

about local

government reform

in India? Incentives

and institutions,

Berkeley, p.9; adde:

G. Sethi (ed.)

(2004), Fiscal

decentralization to

rural governments in

India, World Bank,

p.19

ASIA-PACIFICIndonesia provides the most dramatic exam-ple of major legislative reform for enhancedlocal government autonomy. The ‘big bang’decentralization took place on the basis ofRegional Government Law 22 of 1999, whicheliminated the hierarchical relationshipbetween provincial and municipal govern-ments. This significantly shifted re sourcesand responsibilities from the central andprovincial levels to urban (kotamad -ya) andrural (kabupaten) mu nic ipalities. UnderRegional Autonomy Law 32 of 2004 thesedistrict governments were assigned 11 oblig-atory functions while provincial governmentswere given a secondary role. In line withthese expanded responsibilities a major shiftof staff resources (about 2.5 million civil ser-vants, of whom about three-quarters wereteachers or health workers) took place fromthe central and provincial governments tothe districts during a short transition period(2000-2001). Law 33 on Fiscal Balancebetween Central and Regional Governmentin 1999 (later amended by Law 25 of 2004)provided a new intergovernmental fiscalframe work for general allocation grants (DAU),which represent block grants to finance theadministrative and other costs associatedwith newly decentralized functions (ratherthan the earmarked grants of the past).Under the previous centralized system, socialand public service indicators of some majorresource-producing regions were weak, andto redress this imbalance, these re gionswere now provided with a share of the rev-enues generated. Local governments werealso granted the power to levy their owntaxes supported by regulations on the typeof taxes and service charges permissible andmaximum tariffs (ADB 2006b). However, todate the legal framework and division ofresponsibilities among levels of governmentremains unclear.

II.3. Evolution of Local GovernmentStructures

A great variety of historical experience hasinfluenced the evolution of local governmentstructures in the Asia-Pacific region, rangingfrom the intermarriage of longstanding local

traditions of self-governance to organiza -tional forms imported through the colonialexperience and Marxist-Leninism. Traditionsof community or grassroots self-governancehave long existed in the region, though notnecessarily in the more sophisticated organi-zational forms of local government thatexist today. For example, in Korea, local gov-ernment was founded on the basis of infor-mal, voluntary organizations for the purposeof promoting mutual assistance among citi-zens as well as the strengthening of commu-nity ethics (Sproats 2003). In Japan tradi-tional customary institutions are stillfunctioning today in the form of an extensivenetwork of voluntary neighbor hood associa-tions that in practice operate as subcontrac-tors of local government. In those countriesthat came under foreign rule, these oldsystems underwent a process of colonizationthat subsequently shaped the forms of localadministration that are in operation today.However, national independence encouragedcountries such as India and the Philippines torestore their traditional sys tems of gover-nance, respectively known as panchayatsand barangays, and to in te gra te them intothe formal system of local go vernment. Dur-ing the immediate post-in de pendence periodin many countries, cen tra lization was consid-ered to be the most efficient way of achiev-ing the goals of rebuilding national identityand attaining rapid economic growth.Notwithstanding, most of these countriessubsequently initiated local governmentreforms as part of wider processes ofimproving public sector efficiency anddemocratization (Sproats 2003).

Within the Asia-Pacific region, there has beena wide range of drivers of decentralizationand of obstacles to such changes. In someparts of the world, notably in Latin Americaduring the 1980s and 1990s and in Centraland Eastern Europe following the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, there was a widespreaddemand from citizens for local democracyand for greater citizen control over localaffairs. This has not generally been the casein Asia, where decentralization has moreoften been driven from the top. In the case

Within the

Asia-Pacific region,

there has been a

wide range

of drivers

of decentralization

and of obstacles to

such changes, but

decentralization

has generally been

driven from the top



of China, decentralization has primarily beenabout economic reform, as part of the shifttowards a market-based economy, and liber-ating the economic potential of regions andlocalities, rather than political engagementand local account ability. In Vietnam, themassive Doi Moi (renovation) process initi-ated in the late 1990s was also primarilyabout economic and administrative reform,including the de volution of managementresponsibilities. One feature of Doi Moi wasto encourage and legitimize citizen participa-tion in local decision-making as well as tostrengthen transparency and accountabilitymechanisms at the commune level. In thissense, the creation of decentralized struc-tures and processes is a manifestation of awider movement towards democratization inthe region as it provides the enabling contextfor broader citizen par ticipation in local gov-ernance.

By contrast, the recent and quite radicalprograms of decentralization in the Philip-pines and Indonesia have been moreovertly linked to ‘bottom-up’ processes ofdemocratization. In the Philippines, the sub-stantial devolution of responsibilities andresources to elected local governments waspart of the radical reform agenda of deep-ening political participation and bringingpolitical decision-making closer to citizensfollowing the 1986 overthrow of the Marcosregime. Indonesia experienced one of themost ra dical decentralization programs inthe world from 1999, shifting major func-tional responsibilities, resources and staffto local governments. This was partly aresponse to the highly centralized stateunder Suharto, which was blamed for manyof the ills of the country. Whilst this pro-gram built on an existing structure of localgovernment, the reforms devolved sub-stantial decision-making powers to whathad previously been little more than a sys-tem of deconcentrated local administration(albeit re ferred to in earlier legislation as‘local auto nomy’). Nevertheless, the ‘big-bang’ decentralization was also stronglydriven by the urgent need to satisfy theinterests of the resource-rich outer islands

of Indonesia, which had long felt marginal-ized and were threatening to secede.

In some countries of the region there hasbeen a noticeable cyclical movement to andfro between periods of centralization anddecentralization. This has especially beenthe case in Pakistan, where local govern-ment reforms were introduced in 1960,1979 and 2001. The main objective of the2001 reform was an attempt by the mili-tary government at the center to reinforceits legitimacy and gain popularity acrossthe country. But the institutionalization oflocal (non-party) political account abilityhas been thwarted to a significant degreeby the continuing provincial control overlocal government and the difficulty ofimplementing the provisions for recall ofofficials (Cheema et al 2006). This wasalso, to some extent, the case with earlierfailed attempts at decentralization inBangladesh. In Thailand, communist insur-gency during the 1970s and 1980s rein-forced commitment to strong central con-trol. Only since the 1990s, and despitestrong opposition from the Ministry of Inte-rior, have governments supported decen-tralization. By contrast, in Bangladesh andMalaysia there has been resistance fromthe center to any substantial decentraliza-tion that would strengthen the political roleof local government. Thus local govern-ment in these countries may be regardedas more akin to local administration.

Decentralization is never a smoothprocess as there are many competinginterests at play, some of which resistdecentralization. Strong resistance can co mefrom a central ministry that per ceives thatdecentralization erodes its po wers andresources. For similar reasons, centralcivil servants may resist decentralization,especially when it involves their reassign-ment to a sub-national level of govern-ment, as was the case for large numbersof civil servants in Indonesia and Thai-land. Party political rivalry can also be amajor obstacle, where parties positionthem selves by opposing proposals for de -

By contrast, the

recent and quite

radical programs

of decentralization

in the Philippines

and Indonesia have

been more overtly

linked to

‘bottom-up’

processes

of democratization

59

ASIA-PACIFICcen tralization. This is compounded bypolitical competition at sub-national lev-els: ruling parties at the national levelmay get cold feet about decentralization ifthey perceive that the opposition maygain control of large numbers of thedecentralized units. Three-way politicalconflicts among union, state and localgovernments in In dia were one of themain reasons for the 1992 constitutionalamendments designed to protect theinterests of local governments fromexcessive state interference. Such politicalconflicts continue to hamper effective de -cent ralization in some Indian states.

Finally, the OECD countries in the region,Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea andNew Zealand, also emphasize decentraliza-tion as part of their ongoing administrativereform process. Australia, Japan and NewZealand have a long history of local go -vernment; so, recent experience here hasbeen of relatively modest reform to dealwith particular problems or changed cir-cumstances. A series of reforms to localgovernment acts in all the states of Aus-tralia expanded the general powers of localgovernment during the 1990s. An Inter-Governmental Agreement in 2006expanded local government responsibilitiesin the fields of planning, health, environ-mental protection and cultural activities. InNew Zealand, the Local Government Act of2002 granted local and regional govern-ment broad general powers.

In Japan, House and Diet Resolutions ondecentralization were passed in 1993 ba sedon the premise that the centralized admin-istrative system was unable to cope withrapid developments at the local level. In1995 a Law for the Promotion of Decen-tralization was passed, in 1998 a Decen-tralization Promotion Plan was initiatedand in 2004 the Local Government Law of1947 was amended to strengthen theadministrative authority of cities.

In the Republic of Korea, a series of decen-tralization laws and policies were intro -

duced in the 1990s that increasingly rec-ognized the importance of local autonomy,including the introduction of direct electionfor local government executives. As inJapan, they were largely driven from thecenter. One writer has described the actualpractice of decentralization in Korea as a“curious mixture of deconcentration andde volution” (Seong 1998:13). A uniquefeature of the process was the SaemaulUndong, a community-based movementestablished during the rule of PresidentPark Chung Lee in the 1970s. Althoughthese were mobilized ‘top-down’ by centralgovernment, they eventually laid the foun-dation for a variant of ‘citizen participation’that made a significant contribution to Ko -rean rural development.

II.4. Tiers and Size of Local Governments

There is a considerable variation in theAsia-Pacific region in both the number oftiers of local government and in the aver-age population size covered by local gov-ernment. The territorial organization oflocal government in selected countries ispresented in Table 3. Two of the four fed-eral nations in the case study countrieshave a single tier of local governmentbelow the state level (Australia andMalaysia) while Pakistan has a triple tierand India has a single tier in urban areasand a single, double or triple tier in ruralareas, depending on the state. Of the eightunitary nations in the sample, four have atwo tier system of local go vernment(Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and NewZealand), while three others have a threetier system (Philippines, Korea and Viet-nam) and China has four subnational gov-ernment layers. Furthermore, what is alocal go vern ment tier is not always clear,especially when there is a combination ofmo dern local government structures and oftraditional or customary institutions, as isusual in a lot of countries of the region atthe village level. Even the material evidenceof such basic criteria as the exercise of pub-lic and budgetary power may be uncertain.

There is a

considerable

variation in the

Asia-Pacific region

in both the number

of tiers of local

government and in

the average

population size

covered by local

government



2. Data on China from: Quio Jing (2005). La réforme de l’administration chinesse face aux rites confucéens,

Thesis, University Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. (P. 125) (unpublished). Updated by Dr. Qiao.

Table 3 Territorial Organization of Local Government in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Type of Type of Federated units, Regional / Upper level Lower level government state regions or territories provincial level of local of local

with special rights government government

Australia Costitutional and parliamentary Federal 6 states and 2 territories Single Tier: 703 councils variously described as cities, democracy (Governor general municipalities, shires or districts with 7 differents local representing the Queen as authority systems. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) of head of State, Prime Minister as Canberra has its own local government systemchief of government)

China Communist state (President Unitary Not applicable 1) Provincial level: District level: Township level: (2006) 2 as chief of state, Premier 34 units 2,860 units 41,040 units

as head of government) -23 Provinces, -1,463 districts (xian) -14,119 townships (xiang)- 4 large cities directly -369 cities with district right -19,369 boroughs (zhen)under central government -856 inner city districts -10 joint township boards - 5 autonomous* regions: in larger cities (qu gong suo)Inner Mongolia, Guangxi -117 autonomous* districts -6,355 inner city wardsZhuang, Tibet, Ningxia (zi zhi xian) -1,088 ethnic townships Hui, Xinjiang Uygur -49 ethnic banners (qi) (min zu xiang)-2 special administrative -3 autonomous* banners -98 tribes (sumu)regions: Hong-Kong, Macao (zi zhi qi) -1 ethnic tribe

-2 special zones2) Regional level: 333 units: -1 forest zone -644,000 village committees -283 cities of regional level (85% of villages) and -17 regions (diqu) 71,375 urban neighborhood -30 autonomous prefectures committees (70% of (zi zhi zhou) neighborhood communities - -3 unions (meng) 2004) are not local authorities

India Parliamentary Democracy Federal 28 states and *Urban areas: Single Tier: 3,694 urban municipalities (President as chief of state, 7 union territories *Rural areas: Single, dual, or triple tiers depending on state, Prime Minister as head 246,977 rural councils comprising of:of government) - 459 zilla panchayats (district: third tier),

- 5,930 panchayat samitis (block: second tier)- 240,588 gram panchayats (village: first tier)

Indonesia Republic, presidential government Unitary 2 special districts: 33 provinces Single Tier: 450 units (2006)(President is both the chief of state Aceh, Papua (including special districts) - municipalities (urban): Kotamadya (2004:91)and head of government) Capital district Jakarta - regencies (rural): Kabupaten (2004:349)

- Villages (Desa): (pop. approx. 70,000). Their organization and functioning are the responsability of the provincial authorities (law nº 22/1999).

Japan Constitutional Monarchy with a Unitary Not applicable 47 prefectures 1,820 municipalities. Parliamentary Government 779 city councils, (Emperor as chief of state, Prime 844 town councils and 197 village councilsMinister as head of government)

Malaysia Constitutional Monarchy Federal 13 states 144 local government units (depending on population):(Paramount Ruler as chief of state, 3 federal territories - 10 city councils,Prime Minister as head of government) - 36 municipal councils for large towns

- 98 district councils (areas with small urban centers)


Table 3 Territorial Organization of Local Government in the Asia-Pacific Region (cont.)

Country Type of Type Federated units, Regional / Upper level Lower levelgovernment of regions or territories provincial of local of local

state with special rights level government government

New Costitutional and parliamentary Unitary Not applicable 12 Regional Councils 74 Territorial Local Authorities (TLA) including among which: Zealand democracy (Governor general 4 unitary district councils - 4 unitary district councils),

representing the Queen as head - 15 city councils, of State, Prime Minister as chief - 54 district councils, head of government) Chatham Islands Council Community boards: created by TLA at

their discretion: 150 in 2006 in 50% of TLA

Pakistan Republic, presidential Federal 4 provinces 111 district units 396 sub-district units: 6,125 union administrationsgovernment (President as including: - Tehsil in districtschief of state, Prime Minister - City districts: - Town Municipal as head of government) - Large metropolitan areas Administration (TMA)

- Federal capital district in city districts(no self-government)

Philippines Republic, presidential government, Unitary Autonomous region 83 provinces 120 cities 41,982 villages (barangays)(President is both the chief of of Mindanao 1501 municipalitiesstate and head of government)

Korea, Rep. of Republic, presidential government Unitary Special autonomous 9 provinces 230 municipal units: Lower municipal units (wards): (President is both the chief of province of Jeju 6 metropolitan cities Seoul: 25 Dong (urban), Erp/Myeon state and head of government Seoul (special Metropolitan cities: 49 (rural) differentiated according

metropolitan city) Provinces: to population: Eup = larger unit 75 cities in rural areas (over 50,000, Eup81 rural districts may become a city)

Seoul: 522 DongMetropolitan cities: 689 Dong;10 Eup / 36 MyeonProvinces (incl. Jeju): 942 Dong, 213 Eup, 1,112 Myeon

Thailand Constitutional monarchy Unitary 75 Provincial Administrative 1,129 municipalities (cities and boroughs)(King as chief of state, Prime organizations Pattaya City CouncilMinister as head of government, Bangkok Metropolitan 6,744 Sub-district (tambon) Administrative Organizations (rural)at present provisional military Administrationgovernment)

Vietnam Communist government Unitary Not applicable 59 provinces 662 district units, among 10,776 municipalities:(President as chief of state, 5 centrally controlled cities which: 25 provincial towns, 1,181 wards (urban areas)Prime Minister as head of government) (including the capital city) 42 urban districts (in 583 district towns (rural

centrally controlled cities), district centres)9,012 communes (lower units in urban and rural areas)

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007).* Autonomous areas means a special administrative regime based on the recognition of special rights for ethnic groups.


The average population size of local go -vern ments in the region is shown in Ta -ble 4. The relevance of this ratio dependsvery much on whether the lower tier is de -vised as a rather large jurisdiction adequateto perform a number of functions, orwhether it is closer to settlements and hasto maintain a link with the people. Both mayexist in the same countries; then, the sig-nificance of the ratio depends on the distri-bution of functions. We have indeed to takein to account that some countries have a twotier local level (most Indian states, Pakistan,Philippines, Korea, Vietnam), whereas oth-ers have only a single tier local level (Aus-tralia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia), andexceptionally three tiers in some Indianstates and in China. To make a comparison,we have to take in to account the functionsof these levels. Indeed, major local govern-ment functions are usually exercised at the

upper local level in countries with a two tierlocal level. Therefore, the upper level has tobe taken for the comparison with countrieshaving a single tier local level. Convention-ally, we call it a district whatever its namein the respective countries.

This table is probably misleading in somerespects. It overlooks the role of theprovincial state administration, with itslocal branches in Thailand, which allows ahigher degree of fragmentation. It under-estimates the role for the people of lowerlevel municipal administrations, and itsvalue in terms of local democracy (forexample in India or the Philippines). How-ever, the high ranking of the ratio suggestsdecentralization at the meso level ratherthan at the local level (for example inIndonesia, Pakistan and Korea), and a lowprofile at the municipal level.

63

Table 4 Average Population Size of Local Governments in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Population (m) Number of local Average size of governments local government

Australia 20.1 703 28,592

China 1,296.5 2,860 453,147

India 1,079.7 9,624 112,115

Indonesia 217.6 450 483,556

Japan 127.8 1,820 70,220

Malaysia 25.2 144 175,000

New Zealand 4.1 73 54,931

Pakistan 152.1 396 384,091

Philippines 83.0 1,621 51,300

Korea, Rep. of 48.1 230 209,010

Thailand 62.4 7,874 7,924

Vietnam 82.2 662 124,169

Source: Table 1 and Table 3.

ASIA-PACIFICThe changing ‘shape’ of territorial organi-zation in the region reflects two very dis-similar processes under way. In the high-income OECD case study countries, thenumber of local governments has fallen inrecent years as a result of amalgamationpromoted by central government in pursuitof economies of scale in service delivery.In Australia, as a result of state policies,the number of local authorities diminishedby 200 in the last 30 years. In Japan, anamalgamation policy from 2001, encour-aged by the central government to capturethese scale economies, reduced the num-ber of local governments from 3,229 to1,820. In New Zealand, a major territorialreform in 1989 dramatically reduced thenumber of local governments from 830 bycreating an upper tier of 12 regions inaddition to 74 lower-tier local govern-ments. In Korea, the central government’sefforts to consolidate local go vernments in

1994 and 1995 was undertaken not onlyto realize economies of scale but also tocorrect the much-criticized manner ofdemarcating the boundaries of local gov-ernments. As a result of this reform, thenumber of local governments was reducedfrom 265 to 241 (including autonomous dis-tricts and rural dis tricts in Seoul and metro-politan cities). The boundaries of rural dis-tricts and secon da ry cities were redefinedto form urban-ru ral integrated cities sepa-rated from newly crea ted urban districts.

In lower income countries, the picture ismuch more contrasted. In order to supportthe development of democracy and thelegitimacy of political leaders, local coun-cils or authorities elected by the residentshave been restored, but at the same timemajor functions have been devolved upon

the intermediate level. This is typical forChinese reforms: village committees aredirectly elected in more than 644,000 Chi-nese villages every three years. The com-mittees deal with the lease of land and themanagement of local affairs; however,main responsibilities are carried out at theprovince and county levels. The samemovement can be seen in Vietnam. Thenumber of communes has increased by265 units between 2000 and 2004. Thevitality of traditional village institutions issupported by the government and someadministrative tasks can be delegated tothem by the people’s committee of thecommune. Even so, the key levels of localgovernment are provinces and districts.Similar trends can be observed in the non-communist countries. For example, theIndonesian reform of 1999 resulted in thetransfer of important responsibilities tolocal governments, but in the form of verylarge municipal units (on average near450,000 inhabitants), whereas villages arethe framework of citizen participation. Inthe Philippines, there is less concentrationof local government functions at the upperlevel; nevertheless, the municipal govern-ments are still relatively large, with morethan 50,000 inhabitants on average. Thebarangays, communities of pre-colonialorigin reshuffled by law at the time of theSpanish colonization, constitute an avenueof participation and of access to someadministrative service rather than a go -vern ment level.

In several other lower income countries,there has been a process of municipaliza-tion with more tasks transferred to alocal level closer to the inhabitants whilenevertheless endowed with some admin-istrative capacity. The major example isIndia, although the situation may varyconsiderably from one state to another:the lowest level, the gram panshayat, hasto manage pre-school and primary educa-tion, provide some local services(libraries) and amenities (sport, leisure)and support local agricultural and eco-nomic development. In Pakistan, too,


In lower income countries, in order to support

the development of democracy and the legitimacy of political

leaders, local councils or authorities elected by the residents

have been restored, but at the same time major functions

have been devolved upon the intermediate level


although the sub-district level is crucial,union administrations are local govern-ment units of a fair size and some capac-ity. In Thailand, the reforms of 1999 and2003 resulted in municipal-level consoli-dation in cities and boroughs and in theupgrading of sub-district administrativeorganizations into units of local self gov-ernment. These units subsumed theheadmen that until that time had beenelected by the people but subordinated tothe provincial administration. Thesereforms represent an important steptowards the generalization of municipalgovernment in Thailand – although thegovernment system as a whole remainsrather centralized.

The very rapid pace of urbanization in Asia– a seven-fold increase in urban popula-tion since 1950 (ADB 2006a) – presentshuge challenges for urban governance. Atthe same time, decentralization policies inmany countries are increasingly puttingthese challenges into the hands of localgovernments (ibid. p.4). Although city andurban municipal governments are oftensome of the longest-established local gov-ernments in these countries (some goingback over a century) they have generallybeen unable to keep pace with thedemands of urbanization. A city or munic-ipal government often covers only the his-toric core that spawned a vast metropoli-tan area. Although its boundaries may, insome cases, have been enlarged, this hasvery rarely been sufficient to keep pacewith the rapid urban expansion.

As a result, the urban periphery is oftengo verned by a multiplicity of smallermunicipalities, town and village councils,without any overall system of metropoli-tan-wide management. The available fiscalresources are often concentrated in thecore city, while the poorly served periphery(where many of the poorest live) is go -verned by various municipal and village coun-cils that have access to minimal resources.This fragmentation of urban governancepresents huge problems in the financing

and management of infrastructure andservices across the city.

A few metropolitan areas (Metro Manila,Bangkok, Tokyo) have a functioning met-ropolitan level of government and in Chinastrong municipal governments thatencompass large rural hinterlands havealways governed the largest cities. In Aus-tralia, most of the metropolitan popula-tions live outside central cities and infor-mal cooperation about planning has servedas a means of metropolitan governance.Uniquely, the city government of Brisbaneencompasses the whole metropolitan area(ADB 2006a). In New Zealand, 12 localgovernments representing the largestcities and peripheral districts in the sixbiggest metropolitan regions have joinedwith local government associations todevelop joint strategies to address gover-nance issues.

Elsewhere, there may only be some formof coordinating mechanism between thevarious municipal governments. But itrarely has the power or resources to tacklemetropolitan-wide infrastructure and serv-ice needs. For example, in Jakarta, theremit of the city government (DKI) coversonly what was the metropolitan area untilaround the 1970s. In recent years fouradditional city governments have beencreated in the adjoining areas where mostnew development has taken place.Although there is a planning framework forthe whole metropolitan region(Jabodetabek), this has to operate on thebasis of consensus among the constituentauthorities.

A further complication is the multiplicity ofagencies involved in urban development,infrastructure and service provision. Thishas been a particular issue in India wherethere has been a long tradition of specialpurpose agencies (SPAs). Thus, in a citysuch as Bangalore, there is a plethora ofSPAs in addition to the state government,the municipal government and the munic-ipal and village governments in the su r -

65

ASIA-PACIFICrounding area. The SPAs include the Ban-galore Development Authority, the Banga-lore Water and Sewerage Board and theKarnataka Slum Clearance Board (Devas2005). This leads to overlaps, gaps andthe lack of a coordinated response to theneeds of the rapidly growing population. Inmany large cities of the region, endemicpolitical conflict between the various levelsof government –municipal, state and cen-tral– make metropolitan coordinationeven more problematic.

III. Powers and Responsibilities,Management and Finances

III.1. Functions of Local Government

As in other parts of the world, local gov-ernments in the selected countries of theAsia-Pacific region have multiple roles to

perform: service delivery, governance,planning and community development,and regulation and supervision. Table 5provides a profile of the functions that arethe responsibility of local government.Generally speaking, all countries havedecentralized some basic services to thislevel, including planning, education, pro-vision of social and health services, watersupply, public transport and businessdevelopment support. In Indonesia, the2004 decentralization legislation (Law 32)de volved a comprehensive list of 16 oblig-atory functions to local government.

Education is the most notable servicedelivered by local government in theregion. Local governments in China,Japan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnamand the Philippines are involved in the deliv-

ery of basic education, ranging from pre-school to secondary school. The onlyexceptions are Australia, New Zealand andMalaysia, where basic education remainsa state or central government responsibil-ity. Some aspects of health and welfareservices are delivered by local govern-ment in most countries in the regionexcept for Australia and New Zealand,where these functions remain with thestate and central government respec-tively. In Korea, health and social welfareaccounted for 31% of total local expendi-ture in the consolidated local governmentbudget for 2007. In the Philippines, healthand welfare services have been fullydevolved since 1992. Water supply is pri-marily a local government responsibility inseveral countries of the region (e.g. Aus-tralia, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan andVietnam). By contrast, electricity supplyre mains a central government responsibil-ity throughout the region except in Chinawhere it is a municipal responsibility.

In New Zealand, under the influence ofNew Public Management (NPM), there hasbeen a dramatic increase in private sec torparticipation in local service delivery. The1989 Local Government Act re qu ires localauthorities to “give due con sideration tothe advantages and di sadvantages of dif-ferent delivery options” in the provision oflocal services. This led to a large increasein contracting out and by the mid-1990s75% of all services were delivered by pri-vate contractors (Boston 1996). In India,the pressure on recruitment, togetherwith the spread of NPM initiatives at thestate level, has also encouraged manylocal governments take up new activitiesand service provision arrangementsthrough public-private partnerships, butcorresponding systems of contract super-vision and ‘public service comparators’ arestill not very well developed.

In addition to the functions listed in Table5, many local governments in the regionalso perform some public works functionssuch as road construction (e.g. Australia,

Education is the most notable service delivered by local

government in the region. The only exceptions are Australia,

New Zealand and Malaysia, where basic education remains

a state or central government responsibility



India, Pakistan and Philippines) and evenairports (Australia). In most countries ofthe region local government also has aresponsibility for environmental protectionalthough its powers of enforcement tendto be severely limited. China is the onlycountry where local governments inautonomous regions perform functionsnormally reserved for central government(e.g. judicial administration, scientific re -search, unemployment benefits and pen-sions).

A number of local governments in the re -gion engage directly in business activities.This is especially so in China and Vietnam,where local governments are major pro-ducers of industrial goods. In NewZealand, the 2002 Local Government Actenabled local governments to create a

Local Authority Trading Enterprise (LATE).These companies, in which the local gov-ernments may hold 50% or more of theequity, employ their own staff and aresubject to company taxation. They ope -rate in activities such as public transport,shopping malls, cinemas and car parks aswell as water utilities, property manage-ment and quarrying. Some provinces inthe Philippines own major facilities suchas convention centers and shopping cen-ters that are managed as ‘profit centers’to provide additional sources of local rev-enue. Elsewhere, at the very least, localgovernments provide support services forbusiness development activities. The mostcommon commercial activity of municipal-ities is the operation of local public enter-prises such as markets, slaughterhouses,bus terminals and car parks.

67

Table 5 Services Delivered by the Local Governments in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Planning Basic Basic social Basic health Water Electricity Public Businesseducation welfare services supply supply transport development

support

Australia Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes

China Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes

India Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Indonesia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Japan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Malaysia Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes

New Zealand Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes

Pakistan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Philippines Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes

Korea, Rep. of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Thailand Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes

Vietnam Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007).

ASIA-PACIFIC68 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Table 6 Relative Size of Local Government Expenditure and Income in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Total public Local public Ratio Ratio local public Tax shares + general Local tax revenues

expenditure expenditure local public investment exp/ grants as % of the (= tax revenues

a) as % of GDP (local and meso expenses/total total civil public total LG Income subject to a

b) €per capita level only) public investment local tax power)

a)% GDP expenses expenditure as % of total LG

b)€per capita income

Australia a) 37% a) 2% 7% 6% 52% 38%

(2005) b) €11,486 b) €276

China a) 27% a) 22% 81% n/a 32% 29%

(2004) b) €291 b) €235

India a) 19.1% a) Karnataka: 2.9% Karnataka: 18.5% n/a Rural panchayat: Urban local bodies: 60% of

90% (all India revenues from property tax

(2002) b) n/a b) n/a average) (all India average)

Indonesia a) 19% a) 6% 33% 36% 70% <10%

(2006) b) €189 b) €62

Japan a) 22.9% a) 12.3% 53.6% n/a 69% 34%

(2004) b) €7,243 b) €3,903

Malaysia a) 27% a) 4% 13% 11% 35% 26%

(2003) b) €1,152 b) €155

New Zealand a) 42% a) 3.9% 9.4% 16% 68% 56%

(2005) b) €9,693 b) €380

Pakistan*(2005) a) 18.5% a) 2.6% 14% n/a 90% 10%**

Korea, Rep. of a) 36% a) 16% 44% n/a 53% 34%

(2005) b) n/a b) n/a

Thailand a) 21% a) 2% 9% 15% 45% 12%

(2002) b) €376 b) €34

Vietnam a) 24% a) 11% 48% 51% 44% 24%

(2002) b) n/a b) n/a

Sources: IMF 2006; OECD 2005; World Bank 2004, 2006; and country profiles; + Add. Sethi (2004); Weist (2004). UCLG Country Profiles (2007)* Estimates based on own calculations [sources: Cyan, M. (2006); ADB/DfID/WB (2004)].**Estimate including all own revenues.


III.2. Local Government Finances

The relative economic size of local go -vernment varies widely across the region, asshown in Table 6. In China, the different tiersof local government play a major role inservice provision and local economic devel-opment. Local governments manage some80% of state-owned enterprises. As a result,they account for 81% of public expenditureand 22% of GDP. In Japan, local govern-ments have wide functional responsibilitiesand account for over half of total publicexpenditure and 10% of GDP. In Indonesia,as a result of the recent ‘big bang’ decentral-ization, local governments now account forone-third of total public expenditure. By con-trast, despite their long-established tradi-tions, local governments in Australia andNew Zealand have quite limited responsibili-

ties and account for less than 10% of publicexpenditure and around 2-4% of GDP. Thesize of local government in Vietnam has risenrapidly in recent years – more than doublingin absolute size and increasing from 40% to48% as a share of total public expenditurefrom 1997-2002. Nevertheless, until itimplemented the 2004 State Budget Law,Vietnam was formally one of the least de - centralized countries in the world, with localgovernments essentially carrying out decon-centrated functions at the behest of the cen-tral government (World Bank 2005:87). Forthe biggest countries of the region, globaldata hide enormous disparities betweenregions and between local go vernments.

Local governments of the selected countriesin the Asia-Pacific region are all equippedwith powers of taxation, as shown in Table

Table 7 The Scope of Local Tax Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Major local taxes

Australia Property

China Collective enterprise, agricultural and real estate

India Property, octroi (tax on goods entering the municipality)

Indonesia Hotel and restaurant, entertainment, advertisement, electricity (street lighting), non-strategic and non-vital mining, parking, groundwater and environment. In addition,proceeds from taxes on land and property, motorized vehicles, vehicle transfer and fuel are shared with provinces.

Japan Individual inhabitant, business, local consumption and automobile,property tax, city planning tax, local tobacco tax

Malaysia Property

New Zealand Property

Pakistan District/city: education, health, vehicles (excluding motor vehicles) Tehsil: services, property and sale of property

Philippines Property, business, amusement, sand and gravel, printing and publication, franchise and community

Korea, Rep. of Property, business, acquisition, registration, license, inhabitant, farmland, butchery, leisure, tobacco consumption, urban planning, regional development, motor fuel andlocal education

Thailand Property, land and building, land development, signboard, slaughter duties, swallow nest duties, tobacco, petroleum and hotel

Vietnam Land and house, natural resources (excluding those on petroleum activities), license, land use rights transfer and land rent.

Sources: UCLG Country Profiles (2007).

National Tax Service of the Republic of Korea (2006).

Weist (2001).

ASIA-PACIFIC7. Property taxation is by far the majorsource of local taxation; in Japan itaccounts for 46.2% of own tax revenues(before the “Trinity Reform”); in Australiathis accounts for 100% of own-revenueand in New Zealand for 91% of own-rev-enue. In both countries, as well as inChina, local governments also have dis-cretion over the rate of property taxationwhereas elsewhere this tends to be deter-mined by central or state government. Insome countries, business (or enterprise)taxation is also a major source of own-revenue. Municipalities throughout theregion also collect taxes on hotels,restaurants and places of entertainment.Some local taxes are peculiar to a specificcountry. For example, city governmentsin Japan impose an urban planning tax,Pakistani municipalities impose healthand education taxes and Chinese munici-

palities impose collective enterprise andagricultural taxes. In Indonesia since2004, mu nicipalities may impose a tax onsur face water. Together with the existinglocal tax on groundwater, this authority ispart of the government’s effort to curbenvironmental damage from over-exploitation of water resources.

In China, Indonesia and Vietnam, theproceeds of some locally collected taxesare shared with higher tiers of govern-ment. In China, revenue from personalincome tax, product tax, business taxand joint enterprise tax are all sharedbetween central and local government.In Vietnam, local go vernments have notaxing powers at all. Instead, they sharewith central government the proceeds

from VAT, corporate income tax, incometax on high-income earners, special con-sumption tax on do mestic goods andservices, and gasoline and oil tax. Othertax revenues are exclusively assigned tothem, namely land and housing taxes,natural resource taxes (excluding petro-leum), license tax and land use rightstransfer tax. In Indonesia, local govern-ments share the proceeds of taxes onland and property, and on motorizedvehicles and fuel with provincial govern-ment. Many municipalities also levy userfees and charges that comprise a minorpart, typically less than 10%, of theirtotal own-source revenues.

While local governments all have theirown tax sources, the degree of fiscalautonomy also varies considerablybetween countries. The more developedcountries, such as New Zealand and Aus-tralia generate a substantial share of theirrevenues locally and are hence less relianton intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Theshare of grants in total local governmentrevenue has fallen in both Australia andNew Zealand in recent years - from 23%in the 1980s to 16% in the late 1990s inAustralia and from 18% to 10% over thesame period in New Zealand (OECD2001). In Japan the local finance reform(“Trinity Reform”) 2005-2007 replacestargeted subsidies by tax revenues (trans-fer from the national personal income taxupon the individual inhabitant tax, how-ever for a lower expected yield) and theglobal tax grant, until now a major equal-izing transfer from central budget, isbeing reduced drastically. By contrast, inlower-income countries of the region suchas India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thai-land, local governments (outside themajor urban centers) generate a muchsmaller share of their total revenues fromlocal tax sources (typically 10-30%) andhence are heavily reliant on central trans-fers and grants. In Thailand, according tothe 1999 Decentralization Plan and Proce-dures Act, local governments were to beallocated at least 20% of the national gov-


Ideally, the financial resources at the disposal of a local

government – whether from its own sources3 or from grants

and transfers – should be sufficient to cover all services

that it is mandated to deliver


ernment budget by fiscal year 2001 and atleast 35% by fiscal year 2006. The lattergoal has not yet been reached and thesetargets have been the subject of heateddebate. However, the degree of local fiscalautonomy is not necessarily a function ofthe overall income level of the country. Forexample, Japanese local go vernment onlyraises 34,4% of its total income fromown-taxes while local governments inChina receive only 32% of their incomesfrom grants and shared taxes of centralgovernment. This disparity reflects thevery strong role that local government inJapan plays as an ‘agent’ of central gov-ernment in the delivery of services, espe-cially education and social welfare, whichare financed by earmarked inter-govern-mental fiscal transfers. In contrast, themuch stronger practice of fiscal decentral-ization in China through the mechanism ofrevenue sharing is counterbalanced byextreme political centralization.

Ideally, the financial resources at the dis-posal of a local government –whether fromits own sources3 or from grants and trans-fers- should be sufficient to cover all serv-ices that it is mandated to deliver. This isnot the case in India, Pakistan and the Philip-pines. In these countries own-source rev-enues of local governments plus transfersreceived are together insufficient to fundthe delivery of local services, suggestingthe need for the devolution of extra taxpowers in order to correct this imbalance.By contrast, the strength of municipalassociations in the OECD countries of theregion has ensured that the correspondingextra revenues required to comply withnew mandates have accompanied thedevolution of new responsibilities to localgovernment. In Australia, such ‘cost shift-ing’ to local government was a centralpoint of a 2006 Inter-Governmental Agree-ment between the Local GovernmentAssociation and the federal government.In New Zealand, it has been one of themajor issues that contributed to succes-sive waves of local government reformfrom 1989 onwards. Complicating this

problem is the issue of ‘unfunded man-dates,’ namely the predilection of centralgovernment to legislate further responsi-bilities that involve an additional fiscal bur-den on local government. This is so in thePhilippines, where local government isrequired to pay additional incentives andallowances to devolved health sectoremployees and allowances to national gov-ernment public servants (e.g. judges andpolice) whose offices lie within its jurisdic-tion. These unfunded mandates have put astrain on the finances of local governmentand are a burning issue in the discourse oncentral-local relations in many other coun-tries in the region.

Borrowing is another source of local gov-ernment funding. In the past, central gov-ernments in most countries of the regionhave limited the access by local govern-ment to capital markets because of theinherent risk that over-borrowing may leadto macro-economic instability. In Korea thesize of local government out standing debtsfrom bond issues hardly changed during2000-2006 because of the strong controlexercised over local borrowing by centralgovernment. In China, the central govern-ment placed strict limits on the power oflocal governments to borrow, but the latteroften found ways to avoid these controlsby obtaining loans through their munici-pally owned enterprises. Today some cen-tral governments in the region are increas-ingly encouraging larger municipalities toborrow. In Japan, loans are no longer sub-ject to authorization, but only an under-standing with central government, sinceApril 2006. In India, several of the largercities have issued municipal bonds and inthe state of Tamil Nadu arrangementshave been made for smaller municipalitiesto join together to issue bonds. Of course,municipal borrowing depends on a func-tioning capital market as well as the repay-ment capacity of municipalities. In thePhilippines local governments are legallyenabled and encouraged to tap financialmarkets and other non-traditional sourcesof finance in order to make them less

3. Own sources:

resources levied

directly by local

authorities.

ASIA-PACIFICreliant on central grants. How ever, veryfew have yet attempted to tap private cap-ital markets. Some local governmentshave used variants of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes and other forms ofprivate sector participation in order to fundmajor investment projects, although inter-est in these has waned somewhat follow-ing the East Asian financial crisis.

Borrowing from commercial banks hasbeen minimal because of the lack of col-lateral or guarantees. Loans from govern-ment financial institutions (GFIs) havebeen far more common because theseGFIs serve as the depository banks forthe local governments for their intergov-ernmental transfers. Hence GFIs canalways withhold these central transfers inthe event of default on loan repayment bythe local governments. A drawback,though, is that such arrangements canencourage irresponsible lending. InIndonesia, most borrowing by local gov-ernments has been from the central gov-ernment, often involving on-lending ofdonor funds. In New Zealand, a 1996reform eased the process of loan approvalbut also placed new legal restrictions onit. In place of central governmentapproval, localities were re quired to spec-ify explicitly the purpose and beneficiariesof a borrowing measure and to budgetaccordingly so as to cover operatingexpenses. In Australia, local governmentborrowing is coordinated by a nationalLoan Council that allocates and regulatesdebt among the states. In Ko rea, the sizeof outstanding local government debtfrom bond issues hardly chan ged during2000-2006 because of the strong controlexercised over local bo rrowing by thecentral government.

III.3. Administrative Capacity of Local Government

Data on the share of local level personnelin total public sector employment for se -lected Asia-Pacific countries is shown inTable 8. The share ranges from highs of

92% and 77% in China and Indonesiarespectively to lows of only 7% and 10%in Malaysia and New Zealand. Most localgovernment personnel in the region havepermanent positions with tenure pro-tected by law although chief executiveofficers in New Zealand are recruited onseven-year renewable contracts.

The institutional and policy frameworks forrecruitment, as well as the organizationalresponsibilities in undertaking recruitmentprocesses at the local level, are shown inTable 9. Specific laws govern local publicservice in most countries of the region. InJapan, the Local Public Service Law definesthe criteria for recruitment of local govern-ment personnel as well as a position clas-sification system, remuneration and be -nefits, hours of work, disciplinary mattersand training. In the Philippines, local govern-ment personnel are covered by civil servicelaws and by the rules and regulations ofthe Civil Service Commission (CSC), thecentral agency for public sector personnel.In addition, the 1991 Local GovernmentCode has provisions regarding personneladministration. The Code mandates alllocal governments to design and imple-ment their own organizational structureand staffing pattern, taking into accounttheir service requirements and financialcapacity. It also provides for the manda-tory appointment of certain posts at everytier of local government and the creationof a Personnel Selection Board in eachlocal government unit to assist the localchief executive in the fair selection of per-sonnel for employment and promotion.Notwith standing these safeguards, prob-lems such as nepotism and associatednon-compliance with the merit principle inrecruitment and promotion are endemic inthe local public service system in manycountries of the region.

The degree of influence by higher tiers ofgovernment in the selection of local go -vernment staff remains considerable inthe region. In China, the committees ofthe Chinese Communist Party choose,

The degree

of influence

by higher tiers

of government in

the selection of

local government

staff remains

considerable in

the region



manage, discipline and dismiss civil ser-vants, including those in local govern-ment. The recruiting body is likewiseresponsible for the discipline and dis-missal of appointees. At the other end ofthe spectrum, in Australia and NewZealand, local councils appoint the ChiefExecutive Officer (CEO) but all other staffare employees of the CEO. In Pakistan,provincial authorities largely determinethe appointment of senior local govern-ment personnel, with district and cityestablish ments composed basically of sec-onded federal and provincial civil ser-vants. In Indonesia, despite a radicaldecentralization reform, the central gov-ernment still exercises substantial controlover local government staff appointments.In India, selection and recruitment of localgovernment staff is done by either thelocal authorities themselves or by a statelevel body concerned with recruitment.Local government in Malaysia can recruit,

train, promote and discipline their person-nel and even manage pensions but allthese actions require approval by stategovernment. Local budgets are also sub-ject to state supervision.

In Thailand, the strong vertical connec-tions between local officials and officials ofthe central government (especially in theDepartment of Local Administration of theMinistry of Interior), who handed out jobs,have been dismantled and personnel deci-sions are now largely under the power ofthe local executives. Bureaucrats residentin Bangkok often resist transfer to theprovinces, which involves moving andpossibly less authority and lower pay.However, transfers to local governmentsare more attractive for provincial officialsgiven that provincial offices and districtoffices have lost authority as a result ofdecentralization and the transfer does notrequire a change in residence.

73

Table 8 Size of Local Government Personnel in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Local government personnel Total public sector personnel Share of local government personnel in total public sector employment

Australia 147,500 1,357,600 11%

China 5,000,000 (est.) n/a 92%

India n/a n/a n/a

Indonesia (2006) 2,781,476 3,635,816 77%

Japan 1,432,494 2,311,920 62%

Malaysia 58,000 829,000 7%

New Zealand 21,680 227,220 10%

Pakistan n/a n/a n/a

Philippines (1999) 390,561 1,445,498 27%

Korea, Rep. of (2006) 345,989 611,219 56%

Thailand n/a n/a 20%

Vietnam n/a n/a 60%

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007): Figure 7.1.


Table 9 Institutional and Policy Frameworks for Recruitment Processes and Human Resource Development at the Local Level in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Staffing regime (public or private Recruitment procedure, especially Institutional arrangements for training law, career or job positions) for high-level positions of local government staff

Australia Public law Recruitment by individual local government unit Organized and funded by individual local government units

China Civil servant law Annual competitive exam at national and local levels Organized and funded by local government

India Largely by public law Central and state level staff, selected by Not mandated by law but organized by central and stateexamination, are assigned to senior LG posts. governments

Indonesia Public law with career positions Central government still exercises control over Implicitly mandated by law and organized by central and recruitment, which is generally by competitive local governmentexam with senior LG posts filled by promotion of career-based officers.

Japan Local public service law for full-time positions, Competitive exams for all local governments Regulated by local public service law and implemented by career positions each local government

Malaysia Local councils have recruitment boards, By local government subject to approval of National Institute for Public Administration (INTAN) acts as supervised by Public Service Commission. state level government training arm of the Public Service Commission.

New Zealand Fixed-term seven year contracts for Chief Staffing levels determined by each CEO who Local Government New Zealand provides limited Executive Officer (CEO) and tenure for recruits and acts as legal employer of all other staff professional trainingother personnel

Pakistan Federal, provincial and local civil service Centralized recruitment by merit through Public Various public sector training institutionscadres under civil service acts Service Commission with provincial cadres

assigned to senior posts in local government

Philippines Civil service law and rules, 1991 local By individual local government Local Government Academy, Dept of Interior and Localgovernment code and civil service rules Government and Centre for Local and Regional Governance, and regulations UP-NCPAG

Korea, Rep. of Local public service law for full-time positions Central government staff assigned to local Local Administrator Formation Institutes (LATI);government. Other staff recruited by competitive Other public sector training institutionsexamination or on contract basis

Thailand Strong central government control relaxed with Central government sets broad national standards Central government and provincial responsibilityrecent rapid devolution of personnel for hiring, firing, recruiting, and setting salaries and responsibility to local government benefits in local governments. Personnel decisions

are now largely under the power of local executives.

Vietnam Regulated by 2003 Ordinance on Cadres Central government staff assigned to local National Academy of Public Administration and Provincial and Civil Servants government. Other staff recruited by competitive and District-level Political Schools

examination or on contract basis

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007) and Brillantes 2006.


The most far-reaching management re -forms affecting local government in there gion have been in New Zealand wherethe 2002 Local Government Act requiresboth annual and long-term plans as wellas sys tematic consideration of outcomesfor local communities. It also prescribesprinciples for public consultation includ-ing transparent presentation of propos-als, options and procedures. Most Aus-tralian states have introduced systemsof performance management for localgovernment, including performanceindicators and other benchmarkingstrategies. In particular, the introduc-tion of accrual accounting has had amajor impact on local government man-agement because of the requirement tovalue assets and make adequate provi-sion for depreciation. Elsewhere in somecountries of the region, significantdecentralization programs have createdsevere strains on the managementcapacity of local governments as theytry to cope with the administrative chal-lenges caused by the rapid transfer ofcentral government responsibilities andpersonnel.

The challenges of limited capacity andre sources that all local governmentsface are amplified in urban areas. Thepro blems of urban management are mo -re complex and the potential for disaster(natural and man-made) is greater.Environmental problems are particularlyse vere, with inadequate capacity totreat human and industrial waste,severe contamination of water sourcesand serious air pollution from bothindustrial activity and the rapid growthof motor vehicles. Although city govern-ments may be better able to recruitqualified staff compared to rural localgovernments, their capacity to regulatedeve lop ment and to effectively controlen vironmental risks remains quite lim-ited. Similarly, although city govern-ments may have access to much greaterfiscal resources than rural governments,their need for resources is also much

grea ter, since infrastructure and serv-ices are likely to be much more expen-sive. In turn, inadequate physical in fra -structure is often a major impediment toindustrial development and ur ban eco-nomic growth, on which national eco-nomic development depends.

In its report on urbanization and sus-tainability in Asia (ADB 2006a), theAsian Development Bank identified anumber of examples of good urban gov-ernance in 12 countries in the region.These include: in no vative approaches torevenue mobilization and capital financ-ing; improved ad ministration and per-formance-oriented management;increased availability of information andtransparency of decision-making;greater citizen participation in decision-making; collaboration between munici-palities within the metropolitan area oreconomic sub-region; serious attemptsto tackle environmental problems andeffectively enforce pollution controls;significant programs to address urbanpoverty, and support to community-based service improvements. However,such initiatives have been the excep-tion. In all such cases, local leadershiphas been the critical factor: leadershipthat is committed to reform and toimproving municipal conditions, is effec-tive in mobilizing support for such initia-tives and is responsive and accountableto local citizens. Developing such civicleader ship across the region re mains ama jor challenge.

Decentralization reforms and associatedgreater local level autonomy require majorcapacity building and training interventionsfor local government personnel in the Asia-Pacific region (Brillantes 2006). As shown inTable 9, such training and capacity-buildingprograms in the selected countries of theregion often form part of each coun try’s over-all civil service and policy frameworks. It isnoteworthy that Korea, a coun try that hasemphasized knowledge ma na ge ment as acore element of the development process, is

Decentralization

reforms and

associated greater

local level

autonomy require

major capacity

building and

training

interventions for

local government

personnel in the

Asia-Pacific region

75

ASIA-PACIFICpursuing capacity building in the public sectorthrough the establishment of separate spe-cialized train ing institutes for central and localgo vernment personnel, respectively the Cen-tral Officials Training Institute (OTI) and theLocal Administrators Training Institute (LATI).

In the context of the current decentralizationreforms in the region, attitudinal changeamong central government officials is neces-sary to mitigate the new challenges and diffi-culties faced by local government personnel.In Japan, this process is encouraged by inter-governmental personnel exchanges, wherebycentral government personnel from the Min-istry of Home Affairs are regularly secondedto local government, a practice that is not atall common in New Zealand. Apart fromenabling these officials to appreciate the per-spectives of the ‘locals’ and hence decentral-ize their own ways of thinking, this is also away of building the capacity of local govern-ment through the expertise that is sharedwith them. In this respect, there is growinginterest in encouraging joint training insti-tutes of public administration for both localand central government personnel in order topromote cross fertilization and collaborationbetween the different tiers of government.Given the continued thrust towards decen-tralization in the region, the relative merits ofsepa rate training institutions for national andlocal government employees (as in the caseof Korea and the Philippines) and joint train-ing institutions deserve attention.

III.4. Integrity and Corruption

Corruption in the public sector, including localgovernment, is a global concern. Developedand developing countries alike are bedeviledwith corruption issues. The annual CorruptionPerception Index (CPI) published by Trans-parency International reveals that some of thecase study countries in the region (Indonesia,Pakistan, Philippines and Vietnam) are nearthe bottom of the ladder and strongly suggestthat corruption in these countries is per ceivedas a major problem. On the other hand, NewZealand is ranked as the least corrupt country

in the world while Australia is ranked ninth(Transparency International 2006). Althoughthe CPI does not directly pertain to corruptionat the local level, local governments are notexempted from this negative perception. Infact, there is a widespread perception in bothChina and Indonesia that decentralization hasincreased corruption. Indeed decentralizationcan increase the problem of corruption, or atleast spread it around much more widely,making it more difficult to manage. On theother hand, democratization and the strength-ening of civil society may simply expose cor-ruption to more public view, so that citizensperceive that the problem has increased evenwhen it has not.

Many developing countries of the Asia-Pa cificregion have serious problems with corruption.This is much less significant in the richercountries such as Japan, Australia and NewZealand, because of both the much higherrates of staff remuneration and the wellestablished arrangements for public scrutinyand control in these countries. In NewZealand, the State Services Commission hassince 1988 elaborated and monitored a Codeof Conduct for public ethics and conflicts ofinterest in local as well as central govern-ment. The national Auditor-General enforcesthese rules and criminal charges can bebrought in the event of breaches. Elsewhere,corruption can seriously erode the availabilityof resources for local service delivery and canprevent citizens, particularly the poor, fromgaining access to these services.

Several countries in the region have in tro -duced new mechanisms to curb corruption,in cluding greater transparency of decisionma king. In Malaysia, improvements in localgovernment recruitment procedures andremuneration, together with e-governanceinitiatives, have been designed to improveethical standards and the transparency oflocal service delivery. In the Philip pines, theTransparent Accountable Go vernance Projectinvolves a ‘conduct of lifestyle’ check on pub-lic officials and procedural reforms in localgovernment transactions (procurement, ad -mi nistration of local public enterprises, prop-

Corruption in the

public sector,

including local

government, is a

global concern



erty tax administration and business permit-ting and licensing). In India, many stateshave appointed a Lokayukta (ombudsman)to combat corruption and malpractice in gov-ernment, including local government. InJapan, there were a reported 92 cases of cor-ruption in 2004 at the municipal level. Meas-ures to combat corruption in clude strength-ening the external audit sys tem and check upand reform of the accounting process. Butelsewhere (e.g. Pakistan, Philippines andIndonesia) the capacity of cen tral govern-ment to monitor and audit local governmentsremains a major concern. For example,reports from the Philippine Center for Inves-tigative Journalism point out that up to 70%of local health funds disappear as a result ofcorruption.

III.5. Central-Local Relations

Local governments in the selected countriesoperate under a legal framework that isdefined by higher levels of government. Inunitary nations such as China, Indonesia,Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Philip pines,Thailand and Vietnam, central go vernmentsprescribe the powers and functions of localgovernment. In fed eral systems such asAustralia, India, Malaysia and Pakistan localgovernments are an s werable to the state orprovincial government. In Australia, stateand territory mi nisters for local governmentmay dis solve lo cal councils and appointadministrators to carry out all local govern-ment functions. When this happens, theministers usually have to hold publicinquires into the alleged failings of the con-cerned council that justified the in ter -vention. Even state constitutional provisionsthat restrict these powers can be amendedrelatively easily (CLGF 2005:29). In NewZealand the 2002 Local Government Actgives the minister for local government thepower to initiate review of local govern-ments for mismanagement or deficiencies incouncil de cision making. In India there areno special avenues for intergovernmentalrelations and there is no formal representa-tion of local go vernment in the state struc-tures (CLGF 2005:106).

Generally speaking, local governments as self-governing institutions are both account able totheir citizens and to the higher levels of go -vern ment of which they are agents. In Pa -kistan, local political account ability remainspro blematic because of the control functionsthat the provincial go vernment continues toexercise over local government on matterssuch as local personnel management andlocal finances. Local governments are alsohelpless in influencing grant-aided programsin their jurisdiction because these are usuallydeter mined by provincial and national le -gislators. By contrast, in Indonesia, decentral-ization fun damentally altered the di rection ofaccount ability. Prior to the 1999 reforms, localgo vernment was an swerable primarily to thecentral government, but after the introductionof direct elections of provincial and local gov-ernment executives and legislatures, thedirection of accountability shifted markedly to -wards the local electorates.

In most of the selected countries, national orstate level agencies perform general oversightof local government with regard to audit andprobity. Nevertheless, the extent of this‘upward’ accountability of local government tohigher levels of government differs markedlyamong countries in the region. In China andVietnam, local governments have a dual sub-ordination, both sectorally (to central govern-ment ministries and agencies) and territorially(to the people’s councils). The people’s coun-cils are themselves subject both to supervi-sion and operational guidance from thenational level and to guidance and inspectionfrom sector ministries and agencies of centralgovernment. In India, state sectoral agenciesoften perform functions that overlap with localgovernment functions and preempt local gov-ernment responsibility4.

In contrast to many countries in the region,central government ministries and agencies inJapan do not have direct control or supervi-sion over local governments but may onlyprovide information and suggestions. How -ever, the Ministry of Home Affairs exercises de

facto central fiscal supervision and control byway of the model budget that it presents to

Local governments

in the selected

countries operate

under a legal

framework that is

defined by higher

levels of

government

77

4. Sethi (ed.), 2004,

(pp.15-16.)

5. Member states of the

Federation

(Translator’s note).

6. Gathering together

the different levels of

local representatives

(Translator’s note).

ASIA-PACIFICthe local governments every year. When thecentral government disapproves of their deci-sions or policies, local governments canappeal to the Dispute Settlement Commis-sion; however, authorities almost always pre-fer further discussions. A similar situationexists in Korea, where, despite their significantsize, local governments have far less auton-omy in practice than suggested by legislation.The lack of clarity over the division of respon-sibilities with central and provincial govern-ments –two-thirds of enacted local govern-ment responsibilities are exer cised jointly withprovincial government– is especially true inthe case of education, where local govern-ments deliver services as agencies of centralgovernment. Provinces and metropolitan citygovernments enjoy considerable supervisoryauthority over local government (cities, ruraldistricts and autonomous urban districts).

Even when major decentralization reformshave taken place, the power of central govern-ment may still prevail over local government.In India the state-level Local Government Min-ister may dissolve elected bodies and governthem directly for up to six months. Howeverelections must be held within six monthsin order to reconstitute the municipality. Bycontrast, in the case of the Philippines the dis-solution of local elected bodies is prohibited,even by the highest level of government. Sucha process can only be carried out ‘from below,’either through regular elections or through therecall process, whereby the voters them selvesdecide on the fate of the elected officials. Theprinciple here is that elected officials are solelyaccountable to the citizens who elected them.

In Thailand, the Ministry of the Interior is per-ceived as the strongest opponent of decentra -li zation. By pointing to local weaknesses in ad -ministrative capacity and personnel, theministry has attempted to stem the loss of itsauthority. The ministry argues that it needs tore tain the extensive supervisory powers that itexercises over local governments through theprovincial ad ministration under its control. Lo -cal go vernments are subjected to auditing bythe ministry once a year. The ministry can al -so intervene to terminate or modify local po -

licies if it believes they contradict or threatennational policies or interests. As a re sult, pro -vincial governors and district officers still retainconsiderable authority over local government.

III.6. Local Government Associations

The development of local governmentsundoubtedly depends to a large extent on the“local hands” that mind these communities.Yet there are situations when local govern-ments need to look beyond their parochialconcerns and be more forward-looking andpro-active in their orientation. Oftentimes,local governments would need some kind ofmechanism that can work for their mutualinterests and more significantly, to representtheir collective interest in dealing with higherlevels of government and external institutionssuch as donor agencies. In this respect, localgovernment associations have become theinstrument that local governments in theregion adopt to advance their mutual inter-ests. These associations perform diverse func-tions for local governments.

One significant role that these associations per-form is to act as representative and advocate oflocal government interests in higher levels ofgovernment. Australia has perhaps one of thelongest existing national local go vernmentassociations in the region. Establi shed in 1947,the Australian Local Go vernment Association(ALGA) sits as member in the Premiers Confer-ence5 and Council of Australian Governmentand various ministerial councils, intergovern-mental committees6 and specialist advisorybodies. The association has helped shape thereform agenda in 1990s such as National Com-petition Policy and reviews of intergovernmen-tal relations. At the state level are also foundlocal government associations that link thecouncils in intergovernmental forums, negotia-tions, and cooperative efforts in general andspecific areas of activity. As in Australia, localgovernments in New Zealand have formed theLocal Government Association of New Zealandrepresenting the interests of 86 member localauthorities. Since 2000 when the central gov-ernment-local government forum was initiated,the association has consistently represented

Even when major

decentralization

reforms have taken

place, the power of

central government

may still prevail

over local

government



local government in discussing common issuesand coordination of public services. Member-ship in Australian and New Zealand local gov-ernment associations is voluntary but coun-cils in the two countries have chosen to bemembers because of the actual and potentialcontributions that the associations give to thecouncils. The senior local authority officers inthis country have also formed themselvesinto a national professional body called Soci-ety of Local Government Managers. Otherassociations in the sub-region, recently cre-ated, are the Fiji Local Government Associa-tion and the Papuasia New Guinea UrbanLocal Level Association.

In the Philippines, the Union of Local Authori-ties in the Philippines (ULAP) is a nationalbody, established in 1997, that is composed ofvarious leagues at the provincial, city, munici-pal and barangay (village) levels. Theseleagues represent their respective interestsand serve as me chanisms to articulate issuesthat directly concern them and to secure solu-tions. The ULAP seeks to unite members topursue genuine autonomy for all local govern-ment units. Various groups of elected localofficials (such as vice mayors, women mayorsand young legislators) and professional localgovernment staff (such as treasurers, asses-sors and planners) also have their respectivenational associations. In Indonesia, six inde-pendent associations representing specificlevels of local government were created in2001, following the Lo cal Government Law1999/22: the Association of IndonesianMunicipal Councils (ADEKSI), the Associationof All Indonesian Regency Legislative Councils(ADKASI), the Association of IndonesianProvincial Councils (ADPSI), the Association ofIndonesian Municipalities (APEKSI), the Asso-ciation of Indonesian District Governments

(formerly APKASI – now BKKSI) and theAssociation of Indonesian Provincial Go -vernments (APPSI). They lobby the NationalParliament and the central go vernment toadvocate local issues and interests. The asso-ciations also serve as a forum for discussingcommon interests and forging part ner shipsamong local go vernments. Lo cal go vernmentassociations are more closely linked with thecentral go vernment in Malaysia, (theMalaysian Association of Local Authorities orMALA), Viet nam (the Association of ProvincialCi ties of Vietnam, renamed the Association ofCities of Vietnam or ACVN) and Thailand (theNational Municipal League of Thailand orNMLT). The youngest associations are theProvincial Association of Commune/SangkatCouncil (PAC/S) and the National League ofCommunes and Sangkat (NLC/S) establishedin August 2006 in Cambodia.

India has several local government associa-tions including the All India Council of Ma yors,representing the municipal cor po rations, andthe Nagar Palik Pramukh Sangthen, repre-senting the other urban mu ni cipalities. UnlikeAustralia, New Zealand and the Philippines,these associations are not re cognized in law. ManyIndian states have City Manager Associationsfor ur ban local go vernment officials. Despitethe existence of these associations, local go -vernments have no formal representation instate go vern ment structures; meetings anddialogues with state level institutions happenon an ad hoc basis and by specific local gov-ernment. After several years of effort, anAssociation of Local Governments was es -tablished in India in 2006. In Bangladesh,Nepal and Sri Lanka national associations oflocal governments were created in the mid-1990s7. By contrast, there is no local govern-ment association in Pakistan.

Local government

associations work

for the mutual

interests of local

governments and

represent their

interests in dealing

with higher levels

of government as

well as external

institutions such as

donor agencies

7. There is ADDC/N, the Nepalese Association of District Development Committees (founded in 1995); MuAN, the Municipal Association of

Nepal (established in 1995) and NAVIN, the National Association of Village Development Committees. Following the establishment of

ADDC/N, a new impetus was given to the collective strength of DDCs and decentralization supporters for speeding up the process

toward decentralization. After four years of hard struggle, a new Local Self-Government Act was enacted in 1999, which can be

regarded as a milestone in the gradual but steady movement toward decentralization. Sri Lanka has the National Chapter of Mayors

(NCM) created in 1997, the United Urban Councils Association (UCA) and the Pradeshiya Sabhas Association (PSA) created in 2002.

Bangladesh gained local government associations in 2003 when both the Municipal Association of Bangladesh (MAB) and the National

Union Parishad Forum (NUPF) were established.

ASIA-PACIFICIn Japan, there are no formal associationsof local governments that represent localgovernment interests. But there exist anum ber of elective position-based associ-ations such as Japan Association of CityMa yors, Association of Town and VillageMa yors, National Association of Chairper-sons of City Councils and the NationalAssociation of Chairmen of Town and VillageAssemblies. These organizations cooper-ate with the National Governors’ Associa-tion and the National Association ofChairpersons of Prefectural Assemblies inpresenting and negotiating policy alterna-tives with central government. In China,local governments are represented by theChina Association of Mayors, created in1991. In the Republic of Korea, the newcourse in favor of decentralization hasbeen accompanied by the creation of na -tional associations: the National Associa-tion of Mayors (1996) and the GovernorsAssociation of Korea, based on article154, paragraph 2 of the Local Govern-ment Act (1999).

Another area where associations haveplayed an important role is training andcapacity-building for councils and localstaff. In Australia, the state associationsalso act as employer bodies for councils inindustrial relations. They also providetraining and capacity-building projects forcouncils and deliver a number of special-ist services such as general insurance,workers’ compensation insurance andretirement income schemes for theirmember councils. The documentation anddissemination of local government bestpractices are increasingly becoming animportant function that these associa-tions fulfill for their members.

Beyond representation to higher levels ofgovernment, local government associa-tions advance their respective concernsand interests internationally. This is espe-cially true in Australia and New Zealand.Local government associations in thesecountries are members of regional and in -ter national organizations such as the Com-

monwealth Local Government Forum andthe Asia-Pacific Regional Section of UnitedCities and Local Government Organizations.Additionally, several countries have devel-oped local government organizations aimedat developing international cooperation withlocal governments abroad: in China, theChinese International Friendship Cities Asso -ciation; in Japan, the Council of Local Autho -rities for International Relations (CLAIR)and in the Republic of Korea the KoreanLocal Authorities Foundation for Interna-tional Relations.

IV. Local Democracy

Throughout much of the Asia-Pacificregion, multi-party democracy is thrivingat the local level. The mayor-council sys-tem is the norm across the regionalthough local electoral practices varyconsiderably, including whether mayorsare directly or indirectly elected (UNDP2006b). In most countries citizens directlyelect their local government legislatures(councils) as well as their executives(mayors), as shown in Tables 10 and 11below. The major exception is Malaysia,where the state government appointslocal councils and executives –althoughthose appointed are intended to act asrepresentatives of the local community. InPakistan, an electoral college of lower tiercouncil members selects the higher tier oflocal administration. In China and Viet-nam, local communities elect their respec-tive congresses or councils but the candi-dates are subjected to a prior screen ingprocess. These local councils in turn nom-inate representatives to higher level bod-ies at the town, county, city and provinciallevels. In Vietnam, although candidatesfor council elections are usually membersof the ruling Communist Party, there havebeen recent efforts to attract non-partymembers or self-nominated candidates tostand in local elections. In the 2004 localelections, non-party candidates won 312seats compared to 25 in previous elec-tions, spread among more than 10,000municipalities.

Beyond

representation to

higher levels of

government, local

government

associations

advance their

respective

concerns

and interests

internationally



IV.1. Electoral Systems for Local Councils

It is generally believed that proportionalrepresentation (PR) electoral systems arethe most representative because theytend to produce electoral results that aremore reflective of actual voting patterns,whereas plurality-majority or ‘First PastThe Post’ (FPTP) systems are thought to

enhance accountability because they givevoters a specific representative withwhom to identify. However, this may notalways be true. PR systems can concen-trate power in parties rather than voters’hands, and having an identifiable repre -sen tative in a FPTP system may not ne -ces sarily translate into greater account abi lityfrom this person to the electorate(UNDP 2006b).

81

Table 10 Electoral Systems for Local Councils in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Electoral system for directly Electoral system for directly Terms of mandate and Electoral turnout and trendelected lower tier LG councils elected upper tier LG councils number of terms

Australia Mixed system – PR and FPTP 2 years (2 states), three years Compulsory voting in 4 states. (3 states), 4 years (1 state) and Elsewhere turnout is generally low, 1-4 years in Northern Territory except where there is postal voting

China Mixed system throughout. Mixed system 5 years Declining

India All LG councils (rural and urban, all tiers) have FPTP, single-member ward constituencies 5 years Figures unavailable

Indonesia All LG councils have PR ‘open List’ system 5 years with no limit on number Complete figures unavailable.of terms

Japan All LG councils have PR list system 4 years with no limit on number Declining, 56.23% (2003)of terms

Malaysia* Not applicable

New Zealand Mostly FPTP but STV in a few cases 3 years 2001 – 50%2004 – 52%

Pakistan Union councils have FPTP Not applicable 4 years Figures unavailable+ multi-member constituencies

Philippines Barangay councils have FPTP Municipal and city councils, and provincial 3 years and maximum 3 terms Approx. 80%with block vote. arrangement boards have FPTP.

Korea, Rep. of Korea: Direct council election by single round majority vote in the electoral 4 yearsdistricts, and by PR lists in local authority territories with unitary wards.

Thailand All LG councils have FPTP system. 4 years 35.39% (Bangkok Met. Admin. Council)District (Council elections)

Vietnam People’s councils (commune, district and province) have FPTP and multi-member 5 years 98.7% (2004)constituencies

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007) and UNDP (2006b) .

Note: FPTP = First-Past-The-Post; PR = Proportional Representation; STV = Single Transferable Vote.

* There is no electoral system for local government in Malaysia.

ASIA-PACIFICThe major features of the electoral systemfor local councils in selected Asia-Pacificcountries are presented in Table 10. In mostcountries council members are di rec tlyelected according to the FPTP system via sin-gle-member constituencies, i.e. geo graphicalareas at the sub-municipal level, known as‘wards’ in Australia and Pakistan and as ‘dis-tricts’ in the Philippines. The only exceptionsare Pakistan and Vietnam where the FPTPsystem is applied to multi-member con-stituencies. The Block Vote system is usedfor local elections in the case of barangays inthe Philippines under which electoral districtsare multi-member and voters are given asmany votes as there are open seats in a leg-islative chamber. They can cast the full num-ber of votes or as few votes as they like andthe candidates with the most votes overallwin the election. Uniquely, New Zealand con-ducts local elections exclusively by mail andin four states of Australia voting in local go -vernment elections is compulsory.

Only Indonesia and Japan rely exclusively onPR for local elections, a system that hastended to strengthen the power of nationalpolitical parties over local political life. In2004, Indonesia moved from a ‘closed’ to an‘open’ list PR system, in order to reduce thepower of national party executives to selectlocal candidates. This electoral reformsought to provide voters with more ‘voice’ indeciding which individuals (as opposed towhich parties) represent them in local gov-ernment. New Zealand and Australia have amixture of systems for electing councilmembers, which includes FPTP, PR and sin-gle transferable voting.

IV.2. Electoral Systems for Local Executives

The method of election of the local execu -tive also varies from country to countrywithin the region, but in many cases it alsovaries between the different tiers of localgovernment within a country. The majorfeatures of the electoral system for the localexecutive in selected Asia-Pacific countriesare presented in Table 11. Typically the local

executive (or mayor) is directly elected (e.g.Japan, New Zealand and Philippines).Indonesia’s two-round electoral system (bal-lotage) for local executives is designed toensure that they have at least received amajority (i.e. more than 50%) of the votes.This aims to overcome one of the disadvan-tages of the FPTP electoral system, namelythe likelihood of ‘wasted’ votes. In Indonesiaand Pakistan, the heads and deputy headsof lower tier councils are directly elected, buton the basis of a joint ticket. In Indonesiathis is on a party basis, while in Pakistan itis on a non-party basis. In India, the form ofelection of panchayat and municipal leadersvaries from state to state, depending onstate legislation. Hence, in a few statescouncil members belonging to the party withan elected majority, indirectly elect the localexecutive. Australia has a mixed system –inthree states the local executive is directlyelected, in three states the council choosesbetween direct and indirect election and inone state citizens choose.

Where upper tier councils are themselvesdirectly elected by voters (and not byelector al colleges), their local executives areinvariably also directly elected by voters(e.g. India, Indonesia, Philippines and Viet-nam). Similarly, where upper tier councilsare indirectly elected, local executives aregenerally also indirectly elected. This is thecase in Pakistan, which has a hybrid systemof indirect elections for local executives. Theleader (nazim) of any town (tehsil), districtor city is indirectly elected by an electoralcollege consisting of all the union councilors8

in their respective constituencies. They arethus indirectly elected by all union councilors(including the union council leaders (naz-ims) and deputy leaders (naib nazims) intheir respective jurisdictions. However, naibna zims at the tehsil or district tiers are indi-rectly elected by their respective councils(from amongst themselves) and not by awider electoral college.

The term of office of the local executivevaries within the region –from a minimumof three years (e.g. New Zealand and

8. The union

administrations

council is the

institution which

brings together

villages or

neighborhoods which

have their own

elected organs. In

Pakistan there are

6,125 union

administrations that

each form the basic

municipal

administration for an

average population

of 15.000.



Philippines) to a maximum of five years(e.g. Australia, China, India, Indonesiaand Vietnam). Several countries place

restrictions on the number of executiveoffice terms – two in Indonesia and Thai-land and three in the Philippines.

Table 11 Electoral System for Local Executives in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country Directly Mayors elected by council Mayor appointed Term of Maximum Provision for elected by higher tier office number citizen recall mayors of mayor of terms of mayor

Australia In 3 states In 3 states No 4 years No limit In some states

China No No Yes 5 years No limit No

India In most cases In case of samiti and zilla No 5 years No limit Nochairpersons

Indonesia Yes No No 5 years 2 terms No

Japan Yes No No 5 years No limit Yes

Malaysia No No Yes n/a n/a No

New Zealand In all cases Only in cases of regional No 3 years No limit Nochairpersons

Pakistan Union nazim and naib Tehsil/district nazims elected by all UC No 4 years No limit Nonazim - on a joint ticket members in their respective jurisdictions.

Naib nazims at tehsil and district tiers chosen by their respective councils

Philippines Yes No No 3 years 3 terms Yes

Korea, Rep. of Yes No No 4 years 3 terms Yes, with effect from July 2007

Thailand Yes No No 4 years 2 terms Yes

Vietnam No Chair of People’s Councils’ Standing No 5 years No limit NoCommittees indirectly elected by People’s Councils. Chairs of People’s Committees (Commune, District and Provincial) elected by People’s Councils


9. Gunter Schubert

(2003), «Democracy

under one-party

rule?», China

perspectives n°46,

March-April; Lai

Hairong (2004),

“Semi-competitive

elections at township

level in Sichuan

province”, China

Perspectives n°51,

January-February.

ASIA-PACIFICIV.3. The Role of Political Parties

Partisan local elections are the norm in theAsia-Pacific region. The only significantexceptions are New Zealand and Australiawhere non-partisan or independent affilia-tion is the norm except in large cities.Attempts to ‘de-politicize’ local govern-ment have occurred in Pakistan and thePhilippines, two countries where politicalparties are a vital part of political life at thenational level. In Pakistan, political partiesare banned from contesting local electionsand in the Philippines they are banned frombarangay elections but are allowed at allother tiers of local government. However,in practice political parties play a majorrole in local government elections in Pak-istan by supporting candidates who areclosely identified with one party oranother.

In China and Vietnam, the only politicalparty allowed to contest local elections isthe ruling Communist Party. Independentcandidates may stand for election in Viet-nam but all candidates (whether Party onnon-Party) must initially be screened by arange of institutions, such as the FatherlandFront, that are closely linked to the Com-munist Party of Vietnam. This effective lyensures that all candidates speak more orless the same ‘political language’ (that ofthe Party) and thus implies a limitation onany variation in the political programs ofcandidates. In China, free and direct elec-tions of village committees have been intro-duced since 1987, and have be come com-pulsory nation wide since 1997 (15thCommunist Party Congress); in 2004 therewere committees elected in 85% of villagesand 75% of neighborhood com munities inurban areas. From 1995 (first experience),township leading positions (governor,deputy-governor and sometimes the Partysecretary) have been subject to a semi-competitive election pro cedure in theprovince of Sichuan and in some countieselsewhere. This semi-competitive proce-dure includes as a rule a kind of primaryelection among self-nominated candidates

by a broad selectorate (150 – 300 people),before approval by the party leadership atcounty level, and final direct election by thecitizens among selected candidates.Although under Party control, these elec-tions have already changed the relation-ships between villages and lower local gov-ernment levels in favour of villages9.

Local government elections throughout theregion are hotly contested but are oftenmarred by manipulation and cheating bycompeting parties. In most countries, localpolitical parties are branches of nationalpolitical parties. Independent candidatesare prohibited in Indonesia but are allowedin the Philippines. Local and national electionsare often synchronized, with local partybranches receiving funds from theirnational headquarters to promote the elec-toral campaigns of candidates for nationalof fice. Throughout the region, politiciansview local government as a stepping stoneto national political office. However, as aresult of decentralization reforms, issue-based local elections are increasinglytrans forming local politics.

IV.4. Citizen Participation in Local Governance

Local government is the closest tier of gov-ernment to the citizens. As such it is the firstentry point for people to gain access toand influence decision-making in govern-ment. In all the selected countries, citizenparticipation in local governance isincreas ingly gaining importance. The mostcommon form of participation is throughthe electoral system. All countries allowlocal citizens to select to varying degreesthe leaders who manage the affairs of thecommunity, ranging from the consultativepeople’s congress in Vietnam and China tothe directly elected councils and mayors ofAustralia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines andThailand. The level of participation in localgovernment elections varies consider a blythroughout the selected countries. The



turnout is extremely high under the one-party communist government in Viet nam(98.7% in 2004) and China (80% in villageelections in rural areas). Voting is compul-sory in four states of Australia but in therest of the country turnout in local govern-ment elections is generally low at around30-40%, even where postal voting hasbeen introduced. Elsewhere in the regionthe turnout ranges from a high of around80% in the Philippines to 56% (2003),52% (2004) and 47% (2005) in Japan,New Zealand and Pakistan respectively,and a low of 35% in Thailand’s BangkokMetropolitan Administration.

However, citizen participation in local go -vernance is not merely confined to votingin local government elections. The pre -sence of decentralized structures and proces -ses has been considered one manifestationof a wider movement in the region towardsdemocratization because it provides theenabling context for broader citizen partic-ipation and active civil society engagementin the democratic discourse. Ensuring theparticipation of civil society groups (NGOsand non-profit organizations), and busi-ness and the private sector in the localgovernance process is a continuing con-cern in the region. Such participation is asine-qua-non for successful decentraliza-tion. How to overcome the so-called ‘psy -chological divide’ between governmentand civil society is a challenge that is beingaddressed in various ways by the selectedcountries of the region.

Japanese citizens have extensive powers todemand a local referendum – for example,on important issues such as US militaryrelocation, nuclear sites and cons truction ofindustrial waste disposal fa cilities. They candemand formulation, im provement or elim-ination of ordinances, audits and even dis-solution of the local assembly, as well as thedismissal of the mayor, council members orofficials. In Korea, citizen participation hasbeen greatly strengthened by three legisla-tive reforms in the very recent past: the2005 Local Referendum Act, confirming the

power of councils to hold referendums; the2006 Act on the Local Ombudsman Regimeand Local Petition against the abuse of localfinance, and the 2007 Local Recall system,by which elected mayors and councilorsmay be removed from office by a local vote.In New Zealand around half of all municipal-ities have introduced some form of commu-nity board structure as a strategy for linkingcommunities with the local council. Al -though these structures are authorized inthe 2002 Local Government Act, the boardslack formal government authority or inde-pendent financial resources.

In the Philippines there has been a noticeableincrease in citizen participation in local go -vernance in recent years. The 1991 LocalGovernment Code established new mecha-nisms of consultation and participation.Lo cal referendums and recall of officialshave been introduced and there were 29recorded local recall elections between1993 and 1997 (Teehankee 2002). TheCode requires all municipalities to estab-lish a lo cal development council (LDC), withat least one-quarter of its members beingrepresentatives of non-governmental andcivil society organizations. The LDC drawsup a comprehensive development plan forappro val by the council.

Attempts at promoting citizen participationoften challenge powerful vested interestsand are not always successful. The GramSabha (or assembly of all registered votersin a panchayat) is a key feature of rurallocal government in India, and it is manda-tory for rural local bodies to hold GramSabha meetings where important decisionshave to be approved. There is also anincreasing emphasis on setting up usergroups to take decisions and to participatein the management of public services. Thisis more controversial as it is often seen asa dilution of the institutional role of electedlocal bodies. Currently, urban local govern-ment in India does not have a correspond -ing institution to the Gram Sabha and doesnot offer any institutionalized role for ci -tizens beyond voting at election time

The presence

of decentralized

structures and

processes has

been considered

one manifestation

of a wider

movement in the

region towards

democratization

85

ASIA-PACIFIC–although there are calls to build a ward-level platform for citizen engagement. As astep towards greater public accountability,India has recently enacted a Right to Infor-mation law, overriding earlier laws thatprotected government policies and deci-sion-making from public scrutiny. Localgovernment laws in some states containtheir own Right to Information provisions,mandating what information must be placedin the public domain.

In Pakistan, a major objective of the2001 decentralization reform was to in -stitutionalize community participation inlocal gover nan ce. To support this objec -tive, one- quar ter of the local developmentbudget is mandated for communityorganizations. Despite this, neither com-munity organizations nor participationhas increased significantly. Resourceallocation for community organizationshas become highly politicized within thelocal councils. Local government lawshave also enshrined traditional disputeresolution within the formal system tofacilitate citizen participation. But thesemechanisms have proved ineffective indefend ing the interests of weaker andpoorer mem bers in the community.

In several countries much attention hasbeen given to the villages, because of theirroots in traditional patterns of social rela-tions and as a legitimate basis, owned bythe local people, for local development.Therefore barangays are promoted in thelocal government system of the Philip -pines. In Indonesia, the military governmentreorganized the villages in 1979 in order tointegrate them in its ruling system. Thedecentralization reform of 1999 reversedthis decision in order to revive villages inrural areas as a social structure, based oncustomary institutions and rules, that canhelp to integrate local people in the man-agement of local government affairs. Sur-veys have shown that the village can playa role in local dispute settlement instead ofofficial police and justice – unless formalauthorities are involved in the conflict

(World Bank: 2004). However, other sur-veys show that, despite reforms, local peo-ple do not see much opportunity to par -ticipate in decision-making or even offerinput in the decision-making process.(Alatas, Pritchett, Wetterberg: 2002). Per-haps better results will come in time.

Large city governments face particularchallenges of representation and account -ability. Their large size can mean remote-ness from citizens and voters. In terms ofresponsiveness, much depends on the pre-vailing institutional and electoral arrange-ments. (Rakodi 2004). One way in whichcities can retain a degree of responsive-ness, particularly to the poor, is through alower tier of government at the communitylevel, such as the barangays in the Philippines,which have access to resources for localservice and infrastructure needs (Devas etal 2004). However, with the exception ofthe OECD countries Australia, Japan,Korea and New Zealand, which have muchgreater resources and longer establishedtraditions of local democracy, the cities ofAsia-Pacific demonstrate huge problems oflack of responsiveness to the needs oftheir citizens, particularly the poor, and awoeful lack of accountability. Their lack ofresponsiveness can in large part be attrib-uted to their inadequate resources, bothhuman and financial. But it can also beattributed to weak, unaccountable andopaque administrative systems, politicalsystems that are unrepresentative andrepressive, and high levels of corruption.In addressing these problems, demandsfrom civil so ciety are increasingly forcingmunicipal governments to practice greatertransparency and accountability (ibid).

IV.5. The Political Representation of Disadvantaged and MinorityGroups

Elite representation has tended to domi-nate the electoral systems in the Asia-Pacific region, even where PR has beenthe norm, and especially where uppertier local go vernments are indirectly

In several

countries much

attention has been

given to the

villages, because

of their roots

in traditional

patterns of social

relations and as a

legitimate basis,

owned by the local

people, for local

development



elected. For this reason, many countrieshave taken affirmative action in order topromote the political representation ofdisadvantaged and minority groups atthe local level. In principle, the demo-cratic election of local go vernment repre-sentatives gives all citizens a voice. Butin practice, some electoral arrangementsare more inclusive –particularly of wo -men but also of minority groups and thepoor– and so can produce outcomes thatare more re presentative. To date thereis no legislation in any of the selectedcountries in the region requiring thatpolitical parties ensure that a given per-centage of their candidates for localelection are representative of minorityor disadvantaged groups. However, inVietnam, the law states that the Com-munist Party should, when selectingcandidates to stand for election, ensurethat an appropriate number of womenand ethnic minority people are electedto the People’s Councils.

India, Pakistan and the Philippines haveadopted electoral arrangements withquota systems and reserved seats forwomen and for disadvantaged and minor-ity groups. India offers the most strikingexample in terms of the positive outcomeof affirmative action in favor of women’sand minority representation. Not lessthan one-third (including seats reservedfor Scheduled Castes (SC) and ScheduledTribes (ST), of seats and chairs on alllocal government councils in all states arereserved for women. As a result, over onemillion women are serving as local go -vernment councilors in India. SCs and STsalso have reserved council seats – in thesame proportion as the population of SCsand STs bear to the total population. Therequirement that a proportion of seniorpositions must be reserved for womenand minority groups has also had anempowering effect although the evidenceof the impact is mixed, with states suchas Kerala and West Bengal making muchgreater strides on this front than others(Blair 2000).

In Pakistan on directly elected village orneighborhood councils one seat is reservedfor women and one seat is reserved forpeasants and workers, while on directlyelected union councils four seats are re -served for Muslim women, six seats (ofwhich two are for women) for workers andpeasants, and one seat for minority com-munities. For the indirectly elected zilla,tehsil and town councils, women must rep-resent 33% of all members while peasantsand workers must represent 5% andmembers of minority communities in therespective local government unions mustrepresent a further 5%. The electoral col-lege for filling these seats consists of themembers of the union councils in eachlocal government. However, a large num-ber of the reserved seats remain unfilledor are simply not contested. Following the2000-2001 elections, 17% of councilors atthe union council level were women, 15%at the tehsil level and 11% at the districtand city level (CLGF 2005:1183).

Strong traditions of local elite dominationin many of the countries in the regionmean that the achievement of more inclu-sive representation is a long-term process,although the growth of the civil societymovement and its engagement with localgovernment is helping. This has been par-ticularly the case in the Philippines, whereNGOs and civil society organizations enjoyquite a high degree of legal protection andrights within the local government system.The 1991 Local Government Code statesthat there must be three sectoral repre-sentatives in local councils at all tiers, i.e.one woman, one agricultural or industrialworker and one representative for theurban poor, indigenous cultural communi-ties, disabled persons, or any other sectoras may be determined by the council con-cerned. In addition, the Philippines hasone of the most overtly ‘pro-youth’ localrepresentational systems in the world. TheLocal Government Code provides for theestablishment of youth councils, whosemembers are elected by persons between15 and 21 years of age, in every barangay.

Strong traditions

of local elite

domination

in many of the

countries in the

region mean that

the achievement of

more inclusive

representation is a

long-term process,

although the

growth of the civil

society movement

and its

engagement with

local government

is helping

87

ASIA-PACIFIC

The presidents of these youth councils andof their federations represent the youth asex-officio members at every tier of thelocal government system.

In Australia and New Zealand the rights ofindigenous peoples to local self-govern-ment is a political issue, and one that ismore about self-determination than aboutinclusion (Sproats 2003). In Australia,there is a long-standing difficulty in incor-porating the aboriginal population withinthe formal governmental structures. Insome regions, there are special local gov-ernment areas to serve the needs of theaboriginal population in order to achievea greater degree of representation forthem. Al though the Maori population in

New Zealand makes up 15% of the totalpopulation, it accounted for only 6% ofcouncil members in 1998-2001. Des pitethe absence of affirmative action in bothcountries, female representation at thelocal political level is considerable. In2000, 26% of council mem bers in Aus-tralia were women and on ly 10% of coun-cils had no women councilors. Some 15%of councils had a woman mayor, more inmetropolitan areas (21%) than in ruralcouncils (11%) (UNESCAP 2005a). InNew Zealand, women accounted for 34%of city council members and 28% of dis-trict council members in 2004. In thesame year four of the 16 city mayors and12% of district mayors were women(UNESCAP 2005b).



V. Conclusion

In considering the impact of decentralizationand democratic local governance on servicedelivery, citizen voice, accountability andpoverty reduction, it is important to bear inmind that, while some countries in the Asia-Pacific region have undergone significantdecentralization of government functions(notably Indonesia, Philippines and somestates in India, as well as some sectors inChina, and to a lesser extent, Korea, Thai-land and Vietnam), in other countries therehave been more modest reforms to theexisting system of local go vernment (Aus-tralia, Japan – but significant on localfinance system – and New Zealand). De -centralization and local governance alsoshow widely differing degrees of local dem-ocratic control and accountability across theregion. As such, it is difficult to make gener-alizations about such a wide range of expe-rience, especially where decentralization is acomparatively recent phenomenon in com-parison to other parts of the world. Never-theless, two broad conclusions can be madeabout the impact of decentralization andlocal democratic re form in the region.

First, in terms of the impact of democraticdecentralization on service delivery, thereis a degree of support from within theregion (e.g. Indonesia, Korea, Philippinesand some Indian states) for the positiveview that service performance improveswhen elections are introduced for localdecision-makers, who are then obliged tobecome more responsive and accountableto local citizens. Decentralization should inprinciple open up political space for citizenparticipation and voice, and so create thepotential for greater accountability of deci-sion makers. In India, Indonesia, Pakistanand the Philippines, decentralization has indeedgreatly increased the number of electedpositions, thereby increasing the scope fordemocratic accountability. But traditions ofpatron-client relationships between localelites and citizens, which are strong inmany countries in the region, can seriouslyundermine local democratic accountability.

Decentralization can open the door for‘money politics,’ as is the case in Indone-sia, where it is often money rather thanaccount ability that counts (Hofman andKaiser 2006). In China and Vietnam, localdemocratic choice of community leaders isbeginning to be implemented at the vil-lage level, and citizens are increasinglywilling to chal lenge and demand account-ability from local officials. In Malaysia,where there is no direct line of accounta-bility because local government councilorsare appointed not elected, neverthelessstriking innovations in terms of greaterpublic access to information are underway that are intended to enhance localaccountability. In many countries, particu-larly in the Philippines and some Indianstates, local civil society organizations areincreasingly ready to use that informationto demand accountability. Meanwhile, incountries with well-esta blished localadministrative systems, such as Australia,Japan and New Zealand, much effort overthe past two decades has gone intoimproving the management and efficiencyof local service delivery, including theadoption of performance managementand facilitation of citizen access to infor-mation through e-go vernance initiatives.These should have had a positive impacton local service delivery outcomes.

Second, the available data is insufficient todraw any firm conclusions yet with regardto the impact of decentralization on po vertyreduction. In principle, in combination withan effective and equitable re source distribu-tion system, decentralization should spreadthe benefits of growth around more widelyand so help to reduce poverty. On the otherhand, without such an equitable system forresource distribution decentralization canlead to an increase in inter-regionalinequality. This is typified by China whereeconomic reform generally, including eco-nomic decentralization, has greatlyincreased living standards and substantiallyreduced the numbers living in absolutepoverty but at the same time has substan-tially increased inter-personal and inter-

De centralization

and local

governance also

show widely

differing degrees

of local democratic

control and

accountability

across the region

89


regional inequality. In Indonesia, decen-tralization has increased the resourcesgoing to the local level, but this increasehas been much greater in the resource-rich regions than elsewhere. While thismay help to redress historic differencesin the levels of development betweenregions, it may not do so in a mannerthat systematically addresses eitherpoverty or inter-regional inequality.

In conclusion, it is clear that decentral-ization has become a major theme ofgovernance reform throughout the Asia-Pacific region over the past decade and

that decentralization has for the mostpart been accompanied by enhancedlocal democracy. But the forms and pat-terns of local governance have variedwidely, as have the outcomes, reflectingthe diversity of country contexts. Whilethere are clearly a great many weak-nesses in the current arrangements fordecentralized governance in the casestudy countries, and further reforms willundoubtedly be required, it is hard toimagine that any wholesale return to acentralized system of governance wouldbe either appropriate or politicallyacceptable.


Annex 1 Major Local Government Legislation in Selected Asia-Pacific Countries

Country Year

Australia 1989 Victoria: Local Government Act

1993 New South Wales: Local Government Act

1993 Northern Territory: Local Government Act

1993 Queensland: Local Government Act

1993 Tasmania: Local Government Act

1995 Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act

1995 Western Australia: Local Government Act

1999 South Australia: Local Government Act

China No constitutional or dedicated legal basis exists for local government. The following laws are relevant for the role of sub-national governments: Comprehensive Fiscal Reform (1994), Budget Law (1995) and Tax Sharing System (1994)

India 1950 Constitution (Article 40)

1992 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments

Indonesia 1974 Law 5 on Local Autonomy

1975 Law on Decentralization (decentralisatiewet) that established autonomous regions

1999 Law 22 on Regional Government and Law 25 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Government

2000 Constitutional Amendment strengthening basis for decentralization

2004 Law 32 on Regional Government (amended Law 22) and Law 33 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Government(amended Law 25)

Japan 1947 Local Government Law

1993 House and Diet Resolutions on Decentralization

1995 Law for the Promotion of Decentralization

1999 Global Decentralization Law

2004 Revision of 1947 Local Government Law

2005-2007 “Trinity Reform” of local finance

Korea, Rep. of 1949 Local Autonomy Act, amended in 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1961

1986 Local Autonomy Law

1987 Constitution: Title V111 (Articles 117 and 118) on Local Autonomy

1990 Revised Local Autonomy Law


Annex 1 Major Local Government Legislation in Selected Asia-Pacific Countries (Cont.)

Country Year

Malaysia 1950 Local Authorities Elections Ordinance

1952 Local Councils Ordinance

1976 Local Government Act

2003 Smart Local Government Governance Agenda

New Zealand 1989 Local Government Amendment Acts No. 1 and No. 2

1991 Resource Management Act

2001 Local Electoral Act

2002 Local Government Act

2002 Local Government (Rating) Act

Pakistan 1959 Basic Democracies Order

1960 Municipal Administration Ordinance

1972 Local Government Ordinance

1979 Local Government Ordinances passed in each Province

2001 Local Government Ordinances passed in each Province

2005 Amendment to 2001 Local Government Ordinances

Philippines 1959 Local Autonomy Act

1960 Barrio Charter Act

1963 Revised Barrio Charter Act

1967 Decentralization Act

1983 Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa)

1987 Constitution: Article 10 provides for local autonomy

1991 Republic Act (known as Local Government Code)

Thailand 1933 Municipal Administration Act

1985 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act

1991 National Administrative Organization Act

1997 Constitution: Article 78 provides for local autonomy

1997 Provincial Administration Organization Act

1999 Decentralization Plan and Procedures Act


Annex 1 Major Local Government Legislation in Selected Asia-Pacific Countries (Cont.)

Country Year

Vietnam 1958 Law on Local Governments

1994 Law on Organization of the People's Council and the Administrative Committees at All Levels of government

1996 Ordinance on Concrete Tasks

1998 Budget Law

2004 Revised State Budget Law

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007) and Brillantes 2006; CLGF 2005; World Bank 2005.

EURA SIA

T. Y. KHABRIE VA(CHIEF RESE ARCH GROUP)

L.V. ANDRICHENKO

V.A. VA SILIE V1

EURASIA96

1. The authors thank professors A. Campbell and G. Marcou for their inputs in the

discussion of this chapter.


EURASIADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 97

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the formation, devel-opment and recent trends of local self-gov-ernment in the states of the Eurasianregion that were formerly member statesof the Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Armenia,Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, KyrgyzRepublic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turk-menistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,all these countries shared a unified systemof local government. The main characteris-tics of that system were that 1) local sovi-ets (councils) were part of the state, 2)soviets at each level were subordinate tosoviets at all higher levels, and 3) theexecutive at each level of government wasnominally accountable to a representativecouncil but in practice both representativeand executive powers at each level weresubordinated to the ruling party organiza-tion at that level.

Taken together these attributes of theSoviet system of sub-national governmentform a legacy that continues to influencethe evolution of sub-national governmentin the successor states. In the early yearsof post-soviet transition this legacy wasevident in terms of the practical difficultiescaused by the collapse of the previous sys-tem. After 1991 there were difficulties dueto overlapping functions and shared com-petencies, as well as the lack of a clearrelationship between functions, responsi-bilities and resources, whether generatedlocally or transferred from higher levels.The removal of party control over theexecutive and representative powersopened a power struggle between the twobranches in those countries in the regionwhere genuine democratic elections wereapplied at sub-national levels.

However, it is at the level of ideas –theideas that have informed the debatearound local government reform inEurasian countries– that the Soviet legacycan be seen to have enduring influence.

The legacy is most clearly evident inregard to the relationship between localgovernment and the state. On one hand,Soviet-era centralist ideas continue tocolor the ruling elite’s view of local auton-omy. On the other, the advocates of localautonomy and decentralization often adoptexcessively idealistic views of local govern-ment in their zeal to break with the insti-tutional legacy of the Soviet period. Thefirst group sees local government as anintegral part of the state and entirely sub-ordinate to higher-stand ing state bodies.The second group typically regards localgovernment as a social institution createdby the people of the local community andentirely separate from the state.

The ‘social’ or ‘society’ view has provided abasis for defending municipalities againstexcessive intervention from above. It wasthis view that inspired Article 12 of theRussian Federal Constitution, whichdeclares that local self-government is notpart of the state; this has been a centralreference point in all debates on local gov-ernment in the Russian Federation. At thesame time it can be argued that the socialview itself limits the role of local govern-ment by emphasizing its role in communityrepresentation at the expense of deliveringservices. The social view can encouragefragmentation into small municipal unitsthat are powerful on paper, but not in prac-tice (as occurred in several of the countriesof Central and Eastern Europe after 1989).

However, as long as the ‘state’ view oflocal government remains influential ingovernmental circles, the social view isnecessary as a countervailing force. Thedebate between these opposing views oflocal government tends to coalesce aroundthe key issue of whether mayors areappointed or elected –or, in a non-mayoralsystem, whether the elected council haspower over the executive. This matter iseffectively the working litmus test of localautonomy. This can be seen in the recur-rent debate within the Russian Federationregarding appointment of mayors. On sev-

After the removal of

party control over

local government

bodies, local

government

reforms have been

driven by the

struggle between

Soviet era

centralist ideas

and advocates of

decentralization

based on the

principle that local

self-government

is not part

of the state

EURASIA98

eral occasions in recent years, draft legis-lation that would have introduced appoint-ment rather than election of mayors hascome close to adoption, only to be with-drawn at the final stage. This reflects thefact that proponents of both views of localgovernment can be found at the highestlevels of government. In the post-Sovietcontext the principle of local autonomy hasoften come into collision with that ofregional autonomy. Nowhere more than inthe Russian Federation from the early1990s onwards has conflict betweenregional governors and mayors of regionalcapital cities shaped local politics anddevelopment, sometimes over manyyears. In this case regional governors havefrequently supported the state view oflocal government, whereby local authori-ties would be subordinate to regional statebodies. Advocates of the social or non-state view of local government may, para-doxically, be found at the higher nationalor federal levels.

Most Eurasian countries have inherited insome form the Soviet territorial unit, theraion, consisting of a number of differentsettlements over a particular territory(much like a UK district). In most coun-tries in the region this is where most localfunctions and services are performed. Ini-tially much criticized as a legacy of the pre-vious regime, the raion has proved difficultto replace. In Ukraine perhaps the mostimportant of the reforms designed in 2005(but not adopted, due to that year’s split inthe Orange coalition) was that which wouldhave made the raions into genuine localauthorities, with the execu tive reporting tothe council; councils currently have noexecutive reporting to them. In Russia thereform of 1995 emphasized settlementsrather than districts. As a consequence,many local functions were exercised by thestate. The 2003 reform ended this anom-aly, creating a two-tier system with raionsas the upper tier to carry out those localfunctions that required economies of scale(in addition to certain delegated state func-tions, as in the German/Austrian model)

and leaving settlement-based municipali-ties to do the rest. In Georgia the munici-pal reform has transformed the districts(raiony) in municipalities and cities withoutsubordination to any raion into self-govern-ing cities. Raiony continue to provide thebasis for central Asian local governmentsystems, although local self-government(in the sense of local autonomy) is con finedto the sub-raion level where there are fewfunctions. In cases such as the localmakhallas in Uzbekistan, services are pro-vided at this level, but genuine autonomy isrestricted.

Local self-government in the states of theEurasian region has attained different lev-els of institutional development. In severalstates it exists as an independent institu-tion; in others it is a structure combinedwith the institutions of state power. In thisrespect it is possible to distinguish threegroups of countries.

In the first group are Russia, Armenia andAzerbaijan. In these countries local self-government is legally autonomous andinstitutionally separate from the structuresof state power, and local government isseen as an institution through which thelocal community decides on local issues.

In the second group –Georgia, KyrgyzRepublic, Moldova and Ukraine– theprocess of the formation of local self-gov-ernment is still not concluded. Reformshave barely been implemented, or simplyhave not been achieved up to now. Theaforesaid trend in the development of localself-government has been changed neitherin the course of the Ukrainian “orange rev-olution,” nor in the course of the “revolu-tion of roses” in Georgia.

The third group is composed of the statesof Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Local self-government there functions only on thelowest level, in small villages. In the main,local issues in this region are vested inlocal state organs subordinate to central


Three groups of

countries can be

distinguished:

1) where local

government has

been

established as

separate from

the state power;

2) where the reform

process is still

not concluded;

3) where local

issues are still in

the hands

of local

state bodies,

whereas local

self-government

exists only at

the very lowest

level


Table 1 General Information and Territorial Structure

Countries Territory Population Administrative territorial Local units and tiers Form of government(1000 sq. km) (m) division (intermediate level)

Armenia 29.74 3.21 (census 10 regions 930 municipal units Unitary state with mixed of 2001) City of Erevan presidential-parliamentary

government

Azerbaijan 86.6 8.4 Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 59 districts Unitary state with presidential (Nagorno-Karabakh) 11 district cities governmentde facto secessionist republic 2,757 municipalities

Belarus 207.6 9.75 6 regions 1.665 municipal units: Unitary state with presidential City of Minsk 1) district (basic) government

2) primary

Georgia 69.7 4.661 9 districts, 1,017 municipal units Unitary state with presidential 9 cities, Abkhaz and Adjar governmentAutonomous republics

Kazakhstan 2. 724 15.074 14 regions 1) 159 districts and 36 district cities Unitary state with presidential 3 cities 2) 45 cities, 241 boroughs, government

2,042 rural circuits

Kyrgyz Rep. 198. 5 4.823 (census 7 regions 1) 40 districts and 10 district cities Unitary state with presidentialof 1999) City of Bishkek 2) 11 cities and 465 rural municipalities government

Moldova 33.8 4,466 1 autonomous territorial 1) 32 districts and Unitary state with entity – Gagauz Eri 3 cities parliamentary government1 territorial unit – Stinga Nistrului 2) 907 municipalities and communities“Prednestrovye Moldavian” de factoRepublic struggling for secession

Russia 17,075.2 142.893 84 Federation subjects. Russia is a federation 22.972 municipal units (at 01/01/2007) Federative state with comprised of 86 “subjects”. These subjects 1) 1,802 municipal districts, and 522 district cities presidential governmenthave equal federal rights and an equal 2) 19,892 rural municipalities andrepresentation (two delegates each) in the 1,756 urban municipalitiescouncil of the Federation, but with varying degrees of autonomy. For the composition of legal units see Table 1 (p 97) (member states at 01/03/2008)21 republics, 47 oblast, 8 kraj1 autonomous oblast6 autonomous okrugs

Tajikistan 143.1 7.32 2 regions 1) 58 districts and 23 cities Unitary state with presidential 1 autonomous region Nagorno-Badakhshan 2) 47 towns, 256 settlements and 2,803 villages government

Turkmenistan 491.2 5.37 (census 5 regions 1) 50 districts Unitary state with presidentialof 2001) 2) Several hundred cities, settlements and villages government

Ukraine 603.7 48 24 regions 1) 490 districts and 176 cities with district status Unitary state with mixed Autonomous Republic of Crimea 2) 279 cities of district subordination, 884 urban presidential-parliamentary 2 cities with the status of Regions municipalities and 28,573 rural settlements government(Kiev and Sevastopol) (however 10,227 councils)

Uzbekistan 448.9 26 12 regions, 233 urban municipalities Unitary state with presidentialCity of Tashkent 164 rural municipalities governmentAutonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan About 10,000 local communities (makhalyas)


EURASIA100

government. Nevertheless, first steps ofreform are in progress, aiming to increasethe role of local self-government and toenlarge its functions.

Another model of local self-governmenthas developed in Belarus with a peculiarcombination of different elements of cen-tral state government, local state govern-ment and local self-government.

Table 1 describes the territorial structuresof the countries of the region in relationwith geographic and demographic data. Itdistinguishes the intermediate level ofgovernment (meso level) from the sepa-rate local (municipal) level; the latter maybe organized with a single tier or two tiers(see below, section 1).

II. Evolution of Structures

Territorial and institutional structures re -flect both the introduction of new politicaland legal principles, and the legacy of thepast.

II.1. The Renaissance of Local Self-Government and Its Constitutional Basis

The first time the term ‘local self-govern-ment’ was used in the law of the USSR wasin the “General Fundamentals of Local Self-Government and Local Economies,” enactedon the wave of democratization at the endof the 1980s and the beginning of the1990s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, eachof the states has been independently devel-oping its own model of local government.Nevertheless, the common heritage of thepast is manifest in many current legalnotions including: local self-government,local state government, local state adminis-tration, own and delegated powers, munic-ipal budgets, municipal property, programsof economic and social development ofmunicipal entities, local public service, pre-mature termination of powers of represen-

tative bodies of local self-government anddismissal of heads of municipalities.

The constitutions of all states of the regioncontain separate articles, sections ornorms devoted to local self-governmentand to guarantees of its realization. Theyproclaim that the rights of citizens to localself-government may not be restricted.The constitutions of several states, includ -ing Russia and Ukraine, stipulate that therights of citizens to local self-governmentmay be suspended only in the time of waror emergency. Constitutions regulate rela-tionships between central and local go -vern ing bodies on such principles as: sep-aration of state powers and powers of localself-government, organizational and func-tional independence of local self-govern-ment in the sphere of its compe tence,unity and integrity of state territory, com-bination of centralization and decentraliza-tion in the execution of state power, bal-anced social and economic development ofterritories, and responsibility of bodies andemployees of local self-government to thestate. Some constitutions, including that ofUzbekistan, prescribe that relationsbetween central and local governmentsshall be built on the basis of subordinationand mutual cooperation.

With the exception of Kazakhstan, all con -stitutions prescribe the principal powers oflocal authorities. Transfer of such powersto other entities and persons is not permi -t ted. The constitutions of Russia and Ka -zakh stan proclaim the principle of se pa rationof state and local governments.

Several constitutions, including Armenia’s,prohibit the dissolution of representativebodies of local self-government (municipalcouncils). This serves as an important guar-antee of their independence. In a number ofstates there are procedures for revocationand suspension of acts of local state entitiesand local self-government, and for the rightof citizens to lodge complaints in courtsagainst their decisions. Belarus and Uzbek-istan provide examples of this system.

Several

constitutions

prohibit the

dissolution of

representative

bodies of local

self-government

(municipal

councils)



The constitutions of several states pro-claim guarantees for the integrity of theboundaries of local territories; in particulara local referendum is required to changethe boundaries of municipal units (Arme-nia). Although virtually all constitutionshave detailed norms providing for thedevelopment of local self-government, inpractice they have been implemented atdifferent degrees.

Stages of development

Local self-government in the states ofEurasia has achieved different stages ofdevelopment. In several states it is func-tioning as an independent institution, inothers as a structure combined with, orsubordinated to state power. Again, thecountries fall into three groups.

In the first group of countries, includingRussia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, local self-government is independent: it is separatefrom the system of state-level governmentbodies; local representative bodies inde-pendently decide local issues.

In Russia the system of local self-govern-ment was launched in 1991 by the law “OnLocal Self-government in the RSFSR.”Later the Constitution of the Russian Fed-eration of 1993 guaranteed local self-gov-ernment by providing that local self-gov-ernment bodies shall be separated fromthe system of state power (article 12). In1995 the federal law “On General Princi-ples of Organization of Local Self-Govern-ment” was enacted. It proclaimed demo-cratic fundamentals of localself-government, though they have notbeen fully implemented. Therefore in 2003a new law was enacted “On General Princi-ples of Organization of Local Self-Govern-ment” (Federal Law No. 131), whichenlarged, in accordance with the require-ments of the European Charter of LocalSelf-Government, the functions of munici-pal entities, and transferred some func-tions from member states to federal statebodies.

In Armenia, the present system of localself-government was formed on the basis ofthe Constitution of 1995. Between 1995and 1997 the Parliament enacted laws “OnElections of Organs of Local Self-govern-ment,” “On Local Self-Government,” “Tran-sitional Provisions for Regulating Re la -tionships of Organs of LocalSelf-Government,” “Organs of TerritorialGovernment” and some other acts. Thiswas the period of formation of the legal andinstitutional basis of the systems of stateterritorial government and local self-gov-ernment. Local self-government wasdefined as the right and ability of communi-ties to decide upon and take responsibilityfor local issues deemed to be in the inter-ests of local populations.

In Azerbaijan the Constitution of 1995contained a separate section devoted tolocal self-government. The constitutionalrequire ments were implemented in 1999 inthe laws “On the Status of Municipalities”and “On Elections to Municipalities,” whichlaid down the basis of the system of localself-government in the republic. Laterabout 20 other laws were enacted, includ-ing “On Transfer of Property to MunicipalProperty,” “On Municipal Service,” “On theStatus of Members of Municipalities,” “OnFundamentals of Municipal Finances,” “OnManagement of Municipal Lands” and “OnAdministrative Supervision Over Activitiesof Municipalities.” All of these laws re -inforced the organizational, legal and eco-nomic basis of local self-government.

In the second group of states –Georgia,Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Ukraine–the process of the formation of local self-government is still in progress.

The Constitution of Georgia of 1995 pro-claimed the general principle that localissues have to be the responsibility of localself-governments, subject to an obligationto respect the sovereignty of the state.The procedure of formation and the pow-ers of local self-governments and theirrelation ships with state entities were regu-

The constitutions

of several states

proclaim

guarantees for the

integrity of the

boundaries of local

territories; in

particular a local

referendum is

required to change

the boundaries of

municipal units

(Armenia)

EURASIA102

lated by the “Organic Law” of 1997. Duringthe municipal reform of 2000–2001, thepowers of local self-government were sig-nificantly enlarged, but were not ade-quately supported by necessary materialresources. This divergence was one of themain themes of debates in the last localelections held on October 5th, 2006.

In Kyrgyz Republic the basis for local self-government was established by the Consti-tution and laws “On Local Self-Governmentand Local State Administration,” “On theFinancial and Economic Basis of Local Self-Government,” “On Municipal Property” and“On Municipal Service.” The new stage ofthe reforms has been initiated by the“National Strategy On Decentralization ofState Government and the Development ofLocal Self-Government in the KyrgyzRepublic for the Period till 2010.” Neverthe-less, local issues are still under the controlof the state’s local administrative entity.

In Moldova the democratic fundamentalsof local self-government were laid down bythe Constitution of 1994. In fact, theprocess was launched four years later withthe adoption of the laws “On Local PublicAdministration” and “On Territorial-Admin-istrative Organization.” The division of thete rritory at the intermediate level has beenchanged twice: from districts (raion) toprovinces (judete), and back to districts.The next stage of municipal reform startedin 2003, when the Parliament amendedthe legislation by significantly enlargingthe powers of local self-government. Nev-ertheless, many problems were notresolved. The material basis of local self-government is still not sufficient and itsindependence from state powers is notduly ensured.

In Ukraine the fundamentals of local self-government were shaped by the Constitu-tion of 1996 and by the law “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” (May the 21st.1997). They proclaimed the principles ofdecentralization of public powers and thepriority of territorial units or communities

known as gromada. But these principleshave not been fully realized. Currently amixed system exists, combining local stategovernment and local self-government onthe levels of districts (raion) and regions(oblast). On one side are provincial anddistrict councils as elements of local self-government, representing the interests ofterritorial gromadas. On the other arestate administrations of provinces and dis-tricts –local organs of state executive po - wer vested with the executive functions ofthese councils. Such a combination ofmunicipal and state structures actually de -ro gates principles of local self-government,leaving it in the domain of state rule. Re -form projects have faltered because of po -li tical divisions and are still pending.

The third group is composed of the coun-tries of Central Asia –Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In thesenations local self-government functions onlyon the lowest level, in small villages vari-ously called jamoaty, shakhrak and dekhotin Tajikistan, and makhalya in Uzbekistan.It is nevertheless necessary to note thatthese states are in the process of imple-menting reforms to increase the role of localself-governments and to enlarge their func-tions. In Kazakhstan, for example, recentlyapproved legislation will introduce electionsfor municipal heads (mayors).

The constitutions of the states of CentralAsia acknowledge and guarantee local self-government. Some laws of these republicscontain original definitions of the notion oflocal self-government. Thus, the “Law ofUzbekistan On Organs of Self-Governmentof Citizens” defines local self-governmentas an independent activity of citizens inthe solution of local issues in accord withtheir interests, historical development,national and spiritual values, local customsand traditions.

But on the whole, local matters in thesecountries are not the business of local self-government, an autonomous or quasi-independent body elected by local popular

The constitutions

of the states of

Central Asia

acknowledge and

guarantee local

self-government.

But on the whole,

local matters are

not the business

of local

self- goverment

bodies



vote. Rather, control of local matters moreoften falls to what is termed “local stategovernment” (Kazakhstan), “state poweron local level” (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)and “local state executive power” (Turk-menistan).

Another model of local self-governmenthas been developed in Belarus. The “LawOn Local Government and Self-Govern-ment in the Republic of Belarus” esta -bli shed a peculiar combination of differentelements of central state government,local state government and local self-gov-ernment. Local self-government—asopposed to the notion of a state-controlledlocal body –is defined as the organizationand activities of citizens for independentsolution of local issues, directly or throughelected entities. This definition takes in toaccount the interests of the population,the development of administrative territo-rial units and the basis of own material andfinancial resources local government cangenerate or attract. But at each of the threelevels (province, district or city with districtrights, rural or urban municipality) execu-tive powers are integrated in the system ofthe state executive power, even thoughthey are, at the same time, bodies of localgovernment. Local councils therefore donot have their own executive powers.

II.2. Territorial Organization and Territorial Reforms

The countries of the region have differentforms of territorial organization of publicpower. As a rule, these forms are highlydiversified, but not all countries have aclear hierarchy of territorial units with localself-government organs, as reflected abovein Table 1.

Most countries have introduced or allowedautonomous territorial units in recognitionof ethnic or regional peculiarities, some -times with a dimension of conflict: Azer-baijan (Nakhichevan and Na gorno-Karabakh), Geor gia (Abkhaz and Adjar

republics), Moldova (Gagauz Eri, “Pred-niestrovye Re public”), Ukraine (Crimea),Tajikistan (Na gorno-Badakhstan) andUzbekistan (Ka rakalpakstan).

Russia is the only federal country in thisregion. However, several countries have anintermediate level of government on arather broad scale, distinct from the localor municipal level of government. It isgenerally called oblast, here translated as“region” and it is found in Armenia,Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine andUzbekistan. Georgia also has such a terri-torial level (mkhare). The capital city andother main cities may have the status ofprovince; that is, they are directly subjectto the central government.

Usually the local government level (munic-ipal level) is organized on two tiers, asreflected in Table 1. The most important isthe district level, which is a rather smallconstituency, embracing a lot of villagesbut also some cities. Many municipal func-tions for small and mid-size cities are therealm of district-level powers; large citiesare independent of the district-levelauthorities. Usually, the lower municipallevel is much less significant with respect toits functions. This pattern can be comparedwith the German municipal organization(Kreis-district, and cities independent froma district) or to English districts; it was alsoused in the Soviet era. Now, such a two-level municipal organization can be seen inAzerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, KyrgyzRepublic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan andUkrai ne. Only one municipal level, al thoughit may be differentiated, exists in Ar menia,Georgia and Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan,local government institutions exist only atthe district level. The level of local govern-ment autonomy varies considerably, evenamong similar countries.

In further detail, Russia, as a federativestate, is composed of such member states(called “‘subjects”) as republics, lands(krai), regions (oblast), federal cities,

Most countries have

introduced or

allowed

autonomous

territorial units in

recognition of

ethnic or regional

peculiarities,

sometimes with

a dimension

of conflict

EURASIA104

autonomous regions and autonomous cir-cuits (okrug). All member states of theRussian Federation have equal status. Localself-government in the Russian Federationis exercised in urban settlements and ruralsettlements formed as municipalities (pose-lenie), municipal districts (municipalnij ra -yon), district cities (go rodskoï okrug) andthe territories of federal cities (Moscow andSt. Petersburg).

In Ukraine the administrative-territorial or -ganization has a three-tier structure: thehighest level includes the Autonomous Re -public of Crimea, regions (oblast) and twocities, Kiev and Sevastopol that have aspecial status. The next level, the uppermunicipal level, embraces districts and dis-trict cities. The lowest level includes citydistricts, cities of district subordination,towns, settlements and villages.

The territory of Tajikistan is divided in adescending hierarchy into provinces (veloy-ats), districts (nohiyas), towns of republicansignificance, towns of provincial sig nificance,towns of district significance, settlementsand villages (qyshloqs).

In the countries of Central Asia (Kaza-khstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan), local self-government plays alimited role. Organs of local state govern-ment exercise the principal functions. InRussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyr-gyz Republic and Moldova, local self-gov-ernment has grea ter autonomy and is sep-arated from state government.

In the majority of countries of the regionthe majority of the population resides incities and towns. Statistics show that, onJanuary 1, 2006, 73% of the population ofthe Russian Federation resided in urbansettlements and 27% resided in ruralregions. Urban population slightly exceeds70% of the population in Belarus, 68% inUkraine and nearly 60% in Kazakhstan. Bycontrast, in Uzbekistan, at the beginning of2006, 36% of the population resided incities and 64% in rural regions. Rural

population prevails also in other states ofCentral Asia. The legislation of Kazakhstan(law of December 8th, 1993) distinguishesthe administration of territories and of pop-ulated areas. Territories are provinces, dis-tricts and rural circuits; populated areas arecities, settlements and villages. This meansthat the municipal area is usually limited tothe settlements, whereas areas betweenpopulated areas are administered by theupper level of government. The new law onlocal government of the Russian Federationis backing away from this conception, andthe territory of each subject of the Federa-tion is divided into municipalities; only inareas of low density may the territorybetween municipalities be administered bythe district government (law 131: article11, paragraph 1).

A number of countries have implementedterritorial reforms after the political change,aimed, inter alia, at improving state govern-ment (Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).Ma jor goals and trends of territorial reformswere different. In a number of states theyresulted in the enlargement of regional ter-ritorial units (Kazakhstan, Ukraine). In otherstates territorial reform was called upon tomove the processes of public power closer tothe general population (Azerbaijan, Arme-nia, Ru ssia, Uzbekistan).

In the Russian Federation, territorial re formhas been in the process of implementationsince 2003. According to the Law of 2003,the subjects of the Federation have fixedboundaries of municipal entities, and havedefined the status of appropriate local enti-ties as urban or rural settlements, munici-pal districts (municipalniï rayon) and dis-trict cities (gorodskoï okrug). The year2005 was decisive in the establishment ofthe two-tier model of local self-governmentin Russia. The member states of the Russ-ian Federation have fixed the boundaries of23,972 local entities, including 19,892 ruralmunicipalities, 1,756 urban mu nicipalities,1,802 municipal districts and 522 districtcities (January 1st 2007).

Usually the local

level is two tier, with

the raion being still

the key



Capitals and Metropolitan Areas

In the majority of countries, capital citieshave separate legal status as provided byconstitutions and laws (Belarus, Kazakhstan,Russia and Ukraine –see Table 1). In theRussian Federation the separate regime ofMoscow is laid down by the Constitution andthe law “On the Status of the Capital City ofthe Russian Federation.” In Uzbekistan theseparate legal regime of the capital city isprovided only by the Constitution. By con-trast, Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, doesnot have any special regime.

Several states have metropolitan areas withspecial governance status. Under the Consti-tution of the Russian Federation two metro-politan areas –Moscow and St. Pe ters burg–have the status of the member states of thefederation. Law provides for specific legalregulation of their local self-governmentforms. According to the charters of Moscowand St. Petersburg, local self-government isexercised by institutions of local self-govern-ment formed in appropriate city territories.The enumeration of local issues and sourcesof revenues of the local budgets of themunicipal units are determined by the lawsof Moscow and St. Petersburg, taking intoaccount the necessity of preserving the unityof the cities’ economic systems.

In Georgia, similar special forms of go ver -nance are applied to Tbilisi and Poti, inBelarus for Minsk, and in Kazakhstan for thecities of Astana and Alma-Ata. Expendituresof the capital cities are singled out in eachrepublic’s budget; the cities receive grantsand subventions, transfers of property andstate guarantees for investments. In Ka -zakhstan, separate go vernance rules arepro vided for Alma-Ata to support the devel-opment of the city as the region’s interna-tional financial center. In Georgia, specificstatus is accorded Poti with the aim to cre-ate a free economic zone.

The following table lists the capitals andmain cities of the countries of the region(2006).

Table 2 Capital Cities and Main Cities

Countries Capitals and metropolitan cities Population (thousand)

Armenia Erevan 1,104

Azerbaijan Baku 1,874

Belarus Minsk 1,781

Georgia Tbilisi 1,103

Kazakhstan Astana 550

Kazakhstan Almaaty 1,248

Kyrgyz Republic Bishkek 799

Moldova Chisinau 660

Russia Moscow 10,425

Russia St. Petersburg 4,581

Russia Novosibirsk 1,397

Russia Nizhni Novgorod 1,284

Russia Ekaterinburg 1,308

Russia Samara 1,143

Russia Omsk 1,139

Russia Kazan 1,113

Russia Chelyabinsk 1,093

Russia Rostov-on-Don 1,055

Russia Ufa 1,030

Tajikistan Dushanbe 647

Turkmenistan Ashkhabad 828

Ukraine Kiev 2,693

Ukraine Kharkov 1,463

Ukraine Dnepropetrovsk 1,047

Ukraine Donetsk 994

Ukraine Odessa 1,002

Uzbekistan Tashkent 2,141

Source: Inter-State Committee of Statistics of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In theory,

resources have to

be sufficient for

functions

(connexity

principle); in

practice functions

are adjusted to

resources, and

adequacy depends

on the financial

capacity of the

public budgets

EURASIA106

II.3. Evolution of Relationships between Central and Local Governments

Relationships between central governmentand local self-government are complex. Asa rule, they cooperate closely. For instance,in Russia federal state institutions and thoseof local self-government have agreements ofcooperation, and jointly participate in therealization of special programs.

Different state structures are responsiblefor local government matters. In the Russ-ian Federation, a decree of the Presidentestablished a specialized ministry –the Mi -nistry of Regional Development of theRussian Federation– which is vested, interalia, with the powers to determine andimplement the policy of the state in thesphere of local self-government. InMoldova, the Agency of Regional Develop-ment performs such functions.

In other states, matters of local govern-ment lie mainly in the province of sectoraldepartments of appropriate state bodies.Thus, in Azerbaijan the Administration ofthe President has a division responsible forwork with municipalities; the Ministry ofJustice has formed a specialized center onmatters of local self-government; in theParliament there is a standing committeeon regional issues.

III. Functions, Management and Finances

In theory, resources have to be sufficientfor functions (connexity principle); in prac-tice functions are adjusted to resources,and adequacy depends on the financialcapacity of the public budgets. However,much has still to be done to improve thefinancial system and the management inorder to use scarce resources more effec -tively.

III.1. Financial Management

The most acute problem of local governmentis the shortage of financial resources. This lack

of funds inevitably impedes the execution oflocal-government functions.

Local taxes. The principal indicator of finan-cial power of local self-government is the rightto impose taxes. In most countries of theregion, the share of local taxes in the totalrevenue of local government is extremely low.Azerbaijan is an exception, with the share oflocal taxes and duties in municipal budgetsreaching 24.5% (of this, 22.6% is attributedto local taxes).

In Armenia, local communities may levy onlylocal fees and payments. Rates of local fees,within the frameworks pres cribed by law, areset by municipal councils at the initiatives ofheads of municipalities prior to the adoption ofannual budgets. Rates of local duties aredefined by municipal councils on the propos-als of heads of municipalities in the sums nec-essary for exercising appropriate actions. OnNovember 27, 2005, constitutional amend-ments were adopted permitting the impositionof local taxes.

The Constitution of Belarus (article 121) andannual laws on the republic’s budget enumer-ate local taxes and duties that may be estab-lished by local councils of deputies. Forinstance, the law “On the Budget of theRepublic of Belarus for 2006” pre scribes thefollowing local taxes and duties for the 2006financial year: tax on retail sale, tax on serv-ices, special purpose duties, duties fromusers, duties from purveyors, and health-resort duties. The share of local taxes andduties in state revenues is about 2.1%.

The Russian Federation has only two localtaxes: the land tax and the tax on physicalpersonal property. Representative bodies oflocal self-government define, within theframework provided by the Tax Code of theRussian Federation, tax rates and the proce-dure and terms for paying taxes. Other ele-ments of local taxation are prescribed by theTax Code. According to preliminary data for2005, local taxes comprise only 4.29% of rev-enues of local budgets. Local self-govern-ments in the Russian Federation have been



constantly losing their local, own sources ofrevenues. The Law of December 21, 1991 “OnFundamentals of the Tax System” provided for23 kinds of local taxes and duties. Even so, in1998 they yielded on average 12% of the totalmunicipal revenues. Furthermore, localauthorities could vary the rates within narrowlimits for only eight of the 23. The same num-ber of local taxes and payments was pre-served by the initial version of the Tax Code ofthe Russian Federation enacted on July 31,1998. Later this list was reduced to five in2000. With the amendments of 2004 to thebudget code, proposals to transfer the tax onvehicles to municipal budgets and to establisha local tax on retail sales were rejected, andtwo local taxes remain –the land tax and thetax on personal property.

In Ukraine, bodies of local self-governmentmay establish, in accordance with law, localtaxes and duties, which are allocated toappropriate budgets. Meet ings of citizens mayintroduce local duties on the principles of vol-untary self-taxation. In 2005, local taxes andduties comprised 2.4% of the general rev-enues of local budgets.

Local bodies in the states of Central Asia arenot permitted independence in the tax andbudget spheres. They are not able to definetax rates or other elements of local taxation.Tax rates and other elements of taxation areprescribed by central bodies for all taxes,including local levies. In Uzbekistan, the Cab-inet of Ministers establishes local taxes andtheir rates. In Kyrgyz Republic, local taxes andduties may be introduced only by the Parlia-ment. On the whole, local taxes account for aninsignificant share in the revenues of localbudgets.

Tax shares. In all countries of the region, taxshares accrued to local government on therevenue from national taxes are the mainsource of revenue for local budgets. This isgenerally a share of the local yield of thenational taxes.

In Kazakhstan, law does not provide for a divi-sion of taxes between the republic and local

governments. Local budgets receive 50% ofthe income tax on corporate entities, and 50%of the excises levied on certain specifiedgoods. Income tax on personal property,social, land and transport taxes, and pay-ments for the use of water and forestresources are wholly directed to local budgets.Certain kinds of duties are also considered taxrevenues.

Reinforcement of the revenue base of localbudgets is exercised by increasing the shareof taxes left to local budgets at the expense ofstate taxes; such is the case in Uzbekistan andKazakhstan, for instance. In Belarus, theshare of state taxes and duties makes upmore than 14% of local budget revenue. InUkraine, since the adoptions of a new budgetcode in 2001, the personal income tax is fullydevoted to local budgets of the respective lev-els (province, district, municipality) in propor-tions fixed by the law.

Since Russia is a federal country, the bulk oflocal budgets depends on the budget and thepolicy choices of the subjects of the Fe de -ration, within the framework de signed by theBudget Code. The tax base of the sub jects ofthe Federation has been strengt hened in 2004and 2005 with the transfer of the transporta-tion tax and of the tax on assets of legal per-sons. Part of the current revenues of the sub-ject has to be reallocated to local budgets.Laws of the subjects of the Federation grantadditional assignments of tax revenues fromregional budgets. As a rule, such assignmentsare to be made at uniform rates, except thatdifferential assignments may be esta blished incases provided by law for the period from2006 to 2008. In 2005, assignments of taxescomprised 36.7% of local budget revenues.The share of local budget revenues of the totalbudgetary funds of the Russian Federation(including regional and local) comprises 10%.

Budgetary transfer. Transfers have twomain functions:· bring revenues in line with spending

requirements to accommodate disparities inthe revenue base and in needs,

· compensate the costs of duties assigned to

Local bodies in the

states of Central

Asia are not

permitted

independence in

the tax and budget

spheres

EURASIA108

local government by central or regional gov-ernments. Subsidies are specifically used forthe latter purpose. Efficiency and equityrequire transparency and objectivity inresource allocation. Budgetary reforms inRussia, Ukraine and several other majorcountries in the region are oriented in thatdirection. However, in a num ber of coun-tries, the grant allocation formula does notexist, or is too complicated and cannot besupported by appropriated data.

In Ukraine, the equalization grant for some700 main local budgets is calculated by thedifference between spending needs estab-lished from a formula devised by the centralgovernment, and the revenues from tax shar-ing. This also includes a coefficient determin-ing the level of equalization. The only needsthat are taken into account are those listed inthe budget code, such as education, socialcare, and primary health care. Other functions(housing, basic service delivery, infrastruc-ture, public transport) have to be funded onthe basis of own resources; that is, local taxesand fees. Although the system is sound in itsbasic principles, it has been biased by modifi-cations by the government and by multipledecisions affecting the resources and tasks oflocal governments. Nevertheless, a similarequalization scheme has been introduced atthe district level for municipalities. In brief, thein sufficiency of own resources leads to under-financing of functions not taken into accountin the distribution of resources between differ-ent local governments.

In Russia, more discretion is left to the sub-jects of the Federation than is permitted forUkrainian regions in the matter of resourceallocation to the local budgets. Basic re -sources are tax shares from personal in cometax and shares of regional taxes as de ter -mined by laws of the subjects of the Fe de -ration. But the principle of equalization is sim-ilar: there is an estimate of needs based onexpenditure standards, and an equalizationgrant to cover the gap between the revenuesand the level of equalization required by thelaw. Part of the income tax is also involved inequalization. Grants are paid by the subjects

of the Federation through district funds forthe support of municipalities, and throughregional funds for the support of municipaldistricts and city districts. There is also aregional support fund for municipalitiesreceiving contributions from the districtfunds. Grants are distributed among munici-pal units in accordance with the methodsapproved by laws of the subjects of the Fe -deration, and in conformity with the require-ments of the Budget Code of the Russian Fed-eration. The provisions of the Budget Codeexclude arbitrary distribution of grants. Theyhave to be distributed among municipal unitsin an “automatic way.” The situation variesconsiderably from one subject to another, andnot only for geographic reasons, but also dueto the mechanisms and levels of redistribu-tion of resources between local governments,and whether the transfers are based onspending or needs estimates. On one handthe spending power is centralized, leavingonly the management to local authorities(e.g. the regions of Novosibirsk and Tiumen),or on the other hand the expenditure respon-sibility is delegated (e.g.in the region ofLipetsk). However, the consequences of thereduction of social privileges by federal law122 of 2004, and continuous shifts in the allo-cation of tasks since 2004 make any evalua-tion of the transfer and equalization systemprohibitively complex.

To provide subsidies for shared financing ofinvestment programs and development of thepublic infrastructure of municipal units, thesubjects of the Russian Federation may estab-lish funds for municipal development. Fundsfor mutual financing of high priority socialexpenditures may also be included in subjectbudgets. Municipal units may receive otherforms of financial aid from the federal budgetand from budgets of the subjects. The mainrequirement is the transparency of distribu-tion of financial resources.

According to data from the Ministry of Fi nances,in 2005 budgetary transfers to lo cal budgetstotaled 52.5% of local budget expenditures. Inthe total volume of transfers 54% were sub-ventions, 32% grants and 14% subsidies2.

To provide subsidies

for shared financing

of investment

programs and

development

of the public

infrastructure of

municipal units,

the subjects of the

Russian Federation

may establish funds

for municipal

development

2. Editor's note:

according to

definitions given by

the Budgetary Code

of the Russian

Federation (art.6),

grants are budgetary

transfers to cover

current

expenditures;

subventions are

budgetary transfers

aimed at financing

specific expenditures

(delegated

functions), and

subsidies are

budgetary transfers

as participation in

the financing of

specific

expenditures.



The study of the dynamics of the correla-tion of expenditures of local budgets toGDP shows a downward trend. Thus, in theRussian Federation the share of GDP allo-cated to local budget expenditures was6.5% in 2003, 6.2% in 2004, and 5.3% in2005.

On January 1, 2006, the share of local ex -pen ditures in the general volume of pu blicservices consumed 18% of the consoli-dated budget of the Russian Federation,and 40% of the consolidated budgets ofmember states of the Russian Federation.

In other countries, too, transfers are animportant part of local budgets. For in -stance, in Belarus the share of transfers in thegeneral volume of revenues reaches 58%,depending on the kind of territorial unitsand the relationships between state localgovernment and local self-government. InUzbekistan, where law proclaims the prin-ciple of balanced local budgets, grants are

used to cover deficits. In Kazakhstan, theshare of grants is high and has a tendencyto grow: in 2004 by 19.81%, in 2005 by25.28% and in 2006 by 37.1%. A similartendency can be observed in several coun-tries, such as Ukraine and Georgia. Thisreflects the low buoyancy of tax sharescompared to expenditure needs that aregrowing faster.

Financial provisions for certain state func-tions delegated to local self-governmentare made with the help of subventionstransferred to local budgets from federal orregional budgets. Bodies of local self-gov-ernment are responsible for the use ofmaterial and financial resources receivedby them for the execution of certain statepowers.

Aggregate data on the local finances of thestates of Eurasia is provided in Table 3. Butsuch data have to be used with care. Due tothe unstable economic situation of many of

Table 3 Local Finance Indicators (Various Years)

Country Total public Local public Ratio of local on Tax shares and Local tax expenditure expenditure general public budgetary transfers as revenues(% GDP) (% GDP) expenditures % of the total income as % of total income

Armenia (2003) 20.6% 1.3% N/A N/A N/A

Azerbaijan (2003) 17.8% 0.2% 27.5% (1999) Subsidies: 10.4% 22.6%

Belarus (2004) 48% 19.3 % 40.1 % Basic level budget transfers: 45.6% Local taxes and payments: 2,1%

Georgia 13.9% (2003) 4.6% (2005) N/A N/A N/A

Kazakhstan (2004) 22.1% 10.8% 48% Transfers: 37.1% Local gvt bodies may not establish taxes

Kyrgyz Rep. (2005) 28.7% 3.4% 12% N/A N/A

Moldova (2003) 25% 7.2% 29% N/A N/A

Russia (2005) 18% 5.3 % 18% Transfers to local budgets: 52.5% 4.29 %

Ukraine (2005) 45.2% 11% N/A N/A 2.4 %

Uzbekistan (2005) 32.5% 23% 55% Subsidies covering budget deficits: 16.2% N/A

(estimations)

Sources: Domestic sources, UNDP, World Bank as compiled by authors; data on Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are insufficient or not available. It could

not be verified whether all data are calculated on the same basis, in particular due to extra-budgetary funds.

EURASIA110

the countries of the region, economic indica-tors are volatile; important differences interms of GDP, and percentage of GDP mayoccur from one year to the next. Further-more, changes in proportions may have dif-ferent meanings, depending on other cha -racteristics of the situation. For example, adiminution of the share of local governmentexpenditure may be due to the centraliza-tion of expenditure, or to a sharp in crease ofGDP caused, for example, by an increase inoil prices.

Functions. The functions of local authori-ties are not clearly defined by law. Suchambiguity is explained primarily by anongoing process of redistribution of pow-ers among different levels of government.Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguishseveral models of function allocation.

Main functions. The main functions of lo -cal self-government in Russia and Armeniaare to: provide participation of the popula-tion in local matters, ensure effectivedevelopment of territories, provide publicservices, represent and protect the rightsand interests of local self-government,manage municipal property and finances,protect public order and organize publictransportation.

In Russia, in the course of the reform oflocal self-government, the functions ofmunicipal units were enlarged, thus limit -ing regulation by subjects of the Federa-tion. The law has reshaped the functions ofmunicipal units, taking into account theirnature and status. Law has also prescribedmore clearly the economic basis of localself-government and specified the respon-sibilities of bodies and officials. Further,the law has introduced new schemes ofeconomic inter-municipal cooperation andregulated more precisely the proceduresfor transferring certain state functions tolocal self-government. Today, the mainresponsibilities of local self-governmentare education, public health, social secu-rity, culture, local economy, sport andphysical training and youth policy.

The same functions are transferred to thelocal level in several other states of theregion. For instance, in Ukraine, healthservices, education and social protectionrepresent more than 80% of local publicexpenditures. Furthermore, Ukrainian localauthorities manage communal propertyand local finances, ensure development ofappropriate territories, provide services tothe population, ensure participation of thepopulation in civic life, and protect publicorder.

In the majority of the states of CentralAsia, such functions are exercised by stateexecutive entities integrated in a hierarchi-cally centralized system. Accordingly, statefunctions are distributed between differentlevels of the vertical structure. Regulatoryfunctions belong to central administra-tions. The execution of laws is reserved forlocal authorities. As an example, in Kaza-khstan the role of local government inhealth care and social aid remains signifi-cant. Kazakhstan local government expen-ditures in 2004 were: administrative func-tions 4%, defense 2%, police 4%,education 31%, health care 20%, socialaid 7%, local economy 12%, transporta-tion 6% and 14% for other lesser func-tions. In Uzbekistan, regional and citybudgets represent 64.4% of all socialspending, including 69.6% of all spendingon education and 61.4% of all healthcarespending.

III.2. Main Trends in Selected Competences

Planning. Planning is an importantendeavor in all the states of the region. InRussia, it serves as a basis for federal,regional and municipal programs aimed atthe development of municipal units.Instead of the former strictly centralizedmethods of governance that were charac-teristic of the Soviet period, Armenia andRussia apply new approaches to planningthat exclude administrative mandates. Thestates of Central Asia retain, as a rule,centralized systems of planning for eco-nomic and so cial development.

In Russia and most

of the European

part of the

region,main local

government

functions are

education, public

health, social

security, culture,

local economy,

sport and physical

training and youth

policy. In most of

Central Asia, such

functions are

exercised by state

executive entities

integrated in a

hierarchically

centralized system



Education. In the majority of states,responsibility for public education is dividedbet ween local state government and localself- go vernment. The latter, as a rule, is en -titled to deal with pre-school and basiceducation. Nevertheless, central statego vernment establishes general legal normsin this sphere, and local self-governmentsput these norms into practice.

In Uzbekistan, education is centralized. Forpre-school and basic education, centralstate organs approve standards, provideresources and supervise the execution oflaws, while other levels are engaged inproviding services and deploying re sources.

In Tajikistan, local self-government isresponsible for pre-school and elementaryschool institutions, while cities and districtshandle secondary schools and colleges. InUkraine, there is no strict separation offunctions in education, which results in aconfusion of powers between local stategovernment and local self-government.

In Armenia, according to the law “On StateNon-Commercial Organizations,” the statereserves the role of founder of educationalinstitutions. At the same time, as providedby the law “On Local Self-Government,” allfacilities of pre-school education were gi -ven to municipalities and became munici-pal property.

Provision of social services. In themajority of the states of Eurasia local self-go vernment has fairly broad functions inthe pro vision of social services. Forinstance, Ru ssian law prescribes that localself-go vernment is responsible for organiz-ing so cial protection of the population, pro-viding so cial assistance, establishing differ-ent so cial services and assisting ins titutionsthat provide social services.

In Armenia, social services administrationis assigned to the state. But even there,local self-government has been empoweredto provide social services through theirown social programs. The same situation

prevails in Tajikistan, where providing so -cial services is handled on three levels:that of the republic, the region and thelocale. Regional and local authorities areentitled to maintain the institutions thatprovide assistance at home.

In Kazakhstan, local state organs payallowances and benefits to the unemployed,large families, orphans and single mothers.They also subsidize childbirth, housing andfuneral expenses. Ukraine has made a clearseparation of responsibilities in the sphe reof social services. The law “On So cial Serv-ices” (2003) establishes two spheres ofstate and community services fi nanced bydif ferent budgets.

Provision of public health services.

Near ly all states of the region have dividedthe responsibility for public health betweenstate (national and provincial) governmentand local self-government. The exception isUkraine where powers of local self-govern-ment are not clearly defined. In Russia anda number of other states, local authoritiesare responsible for providing medical first-aid, organizing medical aid in the “zone offirst contact” with patients in hospitals,ambulances and medical posts, and organ-izing preventive medical services.

According to laws of Armenia, heads of mu -nicipalities are responsible for organizingand managing municipal health-care insti-tutions. They promote improvement of san-itation and implement sanitary, hygienic,anti-epidemic and quarantine mea sures. InKazakhstan, local state authorities adminis-ter public health. They assist local hospitalsand general polyclinics, specia lized clinics,tuberculosis hospitals, diagnostic centers andrural medical posts. They are also responsiblefor the prevention and treatment of danger-ous infections. In Uzbekistan, public health ishandled mainly by the state. Local self-gov-ernment is responsible for organizing andmaintaining medical posts.

The majority of states have a multi-levelsys tem for financing social services. As a

EURASIA112

rule, local state authorities and local self-governments do not have adequate finan-cial resources for maintaining public serv-ices in the fields of education, public healthand social aid, though total budgets growconstantly.

In Tajikistan, public health and social ser -vices are not handled by local govern-ments. However, local budgets finance7% and 8% of expenditure on social aidand education. Another model exists inUzbekistan: 100% of expenditure onsocial insurance is covered by local budg-ets. Meanwhile, social aid, public healthand education costs are financed as fol-lows: about 20% by the state, approxi-mately 50% by regional budgets, and20% to 30% by district budgets. In 2005,Russian Federation local budgetsfinanced 22% of ex pen diture on publichealth, 16% on social policy and 43% oneducation.

Water, energy and public transporta-

tion. In Russia, responsibility for publictransportation, and for providing water,energy, gas and heat falls to local self-gov-ernment. Organs of self-government havereceived broad powers and may haveappropriate objects in municipal property,which permit them to implement thesefunctions. In Armenia, infrastructures ofgas, energy and water supplies used formunicipal needs may be transferred,according to the Law “On Local Self-gov-ernment,” to municipal property.

In Belarus, Ukraine and in the states ofCentral Asia, the functions of water andenergy supplies and public transport arewithin the province of local state adminis-trations. They are obligated to provide forthe management and maintenance of localservices, and to grant subsidies to users.Nevertheless, it is necessary to note thatlocal budgets are not always able to pro -vide adequately for the management andmaintenance of these functions due toshabby condition and a shortage of finan-cial means.

Business development support. InAzer baijan, Armenia, Russia and Ukraine,support to business development may beprovided at all levels: by central, regionaland local state bodies, as well as by localself-government. Several countries,including Russia, not only affirm the rightof lo cal self-government to support busi-ness de velopment, they also provide nec-essary financial resources.

In the states of Central Asia, support forbusiness development comes primarilyfrom central state entities. Nevertheless,the role of local state authorities is alsoconsiderable. Local governing bodies areresponsible for licensing economic activi-ties at the local level, granting permissionfor construction of community nets andbuildings, organizing tenders for the provi-sion of social services, and managing thesale of community property.

A summary table on functions of localauthorities is presented below (see table 4).


Efficient execution of powers by localauthorities is determined not only by ade-quate financing, but also by a well-orga -nized professional municipal or state localservice.

Municipal service. The notion of munici-pal service in the nations of Eurasia isapplied to the level of local self-govern-ment. Unlike many other countries, theEurasian countries generally do not includeemployees engaged in the sphere of edu-cation. Municipal service is regarded as aprofessional activity that has to be exer-cised independently of state bodies,regard less of political forces and results oflocal elections.

In all countries of the region, the executivebodies of city municipalities function on amore professional level. Rural territorialcommunities have far fewer municipalemployees, and their knowledge of munic-



ipal management and marketing is low.The improvement of the professional levelof municipal employees is still an acuteproblem in the development of local self-go vernment.

In Russia, there were in 2006 about280,000 employees (on average, onemunicipal employee for every 500 citi-zens) (see table 5). According to Russianlaw, the municipal service is exclusivelycom prised of persons working in localself-government. Municipal institutions,such as schools and healthcare facilities

are not regarded as bodies of local self-go vernment and, as a result, their em -ployees are excluded from municipalservice. The legal status of municipalemployees is established by federal laws,laws of member states of the federation andcharters of municipal entities. The status ofmunicipal employees and the guaranteesof their employment are based in themain on general principles, applied to thestate public service. Evaluation of thework of municipal employees is exercisedon the basis of qualification exams andattestations. For non-execution or undue

Table 4 Functions of Local Government (Intermediate and Local Levels)

Country Planning Education Social Public Water Energy Public Support of services health supply supply transport business

Armenia Yes No (with the No (with the exception Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

exception of of voluntary

pre-school institutions) implementation of own

municipal social programs)

Azerbaijan Yes No Yes (in the spheres not Yes Yes. No Yes Yes

occupied by the state).

Belarus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Georgia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Kazakhstan Yes Yes (elementary, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

secondary and

professional

secondary education)

Kyrgyz Republic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Moldova Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Russia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Tajikistan Yes Yes (pre-school and No No (though local Yes Yes Yes Yes

basic educational budgets finance

institutions) public health - 8%)

Turkmenistan Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Ukraine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Uzbekistan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


EURASIA114 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Table 5 Staff of local government

Countries Staff Regime (public Status (law Recruitment procedure Trainingor private law, carrier or contract) especially in higher or job positions) positions

Armenia N/A Public law; carrier and contract Legal status is defined by Municipal employees are The law provides for professional municipal service the law “On Municipal Service” appointed by heads of organization of training

municipalities courses

Azerbaijan 25,000 (average Public law; carrier and contract Legal status is regulated by Chairmen of municipalities appoint N/A1 municipal employee professional municipal service. the law “On Municipal Service” heads of branch departmentsfor 300 citizens) dated November 30, 1999 on the basis of the decisions of

municipalities; other municipal employees are appointeddirectly by heads of municipalities

Belarus 22,000 at the Public law; contract Legal status is defined by Municipal employees are Training coursesend of 2005 state service the law “On State Public appointed by heads of local

Service in the Republic government bodies on the of Belarus” basis of exams

Kazakhstan 46,546 Public law; Activity of local bodies is Akims and heads of staff of N/Acontract service regulated by legislation of regions, capital and city of Almaty

state public service are political, appointed state employees. The majority of employees of representative and executive bodies are carrier employees (according to results of contests and attestations).

Kyrgyz Republic N/A Public law; contract Legal status is defined by the Municipal employees are N/Aand carrier service law “On Municipal Service” engaged according to results

of contests and attestations

Moldova N/A Public law; contract Application of the law on Appointment and dismissal N/Athe state civil service by the mayor or district head

Russia Approximately Public law; Legal status is defined by Heads of municipal units may be Training courses 280,000 (average 1 contract service federal laws, laws of elected directly by population or municipal employee member states of the appointed by representative for 500 residents) Russian Federation and bodies of municipalities. Other

by charters employees are appointed by of municipal units heads of municipal units

Tajikistan N/A Public law; Legislation regulating Employees of local bodies are N/Acontract service state public service appointed by heads of local

administrations

Turkmenistan N/A Public law; Legislation regulating state Employees of local bodies are N/Acontract service public service appointed by heads of local

administrations

Ukraine 91,925 municipal employees Public law; Legislation regulating state Election and appointment of Staff reserves for as on September 1, 2006 contract service public service municipal employees appointment and

promotion of municipalemployees

Uzbekistan N/A Public law; Legislation regulating state Appointment by higher bodies N/Acontract service public service and heads of local gvt bodies



execution of their duties municipal em -ployees may by subjected to disciplinarypunishments. The new federal frameworklaw number 25 of March 2, 2007, estab-lishes a new unified legal basis for themunicipal public service. It is linked tothe state public service, but clearly dif-ferentiated from the elected officials; it isaimed at professionalizing and stabilizingthe corps of municipal public servants.The new law took effect on June 1, 2007,and has to be developed by laws of thesubjects of the Federation.

Presently in Azerbaijan there are about25,000 municipal employees: on average,one for every 300 citizens. In Belarus,state employees function on the locallevel. Their numbers comprise approxi-mately 22,000 persons: on average, onefor every 450 citizens.

Integrity of elected officials and employ-

ees; prevention of corruption. Munici-pal authorities face the same danger ofco rruption as authorities do at other levelsof public power. Mass media inform thepublic about criminal prosecution ofmunicipal employees for bribes, thefts andother misuses of public functions.

Sociological inquiries conducted in one ofthe regions (oblasts) of Ukraine showthat annually 60% of respondents wit-ness at least one incident of corruption(15.69 % reported ‘numerous,’ 28.55%‘several’ incidents of corruption).

A number of countries have adopted legalremedies to aid the struggle with corrup-tion. For instance, the government ofArmenia enacted the decree “On Anti-Corruption Strategy and Program ofImplementation.” It provides measuresstrengthening public control over bodiesof local self-government, creating trans-parent procedures for forming localbudgets and spending local funds. Itemphasizes the necessity of holding localself-government officials personally liablefor misdeeds.

Several states of Eurasia have ratified theUN “Convention against Corruption” and theEuropean “Criminal Law Convention on Co -rruption.”

Management reforms. A number ofcoun tries, including Russia and Ukraine,have launched administrative reforms toimprove the functioning of all chains ofpublic management. The emphasis forlocal self-government is recruiting profes-sional ad ministrators with sufficient know -ledge and experience to resolve most localissues. In recent years, the percentage ofsuch employees in the system of local self-go vernment has visibly increased. Thesechan ges were directly caused by replenish-ment and intensive education of municipalemployees. The states of the region alsoadopted measures for the introduction ofmodern management technologies. Em -phasis is placed on the importance of strictregistration procedures and rapidresponses to the requests of citizens.

The improvement of the quality of localservices is also connected with furtherprivatization of municipal property, inparticular in the sphere of residentialcommunity economy.

IV. Local Democracy

A certain indicator of progress for localdemocracy is the increasing competitive-ness of local elections at the levels wherethey are organized, even though thisoccurs only at the lowest level of gover-nance in some countries. Electoral partici-pation re mains low in some countries, butis comparable to European countries inothers. It is useful at this point to précisthe legal status of local government bod-ies because this factor can have an impacton the relationships between elected bod-ies and the local administration.

The following table summarizes the basicinstitutional features of local democracyin the countries of the region.

Mass media

inform the public

about criminal

prosecution

of municipal

employees

for bribes, thefts

and other misuses

of public functions

EURASIA116

Decentralization and Local Democracy in the W

orld

State Formation of local Local executive bodies General features of electoral Number of deputies Term of powersrepresentative bodies systems (minimum and maximum)

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Members ofmunicipalities areelected for a term of 5years

The number of members ofmunicipalities is deter -mined by law, dependingon the quantity ofpopulation ofmunicipalities

Majority electoral system.In the 2004 elections 2,731 municipal bodies wereelected composed of 21,613 members ofmunicipalities.On October 6, 2006, by-elections were held with theaim to fill 1.941 vacancies in 604 municipalities

Heads of executive power of cities and districts(state local government) are appointed by thePresident and are responsible to him. Chairmen of municipalities (local self-government bodies) are elected; they directactivities of executive staff of municipalities.

Elections of members ofmunicipalities

Chairmen of regional executive committeesare appointed by the President of theRepublic with consent of regional councils(by majority of votes of elected deputies).Appointment of chairmen of district (city)executive committees is by chairmen ofregional executive committees withconsent of appropriate district (city)councils. Chairmen of district (city)committees may be appointed directly bychairmen of regional committees when hiscandidates have been twice rejected byappropriate district (city) councils

Local council membersare elected for terms of 4years.

Majority electoral system. In the elections held onJanuary 14, 2007, 1,581 local councils were electedcomprising 22,639 deputies. Absolute majority ofdeputies were not affiliated with any party

Elections of local councils.There are 3 territorial levelsof local councils: primary,basic and regional

Local self-governmentbodies are elected for a4-year term.

Depending on the quantityof population, 5 to 15members of municipalcouncils (5 members formunicipalities notexceeding 1,000 residentsand 15 members formunicipalities totalingmore than 20,000residents)

In elections of bodies of local self-government,candidates are appointed exclusively at their owninitiative, but most candi dates are affiliated withdifferent parties providing them appropriate support.In the elections of heads and councils ofmunicipalities, majority electoral system applies.In 2005 elections, bodies of local self-governmentwere formed in 829 out of 930 communities ofArmenia.

Big administrative territorial units are go -verned by bodies of local state government.Municipalities (villages, settlements, cities andquarter communities of Erevan) are managedexclusively by organs of local self-government.Heads of municipalities are elected.

Elections of councils ofmunicipalities

Table 6 Local Democracy

EURASIADecentralization and Local Dem

ocracy in the World

117


Georgia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyz Rep.

Moldova

Local councils areelected for a term of fouryears.

The council of city of Tbilisi is com -posed of 37 members: 25 membersare elected in 10 multi-membermajority election districts. Remaining12 seats are distributedproportionally among the parties thatgained 4 % of the votes in all 10 ofTbilisi’s 10 districts

In Georgia at the local elections of 2006, 69 local councilswere elected in 4 self-governing cities, 60 municipalities,4 communities in zones of conflict and one in the capitalcity, Tbilisi. A proportional electoral system was used inTbilisi and a mixed electoral system in otherconstituencies. 1,733 councilors were elected under thenew mixed electoral system

Local councils elect mayors. Local council of thecity of Tbilisi elects the mayor from among itsmembers for a term of 4 years.

1,017 local councils(sakrebulo) are elected

In the elections held on June 3, 2007, 899 mayors ofmunicipalities, towns, communes and villages.

Councilors and mayorsare elected for 4-yearterms.

The number of councilorsdepends on the size of thepopulation.

11,967 members of local councils were elected in 2007. A proportional electoral system was used for the elections ofcouncilors, and a majority electoral system with a run offbetween the two top-scoring candidates for the elections ofmayors. Second round of elections of 473 mayors was heldon June 17, 2007.

Local councils and mayorsof local communities areelected.

Hokims of stateadministrations ofdistricts are appointedfor terms of 4 years.

Proportional electoral system is used for elections of localcouncils. 6,737 members of local councils were elected atthe elections of 2004.Majority electoral system is used for elections of heads ofadministrations of administrative circuits. In 2006, electionswere held in 34 circuits with populations not exceeding9,000 residents.

Executive bodies of local self-government are elected.Hokims (heads of state administrations) of districts areappointed and removed by the President with consent ofappropriate local council, and after consultations with thePrime Minister

Local self-governmentfunctions only at the lowerlevel in small settlements. Bodies of representativeand executive power areheaded by hokims.

Local representativebodies and akims areelected for a term of 4years.

The number of deputies of localstate representative bodies isdetermined with account ofpopulation of appropriate units inthe procedure as specified by theLaw On Local State Government.Representative bodies of Astanaand Alma-Ata are composed ofnot more than 50 (city, 30,district, 25) deputies.

Majority electoral system is used for elections of statelocal representative bodies. Second round of elections isheld when no candidate has received 50% of votes.Elections of lower akims in administrative units withpopulation less than 5, 000 are held directly, withpopulation exceeding 5, 000, indirectly through electors.

Executive bodies of state local government (akims) havebeen until now appointed by the President of the upperakim. But they may be elected according to the proceduredetermined by the President. In 2005–2007, elections ofakims have been gradually introduced in rural circuits,villages and settlements and as an experiment in severaldistricts and city districts of Astana and Almaty

Local self-governmentbodies are provided only atthe lowest level, but theyare still not formed. Elections to state localrepresentative bodies ofprovinces, districts andcities of republican anddistrict significance

EURASIA118

Decentralization and Local Democracy in the W

orld


Russia

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

The number of members of represen-tative bodies of settlements, includingurban circuits, is determined by char-ters of municipal units and may not beless than:7 for populations less than 1,000;10 for populations over 1,000 and lessthan 10,000;15 for populations of more than10,000 and less than 30,000 ;20 for populations more than 30,000and less than 100,000;25 for populations over 100,000 andless than 500,000; 35 for populationsexceeding 500,000.The number of deputies of districtrepresentative bodies is determinedby charters of municipal units, andmay not be less than 15 The number of deputies of representati-ve bodies of inner-city territories that areof federal significance are defined bycharters of municipal units and may notbe less than 10 .

The terms of powers oflocal self-governmentbodies are defined bycharters ofmunicipalities

Law provides for the use of both majority andproportional electoral systems. In fact, majorityelectoral system prevails.

Heads of municipal units according to their chartersare elected by voters or appropriate representativebodies.Local administrations are headed by heads ofmunicipal units or by persons employed on acontractual basis and with account of the results ofcontests for filling the aforesaid positions

Representative bodies oflocal self-government areformed in units withpopulations exceeding 100voters. When there arefewer than 100 voters, thepowers of representativebodies are exerciseddirectly by meetings ofcitizens.However the rights of amunicipal authority can beexercised only for a unit of1,000 inhabitants as awhole (3,000 in areas ofhigher density).

Local self-governmentfunctions only at the lowerlevel in small settlements.Local state representativebodies (councils of people’sdeputies) are formed inprovinces and districts.

Local state executive power is exercised by hakimsappointed and removed from their posts by, andresponsible to, the President. Local councils (Gengeshi) elect from theirmembers chairmen (archyns).

Local councils(Gengeshi) are electedfor 5-year terms.

System of local self-govern-ment is formed by directlyelected local councils (Gen-geshi) of settlements andterritorial public self-govern-ment bodies.

Majority electoral system is used.Heads of local state executive power are appointedby the President with consent of appropriate localcouncils of people’s deputies. They also act aschairmen of these councils.

Table 6 Local Democracy (Cont.)

EURASIADecentralization and Local Dem

ocracy in the World

119


Ukraine

Uzbekistan

4 yearsMajority electoral system is used for the elections of ruraland settlement councils and heads of settlements, villagesand towns. In other elections (city, district, Regionalcouncils, Parliament of the Autonomous Republic ofCrimea) proportional electoral system is applied

The law provides for the election of heads ofsettlements, villages and towns (heads ofterritorial gromadas). Local councils form localexecutive bodies upon proposal of heads ofsettlements, villages and towns. Districts andprovinces, Kiev and Sevastopol have local stateadministrations functioning as agents of thestate and excluded from the system of local self-government. Heads of local state administrationsare appointed and removed from their posts bythe President upon proposal of the Cabinet ofMinisters of Ukraine.

There are two models oforganization of local self-government. The first modelat the level of villages,settlements and townsdoes not provide for localstate administrations. Thesecond model in Regionsand districts provides forthe mixed model, includingestablishment of districtand Regional councils asorgans of local self-government and Regionalstate administrations aslocal state organs.

The term of powers ofcouncils of people’sdeputies and hokims is 5years.Chairmen (aksakaks) ofcouncils and members ofcouncils of local self-government are electedfor term of 2 or 5 years.

Majority electoral system on multi-party basis is used in theelections of provincial, district and city councils of people’sdeputies

Bodies of representative and executive power inprovinces, districts and cities are headed by hokimsof appropriate territorial units

Councils (Kengeshi) ofpeople’s deputies arerepresentative bodies oflocal state governmentelected at the level ofprovinces, districts andcities. Local self-government bodies areformed at the level ofsettlements, villages, aulsand in makhalya of cities.


EURASIA120

IV.1. Local Government Bodies

All states of Eurasia have diversified mo -dels of local self-government organization.At the lowest (grass root) territorial levelthere are no permanent bodies. Local mat-ters are resolved, as a rule, by means ofdirect democracy. Appropriate organsappear at higher levels of local self-gov-ernment.

The organizational structure of higher mu -nicipal units in the Russian Federation, Ar -menia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova iscomposed of representative bodies, headsof municipal units, local administrationsand other organs and elected officials oflocal self-government as stipulated by lawsand charters of municipal units. The struc-ture of local administrations is establishedby the representative bodies upon propos-als of heads of local administrations.

As a rule, municipal units in the states ofEurasia do not have the rights of corporatepersons. Nevertheless, they take part incivil law relations on an equal basis with otherparticipants both physical and corporate (inparticular, in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,Tajikistan). The rights of corporate personsare granted to organs of municipal unitsacting on their behalf. They may obtain andexercise property and non-property rightsand obligations and represent municipalunits in courts. On the whole the status ofcorporate persons is held by local repre-sentative bodies and local administrations.In a number of municipal units (for instance,in Vologod oblast of the Russian Federa-tion) this status is also granted to certainexecutive bodies or structural divisions oflocal administrations. Organs of local self-government as corporate persons are sub-ject to obligatory state registration in theform of institutions.

Another model exists in Azerbaijan andMoldova. According to the Law of theRepublic of Moldova “On Local PublicAdministration,” administrative-territorialunits have the rights of corporate persons

in public law. They may obtain and disposeof property and enter contractual obliga-tions through their own organs, actingwithin the powers as provided by norma-tive acts and charters of municipal units.

The same powers are exercised by respec-tive bodies of municipal units of Azerbai-jan. Unlike similar bodies in other coun-tries, such as Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine andUzbekistan, those in Azerbaijan do nothave the rights of corporate persons.

IV.2. Local Political Systems

The role of political parties varies consider -ably according to the level of developmentand the extent of self-government.

Role of political parties. Local re pre sen -ta tive bodies exist in all states of Eurasia.For instance, in Georgia there are 1,017lo cal councils (sakrebulo).

In Russia there are 252,000 elected mem-bers of local representative bodies; mostmembers serve on a voluntary basis. Localcouncils are composed of not less thanseven members for municipal units withpopulations above 1,000, and not lessthan 35 members for municipal units withpopulation exceeding 500,000 persons.

Political parties in the countries in theregion participate in local elections in dif -ferent ways and to different degrees. Inthe countries with developed forms of localself-government, including Azerbaijan,Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Russiaand Ukraine, major political parties takepart in all elections. In most of these coun-tries, the creation of independent localparties is prohibited by law.

The main function of political parties is tosupport their own candidates (Belarus,Russia, Ukraine), or candidates who haveproposed themselves (Armenia). For in -stance, in Russia 9% to 17% of candidatesin municipal elections are put forward bypolitical parties.

In the countries

where many

elements of local

self-government

exist only at the

lowest level of

governance, the

participation of

political parties is

less significant



On the whole, local elections in thesecountries take place in a highly competi-tive atmosphere. Thus, in Azerbaijan candi -dates of 26 political parties took part in themunicipal elections of 1999. In Georgia, 21political parties and blocks took part in theelections of the Tbilisi municipal govern-ment held in 2002. In local elections in2006, seven political parties participated;two of them presented joint lists of candi-dates. In Moldova, 22 political parties tookpart in the local elections of 2007.

In many municipalities in Russia, Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia, more than tencandidates compete for each vacant posi-tion.

In the countries where many elements oflocal self-government exist only at thelowest level of governance (Uzbekistan,Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan), the partic-ipation of political parties is less signifi-cant, though such participation is providedfor by law. As a rule, elections for local go -vern ment offices are non-partisan. Uzbek-istan is an exception: five political partiesrecently participated in the elections oflocal representatives. Legislation in KyrgyzRepublic stipulates that candidates forelected municipal posts may be proposedby voters at their place of work, service orresidence or education; by groups of vo -ters at conferences of political parties; orby the candidates themselves.

In the states providing for separation ofre presentative and executive branches(Ar menia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,Uzbekistan and Ukraine in district cities),candidates to the executive are directlyelected by the population.

In Russia there are two procedures forelecting local-level executive officials.Under the first procedure, the heads of theexecutive branch, who are also the headsof municipal administration, are chosen bydirect popular election. Under the otherprocedure, they are appointed by councilthrough a contract on the basis of a com-

petitive examination. In the municipalelec tions of 2005, more than 30% of theheads of municipal entities were directlyelected.

In Azerbaijan, each municipality has itsown executive branch and executive staff,including the chairman of the municipality,heads of agencies and departments, spe-cialists and other employees.

Representation of women is increasing inlocal governments in Russia, Belarus,Moldova, Ukraine and some other states.In the Russian Federation, women com-prise about 30% of municipal leaders and47% of local council members. In the localelections of 2007 in Belarus, women took45.7% of the posts in representative bod-ies. In Ukraine, 40.2% of local councilmembers are women. In Georgia’s 2006elections, women managed to take only11.4% of local council seats, and in KyrgyzRepublic after the elections of 2004, repre-sentation of women in local councils wasonly 19.1%.

IV.3. Electoral Systems

Election by majority vote is the rule formost local governments. In Ukraine, a pro-portional electoral system has been usedbroadly since 2004. In particular, this sys-tem is used for the election of deputies ofcity councils. At times it has caused exces-sive politicization of local government andinappropriate transfers to the local level ofdebates on regional, linguistic and foreignpolicy. It has also increased the number ofinter-party clashes in some regions.

In Russia the law permits the use of bothproportional and majority electoral sys -tems for local elections. The system ofchoi ce is established by the charter of amunicipal entity; most use the voter-majority system.

In Georgia’s local elections of 2002 and2006, a proportional electoral system wasapplied in Tbilisi. In other regions of that

Representation

of women

is increasing in

local governments

in Russia, Belarus,

Moldova, Ukraine

and some other

states

EURASIA122

country, a majority electoral system wasused in 2002, and a mixed electoral sys temin 2006.

In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the majorityelectoral system is used for local elections.


Citizens demonstrate different attitudestoward local political life. As a rule, they stillprefer to turn to the central state for reso-lution of their problems, although this ischanging. In communities where local go -vernments have sufficient resources, candecide local issues efficiently, and defendthe interests of the local population, theauthority and status of local government ishigh, sometimes rivaling state authorities.For instance, in Russia mayors of severalcities are more popular than governors ofthe subjects of the Federation. In countriessuch as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova,where local resources are limited, the pop-ulation typically regards local governmentas simply the lowest level of state power.

Overall, throughout the Eurasian region,voter participation in local elections is lowerthan the turnout for national elections.

In Russia, voter participation in electionsfor rural representative bodies and execu-tive leaders was 56.43% and 54.81%respectively. In municipal districts, voterturnout for comparable elections was50.46% for the representative body andagain 54.81% for executive posts.

According to official data for the 2004 elec-tions in Azerbaijan, 46% of registered vot-ers took part in municipal electionsthere. In Belarus, local elections in 2003saw 73% voter participation, and in Geor-gia the turnout for elections in 2005 wasmore than 40%.

In all countries of the region, legislation pro-vides for different forms of direct democracy.In practice, these forms are employed withdifferent levels of energy and consistency.

In Russia, law establishes such proceduresas local referendum, recall of local electedofficials, voting on changes of the bound-aries of municipal entities and on theirreform, rulemaking initiatives, public hear -ings, meetings and conferences of citi-zens, and other civic activities. In2004–2005, some 400 local referendumswere held in 22 of the 89 subjects –dis-tricts– that comprise the Russian Federa-tion; most of the referendums concernedthe establishment or structure of local go -vernments.

Belarus’ Constitution and Electoral Codeprovides for local referendums and recalls ofdeputies of local soviets (councils) ofdeputies. However, there were no local ref-erendums, and recalls of deputies were rare.At the same time, local meetings are broadlyused in accordance with the Law of 2000.

In Ukraine, the law provides for elections,referendums, general meetings at the placeof residence, local initiatives, public hear -ings, and recall of deputies and local electedofficials. Forms most often used in practiceinclude general meetings at the place ofresidence, local initiatives and public hear -ings on different issues, including taxation.Referendums are held only rarely.

Legislation of the countries of Central Asiadoes provide for elections and referen-dums. But in the main, only state-wide ref-erendums are held. In Uzbekistan, localgovernment takes the form of assembliesof citizens convened in settlements, vil-lages, kishlaks, auls and makhalyas. Man-aging bodies of local government struc-tures are elected by, and are responsible tovo ters residing in the respective territories.

The Constitution of Armenia establishestwo main forms of direct democracy: elec-tions and referendums. No referendum hasyet been held.

In several countries, there are forms ofdemocratic participation below the munici-pal level, including groups representing a

Local referendums

are only practised

in Russia on the

establishment or

structure of local

governments,

although they are

provided for all

legislations. Forms

of citizen

participation at the

sub-municipal level

are still most

popular



neighborhood, part of a residential area ora common interest.

In Russia, this sub-municipal level mayinclude groups speaking for an apartmentbuilding, part of an apartment building, aresidential unit or a rural settlement. Pub-lic sentiments may be expressed in meet-ings and conferences of citizens, as well asby means of local elections. This civic sub-level is responsible for such issues asmaintenance of residential buildings andadjacent territories and the resolution oflocal problems.

Azerbaijan enacted in 2001 the law “Onthe Model Rules of Block Committees ofMunicipalities,” which serves as a basis forestablishing new organizations to assistmunicipalities with governance at the sub-municipal level of apartment buildings andcity blocks. Block committees composed offrom five to 11 people are elected at civicmeetings.

In Belarus, territorial government func-tions not only at the level of residentialunits – apartment complexes and cityblocks – but also in settlements as well. Inall, Belarus counts 43,758 such micro-units of governance.

In Uzbekistan, there are more than 10,000local communities (makhalyas). Membersof these communities are united by placeof residence, traditions and customs,forms of communication, legal, economicand family relations. For centuries theyserved as a means for elaborating and reg-ulating principles and rules of communitylife, for shaping ideological and philosoph-ical views, forming morals, honoring tradi-tions and expressing public opinion.

In Ukraine, citizens may on their own ini-tiative create committees to representapartment buildings, the residents on onestreet, block committees and other groupswith the consent of appropriate local coun-cils. Such self-organizing groups are morepopular in some parts of the country than

in others. For instance, in Faustov (popula-tion: 50,000) about 200 self-organizedcommittees were created, yet in Kiev(population: 2,660,000) there are only 80.

Typically, citizens receive information aboutthe activities of local committees and gov-ernments through traditional forms, suchas mass media, posted announcementsand word of mouth. But increasingly, elec-tronic means of civic participation are beingdeveloped, especially in Russia andUkraine. Electronic communication net-works of local governments disseminateinformation to the public, albeit mostly offi-cial information and announcements. Infor-mation pertaining to citizen participation inlocal governmental affairs is still somethingof a rarity.

IV.5. Central-Local Relationships

In all countries of the region, there is a sys-tem of state supervision over local agenciesof state government as well as local self-governments. Such central supervision isexercised through executive powers, prose-cution offices and courts. In several coun-tries, these controlling agencies cooperatewith each other; in other countries theyfunction without noticeable coordination.

The President and the government of Rus-sia and heads of subjects of the Federationmay consider citizen grievances concern-ing the actions or inaction of municipalemployees and officials. Federal ministriesmay also assist citizens seeking redress ofgrievances.

In Azerbaijan, supervision of local self-gov-ernment is exercised by the Ministry of Jus-tice. This ministry is not only responsible forensuring that local governments act in alawful manner, but also for controllingexpenditure of public means and supervis-ing observance of human rights. The Min-istry of Justice provides an annual report onthese issues. In 2005, some 240 local gov-ernment actions were revoked and 70 actsof municipalities were amended.

Typically, citizens

receive information

about the activities

of local committees

and governments

through traditional

forms, such as

mass media, posted

announcements

and word of mouth.

But increasingly,

electronic means

of civic

participation are

being developed,

especially in Russia

and Ukraine

EURASIA124

In the Russian Federation, the Ministryof Justice does not have such functions.Supervision of local self-government isexercised by prosecution units (proku-ratura).

In Ukraine, control over local self-govern-ment is exercised by committees of theParliament and by local offices of stateadministrations, and the prosecution office(prokuratura). Financial control is exer-cised by agencies such as the AccountingChamber, State Control and Revision Serv-ice, or Fund of State Property.

Financial control, as a rule, is held by min-istries of finance in Armenia, Belarus, Rus-sia and Ukraine, and by the Ministries ofInternal Revenue in Belarus. Branch over-sight is carried out by appropriate depart-ments of ministries and state agencies.Prosecution units (prokuratura) in all coun-tries exercise control over strict and uni-form execution of laws.

There are also forms of popular controlover local self-government. In Russia,charters of municipal entities may providefor recall of local elected officials.

In Armenia, Russia and Ukraine, acts oflocal self-government entities may bequashed by courts or by the entity thatissued the acts.

In other Eurasian countries, local acts maybe revoked or suspended by the head ofthe state (Belarus), the supreme legisla-tive body (Council of the Republic inBelarus, Parliament in Uzbekistan), or byoffices of state power, which is the way inthe countries of Central Asia.

The functions of bodies of local self-go -vernment may be terminated ahead oftime on their own initiative (self-dissolu-tion), by court decision (Armenia, Russia),or by decision of the Parliament (Kaza-khstan, Kyrgyz Republic). In Azerbaijan,the dissolution of local self-governmentbodies is not provided for in law.

In the countries of Central Asia, the Russ-ian Federation and Armenia appointedemployees of local governing bodies maybe dismissed by the higher officials whoappointed them. Grounds for dismissal ofmunicipal employees in Russia and Arme-nia often include: court decisions pro-hibiting the occupation of a particularposition in municipal government bodies,expiration of contracts or reaching aspecified age limit.

In the majority of the countries of CentralAsia, there are systems of central-govern-ment executive branches that ensure theconduct of uniform state policy in appro-priate spheres of activities. These central-government authorities cooperate withlocal governments on matters pertainingto execution of the functions of a local gov-ernment, adopt within their compe tencenormative legal acts and give instructionsand recommendations on due exercise ofpowers on the local level. Ministries mayexercise functions of coordination and con-trol, with the exception of local organs ofinternal affairs (police), which have dualsubordination, similar to the former sovietsystem of government.

In Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,the impact of branch offices of executivepower (central and regional) on the activi-ties of local government and local self-gov-ernment is demonstrated in the controlover the execution of delegated state func-tions. In the event of violations, appropri-ate state officials may give in written formmandatory instructions for eliminating vio-lations. In Russia, such instructions maybe appealed in the courts.

In all countries of Eurasia, bodies of localself-government may sue a state authorityor state officials for actions or decisionsinfringing local rights. Citizens also havethe right to file a suit if they believe gov-ernment at any level has violated theirright to self-government. In several coun-tries, conflicts between local self-govern-ment bodies and private (individual and

In all countries of

the region, there is

a system of state

supervision over

local agencies of

state government

as well as local

self-governments.

Such central

supervision is

exercised through

executive powers,

prosecution offices

and courts



corporate) persons may be resolved onlyin the courts, unless by mutual consentthe dispute is relegated for resolution tosome other body or procedure. In a num-ber of countries as well, acts, local self-government bodies and officials can alsobe re voked by courts, as is the case inArmenia, Kazakhstan and Russia. Accord-ing to legislation in Ukraine, implementa-tion of local self-government actions maybe suspended as provided by law with asimul taneous filing of a judicial suit. Dis-putes concerning local self-government inUkraine are heard by administrative courts.At present, only the Supreme Administra-tive Court has been established. The func-tions of local administrative courts are stillperformed by courts of general jurisdic-tion. In several countries, including Russiaand Ukraine, matters of local self-govern-ment are heard in economic courts (“arbi-tration courts”). These primarily considerdisputes between local self-governmentbodies and citizens or corporate entities.

IV.6. National Associations of Local Self-Government

In the countries of Eurasia with moredeveloped forms of local self-government,there are national institutions representinginterests of local self-government. In thecountries of Central Asia there are as yetonly plans to establish such institutions.

In a majority of countries, there are unionsof municipal units. For example, the Russ-ian Federation has the Congress of Munici-pal Units established by 46 associations andunions of municipal units, the Union ofRussian Cities, and the Union of Small Ci tiesof Russia, to name but a few. In Kyrgyz

Republic, local self-government is re -presented by the Association of Cities andAssociation of Local Self-government of Vil-lages and Settlements. In Ukraine, there isa Congress of Local and Regional Go vern -ments. In Armenia, there are about 20municipal associations and unions. Azerbai-jan establishes regional associations ofmunicipalities on the basis of the Law ofMay 3, 2005: “On Model Charter of RegionalAssociations of Municipalities.” Severalcountries have associations of differentgroups of municipal units, such as rural andurban units. Many countries, includingKazakhstan and Russia, also have associa-tions of different divisions or departmentsof local self-government.

Associations and unions of municipal unitspursue the following goals: establishingand developing local self-government as apolitical institution and a basis for civil soci-ety, creating favorable conditions for com-plex social and economic development ofmunicipal entities, coordinating coopera-tion of municipal entities and their associa-tions with state authorities in the interestsof local self-government and the develop-ment of inter-municipal cooperation.

Associations of councilors of representativebodies of local self-government are directedto increase the authority of the representa -tive branches of local self-government,develop civic activity in the population, takepart in campaigns before elections, and dis-cuss with the central government draft lawson matters of local state government andlocal self-government, as well as any policyissue regarding local government. Theiropinion is usually requested formally on thedrafting of laws.

In several

countries,

including Russia

and Ukraine,

matters of local

self-government

are heard in

economic courts

(“arbitration

courts”). These

primarily consider

disputes between

local self-

government bodies

and citizens or

corporate entities

EURASIA126

V. Conclusion

The countries of Eurasia have achieved dif-ferent stages in the development of localself-government. But despite all differences,they share several general tendencies andfeatures.

First, the legal framework of local self-gov-ernment has been established in all thecountries in this region. The constitutions ofall states contain articles, sections andnorms devoted to local self-governmentand guarantees of its realization. The con-stitutions proclaim that the rights of citizensto have local self-government may not berestricted. The constitutions of all countriesex cept Kazakhstan, enshrine important po -wers of local authorities. Transfer of suchpowers to other persons or governing bo diesis not permitted.

Beyond this fundamental and ubiquitousacceptance of the importance of local self-governance, broad themes of a commonheritage give rise to a similarity in theproblems that are being addressedthroughout the region.

In all of these countries, there is an in -creas ing aspiration among local commu-nities to decide social issues locally andindependently through their own re pre -sen ta tive bodies. This movement is, how-ever, constrained by long-standing tradi-tions; in some countries decentralizationis prevented by unstable political and

economic conditions. The general processof de cen tralization and reinforcement oflocal self-government is also hinderedby the chronic shortage of re sources,including those needed to exercise realpower by local governments. In Kaza-khstan and some other states, local self-government is only proclaimed by theConstitution. In practice, it is rare; insome states citizens are still wary of localpower structures. It is possible to speakonly of the gradual rapprochement oflocal communities and public institutions.In this regard, in all countries of theregion a special role must be attributed toelections of representative bodies, pro-vided their democratic fundamentals areconstantly strengthened.

In all of these countries, the developmentof local self-government is undermined bya weak financial base. To remedy this it isnecessary to reinforce local taxes, developinter-budgetary relations and provide fair andobjective procedures for raising and allo-cating local revenues and expenditures.

The development and strengthening oflocal self-government as a rule takes placewithin the framework of the larger, generaladministrative reform aiming to separateand distinguish clearly the powers of alllevels of government, as well as workableprinciples of subsidiarity. Progress, how -ever, is slow and some reforms are quite



fragile, in part due to complicated eco-nomic conditions in several countries andfrequent political changes.

All Eurasian countries are strongly influ -enced in matters of local self-governmentand general democratic principles by the

standards of the Council of Europe, espe-cially those that are members of the Com-monwealth of Independent States and theEurasian Economic Community. Such sharedinfluences permit the prediction of a highdegree of accord in future legal regulationof local self-government.

EUROPE

GÉRARD MARCOU

HELLMUT WOLLMAN

EUROPE130 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

EUROPEDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 131

I. Introduction

The Europe under study in this chapter co -vers more than the European Union (EU)and less than Europe the geographical en -tity because the area discussed here endsat the eastern border of the EuropeanUnion. The states that make up this region (35)are mo re di verse than ever, yet they sharetwo in trinsic characteristics that distinguishthem from all other geo-political regions: 1)Every part of their territories is adminis-tered by a mu nicipal government; 2) All ofthe se states re cognize a discrete set of fun-damental prin ciples on which local democ-racy is ba sed. These principles, drawn upand implemented with the participation oflocal autho rities and their organizations,we re en shrined in the 1985 European Char-ter of Local Self-Government, which hassince been ratified by several states outsidethe region defined here. Moreover, localself-government has been recognized as ago verning principle by the EU.

However, behind this broad agreement onbasic principles lies a striking variety ofinstitutions and practices, and quite dis-tinctive national exigencies. The traditionaldiversity typical of the western states hasnow been increased by the central andeastern new member states of the Euro-pean Union, in which the principle of localself-government has only been translatedsince the 1990s into institution-building.Also joining in the process are other statesin South-eastern Europe, where reformsare even more recent and fragile. Despiteall this diversity, a number of major trendsin common can be identified.

The first such trend concerns territorial or -ganization. The European countries seemto be entering a new phase of territorialre form that is significantly different fromthose of the 1960s and 1970s. Not allstates are similarly affected by this devel-opment; some in fact remain outside of it.In essence, the new territorial reforms areconcerned with strengthening the munici-pal and inter-municipal frameworks, the

trend toward regionalization, and prob-lems related to organizing urban areas.

The reforms of the 1960s and 1970s setthe scene for two contrasting approachesto local government: the council asprovider of public services (epitomized bythe United Kingdom), and the council aspublic body based on a community of localpeople (epitomized by France). The coun-tries that followed the second approach didnot un dergo territorial reforms at the time,but sin ce the late 1990s these reforms areback on the agenda because of the nowines capable need to rationalize local go -vernment structures. Such reforms alwaysaim at getting first-tier local governments1

to take on greater responsibilities, directlyor indirectly, by giving them adequate ca -pacity to do so. What has sometimes wor -ked against this approach, however, hasbeen an avowed policy of bringing localgovernment closer to local people; afterregime changes in Eastern Europe, thislocalizing trend led to the break-up ofmany councils in the Czech Republic, Hun-gary, Slovak Republic, and the states thatonce comprised Yugoslavia, Serbia andMontenegro ex cepted for the moment.

The other important development in termsof territorial organization has been region-alization. Contrary to many assumptions,regionalization is much more a functionalissue than an institutional one. Far morethan a question of the number and charac-ter of institutions, regionalization concernsterritorial policies adopted in response toproblems that are neither strictly local nornational. Regionalization manifests itselfvery differently depending on the constitu-tional framework of each state, and on howit cuts across issues peculiar to that coun -try. While it concerns urban organization inthe Netherlands or institutional regionalismin Spain, regionalization takes many otherforms as well. Sometimes it is a layeradded to traditional intermediary authori-ties, without undermining them, as is thecase with the French département. Theseexamples also serve to draw attention to

Every part of their

territories is

administered by a

municipal

government and all

of the se states

recognize

a discrete set

of fundamental

principles on which

local democracy is

based

1. The “first-tier” or

premier degré is

that of basic

community-level

local government,

however they are

defined within the

national context.

EUROPE132

the potential impact of regionalization atthe mu nicipal level.

The organization of large urban areas, in -cluding their capital cities, is a key issuefor all the European countries. Nor is this aparticularly new issue. It has, however, co -me back under the spotlight in the past 10years. The problem remains one of how tostructure and connect the different levelsof urban organization while allowing forfunctional needs as well as the demands ofdemocracy. Responses have varied, suchas between adapting common law andapplying specific regulations, between in -te gration within a metropolitan authorityand focusing on the city as a centre.

The second major identifiable trend con-cerns the management of local authorities,and their powers and responsibilities.Sum marized, the powers and responsibili-ties devolved to local authorities areincreasing, though states are tending tostreng then their control over local finance.Combined with this general trend are avariety of issues specific to each state. Thepowers and responsibilities of local author-ities have suffered from the establishmentof regional autonomies2, although someremedies have been put forward (e.g. the2001 constitutional amendments in Italyand their implementation) or are beingdebated (e.g. the “local autonomy pacts”in Spain).The powers and responsibilitiesof local authorities have suffered from theestablishment of regional forms of self-government. Some measures to remedythis, such as the 2001 constitutional re -view in Italy, have already been taken;others are being debated, includingSpain’s “lo cal self-government pacts.”

With regard to powers and responsibilitiesin a strictly technical sense, local authori-ties have been affected by sector-specificdevelopments as well as more generalones. Under the latter category, it shouldbe noted how the general competenceclause on their powers and responsibilitieshas found widespread application despite

some resistance. The Charter’s legal situa-tion remains uncertain in Italy, Portugal,Spain and the United Kingdom, and there isan increasing tendency among localauthorities to turn to the private sector todeliver public services; privatization hasbeen less significant in countries with along record of such outsourcing, includingBelgium, France, Greece, Italy and Spain.Some countries have developed a systemof delegated powers and responsibilities, inparticular Austria, the Czech Republic, Ger-many, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia. Thispractice allows local councils to executeadministrative tasks under state responsi-bility. Among the sector-specific develop-ments, it is evident that local authoritiesare becoming increasingly involved in edu-cation as well as in public safety, thoughhere central control is being reinforced incountries where the local councils andmayors already exercised broad powers.

Progress in public-sector management isevident throughout the European region,even in the newly democratized anddecentralized countries that have bene-fited from various programs developed byinternational organizations, and throughbilateral cooperation projects. The pre-cepts of the “new public management”have been differently received amongEuropean countries, de pending on individ-ual public service traditions, but theincrease in res ponsibilities and the accom-panying rationing of resources intensifiedpressure on local authorities to find waysto rationalize their management in order togive themselves maneuvering room. “Per-formance culture” has advanced andspread, as has its peculiar lexicon: definingobjectives, indicators for evaluating resultsand benchmarking tools.

Another major development affecting Euro -pean local authorities concerns the dynam-ics of institutions and local democracy. Alongwith the steady progress made by localdemocracy, local government is further dif-ferentiating, regarding the relationshipbetween an assembly and the executive

For all the European

countries the

organization of

large urban areas,

and capital cities,

is a key issue


2. We distinguish

between regional

self-government

and regional

autonomy: the

latter is a much

stronger form,

closer to federalism

than to classical

local self-

government, and

affecting the

constitutional

structure of the

state.


body, between the design of the executive,the forms of election in use (e.g. increasingpractice of direct election of mayors) and theplace gi ven to citizen participation. Despitethe wide variety of processes and reformsinvolved, a common tendency can be identi-fied: that of seeking to establish a politicalleadership that is clearly accountable to itscitizens. Promoting local executive power, asdistinct from the assembly, is widelyregarded as a necessary means forstrengthening political leadership andaccountability, even whe re there is no directelection of a ma yor, which is the case in theUnited King dom and the Netherlands.

A presentation of the condition of local de -mocracy in Europe, however generalized,must account for both common tendenciesand the diversity of institutions and prac-tices. The split between shared and distinctelements underlies territorial organization,powers and responsibilities, managementand finance and local democracy.

II. Territorial Organization

The municipal level has to be distinguishedfrom the intermediate levels, but we willfocus here on the municipal level, includ-ing inter-municipal institutions. Any com-parative presentation of the territorialstructures of the European states musttake into account all the reforms that havebeen carried out over the past thirty years,as well as their many structural offspring.Such a presentation presupposes definingthe different levels of territorial organiza-tion.

II.1. Definition of Jurisdictions and Government Levels

Traditional presentations are based on theidea that the local authorities within astate are usually organized into two levels–a local council and a higher level coveringa more or less vast constituency. Powersand responsibilities are usually dividedbetween these two levels according tofunctional criteria. (Marcou / Verebelyi:

1993; Norton: 1993). Even so, in the fol-lowing countries certain councils can takeon the powers and responsibilities of bothgovernment levels:

• Germany: municipality and district(Kre i s ) , w i t h l a rge r u rbanmunicipalities having the status of adistrict and district-level concomitantpowers and res ponsibilities. A similarsystem is now used in Hungary andPoland;

• England: district and county. Before the1972 reforms, certain boroughs had theattributes of a county. Since the re -forms of 1986 and 1996, some areasha ve only a single-tier local authority–the district in metropolitan areas, theuni tary council in others;

• Belgium, France, Italy and Spain: themu nicipality and province, or départe-

ment. This applied in Belgium, Italy andSpain before regions with constitutionalstatus were set up3.

This standard depiction more or less leftout countries like Finland, Greece andPortugal, which traditionally had just onelevel of decentralization. Nor do thesestandard criteria take into account differ-ences in size that can affect meaning at ahigher level4. The traditional presentationalso failed to account for administrativedivisions existing exclusively to meet theneeds of the central government, andexcluded federal entities like those inAustria and Germany. Such shortcomingsaside, the traditional form of presentationdid offer a certain conceptual unity for theconcept of local government based onone or two levels.

These days, the picture is far more com-plicated. For one thing, regions have beencreated in several countries but accordingto very different concepts that, moreover,have changed over time. Belgium becamea federal state; in Italy and Spain, thedevelopment of regional autonomies put

3. In Italy, the regions

with ordinary status

were not set up until

1970, although they

were provided for

under the 1947

Constitution.

4. For example, the

difference between

the German Kreis,

considered to be

both a single local

authority and a

consortia of

municipalities, and

the British county,

covering a much

larger

administrative

division – the usual

translation of Kreis

with county blurred

this significant

difference.

EUROPE134

an end to the unitary state. The UnitedKingdom has moved to an asymmetricalorganization with regional autonomies forScotland, and Northern Ireland, a unitaryregime for England and to a lesser extentfor Wales. (Wales has no proper legisla-tive power after the Wales Act 2006).Meanwhile, in France the region is a third-tier local authority –a model that Polandhas followed. Furthermore, those coun-tries that did not undergo territorialreforms developed institutions for inter-municipal cooperation to take on thetasks that small local councils could notmanage. This has resulted in further dif-ferentiation of the municipal level (thefirst tier). At the same time the new insti-tutions have become closer to the secondtier, and have begun to compete with tra-ditional local authorities at that level.Analyzing authorities in terms of two-tierlocal government is thus no longerenough to give a proper account of thecurrent reality. Asymmetric patterns aremore frequent and the number and thenature of local governments may varyfrom one part of the country to anotherone. This new complexity means that wehave to consider on the one hand, the dif-ferent government levels of the territorialorganization of the state as a whole andon the other the differences in the statusof the institutions that we find at each ofthese levels.

In an effort to present territorial struc-tures in simplified form while still account-ing for the new complexity, the tablebelow classifies states by the number oflevels of territorial organization for whichlocal go vernments have been established,and also according to whether they areunitary or composite states. Here theterm composite states follows the defini-tion provided by the Spanish Constitu-tional Court: federal states and stateswith regional self-government, whichshare the following features:

1) a plurality of legislative authority atthe center, with the constituent mem-

bers as a major expression of theirpolitical autonomy;

2) the constitution sets out and guaran-tees the division of powers and respon-sibilities between the competence ofthe central authority and the compe-tence of the constituent members.

By convention, two of the table’s cellsshow those states that have an asymmet-ric structure; that is, regional autonomyin only part of the territory, or local coun-cils not included in second-tier adminis-trative divisions, or di sa ppearance of theprovince when the region merges with itsadministrative area. Inter- or supra-municipal structures (including those ofhighly integrated inter-municipalities,such as in France or Hungary) will betreated as being part of the municipallevel, as will infra-municipal bodies (e.g.,the freguesias in Portugal or the “towncouncils” in Bulgaria).

Note that territorial reform is once againon the agenda, though this time basedmo re on functional criteria5. Also, there isa ge neral trend toward strengtheningpolitically local governments at the basiclevel of the community as well as the guar-antees for their self-governance; the inter-mediate levels typically show a tendencyto regionalization, although only a minor-ity of states is establishing strong politicalregions. Setting up such regions can haveundermining effects on municipalities.

National capitals sometimes have a par-ticular status positioning them in a directrelationship with their country’s centralauthority (i.e., Berlin, Bucharest,Budapest, Paris, Prague and Vienna).

II.2. Basic Community-Level Local Government (The Local Council)

In all countries, it is at the level of the localcouncil that the issue of trying to balancepolitical space with functional6 spacebecomes particularly critical, especially in

National capitals

sometimes have a

particular status

positioning them in

a direct relationship

with their country’s

central authority


5. E.g., with the

purpose to fulfil

specific functions.

6. This means that it

aims at answering

demands related to

the implementation

of competences.


the urban areas (Bennett:1989; Kersting /Vetter: 2003; Baldersheim / Illner / Woll-mann: 2003).

Here it is useful to divide countries accord-ing to two criteria of the territorial patternof municipalities:

• Countries with a highly fragmented mu -nicipal pattern (Austria, the Czech Re -public, France, Hungary, Italy, Spainand Switzerland) compared with coun-tries that have undergone municipalreorganization aimed at the establish-ment of larger units (Belgium, EasternEuropean countries from the 1950s tothe 1970s, Germany, Greece, Lithuaniatoday, Nordic countries and the UnitedKingdom);

• Countries with a uniform status of mu -ni cipalities (Western and NorthernEuro pe, except the United Kingdom),compared with countries operating a

distinct status for cities (Central andEastern Europe, starting from Germanyand the United Kingdom).

The growing pressures of increased ur -ba ni zation explain this last distinction inthe case of England long before the re -forms of the 1970s; in the other coun-tries, it is a consequence of social struc -tures that for a long time made itdifficult to expand municipal self-govern-ment in the countryside.

Today, territorial reform is back on theagenda in many countries, but from a dif-ferent perspective. The reforms of the1950s, 1960s and 1970s were aimed atestablishing minimal or optimal sizes tomatch the powers and responsibilities to beexercised. The reforms of recent years haveinstead been driven more by functional con-cerns, and can therefore take more formsthan the simple merging of municipalities;they also cover more of the civic and dem-

Levels Unitary states Composite states

Germany (city States: Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg);Austria (Vienna)

1) Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania,Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro,Portugal (continental), Republika Srpska, Serbia,Slovenia, United Kingdom (England: unitary councilsand metropolitan districts)

2) certain capitals: Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Zagreb

1 level: local councils and consortia of local councils

3 levels: local council; département/province/county/district; region or federal body

1) none

2) Austria, Belgium (Brussels-capital), Bosnia-Herzegovina, German Federation (kreisfreieStädte), Portugal (island regions), Spain (certainuni-provincial autonomous communities),Switzerland, United Kingdom (Scotland)

1) Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands,Norway, Poland (cities with district status), Romania

2) Albania, Czech Republic, Denmark (at 01/01/2007),France (Paris), Serbia (Vojvodine), Slovak Republic,Sweden, United Kingdom (England, Wales)

2 levels:- 1) local council; province / département /

county/district

- 2) local council, region or federal body

Belgium, Germany, Italy, SpainFrance, Poland

Table 1 Levels of Local Governments by Country

EUROPE136 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

7. Functional reforms:

reforms concerning

the attribution of

certain powers and

responsibilities and

having the aim of

improving the ways

in which these are

exercised.

8. Field services are

administrative

services with

competence for a

territorial

jurisdiction that are

subordinated to

central government

departments. In

some countries they

are referred to as

“peripheral

administrations”.

Territorial Reform and Functional Reform

The great territorial reforms of the past did meet objectives of functional reform7.

In Greece for example, the municipal reform of 1912 allowed for any built-up

area with a population of more than 300 and a primary school to constitute itself

as a municipality. In Sweden, the territorial reforms of 1952 and 1970 were

devised mainly in order to help implement state education reforms at the munic-

ipal level. In Germany, the municipal reforms of 1965-1975 were based on the

theory of central places, whereby a whole range of services and material

resources would be provided from these for a given population. These reforms

also aimed at giving municipalities a territorial basis for their powers and respon-

sibilities to be expanded later through further functional reforms (Germany, Swe-

den). This has been the case over the last few years in Germany where the gov-

ernments of certain Länder have transferred new responsibilities to the districts

and cities with district status: Baden-Württemberg has undergone the most rad-

ical reform, as most tasks of the field services8 of the Land government have

been transferred to it.

The Greek reforms of 1997 illustrate the dramatic shift that took place. This was

a radical reform, decreasing the numbers of municipalities (demes and rural coun-

cils) from nearly 6,000 to 1,033. But the real innovative aspect of the reform was

that it was not just an amalgamation plan; it involved also a development and

investment program, and the territorial reform was a necessary step to imple-

ment that program. The aim was to set up local authorities able to implement it,

which meant equipping them with the necessary institutions, staff and financial

resources. A five-year program (1997-2001) financed by the state was thus the

support framework within which the new municipalities would operate and which

would help finance a capital investment program. The five-year program was also

aimed at facilitating the recruitment of managers for the new municipalities and

to give them the necessary human resources for exercising a greater administra-

tive and financial autonomy. Another innovative aspect of the reform was to keep

a representation of the old local councils in the new local authorities, and secure

their participation in the debates of the new municipal council, which doubtless

helped to get the mergers accepted by the local communities.

In the new German Länder on the other hand, the transfer of the territorial reform

realized in the west proved at first to be a half-failure. Regrouping smaller munic-

ipalities was seen as working against the aim of restoring democracy, and inter-

municipal bodies (the Verwaltungsgemeinschaft) were set up in order to try and

resolve this problem. However, the territorial reforms were successfully com-

pleted at the level of the districts. More recently, territorial reform has taken a

new turn: the Brandenburg Land has removed many small municipalities by

means of mergers, reducing at the same time the number of inter-municipal bod-

ies, and the Mecklemburg-Vorpommern Land has carried out a radical reform of

districts, bringing their average population to 350,000.


ocratic dimension of the municipal organi-zation, rather than being concerned withjust technical and management issues.Integrated forms of inter-municipal coop-eration have then appeared as an al ter -native to amalgamation.

In the other countries of Central andEastern Europe where post-war territo-rial reforms have endured, a form ofrepresentation for the old local authori-ties was maintained in the expandedlocal councils (Poland, Bulgaria). Thiswas also the strategy adopted byLithuania for its 1995 territorial reforms,which divided the country into only 60district municipalities.

However, highly urbanized countriesthat underwent major amalgamation ofmunicipalities are now seeking to re-establish local community institutions atthe infra-community level (Sweden,United Kingdom). These various devel-opments and experiences should serveto draw attention to the importance of“minor local entities,” as these aretermed under Spanish law (in Castilla-

La Mancha), for giving voice to localdemocracy, and in particular to theexperiences of countries like Portugaland Bulgaria, where large municipalitieswork by relying on strong infra-munici-pal institutions.

By contrast, the concentration of localgo vernments that came into effect inDenmark on January 1, 2007, reducedthe number of local councils from 271 to98, and the number of “administrativemunicipalities” (counties) from 14 to 5“regions.” This effort was driven by aconcern for economies of scale, takinginto account the predictable rise insocial expenditure, particularly for olderpeople. While the local municipalitiesrun nearly all the public services, it isplanned to run the health service at thelevel of the expanded counties(regions). The counties will also takeresponsibility for public transportation,

regional development and planning, aswell as some social services.

But in many other countries where munic-ipal functions are certainly less extensive,it is mainly by developing a second level ofmunicipal government that a solution hasbeen sought for difficulties municipalitiesencounter in performing certain functionswithout undermining the pre-existing mu -nicipalities. France and Hungary provideillustrative examples of this approach,which encourages political vitality in localcommunity institutions rather than work-ing against them. But, the expansion ofthe functions performed at the inter-munic-ipal level raises the problem of the demo-cratic legitimacy of inter-municipal ins -titutions, which are at present formed by themunicipal councils.

It seems that instituting a second level ofmunicipal government is probably a usefuloption in organizing large urban zones becauseurban development does not follow municipaland administrative boundaries (Hoffmann-Martinot: 1999; Hoffmann-Martinot / Sellers:2005; Le Galès: 2002). In this respect, Frenchlaw provides for the status of “urban commu-nity” for the biggest metropolitan areas(excepting Paris); fourteen have been created.The law also provides for the status of“agglomeration community” for smaller urbanareas (164 established to date). In the Nether-lands, a “cooperative framework” approachhas been adopted following the failure of anattempt through a 1994 law to create urbanregions for the seven biggest metropolitanareas of the country. The “cooperative frame-work” is based on an inter-municipal publiccorporation –though without own taxing pow-ers. This formula has been revised by the lawof December 2005 (law known as “Regio Plus”)with the purpose of extending it to other urbanareas. In Germany, Länder laws have on occa-sion instituted similar types of urban area bod-ies, for example for Frankfurt, Munich andStuttgart. In the case of Italy however, theCittà Metropolitana, introduced by the law no.142 of 1990, has still failed to materialize prop-erly, even though it was enshrined in the Con-

Highly urbanized

countries that

underwent major

amalgamation

of municipalities

are now seeking to

re-establish local

community

institutions at the

infra-community

level

EUROPE138

stitution by amendment (new article 114) in2001. Only three perimeters have been drawnup (Bologna, Genoa and Venice), but theseonly constitute rather loose frameworks forvoluntary cooperation. In some regions,including Campania and Piedmont, theprovinces of the regional capitals would like toturn themselves into Città Metropolitana, but itseems uncertain that this will actually happen.Consequences on local democracy are notone-sided; they depend on the selected insti-tutional setting.

In the United Kingdom, first- and second-tier reforms are linked. The White Paperpublished in October 2006 (Strong and Pros - perous Communities, Cm 6939) provides fora further round of unitary council formationin those regions where there is still a two-tier system. The government announced on

the 25th July 2007 the formation of ninenew unitary councils, and the Law of 30thOctober 2007 created the legal conditionsfor the realization and the continuation ofthe process (Local Government and PublicInvolvement in Health Act 2007, c.28).

II.3. Intermediate Levels

It is at the intermediate level that the mostimportant changes in the territorial organi-zation of states have taken place over thepast two or three decades. Moreover, thesechanges have been both institutional andfunctional (Marcou: 2000 and 2002).

Historically, the intermediate level isclosely linked to the creation and aug-mentation of the state. More specifically,it is essential for what has been called


9. Whitebook for the

reform of Local

Governments,

Madrid, Ministry

for Public

Administration.

Territorial Reform through Cooperation

In France, a country of 36,000 municipalities, cooperation has long been themeans to run the public services that single municipalities on their own cannotprovide. But since the introduction of a law in 1999, supported by a strong com-mitment from the central government and financial incentives, inter-municipalpublic corporations with own tax powers have developed rapidly. These inter-municipal corporations are vested by the law with various strategic functions (e.g.planning, economic development, major capital investments etc.) and have owntax powers independent of those of member municipalities. At the beginning of2007, 33,414 municipalities and 54.2 million people had been reorganized under2,588 intercommunalités (inter-municipalities), as they have been called.

In Hungary, a law from November 2004 provided for the development of inter-municipal cooperation within 166 micro-regions in order to meet local develop-ment objectives, the main one of which was to ensure that the management ofpublic schools would be taken on by these inter-municipal corporations. At thebeginning of 2006, such consortia had been set up in 118 micro-regions, and in90 of these, all municipalities have joined the consortium.

This was also the approach followed by Italy, with its unions of municipalities, andin Spain, with the bill on local government reform following the 2005 White Paper,which aims at encouraging inter-municipal cooperation9.

However, the French intercommunalités will keep the distinction of having theirown tax-levying powers and a wide range of functions provided for by law.


“territorial penetration,” the political andinstitutional process by which centralizedpowers were able to establish authorityover all of their territory and the peoplewithin it. This has been illustrated in verydifferent ways by France, Prussia and theUnited Kingdom. Not all the Europeancountries brought this process to comple-tion; sometimes it was completed verylate or challenged by later transforma-tions of the political scene. Moreover,national boundaries have shifted consid-erably, even in the past century. Someonce-powerful European nation-stateshave disappeared altogether, includingAustria-Hungary, the Habsburg Empire,Prussia, and Yugoslavia. But territorialpenetration proved decisive in the forma-tion of certain enduring territorial frame-works, including the département in Fran -ce and the provinces of neighboringcountries on which the Napoleonic modelleft its mark. Also it was decisive in form-ing the county in England and Sweden;the district (Kreis, powiat, okres) in mostCentral European countries; and the“government district” or primary divisionof a Land –Regierungsbezirk– in Germa -ny. Similarly, this organizational processaffected such typical institutions as thepréfet or regional governor; in Germany itwas the Landrat. This functionary, whocame to be known by several differenttitles, was appointed a senior civil servantin 1872 by the King of Prussia. At aboutthis time, the Kreis acquired the charac-teristics of a local self-government –evenas it continued to serve as the frameworkfor an administrative authority of thestate. Thus, the original role of the inter-mediate tier was to represent and relaythe authority of the central power, eitherreliant on local aristocracy, as in England,Hungary and Germany, or against them,as in France.

Since the end of the 19th Century, how-ever, under the influence of liberalism anddemocracy, the intermediate tier evolved.Partly to accommodate the social andeconomic tasks that the modern state

was increasingly responsible for, theintermediate tier underwent two forms ofinstitutional and functional development.They were, broadly speaking: 1) theestablish ment of a local authority evolv-ing to become more like a municipality,both as an institution and in terms of theservices it per formed; 2) the differentia-tion and re duc tion of the administrativetasks of the sta te. Since the end of the20th Century, regionalization has beenmaking its mark as a practical responseto new socio-economic and politicaldevelopments. The trans formation some-times manifests itself in the emergence ofnew territorial frameworks and institu-tions, but it is also apparent in changesand reforms within existing institutions.

Gradually the original consolidating andcen tralizing mission of the intermediatetier of government gave way to incipientde mocratization. The election of a repre-sentative assembly gradually became therule in all the countries. Election ofprovincial councils in Belgium was basedon the 1831 Constitution; that same yearFrance introduced elections for thedepartement; the Netherlands followed in1853 with elections in provincial states;Prussia saw district elections in 1872; andin 1888 Great Britain allowed elections forcounty coun cils. The intermediate levellocal authority institutions later becamemore like municipal institutions, particu-larly in the election of executive officers.The exceptions are Belgium and theNetherlands where these offices remainappointed posts at both the municipal andse cond-tier level, despite the law havingbeen able to introduce an elective ele-ment. (see section III). These localauthorities progressively took on tasksdesignated by law to address experimen-tally two needs: 1) providing primary orsupplemental services in sectors, such ashealth, roads and schools, which did notnormally come within the remit of munic-ipal services; 2) promoting communitysolidarity and equalization of social serv-ices and support for small municipalities.

Gradually

the original

consolidating and

cen tralizing

mission of the

intermediate tier

of government

gave way

to incipient

de mocratization

EUROPE140

Today these kinds of tasks are carried outby second-tier local authorities in Centraland Eastern Europe, particularly in Croa-tia (Z

v

upanije), Hungary (megyiei), Poland(po wiat) and Romania (judet). They arealso part of the responsibilities delegatedto the Czech and Slovak “regions” (kraj).

Three factors differentiate these second-tier local authorities: size, urban adminis-tration system, and the presence or ab -sence of competing sector-specificauthorities.

In countries that were significantlyaffected by the late arrival of local self-government in rural areas, or were heav-ily influenced by Germany or Austria, se -cond-tier local authorities are apt to besmall (German Kreis and Polish powiat inparticular). Other countries have largerauthorities, including France with itsdépartement, England and Sweden withcounties, and Hungary with its megyei.This applies as well to provinces in Bel-gium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain,nomos in Greece, and Czech and Slovak“regions.” Except for the Czech Republicand Slovak Republic, these territorial divi-sions have ancient origins and are con-nected to the administrative divisions ofthe state authorities that preceded thecreation of local authorities. But differ-ences in size do not necessarily corre-spond to differences in responsibilities.The responsibilities delegated to this tierof governance depend more on the extentand nature of powers and responsibilitiesexercised at the municipal level, the roleof state authorities, and the presence ofsector-specific authorities.

Cities in several countries are notincluded in the territorial framework ofse cond-tier authorities, though they mayhave similar responsibilities. This corre-sponds to an institutional differentiationbetween city and countryside with respectto the local authority system, the signifi-cance of which has been emphasised. Incountries where cities assume much se -

cond-tier responsibility, they benefit froma reinforced status within the administra-tive system. This was the situation in theUnited Kingdom between 1888 and 1972(the borough-counties), and again afterthe removal in 1986 of county councils inmetropolitan areas. A decade later theUnited Kingdom saw the constitution ofunitary councils. A similar ascendancy ofthe city occurs in Hungary where 22towns have the status of megyei, in Ger-many with 116 kreisfreie Städte, and inPoland which accords to 65 towns the sta-tus of powiat. A similar system existed inDenmark before that country’s 1970 ter-ritorial reforms.

The presence of specialized sector-spe-cific authorities, such as hospitals, affectsthe powers and responsibilities at theintermediate level. Public hospitals are in -corporated at the intermediate level lo calgo vernment in Denmark, Sweden andHungary, whereas they are part of anational organization in the United King-dom (the National Health Service), inFrance with the regional hospital careagencies (though hospitals have kepttheir legal status as local public corpora-tions) and in Italy though the regionsfinance “local health units.” Similararrangements also characterize the edu-cation sector in many countries.

In federal states and states with regionalautonomies, it is the federated states orautonomous regions which have taken onresponsibility for these services, directly orindirectly. In Germany, the Länder areresponsible for education and for the statu-tory regulation of hospitals, and also forinvestment in public hospitals. However,management in these areas is devolved tothe districts. In Spain, public hospitals weretransferred to the autonomous communi-ties in 2002. In the United Kingdom, thenational health system is under the super-visory control of regional authorities inScotland and Wales, but is nonethelessorganized according to sector-based princi-ples10. In Belgium, health and education are


10. The management of

the health system is

not part of the local

governments’

functions.


designated as “personalizable” areas per-taining to the powers and responsibilities ofthe communautés11.

The preceding examples indicate, that theor ga nization of the intermediate levels nowtends to be associated with developmentstowards regionalization. In functional terms,it is a response to the new importancegiven to territories with respect to eco-nomic development. In institutional terms,it is a formal recognition of the changes inresponsibilities at the intermediate levels.However, regionalization manifests itself instates whose size, constitutions and terri-torial institutions are extremely varied, andwhich fulfil other tasks than those con-nected to regional development. If we alsota ke into account the political factors, thenthe very great institutional diversitythrough which regionalization can manifestitself is hardly surprising. In many coun-tries, it is limited to an administrativeregionalization, i.e. it is based on institu-tions subordinated to the central authori-ties (e.g. England –as opposed to otherparts of the UK–, Greece, continental Por-tugal, Bulgaria and Hungary). By contrast,it gave rise to autonomous regions in somecountries (e.g. Italy, Spain, the status ofScotland). In many countries, regionaliza-tion is reflected in the kind of powers andresponsibilities devolved to the localauthorities or to the institutions whichdepend on them (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Ne -therlands and Romania). Finally, othercountries have simply ex tended their sys -tem of local self-government to theregional level or have invested their interme-diate level authorities with functions ofregional scope, without impinging on theunitary nature of the State (Denmark since1 January 2007, France, Po land, Czech Re -pu blic, Slovak Republic).

III. Powers and Responsibilities,Management and Finances

Local governments operate within a sys -tem that requires interaction with the

state, and more generally with higherauthorities. Managing such a system hasbecome an ever more complex business,as the powers and responsibilities of localauthorities have expanded to cover tasksimportant enough to merit regional ornational legislation and policies. The chal-lenges to be met include how to apportionand share powers and res ponsibilities, howto finance local budgets and how to decidewhat administrative capacities localauthorities should and can have.

In theory, it is the powers and responsi-bilities to be exercised which determinethe level of resources necessary to coverthe corresponding costs. The EuropeanCharter of Local Self-Government puts itthis way: The financial resources of localauthorities should be commensurate withthe powers and responsibilities they mustexercise as provided for by the law, andthese resources must be sufficientlydiversified and progressive to allow themto keep pace with the real changes incosts (Art. 9, paras. 2 and 4). In practice,local finances are the product of eachnation’s complex history of public finance,as well as its particular administrativehistory. More than any others, these fac-tors ex plain the various characteristics oflocal finance, as well as the size, in budg-etary terms, of local powers and respon-sibilities. These same factors pertain tocountries that only recently introducedlocal self-government institutions, or arein the process of doing so. Setting up anefficient tax system and reorganizingfinancial networks takes more time thanchanging the law does. Therefore, con-sider the financial systems of local gov-ernment before moving on to compar-isons of powers, responsibilities andadministrative capacities.

III.1. Finances

Financial autonomy is the basis of localself-government, as stated in Article 9 ofthe European Charter of Local Self-Go -vernment, and it has three dimensions:

11. These are

constituent

members of the

Belgium federal

system, nowadays

run by institutions

shared, or largely

shared, with those

of the region.

EUROPE142

resources must be in line with the costsassociated with the duties conferred uponlocal authorities by law; the authoritiesmust be able to dispose freely of theresources allocated to them; and theymust have certain po wers to determinethe level of their own resources.

However, despite the abundance of nationaland international sources, carrying out aninternational comparison of local go vern -ment financial systems presents real diffi-culties of methodology and interpretation,even in Europe. In the following stu dy, re -gio nal autonomies have been treated as si -milar to federal entities and have thereforenot been considered as local authorities,con trary to how certain in ter nationalsources erroneously represent them.

Analysis of major trends concerning ex -pen diture and resources reveals the grow-ing role of local authorities in Europe (Da -fflon: 2002; Travers: 2005). However, thisincrease in importance is often accompa-nied by a reduction in financial autonomy.

III.1.1. Local authority expenditure

The following chart shows the proportionof each nation’s GDP that is allotted tolocal public expenditure, based on figurespu blished by Eurostat. The term local pu -blic expenditure refers to the expenditureof lo cal public authorities; that is, intra-national authorities with the exception offederal entities and regionalautonomies12. Note that although Spain istreated as a federal state, Italy is not,despite high le vels of powers and respon-sibilities for pu blic spending, as well as leg-islation de volved to the Italian regions. Thesame applies to the United Kingdom withrespect to Scotland and Northern Ireland.Wales could also reasonably be includedin the matter of public finances becauseof the volume of expenditure devolved toit. Although the European states usuallyhave one or two tiers of local authority, thetable slightly overestimates in comparativeterms local public expenditure for countries

with three tiers of local authorities (France,Poland). Despite these approximations,the chart reveals three fairly distinctnational groups:

• Three Nordic countries (Denmark, Fin-land, Sweden) and Switzerland, whoselocal public expenditure is greater than20% of their GDP;

• a large group of countries whose localpublic expenditure varies in reality bet-ween 6% and 13% of GDP: in fact inItaly, the expenditure of local councilsand of their consortia, and of the provin-ces, was around 6.3% of GDP in 2003; inthe same year such expenditure in theNetherlands was 8.5%;

• a small group of countries in whichlocal public expenditure is less than5% of GDP: Greece, Cyprus, FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia andMalta.

In the median group, there is a contin-uum in which it is nearly impossible toplace a threshold. But below 8% or 8.5%of GDP, we find only fairly small countriesmaintaining a certain financial centraliza-tion, along with the federal states andstates with autonomous regions (insofaras part of the expenditure borne by thelocal authorities in the unitary states ispaid for out of regional budgets.)

However, the amount of expenditurealone is not enough to characterizefinancial autonomy. Functional inde-pendence also depends on how muchdiscretion a local authority has to allo-cate and commit its expenditures, andto manage its resources.

Figure 2 shows local authority capital ex -pen diture as a percentage of GDP. Thisindicator helps show the role played bylocal authorities with respect to the flowof capital investment. It relates only tothe Europe of the 25, as there is insuffi-cient data for the other countries. In the

In most European

countries local

public expenditure

varies in reality

between 6 % and

13 % of GDP


12. See above :

footnote 2.


same year, public sector investment inthe Europe of the 25 was 2.4% of GDP,with figures ranging from 1.1% for Aus-tria to 5% for the Czech Republic.

What emerges from the chart is that localauthorities represent the greatest share ofpublic-sector investment, except in 10 coun-tries: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Es - tonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Lu xem -bourg, Malta and Slovak Republic. The chart

takes into account only local authority invest-ments, and not those of federal entities. Itdoes however take into account the capitalexpenditure of the autonomous regions incountries that have such entities, leading tothe aforementioned overesti mate of localauthority investment. The same applies toFrance with respect to the first and secondlevels, because the regions, being localauthorities, have a much greater investmentcapacity; they currently account for about

Figure 1 Local Public Expenditure as % of GDP

DenmarkSwitzerland

SwedenFinland

NetherlandsItaly

PolandUnited Kingdom

NorwayHungary

Czech RepublicFrance

IcelandLatvia

RomaniaSlovenia

LithuaniaAustriaCroatia

GermanySlovak Republic

EstoniaIrelandAlbania

BulgariaPortugalBelgium

SpainMontenegro

SerbiaLuxembourg

GreeceCyprus

Macedonia, FYRMalta

33.00%25.20%

25.00%20.10%

15.47%15.40%

13.50%13.20%13.10%

13.00%12.10%

11.10%10.13%

9.50%8.50%

8.44%8.10%

7.90%7.50%

7.30%7.00%

6.91%6.80%

6.70%6.50%

6.30%6.10%

5.90%5.80%

5.60%5.40%

3.10%1.90%

1.80%0.70%

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00%

Source: Eurostat, 2005.

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5

EUROPE144

10% of the real capital expenditure of localgovernments and their public institutions.

Here analysis must be put in context to takeinto account the wider economic climateand the stage of development for each sit-uation. Macro-economic policies can have aheavy impact on local authority invest-ments, as is the case for Austria and Ger-many. Over several years, capital ex - penditure can show greater fluctuations

than running costs. Al though there hasbeen dynamic growth over the past fewyears in local authority investment acrossthe European Union as a whole, it has beengreater in the new member states; thisreflects the need for new infrastructure inthese more recently admitted countries.Between 2000 and 2005, the averagegrowth in local authority investment acrossthe Europe of the 15 was 2.9% a year. Atthe same time it was 4.9% in the new


Figure 2 Local Public Capital Expenditure as % of GDP

Spain

Czech Republic

Ireland

France

Poland

Netherlands

Portugal

Italy

Luxembourg

Finland

Sweden

Hungary

Latvia

Slovak Republic

Denmark

United Kingdom

Greece

Belgium

Lithuania

Estonia

Cyprus

Austria

Germany

Slovenia

Malta

2.5

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.1

2.1

2

1.9

1.7

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.1

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.5

0.2

Source: Dexia, 2006.


member states, and there was negativegrowth in Austria and Germany13.

In the countries of the former Yugoslavia,as well as Albania, Bulgaria and Romania,central authorities at first kept control ofinvestment funds, including those for localpublic investments. This started to changein 2004. There has been easier access toloans in Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, andthe FYR Macedonia and Serbia. In Albania,a call-for-tenders procedure was intro-duced to select local projects receivingstate funding. In Bulgaria and Romania,the role of local authorities regardinginvestment in economic or social infra-structure has been growing thanks toaccess to European funds14.

III.1.2. Local government resources

Two questions arise concerning resources:the level of resources with respect tocosts, and the degree of control theauthorities have over their capacity toincrease their resources.

The European Charter of Local Self-Go -vern ment stipulates that local authoritiesmust have “adequate financial resourcesof their own, of which they may disposefreely within the framework of their pow-ers,” and that the financial resources oflocal authorities must be “commensuratewith the responsibilities provided for bythe constitution and the law” (art. 9,paras. 1 and 2). The first provision is acondition for local freedom; the second isa guarantee for local authorities that theyshould be given the necessary resources tofinance the tasks devolved to them by law.

The requirement that legally prescribedfunctions (duties) should correlate with theresources allocated –known as the princi-ple of connexity– is the most difficult oneto satisfy because it depends on how costsare calculated. This calculation in turndepends on the level of services deemedsufficient and practicable for the popula-tion. This requirement is at the heart of

the requests made by local authorities tothe higher authorities that their resourcesde pend on. Increasingly, legislation is pro-viding that any transfer of powers andresponsibilities prescribed by law must beaccompanied by an adequate transfer ofresources. In France, this principle wasfirst stipulated by a 1982 law, and laterenshrined in the Constitution in 2003 (art.72-2, para. 4). In Germany, the constitu-tional review of August 28, 2006, providedthe occasion for enshrining in the Basic Law(the Constitution) a ban on using federal lawto devolve material responsibilities tomunicipal councils and their consortia (newart. 84, para. 1). This was in tended to putan end to the practice whereby the federallegislator created new costs for local author-ities without providing the concomitantresources. By contrast, within Länder, con-stitutional courts of Länder ensure that theprinciple of connexity is respected.

However, financial autonomy depends onthe resource system and structure. It ishere that the development of localfinances is now showing signs adverse tolocal self-government.

a) The structure of resources

In most of the European states, the tax rev-enues of local authorities consist for themost part of shared taxes, for which thecentral authorities hold the tax-setting pow-ers. But the only ordinary revenue overwhich local authorities have sufficient pow-ers, allowing them to vary the amount ofresources through their own direct decision-making, is own tax revenue and incomefrom fee-based local public services. Asincome obtained from these local publicservices depends heavily on how the serv-ices are managed –directly by the author-ity, or by a utility receiving direct paymentfrom the users– the most significant vari-able with respect to the local authorities’ability to determine the development oftheir resources through their own decision-making is local own tax revenue. Con-versely, their part of shared taxes, from the

13. Dexia, Finances

publiques

territoriales dans

l’Union européenne.

Evolutions 2000-

2005, November

2006 [Territorial

public finances in

the European Union.

Trends for 2000-

2005, November

2006].

14. Ken Davey (2007),

Fiscal

Decentralization in

South-Eastern

Europe, in: Council

of Europe, “Effective

democratic

governance at local

and regional level”,

Budapest, OSI,

Skopje conference

papers, 8-9 Nov.

2006.

EUROPE146

economic as well as the political point ofview, is equivalent to receiving grants(transfers). The only difference is that thelocal authority’s allocation is sometimes cal-culated on the basis of local tax revenue.For example, in Germany, the municipalshare of income tax is related to the localyield of the income tax; the idea here is thatthe taxpayer is supposed to be pleasedknowing that part of their tax is helpingfinance local public services. Even so, their

elected representatives have no say in set-ting the tax rates and there is no connectionbetween the rate of taxation and the num-ber and quality of services provided.

The differences among the various Euro-pean local government finance systemsstem from their different sources of localbudget resources. All draw in particular onown tax revenue, on various kinds ofgrants, on shared taxes and on revenue


Figure 3 Structure of Local Budget Resources: Own Tax Revenue and Grants or Shared Taxes

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Albania (2005)Germany

AustriaBelgium

Bosnia and HerzegovinaBulgaria (2005)

Croatia (2005)Denmark

SpainEstoniaFinlandFranceGreece

HungaryIrelandIceland

ItalyLatvia

LithuaniaLuxembourg

Montenegro (2005)Norway (2003)

NetherlandsPoland

PortugalCzech Republic

RomaniaUnited KingdomSlovak Republic

SloveniaSweden

Switzerland

Tax shares + general grant as % of the total income

Own tax revenues (= tax revenues subject to a localtax power) as % of the total income

47%40%

51%18%

36%14%

42%45%

62%0%

58%10%

61%5%

18%50%

55%27%

88%1%

22%42%

23%57%

42%31%

60%34%

46%26%

8%70%

61%24%

73%15%

21%78.30%

35%32%32%

15%36%

43%57%

7%67%

33.50%45%

32%71%

3%55%

8%64%

13%38%

14%61%

19%13%

57%22%

44.35%

Source: DEXIA 2002, Council of Europe, 2003 or 2005.


from service delivery. However, theydiverge in the different weighting given totheir income sources, and in the character-istics of the most important ones. We canfor example distinguish local finance sys-tems according to whether the resourcestructure is governed by own tax revenueor instead by grants, including allocationscarved from national tax revenues. FigureNo. 3 compares these two types ofresources against the total resources oflocal authorities in the majority of Euro-pean countries. As in previous charts, thisone takes into account only the local level,usually one or two tiers, but three in Franceand Poland and not the federal entities andautonomous regions. This chart alsoincludes data available on Albania andsome states from the former Yugoslavia.

The chart shows clearly that own tax rev-enue is greater than the total revenue fromnational tax shares and grants in only eightcountries15 –Belgium, Denmark, Finland,Fran ce, Iceland, Norway, Sweden andSwitzerland. In all these countries, the in -come from own tax revenues comprisesmore than 40% of the total for local budgetresources. In the other countries, own taxrevenue falls below 35% as a proportion oftotal resources, except in Albania where itreached 40% after reforms took effect in2005. It rises above 30% only in Greece,Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and Portu-gal. But even in these countries the propor-tion of grants and national tax shares re -presents a much higher percentage ofresources (except in Luxembourg).

Analysis suggests that there are indeed dif-ferences among the various local financesystems that operate with between 30%and 40% of resources coming from own taxrevenues. Such resources are greater thanthose from grants and shared taxes. Whenthese two conditions are met, it can be saidthat the resource system is governed bylocal taxation. Grants then have the role ofproviding a basic source of funds or of fundequalization, or of offsetting costs pre-scribed by the law. The own tax revenue is

enough to allow local authorities to estab-lish their own fiscal policies. Conversely, inthe countries where own tax revenue iscon siderably lower than income from grantsor tax shares, and is considerably lowerthan 30% of total resources, it can be saidthat such resource systems are governedby grants. In this case, own tax revenuetheoretically helps fund non-mandatoryexpenditures, such as those for discre-tionary tasks, or helps pay for costs that areinsufficiently covered by grants and tax-share revenues. But the lower own tax rev-enue is as a proportion of total resources,the more difficult it is in political terms toraise extra resources because a significantincrease in resources necessarily im plies asignificant increase in tax ra tes. This politi-cal aspect may change where the centralgovernment puts pressure on local authori-ties to raise local taxes or cut expenditureby rationing budgetary transfers andnational tax shares. However, connectioncharges and user fees paid locally for serv-ices can provide alternative non-taxresources, especially at the local councillevel. Increases in local service charges andancillary fees are apt to be accepted moreeasily than higher taxes. A final point onthis matter: in the central and easternEuropean countries, property revenues(income from alienation or licensing) cancontinue to play an important role and toincrease the proportion of local resourceskept under the control of local authorities;this is only a transitional situation, but it isjust what is needed to facilitate transition.

b) Own local tax revenue

As far as the structure of own taxation isconcerned, there are several observationsworth consideration. All countries exceptSweden collect property tax, and this tax isgenerally held to be the most appropriateone for local taxation because of the local-ization of the tax base. This view is sharedby most governments throughout the world.But this tax is dependent on the existence ofa fully-functioning land register. As yet nosuch system functions properly in the Cen-

In only eight

countries is own

revenue greater

than the total

revenue from

national tax shares

and grants, and is

in excess of 40% of

the total revenue

15. Lithuania is not

included as there

are clearly errors in

the statistical

classification of their

resources: in 2002,

the local tax

revenue of local

authorities did not

exceed 8.4% of the

total of their

resources (G.

Marcou, Les

structures

régionales dans les

pays candidats et

leur compatibilité

avec les fonds

structurels (Europe

centrale et

orientale) [Regional

structures in

applicant countries

and their

compatibility with

the structural funds

(central and eastern

Europe)],

Luxembourg,

Parlement européen

STOA 105 FR, 2002,

[Part B: country

files]).

EUROPE148

tral and Eastern European countries, someof which have no register at all. Local taxa-tion of households is rarely based on a localincome tax, though it is the practice in theNordic countries and in Switzerland; thesecountries also have the highest levels oflocal governmental ex penditure. In manyother countries income tax is a shared taxwhose yield is partly or wholly allocated tolocal budgets. For example, shared incometaxes account for part of the local allocationsin Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland;all income tax revenue is used to fund localbudgets in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania.In some countries, local governments canvote for an additional income tax, calculatedon top of the state tax (Switzerland) orbased on the income tax revenue leveledlocally (Croatia). One advantage of channel-ing income tax revenue to the local level isthe taxpayers’ increased perception of adirect connection between taxes paid andservices used. In Greece, local taxationmainly comprises taxes that represent fund-ing for public services, and not taxes in thestrict sense. This was also the case in Francewith the taxe d’habitation (community char -ge), that is now a direct tax; there is alsothe same process with the tax for householdrefuse collection that has in recent yearsbeen used as an adjustment variable bymany local and intercommunity councilsvoting rates higher than needed by the ser -vice costs.

By contrast, fewer than half of the Euro -pean Union countries have a local taxspecifically levied on economic activity:Aus tria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ger-many, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Por-tugal and Spain. The tax base for eco-nomic activity is variable, but consideringlocal tax revenues and budget levels as awhole, this tax is only a significantresource in France, Germany, Hungary,Ireland, Lu xem bourg and Spain. More-over, it is vulnerable to economic policymeasures aimed at reducing the burden ofbusinesses; such measures have reducedthis tax base in recent years, particularlyin France, Germany and Spain.

Overall, the general tendency has been tosqueeze own tax revenues as a proportion ofthe total resources of local authorities, tobenefit resources whose variations are con-trolled by the central authorities. In Fran ceas in Germany, the tax base for the businesstax has been reduced. In France, the busi-ness tax rate was capped at 3.5% of valueadded, a move that affects nearly half ofthose qualifying to pay the tax. In theNetherlands in 2006, local property taxeswere abolished for tenants and capped forlandlords, resulting in a reduction in financialautonomy. Sweden and Italy, each withinvery different contexts, have proved to beremarkable exceptions to this general ten-dency to shrink own tax revenues. The samehas been true since 2005 in Slovak Republicwhere new local taxes have replaced theallocation of grants. In Sweden, own rev-enues still provide more than 70% of theresources of local authorities. Italy, since1992, has continued the process of restoringown taxation, which was virtually abolishedin 1971 in an effort to promote equalization.All this means that in most countries, secur-ing resources is prioritized over financialresponsibility. The rules used for calculatingshared tax allocations, insofar as these arerelatively stable or negotiated (as in Austriaor Germany) and the guarantees pertainingto changes in grants (as in a “stability pact”)ensure that there is a certain balancebetween resources and costs – within thelimits allowed by the economic situation.

c) Other funding techniques

Among the alternatives to public budgetfunding that have emerged and developedin recent years to fund investments are thevarious forms of public-private partnerships(PPPs) inspired by the British Private FinanceInitiative (PFI) of 1992. Since the end of the1990s, many countries have adopted legis-lation on PPPs which, under the various legalformats in different countries, nonethelessfollows the same basic process: the publicauthority entrusts a company or a consor-tium with an overall mission of designing,realizing, financing and operating or main-

The general

tendency has been

to squeeze own tax

revenues, and to

prioritize securing

revenues over

financial

responsibility



taining a public works on the local govern-ment’s behalf. This widens the possibilitiestraditionally offered with the system of con-cession. The real reason for the develop-ment of PPPs is a budgetary one.

Results have been mixed. Even in theUnited Kingdom, PPPs do not account formore than 11% of public investment. Thislimited success can be explained by thefact that conditions for local authorities’access to credit were very restrictive untilthe Local Government Act of 2003, so thatthe PFI represented the possibility ofaccessing extra resources.

Although PPPs often help speed funding forcertain operations, they also have certain dis-advantages. One is that capital raised by thecontract partner on the market will beobtained under less favourable terms thanthose usually given to public authorities. Addi-tionally, the fees payable by the public author-ity have to cover all costs, including the finan-cial ones, so that the PPP in effect turns thedebt into operating costs, though this does notin itself assure an overall saving. Anotherpoint of concern is the private companies’push for higher profit margins for additionalrisks they pretend to bear, and it is difficult forpublic authorities to control these margins16.In the other countries, the share of PPPs inpublic investment continues to be fairly mod-est, even if go vernments sometimes setambitious targets, as for example in Francewhere the avowed goal is 10% by 2010.

Such limitations of the PPP as a tool forfunding may explain the re-emergence offunding bodies aimed solely at local author-ities. Founded on a cooperative basis, theyare modeled on Kommuninvest, a coopera-tive body founded in Sweden in 1986 toprovide funding to local authorities17. Until itwas absorbed in a 1996 merger, Belgium’sCrédit Communal was si milar.

III.2. Powers and Responsibilities

It is necessary to make clear the status ofthe different categories of powers and

responsibilities, before reviewing the func-tions (Committee of Regions: 2002; Mar -cou, 2007).

III.2.1. Categories of powers and responsibilities

The first thing is to note how the generalclause on the scope of local self-govern-ment as provided under article 4.2 of theEuropean Charter of Local Self-Govern-ment has found widespread application, atleast at the level of municipal authorities.This clause is not concerned with the divi-sion of powers and responsibilities. Rather,it defines a principle of freedom. This prin-ciple is of paramount importance, even ifthe activities it sanctions remain modest inbudgetary terms. Most of the European sta -tes at the Council of Europe level now re -cognize the principle of the general clauseas applying to local councils, through theirconstitutions or laws. A few countries,including Portugal, the United Kingdom andsome Central and Eastern European na -tions, are exceptions; Spain and Italy rai sequestions of interpretation.

The fact remains that most of the powersand responsibilities exercised by localauthorities are established by law. There is anoticeable general inclination to extend thescope of local authority, sometimes in theform of “powers and responsibilities for spe-cific purposes” (as stated in art. 4 of theChar ter) exercised in the name of the stateand under its direction. This is particularlythe case in Germany, Austria, Italy, theCzech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Itleads to local councils exercising administra-tive tasks traditionally performed by thestate. This does contribute to the overallempowerment of local government, but thereal reach of this type of extension of pow-ers and responsibilities depends on the con-trol exercised in practice by the state.

In the Central and Eastern Europeanstates, the range of material tasks forwhich local authorities are responsible isvast, especially where they are the heirs to

16. Numerous inquiries

reported by the

Committee of Public

Accounts of the

House of Commons

suggest

cautiousness

regarding benefits

that can be

expected by public

authorities from PFI

(for example HC

567, 16 July 2003 ;

HC 446, 31 March

2005 ; HC 553, 14

June 2005 ; HC 694,

3 May 2006).

17. Kommuninvest

consists of 196

municipalities and 7

county councils.

EUROPE150

local bodies formerly controlled directly bythe central state. Exceptions are countrieswhere a separate state administration hasbeen re-established or maintained in somedomains at the local level. The “powersand responsibilities for specific purposes”are then predominant in the mission oflocal government, and can effectively keeplocal authorities in the position of beingagents of the state. This is the case, forexample, at the regional level in the CzechRepublic. Because the resources providedto local authorities are hardly enough tofinance the tasks delegated to them by thestate, there is little time or occasion forlocal bodies to exercise their autonomy.

A more detailed study of the system gov-erning local powers and responsibilitiesalso raises the question of how relevantsome commonly held distinctions are. Basicpo wers and responsibilities are always reg-ulated by law wherever they affect domainsor tasks that have a national dimension(and are therefore mandatory). What thendetermines the degree of local autonomyare the fine details and the scope of thepertinent legal regulations. In extremecases the regulations can make the systemgoverning such functions almost indistin-guishable from the system governing dele-gated tasks. Such a situation led to reformsundertaken in the Nordic countries in the1980s. These reforms were often groupedunder the term of “free municipality,” andtheir aim was reducing the heavy burden ofnational regulations and financial controlson local governments. In some countriesthe courts occasionally can ensure thatregulations respect the rights of self-gov-ernment by censuring provisions deemedto exceed the stated aims of the regula-tions, as in Germany, but such judicialintercession is unusual.

III.2.2. Functions

Regarding functions effectively exercised inapplication of the law, we will limit our studyto the level of municipalities and their con-sortia. A detailed comparison reveals that

certain tasks are carried out by local coun-cils or their consortia in virtually all Euro-pean countries. Providing a slight variation,Portugal delegates these tasks to sub-divi-sions of the local councils. These local taskstypically include: town planning (urban plan-ning, planning permission, developmentprojects), the allocation of so cial benefitsand the ma nagement of social institutionsfor certain categories of the population, par-ticularly for the elderly. They also includeroads and public transport, water distribu-tion (with the notable exception of England),accommodation and housing (with thenotable exception of the Netherlands, Italyand Switzerland), and the construction andmaintenance of school buildings. These dayswe can add to this list education support inall countries, along with actions for eco-nomic development, that can be carried outalso through powers that are not specificallydeemed to this function, when they are notlisted by the law. Together, these tasks canbe considered the common substance oflocal powers and responsibilities in Europe.

The most important variations relating topowers and responsibilities occur in thefields of education, health, and socialsecurity or benefits. Broadly, local go -vernments by national law are responsi-ble for such services in the Nordic coun-tries and to a large extent in the UnitedKingdom. As of this year, regional author-ities in Denmark have overall manage-ment of healthcare and the health insur-ance system, which had previously beenrun to a great extent by the counties. InSweden, social security is managed at thenational level, but the counties run thehospitals and the healthcare system. InGermany, France, Italy and Spain, on theother hand, local go vern ments exerciseonly partial or marginal powers andresponsibilities in these areas. The sameapplies to education: the recruitment andmanagement of staff is generally the taskof state or regional authorities. This is aduty of German and Austrian Länder, ofthe autonomous communities of Spainand in Belgian communautés. In the

The most

important

variations relating

to powers and

responsibilities

occur in the fields

of education,

health, and social

security

or benefits



Nordic countries it is the responsibility ofmu nicipalities, as it is still to a largeextent in the United Kingdom. In Italy,education is outside the domain ofregional authorities.

Public safety responsibilities are also de vol -ved to local governments in many, thoughnot all, European countries. In Belgium, theNetherlands and the United Kingdom publicsafety by tradition is an important responsi-bility of the mayor or other local authorities.By contrast, in Germany, Hungary and Swe-den, public security hardly appears at all inthe remit of local governments.

In the Eastern European countries, respon-sibility for education and health varies con-siderably, even within individual nationsover time. In Bulgaria for example, man-agement of the health system and theschools was first assigned to municipalities,but was returned to the state level in 2003.In Albania, these tasks have been financedout of the state budget since 2003, eventhough the local councils administer thestaff payroll. In Hungary, Lithuania, Polandand Romania, the management of schoolsand education staff is decentralized. InEstonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, SlovakRepublic and Slovenia, on the other hand,it is divided between the state and localgovernments, the state retaining responsi-bility for staff management.

Movement toward centralization can beseen in several countries in the areas ofeducation (United Kingdom), health(Norway) and public safety (Belgium,Netherlands). However, in many othercountries local councils are getting moreinvolved in education, as well as publicsafety. Previously, local councils in thesecountries had had only limited adminis-trative responsibilities in these areas. Athird appr oach is favoured in the Nether-lands, Sweden and the United Kingdom:enlisting the private sector. In these threecountries, management reforms focusedon attracting the private sector havereduced the remit of local governments.


Administrative capacity depends on thehuman resources and style of management,both of which have undergone importantchanges in the past few years.

III.3.1. Human resources

There are substantial differences in thestaffing levels of local governments. Unsur-prisingly, these differences reflect those al -ready noted for the powers and responsibili-ties: countries in which local government andpar ticularly municipalities manage bothessential public services and the human re -sources they require, are the countries withthe highest staff levels. In the Nordic coun-tries, Switzerland and the United Kingdom,local government staff represent about 80%of the total for public sector employees (63%in Norway). These employees for the mostpart work in education and the health serv-ices. Despite an extens ive range of functions,local governments in Eastern Europe have farlower staffing levels (around 40%), except inHungary (69%) and Slovak Republic (90%)(CNFPT: 2005; Pollitt / Boukaert: 2004).

The political structure of a state hardlyimpinges on these staffing issues. In fact ittends to be in unitary states that we findthe proportionally highest levels of staffemployed by local governments. For themost part, levels of employment for localgovernments are similar: for example theyare 28% in Germany, 31% in France, 24%in Spain, 34% in Belgium, 19% in Italy and18% in Portugal. Federal states and stateswith autonomous regions, for their part,are distinguished by the lower staffing lev-els of their central civil service. Localstaffing is also comparatively low becausethe bulk of their human resources areemployed at the regional level18. The lowerstaffing levels of local governments inGreece and Ireland also reflect their limitedpowers and responsibilities.

In recent years, local governments of manycountries have had to cut staff levels be -

18. Pollitt / Bouckaert

(2004), p.44 et seq.

EUROPE152

cause of budgetary constraints and theoutsourcing of many activities. Outsourcingincreased markedly after the implementa-tion of strategies inspired by the “New Pub-lic Management” philosophy, and measuresaimed at improving performance.

Staff skills and qualifications are also im -portant factors affecting the quality of localpublic service. Best practices include re -cruitment based on merit so the impartial-ity of the public service is protected. A rea-sonable level of personnel mobility amonglocal governments makes it easier for smalland medium-size governments to attractqualified staff. There are many ways ofachieving these objectives, but equally,authorities can fail to achieve them becauseof an inappropriate employment system.

In the employment structures of local go -vernments, as is the case for public admin-istration in general, we can identify twotypes of system:

• A career employment structure gover-ned by public law, essentially characte-rized by a system of appointment andjob security;

• A contract-based employment structurewith private law as the reference, andno guarantee of job security.

But the employment systems in the Euro-pean countries vary widely, and ofteninclude a mix of methods. Moreover, certainsituations can be misleading, and public lawstructure and career employment structuredo not always come to the same thing inpractice. In the Netherlands for example, acontract employment system prevailswithin a public law structure, while in Italyand the Czech Republic, local authorityemployees have access to a career pathwithin an employment structure determinedby co llec tive agreements.

Although local government employmentsystems have been developing in thedirection of increased flexibility of employ-

ment conditions and incentive-based re -mu neration, thus taking their inspiratonfrom the message of “New Public Manage-ment”, they continue to take differentforms depending on specific national tradi-tions. While some countries have gonemo re determinedly down the path of con-tract-based employment, others havemain tained the professional career struc-ture as their main system. In many cases,the outcome has been hybridization, mi -xing features from both models.

The countries that have gone furthest inaligning the status and conditions of localgovernment staff with those of the privatesector under labor laws include the UnitedKingdom (where there is no history of alegal distinction between public and pri-vate sector employment) and a group ofcountries that have almost entirely aban-doned their old career employment struc-tures in favor of a contract-based system.These countries are Sweden (1974), Den-mark (1969) and Italy (1993). In mostcountries, the contract-based system hasbeen partially introduced while maintain-ing a career employment structure formanagerial posts. Such “mixed” systems,with their strong element of careeremployment structure, are particularlycommon in Germany, Finland and Switzer-land. In Germany, this system has longbeen a feature of local governments, thegreat majority of staff being employed onfixed-term contracts; but the two systemshave ended up converging: after 15 yearsof fixed-term work, staff are given a per-manent post.

In the post-communist countries of Centraland Eastern Europe, building employmentsystems for local government was an un -certain process throughout the 1990s. Theform of local employment system that eachcountry chose, often after going throughvarious changes, depended on specificnational traditions, different reactions tothe post-communism transformation, andefforts focused on training qua lified staffand preventing corruption. In addition,

The countries that

have gone furthest

in aligning the

status and

conditions of local

government staff

with those of the

private sector

under labor laws

include the United

Kingdom , and a

group of countries

that have almost

entirely abandoned

their old career

employment

structures in favor

of a contract-based

system



coun tries preparing for accession to theEuropean Union made changes to accom-modate the process of accession itself. Thecombination of all these factors yielded dif-ferent results in different countries. Thus,some systems lean more toward contract-based employment, particularly in Bul-garia, Poland and Slovak Republic, whilethe career employment structure predomi-nates in Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Ro -mania and Slovenia.

The fact remains that overall, the careeremployment structure governed by publiclaw is still predominant. Applying labor law topublic service presupposes that there is asystem of strict collective agreements inplace, which cannot exist without powerfullocal authority associations and equallypowerful trades unions. However, this is thecase in only a handful of countries. Weshould not be misled by the coexistence oftwo employment systems, because whenthis is the case, the public law career struc-ture does in fact apply to the executive andmanagerial positions, even if staff on fixed-term contracts are sometimes employed insuch posts. It has kept therefore a decisiveplace in the system of human resources

management and a key role in the relationsbetween managers and the political staff.Furthermore, in many other countries, wefind the vast majority of staff employedunder a public law career structure. Theseobservations can be summarised as inTable 2 according to the dominant featureof the employment system.

A major criticism of public administrationsbased on the career employment structure islack of recognition for good performance bythe remuneration system. Another is thatpromotion tends to be heavily based onlength of service and seniority. The aim ofpolicies to move from career employmentstructures to a contract-based sys tem wasmade in order to introduce ele ments of in -ternal competition and a sys tem of incentive-based remuneration. Sys tems with thestrongest focus on inc en tives seem to bethose introduced in the United Kingdom,Sweden and Italy. However, a move towardsincentive-based re muneration can be notedwi thin career employment structures as well.

In countries where employment systemscontinue to be dominated by public-lawcareer structures, the move toward more

Public or private law career structure Public law career structure [Contract-based] private for executive and managerial posts applied generally or public law employment

BulgariaDenmarkMacedonia, FYRNetherlandsNorwayPolandSlovak RepublicSwedenUnited Kingdom

BelgiumCyprusFranceGreeceHungaryIrelandLatviaLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaMontenegroPortugalRomaniaSloveniaSpain

AlbaniaAustriaBosnia and HerzegovinaCroatiaCzech RepublicEstoniaFinlandGermanyItalySerbiaSwitzerland

Table 2 Typology of European Countries According to the Employment System of Local Governments

The career system

tends nevertheless

to prevail, in

particular for

executive and

managerial

positions

EUROPE154

flexible payment and promotion systemshas been slower and less marked.Nonetheless, they are now making demon-strable headway in Germany and France.

III.4.1. Management Reforms

From the beginning of the 1980s, theprocess of modernization has been drivenby New Public Management (NPM) ideas,though the vogue for these seems to bediminishing (Pollit / Boukaert: 2004; Ker-sting / Vetter: 2003).

The key idea of NPM was to overturn theinflexibility and inefficiency traditionallyattributed to public administration (“letmanagers manage”) and to replace its sys-tem of hierarchical control with manage-ment based on indicators, feedback andfollow-up.

In the United Kingdom after 1979, the re -forms forced local authorities to accommo-date in their organizational structure forservices a separation between the roles ofbuyer and supplier, and to open their serv-ices to competition by soliciting outsidesuppliers (competitive tendering). In 2000,these principles came under review uponthe arrival of a new program dubbed “BestValue Authorities,” which puts a greaterstress on performance over costs. The sep-aration of the roles of buyer and supplierwas also introduced for local authorities inSweden. In Germany, this trend took theform of a “new management model” (Neues

Steuerungsmodell), which challenged thetraditional primacy of legality and hierarchi-cal control. In France, the 1983 electionsled to the election of mayors claiming to beinspired by a new concept of municipalmanagement, whereby a town was to begoverned like a commercial company. How-ever results of municipal elections haveindicated that this model has lost its attrac-tion. Even so, they have not signaled amove away from modern managementtechniques. At present, the extension tolocal budgets of the principles of the statebudget reform (or ga nic law on budget laws

of 2001: ma na ge ment based on programsand di rec ted to results) is discussed.

In the Central and Eastern European coun-tries, the traditional model was first used toset up the new administrative structures,so the managerial model has been slo werto filter through.

In the debate on modernizing the public sec-tor, two arguments were advanced to pro-mote privatization and the market (Lorrain /Stoker: 1996).

First, turning to privatization was advo-cated as a means of reducing the weight ofthe central functions of the “welfare state”by letting market forces take over. The ideaof the “lean state” (Etat modeste,

schlanker Staat…) has been widely pro-moted since the 1980s at both national andin terna tio nal levels.

Moreover, turning to the market for thesupply of services was advocated on thegrounds that public authorities should berestricted to an enabling function. Actualperformance of public services should becontracted out to private companies on acompetitive basis. The European Commis-sion also argued for this approach with theaim of promoting the single market.

These tenets had perhaps their greatestimpact in Sweden and the United King-dom, because it was there that the localpublic sector monopoly was most exten-sive. But in Sweden, only about 15% ofmunicipal services have been effectivelycontracted out. In the Central and EasternEuropean countries, where social serviceswere wholly delivered by the state or bypublic bodies under the communist sys-tem, there have been fundamentalchanges in the management and range ofservices offered. The private sector nowplays an increasing role in their delivery. InGermany however, where most socialservices have traditionally been deliveredby private non-profit bodies (freie

Wohlfahrtsverbände), the local authorities


European

Community law has

a decisive influence

on how the

management of

public services

evolves

and develops


concentrate on organizing and monitoringtasks. The impact of NPM was thus ratherlimited, though it did later lead to a diver-sification of “suppliers.” In countries likeFrance and Spain, with a long tradition ofdevolving the operation of local publicservices to the private sector, the NPMprinciples did not seem of much relevance,although new tools to facilitate recourse tothe private sector have more recently beencreated. But the focus on performance asthe driving force has gained a lot ofground, both through state interventions(for example, reforms in Fran ce of localaccounts models) and through initiativestaken by the local authorities themselves.

European Community law has a decisiveinfluence on how the management of publicservices evolves and develops. This isbecause all services that can be classified asservices of general economic interest –asdefined under article 86.2 of the Treaty onthe European Community– are subject tothe rules on competition, unless these rulesimpede the realization of their mission inconditions compatible with the viability ofthe enterprise. According to the Court ofJustice, if a local authority decides todevolve the operation of a public service toa private company, that local authoritymust use a competitive [tendering] proce-dure. This applies even if the authority itselfhas created a local enterprise specifically todeliver the service in question, unless it canestablish that it exercises the same controlover this enterprise as it does over any ofits administrative services (known as the“in-house” exception). For the Court, it suf-fices that the company has external share-holders, even if only minority ones, to inval-idate this latter condition. The result is thatintegration through the market, as inter-preted by the Court of Justice, means thatthe freedom of local authorities to choosehow to manage the public services they areresponsible for is restricted. This applieseven though this freedom has long beenconsidered an important part of local self-government in many countries, includingFrance, Germany and Spain. Of course,

other countries have sought to restrict thefreedom of local authorities in this respect,in the name of opening up the market (Italyand the United Kingdom, in particular). Inthe same way, the new regulation1370/2007 (23rd October 2007) concerningpublic rail and road transport puts an end tothe exception that preserves urban andregional public transport from open compe-tition. However, competent local authoritiesstill have the possibility to provide publictransport services directly or through a sep-arate entity over which they exercise a sim-ilar control as for their own services and towhich they may assign the service directly.The urban transport systems of numerouslarge European cities will necessarily bereviewed when the new regulation comesinto force (3 December 2009). The freechoice of local authorities regarding theoperational system will therefore be limited.By contrast, most Services of General Inter-est (SGI) should not be affected by theapplication of the so-called "Services" direc-tive of 12 December 2006.

IV. Local Democracy

The main trends we can identify can bepresented by distinguishing among localpolitical systems, supervisory structures,the impact of decentralization on nationalpolicies, and the role of the associations oflocal councilors and mayors, and of localgovernments.

IV.1. The Local Political System

The election of municipal councils, ormore generally of community-level localgovernments, by direct, free and secretuniversal vote is today a reality in all thecountries of the Council of Europe. A lookback over even recent history is enoughto show what important gains have beenmade. As far as intermediate-level localgovernments are concerned, the situationis a little more complex: In some cases,indirect elections seem to be a betteroption for linking intermediate-level tasks

The election of

municipal councils

or local

governments, by

direct, free and

secret universal

vote is today

a reality in all the

countries of the

Council of Europe

EUROPE156

with local-level responsibilities. This isdesirable to prevent legitimate interestsat the middle level from competing andconflicting with those of local councils,and also to protect the independence ofthe latter, as exemplified by regionalauthorities in Ireland, regional councils inFinland and Romania, and provincial del-egations (deputación provincial) in Spain.The provincial delegations in Spain areconsidered part of the local level and aremeant to serve the local councils. How-ever, it was decided in Norway and Hun-gary not to use indirect elections for thecounty-level councils.

The most significant developments haveta ken place in the executive ranks of com-munity-level local governments, namelyfor a certain personalization of the execu-tive role and for direct elections (Bäck /Heanelt / Magnier: 2006; Szücs / Ström-berg: 2006). The most typical changeshere occurred in Italy, Germany and theUnited Kingdom. In Germany, the formervariety among municipal institutions hasgiven way to a unique model, broadlyspeaking characterized by the election ofma yors by direct universal vote, and thepossibility of removing them from office.Italy has introduced the direct election ofmayors, provincial presidents, andregional presidents. In the United King-dom, following the election of a mayor ofLondon by direct vote, the law has alsoprovided for other cities to adopt a similarmodel, along two variant forms. In Centraland Eastern Europe, mayors are elected bydirect vote, except in the Baltic States,Poland, the Czech Republic and Croatia.The question is being debated in Belgiumand the Ne therlands. In the Netherlands, adraft bill to amend the Constitution to allowthe election of burgomasters failed in2005, so these officials continue to beappointed by central government on thebasis of nominations from the municipalcouncils, but with the nominations beingopen to citizen consultations. Mayors con-tinue to be appointed in Belgium and Lux-embourg, but, as in the Netherlands, the

executive body is a collegiate executivebody whose other members are elected bythe council.

In the United Kingdom, the Local Govern-ment Act 2000 led local authorities to aban-don the traditional system of council com-mittees exercising executive tasks, todifferentiate the executive and non-execu-tive roles and, in some circumstances, tosubmit to referendum proposals for a localconstitution that could include direct elec-tion of a mayor. But these reforms did notreceive the expected support. Among the386 local authorities potentially qualifyingfor an elected mayor, referendums hadbeen held by only 31 local authorities by theend of 2006. The results favored the directelection of a mayor in only 12 referendums.However, a feature of these reforms is thatlocal residents can take the initiative to holda referendum on the role of mayor by sub-mitting a petition, signed by 5% of regis-tered voters, to their local authority. A lesswell-known aspect of the reforms, but onewith perhaps a greater impact over the longterm, is the differentiation of the executiveand non-executive roles. This should lead toan enhanced role for local councils in pro-viding policy guidance, and also supervisionwith respect to the executive bodies. TheOctober 2006 White Paper has resumedrevitalizing institutional reforms by reinforc-ing political leadership in the local authori-ties. "The Local Government and PublicInvolvement in Health Act 2007 (c.28)makes possible the election of the council inone ballot and requires the choice betweentwo alternative executive formulas: a leaderelected by the council or a directly electedmayor, who, in either case, then forms hiscabinet by appointing at least two membersof the council".

Useful parallels emerge here with the Ne -therlands reforms known as “dualization”(dualisering), introduced by the laws ofMarch 7, 2002, governing municipalitiesand January 16, 2003 governing provinces(amending the law of September 10,1972), providing for a separation of the


The most

significant

developments have

ta ken place in the

executive ranks of

community-level

local governments,

namely for

a certain

personalization

of the executive

role and for direct

elections


executive branch from the assembly.Henceforth, the aldermen (at the provincelevel, the deputies) can no longer be mem-bers of the council, and nearly all adminis-trative powers are concentrated in theexecutive body. To balance this, the legisla-tors wanted to reinforce the assembly’srole of policy guidance and supervision.The split timing of the different mandateterms also contributes to this dualization:four years for the council and aldermen, sixyears for the mayor (the Queen’s commis-sioner).

Behind all these developments and re -forms, apparently very different in spirit,lies the same key goal: restoring or rein-forcing political leadership in local govern-ments, and above all at the municipallevel. Of course this has not been an issuein countries like France or with the Länder

in the south of Germany. In both places,the figure of a strong mayor is deeplyrooted in history. But it should be notedthat all of the Western European countriesmentioned here have either traditionallyhad a collegiate local executive body, orhave not had an executive body that wasdistinct from the council. In most countriesin Eastern Europe, it was the desire fordemocracy that drove the introduction ofdirectly-elected mayors. However, it isclear that the various countries have verydifferent approaches to this issue. In mostcases, direct election of mayors hasseemed the best way to guarantee politicalaccountability, to the extent that theirmandate is renewable. But in the Nether-lands and probably in the United Kingdom,the preferred approach to reinforcing polit-ical leadership is to focus on strengtheningthe political role of the councils. This ambi-tion was also in the background of the so-called “free community” reforms in theNordic countries in the 1980s, whichgave municipal councils the freedom todetermine the internal organization oflocal go vernment. Previously, the execu-tive com mittees had been determined bylaw. The reforms (see in particular theSwedish law of 1991 on local administra-

tion) meant that the councils could havetheir own choices on their administrativeorganization in relation to their functions;they have also reinforced the executivecouncil’s management lead role in the va -rious specialized sectors.

For local assemblies, the changes are lessclear. There appears to be a definite ten-dency toward what is called “parliamenta-rization.” This condition is characterizedby a reinforcement of the rights of coun-cilors, and the possibility of calling theexecutive branch to account politically.This is particularly evident in Spain in thedevolving of powers and responsibilitiesfrom the council to the mayor. Oneavowed aim of this reform is strengthen-ing the executive branch’s capacity foraction, particularly in the major cities(laws of 1999 and 2003). Calling themayor to account can in some countriesrequire a procedure for recall by the citi-zens. This kind of procedure is seen inmost of the German Länder as well assome Central European countries, includ-ing Poland, where several such caseshave occurred. In a more general form,we are seeing political groups gainingofficial recognition in local assemblies ofthe larger local governments. As inFrance, these political factions have cer-tain rights recognized by the law in largercouncils. This is a form of legal acknowl-edgment of the role of political parties inthe running of local institutions.

The increasing responsibilities of local go -vernments have inevitably affected thestatus of elected officials (Guérin-Lavig-notte / Kerrouche: 2006). In all of thesecountries, there is a clear trend towardpro fessionalizing the status of local exec-utive officers, and toward strengtheningthe professional safeguards necessary forthe exercise of their mandate. This ten-dency to professionalize manifests itselfalso in the move away from a system ofremunerative allowances to one of realsalaries, complete with social security andpension rights. In tandem with this, there

In all of these

countries,

there is a clear

trend toward

professionalizing

the status of local

executive officers,

and toward

strengthening

the professional

safeguards

necessary for the

exercise of their

mandate

EUROPE158

is a move toward preventing officials fromassuming several executive roles. In East-ern Europe, the former classification oflocal executive officers as civil servantshas acquired a particular relevance in thenew institutional context. In Germany, afull-time mayor is classified as a public-sector employee for the duration of hismandate; in most of the other countries,such status is only partial.

On the other hand, the situation for ordi-nary councilors –the members of the delib-erating assemblies– is generally speakingless satisfactory. The system of leave ofabsence, paid leave and compensation forloss of income that are thought necessaryfor exercising their mandate often providesinsufficient protection. The training ofelected officers is poorly organized, and thesystem for defining ineligibility and inappro-priate practices, aimed at preventing con-flicts of interest and improper use of certainpositions, falls short of acceptable stan-dards in many countries.

Despite all these reforms, one trouble-some fact continues to haunt the modernelectoral process: low voter turnout forlocal elections (Gabriel / Hoffmann-Mar-tinot: 1999). Declining voter participa-tion and stagnation in voter numbersreflect a worrying disaffection with poli-tics at large. This new iteration of a kindof voter torpor appears to be more aresponse to high-level politics at na tionallevel and perhaps the international lev-els, rather than a widespread unhappi-ness with local authorities. An exceptionmay be found in Eastern Europe wherelocal elections provoke dramaticallylower participation than national elec-tions, perhaps reflecting a general feelingthat local authorities don’t ha ve much ofa role to play. Only three countries arebucking the trend: Hungary, Ireland andSwitzerland. The United Kingdom is alsoseeing a rise in voter participation, albeitfrom a very low benchmark. In Spain thetrend in voter participation simply is notclear enough to cha racterize.


These developments have been accompa-nied by another notable change, increasedcitizen participation that alters traditionalpolitical dynamics. The most obvious formis the referendum, particularly the citizens’referendums initiated by popular demand.This is being increasingly provided for bythe law, though actual use of referendumsis still rare, except in Switzerland and tosome extent in Germany where they are atraditional institution.

This should be contrasted with the increas-ing importance given to infra-municipal enti-ties, which allow a representation and a par-ticipation of citizens at the closest possiblelevel to where they live. These entities areessentially to be found in countries withlarge municipalities. They are traditional inBulgaria, and in Portugal their role appearsto be growing, which in turn is giving rise tocriticism from council management view-point. They can be found in countries thathave undergone territorial re forms, butwith out a role in local administration; insuch instances they are in tended more tomaintain a representation to legitimize theamalgamations, such as parishes in Eng-land, communities in Wales and villages inPoland, Greece and Lithuania. These can becompared to the neighborhood institutionsin Spain. In the Nordic countries, manage-ment tasks are devolved upon infra-munici-pal institutions with corresponding forms ofsector-based citizen participation. In othercoun tries, neighborhood councils have beenset up, representing local residents; inFrance they are mandatory for cities with apopulation of more than 80,000, and areoptional for smaller municipalities. In Italy,neighborhood councils had some popularityin the 1970s, but have since declined.

In fact, it has often been thanks to sector-based procedures that progress has beenmade in citizen participation, particularlyin the fields of urban planning, environ-mental protection and quality-of-life pro-tection. Here local government has some-


In Eastern Europe

local elections

provoke

dramatically lower

participation than

national elections,

perhaps reflecting a

general feeling that

local authorities

don’t have much of

a role to play


times usefully turned to internationalinstruments and used them to raise publicawareness and mobilize campaigns. Thishappened with the Aarhus Convention,and more recently with the environmentalimpact study plans and programs follow-ing the European Community Directive of2001. The real impact of these procedureson public participatory processes is diffi-cult to assess. Particularly in light of thecircumstances and situations where non-compliance of procedures leads to theannulment of the decisions already taken,thus providing citizens with a more realis-tic appreciation of the room for participa-tory maneuver and its subsequent bearingon the decision-making process.

Progress in the area of citizens’ right toinformation should not be forgotten either.This does not just concern the publication oflocal public records. It also speaks to theright of access to administrative documents,which is an essential condition for trans-parency in local government. Europe hasSweden to thank for the widespread recog-nition of this principle. Although it has notbeen implemented in the systematic wayseen in Sweden, improved access to localgovernment data does give citizens, associ-ations and the media a more complete pic-ture of the workings of their administration.This is, of course, a prerequisite for effectiveparticipation and supervision by civil society.Over the past few years, several Central andEastern European countries have passedlegislation to im prove public access toadministrative do cu ments, most recentlyand particularly the Czech Republic and Slo-vak Republic. The United Kingdom alsorecently adopted such a law, The Freedomof Information Act.

One related development is the advent ofelectronic administration in all the Euro-pean countries. This trend is not restrictedto local authorities, and has severalaspects19. The most important relates tothe authorities’ intention to simplifyadministrative procedures. The de-mate-rialization of the public markets illustrates

the potential information technology hasfor improving administrative procedures.One factor inhibiting more computerizationof procedures is the need for increasedcomputer security to protect personaldata. In many cases this need for confi-dentiality prevents electronic productionand distribution of official notices and cer-tificates. With respect to local democracy,the Internet serves an educational functionby multiplying the sources of informationthat citizens can consult. Of course, it doesnot guarantee that relevant informationwill be made available to them for assess-ing local management or policies. Thatwould require regulations governing whatinformation should be made available tocitizens, as is the case in the United King-dom for performance indicators.

Restrictions, active and passive, still existin some countries on the voting rights ofpart of the population. For example,Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania restrict vot-ing by their Russian-speaking citizens.Such voter exclusion is difficult to squarewith the European Convention on HumanRights. Conversely, the Netherlands andSweden are extending voting rights to fo -reign residents (non-European Union na -tio nals), under certain conditions.

IV.3. Supervision

The supervision of local governments isusually exercised by the state, though infederal states this is usually done by thefederal members and in self-governingregions supervision is at least partially de -volved to the regions.

With regard to administrative controls, the -re is a general tendency to limit these tolegal checks on the lawfulness of actionsand procedures, at least as far as the own(or basic) powers and responsibilities oflocal authorities are concerned. However,one recourse is the “jurisdictionalization” ofsupervision. This trend is beneficial for localself-government. However, a closer consid-eration does reveal that in most of the

19. Chatillon, G. / Du

Marais, B. (dir.)

(2003), Electronic

administration at

the service of

citizens, Bruxelles,

Bruylant.

With regard to

administrative

controls, the re is

a general tendency

to limit these to

legal checks on the

lawfulness

of actions

and procedures, at

least as far as the

own powers and

responsibilities of

local authorities

are concerned

EUROPE160

states, the administrative authorities havethe power to first censure the act underdispute, after which the local authority maysubmit the case to the courts. The admin-istrative authority also has the power tosuspend any act it submits to the courts.Few countries limit the power of the super-visory authority to the submission of casesto the courts. In France, Hungary andSpain, the act under dispute remainsenforceable –subject to a few exceptions.In Italy however, the 2001 constitutionalreview led to the total removal of the legalchecks that had previously been carried outat the regional level, though not by theregion. There remains a power of substitu-tion (stepping in for the lower authority)that the government can exercise in caseswhere Italy’s international and EuropeanCommunity obligations in particular are atstake. The government also has the possi-bility of appointing an “extraordinary com-missioner” to resolve a problem on behalfof a local authority that has proved unableto do so. This procedure has been used toresolve problems related to water supplyand refuse disposal services in a few citiesin the south.

Regional authorities can also exercise cer-tain controls, as is the case for urban plan-ning and development in Italy and Spain,where they have the power of prior approvalof local council plans and can stipulate cer-tain amendments as a condition forapproval.

In some countries, the power of higherauthorities to dismiss or dissolve local bod-ies is only very rarely regulated by the law,and could lead to abuses. Such cases aresteadily decreasing under the influence ofthe Council of Europe and through monitor-ing of the implementation of the EuropeanCharter of Local Self-Government.

Controls on financial management can affectlocal self-government. While there has beena tendency to decrease the traditional auditsfor checking the lawfulness of accounts, thedevelopment of new management tech-

niques based on the accountability of staffand officials, and on per formance evaluationcan translate into heavier controls. Thesecontrols can be an even more sensitive issuegiven that the performance indicators andobjectives will have been defined in greaterdetail. When such controls are carried out bya higher authority, they are by their naturepotentially harmful to local self-government,no matter that the official aim is to improveeffectiveness.

The case of the United Kingdom (England) isexemplary on this. Recent developmentsthere have led to a reinforcement of theinspections carried out on local authorities,either directly through the audits effected bythe Audit Commission for Local Authorities,which can submit cases to the courts, orindirectly through procedures aimed at pro-moting better public sector management(Best Value Inspection, with the mission ofinspecting all services on this basis). If localauthorities, bound by the Local GovernmentAct 1999 to constantly improve their results,improve their performance and obtain thequalification of “best value authority,” theyare rewarded with a greater freedom ofaction, particularly in what use they canmake of the grants they receive. The BestValue Performance indicators are set by thevarious ministries when these are preparingthe annual budget. The Audit Commission(pursuant to the Audit Commission Act1998) must publish to that purpose a reporton its evaluation of the performances oflocal authorities, and classify these accord-ing to their performances into different cat-egories defined by the Secretary of State forCommunities and Local Government (pur-suant to the Local Government Act 2003, inparticular sections 99 and 100). The October2006 White Paper provides for reducing thenumber of indicators used in the evaluationsfrom 1,200 down to 200.

Increasingly worthy of note are the wide-spread forms of cooperation among variouslevels of government based on contractualarrangements. Such agreements are usedunder many different conditions for a va -


Increasingly

worthy of note are

the widespread

forms of

cooperation among

various levels of

government based

on contractual

arrangements


riety of purposes. These arrangements arefound in the various areas of shared po -wers and responsibilities, where coopera-tion creates interdependence. They areused in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,the Netherlands, Portugal, and Poland (seein particular the 1999 law on territorialdevelopment). They even appear inUkraine (see the adoption in 2005 of thelaw on regional development and the adop-tion in 2006 of its implementing provi-sions). In England the regional offices ofthe government have since 2004 beennegotiating “Local Area Agreements” withthe local authorities in order to implementsome 40 programs set by ten ministries.The October 2006 White Paper providesfor this to apply to all authorities, settingout a legal framework for these agree-ments that would make them mandatoryacross the country. This approach hasraised considerable interest, which isunderstandable because it sets an officialframework for negotiations, and facilitatesthe monitoring of how the mutual undertak-ings are ho no red. Developing cooperationbetween the various levels of governmentrepresents a step beyond the notion oflocal self-go vernment as somethingdefined in opposition to the state. Instead,it redefines it positively along the lines of ageneral participation by local authorities inthe different collective responsibilities thatthe public system must carry out. Thishighlights how relative the idea of localself-government is in modern states.

IV.4. The Impact of Decentralization andLocal Democracy on NationalPolicies

It is paradoxical that apathy toward localinstitutions, as reflected in the increasinglylow voter participation in local elections, ismanifesting itself at a time when the po -wers, tasks and independent decision-ma -king of local authorities have markedly in -creased in most countries. Again, evidencesuggests that generally speaking thisdevelopment cannot be blamed on thelocal institutions themselves.

There is also the phenomenon, well notedfor a long time now, by which the morenational policies depend for their imple-mentation on local authorities, the morethese are in a position to influence de facto

the national policies. Or they may causedistortions at the local level, forcing thenational government to anticipate thingsby, at least partly, taking into account thedemands of the local authorities. Thisphenomenon has often been studied, andwas illustrated a few years ago in Franceby a report of the Cour des Comptes

(national audit office) on the “city con-tracts.” The report showed how the con-tents of the contracts and their imple-mentation strayed from the prioritiesinitially set out by the government (Cour

des Comptes, 1992).

However, we should not extrapolate toomuch from this analysis, which onlyapplies to countries where the localauthorities, and in particular the mayors,have acquired sufficient political weight toreduce the scope of the methods of controlavailable to the government. In particular,there are no indications that similar obser-vations could be made about the localauthorities of Eastern Europe, despite theprogress made there.

Connections between national and local po -litics should not be overlooked. An ex tre mecase of intermingling is France, where thepractice of politicians being elected to sev-eral mandates exists. This has allowed somelocal issues to permeate debates in thenational parliament, but has also slowedthe renewal of the political scene by allow-ing elected officials to keep at least onemandate if defeated in election for another.This practice makes it difficult to introduceglobal reforms that would challenge thecollective interests of local representatives.The extensive reach of this system standsin contrast to the countries where radicalreforms have been carried out, such as theUnited Kingdom (particularly the reforms of1972 and 1996). The British system isfamous for the separation it maintains

There is also the

phenomenon, well

noted for a long

time now, by which

the more national

policies depend

for their

implementation on

local authorities,

the more these are

in a position to

influence de facto

the national

policies

EUROPE162

between national and local institutions, andbetween politicians of both levels.

In the other countries, although multiplemandates are usually excluded, at least atthe level of executive roles, the practicenonetheless appears in several countries indiluted or indirect forms. In Germany forexample, municipal or district councillorsmay also be elected as members of theregional parliaments (Landtag); the regionalparliaments do in fact play an important rolein local administration and finances.

The growing influence of national politicalparties in local elections –at least in coun-tries with a system of political parties withwell-established local presence– worksboth ways, but more in favor of centraliza-tion. Political loyalties do lead to a certainhomogeneity in the playing out of issues,even if local candidates for office try to putforward issues specific to their con-stituency or area. This has long beenobserved in the United Kingdom, espe-cially since the Labour party establisheditself at the local level. But for the samereasons, local elections are often consid-ered as a test for the government inpower, which means that national issuestend to predominate over local ones.

It is harder to assess the role local politicsplay in the careers of politicians. Even inFrance these days, national politicalcareers are more frequently consolidatedby a local mandate, a likelier option thangetting into parliament after havingbecome known as a mayor. In the othercountries, there are few examples of localpolitical leaders who went on to thenational level. At most, this applies to themayors of a few large cities.

IV.5. The Role of Local Government Associations

It can safely be stated that local govern-ment associations are playing a greaterrole in Europe, even though their impor-tance varies from country to country. One

of the goals of local self-government build-ing in Central and Eastern Europe was toestablish associations of local govern-ments capable of representing their collec-tive interests to central government. Theseassociations in the Western Europeancountries provided crucial support fortheir establishment.

The role of these associations in the Euro -pean countries can be evaluated by theirsta tus and by the work they carry out.

With respect to their status, legally theyare always associations governed by pri-vate law. Even so, they are increasinglybeing given official recognition, to a greateror lesser degree. In most countries there isjust one organization representing the localcouncils, or respectively the intermediatelevel local governments. This is the situa-tion in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, theNetherlands, Spain and Sweden where,since 2005, only one association has repre-sented the local and county councils. InAustria and Germany, certain differencesbetween cities and municipalities arereflected in the two different associationsthey have. Added to this is the associationrepresenting the districts (Landkreis). Aus-tria for its part is the only country wherethe role of the associations has been ensh -rined in the constitution: article 115.3 stip-ulates that the Austrian Federation of LocalCouncils and the Austrian Federation ofTowns are bound to represent the interestsof the local councils. A few other constitu-tions enshrine the right of local councils toform associations to represent their inter-ests (Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary). InFrance and Hungary there has been a def-inite increase in associations forming alongsectorial or partisan lines.

From the functional perspective, four cate-gories of associations can be distinguishedby what they do in practice. None of theseactivities is exclusive; on the contrary,most associations take over several jointly.However, the weight taken by one functioncompared with others allows distinctions


Local government

associations are

playing a greater

role in Europe, in

particular with

respect to the EU.

Four main

functions may be

distinguished in

their activities,

none of them being

exclusive


to be made among four categories of asso-ciations. The first is that of the associa-tions whose activities are essentially torepresent the collective interests of localgovernments to the central government,or to the regional authorities. These arefound particularly in Austria, Belgium,France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain,as well as most associations from the east-ern countries. The second category isassociations that have developed a role ofrepresenting the local authorities asemployers, and thus play a part in labourrelations with the local government’s staff;

it is these associations that sign the collec-tive agreements legally required for fixingthe employment terms of local personnel.This concerns the countries where theemployment of local government staff isgoverned by private law, in particular Den-mark, Norway, Sweden, the United King-dom, and more recently, Italy. This doesnot mean that the other associations arenot interested in such matters; they justdo not have any legal responsibilities forthe staff. Third, some associations havedeveloped a role as agents for consultancyand other services to the local govern-

EUROPE164

ments; these are often the same ones thatappear in the second category, thoughwith the addition of associations in Austria,Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Fin-land, and most of the Central and EasternEuropean countries. In the latter countriesthe associations receive support for thisfrom their counterparts in the WesternEuropean countries. The fourth category ischaracterized by the difficulty of distin-guishing the associations that representspecific interests from those that are legaltools for facilitating cooperation betweenseparate local councils in jointly carryingout shared work on specific tasks (Bul-garia, Estonia, Lithuania). This last cate-gory reflects some confusion, at the sametime obscuring distinctions that absolutelymust be clear if inter-municipal coopera-tion is to develop on a stable foundation.

We can expect that the growing interde-pendence of different tiers of government–financial as well as functional– will leadto the development of the role of localgovernment associations in all the coun-tries.

Moreover, local government associationsha ve been developing cooperation at theEuropean level since the 1950s. Today, theCouncil of European Municipalities andRegions (CEMR) is a non-governmentalumbrella organization for the national

associations of local and regional authori-ties of 35 European States. The mission ofthe CEMR is to promote a European Unionfounded on local self-government, and itlobbies to be permitted input on EuropeanCommunity legislation and EU policies. Itregularly publishes documents describingits position on EU initiatives or projects inprogress, for example on the Commis-sion’s Green Paper on energy efficiency(Fe bruary 15, 2006), on the urban contri-bution to growth and jobs in the regions(March 10, 2006), on the proposal for aregulation of the European Parliament onpublic passenger transport services by railand by road (April 2, 2006), on the role oflocal and regional governments in relationto migration (October 23, 2006), and onthe directive proposal establishing aframework for the protection of soil (April14, 2007). The CEMR is also the Europeanbranch of United Cities and Local Govern-ments. There are other European-levellocal authority associations, in particularEurocities, a network of 130 big Europeancities in 30 countries that has existed since1986, and whose aims and forms of actionare similar, though more from the point ofview of the big cities. These organizationscan find a support and a relay for theirproposals in the Committee of the Regionsof the European Union, though this institu-tion is not their only channel for makingrepresentations.


Today, the Council

of European

Municipalities and

Regions (CEMR)

is a

non-governmental

umbrella

organization for the

national

associations of

local and regional

authorities of 35

European States


V. Conclusion

This panoramic presentation of decentral-ization and local democracy in the Europeancountries has shown how local self-govern-ment has become the general rule, what-ever the diversity of institutions throughwhich it manifests itself. In this respect,there are greater similarities betweenstates at the local government level than atthe re gio nal level, which does not exist in allcountries in institutional form and displays agreat variety where it does.

However, similarities can be observed atthe level of values and tendencies, ratherthan between systems. The principles oflocal self-government at present in Europeform a corpus to which all states adhere.One seeks to rationalize territorial divi-sions and their scale to make them ade-quate to their functions. Local governmentresponsibilities can no longer be devisedwith regard to a local public interest, butmore and more to their participation in

EUROPE166

functions of overall national interest in aframework established by the law. Thedistance that existed formerly betweenEuropean countries, in broad termsbetween Northern and Southern Europe,is shrinking. This convergence can befound also in the spreading of contractualrelationships between government levels.The role of local go vernment hasincreased considerably, from the economicpoint of view, in the performance of majorcollective functions, as well as their auton-omy in it. But own re sources tend todecrease, although some countries are

excepted, if under these terms are meantthe resources of which local governmentsare entitled to vary the yield, at leastwithin some limits. From the institutionalpoint of view, the tendency to strongerpolitical leadership and the developmentof participation procedures can beobserved everywhere. In sum, Easternand Western Europe are becoming closer.

The major ground for these convergenceshas to be found, without any doubt, in thegrowing integration and interdependencebetween the various government levels,



whatever the differences in legal status.This is the consequence of the extension oflocal government functions and of correla-tive increase of their budgets. Local self-government is not the Asterix’ village; thisis a relative notion that has to be builtthrough a network of relations, resultingitself from the functions and powersassigned by the law.

By contrast, local government systemsare not converging. They further differ-entiate regarding the forms of regional-ization and the role of the intermediatelevel of local government. Countries withlarge municipal units further contrastwith countries with small municipal units.The understanding of central-local rela-tionships is still marked by historical fac-tors, reflected in local government func-tions. Only history can explain that insome countries a function is consideredlocal whereas in others it is considered asnational. Local finance systems aremarked by the structure of na tional taxsystems; it derives from this that the

financing of local government budgets beled by transfers and tax shares or by owntax revenues. Local institutions furtherdifferentiate markedly between countrieswith traditions of representative de mo -cra cy and countries with participativetraditions. In Central and EasternEurope, and even more in South-EastEurope, the burden of the transition isstill there; local government is indeed onlyone piece in the state-building process.Nevertheless, differences do not impedecooperation or ex changes of experience.

Lastly, if decentralization contributes tothe development of political democracy,it would be an illusion to think that theconfidence crisis reflected in the lowerrates of participation in local electionsbe solved by decentralizing more. Localgovernment is part of a whole. Localgovernment may suffer a loss of senseof politics at the national level that can-not be ascribed to it. But it can demon-strate that it can contribute to give itsense again.

LATIN AMERIC A

MARIO ROSALES

SALVADOR VALENCIA CARMONA*

LATIN AMERICA170 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

* In developing this study, the support, information and suggestions kindly

provided by Edgardo Bilsky of CGLU, Iván Finot of CEPAL and Néstor Vega of

FLACMA have been extremely important. The authors wish to acknowledge

their contribution and express their gratitude. Nevertheless, the authors are

entirely responsible for all statements and data.

LATIN AMERICADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 171

I. Introduction

Latin America is made up of a large group ofcountries located in the territory ex tendingfrom Mexico’s Río Bravo in the north toTierra del Fuego at the southernmost tip ofSouth America. Latin America for the pur-poses of this report is divided into four sub-regions: Mesoamerica, in clu ding Mexico andthe Central American nations of Belize,Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hon du ras,Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador; theAntilles with Cuba and the Do minicanRepublic1; South America, which comprisesthe An dean countries of Bo li via, Colombia,Ecua dor, Peru, and República Bolivariana deVenezuela; and the Southern Cone, whichen compasses Ar gentina, Brazil, Ch ile,Pa ra guay and Uruguay.

An estimated 540 million people live in La tinAmerica. Predominant cultures in cludethose embodied by descendants of NativeAmericans, Spanish and Portuguese colo-nizers, African slaves and successive wa -ves of European immigrants du ring thepast two centuries. It is the most urban -ized of the developing re gions. Althoughlevels of urbanization va ry between 93%in República Bolivariana de Venezuela and42% in Haiti (see Table 1), an estimated77.8% of all Latin Americans live in cities.

Latin American countries present very dif-ferent degrees of development. While theaverage regional GDP is $4,044 (CE PAL,2005), it is a continent with great inequal-ity in the distribution of wealth. Almost40% of the population lives below the po -

verty line. The inequality has an unfavor-able impact on the advance of democracyand full exercise of citizenship (HumanDevelopment Report, UNDP, 2005).

The forms of states are diverse as wouldbe expected in a vast area containing 100states or provinces in federal countries,250 regions or departments, and morethan 16,000 local governments —munici-palities, districts or cantons— across thesubcontinent. Several countries, includingBrazil, Mexico, Argentina and RepúblicaBolivariana de Venezuela, have adopted afederal system with at least two levels ofsub-national government. The othercountries have unitary state sys tems.

In Latin America, the presidential regimeis the most prevalent form of gover-nance, with a clear predominance of thena tio nal executive over other state po -wers. From 1980 onward, the authori ta -rian re gi mes that dominated the area forgene ra tions have slowly given way to de -mo cratic governments that foster po pularelection of local authorities.

A few Latin American countries did havedemocratically elected local governmentsbefore 1980, and now all of the nationshave municipal governments elected byuniversal suffrage (see Table 2). Themajority of the countries are demo -cratizing and reforming their statesthrough institutional, political and legaltransformations, of which decentraliza-tion2 and strengthening of sub-nationalgo vernments are part3.

In Latin America,

the presidential

regime is the most

prevalent form

of governance,

with a clear

predominance

of the national

executive over

other state powers

1. The English-speaking countries (Antigua, Barbados, Granada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago) are not included in this study.

Nor is Puerto Rico or the overseas territories of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Only brief mention will be made of

Haiti.

2. The notion of decentralization is broadly understood as the process of transfer of power and functions from the central state to the

intermediate and local levels of government and administration. We make a distinction between political decentralization or devolution

—with the transfer of responsibilities and resources in the framework of local autonomy— and administrative decentralization or

“deconcentration,” which refers only to the transfer of functions and resources without autonomy. Both processes are accompanied by

varying degrees of fiscal decentralization, i.e., the capacity to establish, collect and administer financial resources, to fulfill functions and

provide services. Complex forms arise from the various combinations of these three processes.

3. Valadés, Diego and Serna, José María, 2000; Carbonell, Miguel 2004; Fix, Héctor and Valencia, Salvador, 2005.

LATIN AMERICA172 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Table 1 Development Indicators in Latin America

Country Type of state GDP per GDP per inhabitant IHD ranking % population % urbaninhabitant PPP 2006 * below poverty population in $ US in $ US line 2005

Argentina Federal 4.747 13.298 36 26.0 91,8

Bolivia Unitary 990 2.720 115 63,9 64,2

Brazil Federal 4.250 8.195 69 36,3 83,4

Chile Unitary 7.085 10.874 38 18,7 86,6

Colombia Unitary 2.663 7.256 70 46,8 76,6

Costa Rica Unitary 4.632 9.481 48 21,1 62,6

Cuba Unitary 2.797 ------ 50 --- 76,1

Ecuador Unitary 2.761 3.963 83 48,3 62,8

El Salvador Unitary 2.469 5.041 101 47,5 57,8

Guatemala Unitary 2.492 4.313 118 60,2 50,0

Haití Unitary 454 1.892 154 --- 41,8

Honduras Unitary 1.139 2.876 117 74,8 47,9

Mexico Federal 7.239 9.803 53 35,5 76,5

Nicaragua Unitary 896 3.634 112 69,3 56,9

Panama Unitary 4.797 7.278 58 33.0 65,8

Paraguay Unitary 1.201 4.813 91 60,5 58,4

Peru Unitary 2.841 5.678 82 51,1 72,6

Dominican Rep. Unitary 3.815 7.449 94 47,5 65,6

Uruguay Unitary 4.860 9.421 43 18,8 91,9

Venezuela, R. B. Federal 5.275 6.043 72 37,1 92,8

Latin America 4.471 39,8 77,8

Source: CEPAL, 2006; United Nations Development Report, 2006. * Index of Human Development: High is from 1 to 63; Medium is from 64 to 146; Low is from 147 to 177.


Nevertheless, the depth of the reformsand their impact differ from one countryto another. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—the three biggest nations in the re -gion— have chosen federalism; in the uni -tary countries, the role of the municipa litieshas been expanded, and intermediate go -vernments have been organized in the re -gions and comparable departments.

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombiaand Ecuador have redistributed functionsand resources in favor of sub-nationalgovernments.4 In Peru, the process of de -ce ntralization that began in the 1980swas reversed in the 1990s, and restartedafter 2000. In República Bolivariana deVenezuela, the decentralization of the1990s has, in recent years, been muddledby contradictory reforms that could affectthe nature of local institutions. InUruguay and Paraguay, decentralization isstill in the early stages.

Mexico has moved forward with a “newfederalism,” through the opening of thepo litical system and democratic alterna-tion. Legal and financial reforms favor sub- national governments; progress is slo werat the municipal level.

The Central American countries are evolvingto a lesser extent. Guatemala and Ni caraguaare passing decentralization laws. Hondurasand El Salvador are increasing the amountof money transferred to the municipalities.Costa Rica and Panama are progressingcom paratively slowly: in Costa Rica, the po -pular election of mayors was introduced onlyin 2002; in Panama, de centralization isbeing raised to a constitutional level.

For the past ten years, decentralization in theDominican Republic has been on the pu blicagenda, and there has been a gradualincrease of municipal resources as well asenactment of new legislation favoring themunicipal regime. Cuba remains centralized,and Haiti, though still facing severe problemsat all levels of government, recently held itsfirst local elections in several years.

II. Evolution of Local Governments

Tension between centralization and decen-tralization existed in the region long beforethe emergence of the nation states. Thecolonial era saw only the centralism of theSpanish and Portuguese Crowns. Decen-tralization first appeared during the warsfor independence and in the time of theCabildos Abiertos (People’s Councils).Struggles to preserve the colonial systemor to discard it have flared periodicallythroughout the region ever since.

During the 19th Century, wars and conflictstook place in the nascent Latin Americannations setting federal tendencies againstunitary ones. Throughout the 20th Century,many emerging nations opted for politicaland economic centralization, to the detri-ment of the intermediate and mu nicipal or -ganizations. After the Second World War,national planning and new policies toreplace imports coveted by the pro-de -velopment sectors, reinforced cen tra lizingtendencies. The tide of centralization beganto change in the 1970s as a consequence ofsuccessive economic and political crises.

II.1. Decentralization Cycles

During the 1980s and 1990s, the demo-cratic transition saw state reforms andde centralization. The centralist modelwas deemed outmoded and inefficient asa way to liberalize economies and reducestate costs. It is customary to distinguishbetween two decentralizing cycles: onemo re economic and neo-liberal, the otherwith greater emphasis on social and de -mo cratic aspects5.

The first decentralizing cycle developed fromthe 1980s in a context of debt crisis andhigh inflation. One of its avowed goals wasto reduce the size of the central administra-tion in order to eliminate the fiscal deficitand drive the market. The economies madestrong structural adjustments, delivery ofservices was transferred to the sub-national

During the 19th

Century, wars and

conflicts took place

in the nascent Latin

American nations

setting federal

tendencies against

unitary ones

4. The concept of

sub-national

governments refers

both to state or

intermediate

governments and

municipalities, also

known as local

governments.

5. Finot, Ivan, 2001

and Wiesner,

Eduardo 2003.

LATIN AMERICA174

governments or privatized by passingresponsibility to privately held or state com-panies. Results were mixed at best.Although this first policy cycle did not pro-duce the hoped-for results, it did cause seri-ous social, economic and political problems.

The second decentralization cycle took place atthe end of the 1990s, in the midst of the finan-cial and social crises that affected countries

such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,Mexico, Peru and República Bolivariana deVenezuela. It in volved strategies to correct theneo-liberal paradigm with more democraticand social policies. The decentralization move-ment was stimulated by the progress of mu ni -ci pal management of the region.6

Predictably, these great cycles translatedi ffe rently in each sub-region of Latin


6. New paradigms for

local government

management come

to light, as in the

cases of Curitiba or

Porto Alegre, in

Brazil; Villa El

Salvador, in Peru;

Bogota, in Colombia;

Cotacachi and

Guayaquil, in

Ecuador; Santiago

de Chile; Mérida, San

Pedro Garza García

or San Nicolás de los

Garza, in México;

Rafaela in Argentina;

or La Paz in Bolivia,

among many others.

7. Sub-national

expenditures used as

indicators for

decentralization are

limited in nature,

given that they

usually aggregate

municipal and

federal level

expenditures. For

example, a higher

level of expenditure

in the provinces in

Argentina does not

represent more

municipal

expenditure.

Figure 1 1980-2005: Evolution of Decentralization in Latin America7

Percentage of the Expenditure of Sub-national Governments in Total Governmental Expenditure

Brazil 2002 42.1

Brazil 1980 32.4 Argentina 2004 41.6

Colombia 1982 26.3 Mexico 2000 31.9

Argentina 1980 22.2 Colombia 2005 29.8

Mexico 1980 22.0 Bolivia 2005 29.5

Ecuador 1980 18.3 Peru 2005 26.8

Bolivia 1986 14.8 Ecuador 2004 22.1

Latin American average 11.6 Latin American average 18.8

Peru 1990 9.1 Chile 2005 15.0

Uruguay 1980 8.6 Uruguay 2005 13.2

El Salvador 19 78 5.8 Guatemala 1997 13.0

Paraguay 1980 5.5 El Salvador 2005 8.7

Guatemala 1980 4.5 Paraguay 2005 7.0

Costa Rica 1980 4.0 Dominican Rep 2004 7.0

Chile 1980 3.7 Costa Rica 2005 6.0

Dominican Rep. 1980 3.5 Nicaragua 2002 3.8

Nicaragua 1988 3.4 Panama 2002 3.8

Panama 1980 2.0

Source: UCLG Country Profiles (2007), National Files.

Drawn up by: Mero.


Ame rica (see figure 1). The federal coun-tries mainly strengthened the intermediatelev els of government and, after these, themunicipalities.

Brazil is one of the most decentralizedcoun tries in the region8. It is based on a fe -deral tradition that goes back to the birth ofthe republic at the end of the 19th century.The main attempts to reduce federalism tothe advantage of the central state occurredunder the presidency of Getúlio Vargas(1937-1945) and during the military go -vern ments (1964-1985). With the end ofthis last authoritarian period, decentraliza-tion was pushed forward in order to resolvethe state crisis. Thus, the 1988 Constitu-tion defined Brazil as an “indissoluble unionof states and municipalities and the federaldis trict.” Autonomies were strengthenedand local responsibilities and powers werein creased. The municipalities received fe -deral entity status and were granted fullautonomy by the Federal Constitution. In1993, hyper-inflation and state indebted-ness pushed the national government tofiscal recentralization, and to reorganizingand privatizing the states’ banks and pub-lic services. In 2003, the go vernment ofLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva promoted greaterdialog and coordination between the fed-eral level and the municipalitiesthrough the Se cretariat for Federal Mat-ters. The Ministry for Cities was also cre-ated to establish a national urban devel-opment policy that would guarantee the“right to the city,” relying on the munici-palities to carry out policies to redistributeincome and social pro grammes like “ZeroHunger.” In March 2003, during the VIMarch in Defence of the Municipalities, thefe deral government and municipal entitiessigned a protocol for the creation of theCom mittee of Federal Articulation —CAF.This committee became the main instru-ment for negotiations between the FederalUnion and the municipalities, helping tofur ther advance municipal interests inBrazil in matters such as teacher salaries,school transport, and fiscal and pensionreform.

In Argentina, there was an historical andtroubled relationship between the federalgovernment and the provinces. The Con-stitution of 1853 attempted to regulatethis relationship by transferring support forthe municipal government to theprovinces. Af ter the military governments(1976-1983), the already centralized divi-sion of powers and resources wasreviewed. In the ensuing decade, thenational government and the provincesredefined the rules of fi nancing throughco-participation which increased transfersin exchange for a de crea se in local tax rev-enues and the privatization of services.The constitutional re form of 1994 took upessential aspects of fiscal co-participationbetween the central government and theprovinces. Thus, mu nicipal autonomy wasrecognized and the city of Buenos Aires,capital of the coun try, was granted anautonomous local go vern ment. However, itwas still within the pro vin ces’ power todefine the municipal re gime, allowinggreat diversity among them.9

Mexico, throughout the 20th Century, livedthrough a process of expansion andenlargement at the central level, in accordwith provisions of the 1917 Constitution.The national government absorbed localresponsibilities and their sources ofincome, to the detriment of the sub-national governments. As recently as 1977,1983 and 1999, constitutional reformsfavored municipalities, particularly in orderto introduce party pluralism into the coun-cils, and to strengthen the treasury andlocal public services. During the 1990s, thenational government undertook policies tofavor sub-national bodies through a “newfederalism.” In turn, pluralism and politicalalternation facilitated local reactivation. In1994, the statute of the Government of theFederal District of Mexico City wasapproved, and three years later its Head ofGovernment was elected by popular vote.Mexican municipalities were organized bythe states, but continued to depend on thenational government. However, innovativechanges were taking place in many munic-

8. With over 40% of

public expenditure

delegated to states

and municipalities,

Brazil has the most

equitable distribution

of resources between

the two levels of the

state in the region.

9. Many provinces

usually restrict the

local autonomy of

small municipalities.

For example, in the

province of Santiago

del Estero only five

out of 126

municipalities enjoy

full autonomy.

Brazil is one of the

most decentralized

coun tries in the

region. It is based

on a fe deral

tradition that goes

back to the birth

of the republic

at the end of the

19th century

LATIN AMERICA176

ipalities, which were demonstrating mod-ernization in local management.

Although República Bolivariana de Venezuelaofficially has a federal system, it is a stronglycentralized country, heightened by the modelof sustained development in financingpublic expenditure through the distributionof oil income. In 1989, the Ley Orgánica de

Descentralización, Delimitación y Transfer-

encias del Po der Público (Decentralization,Delimitation and Transfers of Public PowerAct) drove the decentralization process, ofwhich the first achievement was thedirect election of mayors and governors.The process ground to a halt in the secondhalf of the decade. In 1999 the BolivarianConstitution seemed to re-launch theprocess, but subordinated municipalautonomy to the Ley Orgánica del Poder

Público Municipal (Organic Law of Munici-pal Public Power) and its fiscal responsibil-ities to a Ley Na cional (National Law) in2005. The tension between centralism andlocal autonomy increased with the Ley de

los Consejos Comunales (CommunityCouncils Act of 2006), which set up a net-work of local organizations directly con-nected to the presidency in order to chan-nel local financing. At the start of 2007,the Ley de Habilitación Legislativa (EnablingAct) was passed, authorizing the nationalgovernment to regulate the provincialstates and municipalities.

In the unitary countries, the debateabout decentralization focused on the re -lation ship between the national govern-ment and the municipalities. The processadvanced more slow ly at the intermedi-ate level which, in fact, worked in tan-dem with the national level. In themajority of South American and CentralAmerican countries, in termediate admin-istrations depend on the central powerand are the responsibility of an officialappointed by the latter. Despite this,there is a growing tendency toward thepopular election of intermediate authori-ties, as already occurs in Colombia, Peru,Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay.

Decentralization in the Andean countrieshas taken place through far-reaching con-stitutional and legislative reforms, in a rel-atively brief time.

In Colombia, after the extreme centraliza-tion of the 1960s and 1970s, and the politi-cal crisis expressed in the civil strikes of the1970s and early 1980s, a clear decentraliz-ing process be gan in the middle of the1990s. The 1991 Constitution laid the basesfor a unitary and decentralized territorialgovernment, with autonomy of the territo-rial bodies: departments, municipalities anddistricts. Moreover, indigenous territories,regions and provinces were created toregroup bor dering departments and mu -nicipalities. Direct election of mayors(1986) and of de partmental governorswas thus established by 1992. Throughoutthe 1990s, abundant legislation waspassed regulating different aspects oflocal ma nagement, such as the mecha-nisms of transfer and participation, dis -tribution of res pon si bi li ties and territorialorganization. By the end of the 1990s, prob-lems of indebtedness and the economic cri-sis made it necessary to review the transfersystem and impose a regime of aus terity onsub-national government spen ding, alongwith a redistribution of competences.

Bolivia implemented an original decentral-izing process that recognized its multi-eth-nic and multicultural character by streng -thening two levels of sub-nationalgovernment: the municipalities and thedepartments. After many election-free de -cades, in 1987 municipal elections wereheld. In 1994, the Ley de Participación Po -

pu lar (Popular Participation Act) waspassed, strengthening the municipalitiespo litically and financially and strongly pro-moting the participation of grassrootscom munities. In 1995, the Ley de Descen-

tralización Administrativa (AdministrativeDe centralization Act) benefited the depart-ments at the intermediate level, grantingthem elected assemblies. In 1999, the newLey de Municipalidades (Municipalities Act)was passed. The departmental prefect was

Decentralization

in the Andean

countries has

taken place

through

far-reaching

constitutional

and legislative

reforms,

in a relatively

brief time



initially appointed by the national govern-ment, but in 2006 he was elected by popu-lar vote. In that year, after a prolongedsocial and political crisis, Evo Morales’ go -vernment took power and convoked a newConstituent Assembly, in which questionspertaining to the regions, municipalities andindigenous communities took priority. Therichest departments, in particular those inthe east, demanded greater autonomy.

In Ecuador, mired in a deep political and so cialcrisis that led to the fall of various presidentsand the dollarization of the economy, the 1998Constitution ratified the decentralization, de-concentration and participation pres cribed byprevious laws. La Ley de Juntas Parroquiales

(Pa rish Councils Act) of year 2000, the De -centralization Plan and the re gu lation of theLey de Descentralización y Pa rticipación Social

de 1997 (De cen tra li za tion and Social Partici-pation Act of 1997) in 2001, as well as thereforms to the Ley del Ré gi men Municipal

(Municipal Go vernment Act) of 2004 furthermandated im pro ve ments in services and theobligation to trans fer responsibilities. Twomain le vels of autonomous government wererecognized: provinces and can tons (munici-palities). How ever, the provincial level waslimited by its scanty res ponsibilities andresources, and by the coexistence of twoauthorities: a po pu larly elected Prefect and agovernor appoin ted by the central go -vernment. In small municipalities, ma yors andcouncil pre sidents had been elec ted since1935; since 1988 all mayors have been dem-ocratically elected.

In Peru, the Constitutional Reform ofMarch 2002 placed emphasis on the cre-ation of regional governments, effectivelyrestarting decentralization plans that hadbeen blocked under the authoritarian gov-ernment of Alberto Fujimori. That sameyear the Ley de Bases de la Descentral-

ización (Bases for Decentralization Act)was passed, followed in the period from2002 to 2005 by various rulings, includingthe Ley de Gobiernos Regionales (RegionalGo vern ments Act), a new Ley Orgánica de

Municipalidades (Municipalities Act), the

Ley de Descentralización Fiscal (Fiscal De -cen tralization Act) and the Ley Marco de

Presupuestos Participativos (Frameworkfor Participatory Budgets Act). In Novem-ber 2006, regional governors were electedfor the first time by popular vote. Peru nowhas several levels of government:national, regional, as well as distinct levelsfor both provincial municipalities (cities)and district municipalities.

The unitary states of the Southern Cone–Chi le, Uruguay and Paraguay – have alsoca rried out reforms shaped by theirrespective characteristics.

Chile has been a centralized country sincethe middle of the 19th Century. However, in1891 following a brief civil war, the Ley de

la Comuna Autónoma (Autonomous Com-munity Act) was passed, and it was veryadvanced for the time. Nevertheless, theruling did not work and the Constitution of1925 recentralized the country. During the1980s, the military regime applied anadministrative decentralization that handedover to the municipalities the administra-tion of primary health care, primary andsecondary education, and the managementof social funds. With the return of democ-racy in 1990, the country moved toward amore political decentralization with thedirect election of mayors and town council-lors in 1992. In 1993, 13 regional govern-ments were created, although intendentes

(mayors) were appointed by the nationalgovernment. In later years, new responsi-bilities, tasks and resources were allocatedto the municipalities by reforms to the Ley

Orgánica Municipal (Organic Municipal Law)of 1999-2000.

In Uruguay, local government is identifiedat the departmental level, which includesvarious centers of population, and pos-sesses an extension and population farabove the average for Latin Americanmunicipalities (table 2). After the return todemocracy in 1985, the constitutionalreform of 1996 for the first time confirmedthe obligation of the state to formulate

The unitary states

of the Southern

Cone –Chi le,

Uruguay and

Paraguay – have

also ca rried out

reforms shaped by

their respective

characteristics

LATIN AMERICA178

decentralizing policies in order to “promoteregional development and social wellbeing.” It was set down that departmentalelections should be held on a different datefrom the national elections. Now the ten-dency is to dissociate the local level –Jun-

tas locales (Local Councils)– from the de -partmental, although no legislation hasbeen passed to this effect. The 19 depart-mental intendentes (chief exe cutives) havebeen directly elected since 196610.

In Paraguay, after 35 years of dictatorship(1954-1989), the first elections for munici-pal intendentes were held in 1991, and thefirst elections of departmental governorsand councils in 1992. The constitution of1992 recognized the political autonomy ofmunicipalities in handling their affairs, col-lecting taxes and managing their expendi-ture. The autonomy of the departmentswas far more limited. In 2000, the NationalCouncil for Decentralization of the Statewas set up. However, despite the new con-stitutional framework for democratization,the municipal code has not yet beenreformed, and national officials in concertwith the legislature continue to exercisestrong control over the municipalities.

The Central American countries havepassed decentralizing laws, and their mainchallenge now is to implement them. Aboveall, they need to broaden the scant finan-cial capability of the municipalities.

In Costa Rica, the reform of the MunicipalCode (1998) allowed direct election of ma -yors for the first time in 2002. It alsoapproved, through the constitutional re formof 2001, a gradual increase in res ponsi -bilities and transfers to the mu nicipalities,rising to 10% of the national budget. How-ever, strong resistance has arisen and thereis not yet any legislation to achieve itsimplementation.

El Salvador made a concerted effort to drawup its National Strategy for Local De ve lop -ment, with strategic guidelines for decentral-ization to be implemented during the period

1999-2004. A law was passed in 1998 toincrease financial transfers to the municipali-ties (revised in 2005), and recent reformshave been made to the Municipal Co de(2005). A new General Decentralization Act isnow in discussion in the Par liament and a CivilService law was approved.

In Guatemala, the Ley General de

Descentralización (General Decentraliza-tion Act) was enacted through Decree 14-2002. In 2002, the new Municipal Codeand Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo

Urbano y Rural (Councils for Urban andRural Development Act) also came intoforce in 2002; the Ley del Catastro (LandRegistry Act) (2005) was enacted; thePolítica Nacional de Descentralización del

Organismo Ejecutivo (National Policy ofDecentralization of the Executive Organ-ism) was passed in 2005.

In Honduras, the National Plan for Decen-tralization and Municipal Development waspassed in 1994, the Executive Commissionfor Decentralization was established andthe Plan of Action 1995-1998 was drawnup, though it was not put into effect. Thetopic was taken up again in 2000 andlinked to the eradication of poverty. In2003, a new Ley de Ordenamiento Territo-

rial (Decentralized Spatial Planning Act)was issued. Then in 2004 the Ley de

Descentralización del Servicio de Agua

(Decentralization of the Water Service Act)was issued. Other reforms to the Ley de

Municipalidades (Municipalities Act) areunderway.

In Nicaragua, the constitutional reforms ofthe beginning of the 1990s strengthenedthe power and self-financing of the munic-ipalities, and reaffirmed the autonomy ofthe two regions created in 1987 alongNicaragua’s Atlantic Coast. In 2003, adecentralization policy was defined as thecrux of the Estrategia Reforzada de Com-

bate y Eradicación de la Pobreza (ERCERP)(Reinforced Strategy to Combat and Erad-icate Poverty). Between 2002 and 2004,the Ley de Régimen de Presupuesto Mu -


10. The term

intendente was

coined during the

colonial reforms of

the 17th Century.

Such officials

displaced the

greater mayors. In

Uruguay the

intendentes are in

charge of the

departments,

assisted by a

council of

aldermen, to the

detriment of local

bodies.


nicipal (Municipal Budget Regime Act), theLey de Participación Ciudadana (Civic Par-ticipation Act) and the Leyes de Transfer-

encias Financieras y de Solvencia Fiscal

Municipal (Financial Transfers and Munici-pal Fiscal Solvency Acts) were passed.

In Panama, decentralization of the statewas included in the constitution through theconstitutional reform of 2004 and a newlegal framework was developed forprovinces, town councils and corregimien-

tos (ma yoral jurisdictions)11.

In the Spanish-speaking Caribbean,authorities at the provincial level in theDominican Republic are appointed by thecentral government. The town council isthe only elected level of local government.Among recent reforms, mention should bemade of the division of the National Districtinto various municipalities in 2001, and thelaw of 2003 that made it possible toincrease transfers to the municipalities.The convocation of a Constituent Assemblyin 2007 is being contemplated; among itsprerogatives would be the deepening of thedecentralization process. The new Law ofthe Participatory Budget has been enactedand a Municipal Bill is under debate.

In Cuba, the Constitution in force since themid 1970s recognizes the legal status of14 provinces and 169 municipalities. Theyare administered as representative institu-tions whose leaders are elected in the Pop-ular Power Assemblies with their own elec-toral division. These are governedaccording to the principles of “socialistdemocracy,” have very limited autonomy,and generally defer to higher levels of gov-ernment.

II.2. Municipalities, Cities and Metropolitan Areas

The sub-national administrations and go -vern ments of Latin America are extremelyheterogeneous. Among the intermediatelevels of government —states, provinces

or departments —some, such as São Pauloand Buenos Aires, possess populations andproductive capacities surpassing those ofmany nations; many others are small andhave quite limited resources.

Nearly 90% of the 16,000 Latin Americanmunicipalities have fewer than 50,000 in -ha bitants. Some administer broad terri -tories, some are meager in size. The ma -jority have to deal with considerablefi nan cial difficulties, and restrictions onhu man technical re sour ces.

Where local autonomy is a goal, legislationin many countries sets minimum require-ments for a municipality: population andterritory of reasonable size, and sufficienteconomic, social and political capacities toensure adequate institutional consistency.As a practical matter, many municipalitiesare nevertheless established without theseminimum requirements, giving rise towhat is often referred to as municipalfrag mentation. Such inconsistencies oftengenerate problems in the delivery ofmunicipal services and in coordinationbetween the intermediate and national go -vern men tal authorities.

Sometimes called the “atomization” of mu -nicipalities, fragmentation is to somedegree endemic throughout Latin America.Consider: In Brazil, out of a total of 5,562municipalities, 1,485 were createdbetween 1990 and 2001. This gave rise toa constitutional amendment –the 15/96–to specify the requisites for creatingmunicipal corporations. Mexico now has2,438 municipalities, and it may cause lit-tle surprise that in many of its statesmunicipal fragmentation is the norm12.

Fragmentation has also been observed insome unitary countries, especially thosewith numerous municipalities. Colombia,for example has 1,099 municipalities, Perumore than 2,000 provincial and districtmunicipalities. In Bolivia, the 1994 Law ofPopular Participation created 198 new mu -nicipalities, bringing the total to 327.

11. The corregimientos

are elected sub-

municipal entities.

In effect, the

Panamanian

Constitution

decrees that there

must be a municipal

council in every

district, and this

council must

include

representatives of

the corregimiento

who have been

elected in this

electoral division.

12. In Oaxaca there are

570 municipalities;

217 in Puebla; 212

in Veracruz and 124

in the State of

Mexico.

LATIN AMERICA180

More than half of the population of LatinAmerica dwells in cities with more than amillion inhabitants. No fewer than 50 LatinAmerican cities have populations of a mil-lion or more; of these, four rank among theten largest cities on earth: São Paulo (17.8million), Mexico City (16.7 million), BuenosAires (12.6 million) and Rio de Janeiro (10.6million). Three other cities, Bogotá, Limaand Santiago de Chile, have populations in

excess of 5 million; the 3 million mark hasbeen surpassed in Brazil by Belo Horizonte,Salvador de Bahía, Fortaleza, Porto Alegreand Recife; Caracas in República Bolivarianade Venezuela, Santo Do mingo in theDominican Republic, and Monterrey andGuadalajara in Mexico also have passed thispo pulation milestone. Many more cities inLatin America are of intermediate size–between 100,000 and one million inhabi-


Table 2 Number of Sub-National Governments and Population

Population Federal countries Unitary countries Democratic

Country (milions) Average States Municipalities Departments Municipalities municipal population per elections following municipality authoritarian rule

Brazil 190.127 34.183 26 5.562 1986

Mexico 107.537 44.091 32 2.439 1977

Colombia 47.078 42.837 32 1.099 1986

Argentina 38.971 17.531 23 2.223 1983

Peru 28.349 13.695 25 2.070 1981

Venezuela, R. B. 27.031 80.690 24 335 1992

Chile 16.436 47.641 15 345 1992

Ecuador 13.408 61.224 22 219 1935

Guatemala 13.018 39.211 22 332 1986

Cuba 11.400 67.456 14 169 ----

Bolivia 9.627 29.440 9 327 1987

Dominican Rep. 9.240 60.789 32 152 1978

Honduras 7.518 25.228 18 298 1982

El Salvador 6.991 26.683 14 262 1984

Paraguay 6.365 27.554 17 231 1991

Nicaragua 5.594 36.803 15 + 2 regional 152 1990

autonomies

Costa Rica 4.399 54.309 7 81 1948

Panama 3.284 43.787 9 75 1996

Uruguay 3.478 183.053 19 1985

Total 549.851 33.548 105 10.559 251 5.831

Sources: CEPAL 2005. UCLG Country Profiles (2007). Drawn up by authors.


tants– and generate significant demo-graphic and economic dynamism.

The great size of most big cities in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean means thatthey typically encompass many municipalterritories and, in some cases, an entirestate or province. Mexico City and its Met-ropolitan Area, as defined in 1995,envelops more than 41 municipalities intwo states, as well as the Federal District.Buenos Aires covers the territory of theautonomous City of Buenos Aires plus thatof 32 municipalities in the province ofBuenos Aires; Gran Santiago (GreaterSantiago, Chile) takes in 52 municipalities,and São Paulo in Brazil has 39 prefeituras

(prefectures).

Territorial administration and managementof the big cities poses a major problem.While various Latin American capital citieshave special regimes, such as Bogotá,Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Mexico Cityand Quito, few have a metropolitan gov-ernment that allows them to manage theurban territory in an integrated manner.Among this latter type are the MetropolitanMunicipality of Lima13, with a specialregime that grants it the faculties and func-tions of Regional Government within thejurisdiction of the Province of Lima; theMetropolitan District of Quito, created bylaw in 1993, and the Metropolitan Districtof Caracas, created in 200014. In Montev-ideo, the national government has recently

created a Metropolitan Consortium, whichencompasses the municipal councils of thedepartments of Canelones, Montevideo andSan José, with, altogether, 2,000,000 inha -bitants. In most metropolitan areas onlyme chanisms for sectoral coordination of li - mited scope are in operation15.

In Central America, some coordinatingins titutions also function: the Corpora-tion of the Metropolitan Area of San Sal-vador (COAMSS) and in Costa Rica theMe tropo litan Federation of Municipalitiesof San José (FEMETROM) whose aims arelimited to spatial planning and land use-management.

Given the level of urban and territorialcomplexity, various countries are tryingpolicies to realign land use. Others, suchas Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,Ecuador and a few other Central Americancountries, are promoting the creation ofmancomunidades (associated municipali-ties) and other associative forms to helpsolve the problem of the small size ofmany municipalities, which is limiting theircapacity to respond effectively to thedemands of their communities and citi-zens.

More than 70 municipal mancomunidades

have been set up to develop and provideservices in Bolivia. In Argentina, thereare 72 inter-municipal bodies whichgroup 770 local governments of 22

While various Latin

American capital

cities have special

regimes, such as

Bogotá, Buenos

Aires, Caracas,

Lima, Mexico City

and Quito, few have

a metropolitan

government that

allows them to

manage the urban

territory in an

integrated manner

13. The Metropolitan Region of Lima is created by Artícle 33 of Law Nº 27783, on Bases for Decentralization. Artícle 65 and following of

Organic Law Nº 27867, on Regional Governments (modified by Law Nº 27902). Article 151 of Organic Law Nº 27972, on Municipality.

The Mayor of Metropolitan Lima carries out the functions of Regional President, as executive organ; the Metropolitan Council of Lima,

exercises functions of Regional Council, as normative organ and inspector; the Metropolitan Assembly of Lima, made up of the

metropolitan mayor, the district mayors and representatives of civil society and base organizations of the province of Lima, exercises

competencies and functions of the Council of Regional Coordination, as consultative and coordinating organ.

14. Quito has a relatively decentralized configuration, endowed with a council and a metropolitan mayor with responsibility over most of

the territory. Caracas has a system of municipal government on two levels with a metropolitan mayor and a legislatively elected

council, covering the zones of Libertador (the federal district of Caracas has been eliminated) and the muncipalities of the neighboring

state of Miranda.

15. See the Comité Ejecutor del Plan de Gestión Ambiental y Manejo de la Cuenca Hídrica Matanza-Riachuelo (Committee to carry out the

Plan for Environmental Management and Handling of the Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin) in Buenos Aires. Or else partial and incipient

experiments in inter-institutional cooperation, such as the ABC Chamber of São Paulo (with Santo André, São Bernardo and São

Cayetano).

LATIN AMERICA182

Argentinian provinces, aimed mainly atthe promotion of micro-regional eco-nomic development, tourism develop-ment and the preservation of the envi-ronment. In Ecuador, there are morethan 20 mancomunidades, bringingtogether more than 100 municipalities16,with a similar number of associativearrangements between provincial,regional and micro-regional entities topromote development. There are morethan 60 regional, sub-regional and sec-toral local government associations oper-ating in Chile; and in Colombia there areover 44 local go vernment associationsrepresenting 454 municipalities thatwork jointly for the provision of publicservices, public works and/or carry outadministrative functions that are dele-gated to the municipal associations.

III. Finances, Responsibilities and Management Capacities

III.1. Progress in Decentralization and Financing Capabilities

The progress in financing sub-national go - vernments may be seen as a whole in Table 3,though the figures used —based on data fromthe IMF and World Bank, national accountsand others— are not always homogeneousand must be considered with caution. Never-theless, the positive impact which decentral-ization has had on all of the countries is obvi-ous. The simple average decentralizedexpenditure in Latin America went up from11.6% of total governmental spending around1980, to 18.8% between 2002 and 2005.

Drawing from the information for aggre-gated expenditure in the table below (seecolumn 2 in Table 3), the following classifi-cation can be made:

• The first group of countries with sub-national public expenditure greater than20% includes federal countries–Argentina, Brazil and Mexico– and theunitary countries, Colombia, Peru,Bolivia and Ecuador. However, in federal

countries, the states and provinces takeup the largest share of expenditure,while local government expenditure islower than 20% in Brazil and less than10% in Argentina and Mexico17.

• A second group of nations –with an inter-mediate degree of centralization– withsub-national public spending between10% and 20% includes República Bolivar-iana de Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay andGuatemala.

• A third group of countries has only incip-ient decentralization, with public ex pen -diture less than 10%. These are Cos taRica, the Dominican Republic, Ni ca ragua,Panama, Paraguay and El Salvador.

All the same, the indicator for municipalexpenditure shows (Table 3: column 3)that only three countries exceed 15% ofgeneral government expenditure:Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil. They arefollowed by Chile, Guatemala andUruguay at 13% (in Uruguay, the Depart-ments, given their size, are closer to theintermediate rather than municipallevel). Next come Argentina, Bolivia,Peru and El Salvador with between 7%and 9% of general government ex -penditure. The remaining countries rangebetween 3.8% and 7% of this indicator.

Brazil stands out in the first group of coun-tries mentioned above; not only is it thecountry with the greatest degree of fiscaldecentralization, but it is also the countrythat demonstrates the greatest balance inexpenditure (vertical equity) between thethree levels of the state.

Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have hadto overcome critical processes arising outof the excessive indebtedness of theirsub-national and central governments.This has made it necessary to makesevere adjustments, especially in Colom-bia. Even so, in Colombia the fiscal bal-ances in territorial governments haveshown important im provements. At the


16. Example in

Ecuador: the

Mancomunidad of

Municipalities for

the Rehabilitation of

the Ecuadorian

Railway, created

through an

agreement signed

in June 2005 by 33

municipalities.

17. One criticism of this

classification is that

in federal countries

the index for sub-

national

expenditures

usually conceals the

level of

centralization by

state agencies.


end of 2004, the sector of regions andlocal go vern ments presented a high sur-plus of 1.1%, and repeated that mark in2005 and 2006.

In the unitary states, the weight of theintermediate bodies is less. This is thecase because they usually depend whollyor in part on the central government

budget, and because frequently their self-administered revenue is not significant.In general, in these countries progresstoward decentralization is subject to therhythm of the mu nicipalities or local gov-ernments.

Overall, the nations that have carried outmore decisive decentralizing processes have

Table 3 Evolution and Distribution of Expenditure by National, Intermediate and Local Governmentsin Latin America

Countries 1. Non-financial 2. Evolution of Distribution of total governmental expenditure between national government,

public expenditure by intermediate governments, and local governments, 2002-2005expenditure sub-national( % GDP) governments 3. Local 4. Intermediate 5. National 6. General

(% expenditure government government government government of central government)

Argentina 25.2 41.6 7.8 33.0 59.1 100.0

Bolivia 30.0 29.5 8.5 21.0 70.5 100.0

Brazil 24.6 (CG) 42.1 16.6 25.5 57.8 100.0

Chile 34.2 15.0 13.2 1.8 85.0 100.0

Colombia 35.2 29.8 17.0 12.8 70.2 100.0

Costa Rica 25.5 6.0 6.0 ---- 94.0 100.0

Dominican Rep. 19.3 (CG) 7.0 7.0 ---- 93.0 100.0

Ecuador 24.5 22.1 17.2 4.9 77.8 100.0

El Salvador 17.5 8.7 8.7 ---- 91.3 100.0

Guatemala 11.7 (CG) 13.0 13.0 ---- 87.0 100.0

Honduras 34.1 5.6 5.6 ---- 94.4 100.0

Mexico 23.3 31.9 4.3 27.5 68.1 100.0

Nicaragua 30.3 3.8 3.8 ---- 96.2 100.0

Panama 24.8 3.8 3.8 ---- 96.2 100.0

Paraguay 33.3 7.0 5.2 1.8 93.0 100.0

Peru 19.2 (GG) 26.8 8.5 18.3 73.2 100.0

Uruguay 29.6 13.2 13.2 ---- 86.8 100.0

Venezuela, R. B. 32.2 ---- ---- ---- ---- ----

Sources: IMF Finance Yearbook 2002 to 2006; World Bank; Central Bank of Colombia; General Audit Office of Chile; “Descentralización Fiscal en C.

América”, G. Espitia. CONFEDELCA, GTZ, 2004. “Descentralización en Ecuador”, CONAM; Ministry of Economy of Ecuador; State Bank of

Ecuador, 2006. Country Profiles. GC = Gobierno Central. GG = General Government. Drawn up by: MERO.

LATIN AMERICA184

visibly improved the situation of infrastruc-ture, services and degrees of participation inthe poorer, more remote and rural areas.Bolivia provides a notable example: therehas been a substantial increase in theresources which reach the outlying territo-ries, as well as in the degree of organizationand participation of rural communities.

In the countries with a medium degree ofdecentralization there are contradictorysituations, as in Chile. While there arenotable advances in the democratization ofthe municipalities, the intermediate levelcontinues to depend to a great extent onthe central government. Curiously, Chileanle gislation uses the term “regional govern-ments” to refer to the de-concentratedintermediate level, and the expression “lo -cal administration” to refer to the munici-palities, even if they possess autonomyand their own resources, and deliver awide range of services.

III.2. Income and Taxation Capacity of Intermediate and Municipal Bodies

In essence, the political autonomy of anysub-national government depends largelyon its financial strength. Self-administeredrevenue comes primarily from local taxes,over which autonomous local governmentsexercise direct control. But in Latin Amer-ica, restrictions on local taxation powersare one of the main limitations of decen-tralization processes. In most countries,the municipalities do not have the power toimpose duties and local taxes. Rather theyhave a high level of dependence on centralfunds transfers, and although the degree ofdependence varies from one country toanother, the overall trend appears to bemoving toward increasing dependency.

In the federal countries, most local incomeis derived from fiscal co-participation, al -though important revenues are sometimesset aside at the intermediate level.

• In Argentina, the provinces receive taxeson income, property, fiscal stamps and

vehicles (64%, 14.5%, 7% and 6%,respectively, in 2004).

• Brazil has allowed the states to receive thesales tax (Circulation of Goods and Serv-ices Tax - ICMS), which represents 26% ofthe national revenue.

• In Mexico, some states receive taxes onpersonal income and from the acquisitionof used cars. Since 2005, local taxes onprofessional services, transfers, and tem-porary usufruct of property or businessactivities have been permitted.

• República Bolivariana de Venezuela grantsto the states only the tax revenue fromstamps and salt mines.

In the unitary countries that have intermediateentities, only a few types of tax revenue areallocated to the middle level. For example, inColombia intermediate entities receive rev-enue from the sale of alcoholic be verages,tobacco and lottery tickets, plus vehicle regis-tration fees18; road, highway and harbor ta xesin Chile, in Bolivia, departments receive royal-ties for exploitation of hydrocarbons. In Bolivia,the amount of the income and the system ofcompensation to departments that do not pro-duce hydrocarbons explains the relative impor-tance of the intermediate-level expenditure.

Most countries do not grant municipalities theright to determine taxation. Usually, theintermediate governments in the federalcountries, or the national governments andparliaments in the unitary countries retain theright to approve the respective values formunicipal income laws.

With some exceptions, taxation powers aresimilar in federal and unitary country munici-palities. The most common taxes are thoseon property, vehicle circulation and economicactivities, including licenses for businessesand industries or income from industry andcommerce. Throughout the re gion, the mostimportant source of municipal revenue is thetax on property. The ex ceptions areArgentina, where it is a provincial tax; El Sal-

In the unitary

countries that have

intermediate

entities, only a few

types of tax revenue

are allocated to the

middle level


18. In Colombia, in

2000 the tax

income from the

departments

corresponded to

10% of the national

total, 1.8% of the

GDP, while that of

the municipalities

rose to 15%, 2.7%

of the GDP. (Jaime

Bonet,

Descentralización

fiscal y

Disparidades en

Ingreso Regional,

Banco de la

República, CEER,

Nov. 2004).


vador, where it is the responsibility of centralgovernment; and the Dominican Republic,which does not have property taxes. As far asthe tax on vehicle circulation is concerned,Argentina and Brazil are also exceptions; inthose countries it is managed by the interme-diate government. Mexico allocates it to thenational government.

In general, taxation pressure in Latin Americais low (16.9% of the GDP, CEPAL19), and thisis especially critical at the local level whe rethe capacity to collect taxes is weak. What iscollected generally represents a li mi ted per-centage of the local budget. Be cause of theheterogeneity of the territories, populationand wealth of the municipalities, the yield oftaxes and duties is ex tremely unequal. Themost developed urban municipalities haveaccess to significant resources of their own,but this is certainly not the case in poor orrural mu nicipalities.

In Brazil, self-administered fiscal resourcesrepresented almost 32% of the budget inmunicipalities with more than 500,000 inhab-itants in 2000, but only reached 5% of thebudget in municipalities with fewer than20,000 inhabitants, yet the latter comprise72% of all the nation’s municipalities. InRepública Bolivariana de Venezuela, 50% ofthe municipalities with fewer than 50,000inhabitants depend on 80% of the nationaltransfers, while 2% of the municipalities witha greater number of inhabitants have 90% of

the self-administered resources. In Argentina,local tax collection amounted to 48% of rev-enue in the year 2000, although in someprovinces it did not reach 10%20. In Colom-bia, taxes collected by Bogotá represented40% of total municipal revenue in 2000.Something similar occurred with the metrop-olises of the Central American countries.

This inequality in taxation capacity translates,in many countries, into a tendency towardstagnation in the collection of municipal taxesand local duties. This typically leads to anincrease in transfers, as in Bolivia, Colombia21,Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,Nicaragua and República Bolivariana deVenezuela. In Mexico, self-administeredmunicipal taxes did not increase from1994 to 2004, but transfers increasedthree times22 during those years.

However, there are some clear indicationsthat decentralization does not necessarilyinduce fiscal laziness. Territorial revenues inColombia have grown steadily over the pastdecade, and as regards revenue behaviorpatterns, the municipalities have done bet-ter than the departments23. Increases in ter-ritorial entities’ share of national incomehave often been accompanied by anincrease in regional tax collection efforts.Between 1996 and 2004, the great majorityof municipalities enjoyed a real increase intax revenues. There is no evidence, giventhe experience of the municipalities over the

19. Cited by Oscar Cetrángolo, “Descentralización y Federalismo Fiscal: aspectos teóricos y práctica en

América Latina,” Seminario internacional, Arequipa, 30 and 31 October 2006. The country with the

highest fiscal pressure is Brazil (35.9%) and the lowest is Guatemala (10.6%).

20. The main sources of resources are the taxes for services of lighting, sweeping and cleaning, environment

and health regulations for companies and industries, road maintenance and improvement of

infrastructures.

21. The percentage of self-administered taxes collected from the Colombian municipalities went from 76% in

1984 to 44% in 2000 and that of the departments from 97% to 45% over the same period.

22. Peru is in a similar case: local collection increased at a rate less than the transfers (21% and 82%

respectively between 2003 and 2006), which is due to the acceleration of the process of transferring

responsibilities and resources since 2002, National Decentralization Council, Report 2005.

23. In real terms, municipal revenues increased by 28% between 1996 and 2004, compared with 20% at the

department level. Source: la Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic: “Informe social. Evaluación a

las transferencias intergubernamentales 1994-2005” and Boletín de Coyuntura Fiscal 3 CONFIS, Ministry

of Finance and Public Credit, Colombia.

LATIN AMERICA186

past years, to support the hypothesis thatan increase in transfers causes a reductionin local tax collection24.

Frequently, the municipalities do not havethe mechanisms needed to increase collec-tion, either because they are not the oneswho do the collecting or because they donot have the authority to set levels of taxa-tion. In particular, the collection of propertytax is far from efficient because of outdatedproperty registers and real estate evalua-tions, excessive exemptions, and a culturerife among municipalities and citizens of tol-erance for not collecting or paying taxes.This matter should be a priority and is a keyissue in decentralization25. However, the si -tuation varies from country to country, andamong municipalities. In Costa Rica, forexample, when the municipalities assumedcadastral management, their revenuesincreased considerably; however, the cen-tral government changed the rules of thegame, to the detriment of the municipalitiesthat are making a greater fiscal effort26. Thelaw in Ecuador imposes a bi-annual reviewof the cadastral evaluations, from a mini-mum 2/1000 up to 5/1000.

Local taxation structures –often archaicand inefficient– also have much to dowith the low level of tax collection. Forexample, in the Dominican Republic, thelocal tax structure includes 70 taxes, butthe municipalities only bring in 30% ofthese monies. In Central Americanmunicipalities, tax revenue represents,on average, 0.58% of GDP. The municipalcontribution to the GDP is what isreflected in minimum local taxation. In ElSalvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, themunicipalities depend to a large extent

on central transfers. In Nicaragua, localta xation had great importance in the lastdecade, thanks to the Municipal SalesTax (ISV), but this decreased from 5% to1% of gross sales.

In Costa Rica and Panama, the weaknessof the transfers, and above all the reducedmunicipal responsibilities and levels ofspen ding mean that local revenue –localtaxes and duties– represents between96% and 75% of municipal income. Some-thing similar occurs with Paraguay in theSouthern Cone where transfers representjust 11% of municipal budgets. But in thisgroup, local budgets are mostly low. All thesame, within this group of countries, goodlevels of income are not synonymous withgreater autonomy; rather, it points to alack of interest and efficiency in the centralgovernments’ systems for redistribution ofrevenue to less favored territories. In thissense, the high percentage of own-sourcerevenues stands out against the limitedbudget and responsibilities for local gov-ernments.

III.3. Transfers and Compensatory Financing

Transfers from central governments –or in -ter mediate governments in the federalcountries– to local governments haveincreased in recent years. These may befree of use or directed and tend to includecompensation mechanisms to limit regionalimbalances. Free transfers supportautonomous sub-national decisions and arefinanced through tax revenue co-participa-tion systems. Directed transfers addressthe operational costs of national policies,such as those for health and education

The collection of

property tax is far

from efficient

because of

outdated property

registers and real

estate evaluations,

excessive

exemptions, and a

culture rife among

municipalities and

citizens of

tolerance for not

collecting or paying

taxes


24. Different studies show that there is not sufficient evidence to support the existence of fiscal laziness. rather, it has been proven that in

regions with greater economic activity, the decentralization process tends to revitalize the tax collection process.

25. Nickson, Andrew, 2006. Certain cities make an effort to improve the outdated register of the commercial values of properties (Bogotá,

La Paz, Quito, Nicaraguan municipalities). Among the measures are: restructuring the legal framework, modernizing collection,

computerized systems and self evaluation.

26. Information provided by the National Union of Local Governments in Costa Rica, UNGL.


27. Moreover, through fiduciary funds for provincial development, the provinces receive resources for debt reduction programmes, in

exchange for greater fiscal control.

28. They receive 22% of income tax, 21.5% on industrial products, 50% of the rural property tax and 30% of the tax on financial

operations. In addition, the Compensation Fund for the Exportation of Industrial Products (FPEX), the Fund for the Maintenance and

Functioning of Teaching (FUNDEP) and the Rural Property Tax (ITR).

29. Branch 33 of the budget includes 7 funds for municipal activities: primary and normal education; health; social infrastructure;

strengthening of municipalities and delegations of the Federal District; multiple contributions; technological and adult education; public

safety. To these are added specific funds from branches 25 and 39, such as resources for state infrastructures and for natural disasters.

30. The Law of Financial Transfers of 2004 stipulates that, beginning with 4% of the current revenue of the state, transfers to the

municipalities must increase annually to 10% of the budget in 2010. The municipalities also receive resources for investment from the

FISE and the Institute of Rural Development (IDR).

Box 1 Transfer Systems in Latin America

• Argentina. The Regime of Federal Co-participation with the provinces contributes 57% of the collection of taxes on income, wealth and sales27. The provincestransfer part of these funds to the municipalities, to which they add two transfers: a) maintenance of schools, hospitals and specific projects, and b) discretionalresources. Together it adds up to more than 50% of municipal revenue.

• Brazil. The two main sources are the Municipalities Participation Fund (FPM) and the States and Federal District Participation Fund (FPE); both are fed by nationaltaxes28. Furthermore, the municipalities receive transfers from the states (25% tax on the circulation of goods and services, 50% tax on vehicles and theexportation of goods). Some municipalities receive royalties for the exploitation of natural resources. Transfers over the municipal budget have increased in thepast decade, reaching 90% of the budget for the smallest municipalities.

• Mexico. Allocates participations and contributions to draw on federal income. The former are transferred to the states and municipalities through the MunicipalPromotion Fund. The latter are for restricted use by the states and municipalities29. Other transfers exist through oil and export revenue in certain states. Transfersgo from 52% of municipal resources in 1990 to 90% in 2005, in particular thanks to “branch 33.”

• Venezuela, R. B. Municipal dependency on transfers rose from 35% in 1986 to 48% in 1998. It is based on the Treasury Fund (20% of tax income) andextraordinary contributions (Inter governmental Decentralization Fund, with resources from VAT and the Law of Special Economic Assignations, with oil resources).

• Colombia. The General Participations System (articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution) provides the resources transferred by the state to territorial entities(departments, municipalities and districts, and indigenous reserves) to finance the services that are their responsibility. The resources are divided into: sectorallocations for education (58%), health (24.5%), drinking water and basic sanitation (17%), and special allocations (4%). The distribution of resources is based onpopulation, attended population, population to be attended, equity, fiscal efficiency, administrative efficiency and relative poverty.

• Bolivia. Tax co-participation transfers to the municipalities amount to 20% of the national taxes, less the Special Hydrocarbon Tax. To this are added resourcesfrom debt cancellation (HIPC I y II) for education, health and investment in infrastructure and the Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS). The transferscontribute two thirds of the municipal budgets; 85% is used for investment.

• Ecuador. The transfers derive from the Sectorial Development Fund (FODESEC) and the distribution of 15% of current income from the central government budget. Bothsources allocate 80% and 70% respectively of their funds to the municipalities and 20% and 30% to the provincial councils. The transfers represent between 47% and 74%of the municipal budgets (1998-2000), and are generally conditional —they are usually earmarked for public investment, not for current expenditure.

• Chile. The Common Municipal Fund redistributes 30% of municipal taxes (zoning tax, commercial patents, vehicle tax) with the role of addressing imbalancesbetween rich and poor municipalities. The Ministries of Health and Education allocate transfers to finance the corresponding responsibilities. The National Fund forRegional Development, FNDR, and the National Fund for Social Investment, FOSIS, deliver resources to projects for social investment and to reduce poverty. Variousother sectorial funds exist. The transfers constitute half of the total municipal resources.

• Peru. Free availability transfers more than doubled between 2003 and 2006 and the municipalities were the main beneficiaries. Of these transfers, 36% comefrom the Municipal Compensation Fund based on the national taxes collected, 16% of the Canon (levy) and royalties for exploiting natural resources, and 2% forparticipation on Customs Duty. The regional governments receive 2% from FONCOR, 4% from the Canon and 1% from Customs Duty. In addition there are transfers offunds from sectorial programs and projects (FONCODES, PRONAA, PROVIAS, etc.)

• Uruguay. Transfers account for between 33% and 16% of departmental budgets.

• Paraguay. Limited transfers derive from royalties from bi-national hydroelectric companies.

• Central America. The legislation allocates a growing percentage of the national budgets to the municipalities: 10% in Guatemala, 7% in El Salvador, 6% in Nicaragua(it will reach 10% in 2010)30, 5% in Honduras, although the government failed to meet the targets. In Costa Rica the constitutional mandate (2001), which allocated10% of the national budget to the municipalities, has not yet been implemented. In Panama there is no norm for transfer to the municipalities.

• Dominican Republic. Although Law 166 (2003) raises transfers to the municipalities from 6% to 10% of the national budget, only 8% had been transferred (2005).Even so, resources have more than doubled in two years. The Dominican Municipal League, in charge of the transfers, fulfils a controlling and inspecting role overthe town councils. Transfers represent 90% of the local budget in most municipalities.

LATIN AMERICA188

services. These services are delivered bysub-national governments with transferscarried out through difficult systems ofmonitoring, control and evaluation.

In Latin America, different transfer systemsare used –over fiscal income or the nationalbudget– with varying fixed or variable per-centages, distribution criteria by levels ofgo vernment and other conditions (seebox)31. Distribution criteria for transfersinvolve different factors –population, levelsof poverty, access to services, economic po -tential, efficiency in management– but theyhave limited impact on limiting regional gaps.

Directed transfers encompass a wide rangeof objectives that respond to national poli-cies, and only collaterally to the strengthen-ing of democracy and local governance. Themajority of countries have sectorial funds forcarrying out projects, which in fe deral coun-tries may be administered by the intermedi-ate governments32. In the unitary countriesthey are usually administered byautonomous institutions that manage re -sources from the central government and in -ternational financing in a centralized way33.For example, the Fund for Productive andSocial Investment (FPS) in Bolivia co-finances the provision of infrastructure andequipment for educational establish ments.

In Central America, the funds were createdthrough peace agreements to deal with

emergency situations or reconstruction, oras social compensation for national macro-economic adjustments. However, they havebecome permanent and now channelinvest ment into infrastructure, basicservi ces or the promotion of productivedevelopment. Frequently, they handleresources that surpass those of themunicipalities without being subject tothe democratic and civic control of thelatter34.

The excessive proliferation of biddingfunds for projects has a negative impacton intermediate and small municipalities.Smaller cities often can not partake ofsuch funds because the terms are toocomplex, and the local staff lacks theability to draw up sufficient projects. InChile, it is calculated that there are some200 funds and sectorial programs relatedto municipal management.

Recently, systems of direct transfer fromthe national government to poor familiesand people are taking on greater impor-tance. Some of them bypass sub-nationalbodies, or tolerate little intervention.35 InMexico these transfers give rise to the“Opportunities” program; in Argentina tothe “Heads of Household” program; in Brazilthe “Family Grant”; in República Bolivarianade Venezuela it gave rise to “Different Mis-sions”; and in Colombia to “Families inAction.” In Chile a new National System of


31. Martín, Juan and Martner, Ricardo, 2004 pp. 77 and following; Finot, Iván, 2001, pp. 87 and following.

32. This is what occurs with the National Funds for Housing, Provincial Roads and Rural Electrification in Argentina, the transfers from the

Single Health System and the Social Contribution to the Education Salary in Brazil, and the Funds for Contributing to Primary and

Normal Education and the Health Services in Mexico.

33. Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS), Bolivia; Fund for Compensation and Social Development in Peru; National Fund for

Regional Development, FNDR and Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment, FOSIS, in Chile; Fund for Social Investment (FIS) and

Solidarity Fund for Community Development (FDSC), in Guatemala; FISDL, in El Salvador; FHIS, in Honduras; FISE in Nicaragua; Fund

for Indigenous Guatemalan Development, and Fund for Agricultural Development and Guatemalan Housing Fund.

34. The Fund for Social and Economic Investment (FISE) in Nicaragua is another example: an autonomous organization which depends on

the Presidency of the Republic, with funding from the central government, bilateral donations from foreign governments and loans from

the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Something similar occurs with the Social Investment Fund for Local

Development (FISDL) in El Salvador, which finances strategies for the eradication of poverty and local economic development, along

with the Honduran Fund for Social Investment (FHIS).

35. On occasion they are even manipulated for election purposes.


Social Protection was organized for the uni-fication and better coordination of the dif-ferent social subsidies granted to poor fa -milies through the municipalities.

III.4. Control Systems and Difficulties of Indebtedness

The expenditure of Latin American munici-palities is subject to internal and externalcontrols. For internal control, the biggermunicipalities establish a municipal accountsoffice or audit unit –organs granted a cer-tain technical autonomy. In municipalitieswith a weak structure, this task is entrustedto the municipal treasurer or the person incharge of finance.

There are different models of external con-trol. In some countries there is still a controlof the budget by national institutes whosefunction is to support, control and inspect.This is the case with the Dominican Munici-pal League, but also with the Institutes forMunicipal Promotion or the ComptrollersOffices in some Central American countries.In Costa Rica, for example, municipal budg-ets have to be approved by the controlaríabefore they can be allocated.

In many unitary states, the external controlover the intermediate-level local go vern -ment bodies is exercised by the Con tro laria.Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecua dor, Gua -temala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and RepúblicaBolivariana de Venezuela still maintain thisform of ex ternal con trol. In El Salvador andHonduras, control is exercised by the auditboard or the su perior auditor body.

In the federal countries, external control ismore complex, since both internationaland national entities intervene. Thus, inArgentina and Brazil external scrutiny ofthe mayor —intendente or prefeito— isconducted by the Deliberating Council orTown Council with the assistance of theprovincial or State Court of Auditors or theMunicipal Court of Auditors, created by theprovincial or state government. Should thefederation have transferred resources to

the municipalities, the audit would be car-ried out by the Court of Auditors of theUnion. The state legislatures are theorgans of oversight of the municipalities,although control of federal resources isexercised by the Superior Auditor of theFederation’s Office, which in turn dependson the Union Congress.

In recent years, the problem of debt hasbeen a priority. Different countries face fis-cal problems through the indebtedness ofthe sub-national entities. Although in mostcountries sub-national government borrow-ing must be approved by national govern-ment, this does not guarantee discipline;some countries are trying more innovativesolutions to avoid excessive borrowing36.

In 1997, Colombia established a ‘trafficlight’ system for regulating sub-nationalborrowing relative to the level of debtincurred by the regional entity. The lawestablishes the basis for territorial fiscal ad -justment through borrowing performanceagreements that are controlled at nationallevel. These not only limit the debt capac-ity, but also manage the repayment ofloans, essentially duplicating the IMF sys -tem internally. Other laws have comple-mented this policy with good results.

III.5. Public Services

The financial capacity of the municipalities isclosely connected to the delivery of publicservices. In the second half of the 20th Cen-tury, national and intermediate govern-ments absorbed public services which,according to the principle of subsidiarity, aremost effectively provided by the municipali-ties. New support for decentralization hasbegun to reverse the old approach37.

The public services generally attributed tomunicipalities include the provision of:urban cleanliness, refuse collection andtreatment, drinking water, drainage andsewers, public lighting, town planning,parks, gardens and spaces for sport, mar-kets, cemeteries and slaughterhouses,

36. Law of fiscal

responsibility in

Brazil (2000), the

“semaphore

system” in

Colombia – by Law

358 of 1997, in

Ecuador, the Law of

Responsibility,

Stabilization and

Fiscal Transparency

of 2002.

37. Martín, Juan and

Martner, Ricardo

(coordinators),

“Estado de las

finanzas públicas:

América Latina y El

Caribe”, cit. pp. 62

and ff, see table 9

on revenues and

total expenditure at

government level.

LATIN AMERICA190

traffic regulation, roads and civic safety,public shows and culture (see table 4).

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexicohave transferred to intermediate and locallevels responsibility for managing healthcare, primary and secondary education,and social assistance38 .

Latin American municipalities also sharethe management of public services withthe intermediate entities and the nationalgovernment. The specific services differ ineach country, but among the most com-mon are planning, education, health, civilprotection, environmental protection, sportand culture. When these are shared by dif-ferent levels of government, each level ta -kes responsibility for certain componentsof the policy. However, problems of coordi-nation as well as ambiguities with respectto management responsibility are fairlycommon at each level.

Under the influence of neo-liberalism in the1990s, many countries opted for the con-cession or privatization of local services. InArgentina all of the local public services inthe metropolitan area of Buenos Aires andthe provinces in the interior were granted inconcession: mainly water, sanitation andenergy services. In Chile, the basic servicesof water, sewers, electricity, gas and tele-phone systems were privatized and takenover by regional and national companies. InBolivia and Ecuador, the management ofdrinking water and sewers has been priva-tized, granted in concession or delegated to

private sector operators39 in the major mu -ni cipalities of La Paz, Cochabamba andGuayaquil. Nevertheless, the ma na gementof some services is returning to publicauthorities at the local (as is the case inBolivia and shortly in Guayaquil) andnational (Buenos Aires) levels.

In Brazil, there is some overlap of responsi-bilities between levels of government insome regions; others have some inadequateservices or lack certain services entirely.While responsibility for education and healthis transferred to the intermediate govern-ments and municipalities with sufficientadministrative capacity, small municipalitiesgive up part of their res ponsibilities, such asconstruction and maintenance of roads, inexchange for a portion of the fuel tax. Thedivision of responsibilities usually followssectorial logic (water and sanitation andeducation are dealt with by the states; thefinancing of health, housing and sanitation isdone by the federal government).

In Argentina in the 1990s, while servicesmanaged by the national Government andprovinces were privatized, the municipali-ties held onto the services for which theywere responsible. Furthermore, those withgreater capacity40 took on new responsibil-ities41. In addition, through delegation ofthe upper levels of the government, somemu nicipalities administer social policies andtemporary work programs, programs offer-ing assistance to micro-companies, andsmall and medium companies, and the de -ve lopment of sanitation.


38. There are important differences among countries. In Chile, the municipalities administer integrally primary health care, and

primary and secondary education. In Bolivia, they are only responsible for the administration and maintenance of infrastructure

and equipment of the establishments. In Argentina, the municipalities carry out complementary actions for infrastructure

maintenance, and in the health sector they share primary health care.

39. The concept of “privatization” is generally avoided as it tends to generate strong resistance. Bolivia, for example, opted for

“capitalization” where private firms bring capital to public enterprizes, taking over their control.

40. The municipality of Rio Cuarto, in the province of Cordoba took on the water supply company —first national, then provincial;

through excellent management of the water service, self-financing has been achieved for the first time in years.

41. Among the new responsibilities: environment, civic safety, economic promotion, access to justice and resolution of conflicts

between family members and neighbors without recourse to the law; social promotion (young people, senior citizens, gender

equality, disability), health, promotion of culture and sport; and education insofar as it complements the efforts of other levels of

government.

LATINAM

ERICADecentralization and Local Dem

ocracy in the World

191

UO W DW SS SL Cem M B P RI TRNS T PS PHC H SS C S/L ED J Tourism CS FB RP E

X X S S X X X X X S X S S X X X S S S X X

X X X X X X X X X S X S S S X X S X X X

X X X X X X X X S X S X X X X X X S S S S S X S

X X X X X X X S X X S S S S S X S S S S S S S

X X X X X X X X X X X S S S S S X X S X S S X

X X * X X X X X S X S S X

X X X X X X X X O X X O O

X X X X X X X X X X Conv Conv X

X X Pil exp X X X X X X C X

X X X X X X X X X X X S X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X S S X X X X X X X S X X X X X S X

X X X X X X

X X S S X X X X X S S X X

X X X X X X X X X X S S X S X S S S

X X X X X X X X X X X S X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X S X X X X X X X X

S: Shared; O: Optional; Pil exp: Pilot experiencies; Conv: Convention; UO: Urban ownership ; W: Waste; DW: Drinking water; SS: Sewer system; SL: Street light; Cem: Cemetery; M: Market;

B: Butchery, slaughterhouse; P: Urban planning -land regulation and territorial planning; RI: Road infrastructure; TRNS: Transport; T: Traffic; PS: Primary school; PHC: Primary health care;

H: Housing; SS: Social services ; C: Culture; S/L: Sport and leisure; ED: Economic development; J: Job offer; Tourism: Tourism; CS: City safety; FB: Fire brigades; RP: Risk prevention; E: Environment.

* In rural areas.

Basic services Food distribution Urban planning Social services Economic development City safety

Table 4 Municipal Responsibilities in Latin America

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominican Rep.

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela, R. B.

LATIN AMERICA192

In Mexico, the state institutions and occa-sionally federal ones intervene in the deliv-ery of local services. Responsibility fordrinking water, the management of townplanning, roads and the collection of taxeshas often been taken over by the states.The participation of local governments inadministering education is limited to themaintenance of certain infrastructures. Bycontrast, since 1997 the financing of socialprograms has been decentralized. Thegranting of services to the private sector isless common than in other Latin Americancountries.

In Bolivia, a uniform strategy of decentral-ization has been applied to all public serv-ices, including health, education, roadwaysand micro–irrigation. Most are now allo-cated to the municipalities. Since 2001,the decentralization policy in Ecuador hasop ted for voluntary transfers of responsi-bilities through the signing of individualagreements between the central govern-ment and the municipalities involved. Newresponsibilities of special interest to localgovernments are: the environment,tourism, social welfare and, to a lesserextent, education, housing and health42.

In Paraguay, the municipalities provide alimited number of basic services43. The cen-tral government assures the provision ofmost of the services, in particular drinkingwater, education and public trans port44. InUruguay, these services are de li vered at thedepartmental level, including more and

more social services (pri ma ry health care),environmental pro tection and cultural de -velopment.

In Central America, with the exception ofGuatemala, the majority of local govern-ments take on the basic services with dif-ficulty and, in many cases, in precariousconditions. The activities that involvegreater responsibility and require greaterinvestment –education, health, social wellbeing, housing, aqueducts and sewers–are delivered at the national level, in themajority of cases.

The municipalities frequently take onresponsibilities not anticipated in the legisla-tion. The municipality of San Pedro Sula inHonduras allocates resources for the main-tenance of the hospital and payment ofsalaries to doctors, nurses and skilled work-ers, in addition to providing refuse collectionservices to the hospitals free of charge. Inseveral countries, the municipalities takepart in the construction and maintenance ofthe basic infrastructures of education andhealth. In Honduras, water management,previously in the hands of a state company,was decentralized in 200345.

Regrettably, there are few studies thatmake it possible to measure the impact ofall these processes of transfer on accessto, or quality of basic services. Neverthe-less, the existing data is promising: inEcuador, for example, it is calculated thatsince the beginning of decentralization the


42. Fernando Carrión, “El proceso de descentralización en Ecuador,” July 2006. Interest in new responsibilities for local governments is

centered on three topics: environment 31.5%, tourism 24.6% and social well being 23.3%. To a lesser extent, education at 7%, and

housing and health at 4%.

43. Hygiene, waste management, public lighting, slaughterhouses, markets, cemeteries, transport terminals.

44. At the end of the 1990s, agreements were made between the Ministry of Health, the departments and the municipalities to create

departmental and local health councils with limited responsibilities in planning and management. In 2005, only 25% of the

municipalities had signed agreements with the Ministry of Health. In 1996, the Department of Itapúa created a Rotating Fund for

Medication for Social Pharmacies, which administers 70 social pharmacies in 30 municipalities (2002). Paraguay File.

45. In El Salvador, around 15 pilot projects have been set up transferring the management of water to mancomunidades or local

companies. In Nicaragua, there are municipal companies or franchises at the municipal or regional level. Also in El Salvador and

Nicaragua, in the social areas, a limited direct de-concentration is taking shape, aimed at the community and designed centrally

(Ministries of Education, Health, Public Works). Ex: EDUCO program –Education with Community Participation”– in rural zones of El

Salvador, and Co-management of Education and Health in Nicaragua.


percentage of houses connected to thepublic sewer system has risen from 39.5%in 1990 to 48.5% in 2001; homes withelectricity went from 78% to 91%; domi-ciliary connection to the drinking watersupply rose by 10%; and refuse collectionwent up 20% at national level46.

In Chile, the favorable impact of localmanagement is expressed in the positiveevolution of the main indicators of socialand human development (education, basicsanitation, health). For its part, the systemof directed subsidies, applied from themunicipalities, has contributed decisivelyto reducing poverty from 38% in 1989 to18% in 200247.

National Planning observed that in Colom-bia decentralization has improved therates of educational provision, literacy andcoverage of health services. Nevertheless,according to the same source, progress isinsufficient in basic social infrastructuresand provision of services, and regional dis-parities have increased. Improvements inmanagement have been significant, butare still not adequate, although pre-exist-ing imbalances have influenced this factor,as have the difficulties related to thearmed conflict and lack of governance ofcertain territories.

III.6. Local Government Personnel and Civil Service Career

For the intermediate sub-national entitiesand municipalities, the absence of a civilservice career is a serious failing. In themajority of countries the predominant sys-tem in sub-national government is thespoils system which gives rise to a largescale rotation of staff, in particular at theupper and intermediate levels, every timethere are political changes that affect theadministration.

The best performing countries in terms ofdevelopment and institutions at the statelevel are Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica.

Another group of countries –República Boli-variana de Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay,Colombia and Argentina– pre sent civil serv-ice systems that are not particularly wellorganized. The situation is more critical inthe remaining Central American countriesand particularly in Bolivia, Peru, Paraguayand Ecuador, where the degree of politiciza-tion is higher48. This situation is worse atthe level of sub-national governments.

In the best-qualified countries –Brazil,Chile, Costa Rica– local officials have gen-erally become integrated into nationalcareer systems that are now beingmatched by systems at the municipallevel. In Brazil, the 1988 Constitutionallowed local governments to define theirown statute for their three million employ-ees, but application of this is limited.

In Chile, the 185,000 municipal employees(54% of public personnel, including teach-ers and health workers) are mostly inte-grated into different national personnelevaluation systems and career servicesstatutes49.

Costa Rica had 10,755 municipal workersin 2004 (4.7% of public personnel), ofwhom 25% worked in San José50. In 1998a municipal administrative career path wasestablished, but it has not yet been imple-mented to any effect. Similarly, in 2004Nicaragua adopted the Ley de Carrera

Administrativa Municipal (MunicipalAdministrative Career Act).

Ecuador and Colombia have a legal frame-work concerning the career civil service forthe public sector as a whole. In Colombia,it is calculated that in the 1990s municipalstaff accounted for less than 10% of pub-lic personnel. In Mexico it was 5%.

In some provinces of Argentina, theregime of employees is uniform betweenthe provincial and the municipal level; inothers, local governments have their ownregime, although mixed situations are themost common.

46. Ponce, Juan. La

vivienda y la

infraestructura

básica en el

Ecuador: 1990-

2001. SIISE. Cited

by F. Carrión, el

proceso de

descentralización

en Ecuador, July

2006.

47. Ministry for National

Planning in Chile

(MIDEPLAN).

48. See the Report on

the Civil Service in

Latin America,

AIDB, 2006.

49. Department of

Studies of the

Chilean Association

of Municipalities

(Asociación Chilena

de Municipalidades

– ACHM).

50. Ministère des

Affaires Etrangères-

DGCID, Bilan des

politiques de

Décentralisation en

Amérique Latine,

décembre 2005.

51. In Paraguay there

are 13,250

municipal

employees (7.7%

of the public

workforce), half

concentrated in the

city of Asunción

(6,500 employees).

In Nicaragua, the

number of

municipal

employees rose to

8,648 in 2000;

31% of them work

in Managua.

LATIN AMERICA194

In most countries, public employees are sub-ject to national workers legislation and a spe-cial employment status for public or munici-pal employees, although these practices arerarely applied in practice. Unfortunately, themajority of these countries does not possessprecise statistical data on public employees.

In theory, in the majority of countries, sub-national government officials and employeesare covered by the national work law and bystatute as public or municipal employees.However, in practice this is rarely fulfilled.Regrettably, most countries lack precise sta-tistics about personnel in the intermediategovernments and municipalities51.

IV. Local Democracy

IV.1. Local Electoral Regimes

With regard to municipal government, theterms cabildo, town council, council or mu -nicipal corporation are used, with differentnational nuances. In most cases the municipalinstitution is made up of: the mayor, inten-

dente, síndico (trustee), mu nicipal president orprefeito (prefect), who presides over it, repre-sents it and is in charge of the administration.The concejales, regidores or vereadores (towncouncilors) act as a legislative body, althoughat times they receive specific commissions.

Direct election of mayors predominates in theregion, generally through a majority sys tem,on different dates from those de signated forthe national elections (Chile, Ecuador,Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Pe ru, DominicanRepublic, El Salvador, Ni ca ra gua). In the fed-eral countries, local elections tend to coincidewith the provincial or state elections (Ar -gentina, Brazil, Mexico). In Bolivia, the mayoris elected indirectly from among the mem-bers of the Municipal Council who are electedby direct universal suffrage. Recently, themethod of election has changed from indirectto direct in Chile (2001), Costa Rica (2002),Nicaragua (1995), and República Bolivarianade Venezuela (1989). For the town coun-cilors, proportional representation or the

mixed sys tems are regularly established(example: single names and lists in RepúblicaBolivariana de Venezuela). The specificsobserved in different countries are influencedby respective norms and traditional customs.

The duration of the mandate of mayors andre presentative councilors varies from coun tryto country. The majority tend to have man-dates of four years (Central American coun-tries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Dominican Republic, República Bolivariana deVenezuela), but there are also some withthree-year terms (Mexico), two and a half(Cu ba), and five-year terms (Bolivia, Peru,Uruguay, Paraguay and Panama). Re-electionof the mayor and councilors is usuallyallowed, except in Mexico and Colombiawhere re-election to office is prohibited.

The municipalities of each nation possess theirown territorial division, with sub-municipalentities with different names. Such entities arebeginning to be granted greater participation,and direct election of municipal authorities isnow taking place in various countries. Promis-ing re sults have been observed in the cor-

regimientos of Panama; in the Neigh bor hoodAssociations’ legal status and election throughdirect suffrage in Chile; with the Juntas Veci-

nales (neighborhood associations) in Bolivia;the Juntas Parroquiales electas (elected parishassociations) in Ecuador, which were brieflyinterrupted in 1980; the elected auxiliary pres-idencies of Tlaxcala and the municipal commu-nities of Tabasco, in Mexico.

In recent years, the great Latin Americanmetropolises have driven processes of partialdecentralization (18 community centres inMontevideo and 15 communes in BuenosAires) or deconcentration into delegations,sub-mayoral areas or sub-prefectures (16 inMexico City, 31 in São Paulo). In Mexico City,the delegation chiefs are elected by directvote; in Buenos Aires community councilorsare to be elected for the first time in 2007.

In the unitary countries, the process of elect-ing intermediate government authorities hasbeen slow. In 2004, only half of the de -

In recent years,

the great Latin

American

metropolises have

driven processes

of partial

decentralization

or deconcentration

into delegations



partments or regions held elections (Colom-bia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay). Inthe federal countries, the duration of go -vernment terms of office does not alwayscoincide with those of the municipal authori-ties. In Mexico, for example, the governorshave a mandate of six years, as opposed tothree years for the mayors.

As for women’s participation in local go -vernment in Latin America, recent studiesshow that women’s political re presentationremains very low. Between 1999 and 2002,

there were 838 wo men mayors ser ving in 16Latin American countries, re presenting only5.3% of the total (Table 5). The ratio ofwomen to men councilors is slightly higher.

There is open public debate in all the coun-tries throughout the region on the under-rep-resentation of women at local levels, andmeasures have been taken to improve theproportion of democratically elected womenofficials in local government. The quota sys-tem is the most common mechanism used toimprove women’s po litical participation52.

52. In Argentina, for

example, the law

provides that

women candidates

must be positioned

in proportions

sufficient to get

elected; in Bolivia,

a minimum of one

in three candidates

has to be a woman;

and in Paraguay,

one in five

candidates has to

be a woman; by law

in Mexico no more

than 70% of the

candidates can be

of the same

gender; and in

Peru, at least 25%

of the candidates

must be women.

There are electoral

gender quotas also

in Ecuador and

Dominican

Republic.

Table 5 Women Mayors in Latin America (between 1999 and 2002)

Country Number Percentage

1. Panama 1999 11 14.8

2. Costa Rica 1998 10 12.3

3. Chile 2000 39 11.4

4. Honduras 2002 29 9.7

5. El Salvador 2000 22 8.3

6. Nicaragua 2000 11 7.2

7. Colombia 2002 76 7.0

8. Argentina 1999 136 6.4

9. Bolivia 2002 19 6.0

10. Brazil 2000 317 5.7

11. Paraguay 2002 12 5.6

12. Venezuela, R. B. 2000 16 4.7

13. Mexico 2002 80 3.3

14. Peru 2002 52 2.6

15. Ecuador 2000 5 2.3

16. Guatemala 1999 3 0.9

Latin America 832 5.3

Source: “Participar es llegar”, Alejandra Massolo, INSTRAW.

United Nations. Dominican Republic, 2006.

53. La democracia en

América Latina

PNUD, 2004, pp. 77

and following.

LATIN AMERICA196

IV.2. Civic Participation

Latin American democracy has madeprogress. According to the Index of ElectoralDemocracy (IED) –whose values varybetween 0 and 1– the region goes from0.28 in 1977 to 0.93 in 2002. Moreover,89.3% of the potential voters are registeredon the electoral rolls, 62.7% actually voteand 56.1% cast a valid vote. These percent-ages for participation in elections are belowthose of European countries, but are supe-rior to those recorded in the United States53.But significant progress is still nee ded inmany respects: transparency in the financ-ing of parties, the struggle against corrup-tion, and in overcoming clientism.

At the local level, participation in elections ishigh, although in some countries it is tend-ing to decrease. In Argentina, Brazil andUruguay, where participation exceeds 80%,voting is mandatory.

In Bolivia, participation in local elections hasoscillated between 59% and 63% from themid-1990s to the present. In Paraguay, par-ticipation declined from 80% between 1991and 1996, the first period of democraticallyelected local authorities, to 50% between2001 and 2006. In the local elections of 2005in República Bolivariana de Venezuela, up to69% of the voters abstained, because of thepolitical situation and the call by oppositionsectors to abstain from voting. However, his-torically the level of participation in municipalelections in Venezuela has been quite low.

In Central America, general average partici-pation is near 50% of the population of vot-ing age, except for Nicaragua where partici-pation exceeds 70%. In Guatemala in theelection of 2003, 58% of registered votersvoted in the municipal and general elections.In Costa Rica, in the first local elections formayor in 2002, abstentionism reached 48%of the electorate in some municipal cantons.

Political pluralism has taken root throughoutthe region, except in Cuba. In Mexico, forexample, at the local level a genuine politi-

cal competition has emerged, and in just afew years it has overtaken the institutionalquasi-monopoly exercised by a single party,contributing to the democratization of nationalpolitical life. New local and regional parties,supporting new leaders, have also emerged.

In Peru, the new Ley de Partidos Políticos

(Political Parties Act) allows the appearanceof regional political groupings and the for-mation of provincial and district politicalcommittees that obligate the national politi-cal parties to review their structures andrenew their leaders. In Colombia and othercountries, national political figures are start-ing to emerge from the local level.

Multiple procedures for citizen participationhave been formally introduced into almostall the countries, although these are notalways effective or really used. The constitu-tions and legal reforms define a broad rangeof forms of participation.

In Brazil, the Constitution of 1988 mentionsthe plebiscite, referendum, popular tribune,popular councils, and the right to popular ini-tiative with the support of 5% of the voters.But it is the participatory budget that hasachieved world recognition as the expressionof direct democracy whereby the communitybecomes involved in formulating the plan formunicipal investment. This procedure hasbeen applied in Porto Alegre since 1989, andis used in more than 100 Brazilian cities. Ithas also been extended to some municipali-ties in Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia,Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Paraguayand Chile, albeit in simplified form. In theDominican Republic, in 2006, more than 110municipalities (two thirds of the country) wereapplying the participatory budget.

In Bolivia, the Ley de Participación Popular

(Law of Popular Participation) of 1994 hasgenerated new participatory practices in themunicipalities through the Territorial BaseOrganizations (OTBs). Through these, thecommunities take part in the municipaldevelopment and annual operating plansthat are required in order to access co-par-

Multiple procedures

for citizen

participation have

been formally

introduced into

almost all the

countries, although

these are not

always effective or

really used



ticipation funds. The oversight committeeelected by the OTB monitors the implemen-tation of development plans, along with thesub-mayors and social syndicates. The resulthas been encouraging in most municipalities,above all in the regions of Chapare andSanta Cruz. But in many cases, legal require-ments have given rise to bureaucratic prac-tices that get in the way of genuine partici-pation, reinforcing clientism and corruption.

In República Bolivariana de Venezuela, theConstitution and the law are fairly careful insetting up mechanisms for civic participation,but do not clearly define the ways to makethem operational. The recently passed Ley de

los Consejos Comunales (Community CouncilsAct) of April 2006 creates a new frameworkfor participation through the CommunityCouncils responsible for bringing together dif-ferent community organizations, social groupsand citizens for the direct management ofpublic policies at local level. This initiative doeshowever present the risk of displacement tothese Community Councils, which are highlydependent on presidential authority, of pro-grams and re sources that should be chan-neled through the municipalities, as the pri-mary political unit of the national organizationand democratic participation.

In Ecuador, in a context in which nationalinstitutions have lost their legitimacy, citizenparticipation has been channeled towardlocal governments through strategic plan-ning in formulating provincial plans (18),municipal plans (more than 100) and partic-ipatory budgets, and through local sectorialcommittees for public works and serviceprovision; one outstanding example is theparticipatory experience in the municipalityof Cotacachi54.

Also in Peru, recent legislation has promotedthe creation of Councils for Regional andLocal Coordination as spaces in which toparticipate, and Development Plans and Par-ticipatory Budgets in the different levels ofgovernment (districts, provincial municipali-ties and regional governments).In the majority of countries, incentives are

offered for organizing the populationthrough Neighborhood Associations, com-missions or neighborhood councils and otherforms of association (Argentina, Chile,Paraguay, Ecuador, República Bolivariana deVenezuela, Colombia, Uruguay). In Chile,more than 65,000 local organizations linkedto the municipalities manage requests andprojects. Re grettably, the level of participa-tion in neighborhood elections and in the lifeof the organizations is tending to decrease55.

In Uruguay, the neighborhood councils inMontevideo are elected and have a consul-tative role. Moreover, “defenders of the peo-ple” (ombudsmen), have been created; thispost is also included in the Argentine consti-tutional reform of 1994.

Popular initiatives and consultation arepro vided for by law in various Latin Amer-ican countries, including Chile andUruguay. For its part, the cabildo abierto

–open session of the Municipal Council–with a broader participation by the com-munity, serves to sound out the commu-nity with respect to certain impendingdecisions. This last modality has spreadparticularly in Central America (Costa Rica,Nicaragua and El Salvador), and since2004 Guatemala has instituted popularconsultation with neighbors and indige-nous peoples. Such processes are, how-ever, still in the earliest developmentalstages56.

Procedures for the recall of municipal electedofficials also exist. In Colombia, the program-matic vote is taken into account: the mayorsubmits his program and if he does not carryit out, revocation may take place. InRepública Bolivariana de Venezuela, the leg-islation allows for a revocatory referendumfor the ma yors. In other countries, revocationis allowed for cases of corruption or non-ful-fillment of the municipal development plan(Ecuador, Costa Rica). In Bolivia, the mayor isremoved from office by the constructive cen-sure vote of 60% of the councilors, who thenchoose from among themselves the personwho will replace him. It is often used in

54. See “La Asamblea

Cantonal de

Cotacachi” -

International

Experiences

www.municipium.cl

55. UNDP: Social

capital Map of Chile.

56. Procedures of social

participation have

also been instituted

in local planning:

community

development

councils, COCODES,

and municipal

development

councils,

COMUDES, in

Guatemala;

Councils for

Municipal

Development,

CODEM, in

Honduras, etc.

LATIN AMERICA198

response to party political issues rather thanquestions of bad management.

In the interests of greater transparency inmanagement, Brazil and other countrieshave legislated to oblige local governmentsto publish their public accounts, and areexploring other mechanisms for the diffu-sion of public information.

In Cuba, “socialist democracy” establishesthe principle of presenting accounts once ayear, and revoking the mandate of the dele-gates elected to the Popular Power Assembly.

IV.3. Minority Rights

Native peoples are an important part of thepopulation in numerous Latin Americancountries. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala,Peru and some regions of Mexico, they makeup between 12% and 70% of the popula-tion. Significant minorities constituting 10%or more of the population live in specificregions of Belize, Chile, Paraguay, El Sal-vador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.The rights of indigenous peoples and ofother minorities are moving forward throughdifferent options, although the process isstill incipient and does not apply in all coun-tries.

• In Bolivia, the Ley de Agrupaciones Ciu-

dadanas y Grupos Indígenas (Civic Asso-ciations and Indigenous Groups Act) of2004 gives electoral guarantees, theright to present candidates, and recogni-tion of the traditional authorities. Thepractice of old forms of direct democracyinherited from the ayllus, agriculturalsyn dicates, neighborhood associations,and other forms of community participa-tion is very common in local life.

• Brazil recognizes indigenous rights in theconstitution.

• In Colombia, indigenous territorial enti-ties may be formed with their Council,and a special circumscription is antici-pated for ethnic groups, political minori-

ties and Colombian nationals abroad,with five representatives in Congress.

• Guatemala recognizes the multi-ethnicand multicultural character of the munic-ipalities, as well as the indigenous may-oralties, councils of Mayan Advisers andthe law of national languages.

• As a result of the Chiapas uprising, inMexico indigenous rights are included inthe Constitution. Among state legisla-tures, Oaxaca stands out with 480municipalities electing their authoritiesby use and custom.

• Nicaragua grants constitutional auto -nomy to two regions on its AtlanticCoast by means of a Statute ofAutonomy and each region’s own Ley

de Propiedad (Property Law). In thisway, native indigenous peoples livealongside Afro-descendants and othersocial groups.

• In Panama, the Comarca de San Blas

(In digenous Community of San Blas) hasconstitutional autonomy because that iswhere the Kuna people live, having beengranted their own charter. Their highestauthority is the Congress of Kuna Cul-ture. They are entitled to two legislatorsin the parliament.

• In República Bolivariana de Venezuela,the law recognizes that in the municipali-ties where there are indigenous commu-nities, their values, ethnic identity andtraditions must be respected. The figureof the indigenous municipality is estab-lished, and through it the indigenous peo-ples and communities de fine, execute,control and evaluate public management.

IV.4. Municipal Associativism and Defence of Municipal Autonomy

The transformations in local governmentscaused by decentralization processes per-mit the creation and strengthening ofnational and regional associations of local

The rights of

indigenous peoples

and of other

minorities are

moving forward

through different

options, although

the process is still

incipient and does

not apply in all

countries



Table 6 Associations of Municipalities in Latin America

Country / Region Name of the association Acronym Year founded

Regional Associations

Latin America Latin American Federation Cities, Municipalities and Local Government Associations FLACMA 2003

Sub-regional Associations

Central America Federation of Municipalities of the Central American Isthmus FEMICA 1991

Mercosur Mercocities 1995

National Associations

Argentina Argentine Federation of Municipalities FAM 1997

Bolivia Federation of Municipal Associations of Bolivia FAM 1999

Brazil Brazilian Association of Municipalities ABM 1946

National Confederation of Municipalities CNM 1980

National Front of Prefects FNP 2001

Colombia Colombian Federation of Municipalities FCM 1989

Costa Rica National Union of Local Governments UNGL 1977

Chile Chilean Association of Municipalities ACHM 1993

Ecuador Association of Ecuadorian Municipalities AME 1940

El Salvador Municipal Corporation of the Republic of El Salvador COMURES 1941

Guatemala National Association of Municipalities of Guatemala ANAM 1960

Honduras Association of Municipalities of Honduras AMHON 1962

Mexico Association of Local Authorities of Mexico AALMAC 1997

Mexican Association of Municipalities AMMAC 1994

National Federation of Municipalities of Mexico FENAMM 1997

Nicaragua Association of Municipalities of Nicaragua AMUNIC 1993

Panama Association of Municipalities of Panama AMUPA 1995

Paraguay Paraguayan Organization of Inter-municipal Cooperation OPACI 1964

Peru Association of Municipalities of Peru AMPE 1982

National Association of District Mayors ANADIS 2003

Network of Rural Municipalities of Peru REMURPE 1997

Dominican Rep. Dominican Federation of Municipalities FEDOMU 2001

Uruguay National Congress of Intendentes CNI 1959

Venezuela, R. B. Association of Venezuelan Mayors ADAVE 1996

Association of Boliviarian Mayors ADABOVE

LATIN AMERICA200

authorities. With the exception of Brazil,Ecuador and various Central Americancountries, the majority of regional andnational associations of municipalities inLatin America were established between1980 and 2000 (see table 6).

In some countries, the associations enjoya legal status recognized by national legis-lation (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colom-bia, Paraguay, Uruguay). However, theirrepresentative and institutional capacitiesare uneven. In general they offer advisoryservices, information and training, main-tain contact with the governments andchannel resources from international coop-eration. Many of them have incipient insti-tutional structures.

The Latin American Federation of Cities,Mu nicipalities and Local Government Asso-ciations (FLACMA), whose roots date backto 1981, brings together the majority ofnational associations in the region. Inaddition, two sub-regional organizationsoperate: FE MICA with the six nationalassociations of Central America (AMHON,AMUNIC, AMUPA, ANAM, COMURES,UNGL) and the Mercocities Network with181 associated cities in Argentina, Brazil,Paraguay, Uruguay, República Bolivarianade Venezuela, Chile and Bolivia. Recently,a network of Andean cities has been setup, and COSUDAM, another organizationmade up of local government associations,was established.

The majority of countries also have sub-na tional associations of regional munici-palities. Bolivia’s FAM is, in fact, a fe -deration of departmental associations ofmu nicipalities. There also exist associa-tions of indigenous mayors (AGAAI in Gua -temala, Coordinator of Alternative Lo calGovernments in Ecuador) and associa ti ve

structures of aldermen or town coun cillors(Co lombia, Paraguay, Uruguay).

The governors of provinces and states,and more recently of regions or depart-ments, create their own organizations,such as CONAGO in Mexico, and theNational Conference of Governors inColombia. At the end of 2004, the LatinAmerican Organization of IntermediateGovernments, OLAGI, was set up, bring-ing together governors, intendentes, pre-fects and regional presidents from 14Latin American countries that administerintermediate governments.

A number of local-government women’sorganizations have been formed in LatinAmerica, including: the Association ofWomen Councilors of Bolivia (ACOBOL);the National Association of Women Coun-cilors and Mayors of El Salvador(ANDRYSAS); the Ecuadorian Associationof Fe male Municipal Employees (AMUME);and the Paraguayan Network of Women inMunicipal Government (RMMP). In othercountries, there are organizations operat-ing at sub-regional levels, such as theNetwork of Women Councilors of Ayacu-cho in Peru. Additionally, a bi-annual Con-gress of wo men mayors and councilors isheld within the organizational frameworkof the Chi lean Association of Municipali-ties. In 1998, the Latin American andCaribbean Federation of Women in LocalGovernment (FEMUM-ALC) was set up;the organization is linked to FLACMA.

V. Achievements, Limitations andPerspectives on Decentralization

Although progressive and sometimes contra-dictory, the decentralization and strengthen-ing of the municipalities and in ter mediategovernments of Latin America is a reality. Injust over two decades, there have beenimportant achievements.

• Election by the people of local authori-ties has become common, changing theway that parties operate, bringing

In some countries, the associations enjoy a legal status

recognized by national legislation. The majority of countries

also have sub-na tional associations of regional municipalities



about renewal of leadership and trans-forming the municipality into a space inwhich leaders are formed, from whichvarious Presidents of the Republic havealready emerged;

• Multiple constitutional and legalreforms have transformed the states,with competencies and resources beingtransferred to sub-national governments,al though not always with clear strate-gies and methods;

• Sub-national resources have increasedsignificantly, although unevenly, andthe average decentralized continentalexpenditure has risen from 11.6% in1980 to 18.8% of total governmentexpenditure between 2002 and 2005;

• The new responsibilities of the localgovernments translate into progressiveinstitutional development – thoughuneven – where some municipalitiesstand out because of their capacity forinitiatives and innovation, while othersstill cling to their traditional structuresand practices;

• The local spaces for civic democracyhave given rise to new experiences ofparticipation by citizens, such as thestrategic participation plan and partici-patory budgets;

• Experiences in municipal de-concentra-tion or decentralization have also beendeveloped to share management withthe communities and open spaces togroups that were previously marginal-ized (indigenous populations below thepoverty line);

• The new responsibilities of the localgovernments and the transformationof relations with the national govern-ments are expressed in the creationand strengthening of the national andregional associations of local authori-ties;

• In various countries, such as Bolivia,Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador,the positive results attained throughdecentralization are reflected in theincreases of local investment, ex -tension of basic services, improvementin human development indicators,decrea se in poverty and broadenedcitizen participation.

However, the decentralizing process showsgaps and faces obstacles, such as:

• Unequal relations and frequent subordi-nation of the intermediate entities andmunicipalities to the central govern-ments, heightened by the increase infragmentation and municipal hetero-geneity;

• Gaps between the proliferation of legisla-tion and weakness in its application,which may be attributed largely to pre-vailing political and institutional cultures;

• Limited financial capacity of local go -vernments, because of central resist-ance to handing over resources in acon text of macro-economic instability,lack of financing policies and adequatecredit, citizens not used to paying forsubsidized services, but also because ofthe lack of political will to strengthenthe local capacity to collect taxes;

• Low efficiency of many local adminis-trations in delivering services, becauseof the absence of human resource poli-cies and bad handling of personnel(rotation, lack of career paths), result-ing in a low level of efficiency and pro-fessionalism in local personnel;

• Limitations in civic participation in de -velopment management due to a lackof adequate financial and local humanresources, poor adaptation of centrallaws and policies, and difficulties inorganizing and mobilizing the actualcommunities.

A bi-annual

Congress of

wo men mayors

and councilors is

held within the

organizational

framework

of the Chilean

Association of

Municipalities

57. Centralized

establishment of

remunerations by

local authorities,

cutting of transfers

and centralization

of decisions to

finance projects.

LATIN AMERICA202

The decentralizing process in Latin Amer-ica has shown diverse and contradictorysigns, and is passing through a moment ofuncertainty. In big countries like Brazil,there is a need to review the federal pactand transfer policies in order to deal withthe growing cost of the new responsibili-ties of edu cation and health.

In Argentina, party political centralism con-tinues to be a limiting factor for local auton-omy, particularly at the provincial level. InRepública Bolivariana de Venezuela, it isfeared that the government will interveneincreasingly in the provincial states andmunicipalities, cutting down their autonomy.

In Mexico, where democratization ofnational and local political life has madesignificant advances, strong pressure per-sists on the federal government to moveforward with questions of federalism anddecentralization.

In some unitary states, this process hasbeen slowing down. In Colombia, localgo vernment spending is controlled inorder to reduce the fiscal deficit of thecentral government. During the lastyears, de centralization has not beenintensifying. In Colombia, sub-nationalexpenditure is controlled to alleviate thedeficit of central government, and thedecentralization pro cess has not deep-ened over the last years. In Ecuador, thetransfer of competencies is at a standstill;local authorities are asking the govern-ment to undertake concrete measures tore-launch the process. In Peru, localauthorities have shown concern aboutrecent unwelcome measures taken by thenational government57.

In Bolivia, where local governments nowadminister half of the national publicinvestment, the rigidity of the transfer sys-tem and the overlap of responsibilities at

the local, regional and state levels, gener-ate tensions between the municipal andde partmental levels. In the framework ofthe current Constituent Assembly, the to -pic of decentralization and regionaliza-tion is at the heart of the national politi-cal debate.

However, in Peru, Ecuador and the Domini-can Republic, intended constitutionalreforms have positive implications for localgovernments. In the Dominican Republic,a new Law of Presupuesto Participativo orParticipatory Budget has been passed, anda new Municipal Law is expected.

Meanwhile, in Chile the national govern-ment and the Chilean Association ofMunicipalities are negotiating a new Munic-ipal Reform to increase the responsibilitiesand resources of the municipalities withthe hope of stimulating local developmentand re ducing social and territorial inequal-ities.

In those countries with more incipientprocesses, the situation seems stable. InParaguay, control from central govern-ment continues to be decisive in theaction of the sub-national governments,although the Paraguayan Organization ofInter-municipal Cooperation, OPACI, haspresented a project to the national go -vernment to pass a law reforming mu ni -cipal legislation.

In Uruguay, various “Intendencias Depar-

tamentales” (department executives) insistthat the Local Commissions or Juntas befurther strengthened, and propose newme chanisms of citizen participation. Thereis a new bill in parliament for Local Decen-tralization, which intends by 2010 to bringthe public administration closer to the peo-ple through the municipal authorities intowns or villages with more than 2,500 in -habitants.



VI. Conclusion

Despite advances in decentralization, LatinAmerica is still a continent with a highdegree of political, territorial and economiccentralization, exacerbated by concentra-tion in the metropolises and immense so -cial and territorial disparities.

In the near future, new debates are envis-aged. New centralizing trends have emergedthat are curtailing local self-government,such as the accreditation of local capacitiesneeded in Costa Rica to qualify for the trans-fer of responsibilities and resources. Publicpurchase58, information and monitoring sys -tems –through administrative mechanisms–

control, condition and restrict municipalautonomy.

The decentralizing experiences havereignited the debate about the impor-tance of local development for sustain-able and socially equitable developmentat the na tional level. The issue of goodlocal go vernance is emphasized andunderstood as a form of territorial self-government based on participatory net-works of local actors, public-privatealliances and the mobilization of own ter-ritorial resources to activate the endoge-nous processes of de ve lop ment.

Despite advances

in decentralization,

Latin America is still

a continent with a

high degree of

political, territorial

and economic

centralization,

exacerbated by

concentration in the

metropolises and

immense social and

territorial

disparities

58. In Chile, Chile Compras, as the only public sector purchasing website, is presented as an example of procedural transparency and

rationalization of public purchasing for central government and municipalities. Yet it is not very practical for local governments,

as it displaces local providers, favors national companies and slows down the administrative process, to the detriment of

municipal responsiveness to the demands of the community.

MIDDLE EA ST / WESTERN ASIA

MUSTAPHA ADIB

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA206 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 207

1. Insofar as there does

not exist any

generally accepted

definition of the

terms ‘Near East’

and ‘Middle East,’

we shall refer to the

former Levant,

(Lebanon, Syria, the

West Bank and

Gaza, and Jordan)

as the ‘Near East,’

and the countries of

the Arabian

Peninsula, Iraq, and

Islamic Republic of

Iran, as the ‘Middle

East.’ Turkey for

our purposes here is

considered part of

Western Asia.

The religious factor

is omnipresent

throughout

the region, in the

constitution and

across private and

political spheres

I. Introduction

The geographical region of Western Asia/theMiddle East encompasses Turkey, the NearEast1 –with the exception of Is rael–, the Ara-bian Peninsula, and Western Asia, includingIslamic Republic of Iran. The region has, formany decades, undergone political, military,ethnic, and religious tensions that ha veaffected its stability. Of the countries that wewill be examining, seven are mo narchies(Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, SaudiArabia and United Arab Emirates), six arerepublics (Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq,Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Ye men) and theautonomous territory of Pa lestine, which hasnot yet all the attributes of a state. IndeedTurkey is the only coun try that has enjoyedstability, for se veral decades, based on secu-lar and democratic institutions. The religiousfactor is also im portant and omnipresentthroughout the region, in the constitution andacross private and political spheres.

This grouping of over 260 million inhabitantsis dominated from the demographic stand-point by Turkey (74.7 million inhabitants)and Islamic Republic of Iran (69.5 million).The population is now predominantly urban(Syria 50.1%, Islamic Republic of Iran 67%,Iraq 67.2%, Turkey 67.3%, Oman 77.6%,Jordan 79%, Lebanon 87.5%, Kuwait96.3%), with the ex ception of Yemen(25.6%). But the exis tence of a few indus-trialized economies and the wealth gener-ated by oil revenues must not lead one tooverlook either the huge differences thatexist between the countries of the region, ortheir sometimes mediocre performances interms of education, governance, and free-dom –performances which were highlightedby the 2004 UNDP report.

Nevertheless, in spite of the ceaseless polit-ical, military, and religious tensions, warsand other perennial obstacles to the regions’stability as a whole, and certainly to thedevelopment of local autonomy and decen-tralization, some advances deserve recogni -tion: the first local elections in Saudi Arabia,the holding of democratic local elections in

the West Bank and Gaza, the restoration ofmayoral elections by universal suffrage inJordan, and the 2002 constitutional reformsin Bahrain. Under pressure from elite seg-ments of their populations, Islamic Republicof Iran and Kuwait have also begun tentativechanges in this direction. Turkey, which hashad a modern municipal system since 1930and whose citizens as a whole supportdecentralization as one of the criteria formembership of the European Union, is some-thing of an exception to this description;three new laws favorable to decentralizationwere adopted in Turkey in 2004-2005.

These changes, however, cannot conceala broader trend throughout the region–Turkey excepted– toward the gradualconfiscation of local authority by centralgo vernments. In certain cases, even thetasks of providing street cleaning, se wermaintenance, and public health meas-ures, are being taken away from local go -vernments. The most extreme case isJordan where the provision of 13 differ-ent types of service has been taken backby the state. This form of centralizedcontrol typically involves privatization,under the pretext of improving efficiencyand overall services.

Decentralization only appears in the consti-tutions of Lebanon, Syria, Islamic Republicof Iran, and Turkey. Turkey has a middle-level local go vernment, but in the otherthree countries decentralization applies toonly the lowest tier, municipalities.

Apart from the Sultanate of Oman, SaudiArabia, and Bahrain, where the roles of themunicipal councils have been defined fromthe start as purely and openly consultative,legislation in other countries in this region– especially Kuwait and Turkey – doesgrant certain powers to local authorities.

Nevertheless, the existing laws rarelypresent a precise list of local powers, suchspecifics being the province of futureimplementation orders promised but neverpublished. The vagueness of such laws

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA208

crea tes overlapping areas of responsibilityin practically all fields. The central govern-ment uses this vagueness to retain most ofthe powers, leaving municipal authoritieswith only derisory duties.

Reliance on conveniently vague laws typi-cally results in a paucity of financial re -sources for local authorities, and the con -comitant restriction of the services localgovernments can realistically provide. Apartfrom Turkey, the only economy in whichlocal authorities have decent (al though notlarge) resources at their disposal is theWest Bank and Gaza, where they keep up to90% of the taxes they collect plus incomeprovided by non-government organizations(NGOs). In the majority of nations in theregion, obtaining money for operations andservices requires unceasing appeals to thecentral government, or to the organizationsthat manage national finances. One result:increasing levels of debt.

A single figure is enough to describe thescale of the problem. Whereas the localgovernment share of public expenditurerepresents 20% of the gross domesticproduct (GDP) in OECD countries, moneyfor local government averages only about5% of GDP in the Arab countries.

Furthermore, with the exception of Turkey,local authorities’ limited financial inde-pendence is coupled with a priori adminis-trative control of local council proceedings,as well as a posteriori control of all work bylo cal authorities. Together, these two mea -su res ensure complete control of local po -wers by central government.

By contrast with Turkey, there is, in IslamicRepublic of Iran and Syria, ‘cascading’ super-vision of lower councils by higher councils. Inthe West Bank and Gaza repeated outbreaksof violence often make it impossible to sub-mit matters to the central power, leavinglocal authorities with de facto autonomy.

Local governance is underpinned by localde mocracy, which is itself boosted and

supported by civil society. Within the re -gion, the voice of civil society is sometimeshesitant to make its opinions heard, andthis in turn has repercussions for decen-tralization and local government.

This trend toward centralization has expe-rienced an unprecedented intensificationsince the first Gulf War. In fact, because ofa particularly unstable geo-strategic situa-tion due to the upsurge of armed conflicts,the heightening of community and sectar-ian tensions and the interplay of interna-tional pressure, the governments of theregion are haunted by the fear of thebreak-up of national entities. This is partic-ularly the case where the ethnic or reli-gious groups in power are a minority, orcomprise a very slight majority. In IslamicRepublic of Iran, which is a mosaic of 80communities, 51% of the population isPersian; in Lebanon, 18 communities, eachwith a different religion, live together; Jor-dan has a very strong Palestinian minority;and several countries in the region have alarge Kurdish community.

II. Evolution of Local GovernmentStructures

The following table presents local govern-ment organization in the region.

Before going further with an analysis of theregion’s governmental structures and theirrecent evolution, it is necessary to empha-size that Turkey is unique in this part of theworld. Turkey is included in this study of theNear East and Middle East because of itsgeographical location at the gates of theLevant, and its majority Muslim religion.However, as Yves Lacoste has stressed,“The North-South model experiences astumbling block in the very exceptional caseof Turkey”2. Turkey is a secular state adja-cent to Europe, but most of its residents areIslamic. Turkey is geographically part of theMiddle East; its topography affects manyMiddle Eastern states, and has done so forcountless millennia. Within the frameworkof a secular state, Turkey is rela tively cen-

With the exception

of Turkey, local

authorities’ limited

financial

independence is

coupled with

a priori

administrative

control of local

council

proceedings, as

well as a posteriori

control of all work

by local authorities


2. Yves Lacoste,

Géopolitique,

Larousse, 2006,

p. 227.


Country/ Population / land area Political regime Federal entities or Second tier Local levelterritory autonomous regions

Bahrain

Iran , Isl. Rep.

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

West Bankand Gaza

Yemen

Source: World Bank 2005, except: * Source: World Bank 2004. ** Source: World Bank 2003. *** Source: World Bank 2002

Municipality RegionGovernorateDistrict

KurdistanParliamentary republic26.5 m ** 438,320 km2

GDP (per capita): 928 USD***

MunicipalityEmirates (7)Federation of absolute monarchies (Emirates)

4.5 m 83,600 km2

GDP (per capita): 23,770 USD*

Regional council (7)Principal council (5)Council (107)Group of villages (64)

Province (13)GovernorateCenter (A or B)

Absolute monarchy24.6 m 2,149,700 km2

GDP (per capita):11,770 USD

Municipality (3,519)3

16 Metropolitan Municipalities Village (35,000)

Special departmental administration (81)

Parliamentary republic72.6 m 783,820 km2

GDP (per capita): 4,710 USD

Town (107)Small town (248)Village (207)Rural unit

Department (14)Authoritarian presidential republic

19 m 185,180 km2


Municipality (10)Absolute monarchy (Emirate)0.813 m 11,000 km2

GDP (per capita): 28,833 USD***

Municipality (43)Absolute monarchy (Sultanate)2.6 m 309,500 km2


Municipality (930)Region (6) (Mohafazah)Department (Caza)

Parliamentary republic3.6 m 10,452 km2


Municipality Governorate (5)Absolute monarchy (Emirate)2.5 m 17,818 km2


Municipality (99)Governorate (12)Constitutional monarchy5.4 m 88,800 km2


City/town (931)Small townVillage

Province (28)Department (314)

Islamic republic67.7 m 1,648,200 km2


Municipality (12)Constitutional monarchy0.727 m 690 km2


Table 1 Administrative Organization

3. Beside these ordinary municipalities, the metropolitan municipalities provide urban services at the

metropolitan level to ensure greater efficiency, as well as harmonization and coordination between municipal

districts. The metropolitan municipalities supervise and provide assistance for district municipalities.

3.5 m 5,842 km2 (The West Bank)+365 km2 (Gaza Strip)

‘Palestinian Authority’ Governorate (14) (9 in the West Bank5 in the Gaza Strip)

Municipality (74)(63 in the West Bank11 in the Gaza Strip)

21 m 527.970 km2

GDP (per capita): 600 USDAuthoritarian presidential republic

Governorates Municipality (326)Provincial municipality (20)District municipality (326)


tralized, but its local go vern ment system issubject to a constitutional jurisprudencethat is extraordinary in the re gion.

Turkey is the only pluralist secular demo -cra cy, and has always attached great im -portance to developing its relations withEuro pean countries. Historically, Turkishcul ture has had a profound impact overmuch of Eastern and Southern Europe. Af -ter the First World War and the proclama-tion of the Turkish Republic in 1923, theKe malism, to which the present Turkishsta te is heir, deliberately distinguished itspo litical and social system from that of theArab countries. This was particularly em -phasized by the abolition of the Caliphateand the adoption of the Latin alphabet,mo dified only slightly4. Turkey’s modernde mocratic conception and acceptablyfunc tional institutions present more con-trast than similarity to other Middle Easternna tions. This contrast is no less appa rent inregard to decentralization.

II.1. The Objectives of Decentralization

By means of constitutional and legislativereforms during the past ten years, all thecountries in the region have embarkedupon a change of direction towardincreased administrative decentralization.However, far from being uniform, theunderlying motives and results are quitedifferent and wide-ranging.

a) External factors

Membership of the European Union. As acountry where decentralizing reforms areincreasing in scale, Turkey has been moti-vated by its desire to gain membership ofthe European Union, whose criteria formembership include respect for humanrights. It is therefore within the frameworkof the European Charter of Local Self-Go -vernment, signed in 1988 and ratified in1992, that this wide-ranging renovation ofstate structures – including new local go -vernment laws and constitutionalchanges – is taking place.

U.S.A. policy in the region. The United Sta -tes maintains a military presence in the re -gion, particularly in Iraq. The promotion ofthe principles of « good governance » anddemocracy have become the declared USpolicy in the region. With the on-goingsupport of different countries, the UnitedSta tes sustains its regional policy throughdirect and indirect means.

Economic pressures. Along with political pres-sures and within a context of neoconservativeglobalization, the non-petroleum-producingcountries – Lebanon, Jor dan, and Pa lestine –face demands from international backers forthe restructuring, not only of their weakeconomies, but also of their societies. Thestrengthening or the establishment of localgovernment is one of the pillars of thesereforms in that it constitutes the first step inapplying the principles of good governance.

b) Internal factors

Internal population pressure. Although ci -vilian society is not accustomed to ma kingits voice heard, there has recently been anin creasing demand for local democracy bytwo groups whose interests converge onlyin this single area. Both appear to see inmo ves toward democracy the means ofbrin ging victory to their overall concept ofthe state. One group, often re ferred to asradicals, wants a more rigid system of go -vernment. The other group, the intellectualelite, wants to establish real democracy. Anexample of this urging toward democracy isthe 100 Saudi intellectuals who in Ja nua ry2003 presented the Crown Prince with a peti-tion requesting changes; similar pressure ledthe Jordanian government to restore theelection of mayors by universal suffrage.

Coming to terms with demands for auto -

nomy. In the specific case of Iraq, where in -ternal pressures are nationalist in nature,decentralization has enabled the granting ofextensive autonomy, including legislative po -wers, to Kurdistan. However, these powersdo not grant or imply independence for thatregion.

Turkey is the only

pluralist secular

demo cra cy,

and has always

attached great

im portance to

developing its

relations with

Euro pean countries


4. These reforms also

fell within the

framework of the

‘Six Arrows’ as

Ataturk’s general

nationalist policy

aimed to ensure the

modernization of

Turkey.


The need for economic restructuring. Withthe exceptions of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan,and Yemen, the economies of the region arebased on oil; only Syria and Turkey can beconsidered industrialized countries.

Yet the exhaustion of oil reserves in the nearfuture appears likely5. The governments ofoil-producing nations are therefore trying toanticipate a profound structural change intheir economies to facilitate rapid expansionof private initiative. This concerns Syria inparticular. Dubai, which does not have anyoil, but which benefits from oil revenuesthrough the federation of the Emirates, re -presents a striking example of success inthis type of restructuring.

Restoring impetus to governance in ge -

neral. After almost 30 years of system-atic destruction of Palestinian statestruc tures by Israel, the Palestinians,according to the 1993 Oslo Accords,wanted to set their state structures backon their feet in order to construct a state.However, as it is impossible to establish areal central government inasmuch asthere is no territorial continuity betweenthe West Bank and the Gaza Strip, theonly way of providing services to thepeople and to enable them to take effec-tive action regarding the affairs whichconcern them is through the local gov-ernments. This removal of centralauthority has greatly increased publicconfidence and trust in local Palestiniangovernment, the institution closest to itscitizens.

It is surprising that providing better publicservices is mentioned as a concern only inTurkey. One explanation may be that, forthis purpose, administrative decentraliza-tion (déconcentration) in Saudi Arabia, anda rather authoritarian management areperceived as quite effective. In fact, themanagement of the city of Dubai, which isa resounding success in terms of townplan ning, infrastructure, economic deve -lop ment, and service provision, results so -lely from the will of the Emir.

II.2. Encouraging Progress

In Turkey, where the decentralizationprocess is most advanced, three newreforms6 were passed in 2004-2005. Fur-thermore, the 2005 union of municipali-ties’ law7 will fi nally make the villages areal tier of de centralization. It is now pos-sible for the lo cal authorities, on their owninitiative, to or ganize referendums on spe-cific local is sues —an interesting system ofdirect democracy.

Likewise, Iraq’s 2004 constitution establi -shes decentralization as a priority, (Iraq’s1990 constitution did not) devoting anentire chapter to “regions, governorates,and mu nicipalities.” This document sanc-tions the autonomy of Kurdistan, whichbecomes a “region” with a regional govern-ment, par liament, and judicial authority.Moreover, it encourages the creation ofregions by the grouping together of gover-norates. In addition, and in contrast toother countries of the region, exceptTurkey, where ad ministrative decentraliza-tion (dé con cen tra tion) and de le gation pre-vail, Iraq’s new cons titution or ganizesdecentralization on the basis of the admin-istrative and financial autonomy of lo calauthorities, including regional and mu ni -cipal councils8.

Following this same trend, in 1999 IslamicRepublic of Iran finally achieved a long-standing reform: the elections of councils.This reform was first presented as far backas the 1907 Cons titutional Revolution, andwas again cham pioned after the revolutionof 1979. Some 92 years after it was firstproposed, this change took effect underthe presidency of the reformer Khatami.

Another important reform is currently inprogress in Jordan, a country whose kinghas made good governance principles oneof the national objectives. This reformaims to divide the country into threeregions, each of which will have its ownregional par liament as well as local man-agement of its own affairs.

5. On this subject, it is

interesting to

compare the official

figures provided by

the governments

and the large oil

companies with

those provided by

ASPO.

6. On the municipalities

(no. 5393 of 3 July

2005), on the

metropolitan

municipalities (no.

5216 of 10 July

2004) and on the

special

administration of

the department (law

no. 5302 of 22

February 2005).

7. Law no. 5355 of 26

May 2005.

8. In actual fact, this is

only really applied in

the north, in

Kurdistan.

Elsewhere, the local

authorities only

enjoy a weak level

of autonomy, and it

is not uncommon to

find that municipal

councilors and

mayors are

appointed directly.


Lebanon used to have properly functioningmunicipal governance, but this lost all sub-stance during the 1975-1990 war, as secu-rity concerns led to the centralizing of allservices within the different ministries.Executive power was concentrated9 in theoffice of a President of the Republic, whowas always a Maronite Christian. However,at the end of the war, the Taëf Pact, a con-stitutionally valid document signed to put anend to the war, made more room for allcommunities. In the first place, executivepower passed to the Council of Ministers,whose members represent different faiths inproportion to their demographic importance.The document also mentions administrativedecentralization as one of the main areas forreform, thereby distinguishing itself fromthe constitution, which does not mention itat all. The new accord directs that “a moreextensive decentralization be adopted at thelevel of the smallest administrative units”10

and that “the municipalities, agglomera-tions, and unions of municipalities see theirresources strengthened by the provision ofthe ne cessary financial resources”11. Withinthis fra mework, it became far easier for localcommunities to voice their demands for agreater degree of self-government; the cre-ation of 25 municipalities since 2004 tes -tifies to the acceptance of this reform at highlevels of the Lebanese state.

In a similar case, the Palestinian Authority,which was formed as a result of the OsloAccords, was especially keen to proceedwith the strengthening of local government.The population naturally made these bodiesits favorite forum for public expression ofdemands, including practical re questsregarding services. All this was in a situ-ation where the increasingly weak states, orthe mokhtars12, who had lost the confidenceof the population because of their suspectrole during the occupation, were not in aposition to ensure the provision of services.As viable power centers, these municipali-ties are becoming increasingly autonomous.

Two other cases also deserve mention. InBahrain the new constitution, promulgated

in 2002, states that13 the law ”will do so asto ensure the independence of local author-ities under the supervision and direction ofthe State,” and “will do so as to ensure thatthe local authorities are able to manageand supervise local affairs.” In Saudi Ara-bia, the first election of half the municipalcouncilors was organized in 2005.

Yet in Turkey the reform of the executivecommittees (encümen) –the entitiesresponsible for municipal management–still rai ses concerns. In fact, each tier ofdecentralization –Special Provincial Admin-istrations (SPA), ordinary and metropolitanmu nicipality and village– has a deliberativebody called a council, which is elected byuniversal suffrage. At the municipal andvillage level, the executive officer (themayor or the Muhtar respectively) is alsoelected by universal suffrage. On the otherhand, at the top provincial level is a gover-nor appointed by the state. Moreover, eachcouncil works in conjunction with an exec-utive body called the ‘executive commit-tee.’ Before the reform, this executivecommittee was fully appointed in the me -tropolitan municipalities, fully elected inthe SPA and half was elected and half wasappointed in the ordinary municipalities.The new legislation directs that, withoutexception, half of all executive committeesmust be elected and half must be appoin ted.Although this measure is based on a man-agerial vision of local government man-agement, the presence on an executivecom mittee of members appointed by themayor or the governor runs counter to thefull exercise of local democracy and decen-tralization. It is, moreover, the interpreta-tion that the Turkish Constitutional Courtgave of it14 in 1988: all deliberative bo diesmust be elected. It is therefore not impos-sible that these texts will be amended inthe near future.

Likewise, according to the new law15, theSPA council now elects a chairman fromamong its own members. Although thischairman is responsible for the council agen -da, it is the governor who stays at the


9, Lebanese

constitution, art. 17.

10. Taëf Pact [III : A,

art. 3].

11, Id. Art. 4

12. Maire de quartier.

This institution

exists in many Arab

countries, including

Lebanon.

13, Art. 50.

14. Notice no. 1988/23

of 22 June 1988 and

decision no.

1988/19 of 13 June

1988.

15. Law no. 5302 of 4

March 2005, art. 11.


head of the executive committee and whorepresents the SPA16.

In Islamic Republic of Iran, the new lawregarding councils, which was adopted atits first reading by the Islamic ConsultativeAssembly, also seems intended to restrictthe councils’ room to maneuver.

II.3. The Persistence of the CentralizedModel

a) Central state supervision

These advances toward further decentral-ization are quite significant, even though,for the most part, they are still reforms onpaper or are restricted to administrativedecentralization only. Most such reformsstill await the fiscal and economic decentral-ization that is essential for their implemen-tation. Consequently, the standard systemof government in the region re mainsstrongly centralized. Moreover, it bearsmentioning that some countries, such asOman and Qatar, do not even mention localpowers in their constitution. In Saudi Ara-bia, provisions for local governance are alsoabsent from the constitution; instead, theyare specified in a se parate text, the 1992‘law on the provinces.’ Even this documentdoes not deal with municipalities. Rather itaddresses only provinces, all of which arecontrolled by princes of the royal family.

Independent decision-making by localauthorities is allowed in Turkey, the WestBank and Gaza, and Iraq, but in other coun-tries in the region, real decisions are madeonly by higher authorities, either a singledesignated official or some lesser officialsholding power through a complex of arcanelaws. Where there is a clear, single channelof authority, municipalities are subject de

facto and de jure to government authoritythrough their relevant ministry. This is thecase in Saudi Arabia, where local authoritiesare dependent on the Ministry of Rural andMunicipal Affairs. In Jordan, little can bedone without the backing of the territory’s

governor; in Bahrain, Oman, and Lebanonup to 80% of the decisions must be checkedby the Ministry of the Interior, or by a gov-ernor with regional executive po wers.

Other governments practice a more insidi-ous form of control. Under the guise of anominal freedom to make decisions, anarsenal of measures appreciably limit thedecision-making powers of local authori-ties.

‘Cascading supervision.’ In Syria and IslamicRepublic of Iran, there is ‘cascading supervi-sion’ of lower-tier councils by higher-tiercouncils. In Islamic Republic of Iran, theconstitution specifies, moreover, that “theprovincial governors and the ma yors […]must apply, within their jurisdiction, thedecisions of the Higher Provincial Council”17,a fact that clearly calls into question publicprofessions of a desire for de centralization.

The executive committees. Two countrieshave, in addition to local councils, municipallegislative bodies vested with executivepowers; these are called executive commit-tees in Turkey, executive bureaux in Syria.While the members of local councils areelected by the people, the members ofexecutive committees or the executive bu -

reaux, are appointed by more or less directprocedures18. In Turkey, the constitution19

defines local authorities as bodies that havea legal personality, and whose legislativebodies are elected. This, in fact, opens theway to the election of all or part of themem bers of the executive committees, asmuch at the Special Provincial Administra-tion level as at the municipality level20.

Syria’s case is slightly different. There athird of the members of the executivebody can be recruited from outside themunicipal council –on the basis of criteriawhich are far from clear.

The ambivalent role of popular councils. Inaddition to the municipal councils, themahalle muh tarligi (neighborhood coun-cils) chaired by a muhtar have existed in

16. Id. Art. 25 et 29.

17. Art. 103 ‘Of the

power [of the Higher

Provincial Council]

on local

government.’

18. In Turkey, the

appointed half of the

executive council is

selected by the

mayor from among

the municipality’s

chief officers, within

the framework of

the ‘strong mayor

system.’

19. Art. 127.

20. The Turkish

Constitutional Court

has ruled that the

executive councils

are governing

bodies and that their

members must be

elected.


Turkey since the Ottoman Empire. Theyare very similar to the Lebanese mokhtar.The role of these local community leaderswas made official by Article 9 of the newmunicipal law.21 This law gives them offi-cial functions, no tably in the field of theregistration of births, marriages, anddeaths, and in tax collection. In addition,they ensure contact with the municipalityand represent their local community areaon the ‘town councils’ by passing on therequests and comments of the people fromtheir administrative area. Introduced bythe new municipal law, the “city council”–kent konseyi– is a consultative institu-tion, an outcome brought by the success ofthe Turkey Local Agenda 21 Program. Thisconstitutes a unique mechanism of gover-nance in Turkey that brings together thecentral government, lo cal government andcivil society within a framework of partner-ship. In general, this participatory mecha-nism encompasses a broad spectrum oflocal stakeholders, representatives ofworking groups, neighborhood commit-tees, women and youth councils.

In other countries, however, authoritiesworking in parallel with the municipalcouncil can represent an important opposi-tion force in the hands of the central go -vernment, particularly when they have thepotential to report on and perhaps slowdown the work of the municipal councils. Itis this second situation which applies forthe Syrian ‘popular organizations,’ whichrepresent various socio-professional cate-gories, such as manual workers, farmers,and women, and which must make up atleast 60% of local councils. Furthermore,their elected representatives, even thosenot on the municipal council, have theright to monitor their activities.

b) The weight of the political and social system

The report of the United Nations Develop-ment Programme (UNDP) indicates that“the progress in the field of decentraliza-tion in the Arab countries has been very

slow, particularly because of the unevenlevel of involvement in decentralizing re -forms.”22 In fact, it is difficult not to see inthe persistent strong centralization areluctance on the part of the governmentsof the region to accept local governanceand the independence inherent therein.

The refusal of a loss of sovereignty. Themain reason for government distrust of lo -cal governance is fear of a loss of sover-eignty. Excluding Turkey, where powerbelongs to the institutions, governing tra-dition is based on the personal exercise ofpower, with the government, on its owninitiative, delegating a part to people of itsown choice. Given this context, to put inplace real decentralization would require acomplete overhaul of state structures,beginning in some cases with a separationof powers and election of legislative bodiesby universal suffrage.

In the particular case of Lebanon, whichnevertheless satisfies these conditions, theonly area of agreement of the traditionalcommunity leaders is their wish to put abrake on the resumption of municipal go -ver nance. In fact, they consider local mu -nicipal authorities to be usurping some oftheir prerogatives. They seem to believethat municipal authorities are onlyintended to provide services for their sup-porters in exchange for their votes. Thisvicious circle keeps the local councils in astate of lethargy. Members of parliament,who are themselves traditional leaders orwho owe allegiance to them, use their leg-islative position to gradually weaken thepower of the municipalities.

This analysis is equally valid for thosestates where members of the ruling fami-lies, or those of a political party, or of adominant movement have all the power.

The security factor. The other factor whichhinders the decentralization of the states issecurity. Some large fault-lines cross theregion, the main one being the communityorganization. In fact, the risk of subversion is


21. Law no. 5393.

22. ELISSAR SARROUH,

Decentralized

Governance for

Development in the

Arab States, report

presented during

the forum on

governance in the

Arab states, Sana’a,

6-9 September

2003.


far from negligible in those states with a largeShiite community, as in Saudi Arabia, Iraq,and Bahrain. Neither are Islamic Republic ofIran, Lebanon, and Iraq safe from implosion.

The inertia of civilian society. Again ex cep -ting Turkey, those in power are not alone intheir indifference to decentralization. In thegeneral population, it is mostly identifiablegroups who desire increased de cen -tralization. Such groups include the cu l turedurban elite, extremist parties, and thosewho see it as a means to autonomy or evensovereign independence.

Civilian society reduced to its most simpleexpression is typically comprised to agreater or lesser degree of client net-works, which are perceived as being moreefficient and more reliable than the state,sharp di vi sions among different culturaland religious communities, and a wide-spread tra dition of submission to centralauthority. Indeed, in this region the desirefor freedom is embodied far more in reli-gion than in politics, suggesting that thelarger citizenry plays an insignificant roleas a driving force for change. Evidence forthis is the absence of political parties insix of the 14 countries studied (Saudi Ara-bia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates,Kuwait, Oman and Qatar). In Jordan,political parties were not legalized until1992. Further support for the weakness ofpolitical sys tems for expressions of popu-lar will can also be seen in the rapidexpansion of radical religious movements.It is through religious organizations thatwe receive calls for reform, the popularexpression of demands that can not bevoiced successfully by political means.

The influence of the religious factor. Mostof the countries in the region base theirlegislation on the Sharia. This is the caseof Saudi Arabia, (Const. art. 1), Bahrain(Art. 2), Islamic Republic of Iran (Art. 2),Jordan (Art. 2), Kuwait (Art. 2), Oman(Art. 2), Qatar (Art. 2), and Yemen (Art.3). The Syrian Constitution establishes aslight nuance by indicating that “Islamic

jurisprudence will be one of the mainsources of legislation.” The exceptions areTurkey and Iraq, which are secular states,and Lebanon, where a hy brid systementrusts private legal matters to the reli-gious tribunals of each religious commu-nity, Christian or Muslim, but takes as itsbasis secular business and public law.

The original feature of Islam in comparisonwith other religions is that it provides guid-ance not only on private life, but also onthe system of government. This, however,does not mean that its interpretation istotally unequivocal, and the two famousayets —“Consult them in the affairs whichconcern them”23 and “Let them consulteach other”24— gives rise to a wide rangeof interpretations. It is on the narrowest ofthese interpretations that Saudi Arabia,Bah rain, and Oman have based their deci-sion to replace the legislative bodies with aconsultative assembly, the Majlis-al-Shu -

ra; the same ayets have, on the otherhand, given rise to the election of councilsin Islamic Republic of Iran and Jordan.

The perception of a supranational iden ti ty.

With the exception of Oman and Turkey, allthe countries of the region claim in theirconstitutions to be an “Arab nation,”(Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar,Syria, and Yemen), or an “Islamic nation”(Islamic Republic of Iran); both in the caseof Saudi Arabia. This is seen as the ulti-mate goal toward which the national struc-ture would be a stage. It is a question ofthe translation into political terms of thesense of belonging to the Umma (the com-munity of Islamic believers). This mythicidentity would in no case succeed in result-ing in a federal reality, but it tells us a gooddeal about religious aspirations and aboutthe dominance of the group over the indi-vidual, and of global over local policy.

Between necessary change and an in ward-

looking identity: Most of the countries ofthe region are recent in origin, and arecurrently grappling with two major trends:the wish for change and modernization,

23. Koran, [3:159].

24. Koran, [42:38].


and the influence of Islamic movements.Caught in the crossfire between globaliza-tion and an inward-looking identity, andfaced with real threats of destabilization, anumber of leaders prefer to play the stabil-ity card to the detriment of structuralreforms – all the more so because suchre forms are sometimes perceived as beingencouraged by the West.

II.4. Specific Structures for the Organization of the Metropolitan Cities

The region of Western Asia/Middle East en -compasses 28 big cities of more than amillion people25. In 2006 these citiestogether had 77.14 million people whichrepresents 37% of the whole population ofthe region26.The metropolis experienced avery fast growth: 10.6% between 2005 and2006 compared to only 2.56% experiencedby the population of the whole region.

Only Turkey in 1984 granted its majorcities the special status of ‘metropolitanmunicipalities,’ a status that was reformedin 200427. Turkey’s 16 metropolitan munic-ipalities have a total population of 25.9million inhabitants –38% of the country’stotal population.

This special political status enables Turkishcities to be run with comparative effi-ciency. Big cities are divided into two lev-els: the proper metropolitan municipality,and the ordinary first-tier municipalities.The metropolitan municipality is responsi-ble for urban services: urban planning,large parks and green areas, collection anddisposal of household and industrialwastes, water, sewerage, natural gas andpublic transportation, establishing andoperating marketplaces for wholesalersand slaughterhouses, sports, leisure andlarge recreation areas.

Nevertheless, the latest reform was keento encourage coordination and cooperationbetween the two levels, as well as among

the different municipal councils that makeup the metropolitan municipality. If thisreform has indeed successfully strength-ened the metropolitan municipalities’range of activities, some balance remains.On one side, a mayor elected by direct uni-versal suffrage; on the other, the presenceof members of the first-tier ordinarymunicipality councils within his council.

In other countries, there is no special sta-tus for big cities, although this has beendis cussed, but never undertaken in Jordan.

Only Amman, Beirut, and Damascus havespecial status, and this only in matters ofsecurity. Their municipal councils areessentially deliberative bodies with no realpower.

Regarding the organization of metropo-lises, some are based on a hierarchicalmo del, e.g. a central municipality vestedwith the executive authority and lowerlevel mu nicipalities the functions of whichare mainly licenses (such as deliveringbuilding permits) and administrative work.This is the case, for example, in Amman.Others follow a “horizontal” model, withequal status, as for example Mashad inSaudi Arabia.

However, in most cases there are big citieswith a municipal council vested with exec-utive and legislative functions; there existsometimes inner city district municipali-ties, whose status goes from pu re execu-tive bodies (Tehran) to consultative bodies(Baghdad). In this case, su rrounding munic-ipalities located in the me tropolitan areaare subject to the regional authority (re -gion or governorate).

The case of Dubai is exceptional. The ma na -gement of the city has been devised as foran enterprise, the head of which is a ge -neral di rector.

It is clear that, apart from the exceptions ofTurkey and some cities elsewhere, such asAmman and Dubai, the exponential de ve -


25. In decreasing order

of their population in

2006: Tehran,

Istanbul, Baghdad,

Riyadh, Ankara,

Ispahan, Jeddah,

Amman, Izmir, Alep,

Mashed, Damas,

Kuwait, Beirut,

Sana, Mosul, La

Mecca, Damn,

Dubai, Tabriz,

Bursa, Gaza, Basra,

Shiraz, Andana,

Gaziantep. Qom and

Ahvaz.

26. In Yemen 8% of the

population, in Syria

and in Islamic

Republic of Iran

25%, in the

Emirates 30%, in

Iraq 37%, in West

Bank and Gaza

38%, in Saudi

Arabia 43%, in

Jordan 46%, in

Lebanon 55% and in

Kuwait 72%.

Bahrain, Oman and

Qatar don’t have

any city of more

than one million

inhabitants.

27. Law no. 5216 of 10

July 2004.


lopment of metropolises has taken authori-ties by surprise. Most have to establish anur ban planning considering all aspects ofthis expansion, in particular socio-economicas pects.

III. Responsibilities, Managementand Finances

III.1. Local Authority Finances

The lack of reliable data and the issue of

transparency. First, it must be acknow led -ged that obtaining reliable up-to-date dataon the finances of local authorities in thisregion is a formidable challenge. Severalfactors limit accessibility to pertinent data:

Practical obstacles to data collection:• The lack of reliable data compiled in

accord with international standards;international organisations have notbeen able to publish comparative dataon public finance in relation to thecountries examined in this report.

• Lack of training for municipal employ eesin the principles of accountancy and inthe exacting standards of accuratebook-keeping.

• Lack of computerization of data, al -though some countries are on the righttrack.

• In the case of the West Bank and Gaza,the destruction of the archives by Israel.

Informal obstacles:• A tradition of secrecy that pervades the

entire region.• Lack of cooperation from some munici-

pal officers.

Few national governments in this regionha ve demonstrated sufficient concern aboutaccounting practices to cause a discernabledecline in the widespread public perceptionof corruption. However, some progress isapparent in a few countries. In Lebanon,Prime Minister Fouad Sanioura introducedan annual independent audit of all the mi -nistries, along with the computerization of

accounting data. Jordan has become amember of the International MonetaryFund’s Government Data DisseminationSys tem and has started to communicateve rifiable data. Saudi Arabia and Oman ha -ve also started to publish their accountingdata, and Turkey has achieved remarkabletransparency, partly due to go vernmentefforts and partly because of a citizens’ ini-tiative called ‘Society Follows the Budget.’

The weakness of local taxation. In Turkey,lo cal expenditure amounts to 4% of theGross Domestic Product (GDP), 75% of thisshare goes to the municipalities and 25% tothe SPAs. This is the highest share of GDPin the region, except Jordan (which is 6%according to UN-POGAR).

In Turkey, the Constitution and the lawsrequire the national government to con-tribute to the financing of local functions.State funding covers little more than 50%of municipal budgets; 55% of these statefunds represent a 6% share of nationaltaxes, redistributed to the municipalities inproportion to their population. Moreover,the metropolitan municipalities receive ashare of 4.1% of the taxes collected in theregion, revenues which in turn are redistrib-uted to the metropolitan municipality itself(55%) and to the municipalities (35%). Afurther 10% is allocated to water and sani-tation. In addition, 15% of the municipalbudget is paid as subsidies from the variousministries. National government subsidiesand transfers assure a mo re balanced distri-bution of financial re sources among local gov-ernments through out the country.

The share of local taxes, those collectedwithin the municipalities’ own financial re -source base, remains rather small, reach-ing only 12.4%. To that are added va rioustaxes paid directly by the municipalities,including taxes on property owner ship,gambling, public shows and ac tivities, aswell as on electricity and gas con sumption.Although small, this local sha re of tax rev-enue collected locally has been increasingsince 1988.


The system’s stumbling block is thatlocal authorities have no taxing rights,with the exception of the tax on propertyowner ship, because they are members ofthe com mittee that fixes the tax base.All the rates, including those for theproperty owner ship tax, are fixed by thecentral go vernment, in accordance witharticle 73 par. 3 of the constitution,which states that “All types of taxes andrights are to be established by the law,”and that the Council of Ministers can beempowered by law, and within the limitslaid down by law, to fix the exemptions,reductions and rates. Between 1980 and1990, the Constitutional Court deliveredseveral rulings which interpreted theseconstitutional provisions as meaning thetermination of any local authority taxingright.

A bill currently under consideration predictsan increase in municipal and SPA re venuesas well as a real equalization; ho wever, itstops short of granting taxing rights to thesebodies.

In Lebanon, own taxation only reaches30% at best. However, the legislation since1992 has gone in the direction of reducingthis type of taxation, and replacing it withtaxes collected by central government –agood example of the political desire toweaken the municipalities. In Syria, localfinances can hardly be said to exist, as allpublic expenditure is included in thenational budget. Local governmentsreceive funding from central governmentfor running expenses, to which unspentbalances are eventually returned (POGAR).

Insufficient and haphazard resources. Oneof the recurring problems of the region’smunicipalities is the lack of resources,which prevents them from successfullycarrying out their functions. In Syria,Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza,and Yemen, the municipalities are poor, oreven very poor. In Jordan the total budg-ets of 99 municipalities increased, in 2006,to 161 million dollars.

As we mentioned earlier, this is partly dueto weak or non-existent local taxing po -wers. The second problem is the low levelof state subsidies, which are haphazardand arbitrary. Most of the time, state fund-ing barely covers operating expenses– so metimes not even that – in economiessuch as Jordan, Lebanon, and the WestBank and Gaza. This does not leave muchleeway for investment potential or thefinancing of cultural and social activities.For that the municipalities have to rely onthe good will of wealthy locals (“evergets”)or people living abroad. There are evenlocal authorities that are so deprived ofdecent resources that the mayors are paidby central go vernment, and all the serv-ices are provided by other bodies.

Moreover, the financing of local authoritiesis under no circumstances considered tobe a priority; services such as health, edu-cation, civil engineering, and water andpower supply, are run either by the min-istries or by centralized sector-based bod-ies. In Islamic Republic of Iran, the pres-ent law on municipalities does not evenmention finances. For that, the earlier lawof 1982 must be consulted. It is also per-haps interesting to note that in Bahrain’sannual budget for 200628, the items‘Municipalities’ and ‘Agriculture’ appearunder the heading of ‘Miscellaneous,’ alongwith the upkeep of the royal stud farms.

In the West Bank and Gaza, there was aslight improvement in 2002, since the may-ors then obtained the right to collectdirectly taxes on fuels and road traffic, inaddition to an education tax, the only taxthey were allowed to collect directly untilthen. The Palestinian Authority is supposedto pay back to the municipalities 90% ofthese local taxes, but it does not do so.Result: the municipalities are becomingincreasingly poor. Further more, Palestiniancities are not able to collect taxes in the sur-rounding areas. Realistically, tax revenuescan be collected only in villages, to whichmany people who now live abroad sendmoney, or towns with longstanding strong


28. Figures provided by

the Bahrain Finance

Ministry.


commercial activities. Until recently, 90% oflocal investment expenditure was funded bythe Palestinian Authority, thanks to fundingfrom outside organizations, such as theWorld Bank, the European Union for theurban areas, and the UNPD for the ruralareas, as well as bilateral technical aid fromthe G8 countries. However, unhappy aboutthe recent takeover by Hamas, mostsources of outside funding have stopped allaid, and there is now a movement toward afragmentation of services.

Similarly, in Lebanon municipalities aresupposed to receive a percentage of rev-enues collected by the electricity, tele-phone, and water services. This percent-age is supposed to be redistributed tothem by the relevant ministries in propor-tion to the amount collected in each geo-graphical area. In reality, these ministerialorganizations return the money only indribs and drabs.

In theory, a significant part of the munici-palities’ revenues comes from a percent-age of tax revenues allocated to the statewhere they are managed by an organiza-tion called the ‘Independent MunicipalFund’29. However, this fund has never ma -te rialized so revenues payable to munici -pa lities go directly into the national trea su -ry. By some estimates, in 2002 thisrepresented 0.75% of Lebanon’s GDP and2% of the general budget30. Despite themodest percentages, the money takesyears to be paid, and typically flows onlyafter intervention by a local leader. The sit-uation is improving, but the state, bank-rupt and heavily in debt, is still two yearsbehind in its payments.

Those municipalities with a theoretical rightto collect local taxes often encounter reluc-tance among citizens to pay the levy, ho -wever legal the tax may be. Particularly inLebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank andGaza, most local authorities lack themeans of compelling payment. For a vari-ety of practical, social, or security-linkedreasons, tax collec tion is at best uncertain.

The high level of municipal debt. Borrow-ing is standard practice for a modern localauthority, especially for infrastructure.Bahrain31 and Kuwait32 have included intheir constitutions provisions for munici-palities to “take out, agree to, or secure aloan”. Such borrowing power is also possi-ble for the executive body of municipaladministration in Islamic Republic of Iran,though not for the mu nicipal councils.

But such measures in municipal fundingcan lead to disaster, particularly when theyare used to compensate for a lack of oper-ating revenue, when they are not used forinvestments, and when local authorities donot have the means to repay the loans.This is the case in Jordan and the WestBank and Gaza, and both economies areincurring increasingly high levels of debt.Following the Hamas election victory, thewithdrawal of international donors from theWest Bank and Gaza, as providers of directfinancial assistance to local governments,led to the rapid deterioration of the munic-ipalities. In Lebanon, due to scarcity of fis-cal resources, some municipal govern-ments have to resort to advance paymentsfrom the Independent Joint Municipal Fund,which are disbursed at high interest rates.

In Jordan, new measures address this bo -rro wing crisis. Where municipalities haveborrowed to cover operational costs, espe-cially salaries, and are overwhelmed byinterest and service fees, the state haspaid off the loans. Thanks to a reduction ofabout 20% in its general administrativeexpenses, the government has wiped theslate clean for third- and fourth-classmunicipalities (the smallest), and hascommitted itself to do the same for theremaining 27 municipalities by 2011.

The increase in the need for public servicesin Turkish metropolitan municipalities hasled to an increasing level of debt. In 2002,this debt was the equivalent of 4% of theGDP –a full year’s revenue for the munic-ipalities. However, there is no legalrequirement that municipalities balance

29. Established by

decree no. 1917 of 6

April 1979.

30. Al-Dawlyia lal

Maalumet

(International

Journal of

Information).

31. Art. 108, ‘On public

lending.’

32. Const. Art. 136 and

137. ‘On public

lending’ and ‘On

local authority

lending.’


their budgets, and the state has alwaysmade up the shortfall with agreeably flex-ible loans from the Bank of the Provinces.

State supervision of local authority fi nan -

ces. State monitoring of local authori ty fi -nances is a normal, necessary and heal thymeasure as it ensures that finances arema naged not only efficiently, but al so within tegrity. However, this monitoring shouldnot immobilize the decision-makingprocess. In Lebanon, for example, threeseparate entities monitor public municipalfi nances: the comptroller general, the audi-tor-general, and the State Audit Office. TheState Audit Office carries out a priori and aposteriori inspections of local authorityfinances, focusing particularly on mu nicipalproperty management above a specifiedthreshold, the signing of public contracts,public works, and service provision. Ineffect, such oversight power negates localgovernmental autonomy for municipalities.Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain have sim-ilar systems; budgets are proposed bymunicipal councils, but the councils can notvote to approve their budgets.

With the aim of reconciling decentraliza-tion and the careful management ofmunicipal finances, Turkey has set up asupervision system based on internal bod-ies called audit committees. These consistof from three to five council members whomust be elected annually by their respec-tive municipal councils in towns with morethan 10,000 inhabitants, and the SPAs.Their role is to provide a check on theincome and expenditure of local authori-ties. As such, they make up a form of dem-ocratic counter weight to the establishedauthority, particularly in those placeswhere the mayor is both the municipality’shighest authority and the official with thepower to authorize expenditure.

A posteriori checks are carried out, as in anymodern country, by the State Audit Office.

This lack of resources, combined with theirincapacity to implement the areas of

responsibility that they have been allocated,makes local authorities dependent on thestate, transforming them into central go ver -n ment go-betweens. The central govern-ment also manages in an authoritarian andarbitrary way the money that is actually dis-tributed to local treasuries. Unequal dis-tribution is often the rule rather than theexception. For example, the money allo-cated for street clea ning in just the city ofAmman amounts to a third of the entirebudget for all Jordanian municipalities. In asimilar case, over the past few years theLebanese government has withdrawn hugeamounts of mo ney from the IndependentMunicipal Fund to pay for street cleaning inmetropolitan Beirut. In the same way equal-ization is nonexistent in numerous coun-tries,such as Jordan and Lebanon.

III.2. Responsibilities

III.2.1. Extensive theoretical areas of responsibility

In most countries in this region, municipali-ties have official responsibility for a widerange of tasks, including infrastructure andmany human services. On paper, municipal-ities are responsible for highways, publicbuildings and drains, outdoor lighting, andwaste collection, and also health, education,culture, sports, and social services.Lebanon’s law on municipalities33 givesmunicipal councils extensive prerogatives inall these areas, including the support of des-titute and disabled people. Similarly, thePalestinian and Jordanian municipalities34

are supposed to have, respectively, 27 and39 different areas of responsibility.

III.2.2. A reality often out of step with the legislation

However, in many countries, there is a gapbetween legislation and its implementa-tion. Many factors prevent municipalitiesfrom meeting their official responsibilities.

The overlapping of areas of responsibility

with central government. In Saudi Arabia,


33. Art. 47 and

following.

34. The law of

September 1997

gives them a

discretionary power

in many sectors.


the Ministry of Rural and Mu nicipal Affairshas drawn up a very precise list of munici-palities’ areas of responsibility35. In Oman,the Ministry of Regional Municipalities,Water, and the Environment has done thesame. But several national constitutionsremain vague on the subject, mentioningonly the major sectors of planning, health,and education: or nothing at all. Wherethey exist, ordinary laws and statutoryinstruments for their implementation retainthis le gal va gueness. The predictable resultis over lapping of areas of responsibility,which is highly prejudicial to the efficiencyof lo cal government work.

Again, Turkey provides the exception. Therea modus vivendi seems to have been es -tablished between the municipalities andthe Special Provincial Administrations (SPAs),with each providing services according toits ability. Such is the case for environ -mental concerns shared by mun i cipalitiesand the National Administration for theProtection of the Environment, and alsofor collective housing issues addressedjointly by local authorities and theNational Administration for CollectiveHousing. The distribution of responsibili-ties is also or ganized on a territorial basis.In territories where there is a metropolitanmunicipality, the municipality is responsi-ble for most services; this accounts for thepresent explosion in expenditure. This alsooccurs within the administrative area of anormal municipality; in areas not depend-ent on either, the SPAs are responsible forproviding services. The recently legislatedreorganization of responsabilities has alsocontributed to this development.

Unlike Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey does nothave a general competence clause of munic-ipalities. At the present time, the mainresponsibilities of local bodies, particularlythe mu nicipalities, are urban planning, publictransport and com munications, water su pply,sanitation, and the treatment of solid waste.Law no. 5302 added economic ac tion, al -though what exactly this covers is less clearfor municipalities than for SPAs. The law also

confirmed the pre-existing situation of theinvolvement of the municipalities in themaintenance of school buildings and the pro-vision of the necessary supplies. However,the provision permitting municipalities toopen pre school establishments was sus-pended by the Constitutional Court36 on thegrounds that this runs counter to the spirit ofthe constitution, for which education isstrictly a state prerogative.

Everywhere else, almost all the responsibili-ties are carried out by the central govern-ment through its ministries, leaving themunicipalities only planning tasks and basicfunctions such as lighting, drainage, high-way maintenance, and waste collection. Ofcourse, there are exceptions, most notablyJordan where 13 essential service responsi-bilities were taken away from the municipal-ities by the law of 1995. Beirut, Lebanon, isalso a special case. There the provincial gov-ernor has executive power, the municipalcouncil being a deliberative body. Also inLebanon, the mokhtar has supplanted mostmunicipal authorities in the registration ofbirths, marriages, and deaths. It should benoted that this is the mokhtar’s only realresponsibility, though in theory their remit37

covers public order, health, and education.

In Jordan, some of the responsibilities thathave been taken away from the municipali-ties have been taken over by private nationaland foreign companies. Similarly, inLebanon the state has begun to sign con-tracts directly, not only without the consentof the municipalities, but sometimes with outeven informing them. Such was the casewith contracts for street cleaning, publiclighting, and street paving in Beirut andMount Lebanon. The money for these con-tracts is directly withdrawn by the state fromthe funds of the theoretical IndependentMunicipal Fund. Hope for more profitablepublic services induced Palestinian cen tralgovernment to enlist the private sector tomanage services that require a high level ofinvestment for infrastructure constructionand maintenance —water, electricity, andsanitation.

35. For the precise list,

see the ‘Saudi

Commerce and

Economic Review’,

November 2004. It

can nevertheless be

noted that street

cleaning, public

health, town

planning, (vice-

minister of town

planning) and the

maintenance of

public buildings,

public transport, and

traffic management

(Department of

Transport and Traffic

Planning) all come

under the authority

of the Ministry of

Rural and Municipal

Affairs, with water

distribution

infrastructures and

the building of

sewers being

administered by a

special service that

has seven regional

branches.

36. Notice no. 2005/14.

37. Art. 25 and following

of the law on the

mokhtar.


Administrative checking and central go vern -

ment supervision. In a decentralized coun try,the state exercises three checks on localdecisions: legal, financial and ad mi nistrative.When this type of checking is carried out aposteriori it is the sign of a state that is con-cerned about good local ma nagement. Onthe other hand, checks con ducted a priori

entail the infringement on local autonomy;this is so, even when so me local authorities– particularly those in Lebanon – who arefaced with depleted re sources, interpret it asa sign of protection and guarantee.

Taking a broader perspective, two fairlydis tinct systems emerge in the region. InSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, munici-palities are branches of their controllingministry, though they occasionally functionas go-betweens. Elsewhere in the region,laws and regulations delineate a minimal,quasi-autonomous status for local authori-ties, albeit with significant political and fi -nancial constraints.

We have seen how much a priori financialmonitoring weighs heavily on the autono -my of municipalities, preventing themfrom performing their functions. Similarly,with the exception of Turkey, municipalcouncil discussions are also subject to a

priori mo nitoring by the central govern-ment or by one of its representatives, suchas the provincial governor in both Lebanonand Jordan. Technically, this monitoring ofvir tually all discussions may even be illegalin some countries where it occurs routinely.Indeed, in Jordan and Lebanon, the consti-tutions state in almost identical terms thatall local affairs must be managed by themu nici pal councils. Yet in Lebanon, onaverage only 20% of municipal councildecisions are immediately enforceable,33% require the prior approval of theprovincial or regional governor, and 47%need approval from the Ministry of theInterior and the Mu nicipalities38.

In a similar way, local councils in IslamicRepublic of Iran rely on the Higher ProvincialCouncil, an assembly of all the local repre-

sentatives, to convey concerns to nationalauthorities. The Higher Provisional Councilis responsible for the monitoring and coordi-nation of the lesser councils. It also draftsbills that concern local authorities, and pres-ents the bills to the National Assembly.

In Turkey, on the other hand, central go -vernment supervision has been reduced bythe latest reforms, with the provincial gover-nor no longer having direct control overcouncil proceedings or their finances. Hispowers are now restricted to submitting acase to the administrative tribunal whenthere is a suspicion of malpractice. In addi-tion, within the framework of a new mana-gerial vision of municipal ma na gement, thenew laws emphasize the importance of aperformance audit based on modern auditmethods, rather than on a legality oversight.

The comparative administrative autonomyof local governments in the West Bank andGaza is offset by significant fiscal control bythe central go vern ment. Communication dif-ficulties make cen tralized administrative con-trol impractical, but most financial resourcesflow downward from the central authorities.

In Syria, Islamic Republic of Iran andSaudi Arabia, there is an additional admin-istrative check in the form of an electoralsystem requiring that candidates for localposts be approved by an ad hoc electoralcommittee; this could be called an‘absolute a priori check’ since it ta kes placeprior to the discussions themselves.

The security factor. The Palestinian Autho ri -ty’s exclusive powers apply only to 20% of itsterritory (the category A areas, which aremainly urban), the rest being run jointly withIsrael or by Israel alone. As a result, themunicipalities only rarely see their decisions,whether about urban planning or tax collec-tion, applied in their area. The use of lawenforcement personified by the PalestinianPolice is subject to the prior authorization ofIsrael, which retains control of the vastmajority of the rural areas. In addition,everything to do with heavy infrastructures


38. ABDELGHENI IMAD,

Municipal elections,

Jarrous Press, p. 20.


and land use planning is dependent on anoutside body: the State of Israel.

On the whole, local authorities throughoutthe region have only nominal, if not fake,autonomy. At best, national leaders eitherretain a traditional concept of the role oflocal authorities, or consider them unable todeliver higher-quality services; at worst, theydo not want them to gain increased impor-tance. As usual, the exception is Turkey,where a certain number of responsibilities areactually carried out – some since the latestlaw – by decentralized local authorities.

III.2.3. External solutions to the municipal framework

The myriad formal and informal arrange-ments that prevent local governments inthe region from representing their citizensin a meaningful way, lead with little sur-prise to increasing interest in alternativemeans of civic participation.

Unions of municipalities. Some municipalitiesin the West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon havesought a solution in the pooling of theirresources. In the West Bank and Gaza, forexample, ‘Joint Service Councils’ have beenset up by the Ministry of Local Government toconstruct and run communal infrastructures.This has ob vious appeal to the mayors ofsmall local communities, but worries cityauthorities. The higher municipal authoritiesunderstandably fear the loss of their preroga-tives, and would rather bring pooling activitiesto a halt. In Lebanon, on the other hand, it isthe lack of resources which prevents the com-munities of municipalities from functioning, asstate subsidies are never fully paid out.

In Turkey, where the municipalities work well,inter-municipal cooperation occurs primarilyin rural areas where there is a marked short-age of skilled administrative personnel. The2005 reform39 reorganized in ter-municipalorganizations, making them a new tier ofde centralization, with the responsibilities re -cent ly granted to the Special Provincial Ad -ministrations and with a proper budget. This

reform should lead to an improvement andincreased lo cal ma nagement of services inthe rural areas. Thanks to these, all Turkishvillages should benefit, before the end of2007, from water supply, drainage, andaccess roads. There are two types of coop-erative structures: unions of municipalitiesand unions for irrigation.

Neighborhood committees. During the Is raelioccupation in the West Bank and Gaza, Pales-tinian neigh borhood committees were gradu-ally crea ted to deal with those services thatwould ordinarily be provided by municipalities.They still continue to provide some services,such as waste collection, in the Al Mahâta areaof Khan Younès in the Gaza Strip, for exam-ple. This system exists also in Iraq, where inthe city of Basra 170 local informal commit-tees sustain the municipal council not electedto be distributed food and fuel.

In Turkey, on the other hand, the neigh-borhood committee consists of a tradi-tional structure organized by the latest lawas a direct link between the inhabitantsand the municipality.

Private benefactors. Despite the informal andseemingly haphazard nature of pri vate aid,private benefactors (“evergets”) have alwaysplayed an important role in Middle Easternmunicipal life, Turkey again excepted. Attimes private funds make up for state inade-quacies, but more often private benefactorsprovide cultural and social services. Primarilyin the West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon,though sporadically throughout the MiddleEast, most municipalities are reduced to rely-ing on private benefactors for grants forschools, health centers and some hospitals,free meals, and cultural centers. During theJuly 2006 war in Lebanon, traditional leadersand businessmen took responsibility forfinancing the reconstruction of bridges.

III.3. Administrative Capacities

After finances, recruitment methods and trai -ning for local government employees is theleast transparent administrative element. It is

39. Law no. 5355 of 26

May 2005.


difficult, if not impossible, to obtain precise,reliable figures on the people employed bylocal authorities. A tradition of patronagemakes such information especially difficult toobtain. However, certain major trends arebecoming apparent.

Central government supervision. In Le ba -non, only lesser municipalities are permit-ted to draw up their own organizationcharts40. Government employees in provin-cial capitals and in important towns arepublic servants dependent upon theNational Council of the Public Service,which answers directly to the Prime Minis-ter. In Jordan the recruitment of publicsector employees, for which the Civil Serv-ice Office is responsible, has been decen-tralized, to each governorate, by the cre-ation of councils run by the governor.

In the countries where some or all munic-ipal councillors are appointed by the cen-tral government, they are public servantsin the service of the central government;municipal employees who report to themcannot therefore be considered local gov-ernment personnel. This has been the casein Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait sincethe last elections in those countries.

The issue of the training of local go vern -

ment staff. The lack of training for mostlocal authority employees is a serious im -pediment to efficiency. Aware of this, sev-eral countries of the region, with theencouragement of the UNPD, havelaunched extensive training programs forlocal government personnel.

In Saudi Arabia, the ‘Municipal Chairmen’sPerformance Improvement Service,’ a spe-cial department of the Ministry of Ruraland Municipal Affairs, has created a pro-gram to improve the skills of municipalpersonnel, and to encourage their geo gra -phical mobility. This is taking place withinthe framework of a long-standing trainingprogram for public servants. The numberof those who have received training hasrisen from 12,649 in 1989 to 23,056 in

2004, and nearly doubled to 43,132 in2005.

In Turkey, a new municipal law sets dead -lines for payment of salaries, and fixes aceiling for staff expenditure, making it thepersonal responsibility of the mayor ifthese limits are exceeded. At the sametime, municipalities have been given moreflexibility in their staffing structure.

Jordan too launched a series of training pro-grams after an assessment showed thatlack of skills and low productivity amongmunicipal employees was slowing the ge ne -ral restructuring of the municipalities.

By contrast, Lebanon has effectivelyimposed a freeze on municipal hiring since1975. True, a 1977 law on the municipali-ties directed the Minister of the Interior toorganize training seminars for localemployees, but it also seems that nothingsubstantive has been done since. An indi-cator of decline in the public sector is theaverage age of local municipal employees:55 years. As a result, the number of localgovernment employees is insufficient, as italso is in all branches of the civil service.

In Syria, as in most countries in theregion, skilled people are moving out oflocal authority jobs, and into the privatesector where pay and career prospects aremuch better.

Malfunctioning recruitment methods. Ma nylocal authorities actively circumvent arcaneofficial hiring regulations. Instead, they hireincreasing numbers of local people onshort-term contracts. In principle, thisstrategy allows the municipalities to havemore local management of their affairs.

Practices in Turkey are illustrative. Al -though recruitment of public servants hasa high priority in the national legislature,and a competitive examination has beenestablished for government employment,the number of official public servants hasremained more or less stable. At the same


40. Law on the

municipalities in

Lebanon, art. 88.


time, the number of temporary workers,most of whom are not well-qualified, andare employed for an average of one year,is steadily increasing. From 1995 to 2003,the percentage of temporary municipalemployees increased from 21.4% to 35%.These temporary workers can be far moreeasily taken on and dismissed.

Throughout the region, the recruitment ofmu nicipal employees is not done on thebasis of their skills and experience, but ra -ther through patronage based on politicalor community factors.

This practice results in an excess of staff,ma ny of whom are poorly qualified or un -qualified. Officials simply award jobs in lo -cal government as a means of establishingtheir personal influence. Though to somedegree ubiquitous, this practice is espe-cially common in Lebanon and Jordan.

Inefficiency is by no means the only harm -

ful effect of pervasive nepotism and

patronage. Such practices perpetuate asystem of corruption whereby the personwho provided the job expects favors in re -turn. The perception of corruption is strong inthe region. When citizens in a 2002 Turkishsurvey assessed their confidence in localauthorities at only 5.2 out of 10, thenational government was moved to createa spe cial ethics committee to investigateco rruption, and three new laws41 werepassed to address the situation. But thisrequires a strong political will. It shouldalso be noted that the countries thatobtain the best scores regarding corrup-tion are also those, such as Dubai, with themost visibly proactive state policies.

IV. Local Democracy

IV.1. A Changing Local Democracy

Table 2 summarizes significant ad vances inlocal democracy in the Middle East region.Note that if the local elections in somecountries are based on specially devised

election law, they are still in the pro cess ofde velopment.

In Saudi Arabia, Prince Mansour Bin Mitab,a firm supporter and the main organizer ofmunicipal elections, did not hesitate todescribe them as the first stage, empha-sizing that improvements are still needed,including women having the right to vote.As evidence of the newness of the election,the electoral districts themselves had to bedrawn up after the registration of voters onelectoral lists.

Jordan, since the first local elections in 1999,has been going backward and forward. Thegovernment went back on the nomination ofmayors in 2003, but promised to hold newelections on the basis of universal suffragebefore the beginning of 2007 – except in thecity of Amman, which has special status.There were until now 360 appointed councilmembers compared with 920 who areelected. The number of municipalities hasbeen reduced from more than 300 to 99.With the new municipal law of 2007, allcouncil members are elected, except inAmman. Indeed, the municipal electionstook place on the 31st of July 2007; about2,300 candidates ran for 1,022 seats.

In Lebanon, the election by universal suffrageof mayors and their senior deputies was abol-ished just before the 1998 elections by anamendment in extremis of elec tion law. May-ors are now elected by the municipal council.

In the West Bank and Gaza, the voting methodis not fixed. Since 2005, when municipal elec-tions were conducted in five successive stages,there have been changes to the procedure,passing from voting for a single candidate to pro-portional representation. Moreover, the right tovote is not the same throughout the Palestinianterritories. In the Gaza Strip, all refugees canvote, regardless of their place of residence; inthe West Bank, refugees who live in the townstake part in the voting, but those who still live inthe refugee camps indicate their wish to returnto their homeland by unanimously keeping wellaway from local political life.

41. Law no. 3628 of 4

May 1990 amended

by law no. 5020 of

26 December 2003,

law no. 5237 of 26

September 2004 of

the penal code.


Country/ Date of the last local council elections Date of the first election of a municipal council Political partiesterritorySaudi Arabia

Bahrain

United Arab Emirates

Iraq

Iran Islamic Rep.

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Oman

Qatar

Syria

Turkey

West Bankand Gaza

Yemen

No elections

2004 (Dhi Qar province)2000 & 2001 (Kurdistan)*1999 (Rest of Iraq)

1878– but no elections between 1963** and 1998(2001 for the villages in the south)

Yes20012006

Yes1856 (for Istanbul); 1878 (for Ottoman Empire); 1930 (for the Republic of Turkey)

2004

Yes1878 – but no free elections between 1972 and 2007***2003***

No1999

NoNo municipalities

Yes2004

No19322006 (partial)

Yes (since 1992)187842– but no elections between 1957 and 19892003

Yes19992006

Yes1869 – but no elections between 1957 and 1999*

NoNo electionsNo elections

No1921 in some towns – but no elections between 1921 and 2002 (Firstelection on a national scale)

2006

No1963 in Riyadh – but no elections between 1963 and 2005 (First electionon a national scale)

2005

Table 2 The Lack of a Democratic Tradition

42. This refers to municipal

elections held in certain

municipalities of the

Ottoman Empire in

1878 in accordance with

the Law on Municipalities

in the Provinces

of 18 May 1877.

* February 2000 for the areas dominated by the Kurdish Patriotic Union andMay 2001 for those areas under the control of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

** First significant municipal elections carried out on a national scale.*** That is to say without a closed list.

2005 1927 No elections between 1934 (Gaza Strip) or 1976 (West Bank) and 2005

Yes

2003


Syria, where the municipal councillors ha velong been elected by universal suffrage, nowwants to move toward real pluralist localdemocracy. The 2007 reform law stipulatesthat people may elect the candidates of theirchoice, and not, as has been the case so far,just one from a list drawn up by the NationalProgressive Front –a coalition led by theBaath party currently in power.

IV.2. Partially Kept Promises: The Central State and Local Politics

The only two states in the region wherethere is absolute centralization are theUnited Arab Emirates and Oman. There areno elections in these two states, thoughthe possibility of introducing elections isbeing considered on an official level.

Municipal elections have been establishedin all the other countries. For all that, sec-ular traditions, which are more based onthe voluntary ‘consultation’ by the sover-eign than on the sovereignty of the people,are not easy to circumvent. The electoralprocess in many places is still marked bycentral government intervention.

a) A priori state intervention

Nominations. The clearest and most officialtype of intervention is, of course, the nom-ination of all or part of a municipal council,including mayors. This is presently thecase in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, andKuwait.

In Syria, as we have seen, it is the exis-tence of an ‘executive council’ or ‘execu-tive bureau’ parallel to the municipal coun-cil which embodies this central control.

Prior examination of the candidates. An otherform of interference is the prior examinationof the candidates by the central power. Thispermits the central government to effectivelysteer the election in a particular direction. Itis this process that caused the extraordinarylength (from February to mid-December) ofthe 2005 elections in Saudi Arabia. In Islamic

Republic of Iran, candidates are acceptedonly after an examination validates theintensity of their faith, or their belief in theauthority of a jurisconsult, the Velâyat-é-

Faghih – a situation which continues toarou se strong suspicion. In Syria, accordingto the present law, the party in power com-piles the list of candidates.

Election into office. This type of election lim-its the number of candidates to the numberof vacant posts, ensuring that all candidateswill attain public office. Seen as a cost-sav-ing measure, it is reserved for unusual cir-cumstances. When, on the other hand, it isthe result of pre-electoral bargaining, it canbe detrimental to the exercise of sociallyaware democratic principles.

Pre-election arrangements influenced Le ba -non’s most recent elections; 121 municipalcouncils and 400 mokhtar were elected intooffice following an alliance between thepolitical parties and traditional leaders; ineffect, the two factions merged. In Jordan,a similar approach was observed in 17 mu -nicipalities.

b) A posteriori intervention

The modification of municipal councils. InJordan in 1999, the king changed the com-position of municipal councils to include awoman in each of them – a rather positiveaction. By contrast, in Kuwait in 1986, theEmir simply dissolved all the municipalcouncils.

In Syria, once the local councils areelected, they in their turn elect an execu-tive bureau; a third of the executivebureau candidates can be recruited fromthe local councils themselves. Further-more, after an election, certain specificpublic service-related issues can be placedin the hands of permanent or temporarycommittees that include people from out-side the municipal government.

Intervention in the election of the ma yor.

This form of tutelage of the State is


harmful to democracy and to good gover-nance. In Lebanon, the abandonment ofdirect elections has contributed to thistutelage.

IV.3. The People’s Participation

The 2005 Palestinian elections were thefirst in 71 years in the Gaza Strip, and thefirst elections in 29 years in the WestBank. Voter turnout was extraordinary:average turnout was 82% and rose to 98%in certain areas. The elections were widelyperceived as the restoration of the right ofthe Palestinian people to self-determina-tion after years of the systematic destruc-tion of their state structures.

In Turkey also, the turnout percentage isge nerally quite strong, proof of the popu-lation’s involvement in local life. In 2004,average voter turnout reached 72.3%.

In the rest of the region, voter turnout ismuch lower. There are two main reasonsfor this. The first is the widespread per-ception that the game is corrupt. Thesecond, which must not be underesti-mated, is pu blic disappointment withmost of its elected officials. When dis-honesty is expected, whe ther by pre-election selection of candidates withreserved seats — the case in Saudi Arabiaand Syria — or by manipulation of elec-tion results or even election law, turnoutis apt to decline. Allegations of co rruptionwere particularly strident in Ye men afterthe last election there; the Shiites ofSaudi Arabia, and most Lebanese electedofficials are widely suspected of cheating.In Lebanon, however, low overall turnoutfigures (33.3%) can mask wide dis -parities in local turnout, depending uponwhat is at stake or the extent of candi-dates’ mobilization. Thus, the low figureof a 21.4% turnout in Beirut contrastsstarkly with the 70% turnout in theBekaa, and the 65% turnout in Nabatiah;in both high-turnout areas, the mainbeneficiary of the surge in participationwas Hezbollah. The second reason, voter

disappointment with the outcome of pre-vious ballots, or the subsequent ineffec-tiveness of elected officials, does take atoll. Disillusionment with elected officialsand the process by which they come topower has been noted especially in Jor-dan and Islamic Republic of Iran.

However, voter disinterest can vanishwhen the vote is perceived as an expres-sion of popular demand or a form of appro-bation. The 2006 municipal elections inBahrain thus had a turnout — a clearincrease — of 72% because of the involve-ment of the Shiites. Similar elections inIslamic Republic of Iran saw a 60%turnout because of immense discontentwith the policies of President Ahmadinejad.

IV.4. A Specific Problem: The Representation of Women

A low representation. Unsurprisingly, in its2005 report Transparency Internationalseverely criticizes the Middle East as beingthe re gion of the world where the politicalre pre sen tation and participation of womenis the lowest43.

Turkish women were given the right tovote in 1930, and since 1934 the right tobe elected44. Saudi women, on the otherhand, will only be given the right to vote in2009, whereas nothing of the kind isplanned in the Emirates. Kuwaiti womenobtained the right to vote in 2005.

Elsewhere, their representation figures arederisory, hardly reaching 2% of the munic-ipal councils in Lebanon, 1.53% in IslamicRepublic of Iran, 3.4% in Qatar, 6.6 % inSyria, and an unabashed 0% in Bahrain.

In most of these countries, entering thepo litical arena requires strong-willed wo -men at a time when merely working out-side the home is still discouraged. Womenwho want to take part in politics often faceextremely difficult social factors, such asfa mily opposition and public disapproval.So me allege that women also must over-


43. www.transparency.org.

44. The right to vote

was given to women

in 1948 in Syria,

in 1952 in Lebanon,

in 1963 in Islamic

Republic of Iran,

in 1967 in Yemen,

in 1973 in Bahrain,

in 1974 in Jordan,

and in 1980 in Iraq.


come the reluctance of party managers toaccept women, but in all fairness, such ma leintransigence is hardly unique to the Mid-dle East.

Steps towards the participation of wo -

men. Faced with a glaring lack of femalerepresentation in local and nationalpolitical life, several strategies havebeen put in place. The quota system,which is applied in Pa les tine, reserves aminimum of two seats per council forwomen45. Jordan and Ku wait have cho-sen the direct nomination of one womanper council. At the same ti me, importantcampaigns in favor of wo men have beenlaunched in Jordan and Syria.

Thus, municipal councils throughout there gion face enormous difficulties, lead-ing, in some instances, to their resigna-tion, as in Jordan; in other countries, aneven larger num ber of councils haverenounced any form of concrete action.

IV.5. Local Elections as an Ideological and Community Platform

If it is necessary and healthy that acoun try’s political life should rest onnationally constituted parties, it is notdesirable that national issues overridelocal concerns. Mu nicipal elections are,after all, intended to create an efficientlocal authority management.

Lebanon provides an illustrative exam-ple. Although the number of nationalparties is negligible, elections are welland truly fought on religious communityissues which are national in scope.

A curious development is the way inwhich local elections can become aforum for banned national parties or fac-tions. Because local elections are consid-ered less of a threat to the central gov-ernment, they may not be as tightlycontrolled as national elections. Localelections therefore present an opportu-nity for disapproved or illegal parties and

ideologies to appear on the ballot, over-whelming local issues with far morepotent national matters. Such was thecase in the West Bank and Gaza whenHamas triumphed, and in Saudi Arabiawhen Shiites of the Eastern Provinceboasted of having won the election intheir regional stronghold. Similarly, thevictory of Hezbollah in South Lebanonused local elections to effect a nationalchange, and in Islamic Republic of Iranthe 2003 municipal elections in Tehranled to the return of the conservatives,and particularly of President Ahmadine-jad, the city’s mayor. Ironically, the 2006municipal elections rejected his policiesthroughout the country, with the popula-tion going to the polls on a massive scalein order to vote for the opposition. Thiswas also the situation in Bahrain, whichwas the scene of a very strong Shiiteupsurge in November 2006.

IV.6. The Role of the Security Factor and the Delicate Situation of the Governments

The religious community issue. Manycoun tries are currently the scene ofdeep-seated tensions, some attributableto the merging of religion and politics,others to centuries-old feuds betweenIslam’s Shiite and Sunni communities.The latter is especially important wherethe Sunni have held power for a longtime in spite of the presence of a strongShiite minority, or indeed a majority, asin Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain. SaudiArabia’s government contends with aShiite community that could deliver a20% turnout – not the 5-15% which isgenerally reported. The central govern-ment there exercised strong control dur-ing the election in the Eastern Provincewhere the Shiites are a clear majority,and where, it is useful to note, there areimportant oil-fields. Likewise, the Kingof Bahrain faces the risk of destabiliza-tion by the Shiite majority there, as theresults of the recent parliamentary elec-tions showed.

45. There are 15 seats

in the cities, 13 in

medium-sized towns

and 8 in small towns

according to the

electoral law of

1996, amended in

2005.


The risk of destabilization is real. This iswhy the Lebanese and Iranian governments(the Persians in Islamic Republic of Iran areonly in a majority of 51%) exercise suchstrong control over local governance.

Kurdish nationalism. The recognition ofKurdistan by the transitional Iraqi govern-ment, and the granting of extensiveautonomy which even includes legisla-tion, gave hope to the Kurdish communi-ties in neighboring Syria and Turkey. It isclear that municipal elections provide aconvenient means for Kurdish people inthose two countries to agitate for adegree of autonomy comparable to thatgranted in Iraq.

Religious extremism. The other factorwhich must not be neglected is the rise ofhard-line religious extremism. Such reli-gious fanaticism characterizes several fac-tions of fundamentalist Islam. Theiravowed goal is to establish regimes basedon a particularly narrow reading of reli-gious texts. These groups are not onlyopposed to secular governments, but alsoto those that, like Saudi Arabia and Jor-dan, are already governed by the Sharia.Even these officially Islamic states are per-ceived by fundamentalists as being tooinclined toward westernization. Some fun-damentalists in Saudi Arabia refuse to votein legislative elections because, they say,“God is the only dispenser of law.”



V. Conclusion

What emerges from this study is that de -centralization, understood as the devolu-tion of responsibilities, and financial anddecision-making self-government, is notyet completely operational in the countriesof the region, with the exception of Turkey.Currently, the majority of municipalitieshave little room for maneuver, subject asthey are to a twofold dependency – formaland informal - on the State and traditionalleaders.

At the same time, one should take intoaccount the social organization and securityenvironment of the region. Limited progressin the processes of decentralization shouldbe considered in the overall context of ten-sions and conflicts, in the relations betweentraditional leaders, either tribal or religious-based, as well as in relation to the popula-tion at large.

All these factors help explain UNDP-POGAR’s46 more prudent approach tochange that advocates a gradual pace ofreform as part of a comprehensive strategy

of restructuring of the State, beginning withthe strengthening of national legislatures.Broad awareness campaigns on local gover-nance and effective institutions are also key.

Problems in service delivery and weak localmanagement functions in general need to beaddressed, as underlined by UNDP POGAR,through the development and strengtheningof local capacities as well as of transparency.

The success of decentralization efforts de -pends on the selection and training of mu -ni cipal civil servants and employees. Thatre quires special focus and attention.

Local governments should be equipped withthe adequate means to carry out their tasksi.e. the necessary fiscal and budgetary re -sources accompanied by the transfer of in -de pendent decision-making autho rity.

Finally, although many countries in the re -gion are on the right track towards decen-tralization, it will take some time beforethe se processes become fully operational.

46. See:

www.pogar.org/

governance/

localgov.asp.


Country/ Number of Total % % Increase Existence Municipal organizationterritory large cities population of population population of total of a

(more than the three of the of the country municipal 1 M. largest cities, country country population specific inhabitants) 2006 (in M. in 2006 in 2005 2005-2006 structure

inhabitants) (1) (in %) in the three largest cities

Iraq

Iran, Islamic Rep.

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Turkey

United ArabEmirates

West Bankand Gaza

Yemen

Total

Source: World Bank Indicators.

No, but possiblereform for thelarge cities

a) One municipality which supervises manymunicipalities of district on administrativematters only (Riyadh and Jeddah)

b) one single municipality (Mecca and Damman)

No2,4%36%43%10,864

Unique structure : Dubai is managed as anenterprise under a ‘General Director’

No4,4%29%30%1,421

Metropolitan municipalities and others of first level

2,56%10,6%37 %77,1428

Special status for the Sana governorateNo2,9%9%9%1,921

Yes1,4%26%30%22,016

One single municipality with the administrationin the districts

No2,6%25%25%4,872

One single municipality, but for security reasonsthe ‘Prefect’ has the power

No0,8%50%55%1,971

Only one municipal councilNo3,7%71%72%2,021

Amman has a metropolitan structure1,8%24%34%1,91

One single municipality with a main municipalityand many councils and district municipalitiesunder the first level

No0,0%23%25%17,277

One single municipality and councils as advisorsin Baghdad and Basra districts

No2,8%N/A37%10,833

Annex 1 Great Metropolises of the Region

1 1,43 38% 25% 5,6% No One single municipality

MIDDLEEAST/WESTERNASIADecentralization and Local Dem

ocracy in the World

233

Municipal councils Executive local authority

Country/ Form of One or Number of Participation Mayor Mayor Mayor Power in Number of Indictment by territory scrutiny several periods and estimates elected elected appointed hands of the periods and the citizens or

(proportional / electoral duration of by vote by the by Mayor or in a duration of by the majority districts the terms municipal a superior collegiate the terms municipal

council authority body councilBahrain Majority Several 4 years 72% for 2006 No No Yes (Ministry MHHE) (3) Ministry MHME 4 years No

(increasing) 51,3% for 2002Iraq (5) Variable Var. Var. 79% in Kurdistan in 2001 Var. Var. Var. Var. Var. Var.Iran, Islamic Rep. Relative majority Unique 4 years 60% 2006 No Yes (6) No Mayor 4 years Yes by the

(increasing) 49.96% 2003 Municipal Council (7)Jordan Majority Several 4 years 58 % in 2003 (decreasing) No No Yes (8) Municipal council 4 years NoKuwait (9) Majority Several 4 years 50% (decreasing) No Yes No Mayor 4 years NoLebanon Majority Unique 6 years 33,3% in 2004 (decreasing) No Yes No Mayor (In Beirut 6 years Yes, by the Municipal

(unlimited) the governor) unlimited (10) Council after 3 yearsOman NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NAQatar (14) Majority Several 4 years 30% in 2003 (decreasing) No Yes No MMAA 4 years No (15)

(at first round)Saudi Arabia Majority Several 4 years (1) 40% in 2005 (2) No No Yes (The King) Mayor 4 years NoSyria (16) (List of candidates Unique except 4 years 29,3% in 2003 No No (18) Yes, Ministry of Municipal 4 years No

with fixed seats) Damasc and Alep (decreasing) (17) Municipal Affairs Council (19)Turkey Proportional Unique 5 years 71,75 % mayors 69.97% Yes (relative No No (20) Mayor 5 years Evaluation every year by

metropolitan mayors majority, less than 3/4

of councils or (65% in 2004) one round) motion of indictement by 3/

4

United Arab - - - - - (4) - - - -EmiratesWest Bank Proportional (11) Several 5 years 82 % in 2005 No Yes No (12) Yes 5 years Yes by the Municipal and Gaza Council (by offence) (13)Yemen Majority Unique 5 years 65% No No Yes by Ministry of local Mayor 5 years No

administration (21)

Annex 2 Local Democracy

NOTES 1. Only half of the councils are elected, the rest are

appointed.

2. About 18% of the potential voters, one third of them

is registered in the electoral lists.

3. Ministry of Housing, Municipalities and Environment.

General Director.

4. A Sharjah only, but the Municipal Council itself is not

elected.

5. There are several situations: Municipal Councils chosen

among the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works

employees (MMPW) Basra; elected by universal

vote, Baghdad; chosen by a group of important

citizens, Mosul.

6. Accumulation of jobs is forbidden for Minister, Vice

minister, Congress Deputy and Director of Bank or

Director of other public entity.

7. Article 73 of the Municipal Council Law. The Council

can accuse the Mayor who has to present his

arguments in 10 days. The Council then decides if he

is removed or not.

8. Ministry of Municipal, Rural and Environment Affairs.

9. In each Council 10 members are elected

and 6 are appointed.

10. The election of the Mayor and that of the Mokhars

take place together.

11. The number 5 Law of 1996 for the councils’ election

was amended in 2004 and twice in 2005. From

majority, the scrutiny became proportional.

12. From 1976 to 1993 a great proportion of the Mayors

were appointed by Israel.

13. But the destitution has to be approved by the local

Interior Ministry.

14. There is only one Municipal Council for all the country

15. Only by decision of the Minister of Municipal and Rural

Affairs.

16. But a new more liberal law will be passed in 2007.

17. 21% in cities, 34% in small towns and 33% in very

small villages, while 66% in 1999.

18. It should be done according to the new law

19. It is in fact a council of the city.

20. But the Executive Council has elected and appointed

members.

21. The government has to approve it.

NORTH AMERIC A(CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES)

JEFFERE Y SELLERS

NORTH AMERICA236 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

NORTH AMERICADecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 237

I. Introduction

This chapter compares local governmentand decentralization in Canada and theUnited States. These two North Americancountries share important, parallel inherit -ances. Both are settler societies that emergedout of British colonialization. The si mi -larities in their local government sys temshave frequently led to their classificationtogether (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Sellers2006, 2007), and with other countries withsimilar legacies such as Australia and NewZealand.

Both countries are established constitu-tional democracies with federal structuresof government. Both possess highlydeveloped economies and have in com-mon legal, institutional and cultural lega-cies from British colonization from theseventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.Other colonial and pre-colonial legaciesalso mark the practice of local govern-ment in certain areas of each country.Most no tably, French influences havebeen strong in the Canadian province ofQuébec, and have also affected aspects ofinstitutional practice in Louisiana in theU.S. In parts of each country, indigenoustraditions re main important to local go -vernment practice.

Local government in both countries wasestablished in the original British coloniesprior to the creation of a national govern-ment. The arrangements for local govern-ment in what would become New Englandin the United States grew directly fromthose in early colonial settlements. InCanada, provincial acts of the 1840s and1850s established the framework of localgovernment prior to the Constitution Actof 1867.

Although present-day local government inthese countries can possess considerablepowers, it lacks either national constitutionalprotections or a legislated grant of auton-omy. What powers local governments havereceived have come from either na tional

legislation or measures taken by individualstates or provinces. In both federal coun-tries local government is a crea ture of fed-eral states, provinces, or territories. InCanada and a number of U.S. states, statelegislatures determine the content andpowers of local government. The mainexceptions are provisions in some U.S.state constitutions for local governmentpowers. In the United States, approxi-mately half of these documents specifysome general power for local govern-ments.

Institutional practice in these countriesalso reflects the legacies of the Britishultra vires principal that limits the generalpurpose authority of local governments.The “Dillon Rule” in the United States –theprinciple that local governments cannotclaim powers beyond those specificallygranted by the state legislatures—pro-vides a good example. Thirty-one of thefifty U.S. states continue to apply Dillon’sRule to all municipalities, and eight furtherstates apply it to some but not all types ofmunicipalities (Richardson, Gough andPuentes 2003: 17). Increasingly, how-ever, exceptions to this principle havebeen introduced. Beginning in the nine-teenth century, U.S. states legislatedguarantees of general local governmentauthority in “home rule” legislation as wellas in state constitutions. This trend con-tinued up to the 1990s. As a result, localgovernment in all but three states hassome degree of home-rule powers, and 28U.S. states have broad powers that insome cases amount to grants of full localautonomy to treat local affairs (USACIR1993). In Canada, in 1994 in Alberta, in1999 in British Columbia and, since 2000in Ontario and Québec have also givenbroader powers to localities, even aslarger cities continue to call for additionalinstitutionalized local powers.

These variations reflect another way thatlocal government in the United States, andto a lesser degree Canada, differs fromthat of many other countries. Because dif-

Institutional

practice in these

countries also

reflects the

legacies of the

British ultra vires

principal that limits

the general

purpose authority

of local

governments

NORTH AMERICA238

ferent U.S. states have established a vari-ety of legislative frameworks, there aresome fifty American local government sys-tems. Even within states, the diversity oflocal arrangements has produced moreheterogeneous systems of local institu-tions than elsewhere. Most of the largestcities in the United States, as well as Mon-treal, Winnipeg, Vancouver and Saint Johnin Canada, have individual charters fromtheir respective state or provincial govern-ments.

Expansion of localpowers has beenonly one of severallocal governmentreforms. Along withenhanced localpowers, legislationin both countrieshas articulated lo -

cal responsibilities in greater detail, and hasspecified mechanisms for accountability in avariety of specific functional domains, suchas local educational services, environmentalregulation, and planning. In the UnitedStates but much less frequently in Canada,privatization has emerged as a more recur-rent strategy in service delivery. In variousways, local governments have also evolvedpractices to address the growing horizontalinterconnectedness of localities andregions. In Canada these reforms haveoften taken the form of inter-governmentalconsolidation or metropolitan governance;in the United States, informal inter-localcooperation and special district governancehave proliferated.

In both countries, state or provincial go -vern ments as well as local governmentsthemselves, have been the sources of re -forms. The extent of recent reform gener-ally has fallen short of the comprehensivereforms passed in New Zealand or parallelreforms in Australia. But local govern-ments in Canada and the United Statesalready possessed many of the powers re -cently given to local governments in thetwo Australasian nations.

II. Local Government Structures and Their Evolution

The evolution of local government structuresin Canada and the United States needs tobe understood in relation to the distinctivemodel of local decentralization that haslong prevailed in these countries. On theone hand, the national and other higher le -vel governments have generally grantedlocal governments limited legal authoritycompared with that permitted in continen-tal European countries, and less financialsupport from above. On the other hand,local governments are also less subject tothe direct local supervision of territorialfield offices or prefectures, and enjoy highlevels of local fiscal autonomy comparedwith counterparts in Europe and Asia (Sell-ers 2006; Sellers and Lidström 2007). Inrecent years, the elaboration of policymak-ing in North America, both at local andhigher le vels, has changed this model inseveral func tional areas. Higher level gov-ernments have introduced new responsi-bilities in ma ny of these areas. Althoughthis trend can be seen as a move towardcentralization in one sense, new activitiesand often new powers and fiscal resourcesfor local go vern ments have often accom-panied it.

Local government takes a variety of forms,with a different nomenclature in eachcountry (Table 1). In the United States,local government in many states has atleast two traditional tiers of government:counties and towns. Counties play animportant role in every state outside ofNew England as major providers of generalservices like courts, jails, land records,welfare, health, and roads. A number ofeastern and Midwestern U.S. states havealso maintained an intermediate level oftown or township governments betweencounties and municipalities. The legal sta-tus of the town level varies considerablyaccording to state laws. In Canada coun-ties and their equivalents generally haveless power and are only present in someprovinces, but the types of municipalities

The evolution of local government

structures in Canada and the United States

needs to be understood in relation to the

distinctive model of local decentralization

that has long prevailed in these countries



vary widely. Single-tier local governmentspredominate in all but three provinces ofCanada, Ontario, Québec, and British Co -lumbia.

Local government consolidation and

inter-local governance. Recent trendstoward new regional arrangements or localgo vernment consolidation in much ofEurope have had mixed resonance in NorthAmerica. Part of the reason for this may bethe roles that established governmentalunits –Canadian provinces and territories,U.S. states, and U.S. counties and town-

ships– have played in providing regionaland inter-local governance. Especially inthe United States, informal and specializedinter-governmental arrangements haveoften taken the place of formal and gen-eral-purpose institutions.

In Canada, consolidation of local govern-ment units took place in Québec, Nova Sco-tia, Ontario and a number of metropolitanregions since 2000 (Rivard and Collin2006). More recent initiatives have rolledback some of these reforms in Québec andelsewhere. In the United States, the degree

Table 1 Governmental and Country Characteristics

Name Canada United States

Inhabitants (thousands) 31,362 288,205

Area (km2) 9,984,670 9,631,420

Inhabitants/km2 3 30

GDP/capita € 35,758 € 42,623

National Federal Government Federal Government

Intermediate Provinces (10), States (50)

Territories (3)

Local:

Upper Tier: Counties, Regions, Counties (3,034),

Districts (199) consolidated Cities

Lower Tier: Cities, Towns, Townships/towns (some states) (16,504)

Villages, Municipalities (Cities, Boroughs,

Townships (3731) Villages) (19,429)

Special Districts (48,558)

Note: Population and GDP data for 2002; Area (land and water) for 2006; Canada (Upper tier), United States),

2006 (Canada (lower tier).

Sources: (area) CIA World Factbook (retrieved December 10, 2006 at

https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html); (population and GDP) OECD Statistics Portal

(retrieved December 10, 2006 at

http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,2639,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html); (governments) Rivard and

Collin 2006, p. 5; Commonwealth Local Government Forum 2002a, p. 2; Commonwealth Local Government

Forum 2002b, p. 3; U.S. Census Bureau (2002), p. 3.

NORTH AMERICA240

of consolidation has always varied widelyby regions. In recent decades consolidationand annexation of territory by local govern-ments have been commonplace in fastergrowing areas of the South and West, buthave remained more limited or exceptionalin the Northeast and other areas of oldersettlement. On the whole, recent counter-trends toward creation of new municipal-ities have offset counter-trends towardconsolidation. From 1992 to 2002, thenumber of municipal go vern mentsincreased by 150 to 16,504 (U.S. Bureauof the Census 1992, 2002).

Local government consolidation has beenonly one of several types of arrange-ments that could foster inter-local gover-nance within metropolitan regions. Anupper tier of local government or a newform of functional cooperation amongmunicipalities may also provide mecha-nisms for this task. Practical moves inthis direction over the past decade havetaken a variety of forms.

Canadian provinces and municipalities haveundertaken some of the most far-reachingreforms in metropolitan governance.Mainly in eastern Canada, reorganiza-tions in most me tropolitan areas haveproduced more en compassing metropolitanunits of governance. Along side the consoli-dations of municipalities, regional bodieshave been formed in three provinces, andmetropolitan planning initiatives havetaken place in a number of the largest met-ropolitan areas (Rivard and Collin).

Such a move is less apparent in the UnitedStates. Only a few of the large metropoli-tan areas, such as Portland, Oregon, andMinneapolis-St. Paul in Minnesota, have

developed distinct metropolitan institu-tions. County governments like KingCounty in metropolitan Seattle, Washing-ton, and Pima County in metropolitanPhoenix, Arizona, have encompassed largeportions of the metropolitan area, andhave often addressed issues on a metro-politan scale. In a few small-to-mid-sizedmetropolitan areas, such as Jacksonville,Florida, and Sacramento, California, con-solidation of city government into countygovernment has created what amountsto a metropolitan government (Leland andThurmaier 2004). Advisory regional coun-cils of governments, a legacy of federalrequirements for transportation planning,frequently provide a basis for coordina-tion of planning issues. Most states alsoauthorize cooperation among lo cal gov-ernments (Richardson, Gough andPuentes 2003).

Much more than in Canada and other coun-tries, inter-local governance in the UnitedStates has taken place through separate,special-purpose district governments thatare independent of local governments. Thelargest number of these (13,506 in 2002)administered separate public school sys-tems across the country. Others deal withwater and sewers, hospital services ortransportation. Although the total numberof these districts (48,588), as counted bythe U.S. Census of Governments, exceedsthe number of traditional local govern-ments (35,933), the actual number of spe-cialty, inter-local districts is probablyhigher. The number of school districtsdeclined slightly (900) from 1992 to 2002,typically due to consolidation amongmunicipalities within metropolitan areas.But the number of other special districts in -creased by 3,500 over the same period. InCanada too, most primary and secondaryeducation is administered by school boardsindependent of local government, and anumber of agencies, boards, and commis-sions see to special functions jointly sharedamong municipalities. Unlike their U.S.,counterparts, however, these boards do nothave independent powers of taxation.


Much more than in Canada and other countries, inter-local

governance in the United States has taken place through

separate, special-purpose district governments that are

independent of local governments


Decentralization has attracted the mostcritical attention in the United Stateswhere both local government powers andlocal geo-political fragmentation haveremained extensive. Patterns of localgovernance there have been found toexacerbate inequalities among de factosegregated groups by means of inequali-ties in local services (Joassert-Marcelli,Musso and Wolch 2001; Blakely 2000). Inparticular, inequalities in educationalopportunities in the United States havegenerated widespread debate and manyreform initiatives.

The wider effects of regional integrationbetween North American countries forlocal governance are difficult to discern,

and less pronounced than the conse-quences of cross-border integration acrossEurope. The most notable impact has oc -cur red in the cross-border regions of Cas-cadia in the Pacific Northwest mainlybetween the provincial and state govern-ments (e.g., Blatter 2001).

III. Functions, Management and Finance

III.1. Finance

In terms of its place in public expendi -tures, public finance and functions, localgovernment in Canada and the U.S.,occupies an average place within thespectrum of developed countries. In the

Table 2 Financial Management

Australia Canada New Zealand United States

Total Public Expenditure (% of GDP) 37% 42% 42% 35%

(per capita) (Euros) € 11,486.56 € 13,717.90 € 9,692.57 € 14,507.04

Local Public Expenditure (% of GDP) 2.4% 7.5% 3.9% 9.6%

(per capita) (Euros) € 275.68 € 1,031.16 € 380.50 € 1,386.30

Local/Total Public Expenditure (%) 6.6% 17.8% 9.4% 27.4%

Local/Total Public Investment (%) 6% NA 16% 8%

Local Revenues:

Local taxes (% of local revenues) 38% 41% 58% 38%

Property tax (% of local taxes) 100% 92% 91% 72%

Local tax autonomy (0 (high) - 2(low)) 0.34 0.12 0.43 0.82

Grants (% of local revenues) 16% 40% 10% 39%

Sources: (Public expenditure) OECD in Figures 2005; (Local expenditure) IMF Government Finance Statistics (Australia, Canada, US: 2001, New

Zealand: 2003); (Local Revenues, Taxes and Grants) IMF Government Finance Statistics (Australia, Canada: 2001; US: 2000; New

Zealand: 2003): (Local tax autonomy, Supervision of borrowing) Sellers and Lidström 2007, Table 4; (public investment) U.S. Bureau of the

Census, 2005 Statistical Abstract of U.S. Section 9; Compendium of Government Finances: 2002 Table 1; (Australia and New Zealand)

Brilliantes et al. 2007, Table 4.

NORTH AMERICA242

United States, the role of local governmenthas generally been more pronounced, but inCanada that role still exceeds local govern-ment powers in other countries with similarBritish colonial legacies, including Australiaand New Zealand. The relative discretionthat North American local governmentsexercise over their own finances, and themo dest supervision by higher governmentofficials also set local government in bothcountries apart from most of their counter-parts worldwide, including in Europe andEast Asia.

Expenditures. Overall, the proportion ofGross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted togovernmental expenditure in Canada andthe U.S., remains somewhat lower than theaverage for the OECD (Table 2). The localgovernment portion of this expenditure,though it varies considerably, also remainsbelow levels reported for Northern Europe.In Canada and the United States, 18% and27%, respectively, of public expenditurewas distributed to local governments. Thebulk of these distributions is spent on edu-cation. Education consumes 57% of all localexpenditure in the United States, and 40%in Canada. Security services such as policeand fire represent about eight percent oflocal expenditures in the United States, ninepercent in Canada. In both countries, localpublic expenditures as a percentage of thetotal public expenditure have also creptupward slightly in recent years.

Revenues. Locally raised revenue paysfor most educational and security expendi -tures. As in other former British colonies,such as Australia and New Zealand, theproperty tax remains by far the mostimportant source of local government rev-enue. In Canada, it has generated 80% to90% of all local tax revenues. In theUnited States, partly in the wake of tax -

pay er resistance in some states, other lo caltaxes, such as sales taxes, income ta xes anduser fees grew from 22% of local tax rev-enues in 1975 to 28% in 1999. Even so, theproperty tax has continued to supply 72% oflocal tax revenues (OECD 2001).

A distinguishing feature of the propertytaxes, as well as most other local taxesin these countries is the comparativelylarge degree of discretion local authori-ties possess in setting rates and inassessing property. Ratings of local taxautonomy consistently show this discretionto be high compared with that seen inother countries. In the United States, thelaws of some individual states restrict localinitia tives to raise taxes or change assess-ments by requiring prior approval by localvoters. In Canada, setting these rates isalmost always left to the discretion of localgovernment but subject to control by theprovinces.

In both countries local governments havein recent years found themselves lessreliant on grants from higher level govern-ments for local revenues. In the UnitedStates and Canada, state or provincialgrants for education and other servicesremain considerable but modest by com-parison with many other OECD countries.The current 39 percent of total revenues inthe U.S. represents a decline from levels ofup to 45 percent in the late 1970s, but hasfluctuated over the 1990s and early 2000s.The current 40 percent in Canada repre-sents a decline from levels as high as 50percent in the late 1970s, down 2 or 3%from levels in the 1980s (OECD 2001).

Revenues in relation to tasks. Despitedwindling access to funds from above, aswell as local opposition to tax increases,local governments in Canada and theUnited States have assumed more respon-sibilities. Additional areas of responsibilitythat are increasingly being delegated tolocal governments include: environmentalregulation, planning, transportation, publichealth, immigration, education, emergency


In both countries local governments have in recent years

found themselves less reliant on grants from higher level

governments for local revenues


preparedness and security. Even so, thefiscal autonomy of local government inthese countries makes local governmentsespecially vulnerable to unfunded man-dates. Higher-level governments some-times contribute funds for these addedtasks through legislation and new policies.But higher-ups can impose such tasks with-out contributing funds, leaving local gov-ernments to cope as best they can.

In Canada, the Federation of CanadianMunicipalities has noted an increase in thedelegation of responsibilities to municipali-ties. Although the local government por-tion of expendi tures remained stable rela-tive to the provincial level from 1990 to2000 – in creasing in some provinces butdeclining in others (Diaz 2003)– local rev-enues as a percentage of the whole havedecreased. In the United States, despite thefederal Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995, thefederal government has imposed suchmeas ures as the No Child Left Behind Act of2002, which gave state governments incen-tives to administer regular tests as meas-ures of performance for public schools. Theresult ing programs in many states gave riseto accusations that the Act really just forcedschool districts to abandon more worthwhile

programs in order to provide re sources forthe new standardized tests.

Local government borrowing. In theface of such pressures, there have beenshifts in restrictions on local borrowing.This prac tice has been most widespread inthe United States (Sbragia 1988).Although often conditioned upon localvoter approval, borrowing by local govern-ments is subject to approval by a higherlevel government in only one state. InCanada, local borrowing sometimes gener-ally requires approval by a provincialboard, and has been more limited. In bothNorth American countries, local govern-ments have also turned to user fees andother charges to supplement revenues.

III.2. Functions

The limited role of local government in theoverall public expenditure and revenue ofthese countries reflects limits in the func-tions that local government has assumed.With the exceptions of local education andpublic safety, local governments continueto play a subsidiary role to central andintermediate level governments in the broadrun of public policies (Table 3). In re cent

Table 3 Local Government Functions

Functions Australia Canada New Zealand United States

Planning

Housing State, Local Province, Local (DS) Central, Territorial (DS) Federal, Local (DS)

Town planning Local Province (DS), Local Regional Local

Agriculture land planning State Province, Local (DS) Local State (DS), Local (DS)

Regional planning Local Regional State (DS), Local (DS)

Education

Pre-school State Province Central Local (DS)

Primary State Province Central Local

Secondary State Province Central Local

Vocational and technical State Province Central State, Local

Higher education Federal, State Federal Central State


Adult education State Province Central State, Local

Other State Central

Provision of social services

Kindergarten and nursery State Province Central State, Local (DS)

Family welfare services State Province Central Federal, State, Local

Welfare homes State, Local (DS) Province, Local (DS) Central

Social security Federal Province Central Federal

Others Territorial (DS)

Provision of health services

Primary care Federal Province Central (Private)

Hospital State Province Central Federal, Local (DS)

Health protection Federal, State, Local Federal, Province Central, Territorial Federal, State, Local (DS)

Mental hospital State Province Central State

Water supply

Water and sanitation State, Local Local Territorial Local (DS)

Water supply State, Local (DS) Province, Local Territorial Local (DS)

Energy supply

Gas services State Province Central, Regional Local (DS)

Electricity State Province Territorial (DS) Local (DS)

Public transport

Roads State Local Central, Territorial Federal

Transport State Local Central, Regional, Territorial State, Local

Urban roads State, Local Local Territorial State, Local

Urban public transport Local Local Territorial State, Local (DS)

Ports State Federal, Province, Local Territorial (DS) Local (DS)

Airports State Federal, Province, Local Central(DS), Territorial(DS) Federal, Local (DS)

Other transportation Federal, Local (DS)

Business development support

Agriculture, forests, and fisheries Federal, Province, Local (DS) Federal, Province Central, Territorial (DS) Federal, State

Economic promotion Federal, Province, Local (DS) Province, Local Central(DS), Territorial(DS) State, Local (DS)

Trade and industry Federal, Province, Local (DS) Federal, Province Central (DS) Federal, State, Local (DS)

Tourism Federal, Province, Local (DS) Federal, Province, Local Cen(DS), Reg(DS), Terr(DS) State, Local (DS)

Other economic services Federal, Province, Local (DS) Central(DS), Territorial(DS) Local (DS)

Security

Police State Local (generally) Central, Regional Local

Fire State Province, Local Regional, Local Local

DS: Discretionary Services by the local authority. For Australia, provinces includes territories.Sources: Commonwealth Local Government Forum (2002a, 2002b, 2002c); Stephens and Wikstrom. 2000, p. 156; supplemented by author’s

research on government websites.

Table 3 Local Government Functions (Continued)


years, however, local governments havebecome more active in a wide range of pol-icy domains in both countries, mirroringcertain global trends. The most wide-spread trend has been toward the growthof multilevel governance as both local gov-ernments and higher-level governmentsassume new roles in areas where theywere less active before.

Local government functions. Local go -vernments in Canada and the UnitedStates take on certain functions that areunusual in most established democracies.The greater local expenditure in the NorthAmerican nations stems largely from localgovernment responsibilities in educationand public safety. In the United States,individual states assign to local govern-ments responsibility for primary, second -ary and pre-school education, as well asfor police and public safety. These tradition -al areas of local responsibility havebecome more complex in recent years, buthave remained comparatively stable inrecent decades.

Canadian provinces and U.S. states varywidely in their responses to other functionsrelegated to local government. Severalprovinces and states, for instance, havetheir own policies for land use and agricul-tural planning; others have set down spe-cific mandates for local planners to follow.In most states and provinces, however,planning remains predominantly a localfunction. Provision of health and socialservices also varies. Some states andprovinces have enacted legislation thatgives localities more responsibility for wel-fare ser vices, hospitals and other matters.Ontario, for instance, assigns localitiesauthority for administering social securityand kindergartens; other provinces do not.

Environmental services, planning, buildingpermits, land use, sanitation, and refusecollection usually require some localresponsibility, as they do in many coun-tries. Even road maintenance may requiresome local government participation,

especially in urban areas in Canada. Inboth countries, cultural services, such asmuseums, may also fall to local govern-ment along with some responsibility forlocal infra structure, and fire protection orhealth services.

Over the past four decades, there hasbeen a gradual expansion in the numberand types of responsibilities local govern-ments have taken on. However, most havein volved some sharing of responsibilitieswith higher government tiers. In severaldomains where local governments havebecome more active, such as environmen-tal policy, waste management, publichealth, and transportation, authorities atthe national, provincial or state level mayplay as decisive a role as local authorities.

Shifts in local service provision. One ofthe most far-reaching recent transforma-tions in provision of local services has beenthe shift toward privatization. Contractingfor services with private businesses or non-profit organizations has become a commonpractice among local governments in theUnited States. For the most part, this hascome about without the legal man dates thathave spurred privatization in New Zealand orEurope. In the U.S., privatization is nowwell-established as a pragmatic alternativewhen other resource channels will notserve. In surveys, two thirds or more oflocal managers report that privatizationhas been considered and approved as analternative to public provision (ICMA2003). After a surge in the 1990s, it seemssafe to say that privatization has been astaple of local government since 2000.Although privatization has been on theagenda in Canada as well, it has not beenpursued as aggressively as it has in theUnited States. Even so, in neither countryhas the shift to privatization been as dra-matic as it has been in Australia, NewZealand, and some European countries.

Local entrepreneurship, in the sense of localownership of utilities, transport authorities,and facilities, is more limited than it is in parts

The greater local

expenditure in the

North American

nations stems

largely from local

government

responsibilities in

education and

public safety

NORTH AMERICA246

of Europe. However, it is common to find localgovernments generating revenue throughadministration of airports, ports and othercommercial operations. In the United States,special authorities controlled by local govern-ments typically take on these administrativeroles. The city of Los Angeles, for instance,derives a large portion of its revenue from LosAngeles International Airport and the Port ofLos Angeles.


The size of local government staffs varieswidely. This has not prevented implemen-tation of largely parallel practices designedto secure integrity in local government, tocarry out management reforms, to intro-duce at least limited elements of e-govern-ment, and to pursue policies supportinggender equality.

Personnel. Far more people work in localgovernment than might be expected inlight of the comparatively modest expendi-tures at the local government level (Table4; compare with Table 2 infra). In the

United States more than 60% of all gov-ernment employees work in local govern-ment. This rate approaches that of theNordic democracies or Japan, where muchof the welfare state is administered locally.In Canada the proportion is lower but stillconsiderable at 35%.

These contrasts owe largely to the differ en -ces in the functions local government hasassumed. Although local government inCanada and the United States is notresponsible for large public health sectorsand social benefits as in the Nordic coun-tries, it retains responsibility for some ofthe most labor-intensive public social serv-ices. The overwhelming proportion of theadditional local personnel in the UnitedStates works in the localized education sys-tem, and in both North American countriespublic safety officials also make up much oflocal government staff. The additional sec-tors of social service, health, infrastructureand educational provision in Canada alsoemploy personnel who work at provincial ornational levels in Australia and New Zealand.The low staffing levels in these countries

The overwhelming

proportion of the

additional local

personnel in the

United States

works in the

localized education

system, and in both

North American

countries public

safety officials

also make up much

of local

government staff


Table 4 Government Personnel, by Level of Government

Name Australia Canada New Zealand United States

Total 1,485,800 2,552,613 227,220 19,869,558

National 248,500 357,308 205,540 2,878,819

Federal units 1,090,600 1,313,379 4,370,562

Local 146,700 881,926 21,680 12,620,177

Percentages

National 17% 14% 90% 14%

Federal units 73% 51% 22%

Local 10% 35% 10% 64%

Years: 2000 (United States), 2001 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand).

Source: OECD 2002.


also reflect the consequences of systematicpolicies that have contracted out more ofinfrastructure and local services.

The growth of local government in theUnited States has outstripped that at otherlevels. While the federal government hasdeclined as a proportion of all governmentpersonnel, and the state governmentshave maintained essentially the same pro-portion, local governments now hire fourpercent more government employees thanin the 1980s (U.S. Department of Com-merce 2006). In Canada, local governmentemployment declined along with publicemployment over the course of the 1990s.It has been rising again since 2002 (Statis-tics Canada 2006: pp. 6-7), roughly intandem with growth in provincial govern-ment employment.

Public service rules and guarantees for

employees. A distinguishing characteristicof local government in both countries is theabsence of a national civil service for localgovernment. In most other developedcountries, either a national civil service or anational local civil service dominates localgovernment staffing. But in North America,municipal hiring is by individual, privatelaw contract. Although there are civil serv-ice systems in many local governments,the character of these varies widely (e.g.,Freyss 1995). Partly as a consequence, manylocal government employees are recruitedlocally. Within specific domains of localgovernment activity, professional creden-tialing and certification often provide a par-tial substitute for civil service standards.This is notably true in the United States,where public school teachers, police offi-cers, firefighters and financial officials musthave professional accreditation and associ-ated training.

Mechanisms for enforcement of publicintegrity are present in each country. MostU.S. states and Canadian provinces haveenacted codes of conduct for public ethicsthat include openness and proper resolu-tion of conflicts of interest. Often provi-

sions for ethics in local government arepart of a more general system of normsapplied to all public employees within astate or province. Measures of this kindhave helped to assure comparatively highstanding for public officials in these coun-tries (World Bank 2006).

Reforms and management initiatives.

Efforts to improve quality and efficiencyhave proceeded steadily at the local level inthe United States and Canada, though it isdifficult to assess how much difference theseefforts have made. Professional organiza-tions like the International City/CountyManagers Association have sought to pro-vide benchmarking studies and best prac -tices guidelines for these local efforts.

E-government. A growing majority oflocal governments in both countries haveadopted “e-government” practices. Mostlocal governments now have websites;larger municipalities use these to distrib-ute increasing volumes of public informa-tion. Local e-government varies widely inscope and amount. Studies in the UnitedStates show that it is most extensive andwide spread among wealthier communitieswhere residents can easily afford comput-ers, and are apt to be highly educated(Reece 2006). Several municipalities andsome state and provincial governmentshave moved beyond passive online con-tent. In Canada, Nunavet and Yukon have“intro duced legislation which allows coun-cil and committee meetings to be heldelectronically.” (UNESCAP 2005).

Gender equality policies. In both coun-tries, an array of general workplace guar-antees of civil rights extend protections ongender equality to local governments.

A distinguishing characteristic of local government

in both countries is the absence of a national civil service

for local government

NORTH AMERICA248

IV. Local Democracy

In the workings of democracy at the munic-ipal and other local levels, Canadian andU.S. local governments maintain some oftheir most distinctive prac tices. Non-parti-san elections, single-member electoral dis-tricts, frequent elections, direct democracy,and greater local choice of institutions setlocal institutions in these countries apart. Anumber of these practices mark clear di -vergences from inherited British traditions,as well as from the institutions in compar ablecountries like Australia and New Zealand.

IV.1. Parties and Partisanship

In Canada and the United States the over-whelming proportion of local elections arenon partisan. Canadian candidates tend tobe listed either as independents, or to beaffiliated with local, rather than nationalparties (UNESCAP 2005b). Even whennational politicians run for local office, thelinks between local elections and nationalparty organizations remain loose. In theU.S., most states, particularly those in the“reform” areas of the South and West,require elections to be non-partisan. Inlarger cities, partisan affiliations are oftenwell known even in formally non-partisanelections and can play an important role.

IV.2. Elected Executives

Although a variety of arrangements char-acterize local elections, several broad insti-tutional patterns have predominated(Table 5). In the United States some 38%of municipal governments feature amayor-council system, with an electedmayor who often exercises considerableindependent authority (MacManus & Bul-lock, 2003 pg. 3). This arrangement ismost common in larger cities. A growingmajority of U.S. cities – a 2001 survey esti-mated the proportion at 53% – haveadopted instead a council manager sys-tem. In this system the mayor is electedby the council from among its membersand usually has few powers. In Canada,

ma yors of lower-tier authorities are gener-ally elected. But in rural authorities, thema yors, reeves and wardens who exerciseexecutive authority are generallyappointed by councils.

IV.3. Council Voting Systems

Council voting systems vary, but displaysome overarching commonalities. Althoughthe single-member district method of elec-tion is part of the British local governmenttradition, in the United States at-large elec-tions have grown to predominate. In a 2001city council survey 45% of councilors incities with populations over 25,000 reportedthis form of elections, compared to 28%with ward elections and 26% with a mixture(Svara 2003; p. 13). Among cities over200,000, however, ward elections remainmost frequent. In Canada as well, the typeof representation varies among and withinprovinces. There the ward system with firstpast-the-post voting generally predomi-nates.


One of the distinguishing features of localgovernment in Canada and the UnitedStates has been the greater extent of par-ticipatory opportunities for local citizens.Electoral terms are short, elected officesoften more numerous, direct democraticprocedures like recall and referenda morewidespread, and citizen commissions havelong been a regular feature of local gov-ernment.

Voters in the United States and Canadaoften have the opportunity to vote morefrequently for local officeholders than dotheir counterparts in other countries. Thethree years that correspond to the averageterm in U.S. cities for elected executivesand councilors, and corresponding practicesin Canada, represent only one dimensionof this additional opportunity. Even forcouncils with four-year terms, the termsare often staggered so as to schedule anelection for part of the council every two


Voters in the United

States and Canada

often have the

opportunity to vote

more frequently for

local officeholders

than do their

counterparts in

other countries


years. In the U.S. there are often multiplelocal electoral offices, including boards,local administrative officials and some -times local judges. Recall elections forlocal officials are authorized in around halfof U.S. states. In California these have be -come a regular occurrence. Term limits ina growing number of U.S. localities havealso prevented incumbents from holdingon to safe seats. Finally, referenda are amore regular feature of local politics inmuch of the United States than in anycountry other than Switzerland. Althoughresort to direct democracy varies widely bystate and region, voting now plays a majorrole in transportation, infrastructure andpublic finance in such states as California,

Ohio and Washington State. Canada alsohas a long tradition of referenda (Hahn1968). With the exception of three-yearcouncil terms, these practices set bothcountries apart from fellow former coloniesAustralia and New Zealand.

Participation in local elections is relativelylow, conforming to the international trendof higher voter turnout for elections athigh er levels. This tendency is particularlypronounced in the United States whereelectoral turnout has been lower than it isin other countries affiliated with theOrganisation for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD). Local electionturn out as a proportion of the eligible pop-

Table 5 Local Democracy

Local councils Local executive Direct democracy

Proportional/ Constituencies Term Mode of Term Collegial / Recallmajority rule selection unitary

Australia preferential or plurality One 3-4 years Mostly popular 3-4 years Unitary No Infrequent

systems (4 states), election, some

preferential or indirectly election

proportional

representation (2),

proportional

representation (1)

Canada Generally, plurality Multiple 3 years, Direct election 3 years, Unitary No Frequent: for

4 years or (8 provinces), 4 years or taxes, planning

2-3 years indirect election (2) 2-3 years

New Zealand Plurality Multiple 3 years Direct election 3 years Unitary No Occasional,

infrastructure

and electoral rules

United States Mostly plurality, Multiple, one 3.3 years Direct Generally Collegial Authorized Frequent or

some multimember and mixed on average election (50%), 2-4 years (5%), in half of very frequent:

districts and single indirect election (3 on average) Otherwise states, revenues,

nontransferable (50%), unitary occasionally infrastructure,

vote systems used annexation issues

Sources: Bush (1995); Commonwealth Local Government Forum (2002a, 2002b); International City/County Management Association (1997);

McManus (1999); Mouritzen and Svara (2002); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2002a, 2002b );

Zimmerman 1997; Canadian provincial and territorial local government acts.

NORTH AMERICA250

ulation has been estimated as low as 10%(Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). A study offive major U.S. metropolitan areas from1996 to 2003 showed an average turnoutof 29% for municipal elections, comparedwith an average turnout of 57% for thepresidential election of 2000 (Sellers andLatner 2006). In Canada, where the onlyavailable measures are for the majorcities, local election turnout since the 1990sranged between 41% and 49% of the eligi-ble population in general election years,and between 31% and 39% in off-yearelections.

The traditional New England town meeting,a legislative assembly of citizens them -selves, survives today in only a very smallproportion of U.S. local governments. Butcitizen commissions and boards remain aregular feature of local governmentthroughout Canada and the United States,and several municipalities have adoptedinnovative new forms of citizen participa-tion in recent years. Several larger cities ofCanada and the United States haveadopted systems of neighborhood-levelcouncils with elected representatives(Berry et al . 1993; Rivard and Collin2006: 7). Most of these councils havebeen confined to advisory powers. In a fewcases, such as the borough system of NewYork City and the neighborhood councils ofSan Antonio, sub-municipal councils of thissort also exercise governmental powers. Afew Canadian municipalities have alsoexperimented with such innovations asparticipatory budgeting. New practices insuch functional areas as planning havealso included consultations with neighbor-hood associations and even individual res-idents in the preparation of local develop-ment plans.

IV.5. Choice of Localities to Determine the Shape of Their Own Institutions

In Canada and the United States, localgovernments have historically exercisedconsiderable authority over the shape oftheir institutions. General laws governing

municipal government in the provincesand states offer a choice among a varietyof different legal forms, as well as discre-tion to choose different voting systems,executive forms, and other electoralprocesses. As a practical matter, choicesvary only moderately among a limitednumber of standard types, often depend-ing on population size and the rural orurban character of a jurisdiction. Especiallyin the areas of later European settlement–outside the northeastern re gion of theUnited States, for example– state laws forannexation and municipal incorporationfacilitate the formation of new local gov-ernments as well as the public annexationof land. Throughout the U.S. and in a num-ber of Canadian cities, many larger citygovernments have been maintainedthrough a specifically legislated charterunder the state government. This leads toeven more distinctive institutionalarrangements for each such city. A charterof this kind enables higher-level govern-ments to establish the local government’sstructure, fiscal authority and other pow-ers for each city. Local authority of thiskind is unusual in Europe, or even Aus-tralia and New Zealand, although it is fairlycommon in developing regions.

IV.6. Local Political Representation

Representation of women in local govern-ment has increased in recent decades. In a2001 survey by the U.S National League ofCities, 28% of city council members werefemale, two percent more than in 1989(Svara 2003, p. 5). In the city councils oflarge cities, as well as ‘liberal’ states likeNew York, the number has risen to morethan 30% (ibid.; Anthony Center: 2006).In 2002, 17% of mayors in cities with pop-ulations of 30,000 or more were women(Conway 2005: 60). Female re pre -sentation was highest, 44%, on localschool boards (ibid.). In Canada the pro-portion is somewhat lower. A 2004 nationalsurvey by the Federation Canadian ofMunicipalities reported that only 21.7% ofmunicipal councilors were women (Federa-

Representation

of racial and ethnic

minorities

continues

to pose problems

in both countries.



tion of Canadian Municipalities 2004: 9),with much lower representation of womenfrom minority ethnicities.

Representation of racial and ethnic minori-ties continues to pose problems in bothcountries. In the United States, with therise of majority-minority jurisdictions inmany central cities, African-American,Latino and Asian-American representativeshave in many places acquired a significantor even predominant role in local councils.In cities of all sizes – especially in thelargest ones– surveys indicate that minorityrepresentation doubled from 1979 to 2001(Svara 2003: p. 7). But studies continue toshow under-representation of minorities inrelation to their numbers, a situation oftenlinked to low electoral turnout and otherfactors (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). Sim-ilarly, a 1998 analysis of council membersin Montreal showed only 29% from theethnic minority groups that comprised43% of the total population (Simard 2000:p. 17).

IV.7. Traditional Institutions

In particular regions in both countries,indigenous populations from the yearsbefore European settlement continue tomaintain traditional institutions that canalter or replace the workings of otherlocal governments. In some cases, rela-tions between indigenous local practicesand local government have becomeenmeshed in renewed de bates aboutindigenous claims to land title and formsof sovereignty (Langton et al. 2004).Wider systems for providing services andmaintaining infrastructure have also hadto be modified to accommodate local selfgovernment through traditional institu-tions.

In Canada, where there are some 1500indigenous tribes, a series of treaties sincethe 1970s has established the right of FirstNations to self-government (Morse 2004).The need for cooperation with the localgovernments has led First Nation treaty

negotiators for British Columbia to agreeto a protocol that guarantees local govern-ment representatives a place in treatynegotiations.

On the 550 Indian reservations in theUnited States, the tribal government is thelocal government authority. Reservationsare exempt from certain taxes, such asstate sales taxes, and often maintain theirown tribal courts. The isolation andpoverty of many reservations makes set-tlements some of the poorest in the coun-try (Kalt and Cornell 2000).

IV.8. Decentralization and Oversight of Local Government

Adhering to the British sys tem that influ-enced the early development of these coun-tries, higher-level governments in Canadaand the United States do not rely on the ter-ritorial representation of a prefect, or a com-parable general representative at the lo callevel. In the federal systems of the two coun-tries, separate de partments of the states,provinces and territories provide generaloversight. In Canadian provinces and terri to -ries, Ministries or Departments of Local Go -vernment provide this function. In the U.S.states, the Secretaries of State ge nerallyhave this responsibility. In both countries,the oversight activities include supervision oflocal elec tions, administra tive records, andother re quirements in clu d ing those for ba -lanced budgets.

National governments in both countries have,for several decades scaled back direct inter-vention into municipal affairs. Canada elimi-nated its federal ministry of urban affairs inthe 1970s; the Department of Housing andUrban Development (HUD) in the U.S., hasalso reduced its role. How ever, the nationalgovernments have undertaken some initia-tives in recent decades, intervening directly inlocal affairs. In Canada, the creation of a Mi -nister of State for Infrastructure and Commu-nities in 2004, which became the Minister forTransport, Infrastructure. In certain areas,such as grants for housing or community de -

In some cases,

relations between

indigenous local

practices and local

government have

become enmeshed

in renewed de bates

about indigenous

claims to land title

and forms of

sovereignty

NORTH AMERICA252

ve lopment or the administration of nationalparks in the United States, direct interventionof this sort bypasses officials of state andprovincial governments. In areas like trans-portation planning or regulation of air andwater pollution, the federal government inthe United States has enlisted state govern-ments in national regulatory schemes, andsometimes works along side state officials at thelocal level.

Higher-level governments, therefore, doretain some broad powers to oversee localaffairs, and to intervene in local govern-ment activities. Canadian provincial minis-ters responsible for local government, inaddition to broad oversight and approvalpowers, can go so far as to dissolve localcouncils and appoint administrators tocarry out local government functions. Inthe United States as well, state govern-ments are generally empowered to takeover administration of local governmentsthat default on financial obligations or oth-erwise fail. This has occurred, for in stance,in the takeover of the urban Philadelphiaschool district by the state of Pennsylva-nia. These powers are also typical ofhigher level governments in other systemswith British colonial legacies, including,once more, Australia and New Zealand.

Among politicians, the holding of multipleelectoral mandates offices for local andstate or national office is rare, and islargely, if not entirely, prohibited by con-flict of interest laws. Although politicianshave often moved between offices at dif-ferent levels, they do so through a succes-sion of posts. In U.S. states, where termlimits have increasingly restricted thenumber of mandates a politician can serve,moving between state office and localoffice has become increasingly common.

IV.9. Public Opinion on Local Government

As in most advanced industrial democra-cies with longstanding institutions, skepti-cism about public officials and politicianshas increased. In both the United States

and Canada, however, the public opinion oflocal government appears to be somewhatmore positive.

Since the 1970s in the United States, thepublic has placed growing trust in localgovernment, particularly in comparisonwith government at higher levels. In 1972,a Gallup survey showed that 12% placed“a great deal” and 51% “a fair amount” oftrust in local government – a total of 63%.In 2005, 23% expressed “a great deal” oftrust and 47% “a fair amount” – a total of70%. From 2001 to 2004, the proportionin both categories averaged 5 % high erthan trust in state government, and elevenpercent higher than trust in the federal go -vernment.

In Canada as well, a recent survey showedskepticism about the performance of the fe -deral government, but positive assessmentsof the performance of local government infacing local issues (Infrastructure Canada2006). Fifty three percent of respondentsrated local governments “excel lent” or“good” in addressing these issues. This com-pared with 37% for provincial governments,and 32% for the federal government.

IV.10. Local Government Associations

As in other countries with highly devel-oped systems of local governance,national associations of local govern-ments and local government officials playdiverse roles. The Federation of CanadianMunicipalities (FCM) began in 1901 asthe Union of Canadian Municipalities. Inthe United States, the National League ofCities (NLC) was founded in 1924, andthe United States Conference of Mayorsin 1932. Much of local government legis-lation is a matter of state or provincialand territorial law. Local governmentassociations formed within these inter-mediate levels of government are alsovery active and influential. Associationsof local professionals, such as the Inter-national Ci ty/County Management Asso-ciation, have also been a major factor.


Since the 1970s in

the United States,

the public has

placed

growing trust in

local government,

particularly in

comparison with

government at

higher levels


One of the most important roles thatthese organizations have served is ascorporate representatives of the inter-ests of local governments in national andstate or provincial policymaking. TheU.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), forinstance, emerged in the 1930s from thefirst successful efforts by a coalition ofmayors to secure a package of federalfinancial aid targeted to city govern-ments during The Depression. The Cana-dian Federation of Municipalities (FCM)has increasingly gained recognition as avoice for protection of the rights ofmunicipalities in national debates. By

contrast, the U.S. national or ganizationshave in recent decades scaled backefforts to influence national policy. Stateor provincial organizations of municipalgo vernments are often more active atthese lower levels of government, wheremost policies and frameworks for localgovernments are crafted.

IV.11. National Organizations Also Take on Other Roles

Documenting and disseminating best prac-tices and information about local govern-ment has been a goal for all of these asso-


ciations. This role has been especiallyprominent among the national associationsin the United States. The National Leagueof Cities (NLC) maintains a database oflocal government practices, and a Munici-pal Reference Service that collects informa-tion on local government activities aroundthe country. Both the NLC and the Interna-tional City/County Managers Associationregularly conduct surveys of local govern-ments. Their surveys have become themost important source of in formation onbroad trends at the local level. In the U.S.,national forums linked to the USCM and theNLC bring local officials together regularlyto discuss issues of common concern. Net-working both do mes ti cally and internation-

ally among local go vernments has alsobeen an important element of these activi-ties. As part of its initiatives for local capac-ity building, the FCM has established theCenter for Sustainable Community Devel-opment (CSCD). The FCM also maintains aGreen Municipal Fund (GMF), a unique$550 million endowment from the federalgovernment devoted to environmental sus-tainability and local capacity building. Since1987, Ca nadian municipalities haveauthorized an International Center forMunicipal De ve lopment to represent theFCM in international work. In both coun-tries, in ter national partnerships have pro-liferated outside as well as within the aus-pices of national associational activities.


V. Conclusion

In both Canada and the United States, localgovernment has evolved quite far from itsoriginal British colonial legacy. Their parallelevolution has given these settler nations adistinctive type of local government thatcan be understood only partly through com-parison with contemporary British local gov-ernment, or even with local government inother former British colonies. Long-standingfeatures of these systems include limitedlegal status, comparative local fiscal auton-omy, a modest municipal role in overallpublic finance, a strong role in local civicaction, and an emphasis on local democ-racy. By comparison with Europe and EastAsia, these systems may seem to embody alimited role for local government. But thatrole is also much more institutionalized androbust than in many newly decentralizingcountries, and less subject to supervisionfrom above than in most of the developedNorth.

Within both countries, but especially withinthe United States, considerable varietycontinues to mark local governance. Localgovernment remains subject to differentlegal frameworks by state or province, andeven by individual city. Informal and for-mal inter-local arrangements also differwidely, even across a single metropolitanarea. Such common trends as the growth

of local government, the shifting ofresponsibilities to the local level, and thesearch for new inter-local and public-pri -vate arrangements for governance showfew signs of abating.

In the United States, local government hasthrived even as it has confronted wide -spread decentralization, greater supervision,intergovernmental fragmentation and anincreasingly limited role in national policy.Local government powers in some statesinclude general authorizations like those ofNorthern Europe, and overall, local gov-ernment has one of the highest propor-tions of public employment in the world.Both this proportion and the local govern-ment portion of public spending continueto rise. The growing trust of citizens inlocal government suggests that thisgrowth will continue.

Canadian local governments traditionallypossess more limited powers and fiscal re -sources than do those in many U.S. states,but this may be changing. Local go vern -ment representatives have lobbied forstrengthening these powers. New go -vernmental units, and planning at the me -tropolitan level have taken hold, and thetrust of citizens in local government re -mains high.

In both Canada and

the United States,

local government

has evolved quite

far from its original

British colonial

legacy

METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

JEFFERE Y SELLERS

VINCENT HOFFMANN-MARTINOT

METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE258


I. Introduction

Worldwide, metropolitan regions (also re -ferred to as “urban regions” or “city regions”)are rapidly becoming the predominantform of human settlement. In 1800 only2% of the world’s population lived in urbanareas. Five years from today –most likelywhen a villager somewhere in Asia orAfrica mo ves to an urban center there–the ma jority of the world’s population willbe ur ban. Thereafter, humankind will be,indisputably, an urban species.

With the industrial revolutions of the 19thand early 20th Centuries, urban regionsbe came the predominant form of settle-ment throughout most of the global North.This process of urbanization is now increas-ingly the rule in the global South as well.For example, most of Latin America is nowurbanized. The United Nations predicts thatfrom 2005 to 2030, 90% of all global pop-ulation growth will take place in urbanregions of the global South (UNCHS 2005).

The size and form of metropolitan regionsdiffer considerably, both within countriesand between global North and global Southre gions. The size of today’s largest urbanregions is unprecedented in world history. In1950 only one city had a population of morethan 10 million. By 1975 there were fivecities of this size, three of them in the devel-oping world. By 2000 there were 16 citieswith populations over 10 million, twelve ofthem in the developing world. However,such megacities like these present only partof the story. Cities with populations inexcess of one million are proliferating world-wide, and the number of cities with morethan five mi l lion inhabitants is also increas-ing. As more people are drawn into expand-ing urban regions (UNCHS 2005), theworld’s metropolises grow more extensive,more diverse and more fragmented.

Simultaneously, changes in the governance,economics and societies continue to transformthe spatial and social structures of ur banregions. Diverse service sectors in both the

South and the North have grown into domi-nant components of metropolitan economies.As economic globalization has in creas inglylinked urban regions to each other, and citiesto their peripheries and hinterlands, competi-tion among cities and regions has intensified.At the same time, widespread decentralizationhas encouraged high-level governments toabandon local go vern ments within metropoli-tan regions to the myriad consequences of theongoing de mographic, economic and socialchanges.

Social scientists have for many years linkedurbanization with economic development,education and other components of “mod-ernization” (Ingram 1997). Of course, citiesare still the centers of economic and socialactivity worldwide, but in important waysthe dynamics of modernization havechanged. It is increasingly clear that today’sme tropolitan regions face unprecedentedgo ver nance chal lenges. The size of moderncities, their continued growth, their socialand spatial frac tures, their distinctive eco-nomic characteristics, and their institutionaldimensions present hitherto unanticipateddimensions of governance. As expandingme tropolitan reg ions co pe with the newfacts of governance, go vernments at higherlevels must also acknow ledge and addressmetropolitan issues. Nor is it likely thatsolutions will be simple. Solutions for oneregion may not pertain in another. Eachmetropolitan setting, North and South, is inimportant respects unique.

II. Conditions of Metropolitan Governance

Worldwide urbanization has given rise tothe global phenomenon of geographicallyextended metropolitan regions. This chap-ter focuses on governance of these settings,go vernance being defined as “actions andinstitutions within an urban region that reg-ulate or impose conditions for its politicaleconomy” (Sellers 2002, p. 9). Despite thema ny forms that metropolitan governmentsta ke, they confront common challenges shapedby parallel shifts in politics, economics and


The size of today’s

largest urban

regions is

unprecedented in

world history


society. Still, fundamental differencesbetween Northern and Southern cities makegovernance a significantly different proposi-tion above and below the equator.

Urban growth means territorial expansionas well as population growth. De facto met-ropolitan borders push thus farther and far-ther out into the surrounding rural area. Atthe same time, improved transportationand com munication technologies havegreatly in creased the mobility of employersand re sidents. Especially in developedcountries, clear di chotomies between cityand countryside ha ve given way to dis-persed, polycentric pat terns of settlementand economic activity. Ma ny developingareas, such as the Pearl Ri ver Delta ofChina, manifest a similar evolution.

The problem of horizontal governanceacross an extended area confronts all ofthese ur ban regions. Settlement and eco-nomic activity frequently expand acrossins titutionalized boundaries, and beyondthe reach of stable, pre-existing gover-nance arrangements. This phenomenonpresents several potential problems:

• Absence of territorial controls and gui-

dance: Urban spread can be limited andrestricted only by co-operative actionamong the affected urban areas. Local go -vernments must look beyond their pa -rochial vision and strategy, and make atleast a minimal effort to acknowledge andaccommodate this crucial spillover di -mension;

• Shortcomings in management ca -

pa bilities and experience: Small go -vern ment units find it difficult to attractand develop the administrative andtechnical resources required for territo-rial management. Pooling resourcescould provide increased efficiency andeconomies of scale;

• Lack of structural consultation for sol -

ving common problems: Collective ac tionby local governments is still the exc eption.

Yet when the social and economic structureswithin a metropolitan re gion are inter -connected, decisions and ac tions ta ken byone community can easily affect or evenundermine the choices made in a neighbo-ring one. This inter connectedness of metro-politan communities stands at the core of themetropolitan problem.

Partly for these reasons, metropolitan gover-nance requires vertical as well as horizontalrelations among governments. The social andeconomic problems that the higher-level gov-ernments of both developed and developingcountries confront – from economic de -velopment to reducing pollution – are also in -creasingly the problems of metropolitanregions. Opportunities for governance withinthese regions are often provided by nationalpolicies and institutions. For example, trans-portation policy determined at a higher levelof government can be coordinated with localdecisions about economic development. Si -mi larly, implementation of national orregional pollution laws can be facilitated byappropri ate local planning; or an overarchingsocial welfare policy can be coordinated withlocal educational policy.

Other social and economic dynamics in me -tro politan areas compound the need for me - tro politan governance. Recent researchpoints to growing socio-economic disparitieswithin many contemporary metropolitanregions (e.g., Fainstein 2001; Segbers et al.2007). As markets for residence and em -ployment in metropolitan areas diversify,affluent households seize the opportunity tosort themselves into areas with superioramenities and a better quality of life. Poorhouseholds gravitate toward areas with thelowest housing costs. Especially where theboundaries between affluence and povertycorrespond to boundaries between govern-mental entities, such as villages or towns,heightened differences in the number andquality of public services can reinforce socialdisparities. With out public measures toequilibrate the fiscal disparities among locales,governance arrangements can reinforcespatial advantages and disadvantages.

As markets

for residence and

em ployment in

metropolitan areas

diversify, affluent

households seize

the opportunity to

sort themselves

into areas with

superior amenities

and a better quality

of life


Even beyond the boundaries of metropoli-tan settlement itself, increased mobilityand communication have intensified socialand economic links between urban centersand outlying areas. Metropolitan regions,like most central cities, function as centersof production and distribution for the sur-rounding regions. However, they are alsocenters of consumption for outlying areas,providing a strong cultural economy forintellectual life, education and tourism.Indeed, growth in the metropolis often comesat the expense of rural economies, trigger-ing a population influx from rural areas.

Differences between northern and southern metropolitan regions

Within these broad commonalities, urbanregions in the developed North and thosein the developing South have distinctivecharacteristics and face markedly differentchal lenges.

In parts of the South, especially in Asia andAfrica, urban regions are growing at unprece-dented rates, faster even than cities grew atthe onset of urbanization in the North. Flightfrom the countryside is driven by rural en -vironmental degradation, disappearing jobopportunities and poverty. So dire are con-ditions in many rural areas that growth insouthern metropolitan regions is simply ex - plosive. Although current rates of growthamong cities in the North vary widely, they aregenerally lower. In much of Europe, decliningbirth rates and migration present new prob-lems among declining urban populations.

The populations and forms of peripheralsettlement also differ. In most of theNorth, middle class and affluent residentshave led a migration from the central cities(Hoffman-Martinot and Sellers 2005). Inmost of the South, however, urban regionsremain generally more concentrated anddense, and poor residents typically pre-dominate on the urban periphery.

Concentrations of poverty and slums may stillbe found in major metropolitan areas in the

United States and in a number of Europeancountries. In many Southern metropolitanregions, however, poverty pre dominates. Thelatest survey data suggest that 25% of theurban population is below the poverty line inIndia, 15% in Brazil, 30% in Tanzania, 19% inGhana, 13% in Jamaica, 57% in Sierra Leoneand approximately 7% in Vietnam(UNFPA:2006). If poverty in the South weremeasured by the same standards applied indeveloped countries, at least half of the urbanpopulation in many developing countries wouldbe categorized as poor. In developing nations,the urban figure is usually less than the pro-portion of households below the relevantpoverty line in the rural areas (UNFPA: 2007).

The most recent UN figures also suggestthat one third of the world’s urban popula-tion – 90% of city dwellers in the develop-ing world – live in slums, defined as areaswith inadequate provision of infrastructuresuch as sewers, running water and elec-tricity (UNFPA: 2007).

For urban residents in the South, a notablemeasure of informality characterizes em -ploy ment and housing (cf. Gilbert 1998;Seg bers et al. 2007). While their legal sta-tus varies with local circumstance, thesesettlements by definition lie outside theformal plan ning and legal system, and areusually built on land that the inhabitantsdo not own. Such residential areas come inmany forms and sizes, and most attain defacto acceptance by local authorities. Localmunicipal po liticians often use their resi-dents as sources of patronage and elec-toral support. One re sult of this acknowl-edged but unofficial sta tus has been theappearance of a full-fledged undergroundhousing market with properties (usuallyshacks) being unofficially bought and sold.Because most settlement residents can notafford to “own” property, even under suchquasi-legal conditions, there is also astrong rental market.

In many developed countries, local gov-ernments, planning regimes, property lawsand welfare states institutionalized at the

Concentrations

of poverty and

slums may still be

found in major

metropolitan areas

in the United States

and in a number of

European countries



national level have provided powerfulinstruments to steer metropolitan settle-ment and address resource inequalities. Inthe South, however, even where compara-ble mechanisms exist, they are apt to beless extensive and less effective.

In confronting rapid urbanization and thechallenges of metropolitan governance in the21st Century, Southern metropolitan areascan find guidance in the growing number andrange of global institutional models. The semodels incorporate international ex pertiseabout policy in specific sectors, and accumu-lated lessons about metropolitan manage-ment garnered from previous experience withurbanization. But the sheer size and extentof the largest urban regions, as well as thegrow ing influence of outside forces and met-ropolitan interconnectedness, frequently giveri se to unforeseen circumstances and daunt-ing complexities.

The growth patterns of metropolitan regionsare most usefully viewed as products of bothgovernment and private-sector policies.Intentionally or not, even the most diverseand expansive metropolitan areas achievedcertain aspects of their present form partlyas a result of governmental choices. Suchgo vernmental efforts include extendingtrans portation systems, such as motorways,trains and other forms of mass transport,de signating locations for businesses and re -si dents, providing incentives through taxaba tements and other subsidies, and plan-ning suburban habitats. At the same time,individual businesses and consumer housingpreferences exert powerful, ongoing influ-ences on growth patterns.

III. Key Challenges of GoverningMetropolitan Areas

The governance of metropolitan areas is par-ticularly difficult for a number of reasons.Whatever the institutional arrangements orthe peculiarities of the surrounding region,metropolitan governance must address in -creas ingly extended, diverse, and divided

spaces. Many metropolitan areas must dealwith continued demographic expansion. Manyothers must also overcome institutional frag-mentation due to the lack of a central, en -com passing regulatory authority. Most, to so -me degree, also have to cope with new andsometimes intense local conflicts.

III.1. Social and Territorial Diversity

The shape of metropolitan regions todaymarks a clear departure from the traditionalform of cities. Especially in Europe, urban set-tlement has long been understood to followan agglomerative concentric model. Withinfortifications, behind gates and along greatboulevards, the European city developed adistinct economy and way of life. Beyond thecity walls lay the economically and adminis-tratively separate sphere of rural settlement.Modern metropolitan regions, however, havefar more complex patterns of territorial diver-sity that often blend urban and rural ele-ments. Such new patterns are reinforced bysocial diversity that frequently outstrips thatof urban regions in centuries past.

Though it may seem counterintuitive, todaythe fastest growth often occurs in the ruralcommunities on the fringes of urban areas.In the developed countries of the North, thisgrowth is fed by young families looking forhomes with more space. Many of these “newrural dwellers” left denser urban neighbor-hoods or even established suburbs to live inoutlying villages. Though they move fartherfrom the center of the city, these familiestypically remain dependent on the city foremployment and public amenities.

In the developing countries of the South,especially in Brasilia and Mexico City, mid-dle class and affluent households are alsomoving away from the center of metropol-itan regions. However, an even largernumber of new arrivals are poor residentsof rural areas and poor urban dwellersseeking affordable housing.

As the urban fabric spreads and stretches, thenotion of ‘conurbation’ – a continuous network

The growth

patterns

of metropolitan

regions are most

usefully viewed as

products of both

government and

private-sector

policies


of built-up urban areas – has increasingly failedto capture the fluid and ambiguous nature ofperi-urban regions. It has given way to meas-ures of commuting intensity or patterns ofmigration toward a central city. Significantly,geographers and urban planners have eveninvented special terms to describe the newentities that are taking shape around largecities: City-archipelago, emerging town,megalopolis, metapolis and metropolitan areaare a few examples of recent additions to theurban-studies lexicon (Ascher 1996; Gottman1961; Mongin 1998; Veltz 1995).

Growing social diversity in many urban re -gions has contributed to the increase inground-level territorial diversity. The largesturban regions in developed countries gener-ally feature higher levels of social and eco-nomic segregation by residence. In Europeand North America, many such regions havealso absorbed the largest proportions of newimmigrants, including those from developingcountries. Growing economic and socialdiversity has often compounded metropoli-tan segregation. Although middle classareas predominate in the largest metropoli-tan regions of the developed world, it is usu-ally possible to find both exclusive affluentlocalities or neighborhoods and concentra-tions of poverty and social disadvantage.Overall levels of territorial segregation varywidely among metropolitan regions, butrange higher in the United States than inmost of West ern Europe or Japan.

In most southern cities, the incidence ofpoverty is determined primarily by the locallabor market. The income, security, andbenefits linked to employment remain theprimary means by which households canavoid impoverishment. Industrial firms arethe major employers in the urban centersof the South, though in some places theservice sector has been replacing them.Street trading and the informal job sectorhave be come a major source of employ-ment for those not in the formal sector. Theproportion of jobs in this sector variesbetween cities but often accounts forupwards of 20% of those in employment.

III.2. Governmental Fragmentation

Another challenge for governance stemsfrom the organizational fragmentation oflo cal governments in extended metropoli-tan regions. Much of this fragmentation isgeopolitical. As more people move into anincreas ing number of communities sur-rounding central cities, more local govern-ments are drawn into problems that besetthe en tire metropolitan region.

Data from the 476 metropolitan regions inthe International Metropolitan Observatory(Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005) offerthe most systematic current overview ofgovernmental fragmentation in OECD coun-tries; data for several additional cases areprovided as well. Measured by the propor-tion of the central city population in areas ofmore than 200,000 inhabitants, Israel isone of the most fragmented countries froma geopolitical point of view, along withSwitzerland (30%), Germany (31%), theUnited Sta tes (34%) and France (36%). Inthe Ne therlands, about half the populationlives in central city neighborhoods, but inthe other countries studied, the bulk of thepopulation continues to reside in centraltowns rather than traditional suburbs.

The number of communities with approxi ma -tely 100,000 inhabitants is a second widelyaccepted measure of this kind of political-institutional fragmentation (e.g., Brunn andZiegler 1980) in metropolitan areas. Thehigher this indicator is for a metropolitanarea, the greater the fragmentation. In amajority of the countries in the InternationalMetropolitan Observatory (IMO) project, thismeasure of institutional fragmentation is low,having a value lower than five. Such a lowscore invariably indicates that municipalitiesin the region have been merged, as theywere recently in Canada (1). Sweden and theNetherlands (2), Poland and Israel (3), andNorway (4), also merged their metropolitanmunicipalities comparatively recently. InSpain, the exurban parts of metropolitanareas have only developed in recent years,accounting for that country’s low level of

The largest

urban regions in

developed

countries generally

feature higher

levels of social and

economic

segregation by

residence



institutional fragmentation (3). The highestva lues appear in countries where pre-in -dustrial municipal boundaries largely sur vive,such as France (32), the Czech Re public andSwitzerland (21), Germany (18), the UnitedStates (15) and Hun gary (12). It may seemsurprising that the se values are much higherin Hungary and in the Czech Republic, formercommunist countries, than in Poland (3) or inother post-communist countries such as Slo-vak Republic. This higher level of fragmenta-tion is a re sult of planned programs formunicipal disaggregation carried out by theCzech and Hungarian national governments.

A geopolitical fragmentation index deve -loped by Brunn and Zeigler (1980) com-bines the two previous indicators into a sin-gle measurement. This enables a summarycom parison among the IMO countries.

As measured by this index, France appearsas the most territorially fragmented coun-try in Europe with a value of 11. This indi-cates considerably more fragmentationthan the average for the United States(7), which is more or less the level forSwitzerland. International comparison ofthe Zeig ler and Brunn scale shows thatthere is no uniform North Americanmodel: Canadian metropolitan areas areinstitutionally very different from those inthe United States, and recent consolida-tion re forms have placed Canada closer tothe Northern European model. Similarly, itis not possible to put all countries in East-ern Europe in the same bracket. Whilethey were all subject to waves of mergersduring the communist period, the frag-mentation of the post-co mmunist CzechRepublic (3) pre sents a completely differ-ent profile from Hungary (1.7) or Poland(0.6). Because of a recent, less-pro-nounced metropolitani za tion process,Spain (0.5) appears to be clo ser to theNetherlands (0.5), Sweden (0.3) and Nor-way (0.8) than to neighboring Fran ce.Germany (6) is highly fragmented, andhas higher levels in eastern metropolitanareas, as well as some western metropol-itan areas, including Koblenz.

Overall, the IMO data show geopoliticalfragmentation to be highest in those devel-oped countries where metropolitanizationhas proceeded amid continued legacies ofolder town and village settlement andadministration (France, Germany, Switzer-land, the eastern portions of the UnitedStates). Fragmentation is also progressingrapidly in a number of other countries wheremetropolitanization is relatively new, suchas the Czech Republic, Hungary, Spain andIsrael. By contrast, far-reaching re formshave succeeded spectacularly in re du cingfragmentation in Scandinavia, Ca na da, andthe United Kingdom.

Other than South Africa, which is included inthe IMO project, no comparable data are asyet available to measure geopolitical frag-mentation in the developing and transitionalcountries of the South. However, SouthAfrica provides a dramatic example of gov-ernmental restructuring in the South. Post-apartheid reforms in South Africa effectivelyeliminated geopolitical fragmentation byreconfiguring municipal boundaries to corre-spond with the economic and social outlineof the major metropolitan areas.

Similar moves toward metropolitan consolida-tion took place earlier in other developingcountries during the period when governmen-tal consolidation was fashionable in NorthernEurope. In 1973, the Brazilian military regimecreated nine metropolitan regions that are stillfunctioning today. In Republic of Korea, theregime instituted metropolitan regional gov-ernments for Seoul and several other cities.Many Southern countries also establishedsome form of metropolitan territorial authorityfor their capital city regions.

In the South, these consolidation effortshave generally failed to eliminate the prob-lem of geopolitical fragmentation. There as inthe North, the problem remains especiallyevident in the largest urban regions. Laqian,in a recent survey of governance in Asianmetropoles, calls political and administrativefragmentation “[t]he most serious problemthat many of them face” (2007, p. 145). In

As measured by

this index, France

appears as the

most territorially

fragmented

country in Europe


some former colonies, structures of colonialadministration still define local districtboundaries outside central cities. Elsewhere,as with the Indian panchayat or the Philip -pine barangay, indigenous settlements shapemu nicipal jurisdictions. Where metropolitango vern ments are in place, spa tial expansionoften continues beyond the for mal adminis-trative boundaries into su rroun ding localities.Metropolitan governments now ad minister50% of the metropolitan population in Mex-ico City, 71% in Sao Paulo, 45% in Seoul and38% in Johannesburg.

Even where the jurisdiction of metropolitangovernmental authority extends over the en -ti re metropolitan area, other forms of frag-mentation can frustrate effective go ver nance.In Bangkok, Manila, and Mumbai, for in -stance, metropolitan authorities have se -cured extensive geopolitical jurisdiction, yeteffectiveness is often limited by political andadministrative interference. To some extentlocal or high-level governments can formallyrestrict the power of metropolitan institu-tions. A further dilution of metropolitanauthority occurs where agencies or officescharged with different sectoral tasks, such asroads, housing, and transit, resist directivesfrom the metropolitan government.

III.3. Economic Globalization

and Competitiveness

Increasingly, in both the North and the South,metropolitan regions have been recognizedas key nodes for national economic strate-gies. They are also regarded as vital hubs formobilization for rapid economic development.Alongside the globalization of trade and pro-duction networks, the shift to service andhigh-technology business has reinforced thistransformation of metropolitan commerce.

Most literature on “global cities” initially cen-tered on the largest cities of the North, andsought to analyze urban regions accordingto global hierarchies based on their positionin international finance, corporate governance,elite travel, and communication (e.g.,Sassen 1991; Taylor 2003). Other work on

“global city regions” points instead to the ro -le of regional economic clusters in the high-tech nology and advanced service com po nentsof modern industrial economies (e.g., Scott2001). In developed countries, a range ofsmaller and mid-size urban regions havealso managed to stimulate growth byattracting high technology, corporate branchoffices, and educational or administrative ser -vices (Markusen, Lee and DiGiovanna 1999).This new round of economic competitive-ness has not pushed growth in just onedirection. In creasingly, metropolitan centersfind that there is considerable commercialallure in a vibrant urban environment andthe cultural amenities found there (Glaeser,Kolko and Saiz 2000). Such new regionaleconomic dynamics further reinforce de mandsfor mo re regional collective action.

In the South, development has been compar-atively uneven. Despite greater pressuresthere to pursue economic prosperity, gover-nance of metropolitan regions in the Southpresents challenges that are similar to thosein the North. For the first half of the 20th Cen-tury, cities in Asia and Latin America focusedalmost exclusively on industrial developmentand modernization. In much of Latin America,as well as in the Asian countries of Thailandand Republic of Korea, cities absorbed muchof this industrialization and commanded cor-respondingly large proportions of nationalresources. Aggravated by conditions ofauthoritarian rule in many of these countries,urban primacy had the demonstrated effectof reducing the potential for overall nationaldevelopment (Ades and Glaeser 1994).

Since the 1970s, however, much of the newmanufacturing capacity in the developingworld has been built outside urban centers,usually in surrounding towns. New indus-trial parks and high-technology centershave also been situated on the periphery ofmajor urban centers, such as Campinas inthe Sao Paulo region (Markusen, Lee andDiGiovanna) and the HITEC Center outsideof Hyderabad (Kennedy 2007). In the faceof the underdevelopment and declining for-tunes of the countryside, new centers of

Since the 1970s,

however, much

of the new

manufacturing

capacity in the

developing world

has been built

outside urban

centers, usually in

surrounding towns



development in the South continue to relyon the in frastructure, capital, and otheradvantages conferred by proximity to thelargest urban concentrations. This standsin contrast with the North where more dis-parate, smaller urban regions, includingAustin, Montpellier, Raleigh-Durham andToulouse, have seen significant growth inhigh technology and service development(Sellers 2002).

A corresponding consequence of global eco-nomic shifts has been a general increase ininequality. According to Sassen (1991), theincrease in disparities between the elite inservice businesses and the underpaid, im -migrant work force employed by those busi-nesses, results in an increase in social and spa-tial polarization. Regional strategies associatedwith globalization are often geared moretoward attracting economic development thanto addressing these new dis parities. In moredynamic regions, public expenditure tends tosupport physical infrastructure that facilitatesgrowth and new economic activities. Especiallywhen accom panied by the fragmentation ofmany metropolitan regions, such strategiescan compound disparities in the provision oflocal public services.

III.4. Socio-Political Conflicts

The emergence of metropolitan regionshas some of its most far-reaching implica-tions for territorial conflicts. Especially inmuch of the North, as the monopolisticposition of central cities has declined,increasingly fierce economic and politicalcompetition pits urban centers against sur-rounding municipalities that refuse to berelegated to su burbs or satellites. Experi-ments in inter-local redistribution ofresources in Europe and North Americahave largely arisen out of in tensified argu-ments over fiscal exploitation between ex-urban communities and cities.

As the localities within metropolitan regionshave coalesced into distinctive demographicand income clusters, tensions over the terri-torial distribution of resources and responsi-

bilities have increased. Conflicts now focusroutinely on the financing of collective goodsand services, from public transportation tocultural facilities to sewage treatment. Evenwithin a consolidated jurisdiction, territorialpolarization between neighborhoods orother parts of cities can generate growingconflicts. In the wake of decentralization anddemocratization in Southern cities, metro-politan leaders in such diverse settings asBrazil, South Africa and India have all had toaddress tensions of this kind.

The socio-economic dimension of conflict cantranscend territorial bases. A classic exampleis the perennial clash bet ween the in terestsof capital and those of the workforce andlocal residents. Conflicts of this type harkback to the mercantile origins of cities, yetthey still drive debates over metropolitangovernance institutions. Proponents of me -tro politan governance, regardless of whe -ther they are themselves local chambers ofcom merce or business representatives, of -ten portray economic development as a pri-mary objective. But in the South as well asthe North, the arguments about this objec -tive have shifted. Services, high technol-ogy activities and com mercial develop-ment have increasingly replacedtraditional manufacturing as the objects of me - tro politan economic recruitment. In the North,local businesses now mobilize regularlyalongside governments around local initia-tives to bring these activities (Sellers 2002;Jouve and Lefèvre 2002). In much of theNorth partisans of growth limits or growthmanagement also regularly contest theuntrammeled pursuit of regional growth(Clark and Goetz 1994). In the South,environmental groups usually exercise lessinfluence, but are becoming mo re active.

Ethnicity and religion present anothersource of conflict that can cross territorialboundaries in metropolitan regions. In boththe North and South, ethnic, racial and reli-gious divisions often reinforce existing bar-riers between the haves and have-nots.Where minorities, especially immigrants,move into areas dominated by residents

Services, high

technology

activities and

com mercial

development have

increasingly

replaced

traditional

manufacturing

as the objects

of me tro politan

economic

recruitment


with a dif ferent ethnicity or race, the inte-gration of the newcomers can give rise toconflicts with a national majority, as well asbetween the new minority and the residentmajority. Immigration and citizenshipissues have thus provoked both populistbacklashes and resurgences in minority-rights movements in the cities of Europe,Japan and the United States. In the grow-ing number of large cities with pervasiveethnic or racial divisions, such as Mumbaior Los Angeles, group identity regularlyfurnishes flashpoints for social tensions,political clashes and inter-group violence.

A fourth element of the new urban strife ispartisan conflict over ideologies, programsand strategies. The influence of distinct par-ties and coalitions differs considerably,depending on location and context. Reflect-ing, at least in part, trends in other dimen-sions of conflict, political parties have alsodeveloped new forms. In many countriesthe number of parties and political groupsrepresented in local assemblies has grownsubstantially. In Europe new ecological andpo pulist parties have appeared. In theSouth decentralization and the establish-ment of lo cal democracy has helped fosternew interest groups in the local partisanlandscape. Partisan organizations tradition-ally have exerted only limited control overlocal politics in many Southern cities. Nowupstart religious and ethnic parties competeopenly and with some success with theestablished parties. As in Europe, these newgroups threaten traditional single – or two-party domination, and further complicatethe already fragmented local party system.

IV. Institutional Alternatives forGovernance within MetropolitanAreas

In early 20th Century North America, wide -spread suburbanization created some of themost extensive and dispersed urban regionsever seen. Under conditions of high geopo-litical fragmentation, a debate emerged thatto this day continues to shape choices about

institutional designs for metropolitan gover-nance. At the beginning of the 1940s, one ofthe leading representatives of the ChicagoSchool of urban studies, Louis Wirth (1942),called for formal institutional consolidation:“We live in an era which dissolves bound-aries, but the inertia of antiquarian lawyersand lawmakers, the predatory interests oflocal politicians, real estate men, and indus-trialists, the parochialism of suburbanites,and the myopic vision of planners have pre-vented us from a full recognition of theinescapable need for a new planning unit inthe metropolitan region.”

Up to the 1970s academic opinion through -out the global North reflected this view. Thewave of reorganization of local governmentin the 1960s and 1970s in Europe, NorthAmerica and parts of the South drew onthese critiques. Two arguments were essen-tial to the case against fragmentation. First,the essential tasks and responsibilities ofgovernance – from infrastructure to socialequity – spi lled over fragmented jurisdictionalboun daries in ways that demanded consoli-dated institutions. The second, opposing,concept posits that larger governmentalunits could take advantage of economies ofscale, providing public services at lowercost than smaller governments.

Applied to vastly different regional, nationaland socio-political contexts, a decades-oldargument has coalesced around two gen-eral strategies: supra-community reforma-tion and territorial polycentrism.

IV.1. Supra-Community Reform

To those in favor of creating overarchingmetropolitan governments to replace amultitude of existing local authorities, asalient failing of the multi-governmentmodel is its weak performance as a demo-cratic institution. This is evidenced by adecline in local political and electoral par-ticipation in many countries. In addition,many local governments are perceived asinefficient and disconnected from theexpectations of their citizens.

In many countries

the number

of parties

and political groups

represented in

local assemblies

has grown

substantially



The weakness of a multitude of local govern-ments preoccupied with only local concerns isa perceived unwillingness to act on issuesthat affect the entire region. This was the ar -gument advanced, for example, by the Que-bec government in their White Book on mu - nicipal reorganization (2000:20): “Theli mi ted size of the municipalities is sometimespre sented as an advantage in terms of theexercising of democracy because it allows foran administration that is more attuned to re -sidents’ needs. However, insofar as the frag-mentation of the municipalities limits theirability to deal with the often important issuesthat transcend their territories, e.g. land useplanning, the environment, public transporta-tion, and economic development, there is in -stead a risk that residents will be less in - terested in participating in municipal life.”

The significance of these arguments needs tobe understood in light of the highly decentral-ized states where they were put forth. InNorth America, the fragmentation of localauthorities, including municipalities and dis-tricts established for education and otherservices, contributes to great disparities inthe services different communities receive. Insome cases these differences are caused byvariations in local skills and in the profession-alism of municipal bureaucracies. In theUnited States and Canada, those in favor ofintegrated forms of metropolitan governmenthave generally stressed the need to reduceintra-metropolitan area socio-economic dis-parities in such services as education andsecurity (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom2004). Reform was also held out as a betterway to address problems that require coordi-nated collective action throughout a metro-politan area, in such sectors as water supply,waste management and air pollution.

IV.2. Territorial Polycentrism

It was ultimately in more centralized North-ern European countries, for example theUnited Kingdom, where successive waves ofcommunal consolidation came closest to real-izing the goals of supra-community reformnationwid.. In the United States, a counter-

movement emerged to defend decentralizedmetropolitan arrange ments. To counter thearguments of reformers, those against theformation of me tropolitan governments criti-cized their red tape, their high operating costsand their re moteness from their citizens.

The supporters of the political-economicapproach known as Public Choice have pro-vided the main inspiration for arguments infavor of small local units as the main unitsfor governance in metropolitan areas (Os -trom, Bish and Ostrom 1988). This approachanalogizes local governments competing forresidents to privately owned companiescom peting for the production or sale of goods.Proponents argue that it is more efficientand democratic for the localities within ametropolitan area to compete among them-selves for the production or sale of publicservices than to leave those services to onemonolithic government entity. They arguefurther that the coexistence of different gov-ernment units with different combinations ofservices and taxes offers inhabitants a widerchoice of residential areas. Residents canthus select the community within the metro-politan area that best corresponds to thelevel of public service they seek. Resourcesneeded by the separate metropolitan townscan be shared through agreements aboutspecific functional sectors, such as trans-portation, education and health (Marks andHooghe 2003).

Beyond such operational concerns, there isa perceptible lack of collective will amongthose who might effect broad changes inmetropolitan boundaries. Middle classes inmany countries have shown little desire tocontribute financially to the reduction ofintra-metropolitan wealth disparities, andto the quest for fiscal equity. There hasthus been only limited middle-class sup-port for a key principle underlying the pushfor metropolitan integration.

IV.3. The “New Regionalism”

Given the imposing realities of life in largemetropolitan areas, a practical compromise

There is

a perceptible lack

of collective will

among those who

might effect broad

changes

in metropolitan

boundaries


may be found in a flexible solution with avariable scale of inter-municipal coopera-tion. In this case results can be manifestedin different ways. The advantages of suchquasi-formal cooperation have beenemphasized in many empirical studies.

By the end of the 1970s, disenchantmentwith conurbation institutions becameapparent in many countries. In GreatBritain the suppression of urban countiesand the Greater London Council took placein 1986; the same year saw the dissolutionin the Netherlands of the Rotterdam andEindhoven conurbation bodies. At aboutthe same time, Australian authoritiesacknowledged the failure of repeated fed-eral and state attempts to consolidate localauthorities, and in Spain metropolitan gov-ernments in Valencia and Bar celona weredismantled. The French ca lled an early haltto an urban communities’ institutionaliza-tion process, the Italian effort to createmetropolitan areas failed to get off theground and in Germany consolidationexperiments such as the Umland VerbandFrankfurt and the KommunalverbandRuhrgebiet proved disappointing.

However, the concept of metropolitan areagovernment itself has substantially changedin the past 20 years. Most of the modelsenvisaged or experimented with in the 1980sare now seen from the perspective of gover-nance, rather than government. Moreover,governance is no longer confined to the built-up areas of distinct urban conurbations; itnow extends to vast multi-polar urbanregions that continue to expand and change.

This new trend toward a more flexible,polycentric form of governance, describedin North America as new regionalism, isfirstly associated with the global decentral-ization process. This approach seeks tostrengthen local authorities at the expenseof large, supra-municipal organizations,especially in areas of the world that are onthe path to democracy. At the same time,the form, pace and scale of contemporarymetropolitan transformations has made

traditional forms of metropolitan govern-ment seem in creasingly inadequate.

It is therefore not appropriate to speak ofsim ple replacement or of the substitutionof one model by another over time. Ratherit is more useful to envision increased dif-ferentiation among a variety of mixed sys-tems of government. This movement canbe observed in most countries, both in theNorth and in the South.

How can these new forms of metropolitan go - vernance be characterized? Analysis of re centinstitutional experience reveals five par ti cu -lar ly significant aspects:

• Pragmatic responsiveness in execution.Sta te governments tend not to impose theirideas any more; instead they take greatcare to consult, listen, put into perspective,harmonize and reconcile. Rather than pro-pose a single institutional model for allurban areas, they work carefully on a“made-to-measure” solution. Decisions toun dertake reform respond to specific cha-llenges related to the management of ur -ban growth (Downs 1994).

This view makes it easier to understandthe changes in governance of the Tokyoregion. The Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-ment (TMG), became one of many players– prefectures, regional ministerial offices,Japan Railway, private companies – in -volved in regional go vernance. In a similarfashion, the recently created Greater Lon-don Assembly appears to be a relativelysuperficial me cha nism. It cannot exerciseany real in fluen ce except in strict collabora-tion with the boroughs, privately ownedpublic service companies (special purposeagencies), two regional developmentagencies, and se veral central governmentdepartments. Ca nada, throughout thesecond half of the 20th Century a leader inintegration of me tropolitan governments,has now turned to ward a polycentric neo-regionalism. This shift comes in the wakeof spectacular de-fusion measures fol -lowing referenda among municipalities

Governance is no

longer confined to

the built-up areas

of distinct urban

conurbations; it

now extends to

vast multi-polar

urban regions that

continue to expand

and change



grouped within metropolitan areas. Thedevelopment of “lighter” governance struc-tures built around regional districts andmetropolitan municipalities has followed.

• The adaptation of existing territorial unitsand governments above the municipal le -vel to manage emerging challenges ofme tropolitan regions. For large urbanregions, such as Tokyo, Paris and Sao Pau-lo, a regional or federal unit of go vern mentprovides administration at a sca le beyondthe local government itself. Si milarly, inthe United States county go vernments,which are a higher level than local munici-palities, often provide a more encompas-sing administrative framework forcarrying out planning or providing so cialservices across municipal boundaries.American advocates of metropolitan go -vernance increasingly look to coalitionsamong representatives of cities and su -burbs in the legislative and policymakingarenas of state and federal governmentsas a source of metropolitan policy (Dreier,Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2004).

• Strengthening democratic legitimacy. Forthe supporters of new forms of metropoli-tan governance, direct popular election oflegislators and government executives hasa double purpose: enhancing local auto-nomy and strengthening the link betweencitizens and their political representatives(responsiveness). The direct election of theleadership for Metro To ronto began in 1988.In Stuttgart, when the political parties offe-red lists of candidates for election to theStuttgart Regional Community (VerbandRegion Stutt gart) founded in 1994, partyleaders took care to include the smallestpossible number of local representatives.This tactic limited political ties to parties inexisting local governments, further em po -we ring the regional assembly. Since 2000,the Greater London Assembly and themayor are elected directly by the people.Unlike the former Greater London Council,the GLA has adopted a strategy to encoura-ge com petition and social cohesion rather

than simply to supply services directly(Har loe 2003).

• The primacy of mission over management.The metropolitan administration is com-mitted above all to planning, coordinatingand integrating policies set by metropolitanarea local authorities. True ma nagementtasks remain limited. As a consequence,expert and scientific analysis of the metro-politan problem is more nuanced and plu-ralistic than it was 20 years ago. Ratherthan agencies of strategic direction, thenew structures of metropolitan governanceare necessarily lighter: The Greater LondonAuthority has little more than 600 employe-es.

• Close association with the private sector.At all stages in the process of institutionalmaturity, the strong influence of privatesector leaders and organizations can beseen. In Europe as well as the UnitedStates, chambers of commerce and asso-ciations of enterprises are particularlyprevalent. In some countries, the role ofthe private sector is determined by legis-lation.

V. Panorama of Existing MetropolitanGovernance Arrangements

Worldwide there is great variety in metro-politan governance. As illustrated in Table 1,metropolitan governments can usefully beclassified by the amount of territory wherethey have jurisdiction, their institutionaldepth, and their democratic intensity. Theposition of metropolitan regional govern-ments in the overall governmental hierar-chy, including national and other systems,also influences the effectiveness and signifi-cance of metropolitan governance. Addition-ally, the specific governmental functions as -sumed by the institutions of metropolitango vernance reveal global similarities andcontrasts, as do any trans-national arrange-ments that address the challenges of defacto international metropolitan governance.

Metropolitan

governments

can usefully be

classified by the

amount of territory

where they have

jurisdiction,

their institutional

depth, and their

democratic

intensity



V.1. Spatial Coverage

Existing institutions may cover all of a met-ropolitan territory, or only part of it. Conse-quently, their ability to regulate, manageand affect residents necessarily varies.Especially under conditions of rapid growth,the fluid functional and demographicboundaries of metropolitan regions makespatial coverage a constant challenge.

Most metropolitan governments have tomake adjustments to accommodate changes in their official territory. In some cases,the metropolitan government at its incep-tion did not encompass its entire modernregion; others have seen their region grownwell beyond their official boundaries. Forexample, Metro Toronto was created in1953, but by 1991 still covered only 54%of the Toronto metropolitan area. Similarly,the Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation(GBMC) covers only 67% of the populationin the Mumbai metropolitan region, eventhough it serves 12 million of the region’s18 million inhabitants. More recently, thereform that created metropolitan govern-ments for South African urban regions suc-ceeded in bringing only 38% of the totalpopulation in the Johannesburg metropoli-tan region under the single central metro-politan government there.

Many metropolitan governance arrange-ments are confined to limited, often sociallyand spatially distinct portions of metropoli-tan areas. In Argentina, the Northern Met-ropolitan Region, a consortium created in2000, encompasses just a portion of themain ly affluent municipalities in the BuenosAires metropolitan area (San Fernando, Vi -cente Lopez, San Isidro, Tigre). In the samemanner, the minimal coordination of publicpolicy among 39 different towns in the SaoPaulo metropolitan area appears to affectjust seven of them. All seven, Diadema,Sao Caetano do Sul, Sao Bernardo doCampo, Santo Andre, Maua, Ribeirao Piresand Rio Grande da Serra, operate within theCamara Regional do Grande APC. It issymptomatic that the central town, SaoPaulo, is not a member of this consortium.

V.2. Institutional Thickness

The governance of metropolitan areas can bemore or less institutionally concentrated andintegrated, both territorially and functionally.

a) New town or metropolitan town It is relatively rare for a single authority toexercise general and multifunctionalauthority over an entire metropolitan terri-tory. It occurs where a merger of all com-ponent communities has taken place.


Table 1 Dimensions of Governance Institutions in Metropolitan Areas

Lower Moderate Higher

INTERNAL

Spatial coverage Fraction of the metropolitan area Majority of the metropolitan area The entire metropolitan area

Institutional thickness Inter-community co-operation Authority for metropolitan development or specific sector Metropolitan town

Democratic intensity Local democracy only Multi-level democracy Compound metropolitan democracy

EXTERNAL

Centrality to higher level policymaking Intra-metropolitan divisions Regional capital Prime urban region

Inter-metropolitan divisions National alliance of urban regions National capital

Limited representation Sector-specific integration

for metropolitan interests


When this happens, the metropolitan area islikely to be structured around the metropol-itan town that provides most services. TheBangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA),for example, was created by mergingBangkok and Thonburi. Similar absorption ofat least some functions and responsibilitiesof lesser towns has occurred in Seoul, KualaLumpur, Surabaya and Jakarta. The SeoulMetropolitan Government is run by a mayorand an assembly that is more or less electeddirectly by the people, and encompasses25 districts called Gu. The Chinese governmentcreated metropolitan towns directed bypo werful mayors who are appointed by thestate in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,Chong qing and Tianjin. On the infra-metro-politan level, districts still exist, but with re -duced authority and budgets. This some-times leads to friction between themetropolitan level and the affected areas.

A series of mergers between communitiesbelonging to two-level metropolitan sys-tems has taken place at the instigation ofCanadian provinces. In 1970, the NewDemocratic Party, having a majority in theManitoba provincial parliament, decided tocombine the Corporation of Greater Win-nipeg and its districts into a single town,Winnipeg. The hope was that the mergerwould alleviate socio-economic and finan-cial difficulties in the central town byincluding its wealthier suburbs in theregion’s resource pool. The Ontario govern-ment in 1998 employed a similar mergerstrategy to forge the new Town of Toronto.Two years after that, the province of Que-bec created the new, enlarged municipalareas of Montreal and Quebec.

One of the world’s most striking recentexperiments with metropolitan governanceis taking place in South Africa. By itsnature, the old apartheid regime with itsinstitutionalized segregation prevented anytype of metropolitan organization. The abo-lition of apartheid in the 1990s led in a veryshort time to the appearance of metropoli-tan towns. Pressure for this change cameprimarily from the dominant party, the

ANC, which saw in metropolitan govern-ment the most effective vehicle for territo-rial reform and for reduction of socio-eco-nomic inequities. In De cember 1998, theLocal Government Mu nicipal Structures Actofficially recognized the formation of metro-politan towns, whose boundaries would bedefined by a commission called the MunicipalDemarcation Board be fore the 2000 localelections. There are now six such towns: CapeTown, Ethekwini, Jo han nes burg, Ekurhuleni,Tshwane, and Nelson Man dela (Cameron andAlvarez 2005). It is still too early to draw firmconclusions from this unique effort. So far,however, the creation of metropolitan townsappears to have improved the lives of resi-dents in some places but had mixed or evendisappointing results in others.

b) Co-existence of local governments with metropolitan structures

This formula combines proximity betweenlocal authorities and their citizens with trans-fers of responsibility for metropolitan issuesto a specific supra-community entity. In prin-ciple, the federal logic underlying such anarrangement precludes any hierarchical orsubordinate relationship between the twoterritorial levels. The Canadian provinces ofOntario, Manitoba, Quebec and BritishColumbia created such structures for all oftheir metropolitan areas in the 1950s and1960s; for a long time Metro Toronto (1953-1997) was the government prototype. Simi-lar metropolitan governance structures alsoplay a role in Metro Manila, Sao Paulo, Lima,Rio de Janeiro, Bombay and Calcutta.

The metropolitan level of governance canta ke any one of several forms: a metropolitande velopment council, a metropolitan devel-opment authority, or a fully empowered met-ropolitan government.

The metropolitan development councilguarantees the retention of power by com-ponent local governments. Members of thelocal government designate their mayor, orsome other local official, as their councilmember. These council members in turnselect a council executive from among

The metropolitan

level of governance

can ta ke any one

of several forms:

a metropolitan

de velopment

council,

a metropolitan

development

authority,

or a fully

empowered

metropolitan

government



their number. Advisory councils with thistype of structure can be found in mostmetropolitan areas in the United States,For example, the Metropolitan WashingtonCouncil of Governments (WASHCOG), wascreated in 1957 for the Washington metro-politan area. The same structure is alsofound in El Salvador in the Council of May-ors for the Metropolitan Area of San Sal-vador (COAMSS: Consejo de Alcaldes delÁrea Metropolitana de San Salvador).

The Metro Manila Development Authority(MMDA) was created by Filipino legislationin 1995. The council is made up of staterepresentatives and 17 mayors (seven townswith extended powers, and 10 municipali-ties). It replaced the Manila MetropolitanAuthority, which in 1990 had in turn replacedthe Me tropolitan Manila Commission, whichwas set up in 1975 with relatively impor-tant powers. The MMDA is not a territorialcollective. It is a specific public body placedunder the direct control of the President ofthe Philippines. The MMDA is responsiblefor planning, monitoring and co-or dinationtasks, but its budgetary re sources remainlimited. It is considered not well suited toregulating the policies of its componentparts because of the weakness of its inte-gration instruments. The MMDA appears tobe caught between the power of the stateauthorities and the desire of the 17 munic-ipal authorities to escape from any direc-tion or restriction imposed by higherauthorities. (Laquian 2001).

Compared with a metropolitan develop-ment council, a metropolitan developmentauthority concentrates more on techno-cratic functions than on political methodsof go vernance. This model has beenadopted by many Indian metropolitanareas, including New Delhi, Bombay,Karachi and Co lombo.

The model of a metropolitan governmentsuperimposed on local authorities providesmore functional integration, and its leadershipis often elected directly by the people. Thisis the case in Tokyo and in Toronto.

Tokyo’s TMG was created in 1943 by amerger of the City of Tokyo and the Prefec-ture of Tokyo. Today, it is a metropolitanprefecture consisting not only of the centraltown and its districts, but also the Tamaarea, which includes 39 municipalities, 26towns, 5 localities and 8 villages. Itappears that the TMG gives priority torunning the services and development of23 districts of the City of Tokyo guided by asystem of financial equalization, while run-ning the western part of its territory (Tama)in a more detached manner (Vogel 2001).

The degree of institutional thickness de -pends on a metropolitan structure’s fi -nancial autonomy. The Chinese central gov -ernment has given metropolitan areassignificant scope in taxation and the man-agement of their own resources, includingbuying and selling of land, tariffs andlicense fees and securing loans in China andabroad. In France, the communautés ur -bains are responsible for large budgets thatcorrespond to their ex panded areas ofauthority. The Communauté Urbaine deBordeaux (CUB) budget is twice the size ofthe budget of the City of Bordeaux, in partbecause the CUB carries both compulsoryand optional missions associated with theproduction of large facilities, the modern-ization of urban services and the develop-ment of the local economy.

c) Intercommunity co-operation Governing metropolitan areas can also becarried out by means of agreements bet weenand among municipalities. Legislation canprescribe or simplify such arrangements indesignated sectors or services. An intermu-nicipal agreement, which is the most populararrangement worldwide, can operate even inthe absence of a specific metropolitan insti-tution. Such cooperative agreements havebeen established in quasi-official form withinthe metropolitan areas of Sydney (Kübler2005), Australia, and also in Lima-Callao,Santiago du Chile, and Santa Fe de Bogota inSouth America. They also foster mutual sup-port between large Russian towns and theirsurrounding oblasts (regions) and among

The degree

of institutional

thickness

de pends on a

metropolitan

structure’s

fi nancial autonomy



many municipalities and counties in UnitedStates metropolitan regions.

Under these types of agreements, territorialfragmentation persists, but specific sec tor-based integration overcomes it in the per-formance of specific, sometimes narrowlyde fined sectors, such as water and sanitation,electricity, transportation and waste pro -cessing. The resulting arrangements areexpected to realize economies of scale for themanagement of capital-intensive services.

The two main agencies of Metro Manila arethe Metropolitan Waterworks and SewerageSystem, and the Light-Rail Transit Authority.The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation special-izes in economic development projects in thelargest of Pakistan’s cities, the Karachi Devel-opment Authority manages property andinfrastructure and the Karachi Water Supplyand Sewerage Boards preside over theirrespective tasks. Another example of inter-community cooperation is seen in the Dhakametropolitan area of Bangladesh. There spe-cialized agencies operate in parallel both inthe City of Dhaka, and with a set of munici-palities (pourashavas) and 42 state services.Among these, the most important are RAJUK(Capital Development Authority), the DhakaCity Corporation and the partly state-control -led Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority.Similar arrangements may be found in othermajor metropolitan regions from Los Angelesto Sao Paulo (see Appendix).

Flexible structures to coordinate local par-ticipation around targeted initiatives arecommon, and have become more so overthe past few years. The State of Sao Paulo,for instance, has initiated a number of thesearrangements since the 1990s. In conjunc-tion with an NGO, the Metropolitan Forumfor Public Safety created the institute “SaoPaulo Contra a Violência.” The state alsoestablished a system of governance forriver watersheds, incorporating a variety oflocal stakeholders (Abers and Keck 2006).

Especially in the South, many metropolitanareas have weak intra-metropolitan coordi-

nation: in some cities there, none at all.Lack of sufficient local autonomy or capa-bility of ten contributes to this problem. InNigeria, Ethiopia and Tanzania, the urbanauthorities have rarely experienced a levelof autonomy that would allow them tomanage their own policies, much less forgecooperative agreements with neighboringlocal governments. In Nigeria, disputesover the proper application of existing gov-ernmental and professional skills haveimpeded intra-city coo peration. It was only in2003 that the decentralization begun byEthiopian state authorities gave Addis-Ababa a new charter with the express aimof ending a century of centralized develop-ment. In Tanzania, decentralization in the1970s was simply a de-concentration exer -cise. Dar el-Salaam’s new municipal structure,operational since February, 2000, followeda long period of technocratic and central-ized management of the town. In all three ofthese African metropolitan towns, territorialparceling through the creation of newadministrative units contrasts with the uni-fication process seen in South Africa.

Intervention by higher level governmentscan also supplant metropolitan cooperation.In Israel, for instance, despite the high pro-portion of its population living in the fourmetropolitan areas of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem,Haifa and Beer Sheva, there are very fewmetropolitan governance mechanisms. Inthe Tel-Aviv metropolitan area most inter-community efforts are organizationally weak.At least in part, this is because centralauthorities maintain strict control over ter-ritorial development, transport and regionalinfrastructures (Razin and Hazan 2005).

V.3. Democratic Depth

The citizens’ role in the appointment andcon trol of metropolitan authorities varieswi de ly. Although electoral institutions aloneare rarely sufficient to ensure responsive-ness or democracy, recent local electoralreforms in many countries have beenintended to extend opportunities for elec-toral participation. The growing size, com-

Flexible structures

to coordinate local

participation

around targeted

initiatives are

common, and have

become more so

over the past few

years



plexity and territorial connectedness ofmetropolitan regions increasingly poseswhat Devas (2005) calls a tradeoff between“scale” and “voice” in governance. Thelarger the scale of governance, the moredifficult it is to provide effectively for theparticipation of local units, neighborhoods,civil societies or individual citizens.

Indeed, integrated metropolitan structureshave frequently been imposed by authori-tarian central governments. Alongside tech-nocratic efficiency in urban management,non-democratic governments have usedmetropolitan administration to control polit-ically “sensitive” urban regions; that is,those suspected of having potential tobreed opposition. For example, in 1973 itwas the Brazilian military regime that cre-ated the nine metropolitan regions ofBelém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, BeloHorizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo,Curitiba and Porto Alegre. Though initiallysupported and tightly controlled by the gov-ernment, only vestiges of this systemremained at the start of the 1990s. By then,a new democratization and decentralizationprocess was well underway. Similarly, theMetropolitan Manila Commission was cre-ated by the Marcos dictatorship in 1975, itsleadership entrusted to Imelda Marcos.

Association with authoritarian regimes mayexplain why metropolitan governance has to acertain extent been neglected in some coun-tries. In metropolitan governance sys tems thatare based on the functions of specialized agen-cies, management is mainly ca rried out by tech-nicians or bureaucrats. This necessarily reducesdemocratic control, and with it, legitimacy.Appointed by the President of the Philippines,the MMDA executive is often politically impotentin the pre sence of the 17 directly elected may-ors of the towns in the metropolitan area. Thesemayors provide financial contributions to themetropolitan authority’s budget.

Direct election of a metropolitan executive,as in Tokyo, Bangkok and Jakarta Raya, canenhance the legitimacy of metropolitanpolitical institutions. South African metropol-

itan towns are run either by mayors (Johan-nesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane, and NelsonMandela) or by executive colleges (CapeTown and Ethekwini). Although the latter arenot directly elected by the people, they areappointed by the parties according to theirelectoral score. In some cases, only some ofthe representatives are elected by the peo-ple. The council of Bombay’s GBMC, forinstance, is elected, but its executive isappointed by the state of Maharashtra.

Democracy can be organized on an infra-me -tropolitan scale. Sub-municipal elected gov-ernments play an especially important rolewhen the municipal government is large. Thus,South African legislation allows provincialauthorities to create either sub-councils orward committees. The sub-councils, made upof municipal councilors and councilors fromadjacent wards, perform a consultative role forthe municipal council, which can delegate spe-cific powers to them. Ward committees, madeup of the ward mu nicipal councilor and repre-sentatives of the people, function as instru-ments of participative democracy. Sixteen,then 20 sub-councils have been created inCape Town. Ward committees have been setup in Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane andNelson Mandela. As in many such instances ofsub- mu nicipal participation, municipal authori-ties have generally been hesitant to transferpower to these bodies. Initial assessments oftheir operation show only modest participationby local people (Cameron 2005).

In the case of the Tokyo TMG, arrange-ments for sub-metropolitan democracyhave re cently provided greater democraticdepth. The mayors of the TMG districtshave since 1974 been elected directly bythe people. Since then, the districts havebeen transformed from administrativeentities into special urban governmentsthat carry out a portion of metropolitangovernment services. A re form to devolvefinancial functions and skills to the districtswas adopted in 1998 and took effect in2000. The metropolitan authority remainsresponsible for fire-fighting services aswell as water and sanitation.

Electoral

institutions alone

are rarely

sufficient to ensure

responsiveness or

democracy, recent

local electoral

reforms in many

countries have

been intended

to extend

opportunities

for electoral

participation



The depth of democracy refers to an aspira-tion that may never be entirely met.Nonetheless, governance structures thatcome closest are those that go beyondmulti-level participation procedures andprovide real empowerment to make partici-pation meaningful at each level, fromneighborhoods to metropolitan councils.Mechanisms that allow public participationin routine governmental planning and budg-eting can also dee pen democracy. Since theemergence of metropolitan areas as a wide-spread form of settlement, democratic the-orists have advocated compound demo-cratic forms of this nature (Dahl 1969).

V.4. Relations with Higher-Level Governments

The politics of metropolitan governance playsout at higher levels of government, as well aswithin metropolitan regions themselves. Fromthe perspective of leaders in metropolitanregions, effective governance often dependsupon bringing wider regional and nationalorganizations and resources to bear. As urbanregions have become increasingly extendedand connections with the hinterlands havegrown, a better understanding is needed ofthe changing dynamics of in tergovernmentalrelations between large ci ties and other sur-rounding regions.

It can not be surprising that relations bet -ween metropolitan regions and higher lev-els of government vary widely. At one endof the spectrum are urban regions that havesecured a central position in the nationalpolitical process. Such cities contain thebulk of a nation’s urban population, eco-nomic activity and cultural production. Themetropolitan region of Seoul, for instance,contains 47% of the Republic of Koreanpopulation; metropolitan Lima contains32% of the population of Peru; metropolitanBuenos Aires has 32% of the Argentinepopulation. The demographic weight ofsuch cities often goes along with economic,political and cultural centrality. In thesmaller countries of the North, the growthof cities into inter-connected regions has

sometimes created metropolitan regionswith a similar kind of primacy. In theNetherlands, for instance, the nationaleconomy re volves around the Randstadregion that en compasses Amsterdam, Rot-terdam and the Hague. Even with a smallerproportion of the national population, statusas a national ca pital can enhance the posi-tion of an urban re gion in the national econ-omy and in the sha ping of national policy.

In the South, the political dominance of ma jorcities in the middle of the 20th Century pro-voked criticism that “urban bias” in po li cy -making had rewarded the urban elite at theexpense of citizens living in smaller settlementsand in rural areas (Lipton 1977; Bates 1983).Although cities, especially the largest, remainmore prosperous than rural areas, recentanalyses have rejected such a broad conclu-sion. The increasing prosperity of cities smalland large, the growth of po verty within cities,the democratization of na tional and local gov-ernments, and the growing inter-dependencyof city and countryside have fundamentallyaltered underlying assumptions of that earlyanalysis (Corbridge and Jones 2005). Moreover,accumulating evidence shows that policy inter-vention can alter economic and social dispari-ties between cities, as well as between citiesand the countryside (Overman and Venables2005). National development in much of theSouth now hinges on the exploitation of jointadvantages in cities, in the countryside and inthe rapidly growing zones in between.

By comparison with other metropolitan re -gions, those with a favored position innational politics can benefit from advantagesin policymaking as well as in economic andcultural life. Paris, for instance, has been a re -peated site of major planning initiatives sincethe 19th Century. Similar initiatives in manysmaller French cities began only in the 1970s.Latin American capital cities such as Bogotaand Santiago, as well as Bangkok, Manila andSeoul in Asia, have been leaders in efforts tobuild metropolitan governmental institutions.

However, some metropolitan regions, espe-cially in the largest nations, lack a notable

Since

the emergence

of metropolitan

areas as

a widespread form

of settlement,

democratic

theorists have

advocated

compound

democratic forms

of this nature



degree of socio-economic and political cen-trality. Under these conditions, metropolitanregions can still find a voice at higher levelsof government, and secure crucial supportfor governance at the metropolitan level. Infederal countries, metropolitan dominancewithin one of the federal states can securesimilar resources. The Sao Paulo region inBrazil, for instance, dominates the largerstate of Sao Paulo; the Mumbai region is themetropole for the Maharashtra state in In dia.Officials and activists from the Sao Pauloregion helped secure state-level legislationfor water basin governance that created newpossibilities at the metropolitan level (Abersand Keck 2006). Similarly, pu blic companiesand officials from Maharashtra state haveplayed an important role in the developmentplans of localities in metropolitan Mumbai.

In specific sectors of policy-making, statemi nistries or other specific organizationsre presenting higher-level governmentsmay con tribute to metropolitan governancein ways that need not implicate those gov-ernments as a whole. National and stateenvironmental agencies, for instance, oftenplay active roles in antipollution initiatives.Organizations such as the MetropolitanRegion Development Authorities in Karachiand Mum bai can mobilize higher-level gov-ernment resources and authority on behalfof local development. (See Annex 1.)

At the national level, disparate metropolitanregions can form alliances to represent collec-tive interests. Politically influential or ga ni -zations of urban representatives, such as theGerman Staedtetag or the Nordic lo cal go -vernment associations, provide exam ples ofthis potential (Sellers and Lidström 2007). Inother countries such as the United States,urban representatives have faced growingmarginalization in national political processes(Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2005).

The increasingly dispersed, fragmented anddivided nature of metropolitan regions inmany developed countries poses new prob-lems for effective political and intergovern-mental representation of this sort. At the

same time, political and economic diver-gences between metropolitan regions canfrustrate alliances in pursuit of commonme tropolitan interests. Intra-metropolitanand inter-metropolitan political divisions arenow a recurrent feature of governance inthe United States, and recently have begunto emerge in such countries as Canada,France, Switzerland and the United King-dom (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005).

V.5. Sectoral Diversity and Limited Convergence

As Hooghe and Marks (2003) have observed,governance arrangements for local cooper-ation in specific policy sectors – roads,education, and pollution regulation –departs from the traditional hierarchical modelof re la tions between higher-level and local go -vern ments. By and large, such arran gementsfor governing metropolitan regions re flect aglobal convergence around this mo re sec-tor-spe cific, flexible approach, which is con -sistent with the “new regionalism.” To a degreenot seen in the earlier U.S. debates over poly-centric and supra-communal arrangements,higher-level governments have pla yed deci-sive roles in many sectors. But the maininternational commonalities in or ga -nizational practices correspond to differ-ences between distinct sectoral domains.

A look at the main organizations involvedin metropolitan governance in six majorme tropolitan regions provides illustrativeexamples of several distinctive patterns.(See Appendix.) The two examples fromthe de veloped world present both central-ized and decentralized models. Los Ange-les has relatively decentralized governingarrangements under a federal state,whereas Paris relies on a more centralizedpattern under a unitary state. The remain-ing cases include Seoul, which has experi-enced recent transitions re sulting fromindustrialization and democratization, andthe Southern metropolises of Jo -hannesburg, Mumbai and Sao Paulo. Thesesix examples include two national capitals(Paris and Seoul), two capitals of federal states

The increasingly

dispersed,

fragmented and

divided nature of

metropolitan

regions in many

developed

countries poses

new problems

for effective

political and

intergovernmental

representation



(Mumbai and Sao Paulo), and two metrop-olises that are neither state nor nationalca pi tals (Johannesburg and Los Angeles).The comparative table of the Appendixfocuses on the main organizations chargedwith carrying out policy implementation innine sectoral do mains, including the distri-bution of public and private responsibilities.

Regional geopolitical fragmentation by itselfimposes similar problems for all of thesedifferent governmental structures. As istypical of other metropolises, the centralcity in these cases contains between 19%and 67% of the metropolitan population. Inevery case – even Johannesburg in thewake of the recent metropolitan reforms–the local go vernments across the metropol-itan area di vi de into multiple units. If weinclude the in fra-local district governance inJohannesburg, then every configuration ofgeneral-pur pose governments includesboth some lo cal units and a second layer ofunits that takes the obligations of the entiremetropolitan area into account. In eachcase, under both unitary and federal states,an intermediate unit of government at theregional level stands between the nationallevel and the se local arrangements.

Even more striking similarities among me -tropolitan institutions emerge from thebreak down of specific sectors of policy. Forexample, a similar configuration of agenciesand firms addressing needs at national, me -tro politan and local levels carries out transitser vices. Roads administration is alsodivided among national agencies responsiblefor big state and national roads, local gov-ernments charged with maintain ing localroads and other governments for the roadsin between. Municipal and inter-localarrangements manage most trash collectionand land use planning sectors. Against abackdrop of na tional legislation in all sixcountries, local or me tropolitan govern-ments are often given the job of implement-ing environmental policies. These commontrends reflect a transnational understandingof best practices, as well as common influ-ences at work within each sector.

Of course, there are significant contrasts.In Seoul and in the Southern metropolitanareas, the examples demonstrate how pub-lic corporations tied to national or otherhigher-level governments play a more per-vasive role in many areas. National publiccompanies in all of these countries exerciseexclusive control over all airports. Nationalor sta te-held development companies playa leading role in land-use planning androads. National or provincial governmentscarry out secondary and – except in Mum-bai – primary education. Even where localgovernments bear much of the responsibil-ity, there is less evidence of active inter-local arrangements or local initiatives inFrench and U.S. metropolitan areas. Espe-cially in the rapidly developing areas outsidethe main urban centers, local go vernmentca pacities remain weak.

The metropolitan regions of Los Angelesand Paris contrast with their counterparts inthe South in their reliance on stronger localinstitutions, particularly those commandingthe greater resources available to townsout side the urban centers. Yet Los Angelesand Paris differ significantly in their patternsof organizational fragmentation. To a fargreater degree than that seen in Los An -geles, the 1584 communal governments ofmetropolitan Paris exemplify a polycentricmodel espoused by Public Choice proponentsof territorial fragmentation. In trash collec-tion, water or sewage and land-use plan -ning, inter-governmental arrangements inPa ris have proliferated more or less in waysthat Public Choice theory would prescribe.Even in these domains, ho wever, multiplemunicipalities often de pend on unified cen-tralized agencies or companies. Before thedecentralization of the 1980s in France,even land use and planning were carried outby national field offices.

By comparison, the 180 municipalities andfive counties of greater Los Angeles pres-ent a less fragmented organizational land-scape of general purpose local govern-ments. Ho wever, numerous sectors thatare centralized in France are decentralized

The metropolitan

regions

of Los Angeles

and Paris contrast

with their

counterparts in the

South in their

reliance on

stronger local

institutions,

particularly those

commanding the

greater resources

available to towns

out side the urban

centers



and frag mented here. Primary and se -condary schools present perhaps thebiggest contrast. Unlike any other me tro -politan region, in the Los Angeles area apatchwork of local districts operating al mostindependently share the primary responsi-bility for this area. Ownership of the area’sairports similarly belongs to four differentlocal go vernments, although the central cityowns the largest airport, Los Angeles Inter-national, and one other. Land-use planninglacks the coordinating intervention that hastypified planning at the regional level inParis and in other metropolitan regions.Even po llution regulation is the responsibilityof me tropolitan-level district organizationscrea ted by the state government, ratherthan being subject to direct intervention byhigher-level governments. The result is anorganizational landscape that is in important

res pects more fragmented than metropoli-tan Paris. Private contracting, a widespreadpractice in greater Los Angeles for trash col-lection, adds to the organizational fragmen-tation of local service delivery.

A full comparison of metropolitan governancewould include other elements that would bedifficult to categorize without more detailedcomparative case analysis. These includelegal norms, fiscal relations betweendifferent levels of government, the role ofprivate fac tors, and the dynamics of leader-ship. Or ga nizational comparison none the -less de monstrates both broad global si -milarities in the practical form thatgovernance takes and strong contrasts thatstand out boldly only when differencesbetween sectors of governance and policyare taken into account.



VI. Conclusion: The Emerging Metropolitan Agenda

To a significant degree, the governance of21st-Century metropolitan regions poses si -milar questions both for the establishedme tropolis of the North and for the emerg-ing ones of the South. The extension andincreasing diversity of metropolitan settle-ment has imposed new conditions for gov-ernance in the metropolitan areas of bothregions. In both, arrangements for gover-nance present parallel dilemmas of frag-mentation and coordination. North andSouth, the formal ins titutional alternativesfor metropolitan go vernance share similardimensions. Me tro politan governance pres-ents common problems of accommodatingan array of di ver se, conflicting in terests andinfluences. In both the North and the South,growing mo bility and the influence of trans-local and trans-national connections arereshaping the possibilities as well as theimperatives for metropolitan governance.

In important respects, however, theproblems of metropolitan governance inSouthern ur ban regions still differ fromthose in Northern ones. The growth ofSouthern me tropolitan regions has cre-ated the largest metropolitan areas inthe world. More compact, denser andless geographically fragmented, South-ern metropolises are mo re li kely to bedriven by security concerns born ofgreat dis parities between affluent andpoor neighborhoods. Southern metro-politan areas also have fewer economicand administrative re sources to bring tobear on far more pressing and massiveproblems.

VI.1. Multi-Level Governance

As urban re gions have become increas-ingly extended, and connections withtheir hinterlands have proliferated, abetter understanding is needed of thechanging dynamics of in ter-



governmental relations between citiesand their surround ing regions. Metro-politan regions in both the South andthe North are not only crucial to therealization of national po licy in numer-ous domains, but can take an active rolein influencing policies at higher levels.

VI.2. Participation in Metropolitan Gover nan ce

Participation in metropolitan go vernancepresents important issues for the rea -lization of democracy as well as foreffective decision-making processes.What ever institutional form it takes,governance at the me tropolitan levelconfronts the problem of in corporatingthe participation of a growing number ofincreasingly diverse interests. Un -derstanding the informal as well as theformal dimensions of participation iscru cial. The challenges surrounding par-ticipation are particularly acute for mar-ginalized groups, such as the urban poorand ethnic and racial minorities.

VI.3. Ecological Sustainability

Environmental policy in many domainsdepends on effective implementation atthe local level, and in turn on the effi-cacy of metropolitan governance. The

provision of adequate water resourcesand water quality, especially in theSouth, presents some of the most far-reaching challenges. Global and nationalefforts to assure air quality and carbonconservation depend on sustainabletransportation as well as solid regula-tory and energy policies at the locallevel. Metropolitan ini tia tives are criticalto these efforts.

VI.4. Social and Spatial Inequalities

Addressing the legal informality andpoverty of Southern cities is one of thehighest priorities for metropolitan go -vernance. Concentrations of the disadvan-taged often require mo re in terventionand public expenditure to combat relatedproblems, such as crime, ina dequateeducation and health needs (Pack 1993;Chernick and Reschovsky 1995). Indiverse, segregated metropolitan re -gions, fragmented governance can exac-erbate the disadvantages of the poor inobtaining public services (Alesina, Baqirand Easterly 1997). Similarly, extended,diverse metropolitan re gions can offeraffluent communities opportunities andincentives to segregate them selves fromthe rest of so cie ty. This pro c ess can alsoundermine collective efforts to providegoods to the entire metropolis.

Me tro politan

governance

presents common

problems

of accommodating

an array of di ver se,

conflicting

in terests and

influences


METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE282 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Metropolitan Los Angeles Paris Seoul Sao Paulo Mumbai Johannesburgarea

Population (per km2)

Percent in central city

Sub-national governments

Transit

Roads

Trash collection

Water/sewage Basic SanitationCompany of the State ofSao Paulo (SABESP)(state-ownedcompany), stategovernment, basincommittees of localofficials and others

Johannesburg Water(city-owned company),other municipalgovernments, privatecontractors

Municipal governments,City IndustrialDevelopment Co. andMaharashtra IndustrialDevelopment Co. (statecompanies)

Municipal governments,national public corporations(Environment ManagementCooperation (EMC),ENVICO(Korea Environment &Resources Corporation)) andinterlocal cooperation directedby Ministry of Environment

Municipal and alimited number ofintercommunalagencies, privatecontractors

Numerous county,municipal and interlocalutilities or agencies,private contractors

Pikitup (central city-owned company), othermunicipal governments

Municipal governments,limited privatecontracting

Municipal governments(mostly), limited use ofprivate contracting,municipal firms

Municipal governments andprivate contracting. Someinterlocal cooperation

Municipal and alimited number ofintercommunalagencies: 65+(collection), 30+(treatment)

Private contracting(42), municipalgovernments (13),some interlocalcooperation

National Roads Agency(national roads),Johannesburg Roads(central city-ownedcompany), municipalgovernments

National HighwaysAuthority, MumbaiMetropolitan RegionDevelopment Authority(state agency), CityIndustrial DevelopmentCo. (state company),municipal governments

Federal TransportationMinistry (federal roads),State Department ofRoads, municipalities(local roads), privatecompanies byconcession

Ministry of Construction andTransportation, SpecialMetropolitan City Government,Provincial/City/County/DistrictGovernment, publiccorporations (KoreaConstruction ManagementCorporation, KoreaExpressway Corporation)

Infrastructureministry fieldoffices (region,department);departments,municipalities(local roads)

Federal HighwayAdministration(national roads), StateTransportationDepartment, RegionalCouncil of Governments(advisory), counties, municipalities (localroads

Spoornet (nationalrailway), Metrobus(central city-ownedcompany); municipalgovernments; provincialDepartment of PublicTransport, Roads, andWorks

Indian Railways(national publiccompany), State RoadTransport Corporation,Mumbai MetropolitanRegion DevelopmentAuthority (state agencywith participation bycentral city), other stateagencies, interlocal andmunicipal bus services

State Secretariat forMetropolitanTransports, Sao PauloTransporte, SA, (privatecompany), Companhiado Metropolitano de SaoPaulo Metro, CompanhiaPaulista de TrensMetropolitanos, andEmpresa Metropolitanade Transportes Urbanos(state companies),numerous private firmsby concession

Korail (national railway),Seoul Metropolitangovernment, Seoul MetroSubway Corporation and SeoulMetro Rapid TransitCorporation (city-ownedcompanies), provincial transitauthorities, municipalsystems and private lines,national ministries

SNCF (nationalrailway), RATP(public companywith metro, bus,regional rail),OPTILE (network of39 public, privatelines), STIVO(network of publicand private lines)

Amtrak (national railcompany), Metrolink(joint authority oftransit agencies),separate county transitauthorities (5),interlocal authorities(6), municipal systems(39), private lines

Metropolitan or districtmunicipalities (3)

State (1), municipalcorporations (7),municipal councils(13), state districts (4),villages (900)

State (1), MetropolitanRegions (3),municipalities (139)

Province (1), metropolitan localgovernments (2), other municipalities (20)

Regions (1), departements (7),communes (1.584)City of Paris

State (1), counties (5),municipalities (180),regional councils ofgovernments (11)(advisory)

38.23%66.90%57.32%44.94%19.00%22.29%

1.692 per km24.089 per km2196 per km2 2.314 per km21929 per km2927 per km2

Annex 1 Examples of Metropolitan Organization, by Tasks

METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE283Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

Metropolitan Los Angeles Paris Seoul Sao Paulo Mumbai Johannesburgarea

Airports

Land useplanning

Air pollution

Water pollution

Primary and secondary education

Sources: Abers and Keck 2006; Metropolis 2007; Segbers et al. 2007; and governmental and organizational websites.

ProvincialgovernmentDepartment ofEducation

State government(secondary), localgovernments(primary), privateschools

State Secretary ofEducation (elementaryand secondary),municipalities(elementary)

National ministry of EducationNational ministryof education

Local school districts(172)

Municipal governmentsState pollution controlboard, municipalgovernments

State EnvironmentMinistry, StateEnvironment Agency(CETESB), basincommittees of localofficials and others

Metro government andmunicipal agencies and publiccorporations, Ministry ofConstruction andTransportation, K-Water(Korean Water ResourcesCorporation (national publiccompany), nationallydesignated water test centers(usually public institutions)

Nationalgovernmentagency fieldoffices

Water quality districtsestablished by state(3), governed by boardsof local officials

Municipal governments State pollution controlboard, municipalgovernments

State EnvironmentMinistry, StateEnvironment Agency(CETESB)

Municipal governments andinterlocal cooperation led byMinistry of Environment

Nationalgovernmentagency fieldoffices

Air quality districtsestablished by state(2), governed by boardsof local officials

Municipal governments,advised by provincialgovernment

Mumbai MetropolitanRegion DevelopmentAuthority (state agencywith central cityparticipation), CityIndustrial DevelopmentCo. (state company),other state agencies,municipal governments

Municipal governments,private contracting,Empresa Municipal deUrbanizacao company)

Municipal governmentsadvised by Korea LandCorporation (national publiccompany) and Ministry ofConstruction andTransportation , SeoulMetropolitanDevelopment Corporation(city owned company)

Municipalgovernments,interlocalcooperation, privatecontracting

Municipal governments,counties, advisorycouncil of governments

Five (owned by AirportsCompany South Africa(national publiccorporation))

Two (both under Airportauthority of India, onemanaged by privatefirm)

Three (owned byINFRAERO (Nationalpublic company))

Two (owned by Korea AirportCorporation (national publiccompany))

Two (owned byParis Airports(national publiccompany))

Five (two owned bycentral city, others byseparate municipal orcounty governments)

Annex 1 Examples of Metropolitan Organization, by Tasks (Cont.)

CONCLUSION284 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

CONCLUSIONDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 285

The purpose of the First World Report onDecentralization and Local Democracy– and of this overview – is neither norma-tive nor prescriptive1. Rather, the aim isto provide a balanced view of the state ofdecentralization and local democracy inthe world.

The opening section of these conclusionsprovides an overview of trends. The sec-tion also frames the major issues –thepolicy objectives and component issues–that virtually all states must engage toachieve decentralized democracy, notingoutstanding areas of progress as well asareas of concern. The succeeding sectionthen reviews each of six central policyissues, analyzed from the perspective oftheir contribution to decentralized democ-racy. Next, are emerging sets of globalissues, selected Millennium DevelopmentGoals – climate change, land use, health,and gender – are directly relevant to localgovernments and will require more atten-tion in the future. Another emerging issue,though not an MDG, concerns metropolitangovernance. Suggestions for next steps toaddress the state of inter-governmentalrelations and democracy are included inthe closing section.

Though the regional reports provide a cen-tral source of information for this synthe-sis, additional perspectives are brought infrom a variety of local, national, independ-ent, and supra-national organizations. In

addition, recent research from a samplingof academic literature complement andround out the discussion.

I. The Many Faces of Decentralization and Democracy

The nations covered in this report presenta wide variety of experiences, most ofthem leading toward decentralized gover-nance in some form. The fact that so manystates have chosen to move along the pathof decentralization constitutes a remark-able phenomenon, the impetus for whichmust connect with deep underlying struc-tural factors felt around the globe.

Among the more frequently mentioneddrivers of change are the exhaustion of thecentral state model after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union and the realization that anew departure towards state developmentwas required, one that relied on a broader-based pyramid of legitimacy and statepresence. Meanwhile in Europe, theprocess of regionalization was encouragedby the Euro pean Union and many countrieswere confronting the emergence of region-alist demands (Spain, Italy, Scotland, andNorthern Ireland). At virtually the sametime, and for similar reasons, the spreadof democracy was a palpable form ofreconnecting citizens and governments,and many actors and grass roots move-ments pushed for deeper democratization

CONCLUSIONDecentralization and Democracy:A Global Perspective in 2007

Tim Campbell

1. The author wishes to

acknowledge the

extensive and detailed

contributions of the

World Secretariat of

UCLG to the

preparation of this

report. The present

analysis draws from

regional chapters from

time to time.

Reference is made to

the respective chapter

whenever necessary.

CONCLUSIONDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World286

in the countries of Africa, Asia and LatinAmerica (Haggard, 1994; Campbell 2003).

In a related sphere, and about the sametime, liberalization of trade and the dra-matically increased velocity of globaltransactions suddenly thrust states into amore vulnerable, more competitive envi-ronment, as compared to just decadesearlier (Swyngedouw, E. A. 1992; Aminand To maney, 1995). One consequence ofthe globalized economy has been the riseof cross-state corporate connections. Asnational borders began to lose their impor-tance as markers of comparative advan-tage, regions and cities became the nextdistinguishing feature on the economiclandscape (Harris, 2003; Taylor and Watts,1995). Some authors point to the“…opposing forces of horizontal competi-tion imposing market based disciplines inEurope… constrained by within-countryredistributive tendencies and mobility-based competition.” (Salmon, 2007).Accordingly, a re gional perspective on eco-nomic development began to assume animportant place in both the process andthe outcome of decentralization.

Snapshot of the Regions

In short, looking across an extremelydiverse set of nations grappling with acomplicated field of issues, nations havemoved on decentralization in a half dozendistinct directions, and have not held closeto any single normative framework toguide the formulation and implementationof decentralized governance.

• European countries seem to haveembarked on a new phase of territorialreforms. Not all states are similarlyaffected by this development, withsome in fact remaining outside of it. Inessence, the reforms are concernedwith strengthening the municipal andintermunicipal framework, a trend toregionalization, and the problems relat-ed to organizing urban areas.

• In North America, higher-level govern-ments have shifted more of the respon-sibility for financing activities to the locallevel, often cutting back on fiscal supportfrom above. New substantive mandatesand procedural requirements foraccountability have often accompaniedthese shifts. To varying degrees localgovernments operate under less regula-tory restrictions than in other regionsand have sought new modes of servicedelivery through privatization and pub-lic-private partnerships. Various innova-tions have introduced elements ofinterlocal cooperation or territorial con-solidation.

• In Africa, implementation of thedecentralization process has rarelybeen properly planned. Many countries,es pecially south of the Sahara, haveundertaken reforms in the field oforganization of the state and public life,particularly by adopting decentralizationpolicies. These countries have organizedlocal elections, which have seen localauthorities emerging as new publicauthority figures alongside the nationalauthorities. In almost all these coun-tries, this splitting of public authorityhas caused problems, as this majorinstitutional change has not yet beenreflected in the behavior of most nation-al authorities. But in West and CentralAfrica, apart from Mali, Senegal andBurkina Faso, there is no real plan toimplement decentralization, whichseems to rest on policy announcements.And in North African countries theautonomy of local government is stillrestricted overall in relation to the cen-tral state.

• In Eurasia, the main idea of the reformswas to separate the state from localself-government. Legal reforms havebeen approved, but for the most partthe functions of local authorities are notclearly defined. The Soviet system ofsub-national government forms a le -gacy that continues to influence the


evolution of decentralization. The prin-ciple of local autonomy has often comeinto collision with that of regionalautonomy and nowhere more than inthe Russian Federation from the early1990s onwards. It is possible to distin-guish three groups of countries. In thefirst – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia –local governments could be seen asindependent institutions. Whereasin the second group – Georgia, KyrgyzRepublic, Moldova and Ukraine – theprocess of the formation of local self-government is still not concluded.Reforms can hardly be implemented, orsimply could not be achieved until now.The third group is composed of thestates of Central Asia (Kazakhstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)where local issues in this region arevested in local state organs subordinateto central government.

• In Latin America, the three biggestnations (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) all fed-eral systems, focused mainly on strength-ening the intermediate levels ofgovernment, although Brazil shifted moreweight to the municipal level. In Repúbli-ca Bolivariana de Venezuela, also a feder-al country, contradictory reforms areactually taking place that could affect thenature of local institutions. In the Andeancountries, decentralization has takenplace through far-reaching constitutionaland legislative reforms, in relatively briefprocesses. Colombia and Bolivia producedcomprehensive visions of reforms in theearly 1990s. But economic and politicalcrisis altered their coherence and slowedthe pace of their implementation. In Peru,the process of decentralization restartedafter 2000 following a reversal of directionin the 1990s. The unitary states of theSouthern Cone – Chile, Uruguay andParaguay – have also carried out reformsshaped by their respective characteristics.Central American countries have enactedlaws on decentralization, and their mainchal lenge is to achieve their implementa-tion.

• In the Middle East and Western Asia, inspite of the ceaseless political, military,and religious tensions, some advancesdeserve recognition: the first local elec-tions in Saudi Arabia, the holding ofdemocratic local elections in the WestBank and Gaza, the restoration of themayoral elections by universal suffragein Jordan, and the 2002 constitutionalreforms in Bahrain. In Turkey, threenew laws favourable to decentralizationwere adopted in 2004-2005. Decentral-ization is one of the criteria for mem-bership of the European Union.

• In Asia Pacific, decentralization hasbecome a major theme of governancereform over the past decade and decen-tralization has for the most part beenaccompanied by enhanced local democ-racy. But the forms and patterns of localgovernance have varied widely, as havethe outcomes, reflecting the diversity ofcountry contexts. While there are clear-ly a great many weaknesses in the cur-rent arrangements for decentralizedgovernance, and while further reformswill undoubtedly be required, it is hardto imagine that any wholesale return toa centralized system of governancewould be either appropriate or political-ly acceptable.

Framework of Issues

In short, decentralization has been pur-sued by different countries with differentobjectives – some political, others moreeconomic, still others give more weight tobetter services or democracy. Further-more, states have placed emphasis on dif-ferent combinations of the half dozenstrategic areas which must be engaged todecentralize successfully. These includenational policy, state organization, respon-sibilities of local governments, intergov-ernmental finance, mechanisms of par -ticipation, and capacity strengthening.Taken together, the objectives and strate-gic areas constitute a framework for un -


der standing the breadth and depth of thedecentralization experience.

To illustrate, from the snapshot of cases,political reforms were mixed with economicrestructuring in some regions, notably in thetransition states in Eastern Europe, the for-mer Soviet Union, and China and Vietnam.Still others centered on democracy andmodernization of the state as in Africa, LatinAmerica and in some countries in Asia (e.g.Indonesia, Philippines). Improved serviceswere perhaps a more notable priority inNorth America, Australia and New Zealand.And though this categorization is far fromneat, pursuit of policy and practice, espe-cially in political reforms, economic develop-ment, and finance, has strayed even furtherafield from the avowed objectives of manystates.

Velocity of Change

Turning to the pace of change in decentral-ization, the nations covered in the reportscan be classified very broadly in threegroups. At one extreme, are those coun-tries (many of them higher income GDP)where decentralization has advanced quitefar, having built on 50 years or more ofconsolidated local government. In manycountries of this group (and some coun-tries in other groups, as noted below),deliberate if not measured progress hasbeen made on policy and technical issuesin a search for what must be called adynamic balance in power sharing. Shiftingpolitical preference is complicated by grad-ual im provement in institutional capacityand occasional shifts in technological pos-sibilities, all of which can move the fulcrumof balance in central/local relations.

At another extreme, mainly but notentirely in the Middle East, are thosecountries that are taking a long, slowtake-off, mostly in the direction ofimproving participation at the local level.A few countries are making good faithefforts and show promise to be sources of

advice and counsel for their neighbors inthe re gion. Reviewing the uneven record,Cheema and Rondonelli (2007) point toineffec tiveness in implementation, asopposed to weaknesses in the concept ofde centralization itself. They also cautionabout the use of parallel administrationsat the subnational level, a ploy that isultimately self-defeating. The most trou-bled cases, from the point of view ofpower-sharing and democracy, are thosecountries afflicted by armed conflict or oilwealth. They present understandablesluggishness, even resistance.

In the middle, a disparate collection ofcountries that, with few exceptions, are inan active tug of war over the state ofdecentralized democracy. Some detailedexamples, below, are drawn from theregional chapters.

• The most exemplary case in thisrespect is South Africa, where the endof the Apartheid regime imposed a newapproach to governance based ondecentralization and involving theentire population in public managementat all levels. In most francophone coun-tries of Africa, the profusion of statutescomplicates the implementation ofdecentralization and slows things down,causing substantial delays betweenapproval of laws and their actualenforcement (delays of 10 years arecommon). In countries of North Africa,the pace of decentralization is uneven.

• In Latin America, some countries, suchas Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru,and República Bolivariana de Venezuelastarted early and, with Argentina andEcuador, went further than others in thedevolution of functions and resources.Peru and República Bolivariana devenezuela reversed some of the decen-tralization reforms begun in the 1980-90s. Mexico has moved forward with a“new federalism,” but progress is slowerat the municipal level. Other countriesare evolving to a lesser extent.


• In Eurasia, particularly in EasternEurope, reforms were taken quickly todismantle the former system andmove toward local self-government,and at present the countries haveattained different levels of institutionaldevelopment. In some countries localself-government exists as an inde-pendent institution, while in othersreform has not been implemented.

• In Asia-Pacific, Indonesia, the Philippines,and India provide the most dramaticexamples of major reform for enhancedlocal government autonomy. Countriessuch as China and Vietnam have adopt-ed decentralization strategies within thecontext of strongly centralized politicalruling systems. In some other coun-tries, like Pakistan, there has been anoticeable cyclical movement to and frobetween periods of centralization anddecentralization. By contrast, inBangladesh and Malaysia resistancefrom the center has impeded any sub-stantial decentralization that wouldstrengthen the political role of localgovernment. Finally, the OECD coun-tries in the region, Australia, Japan, theRepublic of Korea and New Zealand,also emphasize decentralization as partof their ongoing administrative reformprocesses.

With these two perspectives – on strategicobjectives and on velocity of change – weturn now to explore how the nations andlocal governments have approached theorganization of the state. To what extenthave policy frameworks guided the designand implementation of decentralized go -vernance? What changes have been madein assigning functions, in providing ade-quate finance, and arranging for participa-tion and democracy? How closely havegovernments adhered to international ex -pectations and standards as expressed inthe UN Habitat Guidelines on Decentraliza-

tion and the Strengthening of Local

Authorities and the European Charter of

Local Self-Government?

II. Progress and Pitfalls: Six Core Issues

Though the preceding introduction may berhetorically useful for grasping a glimpseof the global state of affairs, it is not a tidycategorization and has limitations in termsof understanding the tactical issues inimplementation. Countries are in variousdegrees of engagement with the six areasof policy 1) national policy and strategy, 2)organizational units, 3) responsibilities, 4)financing, 5) mechanisms of participationand accountability, and 6) institutionalcapacity. This section reviews the six coreissues, noting trends across or withinregions, and spotting promising areas ofprogress where lessons may be useful in awider setting.

Policy and Strategy

This review of countries and regionsreveals a wide spectrum of policy positionsand organizational strategies for local gov-ernments. Though few countries have full-blown strategies, as we note below, mostmake some reference to the European

Charter and Guidelines on Decentralization

(see Box 1, below). Both documents refer toprinciples that have been widely discussed,synthesized and generally accepted by theinternational community. The European

Charter was published in 1985. UN Habitatin close collaboration with local authoritiesproduced Guidelines on Decentralization.

Only a handful of nations have framed acom prehensive policy on decentralization,blending political reform (power-sharing),economic development, and democraticchoice-making with capacity-strengtheningand financing in order to produce a longterm solution. As noted above, Bolivia,South Africa, and Indonesia have eachmounted comprehensive elements, but nota complete strategy. Bolivia and SouthAfrica produced comprehensive visions (in1992 and 1994, respectively), and thoughBolivia recently reaffirmed its intentions(Go vernment of Bolivia 2006), neither go -


vernment has been able to sustain coher-ent effort to implement its strategy.

Indonesia’s sudden “Big Bang” of reform isnotable for the scope of change (transfer-ring several million public sector workersto local authorities), but not for the inte-grated, long term solution needed. None ofthese countries has developed a compre-hensive decentralization plan, a blue printwith concrete objectives and milestones toguide the decentralization process, includ-ing local capacity strengthening and a cen-tral agency to see through the entireprocess. Even when piecemeal legislationis in place, sluggish regulation drags downthe speed and limits the reach of imple-mentation.

International institutions – financial, tech-nical, and political – have had no shortageof normative frameworks to recommend togo vernments, yet neither do they fullyaddress the practical issues of implementationmost governments face. The international

financial assistance organizations like theWorld Bank and the regional developmentbanks adhere to a market-based approach,seeking to introduce quasi-market mecha-nisms to guide supply and demand of pub-lic goods. The Asian Development Bankdoes not have a specific policy paper ondecentralization. Instead, it focuses ongood governance and corruption.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)published its public sector strategy in 1996and last year issued a companion policypaper on the issues of implementing de -centralization (IDB 1996, 2002). Like mostdevelopment banks, the IDB policy startswith the fiscal imperative of macroeco-nomic stability. Guarding against excessivedebt, and particularly sub-national debtheld by domestic banks and even suppli-ers, is not merely to keep the banks in linewith their primary stakeholders, nationalgovernments. It is also to safeguard expo-sure to risk and increased cost of borrow-ing on international capital markets.

UN Habitat Guidelines on Decentralization and the Strengthening of Local Authorities

• The principle of subsidiarity constitutes the rationale underlying the process of decentralization. According to that principle, public responsibilities should be exercised

by those elected authorities, which are closest to the citizens.

• In many areas powers should be shared or exercised concurrently among different spheres of government. These should not lead to a diminution of local autonomy or

prevent the development of local authorities as full partners.

• National, regional and local responsibilities should be differentiated by the constitution or by legislation, in order to clarify the respective powers and to guarantee

access to the resources necessary for the decentralized institutions to carry out the functions allocated to them

• As far as possible, nationally determined standards of local service provision should take into account the principle of subsidiarity when they are being drawn up and

should involve consultation with local authorities and their associations.

• Local authorities should freely exercise their powers, including those bestowed upon them by national or regional authorities, within the limits defined by legislation.

These powers should be full and exclusive, and should not be undermined, limited or impeded by another authority except as provided by law.

European Charter of Local Self-Government

• Basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute

• Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initiative

• Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen.

• Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive.

• Where powers are delegated to them by a central or regional authority, local authorities shall, insofar as possible, be allowed discretion in adapting their exercise to local

conditions.

Box 1 Guidelines and Charter of Europe


A companion principle in the internationalfinances institutions (IFI) framework ismanagement of economic systems freefrom distortions (for instance, due to inter-ference in local decision-making). Efficientresource allocation places a premium onexpression of demand, especially at thelocal level. The banks also recommendclarity in the division of labor among levelsof government. All of the developmentbanks espouse a similar line in connectionwith reform of the state.

The World Bank recently cast decentraliza-tion issues in terms of poverty alleviationand services for the poor. Building on earlierwork devoted to reform of the state (WorldBank 1995), the World Bank’s World Devel-

opment Report (WDR) of 2000 dedicated achapter to decentralization, and the 2004report focuses on services to the poor, argu-ing that politicians, providers and the poormust be brought into tighter juxtapositionwith one another in order to improve provi-sion of and access to basic health-care andeducation. A key me chanism is “local voice.”Expression of demand at the local levelgoes hand in glove with the idea of partici-patory democracy. The Bank points out thatlocal go vernment plays a key role in certaincircumstances, for instance, when localpopulations are more or less homogeneousand when services are easy to monitor.These tests could prove useful in evaluatingpolicies of nations and roles of local govern-ments.

Thus, governments have the benefit of se -veral international sources on general prin-ciples. We shall see in the ensuing discus-sion that more practical strategies ofimplementation might be useful. Beforemoving on, note should be taken of impor-tant areas that have been largely ignoredand should be addressed in the future.One gap is the calculation of the cost tothe nation of decentralizing in a piecemealor haphazard way. None of the regionalchapters speak of the economic and socialcosts of burdens being transferred to localautho rities in the shape of half-baked or

un der-financed de centralization schemes im -posed on poorly-equipped local govern-ments.

Organization of the State

The inchoate nature of national decentral-ization policies is mirrored by piecemealmeasures, either explicit or tacit, toorganize administration of the state atthe local level. This may be partly due tothe dual nature of governmental units.Go vern ments have both territorial andfunctional aspects. They are put in placeto connect to citizens and they operate todeliver services. Decentralization experi-ences sometimes get wrapped up withthese multi-dimensional features – fed-eral, unitary, territorial, functional – pro-ducing a system of governance which is in -complete or out of sync.

Many federated systems accord to states,with their own constitutions or legal stat-ues or both, the powers to govern, regu-late, sometimes even create, lower tier,municipal governments. For the most partfederated systems have been adopted inlarge territories, as for instance in Russia,Brazil, and India, and often, national go -vernments like Argentina, USA and Indiahave left many issues for the states todecide. This can either compound or helpto solve problems, depending on the sys -tem in question, i.e., states can help coor-dinate, but as the regional reports haveshown, they can also introduce confusionand interfere with national policy on bothfunctional and representational issues.

Some states were more inclined to respondto a clamor for representation, as in themajority of African, some Latin Americanand some Asian countries in the 1990s.Most states in Eurasia have created or ex -tended local government units to accom-modate regional or ethnic groups. Othercountries (New Zealand, Germany) focuson the functional side, aiming to improvethe extension or efficiency of services. Thissometimes means a diminution of numbers


in local government units. In OECD coun-tries, a wave of amalgamation is takingplace to reduce the sheer number of localgovernment units in the interest of improv-ing efficiency. OECD Countries such as theUK, Belgium, and Greece, among othershave reduced the numbers of go -vernmental units by substantial fractions.Where local units were weak in the past(Hungary, France, Italy), new tiers havebeen created to handle new tasks.

The wide range of organizationalapproaches, and even conceptions of localgovernment, makes head to head compar-isons between nations not just difficult, butalso ultimately unproductive. Neverthe-less, it is useful to gain an appreciation forthe variations in approaches taken bystates in different regions.

Many countries are experiencing prob-lems where units of government overlapin dense urban areas. Countries have ex -plored various kinds of partnerships among

local units –a step that is frequentlyallowed in national legislation. NorthAmerican local governments have fewerconstraints imposed upon them aboutcooperating across boundaries, both ho -rizontal and vertical (with states). TheUS is unusual also in having developed alarge number of special districts; govern-mental units with high target finance anda tightly focused mandate (for in stancein primary education, environmental con-trols or fire safety).

Outside Europe and North America, Japanis the only country that provides examplesof policies of amalgamation of municipali-ties. Horizontal cooperation among firsttier units of government is taken up againin a later section of this paper on metro-politan governance.

It should be noted that the sheer numbersof small local governments implies a policydilemma. The weak institutional capacityof many small local governments affects a

Figure 1 Local Governments and Population Percentage Distribution, LAC

Source: IDB 2006.

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0<5,000 5,000 10,000 50,000 100,000 500,000 1,500,000>

Local governments Population Percentage distribution LAC

Perc

ent

Population range


minor share of the population, while a fewstrong local governments of big cities holdan important share of the population (seeFigure 1). Take the example of Latin Amer-ica, a region with 16,400 units of localgovernment and a population (2005)of nearly 550 million. Less than 5 %of local governments – those in big cities– contain more than half the popula-tion, while more than 53 % of local go -vernments in small towns and rural areascover less than a tenth of the population.Similar proportions are found in most re -gions (see Figure 1).

In a nutshell, the issue of organizing localgovernment units is one of balancing atension between two imperatives. Effec-tive representation is needed to servedemocracy, but this tends to require mo -re units of government. Against this ex -pansionary push is a constricting pull toreduce the number of units, or fold theminto higher tier governments in order toachieve economies of scale and moreefficient service delivery. Virtually allcountries in the middle and many in thead vanced stages are engaged at so melevel with this issue.

Responsibilities

The logic of assigning responsibilities tolocal governments is to achieve efficacy orefficiency in delivery of local goods andservices to citizens. And though the guide-line principles of subsidiarity and auton-omy provide a normative standard for gov-

ernments, in practice, states find manydilemmas when implementing sub sidiari ty(See Box 2).

States also face many temptations to pushthe limits, like shifting responsibilities tolocal governments with little or no consul-tation and without corresponding financialresources. The issues related to responsi-bilities can be summed up as follows: a)clarity and consistency in observing sub-sidiarity and autonomy of choice; b)achieving efficiency in allocation and indelivery of services, an issue that involvespublic and/or private provision of service;and c) the impact of technology.

Subsidiarity and Autonomy in Choice.

Most countries have devolved a core set oflocal functions, and many countries gradu-ally adjust these, as circumstancesrequire. On the one extreme are China’sbig cities that handle supra-local functionslike judiciary, pensions, and economicdevelopment. A more typical arrangementinvolves local public services, like waterconnections, streets, solid waste, localmarkets, urban and land use planning, andprimary care in health and often educa-tion, social policy and sometimes economicdevelopment and housing.

In Europe the most important variationsrelating to powers and responsibilitiesoccur in the fields of education, health,and social security or benefits. Broadly,local governments are responsible for suchservices in the Nordic countries and to a

Oates, 1972 “Assign to the lowest level of government possible, those local public goods and services which can best be delivered at that level."

World Bank “The lowest tier of government that can internalize the costs and benefits of the service.”

2004, p. 189

European Charter “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest

Art. 4.3 to the citizen.”

Box 2 Subsidiarity—an issue at the heart of autonomy—is viewed in different ways by academics, political organizations, and development institutions


large extent in the United Kingdom. Othersrestrict assignments to be either exclusive(land-use controls in many countries) orshared, such as primary education in mostcountries and in others, police and secu-rity. Still others share responsibilities.Turkey provides an example of a modusvivendi in which municipalities and theSpecial Provincial Administrations (SPAs)share public services, including education(maintenance of school buildings).

None of these variations necessarily vio-lates the principles of subsidiarity andautonomy. The problem comes, as regionalreports frequently show, when assign-ments are shifted in a way that is unclear,is ambiguous, or is unreasonable, arbitrary,or inconsistent. For instance, in the US,recent devolution of Home Security respon-sibilities suddenly imposed severe financialconstraints on many cities. Another exam-ple is found in Eurasia, where in mostcountries the functions of local authoritiesare not clearly defined by law, largelybecause of an unending process of redistri-bution of powers between different levelsof government. In the Middle East, on theother hand, many countries designate localservices in national law, but these aresometimes ambiguously worded, contra-dicted, or ignored. The report on the MiddleEast notes that formal assignments are“highly idealized and out of step with real-ity…” (of local authorities and institutionalcapacity).

In Africa, while public assertion of the newnominal powers of local governments iswidespread, the actual transfer of realexecutive and operational powers is stillrare. In Northern Africa, national min-istries typically retain control of local serv-ices, or delegate them to the private sec-tor. This tendency can also be observed inWest and Central Africa, although basicservices there for education, health, water,sanitation and transportation are generallyacknowledged as local concerns. In severaleastern and southern African countries,like Ghana, South Africa and Uganda, cen-

tral government defines strategic guide-lines for sectoral policies regarding health,water and education and local govern-ments are responsible for implementation.

Direct intervention by higher levels isanother form of disturbing subsidiarity andviolating the principle of choice. Ambigu-ous or overlapping jurisdictions sometimeslead to “end run” practices –nominaldecentralization coupled with direct deliv-ery by central government. This repre-sents a significant slippage in the way gov-ernments should work. Serious problemarose in Latin America in the 1990s whencentral governments either delivereddirectly to local citizens, as a means of gain -ing political support, or simply fell short oncoordination, meaning that both centraland local governments were spending onredundant services, resulting in theincrease of economic costs to the nation(Peterson, 1997). Similar problems havebeen detected in Russia.

Intervention from higher levels of govern-ment in Europe is currently the focus ofdebate in connection with the EuropeanCommunity Laws on public service man-agement subject to competition rules. Theissue is the extent to which, in seeking toprovide certain services, national powerseffectively limit local self government. Theposition of local governments is that theyshould enjoy complete freedom to choosethe modality of service provision that bestreflects the needs of their communities.

The uncertainty and lack of definition illus-trated in these examples – examples whichare a few among many cited in theregional reports – effectively rob the sub-sidiarity principle of its virtues and limitthe choice of local governments.

Efficiency in Allocation and Produc-

tion. A second aspect of the assignmentsissue is efficiency. Two distinct functionsare involved: 1) deciding on what isneeded (allocation efficiency) and 2) actu-ally delivering the services (production


efficiency). Allocation efficiency is one ofthe principal economic rationales fordecentralization. It is to ensure public sec-tor decisions are made close to the citizenswho use (and may need to pay for) infra-structure and services. For this reason,par ti cipation in choice-making – in voicingpre ferences and voting in local elections –is important. These topics are covered in amore organic way in a subsequent section,below, having to do with participation andchoice.

One of the front edge issues in the deliv-ery of services is whether and how muchto contract out, to privatize, or to dele-gate. In the case of the Middle East, men-tioned earlier, so-called “external solu-tions” include joint service councils forinfrastructure in small rural areas andneighborhood committees. A survey ofNorth American local governments in 2003showed that as many as two-thirds of themunicipalities had tried privatization ofsome kind, although this trend hasdeclined in this decade. New Zealand andAustralia have followed a steadily expand-ing privatiza tion policy. In other coun-tries, the reform pro cess that has beenreliant on the private sector has led to areduction of local government competen-cies (UK, Holland and Sweden).

In the 1990s, public-private-partnerships(PPP) were advanced by the internationalfinancial assistance agencies (World Bank,Asian Development Bank, International Fi -nance Corporation) as a promising solutionto lagging investment and poor manage-ment by public agencies. PPPs promised apractical alternative for financing the ever-growing demand for services. The argu-ment reached the point of suggestingthat local governments should limit them-selves to a strictly “enabling function,”leaving service provision in the hands of acompetitive private sector (EuropeanCommission). In hindsight, the promise ofprivate sector investment in infrastructurewas overestimated. A World Bank reportshows that private participation in infra -

structure represented a small anddecreasing proportion of the total in localpublic and urban infrastructure in the1990s (Annex 2006).

Technology. Finally, few if any assignmentsof functional responsibilities will hold for alltime because of shifting preferences, polit-ical agendas, and administrative capacityin government. Changing technology alsoplays a role. Technological change in suchfields as distributed solar power, healthcare diagnostics, distance-learning in edu-cation, and water purification can affectthe placement of responsibilities. Further-more, the time cycles of change – eitherof decentralizing functions or bringing newtechnologies on line – have similar lifecycles. This means that a well-intentionedcountry might, say, centralize diagnosticaspects of health care and take three orfour years to accomplish it, only to findthat during the period of implementation,technological progress now permits so -phisticated diagnoses to be done virtuallyanywhere. For these technological andother reasons, the assignment of responsi-bilities is probably best viewed as a mov-ing target.

Financing Decentralized Systems

When assignments change, so should fi -nance. Inter-governmental finance isinex tricably linked with decentralizationbe cause the vast majority of states on theplanet have more than one level or tier,and lower tiers of government are rarely, ifever, financially self-sufficient. In fact, it isworth noting that the notion of pure finan-cial autonomy for local governments is illu-sory. Even the richest countries, for in -stance those in the G-8, support half ormore of local government expendituresthrough revenue transfers of some sort.Constraints on many local governments inthe south – for instance limited or no abil-ity to set rates, raise taxes, or borrow –make the idea of financial autonomy evenmore remote.


National governments structure many waysto finance local investment and services,and almost all of them involve issues of tax(and rate setting), borrowing (or privateinvolvement), and revenue sharing. Buteach of these singly and in combinationentails issues of policy and practice,including mechanisms of control, capacityconstraints and problems of transparencyand discretion. The question is how havecurrent practices around the globeengaged and sol ved these issues?

Though regional reports document a wide -spread growth in the share of spending bylocal governments relative to central gov-ernment spending, the share is small in allbut a few cases. Denmark and the Nether-lands Antilles are the only two countrieswhere municipal spending is over 50 per-cent of the total sub-national spending.

Figure 2 shows spending by all sub-national tiers. Municipal-level spendingranges widely and on the whole is on an

upward trend over the past few decades.At the low end of the spectrum are someCaribbean islands (zero) and a number ofcountries in the Middle East, which rangein a few percentage points of total govern-ment spending. The chapter on Africareports a range of five to 10 percent in 30African countries. Most of Latin America isunder 20 percent, but it is notable that thisproportion has increased from 11% to18% in the past two decades. On the highend are countries like Denmark, Switzer-land, Finland and Sweden. More thananything, these figures suggest that manyformulas for spending are in use.

On the income side, central governmentsare in the habit of restricting the incomepo tential of local governments. In LatinAmerica, local governments depend on theexe cutive or legislative branches and some -times the states in federated systems toset taxes and, in some instances, to settariffs. Fiscal power in the Middle East,Africa, and Eurasia is even more limited or

Figure 2 Local Government Expenditures, Sample Countries

Legend: 1. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama; 2. Botswana; Belarus; 3. Israel, France, Belgium; 4. Albania, Bulgaria, Poland; Latin Ameri-

can average; S. Africa; 5. Netherlands, Italy, UK; Uzbekistan; 6. Norway, Sweden, Finland; 7. Denmark; 8. N. Antilles.

Source: World Bank 2004.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

510

15 2025

35

5560

Perc

enta

ge of

Publi

c Spe

ndin

g


nonexistent, with very low levels of rev-enue (excluding Turkey, Zambia and SouthAfrica). More than half the countries in theAsia-Pacific region have own-source rev-enues above 30% of the total. The samepattern holds in North America and Europe(around 40%).

Perhaps the most troubling trend is thetendency of central governments toimpose spending responsibilities on localgovernments without loosening the con-straints on income. These unfunded man-dates are a burning issue in high incomecountries and some southern countries.Virtually all of the regional reports mention(but did not quantify) increasing burdenson local governments.

Non-tax sources of income – borrowingand private finance – have been tightly cir-cumscribed in most countries. In the firstplace, only a small fraction of local govern-ments are credit worthy. Some countries(Chile) flatly prohibit borrowing; others(Philippines) are experimenting with grad-uated systems of indebtedness. In theEuropean Union, the newer states enjoyfewer restrictions on borrowing. Often, thepotential for revenue mobilization variesdirectly with city size, and the distinctiveadvantage of larger cities echoes an earlierdiscussion about the possible practicaladvantages of managing decentralizationby size class of city.

Even when credit worthiness can be estab-lished, national governments face moralhazard issues of sovereign guarantees. Indiahas begun to experiment with syndicatedsubnational borrowing by packaging loans togroups of local governments. Europeancountries are discussing municipal credit,somewhat along the lines of the Swedishand former Belgian municipal funds. Munici-pal bonds are common in the US. They areapproved by voters at elections and enjoytax advantages, but these arrangementswould be of dubious feasibility in lowerincome countries. Depending upon the stateof capital markets, credit worthiness, and

the willingness of national governments tooffer sub-sovereign guarantees, bondfinancing can be feasible for a handful ofwell-managed local governments.

Transfers from central government, in grantsor revenue sharing, are the most commonway to cover local government costs (the so-called “vertical gap”). They are also useful inhelping less advantaged regions (“horizontalgap”). Intergovernmental finance specialistshave a multitude of tools – automatic, for-mula−driven revenue sharing, block grants,and conditional grants, for instance, thathave matching requirements and otherrefinements. Fiscal specialists are learningabout the multiplier effects of conditionalgrants (Shah 2007) and the importance ofhard budget constraints (Rodden, Eskelandand Litvack 2003).

A tension in financial imbalance is discerni -ble in virtually every report. The theory ofintergovernmental finance is not the prob-lem. The problem arises more with ambigu-ous or changing rules (Latin America), lackof transparency (Middle East), and excessivediscretion (Africa) on the part of central gov-ernments in implementing revenue sharingprograms. Wescott (2005) provides a reviewof these arrangements and the questionsthey raise for nations and the Asian Devel-opment Bank in the case of several Asia-Pacific countries.

One more point deserves emphasis. For themost part, intergovernmental transfers areformulated, promulgated, and defended bycentral governments, often on advice frominternational financial institutions (IFIs). Thepoint of view of local governments is rarelygiven equal weight in adjusting the system.In the case of Latin America, constant tinker-ing with transfer formulas left local govern-ments perpetually in the dark about prospec-tive income from year to year (Peterson,1997). An added problem is imprecision ofdata. The regional reports speak of a fiscalsqueeze in which local governments havemore responsibilities without the financialmeans with which to discharge them. None of


the regional reports contains data to measurethe magnitude of this squeeze. Indeed, manyreports call attention to the need for reliable,time-series data to document financial andother issues (for instance, personnel). Evenfewer countries have accurate numbers onthe costs of delivering local services. Objec-tive cost and expenditure data are vital tohelp decision makers formulate and defendpolicies on finance and spending.

Local Democracy: Participation and Accountability

One of the signal features of decentraliza-tion, and one of its bright spots, is therenewed connection between citizens andgovernment. The regional reports docu-ment a growing tendency of involving citi-zens in the decision-making process. Thisis important for economic reasons – theallocative efficiency discussed earlier – andfor political reasons of legitimizing localgovernment and holding elected leadersaccountable for their actions. In practice,governments employ many modes of par-ticipation and choice-making.

The range of issues considered in the par-ticipatory dimension of decentralization in -cludes: a) elections and electoral rules; b) the focus on chief executives and coun-

cils at the local level; and c) modalities of voice, participation, and

choice.

Elections. The very fact that elections aretaking place at the local level in mostregions of the world is by itself a notableachievement. The regional reports note“important gains” in Europe and that, “un -deniable progress” has been made in Africa,LAC, Asia, Eurasia, and MEWA. Se veralreports refer to political parties and electionrules in connection with local democraticchoice-making. The Eurasia report notesthat elections are “increasingly competi-tive,” and in Asia-Pacific, that “multi-partydemocracy is thriving” and is the norm. InLAC, the regional report notes that “plural-

ism is taking hold” and the North Americareport notes an independence from parti-sanship. Further, in North America “…single-member electoral districts, frequent elec-tions, direct democracy, and greater localchoice set local institutions in these coun-tries apart” from others with British tradi-tions like Australia and New Zealand.

Yet a number of concerns persist in connec-tion with local elections. One issue signaledin several regions is the tendency for nationalpartisan issues to crowd out local concerns.Some observers feel that local and nationalelections should be staggered in ti me inorder to prevent local elections from be -coming miniature battles of national issues.A second issue is low turnout of vo ters inlocal elections. With some exceptions,turnouts are in decline in North America,Europe and Eurasia and decreasing in someparts of East Asia and the Pacific.

Still another issue, one that requires muchmore scrutiny, concerns the rules of elec-tions, not just the timing, but also howwinners are declared (first past the postversus majority or slate lists) and theissues of direct and indirect elections, theperiods of office (often short, three to fouror five years), and whether electoral rulesallow for self-succession in re-election.Short periods and prohibitions on re-elec-tion make it difficult to design and imple-ment significant programs at the locallevel.

Executive and Legislative. Much of thefocus of local democracy has been on thecity or municipal executive – mayor, prin-cipal officer, or municipal president. Selec-tion of chief executives is not always di -rect. Countries have structured indirectmeans to select second tier executives orto accommodate minority parties at thelocal level. But direct elections appear tohave increased accountability (in Europe).Some countries – for instance Indonesiaand Vietnam – are beginning to relax therules on candidacy. In Asia-Pacific and LatinAmerica, big city mayors are a well-known


stepping stone to higher political office. Onthe other hand, more than half the NorthAmerican cities have adopted a councilmanager form of executive, separatingpolitical functions from the day to dayoperations of running a large city. Citymanagers bring certified, professionalskills to handle the complexities of moderncity ma nagement. The disadvantage of themanager (or in Russia the hired manager)system, is that this arrangement puts theCEO of the city one step further away fromdirect electoral accountability, since mostmanagers are hired by, and are account-able to, the city council.

Modes of Participation. Modes of par-ticipation by local citizens – i.e., expressingvoice and making choice – are the mostcolorful and innovative spots in theunfolding story of decentralization anddemocracy. Perhaps the most refreshingmes sa ge in the reports is that manycountries in Africa (for instance, Ghana,Niger, and Uganda) in Asia (India andPakistan) in East Asia (Philippines) and inLatin America draw on tradition and cus-tom, making creative use of village coun-

cils to hear citizen opinion and deliberate.A good example is the Gram Sabha inrural India, a mandatory meeting of reg-istered voters called to decide importantissues. Table 1 illustrates the many waysthat citizens at the local level take part inplanning, implementing and monitoringlocal government activities.

However, evaluative research reports thatparticipation by itself does not mean thatgovernance or services are better or thatpoverty is any more quickly reduced, oreven that local autonomy is safeguarded.One tricky issue concerns interventionsby central state actors on behalf of disad-vantaged people at the local level (John-son et al 2005 in India; Tendler 1997 inBrazil). Other studies have focused on theconditions of successful participation.Crook and Manor (1998), suggest that inthe cases of South Asia and Africa, theimpact of participation depends on pre-existing conditions and the type of partic-ipation employed (see Table 1).

Still others argue for the importance ofconnecting participation to the deeper issue

Table 1 Sample Mechanisms of Participation and Their Functions

Source: Adapted from Campbell 2003.

Area of effectiveness

Participatory mechanism Policy and planning Demand preferences and budgeting Implementation and oversight Accountability

Tapping into grassroots opinion Gram Sabha, India; neighborhood councils (Africa, Middle East)

Mobilizing grassroots groups Participatory budgeting (several countries in LAC, Neighborhood work gangs, Comités de Vigilancia (Bolivia)

Philippines, Europe). many countries

Beneficiary contributions Mayor’s funds (Chile) Bond measures in US

Citizens initiated contact Voluntary neighborhood Rating systems India, US

organizations in Japan

Electoral and voting process Programmatic campaign Referenda in US, Europe, and

(Colombia) Eurasia (permitted but not used).

Legal and judicial system Impeachment, LAC, US, Canada


of citizenship and citizen rights (Hickeyand Mohan, 2005). Local leadership, cen-tral monitoring, an articulate civil society,and the right kinds of information are allnecessary, though not a guarantee thatgovernment services will work better(Devas and Grant 2003). Several of theregional reports speak of serious issues inthe free flow of information and the needto ensure the availability of information, asrepresented in legislation on freedom ofinformation (Philippines, UK, US).

A somewhat deeper modality of partici-pation, one that relies on the instigationof citizens, is in such tools as the ballotinitiative, referenda, and recall elections(see Campbell 2003 and Cabrero 2007).These are widespread in North Americaand Japan, and though permitted inmany countries of Eurasia, not used.They are “seeping down” in Europe andLatin America. The LAC region has itsown innovative uses of participation, inthe form of participatory budgeting. Asthe name implies, the practice involvescommunity and neighborhood groupstaking part in semi-formal planning ses-sions to determine the mix and scale ofcapital investment.

Capacity

The second most important problem afterfinancial shortfalls, (again, except formany OECD countries) is the yawning gapin proficiency of administration and man-agement in local government. The range ofissues covered includes a) the sheer num-bers of qualified staff, b) contracting andmanagement systems, c) the need formerit based reforms and d) corruption,where it occurs.

In the first place, the majority of regionalreports note that local governments areundermanned and their personnel underpaid and in many places poorly qualified.In purely numerical terms, the reportsfrom regions frequently cite local publicsec tor workers as a proportion of total

public sector (often ignoring differencesacross countries in responsibilitiesassigned to local governments).

A somewhat more useful ratio is thenumber of local government personnel inrelation to the population. This figure,compiled from the regional reports, runsfrom 2 per 1000 population in WestAfrica to over 43 per 1000 population inthe US (see Table 2).

Another way to normalize the data is toexpress municipal staff in relation to theresponsibilities of local government, forinstance, per capita public expenditures atthe local level (column 2 in Table 2). Therange here is €5.6 in West Africa to €348in Japan. The implications of these ratiosare clear. A municipal government of100,000 in West Africa would have nomore than six professional staff to lookafter a spending program of €1 million.Increased decentralization or increasedassistance to African cities or both, imply aneed to improve these ratios. The numbersof qualified personnel per capita, wouldneed to move ahead of public expenditure(the denominator) in order to expectnational governments to deepen decen-tralization. But the data are sketchy. More-over, time series data are rarely available.Nickson (1995) is a notable exception.

But the regional reports are clear about thediscouraging, vicious circle of local employ-ees. In several regions, for instance, theMiddle East and Africa, there is little careerprospect for municipal employees. As aresult, qualified professionals do not seekpositions in local government. One conse-quence noted in Lebanon, admittedly anextreme case because of the war, is that theaverage age of municipal workers is 55.Another consequence is that governmentsturn to contract workers. Turkey hasreverted to a short term contract system.Elsewhere, the prospects for rent seekingbegin to appear in the system. The percep-tion is that corruption has increased in Chinaand Indonesia, and a survey in the Ukraine


established that 60 % of the respondentshad “faced one fact of corruption” in the pre-vious year and in Turkey, the confidencelevel is only 5.2 on a scale of 10.

Different systems of management – publiclaw, civil service, and private contractlaw – can all be made to work. Public lawis still the predominant career employmentstructure in Europe. Russia has recentlytaken this step (Art 86 of its pu blic frame-work law of March 2007). Some countriesare in the process of extending thenational civil service to local levels (ex: inLAC Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica,Nicaragua, El Salvador.). It should benoted that the civil service is only onesolution of many. Certification sys tems arebeginning to appear in Mexico and Thai-land. In the US, certification is managedby professional associations of municipalemployees, not by go vernment. The issue

is not so much the na ture of le gal frame-work, but rather that few go vern mentsha ve established a unified sys tem of me rit- based public employment that offers careerprofessional employment and mobility.

Other hopeful signs of progress include thenew public administration (NPA) reformsthat have begun to influence thinking andpolicy in several regions, though accordingto the Europe chapter it is “running out ofsteam.” Many countries have launched ini-tiatives to improve professional compe-tence of local public officials or to explorealternatives to direct service (such as in -creased private provision with local pu blicsupervision), for instance, public transportin Europe, the US, and Latin America andthe swapping of national and local employ-ees, as in Republic of Korea, Germany, andJapan, so that national officials might seethe world from the shoes of local officials.

Table 2 Local Government Personnel and Spending in Selected Countries

Country Personnel per 1000 population Expenditure/cap/staff (euros)

Africa (5)* 3 West 2 North 2 5.6

Eurasia (5) 2.5 Na

N. America (US) 43.8 31.6

Canada 28.3 36.4

Europe Na Na

Asia-Pacific (4 low income) 6.75 Na

Indonesia 12.8 4.84

Malaysia 2.3 67.4

Australia 7.5 36.8

New Zealand 5.5 69.1

Japan 11.1 348.5

LAC 4.9 Na

* Uses per capita expenditures from West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Source: Compiled by author from Regional reports, Nickson (1995), OECD.


Only a small handful of countries in thesouth have framed a long term strategy tobuild capacity at the local level. These cir-cumstances leave local governments weakand provide a convenient justification fornations to hold position in the stalematedtug of war.

III. Metropolitan Governments

Cities that are comprised of more than onelocal governmental unit are of special con-cern to decentralization and democracy.Virtually every regional report, in additionto the dedicated chapter on metropolitangovernance, calls attention to the specialproblems of large, multi-jurisdictional ci -ties. National strategies and actions arehobbled by the lack of understandingabout feasible approaches to horizontalcooperation among governments in largecities. The changing global environment,cou pled with rapid city growth, have oftenmade institutional arrangements obsoletesoon after they are promulgated.

Definition: Numbers and Growth

Much attention has been paid to the grow -ing urban population, and to the peakcities in the demographic pyramid –theso-called mega-cities of 10 million or

more in population. More attention needsto be paid to the growth in the number oflarge cities – those of a million or more inpopulation. Cities in this size-class num-bered around 200 in the latter part of the20th century. They will reach more than500 by 2015 (Table 3). These are all met-ropolitan cities in the sense that they areeither of great economic importance(Douala, Ca meroon) in their countries; orare centers of cultural heritage or reli-gious tradition; or because they arenational capitals (Rabat), or all of thesethings. Many cities have special regimes(Abuja), but not a metropolitan govern-ment. Virtually all cities in this group arecomprised of more than one municipality,and often involve many units of localgovernment. Only about a quarter ofmetro cities are in advanced economies.

Emerging Features of Metro Cities:Flatter, More Fragmented, In Competition

Three features about growing metropoli-tan areas add new challenges to decen-tralized governance and democratic choi ce- making. First, metro cities are spreadingout. Angel et al (2005) have recentlyreported that average densities are fallingin cities around the globe, and particularlyin the developing regions. Angel’s data are

Table 3 Cities by Population Size, 2015

Size range World total Less developed More developed

10 M > 21 17 4

5-10 M 37 31 6

1-5 M 496 378 118

0.5-1 M 507 400 107

Total >500.000 1.061 826 235

Source: National Research Council 2003.


drawn from side-by-side comparisons of1990 and 2000 satellite images of a repre-sentative sample of 120 cities. His team cal-culated that average density decrease is adirect function of spreading city perimeters.These observations are corroborated by thechapter on metropolitan governance and bydata from East Asia (e.g. Webster 2003,Laquian 2005).

Second, as settlements move beyondestablished administrative and jurisdictionalboundaries, they stretch the customary de -finitions of city limits and often lead to newmunicipalities, contributing to a fragmenta-tion of the metro area. The Africa reportprovides a comprehensive illustration of thelarge number of municipal jurisdictions inAfrica’s major cities. A well-known exampleof this spreading urban region is theBoston-Washington corridor, a megalopoli-tan region with a population of 50 million,which extends more than 600 km, farbeyond the prospective planning compe-tence of any of the more than 50 metropol-itan areas in the region.

The significance of spreading urban re -gions is not just the growing territorialexpansion, but also the increasing socialdistance implied in these developments.Though many low income populations stillsettle in and around the urban core ofmetro cities, increasingly, low income set-tlements take up residence on low-costland where property values are sup-pressed because of distance or due toclouded title, poor conditions of slope orflood. At the same time, wealthy settle-ments spring up in nearby places, formedas self-contained enclaves protected byse curity walls. Both the poor and emerg-ing middle classes require services ofhealth, education, water, and roads out-side the established perimeters of thecity. These settlement patterns translateinto frag mented political units and unco-ordinated actions. Metro cities increasethe importance of in ter-jurisdictionalcoordination in planning, infra structureinvestment, and services de livery.

A third feature of metropolitan centers isthat they have entered a more competitiveenvironment. Liberalization of trade leavescities much more exposed to outside com-petition because the elimination of protec-tionist trade regimes no longer shields cityindustries from competitors. Also, theincreasing velocity of international transac-tions – in trade, exchange of capital, andin vestment – means that metropolitancities must move quickly to retain indus-tries as well as to attract new ones.Beaverstock et al (1999) have developedin dicators which measure the growing ex -tent to which metropolitan centers are con-nected to global places of doing business.

Policy Challenges

The policy challenges for cities spanningmore than one jurisdiction or sprawlinginto outlying regions fall into three familiarareas:

1) substantive issues of growth, poverty,and environment;

2) institutional issues of powers, organiza-tion, and finance;

3) issues of democratic representation.

City regions have always been the centersof national GDP. For example, the cities ofRio and Sao Paulo in Brazil accounted foraround 40 percent of the nation’s US$800billion dollar economy in the early 2000s.This made the economies of those twocities approximately equal in size to theeconomic importance of all five Andeancountries, combined. And although cities indecentralized regimes all around the worldare handling much more public spending,few nations have found the solutions andtools to manage infrastructure and serv-ices in metro cities.

Handling spillovers, both positive and neg-ative, is a defining feature of metropolitanareas. Smaller cities or units of govern-ment cannot generate the economies ofscale that are typical of production in met-ropolitan cities. On the other side of the


coin, major cities generate negativespillovers in pollution and congestion. Thechallenge is made sharper by the need toincorporate large regional hinterlands.

Few organizational models seem to holdup under the pressures of changing eco-nomic and political circumstances. Virtu-ally all the European countries areengaged in the question of metropolitanorganization. Turkey has addressed theproblem directly with reforms that linkmunicipal, metropolitan and national tiersin planning and functions and the directelection of a metropolitan mayor. Russianand some former Soviet states have givencapital cities special legal or financial sta-tus, as is the case with many capitals,particularly special districts, for instance,Brasilia, Canberra, and Abuja (Nigeria).These enjoy special spending or planningstatus, often linked directly to centralgovernment budgets. Cities in Europe,Canada, the US, and Republic of Koreahave all undergone a variety of configura-tions with mixed success. Many of thecities – London, Montreal, and Toronto,for example – have reversed field, goingfrom regional councils or area-wide go -vernments to facilitate planning andinvestment of large scale infrastructure,back to small governance units, and backagain to larger areas in a quest to capturea wider tax base. In the US, the policybattle has been over whether there is aneconomic payoff to cities with regionalauthorities (Nelson and Foster 1999).

Recent Trends

The chapter on metropolitan governancepoints out that recent trends are towardcooperative pragmatism at the regionallevel. Governments are recognizing that nonormative solution will fit the rapidly chang-ing political and economic circumstances ofthe globalizing world, and that metropolitangovernance needs to start with solutions forbasic problems and have degrees of flexibil-ity as it moves to more complex arrange-ments, as they have in Republic of Korea

and Peru. Cooperative regionalism mightdescribe the problem-solving approach andgive-and-take arrangements for largeregions in Europe and the ad hoc intergov-ernmental agreements in the US, like Seat-tle’s King County. An example of flexiblearrangements is the growing use of “conve-

nios” (agreements) in Brazil, having grownfrom a handful in the 1990s to hundredstoday (Spink 2005), or the mancomu-

nidades (associated municipalities).

IV. Role of Associations

Virtually every region reports a floweringof regional and sometimes professionalassociations involving local governments.In Latin America, 28 associations arelisted, the oldest (in Ecuador) dating from1940, but 16 having been formed since1990. Further, many regions report a par-allel growth of associations of local govern-ment professionals, for instance, of ma -yors, of finance officials and engineers. Forthese groups, the most common denomi-nators functionally are:

1) representing interests of local govern-ments in national policy;

2) advocating for local governments; 3) building capacity to strengthen local

governments.

They also create a platform for exchangeof views and experience about policy andpractice. Very few countries do not haveassociations, but some, for instance inAfrica, have very limited resources.

At the apex of national and regional group-ings is the Union of Cities and Local Go -vernments (UCLG), formed from the WorldFederation of United Cities and the Inter-national Union of Local Authorities andMetropolis. UCLG came into being officiallyin 2004 and counts on various regionalaffiliates (known as sections), a network ofregional associations which is growing innumbers and strength. For instance, inAfrica, the United Cities and Local Govern-


ments of Africa, a Pan-African local gov-ernment or ga nization, arose from threelocal go vernment organizations previouslydivided along linguistic lines. The foundingcongress in 2005 marked a starting pointfor a unified African municipal movement.

National associations have had mixed suc-cess in mobilizing political movement tosolve the many problems faced by localgovernment. A combination of approacheshas been tried and needs deepening; theyinclude focused educational activities on se -lected topics for local and national go -vernments to assist national associations todo their job, documentation of good prac-tice approaches and techniques, and a sys -tem of learning and information ex changebetween and among local governmentsacross nations and regions.

V. Global Challenges

New evidence is coming to light aboutthe impact of decentralization on the Mil-lennium Development Goals (MDGs) andrelated issues. Besides poverty, gender,health, technology and culture, the MDGshave brought out the importance of envi-ronmentally sustainable development. Butclimate change, particularly the productionof greenhouse gasses, moves this issue toa much higher and more urgent plane.Similarly, some infectious and communica-ble diseases threaten to become globalproblems.

Local governments have a front line po -sition in the battle against poverty,through social inclusion, access to basicservices, and participation. But environ-mental issues are increasingly at the topof the agenda: fighting greenhousegasses, for instance, land use and trans-portation, building standards, densitycontrols, solid waste recycling, and manyother aspects of urban growth that fre-quently fall under local government juris-diction. Hundreds of cities have takenaction to improve environmental sustain-

ability of urban growth following LocalAgenda 21 and the Aalborg Charter of1994, that addresses climate changeagendas and action plans. Scores of Euro-pean cities have developed detailed plansto achieve a smaller “carbon footprint,”that is, more sustainable settlements. Inthe US, mayors are joining a coalition toachieve or surpass Kyoto protocol tar-gets. More than 500 US mayors havesigned a climate protection agreement.

Recent evidence reported by Angel et al(2005) shows a trend towards decreaseddensity in cities, signalling an alarmingmove in a direction away from sustain-able urban living. Brazil and China havebegun to focus on urban remedies to theproblems of rapid conversion of land intothe urban fabric. Brazil has recentlyenacted legislation requiring local govern-ments to meet a higher standard in land-use planning and has created land-swap-ping tools to do so.

As for the MDGs, local governments havean important role to play in managinggrowth for health and safety. Effectiveaction in these spheres would strengthenthe rationale for governments to mobilizelower tiers to address these issues. WHOhas recently signaled the importance ofthe social determinants of health, pointingparticularly to issues of safety, violence,and prevention of at risk buildings in urbansettings. WHO’s contribution adds to thealready large body of work on local levelaction to address communicable diseaseslike HIV/AIDs, malaria and tuberculosis(Kjellstrom, et al 2007). In health and cli-mate change, local governments have acritical role to play.

On other MDG issues, gender, culture, andtechnology, local governments are againon the front line. More than a few countries– Africa, Middle East, Asia-Pacific arenotable examples among many – speak ofquotas to involve woman in local govern-ment. Special status is accorded to womenin Africa; 30 to 40 % of council seats are


held by women in Eurasia, and India hasset aside 30 % of local governmentelected positions for women and sched-uled castes. Cultural issues, in heritage,buildings, and inter-cultural dialog, areareas where cities have shown promiseand have great potential, for example incity to city exchanges, in cultural under-standing, and in informal alliances aroundissues of sport and festivals. New informa-tion technology holds great promise forlocal governments in a variety of fields –management, information for citizens, andeducation to name a few. In all of theseareas, the agenda is wide and promising.

VI. Next Steps

In this final conclusion we have attemptedto summarize the main points and findingsof the World Report, while also introducingnew elements and insights that mayenhance reflection. Quite possibly, thestudy does not always provide precise,conclusive answers to the issues and ques-tions raised in the introduction of theReport regarding the principles of localself-government and subsidiarity.

The discussion remains open. Onlythrough the sustained practice of runninglocal governments and continued interac-tion with their citizens and other levels ofgovernment will concrete solutions befound.

Therefore, the Report essentially con-cludes with a call for initiatives thatdevelop and deepen local democracy. Ineffect, the objective should be to applythese core principles of local self-govern-ment, subsidiarity and participation to thepraxis, particularly by:

• Underpinning policies favorable todecentralization. The Guidelines on De -

cen tralization approved by UN Habi-tat are important instruments forad vancing in this direction. It is neces-sary for UCLG and local government

associations to disseminate this Report

and to encourage the implementation ofthe Guidelines both at national levelsand among international and regionalorganizations, e.g. African Unionthrough the African Conference onDecentralization and Local Develop-ment (CADDEL), the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) and its Inter-American High Level Network on De -cen tralization (RIAD).

• Strengthening policy-making capacitiesof local government. In effect, UCLG,through the Global Observatory onLocal Democracy and Decentralization(GOLD), should develop indicators, rec-ognized by national and internationalinstitutions, to monitor processes ofdecentralization and the implementa-tion of the Guidelines; and contribute tolocal capacity for policy dialog vis-à-visnational governments and internationalorganizations. These indicators shouldbe used to shape and inform localdevelopment policies and nationalstrategies for poverty reduction.

• Enhancing local finance systems. Localaccess to adequate funding is key todevelopment. In view of the fiscalweaknesses observed at local level,UCLG should continue to promote pro-posals and initiatives to strengthenlocal finances and to draw up plans, inconsultation with governments and re -gio nal and international financial institu-tions, for new national systems in or derto keep pace with urban explosion, grow-ing demands for basic services andmounting environmental challenges.

This list of initiatives could, without adoubt, be extended further to includeequally as important initiatives such aslocal government capacity building,upgrading service provision and urban pol-icy for sustainable development.

Local governments have an integral role toplay in the international development


agenda not only to articulate their ownneeds and have them met, but also to playa role in reaching the MDGs and fightingclimate change. The sustained efforts oflo cal governments to integrate their needsin the international development agendafor the fulfillment of the MDGs and fight

against climate change will continue toguide these actions.

Quite plainly, change and transformationcannot be brought about without the directinvolvement and determination of local go -vernments around the world.

POSTFACE308 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

POSTFACEDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 309

The World Report offers, for the first time,the possibility of clarifying the meaning ofwords used to address the term “local”. Viathe different situations and developmentsanalyzed, the words often seem closelyrelated but not accurately synonymous. Inaddition, the choice of linguistic equiva-lents when translating may involvenuances of meaning or presuppose differ-ences which, in fact, are merely differ-ences in terminology. The interest of theWorld Report is that it puts key notionsinto context by comparing political andlegal discourse from many countries on allcontinents. The definitions arrived at couldthen acquire legitimacy from the fact thatthey are not self-centered. The conver-gences we have found are not alien to thesocio-political reality of each of the coun-tries concerned, even though mimeticeffects may still exist, and at times arisefrom prescriptions imposed by interna-tional organizations. These convergencescan be considered as positive effects ofglobalization.

However, convergence at the level ofideas does not necessarily imply that thesame occurs at institutional or practicallevels. On the contrary, factors of differ-entiation remain, resulting from verydiverse socio-political and economic real-ities, which should not be overlooked.The very notion of “local” varies consid-erably from one country and one conti-nent to another and with it varies thedefinition of the territories constitutingthe framework of local self-government,and the concept of local-state relations.The sociology of local institutions is

dependent on the importance of thesocial structures. The role of local de -mocracy in decentralization depends onthe state’s political system. The scope ofdecentralization depends on the politicalweight and human and financialresources available to local authorities.

Decentralization does not exist out-

side the state but it ceases to exist

even within where local authorities

are no more than the executors of

policies determined by higher

authorities. These are the extremepositions that limit the space of local self-government; this is the space withinwhich the equilibrium of decentralizationmust be created in each country depend-ing on the conditions2.

The World Report refers explicitly to twonotions: decentralization and local democ-racy. These two terms should be clarifiedtogether with their status in the political andlegal systems of states. A distinction shouldalso be made between them and similar orcorrelated notions. This clarification must becontextual and comparative, i.e. based asmuch as possible on the accepted conceptsused by states in the various regions of theworld, depending on their history and insti-tutions. But at the same time, these notionsare part of global debates fostered by inter-national organizations and a number ofstates, contributing to the convergence ofideas under discussion by providing terms ofcommon reference.

Firstly, a distinction can be made betweenthree separate semantic fields: decentral-ization, self-governance and democracy.

Gérard Marcou1

POSTFACEEssay on the clarification of some key concepts

and methodical problems

1. The text below is a

part of the synthesis

chapter submitted

by the author to

UCLG under the

title:

“Decentralization

and local democracy

at the age of

globalization”.

2. In what follows, the

information quoted

comes from

chapters in the

World Report,

unless other sources

are indicated by

notes.

POSTFACEDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World310

The first of these three terms refers torelations between the various levels ofpower, the second to the status of theauthorities and the third to the way inwhich power is exercised. We will notaddress the expressions of these semanticfields relating to federalism or to regionalautonomies. The comparison betweenthese three fields shows a convergence atthe level of political ideas and legalnotions; even though some major stateshave re mained outside this tendency.

I. Decentralization

The notion of decentralization is under -stood today in very different ways depend-ing on the author and institution, whichleads to misunderstanding and confu-sion. Sometimes, overly broad defini-tions of decentralization become con -fused with governance, a notion which initself is already not very precise. This isthe case in a report published by theUNDP on decentralized governance à

propos the services which ought to beprovided to poor populations: “Concep-tually, decentralization relates to theroles of, and the relations between, cen-tral and sub-national institutions,whether they are public, private or civic.Improved governance will require notonly strengthened central and local gov-ernments but also the involvement ofother actors from civil society organiza-tions and the private sector in partner-ships with government at all levels”3.According to this definition, the relationsbetween the state or local governmentand private companies or NGOs are partof the problem concerning decentraliza-tion.

The report then distinguishes four types ofdecentralization: administrative decentral-ization, in which local authorities areaccountable to higher authorities; politicaldecentralization, in which local authoritiesare theoretically independent of the state,invested with powers and elected; budget-ary decentralization, which refers to thetransfer of the resources necessary for theexercise of the transferred powers andresponsibilities; and lastly, divestment ormarket decentralization, which entails atransfer of functions to the private sector(companies, NGOs...), including planningand administration, previously held bypublic institutions.

However, the argument slips from decen-tralization to governance. We recognizethat improved governance might indeedcall for the involvement of private actors,but this applies to all levels of governmentand not just to relations between localpowers and higher authorities. This idea isalso represented in a recent book withcontributions from various United Nationsexperts. Globalization would necessitatean enlarged vision of decentralizationwithin the framework of the new conceptof governance. According to these authors,decentralization cannot be devised anylonger as the devolution of powers withingovernment, and rather embracesresource and power sharing in policy mak-ing in society as a whole. The enlargedconcept of “governance decentralization”suggests a new decentralization category,in addition to the traditional ones: “eco-nomic decentralization”, including “marketliberalization, deregulation, privatization ofpublic enterprises and public-private part-nerships”4.

3. Work, R. (2002), The Role of participation and partnership in decentralized governance: a brief synthesis of policy lessons and

recommendations of nine countries on service delivery for the poor, UNDP, New York, p.3.

4. G. Shabbir Cheema / Dennis A. Rondinelli (2007), “From government decentralization to decentralized governance”, p.6 in: G. Shabbir

Cheema / Dennis A. Rondinelli (eds), Decentralizing governance, Brookings Institution Press / Ash Institute for Democratic Governance

and Innovation.


This approach is not really all that new. Itcomes from a critique of the “Welfarestate”, developed in particular in the1980s. Such lines of thinking advocatedmarket competition as an alternative forthe provision of services that the publicpowers could no longer provide, as well asdecentralization so that fiscal competitionwould exercise pressure to reduce publicexpenditure and so better satisfy the col-lective preferences of the electoratethrough competition between local author-ities5. Hence, a distinction could be madebetween “economic”, “administrative” and“political” de cen tralization. “Economic decen-tralization” refers to economic decisions(decentralized when they result diffuselyfrom the play of market forces, centralizedif they are decisions made by the govern-ment); “administrative decentralization”refers instead to the degree of dispersionor concentration of public decisions; and,finally, “political decentralization” whichrefers to the authorities with the capacityto make political choices6.

In this framework, it has been possible topropose a classification of all systems ofdecentralization based on two dimensions:the method of allocating resources (puremarket and state controlled economies repre-sent the two extremes) and the levels ofpolitical and administrative organization towhich the resources are allocated (central,local or intermediate). Obviously, all realsystems are mixed systems but they aresituated somewhere between four extremetheoretical models as follows: the central-ized public model, the centralized marketmodel, the decentralized public model andthe decentralized market model7. Thesemodels make it possible to assess thecharacteristics of real systems and to com-pare their relative positions.

Despite its heuristic value, this global the-ory of decentralization may be criticized forleading to a degree of confusion. Firstly, therelations between the public powers and therelations between the public powers and theeconomy are not the same; unlike the pu -

blic powers, the decisions of economicagents are not subject to democratic proce-dures. In addition, the fact of turning to themarket to produce or supply a good or aservice does not mean that the publicauthority, local or otherwise, is no longercompetent. If the responsibility of the pub-lic authority is to ensure that a good or aservice is offered to the population and it isallowed by law to chose the method or formof provision, it can then assess whether itis preferable to set up a public organization,to conclude public procurement contracts orto proceed to delegate the public service tothe private. However, the public authorityre mains responsible in the eyes of the lawand the citizens for the provision of theservice under the conditions it has defined.The case would be different, of course, ifprivatization is decided on by the state andthe consequences affect the local authori-ties, or if the law obliged them to resort tothe private sector, even when the localauthority continues to exercise powers ofcontrol and organization. It is then paradox-ical to use the expression “decentralization”to characterize measures which result in areduction of the role and responsibilities ofthe local authorities.

This is why it is preferable to reserve

the notion of decentralization for the

relations between the public powers,

some of which are placed under the

control of others, and not for the rela-

tions between the public powers and

the economy or society in general. Thisis not to ignore, for all that, the impor-tance of relations with the economy, andthey may be addressed in an analysis ofgovernance, but they do not come underwhat is normally called decentralization.

Even within these boundaries, the notionof decentralization is still likely to beunderstood in two different ways: a broadmeaning, which relates to the public econ-omy or to the sociology of organizations,or a narrow meaning, of a legal and politi-cal nature. The former has become thegeneral or commonplace meaning; the lat-

5. See amongst basic

texts on the subject:

Tiebout, C.M.

(1956), “A pure

theory of local

expenditure”, Journal

of Political Economy,

vol.64, p.416;

Buchanan, J.M. /

Tullock, G. (1962),

The calculus of

consent: Logical

foundations of

constitutional liberty,

University of

Michigan Press, Ann

Harbor.

6. Wolman, H. (1990),

“Decentralization:

What it is and why

we should care”,

p.29-42 in: Bennett,

R.J. (ed),

Decentralization,

local governments

and markets.

Towards a post-

welfare agenda,

Oxford, Clarendon.

7. Bennett, R.J. (1990),

“Decentralization,

intergovernmental

relations and

markets: towards a

post-welfare

agenda?”, pp.1-26

in: Bennett, R.J.

(ed), op. cit.;

Bennett, R.J. (1994),

“An overview of

developments in

decentralization”,

pp.11-37 in:

Bennett, R.J. (ed.),

Local government

and market

decentralization.

Experiences in

industrialized,

developing and

former Eastern Bloc

countries, United

Nations University

Press.


ter, more exact, is the only one, as we willsee, which has a normative scope. Decen-tralization should also be distinguishedfrom related notions: devolution, originallyan English concept, and deconcentration,which is of French origin and the notion ofdelegation.

In its broadest sense, decentralizationexpresses a quality of the relations betweenlevels of authority one of which is under thecontrol of the other. We say that these rela-tions are more or less decentralized,depending on whether the inferior powerbenefits more or less from freedom ofaction in the exercise of its attributionsunder the control of the superior power. Thenotion of decentralization can thus applyboth to the relations between the federalpower and the member states (for exampleAustrian or Australian types of federalismare said to be more centralized than thosein the USA or Canada) and to the relationsbetween the state and local authorities in aunitary state, or between the federatedentities and the local authorities which theycomprise, or even to the internal relationsin a company or a group of companies con-sidered as an organization.

In the narrow sense, decentralizationmeans that local authorities are estab-lished by the law, have a legal personalityand are administered by bodies throughwhich they exercise, with a degree of lib-erty, the powers and responsibilities theyobtain from the law under the control ofthe state. This notion was first asserted inFrance. According to an English variantfound in many countries influenced byBritish tradition, the law confers thelegal personality and powers not on thecommunities but on the bodies; since the90s, it is this concept which has been fol-lowed, with certain differences, by Russianlegislation and that of other former SovietUnion countries. Decentralization under -stood in this way, depending on the variant,has resulted in quite different regimesfrom the point of view of local institutionsand the self-governance left to local

authorities. But it still signifies, and this isthe basis of its unity, an institutional andpolitical differentiation between the stateand the local authorities, and the legiti-macy of representation at local level ofpublic interests distinct from those forwhich the state is responsible.

From decentralization in its narrowestsense, we must compare and distinguishthe English notion of devolution, which onehesitates to translate as “dévolution” inFrench. It is a relatively imprecise notionwhich appeared at the end of the 19th cen-tury as an attempt to respond to the Irishindependence movement through an inter-nal regime of ex tensive self-government(Home Rule). Devolution corresponds tothe transfer of wide-ranging powers to apolitical assembly for the management ofinternal affairs. The word was used to des-ignate the projects in the 70s and thereforms of 1998, which transferred impor-tant powers and means to regional bodies.But it is also used, today, in a broadersense, particularly outside the UK, to des-ignate transfers of power to local orregional communities.

The meaning of the word devolution thusseems akin to a distinction commonly ma -de today between political decentralizationand administrative decentralization. Butthe criterion of the distinction is far fromclear. In the typology of decentralizationproposed in the UNDP report re ferred toabove, administrative de cen tralization ischaracterized by the fact that the localauthorities are accountable to the higherauthority. This corresponds to what onecould call de-concentration or delegation(depending on the cases - cf. infra). This

control relation (accountability) with

the higher authority does not exist in

political decentralization nor in devo-

lution, which implies a total transfer

of powers and responsibilities, deci-

sion-making power and re sources,

including the power to procure

resources8. However, devolution does notnecessarily imply that the local authority8. Op. cit. p.4.


results from election, just as decentraliza-tion also does not necessarily entail theelection of local authorities.

However, the distinction between politicaland administrative decentralization ismore currently based on other criteria. Afew examples follow. Political decentraliza-tion corresponds to the exercise of politicalpower, as in the case of federated govern-ments in the framework of a federal state;whereas administrative decentralizationonly consists of the institutionalization ofthe legal entities responsible for managinglocal interests9. It is therefore the exerciseof legislative power by sub-national terri-torial units which is considered as theexpression of political decentralization, incontrast with the classical case of the uni-tary state in which the unity of legislationis the expression of the unity of power10.Or again, political decentralization presup-poses the dispersion of political decision-making power, i.e., a degree of freedom ofaction as to the determination of policies,the capacity to mobilize resources and thefreedom to use them11. But some defini-tions of administrative decentralization donot differ greatly from this latter concept:according to Maurice Hauriou, it is the needfor political freedom rather than adminis-trative needs, which justifies decentraliza-tion12; according to Charles Eisenmann,administrative decentralization “consists ofgiving to locally competent authoritiespowers of action, therefore firstly of deci-sion-making, independent of the centralauthorities”13.

But today, over and above these theoreti-cal approaches, another criterion must beadded, that of the election of local author-ities. Although, from a theoretical point ofview, the notions of decentralization anddevolution do not necessarily imply theelection of local authorities, the fact is thattoday territorial decentralization is insepa-rable from the democratic legitimacy oflocal authorities, and in all countries theinstitution of locally elected councils is therule. Even in the Arab Gulf states, local

elections have been held over the last fewyears with the exception of the UnitedArab Emirates. If the classical idea of

decentralization accepts the auton-

omy of local authorities in the frame-

work of the law, the modern view of

decentralization is today inseparable

from the democratic norm, and no onedisputes this even if its transposition andimplementation are often criticised.

As soon as universal suffrage applies forthe designation of local authorities, itbecomes inevitable that decentralizationwill take on a political dimension, eventhough, in certain countries, political par-ties are not allowed to participate in localelections, and even though the officialvocabulary continues to speak of “adminis-trative” decentralization, or “administra-tive” elections à propos local elections. Thisis so, given that elections imply a form ofresponsibility of those elected vis-à-vistheir electorate even if the higher authorityexercises a form of supervision. This is themeaning (the direction) of accountability

which makes the difference, as shown inthe UNDP report: no longer towards thestate but towards the electorate.

In this case, devolution is not distinguishedfrom decentralization through its politicaldimension but by its possible scope. Inpoint of fact, the idea of devolution has noli mit on the transfers which may carriedout, other than the point at which thetransfers would mean independence; onthe contrary, the idea of decentralization isinseparable from the idea of the unity ofpower. Decentralized entities administerthemselves without ceasing to be an inte-grated part of the state and without thestate conceding to them part of its consti-tutional functions. Extended to the transferof legislative powers, political decentraliza-tion corresponds in fact to a differentnotion of decentralization in its strictestsense. This results in the fact that, apartfrom this hypothesis, devolution anddecentralization may be considered as syn-onymous particularly for local authorities at

9. Bourjol, M. (1975),

La réforme

municipale, Paris,

Berger-Levrault,

pp.56-58.

10. Aja, E. (1999), El

Estado autonómico.

Federalismo y

hechos

diferenciales,

Madrid, Alianza

Editorial, pp.23 et

suiv.

11. Wolman, H., op. cit.

pp.29-30.

12. Hauriou, M. (1919),

Précis de droit

administratif, Paris,

Sirey, preface.

13. Eisenmann, Ch.

(1982), Cours de

droit administratif,

Paris, LGDJ, tome 1

p.278 (cours de

1966-1967).


municipal level for which there is never atransfer of legislative powers.

On the other hand, a clear distinction mustbe made between deconcentration anddecentralization and the former must not beassimilated to a restrictive application of theidea of decentralization as is proposed withina broad concept of decentralization. Decon-centration is originally a French notion whichapplies to the relations between the centraladministration and their local-level officesthat depend on the delegation of powers tothe latter. Deconcentration is the oppo-

site of decentralization in that it governs

the relations within an administrative

hierarchy, whereas decentralization ex -

cludes any hierarchical relations

between the state and local authorities.De concentration comprises two elements:

i) the existence of territorially competentservices within the state administration;

ii) delegation of powers to these services.

But the term delegation may also be usedto designate an intermediate situation:state powers and responsibilities are dele-gated to a decentralized authority (i.e.,resulting from an election and not fromnomination by a higher authority) and areexercised on behalf of the state and forwhich the decentralized authority isaccountable to the state. This situation ismost often designated by the expression:“delegated powers and responsibilities”.Depending on the case, it may be thatelective legitimacy weakens the control ofthe higher authority or, on the contrary,that the weight of the delegated powersand responsibilities weakens decentraliza-tion because of the control exercised bythe higher authority.

These distinctions lead to a preference fora strict definition of decentralization whichmarks the difference from related notions.Decentralization is thus characterized

by the existence of locally elected

authorities, distinct from the state’s

administrative authorities, and exer-

cising, in the framework of the law,

their own powers and responsibilities

for which they have a degree of self-

government, under the control of the

state. As understood in this way,

decentralization in its modern mean-

ing is inseparable from the idea of

local self-government and the demo-

cratic principle. But the volume ofresponsibilities exercised is not sufficientto assess the level of decentralization in agiven country; that depends also on theregime under which the responsibilities areto be found and the control effectivelyexercised by the state.

In its broadest sense, decentralizationexists in almost all countries although ithas very different characteristics. Butstrictly defined, decentralization is lackingin very many countries. Hence, when arti-cle 96 of the constitution of the Chinastates that “local congresses of the peopleat different levels are the organs of thestate’s power”, this is a form of decentral-ization in its broadest, and not strictest,sense. This was the concept in the SovietUnion, abandoned today under article 12of the constitution of the Russian Federa-tion. But some states, formerly part of theSoviet Union, still adhere more or lessexplicitly to this concept (in general thestates of Central Asia and Belarus). InCuba, although assemblies of people’spower are characterized in the constitutionas the “higher local bodies of state power”,it is however recognized that they fulfilspecific functions other than the assistancethey provide in realizing the ultimate goalsof the state (art.102 and 103). Other polit-ical concepts may also lead to principlesexcluding decentralization of the localadministration. This is the case in SaudiArabia, in Oman and in Qatar; in otherArab countries and in Islamic Republic ofIran some moves have been made towardsdecentralization in recent laws and consti-tutions. Yet the Iranian constitution, whichsets up locally elected councils, subjectsthem to the principles of the Islamic


regime and envisages their “subordina-tion” to central government authority(article 100)14. Despite this, there is atendency towards the diffusion of themodel of decentralization and the recog-nition of a sphere of responsibility specificto local authorities, at least regarding theprinciples, even in countries which seemfar removed from these principles.

II. Self-Government (Autonomy)

Autonomy literally means the power to setfor oneself the rules by which one is gov-erned. However, this notion may also beunderstood in at least two different ways.In the sense of political autonomy, it is ademand for sovereignty which stops atthe limit of independence, from which itis distinct. Understood as administrativeself-government, it expresses the possi-bility for the local authority to govern itsown affairs and those which the lawentrusts to it. It is in this second sensethat it is generally understood as localself-government. The regional autonomystatutes in different European countries(e.g. in Spain or in the UK) and on othercontinents (for example the autonomy ofKarakalpakstan in Uzbekistan, or that ofAceh in Indonesia) come under the firstmeaning. The French constitution todayaccepts both meanings but applies themto entities of a different nature: the firstto “overseas countries” (New Caledonia,French Polynesia) (art.74), and the sec-ond to territorial communities (art.72).The European Charter for Local Self-gov-ernment as well as the “Guidelines”recently adopted by the Governing Coun-cil of UN Habitat both refer to the secondmeaning. This self-government also hasa political dimension but it results fromelections not from the statute of the localauthorities.

Local self-government, as under-

stood above, is more and more

widely recognized on the different

continents. The exceptions are stateswhich do not refer to decentralization in

the legal meaning of the word and also afew countries which attribute a politicalstatus to municipal self-government.

Local self-government is expressed insometimes differently coined legalnotions but which are, in general, similarin content. In certain European coun-tries, reference is formally made to thenotion of “autonomy” in the constitutions(Italy: art.5; Spain: art.140; Portugal:art.6; Romania: art.120; Greece:art.102.2; “administrative autonomy”).In all the other European countries, theterm used corresponds literally to theGerman expression Selbstverwaltung

(Fundamental Law: art.28.2), defined as“the right to govern, under one’s ownresponsibility, all the affairs of the localauthority”, which corresponds to thenotion of “libre administration” in theFrench constitution (art.72), and theEnglish notion of self-government15. Thislatter expression could however be dis-tinguished insofar as its material contentderives only from the provisions of thelaw, but this limitation is receding both inthe United Kingdom and in the USA andAustralia (constitution of certain feder-ated states in the latter two countries),and by the link with a degree of freedomof organization at local level (ho me rule).

This notion of “self-government” (“libre

administration” in French) is to be foundin the 1993 Russian constitution (mest-

noe samoupravlenie, art.130 to 133),including the freedom of organization inlaw 131/2003), the Ukrainian constitu-tion of 1996 (mitzeve sa mo vriaduvania,art.140) or the Polish constitution of1997 (samorzad terytorialny: art.163 etseq.). In Latin America, the word “auton-omy” is usually preferred, both in unitarystates (Colombia: art.287) and in federalstates (Argentina: art.123, ensuringmunicipal autonomy is a duty of theprovincial constitutions; see for examplethat of La Rioja: art.154). In Asia, coun-tries which were under British colonialrule have retained the British concept of

14. Jalali, M. (2005),

“Iran: une

décentralisation en

trompe l’œil? Les

fondements

essentiels de la

décentralisation en

Iran”, Revue

iranienne de Droit

constitutionnel,

summer 2005, n°4,

pp.74-86.

15. In this sense:

Breuillard, M.

(2000),

L’administration

locale en Grande-

Bretagne, entre

centralisation et

régionalisation,

L’Harmattan, coll. «

GRALE » Paris.


local government and of local self-gov-

ernment, including the restoration of tra-ditional methods of local organization(not only Australia and New Zealand, butalso India, Pakistan, Malaysia) but othercountries refer rather to the wording“local autonomy” (Japan, Indonesia,Republic of Korea, Philippines).

One can see however that these differ-ences in terminology and sometimes con-ceptualization have no impact on the realcontent of “autonomy” or “self-govern-ment”. There is nothing that allows us toassert that the reference to “local auton-omy” corresponds to a degree of decen-tralization greater than the reference tothe principle of “self-government”, if onecompares institutions, powers andresponsibilities. Municipalities in Germanyor France do not benefit from less exten-sive decentralization than municipalitiesin Italy or Portugal; decentralization is nomore advanced in the Republic of Koreathan in India. But decentralization isessential as a reference standard for localgovernment. This standard is beingdeveloped by the European Charter for

Local Self-government and the UN Habi-tat Guidelines for Decentralization.

This general tendency has however a fewnuances. In African countries, the con-cepts which the constitutions andnational laws reflect follow those of theformer colonial power. However, this con-ception has been dominated since inde-pendence by the wish to ensure the unityof the state, which has upheld a central-ized sys tem and an essentially instru-mental vi sion of decentralization. How-ever, for a number of years, the reformsundertaken in a certain number of statesbring them closer to the general trend bygiving to decentralization a more sub-stantial content of local self-government(for example: South Africa, Uganda,Zambia, Bur kina Faso, Niger, Senegal).

Lastly, a few countries stand out, con-versely, by the affirmation of a concept of

mu nicipality which makes it a componentof the state or the framework of an ex -pression of sovereignty. Sweden is theonly European country whose constitu-tion declares that “self-management oflo cal communities” contributes to therealization of “national sovereignty”(1:1). The constitution of the Ukraine al -so states that the people’s sovereignty isexercised by the organs of power of thestate and by the bodies of local self-gov-ernment (art.5), but this formula re callsthe former adherence of local bodies tothe state power. In Brazil, the 1988 con-stitution, in principle, confers on themunicipalities (municipio) political self-government: the municipios, as with fed-erated states, are part of the compo-nents whose “indissoluble unity” formsthe Federal Republic of Brazil (art.1), andthe federal constitution defines the basesof their organization and their powersand responsibilities (art.29 to 31). Thepractical scope of this concept seems,however, limited16. In Indonesia, the in -troduction of the reference to “auton-omy” in the laws of 1999 and later laws,corresponds on the other hand to achange of concept, with the transfer ofwide-ranging powers, responsibilities andresources and the di rect election of thelocal executive.

Local self-government is a con-

stituent element of decentralization.

The terms “local autonomy”, “libre

administration” and “self-govern-

ment” do indeed correspond to one

and the same notion. It presupposes

freedom of action and organization

for the local authority in the context

of the laws; this freedom may be

more or less extensive but this does

not affect the notion itself.

III. Democracy

The classical notion of decentralizationdoes not necessarily imply democracy;an organization may be decentralized

16. Franck Moderne

(2006), “Le

municipio comme

entité politique dans

l’organisation

territoriale fédérale

du Brésil”, pp.347-

363 in: Mélanges en

l’honneur de Jean-

Claude Douence. La

profondeur du droit

local, Paris, Dalloz.


with out being based on democratic prin-ciples17. Conversely, an organization ba -sed on democratic principles may be cen -tralized.

Now, the link between decentralizationand democracy has become narrowerand more direct, as in the past in Europe,the link between parliamentary govern-ment, arising out of the census system,and democracy. Decentralization,

understood in its strictest sense as a

me thod of organization, today im -

plies democracy. It presupposes the

self-government of local authorities

in the framework of the law, but it is

democracy which is the basis for

local self-government. Democracyeffec tively allows citizens to express col-lective preferences which direct the exer-cise of power held by local authorities bylaw. This has not always been the case:property ownership as a requirement forvoting or the recognized authority of thetraditional elite have in the past consti-tuted the basis, or the driving force, fordecentralization.

This has not completely disappeared. Onthe contrary, in certain countries, theinstitutions give community leaders orreligious chiefs a controlling role in civilsociety and the law sometimes givesthem a place in the representative bodiesexercising public powers (for example:

Ghana, Uganda, Niger, South Africa...).In certain Middle Eastern countries, theauthority of members of the local aristoc-racy is influential even though there areelections (UAE, Saudi Arabia andBahrain).

Despite these surviving customs, the ge -ne ral trend is towards the election oflocal go vernment bodies and to thedevelopment of instituted forms of popu-lar participation. Even if the election isnot dis puted, it is considered to beessential for the authority and the legiti-macy of the local authorities and one cansee that le gislation tends to introduce adegree of possibility of choice or influ-ence for electors (Vietnam, 2004 localelections; China at village or districtcommittee level).

In conclusion, it is obvious that a systemof reference for decentralization is beingconsolidated which includes recognizinglocal self-government and calls for repre-sentative elected institutions and partici-patory institutions by which the peoplemay ex press their collective preferencesand interests. We should underline thatthis system of reference is not foundeverywhere, but it is challenged by anyother reference system and continues tospread. Without question, its strengthlies in its ability to take form in a widevariety of institutional models.

17. A renowned French

legal expert, Charles

Eisenmann, wrote:

“decentralization is

a system without a

given political

colour; it can be

equally

undemocratic and

democratic”; all that

is required is that

the designation of

local authority be

“independent of

central authority”

(op. cit. p.277).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY320 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World

BIBLIOGRAPHYDecentralization and Local Democracy in the World 321

Africa

Banque Mondiale, 2003, Résultats de re -

cherches menées par la Banque Mondiale sur

l’expérience de décentralisation de 30 pays

africains, http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings.

Belaid, N., 1999, Autonomie locale et mu -

ta tions récentes dans les finances munici-

pales, ENA-CREA, Tunis.

Ben Salah, H. and Marcou G., (sous dir.),1998, Décentralisation et démocratie en

Tunisie, IORT, L'Harmattan, coll. Logiquesjuridiques. Paris, Tunis.

Bureau d’Appui à la Coopération Canadi-enne pour le Développement International(Bacdi), Avril 2005, Etat des lieux de la

décentralisation au Sénégal.

Club du Sahel / Partenariat pour leDéveloppement Municipal (PDM), 2000,Rapport sur le financement du

développement locale en Afrique de

l’Ouest, par Gagnon Gérard.

Crook, R. and Manor J., 2001, Local Go -

vernment and Decentralization in Zambia,Final Report to SNV, MoLGH and the DonorReference Group, Lusaka.

Cordelier, S and Didiot B., 2005, Etat du

monde 2006 : annuaire économique

géopolitique mondiale ( 25 éme éd. Paris ,la Dé couverte).

Momaniat, I., 2001, Fiscal Decentralization

in South Africa, http:// www. worldbank.org/ -decentralization/afrlip/Momoniat.

Kessey, K.D., (April 2006), Traditional

Leadership Factor in Modern Local Govern-

ment System in Ghana: Policy Implemen-

tation, Role Conflict and Marginalization.

Journal of Science and Technology, KwameNkrumah University of Science and Tech-nology Kumasi, Ghana. Volume 26.

Mémorandum Union des Associations des

Elus locaux, 2006, Union des Associationsdes Elus Locaux du Sénégal.

Nach Mback, Ch., 2003, Démocratisation

et décentralisation « Genèse et

dynamiques comparés des processus de

dé cen trali sation en Afrique subsahari-

enne », Kar thala-PDM, Paris.

Ouazzani Chahdi, H., 2003, Droit adminis-

tratif, imprimerie Najah el Jadida,Casablanca.

Partenariat pour le Développement Munic-ipal (PDM), 2003, Etat de la décentralisa-

tion, Karthala.

Partenariat pour le Développement Munic-ipal (PDM), “Observatoire des Financeslocales”, Données sur les finances locales

2000 à 2004.

Rapport du Comité Paritaire Etat/ Com-munes, 2005, Suivi du transfert des com -

pétences aux Communes du Bénin, dé -cembre.

Roubaud, F., 2000, Identité et transi tion dé -

mocratique : l’exception malagasy ? L’Har -mattan, Paris.

Smoke, P., 2003, Decentralization in Africa:

goods, dimensions, myths and challenge.

Public administration and de velopment, Vol-ume 23, p. 7-16.

Steytler, N., 2005, Local Government in

South Africa: Entrenching Decentralized

Go vernment.

Yatta, F. P., 2006, Villes et développement

économique en Afrique, Economica, Paris.

BIBLIOGRAPHY322

Asia-Pacific

ADB, 2004, Devolution in Pakistan. Manila:Asian Development Bank, World Bank andDepartment for International Development.

ADB, 2006, Urbanization and Sustainabil-

ity: Case Studies of Good Practice. Manila:Asian Development Bank.

ADB, 2006, Indonesia 2006 – 2009: Coun-

try Strategy and Program. Manila: AsianDevelopment Bank.

Alatas, V., Pritchett, L., and Wetterberg, A.,2002, Voice lessons: local government

organizations, social organizations and the

quality of local governance. WashingtonDC: World Bank Policy Research WorkingPaper 2981, 49 pages.

Asquith, A., 2007, New Zealand CountryFact Sheet on the State of Decentralization

and Local Democracy in the Asia Pacific

Region.

Bambang, P. , Brodjonegero, S. and Swa-sono F., 2007, Indonesia Country Fact

Sheet on the State of Decentralization and

Local Democracy in the Asia Pacific Region.

Blair, H., 2000, Participation and accounta-

bility at the periphery: Democratic local

governance in six countries, World Devel-opment 28(1): 21-39.

Boston, J., 1996, The use of contracting in

the public sector: Recent New Zealand

experience, Australian Journal of PublicAdministration 53 (Sept.): 105-110.

Brillantes, A., 2001, Public Sector Reform

and Poverty Reduction in Developing Asia.Manila: Economics and Development Re -search Center, Asian Development Bank.

Brillantes, A., 2006, Decentralization

Imperatives: Lessons from some Asian

Countries. Meiji University InternationalExchange Programs Guest Lecture Series.

Chandra-nuj, M., 2007, Thailand Country

Fact Sheet on the State of Decentralization


Region.

Cheema, A., Khwaja, A. and Qadir, A.,2006, Local Government Reforms in Pak-

istan: Context, Content and Causes, inBardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (eds.)“Decentralization and Local Governance inDeveloping Countries: A Country Perspec-tive”. Cambridge, MA and London: MITPress (pp. 257-284).

Citypopulation, List of metropolitan areas

by population, http://www.citypopulation.de/world.html.

CLGF, 2005, Commonwealth Local Go vern -

ment Handbook 2005. London: Com -monwealth Local Government Fo rum.

Devas, N. et al., 2004, Urban Governance,

Voice and Poverty in the Developing

World. London: Earthscan.

Devas, N., 2005, Metropolitan Governance

and Urban Poverty, Public Administrationand Development. Vol 25 (pp. 351-361).

Gao Xiao Ping., 2007, China Country Fact



Hairong, L., 2004, Semi-competitive elec-

tions at township level in Sichuan

province, China Perspectives, Vol.51 (Jan-uary-February).

Hofman, B. and Kaiser, K., 2006, Decen-

tralization, Democratic Transition and

Local Governance in Indonesia, in Bard-han, P. and Mookherjee, D. (eds.), “Decen-tralization and Local Governance in Devel-oping Countries: A Country Perspective”.Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press(pp. 81-124).


International Monetary Fund, 2006, Gov-

ernment Finance Statistics 2006. Washing-ton DC: International Monetary Fund.

Lee, D., 1998, Local Government Reforms in

Korea: A Transition from a Marionnette Per-

formance Toward an Elementary Class Day,in Nakamura, A. (ed.), “Reforming Govern-ment: New Concepts and Practices in LocalPublic Administration”, Tokyo: EROPA LocalGovernment Center (pp. 65-82).

National Tax Service of the Republic ofKorea, Korean Taxation 2006.http://www.nta.go.kr/engdefault.html.Date accessed: 9 July 9 2007.

OECD, 2001, Revenue Statistics of Mem-

ber Countries, 1965-2000. Paris: Organi-sation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment.

OECD, 2005, OECD in figures. Paris:Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development.

Park, I., 2007, Republic of Korea Country

Fact Sheet on the State of Decentralization


Region.

Qiao, J., 2005, La réforme de l’administra-

tion chinoise face aux rites confucéens,

thesis. Paris: University Paris 1 (unpub-lished).

Rakodi, C, 2004, Urban Politics: Exclusion

or Empowerment, in Devas, N. et al.:“Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty inthe Developing World”. London: Earthscan.

Rao, G. and Singh, N., 2003, How to Think

About Local Government Reform in India,in Kalirajan, K. (ed.), Economic Reform andthe Liberalisation of the Indian Economy:Essays in Honour of Richard T. Shand.Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (pp. 335-390).

Sagawa, Y., 2007, Japan Country Fact



Schubert, G., 2003, Democracy under one

party rule?, China Perspectives Vol. 46(March-April).

Seong, K., 1998, Delayed decentralization

and incomplete consolidation of democ-

racy: The case of Korean local autonomy,paper presented at the Hoover Conferenceon Institutional Reform and DemocraticConsolidation in Korea, 8-9 January 1998.

Sethi, G. (ed.), 2004, Fiscal decentraliza-

tion to rural governments in India. Wash-ington, DC: World Bank and Oxford Uni-versity Press.

Singh, A. and Matthew, J., 2007, India

Country Fact Sheet on the State of Decen-

tralization and Local Democracy in the Asia

Pacific Region.

Sproats, K., 2003, Local Governments in

Asia and the Pacific: A Comparative Analy-

sis of Fifteen Countries, in Brillantes, A. etal. “Decentralization and Power Shift: AnImperative for Good Governance”. QuezonCity: Center for Local and Regional Gover-nance, National College of Public Adminis-tration and Governance, University of thePhilippines (pp. 25-62).

Teehankee, J., 2002, Electoral politics in

the Philippines, in Croissant, A. (ed.) Elec-toral politics in Southeast and East Asia.Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

UNDESA, 2006, Urban and Rural Areas

2005. New York: United Nations Depart-ment of Economic and Social Affairs, Pop-ulation Division.

UNDP, 2006, Human Development Report

2006. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


BIBLIOGRAPHY324

UNDP, 2006, Local democracy in Asia:

Representation in decentralized gover-

nance. Bangkok: United Nations Develop-ment Programme Regional Centre inBangkok.

UNESCAP, 2005, State of women in

ur ban local government in Australia,

http://www.unescap.org/huset/women/reports/australia.pdf, United Nations Eco-nomic and Social Commission for Asia andthe Pacific.

UNESCAP, 2005, State of women in

ur ban local government in New Zealand,

http://www.unescap.org/huset/women/reports/newzealand.pdf, United Nations Eco-nomic and Social Commission for Asia andthe Pacific.

UNESCAP, Local Government in Asia and

the Pacific, http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/malaysia/malaysia.html, date accessed: 12 July 2007.

UNESCAP, Country Reports on Local Go -

vern ment Systems: Republic of Korea, pp.9-10, http://www.unescap.org/hu set/lgstu dy/new-country paper/RoK/ RoK.pdf,date accessed: 12 July 2007.

Weist, D., 2001, Thailand’s Decentraliza-

tion: Progress and Prospects (Paper pre-pared for the KPI Annual Congress III onDe centralization and Local Government inThailand held on 10-11 November 2001).http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decen-tralization/eaplib/weist.pdf, date accessed17 July 2007.

Weist, D. (ed.), 2004, India Urban Finance

and Governance Review. Washington, DC:World Bank Report No. 32253-IN, vol. 1(executive summary and main report).

Wettenhall, R. and Aulich, C., 2007, Aus-

tralia Country Fact Sheet on the State of

De centralization and Local Democracy in

the Asia Pacific Region.

World Bank, 2004, Village Justice in

Indonesia. Case Studies on Access to Jus-tice, Village Democracy and Governance.Jakarta: World Bank Social DevelopmentUnit, 117 pages.

Yunus, A., 2007, Malaysia Country Fact




Eurasia

Administrativnaya reforma v Rossii.M., 2006.

Aksenenko Yu. N. Municipal’naya social’-naya politika:Stanovlenie, puti I factoryrealizacii. Saratov, 1999.

Babich A. M., Pavlova L. N. Gosudarstven-nye i municipal’nye financy. M., 2000.

Babichev I. V. Subyekty mestnogosamoupravleniya i ikh vzaimodejstvie. M.,2000.

Babun P. B., Mullagaleyeva Z. Z. Voprosymunicipal’noj ekonomiki. M., 2000.

Bazhinov M.A. Mestnoe samoupravlenie kakfaktor stanovleniya grazhdanskogo obshh-estva v sovremennoj Rossii. M., 2004.

Bajmuratov M. A. Evropejskie standartylokal’noj demokratii I mestnoesamoupravlenie v Ukraine. Kh., 2000.

Berkovich E. F. Zakonnost’ i mestnoesamoupravlenie v Rossijskoj Federacii M.,2005.

Cherkasov A. Spraviteln’noe mestnoeupravlenie: teoriya I praktika. M., 2005.

Chikhladze L.T. Mestnoe samoupravlenie imestnoe upravlenie v Gruzii: tradicii Iopyt. M., 2005.

Filippow V. Yu., Avdeyeva T. T. Osnovyrazvitiya mestnogo khozyajstva. M., 2000.

Grazhdan, zakon I publichnaya vlast’. M.,2005

Grigoyev V. A. Stanovlenie mestnogosamoupravleniya v Ukraine. Odessa, 2000.

Dementyev A. N. Ustanovlenie granic ter-ritorij I preobrazovanie municipal’nykhobrazovanij. M., 2004.

Eremin A. R. Realizaciya prava cheloveka Igrazhdanina na mestnoe samoupravlenie vRossiiskoj Federacii: Konstitucionnyevoprosy. Saratov, 2003.

Iginatyuk N. A., Zamotayev A. A.,Pavlushin A. V. Municipal’noe pravo.Uchebnik. Moscow, 2004.

Ivanov D. V. Pravotvorchestvo pred-stavitel’nykh organov mestnogosamoupravleniya: Na materialakhUral’skogo regiona. Chelyabinsk, 2004.

Khabrieva T. Ya. Sovremennaya konstitu-ciya i mestnoe samoupravlenie // zhurnalrossijskogo prava. 2005 4.

Khabrieva, T. Ya. O razgranichenii predme-tov vedeniya I polnomochij mezhdu gosu-darstvennymi organami I organamimestnogo samoupravleniya // Administra-tivnoe pravo: teoriya I praktika. M., 2002.

Koveshnikov E. M. Gusudarstvo I mestnoesamoupravlenie v Rossii: teoretiko-pravovyeosnovy vzaimodejstviya. M., 2002.

Kompetenciya organov gosudarstvennojvlasti subyektov Rossijstkoj Federacii.Orenburg, 2000.

Kutafin O. E., Fadeyev V. I. (2006) Munici-palnoe pravo Rossijskoj Federacii.; M. Malye goroda i mestnoe samoupravlenie.A. M. Kuzancev, V. P. Lenyshin, A. E.Murashov, E. A. Suslova; pod. red. E. A.Suslovaya. M., 2004.

Makhmutova M. Sistema mestnogosamoupravleniya v Respublike Kazakhstan// Razrabotka novykh pravil igry v starykhusloviyakh. Pod red. I.Muntyanu I V.Popa. –Budapesht: Institut otkrytogo obshhestva,

Programma reformirovaniya mestnogosamoupravleniya i kommunal’nogo khozya-jstva, 2001.


BIBLIOGRAPHY326

Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Kazakhstane:osobennosti situacii I perspektivy razvi-tiya. Materialy mezhdunarodnoj konfer-encii I rapochego seminara regionalnykhcentrov obucheniya gosudarstvennykhcentrov obucheniya gosudarstvennykhsluzhhikh. M., 2003.

Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossii: pre-blemy razvitiya, stanovleniya, funkcion -irovaniya. Perm, 1999.

Mestnoe samoupravlenie: Otechestvennyji zarubeznyj opyt. Uchebnoe posobie / Podred. S.Yu. Naumova. Saratov, 2001.

Mestnye soobshhestva v mestnomsamoupravlenii M., 2000.

Mokryj V. S. Samoupravlenie v RossijskojFederacii kak institute publichnoj vlasti vgrazhdanskom obshhestve. Samara, 2003.

Municipal’noe pravo Respubliki Armeniya.Uchebnoe posobie dlya vuzov. ArutyunyanA. Sh. Yerevan 2004, - 359 st.

Municipal’nyj menedzhment v RossijskojFederacii M., 2001.

Naumov C. Yu. Mestnoe samoupravlenie vsisteme pu blich noj vlasti: Rossijskij imirovoj opyt: cb. Nauch. Tp. Saratov, 2004.

Nechaev V. D. Territorial’naya organizaciyamestnogo samoupravleniya v regionakhRossii: genesis I institucional’nye effekty.Kursk, 2004.

Osnovy Evropejskoj Khartii mestnogosamoupravleniya: metodicheskoe posobie/ otv. red. I.A.Volodin. M., 1999.

Penkova-Lyujer P., Pagozina L. Social’nayapolitika municipal’nykh obrazovanij: soderzanie prioritety, mekhanizmy osush-hestvleniya. M., 2000.

Pravovoe obespechenie nacional’nykhinteresov: materialy mezhdunarodnoj

nauchno-prakticheskoj konferencii (Moskva,25-26 Oktyabrya 2005 g.) / pod obshh. red.T. Ya. Khabrievoj. M., 2005.

Pylin V. V. Narodovlastie v sistememestnogo samoupravleniya. SPB, 1998.

Ragulin D. D. Obshhie principy organizaciimestnogo samoupravleniya v Gosudarst-vakh Sodruzhestva. Yurist., 1998 9.

Ragulin D. D. Territorial’nye osnovymestnogo samoupravleniya v zarubezh-nykh stranakh CNG I Baltii // Pravo i zhizn’.1998. 14.

Regulirovanie voprosov organizaciimestnogo samoupravleniya zakonami sub-yektov Rossijskoj Federacii i munici-pal’nymi pravovymi aktam. M, 2004.

Salomakin A. A. Mestnoe samiupravlenie vsel’skikh peselenyakh Rossii: voprosi teoriiI praktiki. Chekyabinsk, 1999.

Sergeyev P.V. Mestnoe samoupravlenie nasele: voprosy terii I praktiki. Kursk, 2003.

Shirokov A. N., Yurkova C. N. Mestnoesamoupravlenie v Rossijskoj Federacii:osnovnye ponyatiya, terminy I polozheniyafederal’nogo zakonodatel’stva. M., 2004.

Shvecov A. A. Ekonomicheskie resurcymunicipal’nogo razvitiya: Financy, imushh-estvo, zemlya. M., 2004.

Sivickii V. A. Regulirovanie otvetstvennosti vsfere mestnogo samoupravleniya // Konstitu-cionnye I zakonodatel’nye osnovy mestnogosamoupravleniya v Rossijsoj Federacii M., 2004.

Social’noe zakonodatel’stvo. Nauchno-prakticheskoe posobie. M., 2005.

Social’nye osnovy mestnogo samouprav -leniya v Rossijskoj Federacii. M.,1998.

Spravitel’noe konstitucionnoe pravo / Podred. Chirkina V.E. – M., 1996. M., 2004.


Sudebnaya zashhita organov mestnogosamoupravleniya v Rossijskoj Federacii.M., 1998.

Uchastie naceleniya v osushhestvleniimestnogo samoupravleiya. M., 2004.

Upravlenie municipal’nym khozyajstvom imestnymi financami. M., 2004.

Vasilyev V. I. Zakonodatel’naya osnovamunicipal’noj reform. Moscow, 2005.

Vestnik Central’noj izbiratel’noj komissiiRossijskoj Federacii. 2006 2 (193).

Voronenko A. M. Mestnoe samoupravleniev krupnykh gorodakh zarubezhnykh stran.M., 1990.

Zaslavskaya L. V. Byudzhetnyj process vmunicipal’nom obrazovanii kak odna izstadij upravleniya finansami. M., 1999.


Country reports:

• Armenia: Rafaelian, V.V., Kazinian, A.G.,Chatirian, E.E.

• Azerbaijan: Safarov, N.• Belarus: Vasilevitch, G.A.• Kazakhstan: Januzakova, L.T.• Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz

Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan): Saïdov, A.X.

• Uzbekistan: Saïdov, A.X.• Russia: IZAK• Ukraine: Batanov, A.

BIBLIOGRAPHY328

Europe

Bäck, H., Heinelt, H., Magnier, A. (eds.),2006, The European mayor, VS Verlag “Ur -ban and Regional Research In ter na tional”,Wiesbaden.

Baldersheim, H., Illner, M., Wollmann, H.(eds.), 2003, Local Democracy in Post-

Communist Europe, VS Verlag “Urban andRegional Research International”, Wies-baden.

Bennett, R. (ed.), 1989, Territory and Ad -

ministration in Europe, London.

Berg, R., Rao, N. (eds.), Transforming local

Political Leadership, 2005, Hound mills, Pal-grave.

Bloomfield, J., 2006, Counselling, Cajoling

or Coordinating: Central Governments’ Po -

licy Approaches toward Local Government

on the Issues of Performance and Cost-

Effectiveness. Brussels, CCRE/CEMR.

Comité des Régions [Committee of theRe gions], 2002, Les pouvoirs locaux et

ré gionaux en Europe [Local and regionalautho rities in Europe], volumes 1 et 2, Lu -xem bourg.

Comité des Régions, 2003, Le processus de

dé centralisation dans les Etats membres et

les pays candidats [The decentralizationpro cess in the member states and applicantcountries], Luxembourg.

Conseil de l’Europe (années diverses)[Coun cil of Europe (various years)], La dé -

mo cratie locale et régionale, collection de

bro chures par pays [Local and regional de -mo cracy, collection of brochures by coun -try], Strasbourg.

Coulson, A., Campbell, A. (eds.), 2006, Lo -

cal Government in Central and Eastern

Europe, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32No. 5, November, special edition.

Council of Europe, Effective democratic

go vernance at local and regional level,Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2005(re ports by Gérard Marcou and Ken Daveyon the Sta bility Pact countries of South-East Europe).

Centre National de la Fonction Publique Te -rritoriale [National center for territorial civilservice], 2005, Les fonctions publiques lo -

cales en Europe. Décentralisation et

réforme des conditions d’emploi des agents

pu blics dans l’Europe élargie, Rapport final

[Lo cal civil service in Europe. Decentraliza-tion and reform of the employment condi-tions of civil servants in the widenedEurope, Final report], 195 pages, Paris.

Dafflon, B., 2002, Local Public Fi nance in

Europe, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

Delcamp, A., Loughlin, J. [dir. (ed.)], 2002,La décentralisation dans les Etats de l’Union

européenne [Decentralization in the Euro-pean Union States], La Documentationfrançaise, Paris.

Denters, B., Rose, L. E. (eds.), 2004, Com-

paring Local Governance, Palgrave.

Dexia, 2004, Les finances locales dans l’Eu-

rope à 25 [Local finances in the Europe ofthe 25], Dexia Editions, Paris.

Gabriel, O. W., Hoffmann-Martinot, V.(eds.), 1999, Démocraties urbaines [Urbandemocracies], Paris, L’Harmattan.

Goldsmith, M., 2002, Central Control over

Local Government – A Western European

Comparison, Local Government Studies,vol. 28 , no.3, 91-112.

Goldsmith, M., Klausen, K. (eds.), 1997,European Integration and Local Go -

vernment, London, Edward Elgar 1997.


Guérin-Lavignotte, E., Kerrouche, E.,2006, Les élus locaux en Europe. Un

statut en mutation [Local authorityelected officials in Europe. A changingstatus.], La Documentation Française «Etudes », 158 pages.

Haus, M. et al., (ed.) 2005, Urban Go ver -

nan ce and Democracy, Routledge.

Hesse, J.-J. (ed.), 1991, Local Govern-

ment and Urban Affairs in International

Perspective, Baden-Baden, Nomos.

Hoffmann-Martinot, V. and Sellers, J.(eds.), 2005, Metropolitanization and

Political Chan ge, VS Verlag “Urban andRe gional Re search In ternational”, Wies - baden.

John, P., 2001, Local Governance in

Western Europe, London, Sage.

Kandeva, E. (ed.), 2001, Stabilization of

Lo cal Governments (2 vols). Local Go -vern ment and Public Service Reform Ini -tiative, Bu dapest.

Kersting, N., Vetter, A. (eds.), 2003,Reforming Local Government in Euro pe.

Closing the Gap between Democracy

and Efficiency, VS Verlag “Urban andRegional Research International”, Wies-baden.

Lazijn , F. et al., (eds.), 2007, Local Go -

vern ment Reforms in Countries in Transi-

tion. A Global Perspective. LexingtonPress (forthcoming).

Le Galès, P., 2002, European Cities, Ox -ford, Oxford University Press.

Lorrain, D., Stoker, G. (eds.), 1996, The Pri-

vatization of Urban Services, London, Pin-ter.

Marcou, G., 2002, Les structures ré gionales

dans les pays candidats et leur compatibilité

avec les fonds structurels (Europe centrale

et orientale) [Regional struc tures in theapplicant countries and their compatibilitywith the structural funds (central and east-ern Europe)], “Rapport au Parlementeuropéen” [Report to the European Parlia-ment], Luxembourg, Parlement européen,Direction générale des Etudes, STOA 105FR, septembre 2002, 150 pages.

Marcou, G., 2003, Les régions entre l’Etat et

les collectivités locales. Etude comparative

de cinq Etats européens à autonomies

régionales ou à constitution fédérale (Alle-

magne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, Roy-

aume-Uni) [The regions between state andlocal authorities. Comparative study of fiveEuropean states with self-governing regionsor a federal constitution (Germany, Bel-gium, Spain, Italy, UK)], Ministère de l’In-térieur [Ministry of the Interior], Travaux etRecherches du Centre d’Etudes et de Prévi-sion [Research and work of the Center forStudies and Forecasting], Ministère de l’In-térieur, Paris, 2003, 237 pages.

Marcou, G., 2007, L’étendue et la na ture des

compétences des collectivités locales dans

les Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe

[Scope and nature of the powers andresponsibilities of local authorities in themember states of the Council of Europe],Rapport pour le CDLR (Comité directeur despouvoirs locaux et régionaux) [Report for theSteering Committee on local and regionalauthorities], Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg,102 pages (à paraître).

Marcou, G., Verebelyi, I. (eds.), 1993, New

trends in local government in Western and

Eastern Europe, International Institute ofAdministrative Science, Bruxelles.


BIBLIOGRAPHY330

Marcou, G. and Wollman, H. (eds.), Annu-

aire des Collectivités locales, éditions

annuelles avec une chronique internationale

thématique [Local authority yearbook withinternational thematic articles], CNRS Edi-tions Paris.

Meligrana, J. (ed.), Redrawing Local Go -

vernment Boundaries, 2004, UBC Press,Van couver, Toronto.

Norton, A., 1993, International Handbook

on local and regional government. A com-

parative analysis of advanced democracies,

Ed ward Elgar, London.

Sellers, J. M., 2002, Governing from Below,

Ur ban Regions and the Global Economy,

Cam bridge U Press.

Szücs, S., Strömberg, L. (eds.), 2006, Local

Elites, Political Capital and Democratic

Development. Governing Leaders in Seven

European Countries. VS Verlag “Urban andRegional Research International”, Wies-baden.

Travers, T., 2005, International Compar-

isons of Local Government Finance: Propo-

sitions and Analysis. London School of Eco - nomics and Political Science.

Latin America

A) Books and reviews:

Aghón, G., Los retos pendientes de la

descentralización fiscales América Latina y

el Caribe, 2000.

Alburquerque, F., Desarrollo eco nómico lo -

cal y descentralización en Amé rica La ti na,Re vista de la CEPAL, núm. 82, abril de2004. !Desarrollo Económico Local yDistri bu ción del Progreso Técnico!. IL PES/ -CE PAL, Santiago de Chile, 2006.

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo,Informe Sobre la Situación del Servicio en

América Latina, Washington, IADB, 2006.

Burki, S. J. and others. La Descentral-

ización del Estado. World Bank, Wa -shington, 1999.

Carbonell, M. (ed.), Derecho constitucional

(Memoria del Congreso Internacional deCul turas y Sistemas Jurídicos Compara-dos), México, UNAM, 2004.

Cetrangolo, O., Descentralización y Fe de -

ra lismo Fiscal: aspectos teóricos y prác -

ticos en América Latina. Arequipa, Pe rú,2006.

Conam GTZ Ecuador, Línea de Referencia

Descentralización en Argentina, Bolivia,

Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y

Ve nezuela. Quito, 2000.

European Commission, Informe

Estratégico Regional Sobre América

Latina, april, 2002.

Espitia, G., Descentralización Fiscal en Amé -

rica Latina. El Salvador. CONFEDELCA, Di -pu tación de Barcelona, GTZ. Octubre2004.

Finot, I., Descentralización en América La -

ti na: teoría y práctica, Santiago de Chile,CEPAL-ILPES, 2001.


–––. Descentralización, transferencias terri-

toriales y desarrollo local, Revista de la CE -PAL, núm. 86, agosto 2005.

–––. La descentralización fiscal y transfer-

encias intergubernamentales en América

La tina, CEPAL-ILPES, 2004. “Teoría eco nó -mica de la descentralización y procesos la -ti noamericanos”, octubre de 2006.

Fix Z., Carmona H. and V., Salvador,Derecho constitucional y comparado, 4 ed.México, Porrúa, 2005.

Foschiatto, P. and Stumpo, G. (ed.), Políti-

cas municipales de micro crédito. Un

instrumento para la dinamización de los

sis temas productivos locales. Estudios deca so en América Latina, Santiago de Chile,CEPAL-Cooperazione Italiana, 2006.

Kliksberg, B., Más Ética, Más De sa rrollo. Edi -torial Temas, Buenos Aires, 2004.

Licha, I. (ed.), Citizens in charge. Ma naging

local budgets in East Asia and La tin

America, Inter-American DevelopmentBank, 2004.

Lora, E. and Cárdenas, M., Reforma de las

ins tituciones fiscales en América Latina,IADB, 2006.

María Hernández, A., Derecho mu nicipal,

Mé xico, UNAM, 2003.

Martín, J. and Martner, R. (ed.) El estado

de las finanzas públicas: América Latina y

El Caribe, CEPAL-ILPES, 2004.

United Nations (UNDP), Informe Sobre De -

sa rrollo Humano 2005, Ediciones Multi-prensa, 2005.

Nickson, A., Tendencias actuales de las fi -

nan zas en América Latina, http:// www.lagniks. net/ lagniks/ c.php?e= FILEFRAMEandid= 436155651668.mhtandaction, con-sulted: July 2006.

Palomino Manchego, J., Regiones y munici-

pios del Perú. Marco constitucional actual,in “El municipio en México y el mundo”,Mé xico, UNAM, 2005.

Piazze, A. and Flaño, N., Diálogo Social en

América Latina, IADB, 2005.

United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), La Democracia en América Latina.

Hacia una democracia de ciu dadanos y ciu-

dadanas, 2004. http:// democracia. undp. org / default.asp.

Rodlauer, M. and Schipke, A., América

Central: Integración mundial y coop-

eración re gional, Washington, IMF, 2005.

Rojas, E., Cuadrado, J. and Fernández, J.M., Gobernar las metrópolis, IADB-Univer -si dad de Alcalá de Henares, 2005.

Rosales, M., Los Secretos del Buen Alcalde.

Universidad Virtual del Tecnológico deMon terrey, México, 2000.

–––. El Buen Gobierno Local, UniversidadBo livariana de Chile. Santiago, 2005.

Rosas Aispuro, J.; Cienfuego, D. (ed.), El

Municipio en Iberoamérica, México, Edit.Laguna, 2003.

Rousset, M., L’action international des col-

lectivités locales, Paris. Librairie Gé né ralede Droit de jurisprudence. EJA, 1998.

Serna de la Garza, J.M., La reforma del es -

ta do en América Latina: Los casos de Ar -

gen tina, Brasil y México, México, UNAM,1998.

Valadés, D. and Serna, J. M. (Coord.) El

go bierno en América latina, Mé xico,UNAM; 2000.


BIBLIOGRAPHY332

Valencia Carmona, S., Derecho Mu nicipal,Mé xico, Porrúa, 2003, El Municipio en Mé -xico y en el mundo. “Primer Congreso In -ter nacional de Derecho Municipal”, México,UNAM; 2005.

Varios autores, Los sistemas constitucio -

nales Iberoamericanos, Madrid, Dykinson,1992.

Vasquez Baquero, A., Desarrollo

Económico Local y Descentralización en

América La tina. CEPAL, Santiago de Chile.2000.

Wiesner, E., La descentralización, la esta-

bilidad macroeconómica y la integración

económica regional: Enlaces de política y

me canismos de transmisión, Bogotá BID-Instituto para la Integración de la Américay El Caribe, 2003.

B) Latin American constitutions:

Cited constitutions, compiled by the De -partment of Legislation and Jurisprudence,UNAM Legal Research Institute: http:// www. juridicas.unam.mx.

C) Websites:

Centro Latinoamericano de Administraciónpara el Desarrollo (CLAD). http:// www.clad.org.ve/.

e-local.gob.mx. http://www.e-local.gob.mx/ wb2/.

Economic Commission for Latin Americaand the Caribbean (ECLAC). http:// www.eclac.cl/.

Federación de mujeres municipalistas deAmérica Latina y el Caribe. http://www.femum.org.

Federación Latinoamericana de Ciudades,Municipios y Asociaciones. http://www.flacma.org/.

Fundación para el Desarrollo Local y el For-talecimiento Municipal e Institucional deCentroamérica y el Caribe (DEMUCA).http:// www.demuca.or.cr/.

Human Development Reports. http:// hdr.undp. org/reports/global/2005/espanol/.

Inter-American Agency for Cooperationand Development (IACD). http://oeamejorespracticas.axesnet.com/default.asp.

Latin American Governance Network Infor-mation and Knowledge System. http://www. lagniks.net/ lagniks/c.php?e=HOME.

Latinobarómetro. http://www.latinobaro me tro.org/.

Municipium / Servicio de Asistencia y Ca -pa citación para el Desarrollo Local(SACDEL). http://www.municipium.cl/.

Observatorio Latino Americano de la descentra -lización. http://www.observatorio-flacma.org/.

PNUD Mexico - United Nations Develop-ment Program in Mexico. http:// www.undp.org.mx/.

Political Data base of the Americas.http://pdba.georgetown.edu/spanish.html.

Red de Investigación y Acción para elDesarrollo Loca (RIADEL). http://www.riadel. cl/ default.asp.

Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y delCaribe – SELA. http:// www.sela.org/ sela/index.asp.

Transparency International. http:// www.transparency.org/regional_pages/ameri-cas/introduccion.

UCLG - Global Observatory on LocalDemocracy and Decentralization. http://www. c i t i es- loca lgovernments .org/gold/list.asp?region=8andL=en.


United Cities and Local Governments.http: // www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/ index.asp?L=ES.

United States Agency for International De -velopment (USAID) - Latin America.http:// www. usaid.gov/espanol/.

Zevallos V., Micro, pequeñas y me dianas

empresas en América Latina. http:// www.cepal.org/.

Zovatto, D. and Burdman, J., Balance Elec -

toral Latinoamericano 2003–2004, work-ing paper of the Observatorio Electoral.http:// www.observatorioelectoral.org/.

Middle East and West Asia

Enactments:

Saudi Arabia:

• Saudi Constitution (Basic Law), 1992.• Law on the provinces (Saudi Arabia), 1

March 1992.• Law on municipal elections, 2004.• Royal decree no. A/276 of 08 October

1395 H1 on the creation of the Ministryof Rural and Municipal Affairs (SaudiArabia).

Bahrain:

• Bahraini Constitution, 2002.

Islamic Republic of Iran:

• Iranian Constitution, 1979.• Law of 25 June 1949 establishing

municipalities and town and villagecouncils.

• Law of 2 July 1955 concerning munici-palities.

• Law of 5 July 1979 establishing localcouncils.

• Law of 28 September 2003 amendingthe law on « les structures, les attribu-tions et l'élection des conseilsislamiques du pays et l’élection desmaires » of 23 May 1996.

• Implementing decree of 20 December1998 concerning the election of councilsin towns and small towns.

• Implementing decree of 20 December1998 concerning the election of villageand district councils.

Iraq:

• Constitution du gouvernement intéri-maire irakien, 1990.

• Constitution proposée par les partisd’opposition, in Al-Mutamar no. 305 of23 May 2005, pp. 14-15. (Iraq).

Jordan:

• Jordanian Constitution.• Law on municipalities, 1995, and 2007.

Kuwait:

• Kuwaiti Constitution, 1962.


1. Hegiric calendar.

14th October 1975 in

the Gregorian

calendar.

BIBLIOGRAPHY334

Lebanon:

• Lebanese Constitution.• Legislative decree no. 118, 1977 on

municipalities.• Taëf Accords (Pacte national de Taëf),

22 October 1989.• Law on administrative organization (dé -

cret-loi n° 111 du 12/06/1960).• Law on the mokhtar of 27 November

1947.

Oman:

• Omani Constitution, 1996 (Basic Law).

Qatar:

• Qatari Constitution, 2003.

Syria:

• Syrian Constitution, 1973.

Turkey:

• Turkish Constitution, 1982, substantial-ly amended in 2001.

West Bank and Gaza

• Law on ‘Palestinian local council elec-tions’, December 1996, partiallyamended in 2005.

• Law on local life, September 1997.

Yemen:

• Yemeni Constitution, 1991, amended in1994.

Articles and reports:

Al Jordi, H., Power and the municipalities,Centre National de Recherches, p. 20, 1998.

Al Khalil, Y., The role of muni ci palities in eco -

nomic and rural deve lop ment, Id., in Munici-palités et ad ministration locale, n°2, p. 45,Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur leMoyen-Orient contemporain.

Bédar, S., The Greater Middle East: a world -

wide post-colonial project?, Diplomatie n°3,May-June 2003.

Imad, A., Municipal elections, Jarrous Press,p. 20.

Municipalités et administration locale n°1,Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le

Moyen-Orient contemporain, 2000.

SARROUH E., Decentralized Governance for

De velopment in the Arab States, report pre-sented during a forum on the governance ofthe Arab states, Sana’a, 6-9 September 2003.

Saudi Elections in Regional Perspective : The

Shiite ‘Threat’ Theory, Policy Watch no. 970,9 March 2005, The Washington Institute forNear-East Policy.

Zubai, K., 2006. Local Administration and its

integrative relations with the central author-

ities of the modern state. The proceedings ofthe third conference of big cities administra-tion. (June 4-6) Amman, Jordan.

Main websites :

http://www.citymayors.com

World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org

Program on governance in the Arab Region:http://www.pogar.org

UNDP: http://www.undp.org

Transparency International: http:// www. transparency.org

Government websites

Lebanese Finance Ministry: http:// www. finance. gov.lb

Lebanese Ministry of the Interior and of Mu -nicipalities: http://www.interior.gov.lb


Saudi Ministry of Rural and Municipal Affairs:http://www.momra.gov.sa

Jordanian Ministry of Rural and MunicipalAffairs and the Environment:http://www.nis. gov.jo

Jordanian Finance Ministry: http://www.mof. gov.jo

Bahraini Finance Ministry: http://www.mofne. gov.bh

Qatari Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Agri -culture: http://www.baladiya.gov.qa

Syrian Ministry of the Economy and Finance: http://www.syrecon.org

North America

Ammons, David N., 2003, Urban Services.In John P. Pelissero (ed.), “Cities, Politics,and Policy” (pp. 254-282). Washington,D.C.: CQ Press.

Berner, M., 2001. Citizen Participation in

Local Government Budgeting. Popular Go -vern ment, Spring 2001, 23-30.

Berry, J. M., Portney, K. E., and Thomson, K.,1993. The Rebirth of Urban Democracy. Wa -shington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Bibby, J. F., 1999. State and Local Parties in

a Candidate-Centered Age. In R. E. Weberand P. Brace (eds.), “American State andLocal Politics: Directions for the 21st Cen-tury”. New York: Seven Bridges Press.

Blatter, J.K., 2001. De-bordering a world of

states: towards a multi-level system in

Europe and a multi-polity system in North-

America? Insights from border regions.European Journal of International Relations7, 2 (2001): 175-209.

Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2006, BIA Website.Retrieved June 28, 2006, http:// www.doi.gov/ bureau-indian-affairs.html.

Canadian Federation of Municipalities, 2004.Increasing Representation of Women in

Municipal Decision-making Processes.Ottawa: Canadian Federation of Municipali-ties. Retrieved July 3, 2007, http:// www.fcm.ca/ english/ policy/women.html.

Center for American Women and Politics,2006. New Brunswick, N.J.: Eagleton Insti-

tute of Politics, Rutgers, The State Universityof New Jersey, Retrieved on August 10,2006, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/ Facts/Officeholders/stleg.pdf.

CIA World Factbook, 2006. Retrieved July 4,2006, http://www.cia.gov/cia /publications/factbook/fields/2056.html.


BIBLIOGRAPHY336

City Mayor, 2006, Canada Offers Its People

an Array of Local Governments, RetrievedJune 26, 2006, http:// www.city ma yors.com/ canada/canada_locgov.html.

Commonwealth Local Government Forum,2002, Canada. Retrieved July 6, 2006http://www.clgf.org.uk/index_profiles.htm.

Cornell, S. and Kalt, J. P., 2000, Sovereignty

and Nation-Building: The Development

Chal lenge in Indian Country Today. Unpub-lished paper, John F. Kennedy School of Gov-ernment, Cambridge, MA.

Coursey, D., 2005, E-Government: Trends

and Challenges. In The Municipal Year Book(pp. 14-21), Washington, D.C.: InternationalCity/County Management Association.

Diaz, A., 2003, Shifting of service responsi-

bilities between provincial and local govern-

ments. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

Elections Canada (n.d.), Retrieved July 25,2006, http://www.elections.ca/ scripts/ OVR2004/ default.html.

Electronic Government 2004. (2004). Wa -shing ton, D.C.: International City/CountyMa na gement Association.

Fisher P. S., 1982, Regional Tax-Base Shar-

ing: An Analysis and Simulation of Al ter -

native Approaches. Land Economics, 58(4),497-515.

Freyss, S. F., 1995, Municipal Go vernment

Personnel Systems: A Test of Two Arche-

typical Models. Review of Public PersonnelAdministration 15: 69-93.

Gallup, 2006, Trust in Government. RetrievedJune 12, 2006, 2006, www.gallup.com.

Hahn, H., 1968, Voting in Canadian Commu-

nities: A Taxonomy of Referendum Issues.

Canadian Journal of Political Science 1(4):462-469.

Hajnal, Z.L. and Trounstine, J., 2005, When

turnout matters: The consequences of

uneven turnout in city elections, Journal ofPolitics 67(2): 515-535.

Hajnal, Z. L., and Lewis, P. G., 2003, Munic-

ipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local

Elections. Urban Affairs Review, 38(5), 645-668.

Hajnal, Z. L., Lewis, P. G., and Louch, H.,2002, Municipal Elections in California: Tur -

nout, Timing, and Competition. San Fran-cisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe , L.J., 1991, Conclu-

sions. In “Local Government and UrbanAffairs in International Perspective”, ed. J.J.Hesse. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 603-621.

Hill, M. B. (n.d.), State Laws Governing

Local Government Structure and Adminis-

tration, Institute of Government/Universityof Georgia.

Infrastructure Canada, 2006, Public Opinion

Research. Ottawa: Government of Ca nada.Retrieved December 21, 2006 at http://www. infrastructure.gc.ca/communities-collectivites/pub_opinion/.

International City/County ManagementAssociation, 2001, Municipal Form of Go -

vern ment. Washington, D.C.: InternationalCi ty/ County Management Association.

International City/County Management Asso-ciation, 1997, Municipal Forms of Go vern -

ment, 1996. Washington, D.C.: In ter nationalCi ty/ County Management Association.

Internet Center for Corruption Research. (n.d.).Retrieved July 25, 2006, http:// www. icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2005.html.

Judd, D., and Swanstrom, T., 1994, City Po -

li tics: Private Power and Public Policy. NewYork: HarperCollins College Publishers.


Laubach, T., 2005, Fiscal Relations across

Levels of Government in the United States.

OECD Economics Department WorkingPaper No. 462. Retrieved July 4, 2005,http:// www.olis.oecd.org/ olis/ 2005 doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/da360144bb5dbe5ec12570c8005c0cfd/$FILE/JT00195165.PDF.

Leland, S.M. and Thurmaier, K. (eds.), 2004,Case Studies of City-County Consolidation.Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

McManus, S., 1999, The Resurgent City

Councils. In Ronald E. Weber and Paul Brace(eds.), “American State and Local Politics”(pp. 166-193). New York: Chatham HousePublishers.

MacManus, S. A., and Bullock, C. S., 2003,The Form, Structure, and Composition of

America's Municipalities in the New Millen-

nium. In Municipal Year Book (Vol. 2003, pp.3-18). Washington, D.C.: International Ci -ty/ County Management Association.

Maher, M. and Jay S., 2005, Production Mar-

ket Competition and Economic Performance

in Canada. OECD Economic DepartmentWorking Papers No. 421. Retrieved August17, 2006, http:// www. olis. oecd.org/ olis/2005doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/c62110dffb4a9cdcc1256fd9007d0670/$FILE/JT00181345.PDF#search=%22eCO%2FWKP(2005)49%3A%208%22.

Meligrana, J.F., 2000, Toward a process

model of local government restructuring:

Evidence from Canada, Canadian Journal ofRe gional Science 23(3).

Morse, B. W., 2004, Indigenous-Settler

Treaty Making in Canada. In M. Langton, M.Te han, L. Palmer and K. Shain (eds.), “Hon-our Among Nations?” Melbourne: MelbourneUni versity Press.

Mouritzen, P. E. and Svara, J. H., 2002,Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and

Administrators in Western Local Govern-

ments. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pitts-burgh Press.

OECD, 2001, Revenue Statistics of Member

Countries, 1965-2000. Washington, D.C.:OECD.

OECD, 2003, Public and Territorial Develop-ment Directorate - Country Factsheets.Retrieved July 19, 2006 fromhttp://www.oecd.org.

OECD, 2005, OECD in Figures-2005 Edition.

August 1, 2006, from http:// www. oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_37405_2345918_1_1_1_37405,00.html.

OECD, 2006, Statistical Profile of Canada-

2006. Retrieved July 25, 2006 from http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/ViewHTML.aspx?QueryName=177andQueryType=Viewand-Lang=en.

OECD, 2006, Statistical Profile of United

States-2006. Retrieved July 25, 2006 fromhttp://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/ViewHTML.aspx?QueryName=203andQueryType=ViewandLang=en.

OECD, 2003, Metropolitan Governance in

OECD Countries. Retrieved July 25, 2006from http:// www. oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 59/40/ 6100078.pdf.

OECD Observer, 2003, OECD Territorial Re -

view of Montreal. Retrieved July 25, 2006from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/11/ 26010229.pdf.

Post, S. S., 2005, Metropolitan Area Gover-

nance and Institutional Collective Ac tion. InFeiock, Richard C. (Ed.), “Metropolitan Go -ver nance: Conflict, Competition, and Coope -ra tion” (67-92). Washington, D.C.: Geor ge -town Press.


BIBLIOGRAPHY338

Reece, B., 2006, E-Government Design and

Equity. Ph.D. Dissertation, University ofSouth ern California, Los Angeles.

Richardson, J., Gough, M. and Puentes, R.,2003, Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying

the Effect of Dillon’s Rule on Growth Man-

agement. Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution.

Rivard, M. and Collin, J.-P., 2006, Factsheet:

Ca nada. Paris: Global Observatory on LocalDe mocracy and Decentralization.

Ross, B. H. and Levine, M. A., 2001, Urban

Po litics: Power in Metropolitan America.Itas ca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers.

Saffell, D. C. and Basehart, H., 1997, Gov-

erning States and Cities. New York:McGraw- Hill Companies Inc.

Sbragia, A. 1988, Debt Wish. Pittsburgh,University of Pittsburgh Press.

Sellers, J.M., 2006, Comparing local gover-

nance in developed democracies: Selected

in dicators. Working paper available online athttp://www.usc.edu/dept/polsci/sellers/Publications/publications.htm.

Sellers, J.M. and Latner, M.L., 2006, The Po li -

tical Ecology of the U.S. Metropolis: An In te -

rim Report. Paper presented at In ternationalPolitical Science Association and AmericanPo litical Science Association Annual Meetings,Fukuoka, Japan and Philadelphia, PA.

Sellers, J.M., 2007, The Decentered State.Manuscript in process.

Sellers, J.M. and Lidström, A.L., 2007,Decentralization, local government and the

welfare state. Governance (forthcoming).

Simard, C., 2000, Ethnic Minority Political

Representation in Montreal. Paper presentedat National Metropolis Conference, Montreal.

Simpson, D. M., 2005, Use of Web Technology

by U.S. Planning Agencies: Results from a

National Benchmarking Survey. In MunicipalYear Book (Vol. 2005, pp. 22-26). Wa shington,D.C.: International City/County Ma nagementAssociation.

United States Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States. (Jan. 04,2006). Retrieved July 4, 2006 from http://www. census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-2001_2005.html.

Public Sector Statistics: Supplement 2006,Statistics Canada, 2006, Ottawa: Ministry ofIn dustry.

Stephens, G. R. and Wikstrom, N., 2000,Metropolitan Government and Go vernance:

Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Analysis,

and the Future. New York: Ox ford UniversityPress.

Svara, J. H., 2003, Two Decades of Continu-

ity and Change in American City Councils,

National League of Cities.

Silva, L., 2005, Escaping from the Straight-

jacket that Baffled Houdini: An Analysis of the

Myths and Realities of Empowering Toronto

Through a City Charter, Master of PublicAdministration, University of Western Ontario.

Anthony Center, 2006, Women Lag as Lo cal

Leaders. Rochester, NY: Anthony Center. Re -trie ved December 12, 2006 at http:// www.rochester.edu/SBA/PDFs/WomenLag2006.pdf.

Turnbull, G. K., 2002, Local Tax Sharing: An

Incentive for Intergovernmental Coopera-

tion. Fiscal Research Program No. 75. An -drew Young School of Policy Studies: Geor -gia State University.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovern-mental Relations (USACIR), 1993, State

Laws Governing Local Government Structure

and Administration. DC: U.S. Advisory Com-mission on Intergovernmental Relations.


U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992, Census of

Governments, 1(1) Government Organiza-tion. Retrieved July 28,2006 from http://www. census.gov/govs/www/cog92.html.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997, Govern-

ment Organization. 1997 Census of Govern-

ments, Vol. 1 Government Organization. Re - trieved July 28, 2006 from http:// www. census.gov/ govs/www/cog.html.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002, Govern-

ment Organization, 1(1) GovernmentOrganization. Re trieved July 28, 2006 fromhttp: // www. census. gov/ govs/ www/ cog2002. html.

U. S. Bureau of the Census, 2002, Government

Finances. 2002 Census of Government 4(5).Retrieved July 4, 2006 from http:/ /www. census. gov/prod/2005pubs/gc024x5.pdf.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006, 2005

Public Employment, Data: Local Govern-ments. In “Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates”.

World Bank, 2006, GRICS: Governance

Research Indicator Country Snapshot Compar-

ison within Canada for all Six Governance Indi-

cators. Governance and Anti-Corruption.Retrieved July 28,2006 from http:// www.worldbank. org/ wbi/governance/.

World Bank, 2006, GRICS: Governance

Research Indicator Country Snapshot Compar-

ison within United States for all Six Gover-

nance Indicators. Governance and Anti-Cor-

ruption. Retrieved July 28,2006 fromhttp:// www. worldbank. org/wbi/governance/.

Zahra, S.A. et al., 2000, Privatization and en -

tre preneurial transformation: Emerging issues

and a future research agenda, The Academy ofManagement Review 35(3): pp 509-524.

Zimmerman, J. F., 1997, The Recall: Tribu-

nal of the People. Westport, Connecticut.Praeger Publishers.

Metropolitan Governance

Abers, R. N. and Keck, M., 2006, Muddy

Waters: The Political Construction of Delib-

erative River Basin Governance in Brazil,International Journal of Urban andRegional Research 30(3): 601-622.

Ades, A. F. and Glaeser, E. L., 1995, Trade

and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants,Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1):195-227.

Alesina, A., Baqir, R. and Easterly, W.,1999, Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4):243-84.

Ascher, F., 1995, Metapolis ou l’avenir des

villes. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Banfield, E. C. and Grodzins, M., 1958,Government and Housing in Metropolitan

Areas, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Blankart, C. B. and Pommerehne, W. W.,1979, Les économies d’échelle dans les

services urbains, “Revue Économique”,vol. 30, n°2.

Cameron, R. G., 2005, Metropolitan res -

tructuring (and more restructuring) in

South Africa, Public Administration andDe velopment 25(4): 329-339.

Cameron, R. and Alvarez, A., 2005, Metro-

politanisation and political change in South

Africa, in: Hoffmann-Martinot, V. and Se -llers, J. (eds.), “Metropolitanization andPo li tical Change”, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag(Ur ban Research International, 6): 373-394.

Chernick, H. and Reschovsky, A., 2001,Lost in the Balance: How State Policies

Affect the Fiscal Health of Cities, WorkingPaper, La Follette School of Public Affairs.


BIBLIOGRAPHY340

Clark, T. N. and Goetz, E. G., 1994, The anti-

growth machine: Can city governments con-

trol, limit or manage growth? In Clark, TerryN. (ed.) “Urban innovation”, pp 105-145.Thou sand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cobridge, S. and Jones, G. A., 2005, The

Continuing Debate About Urban Bias.Working Paper, Department of Geographyand Environment, London School of Eco-nomics.

Dahl, R., 1969, The city in the future of

democracy, American Political Science Re - view 61: 953-970.

Davis, M., 2006, Planet of Slums. London:Verso.

Devas, N., 2005, Metropolitan Go vernance

and Poverty, Public Administration andDevelopment 25: 351-361.

Downs, A., 1994, New Visions for Me -

tropolitan America, Washington, D.C.: TheBrookings Institution.

Dreier, P., Mollenkopf, J. and Swanstrom,T., 2004, Place Matters, Lawrence, KS:University of Kansas Press.

Dupuy, G., 1997, Préface, in: Dubois-Taine,G. and Chalas, Y. (eds.), “La ville émer-gente”, Paris, Editions de l’Aube, p. 5-9.

Fainstein, S., 2001, Inequality in Global Ci -

ty-Regions, in: Allen J. Scott (ed.), “GlobalCi ty-Regions”, New York : Oxford Uni ver -sity Press, pp 285-98.

Frederickson, H. G., 1999, The Reposition-

ing of Public Administration, PS: PoliticalScience and Politics 32(4): 701-711.

Gilbert, A., 1998, The Latin American City,re vised edition, London: Latin AmericanBureau.

Glaser, E., Kolko, J. and Saiz, A., 2001,Consumer City, Journal of Economic Geog-raphy 1, pp. 27-50.

Gottmann, J. 1961, Megalopolis: The Ur -

banized Northeastern Seaboard of the Uni ted

States. New York: The Twentieth Cen turyFund.

Haddad, L., Ruel, M.T. and Garrett, J.L.,1999, Are Urban Poverty and Undernutri-

tion Growing? Some Newly Assembled Evi-dence, World Development 27(11): pp.1891-1904.

Harloe M., 2003, Le nouveau gouverne-

ment métropolitain de Londres: vers la

terre promise, Revue Française d’Adminis-tration Publique n° 107: 319-332.

Hoffmann-Martinot, V. and Sellers, J.(eds.), 2005, Metropolitanization and

Political Change, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag(Ur ban Research International, 6).

Hoffmann-Martinot, V., 2005, To wards an

Americanization of French Metropolitan

Areas?, in Hoffmann-Martinot, V. and Se -llers, J. (eds.) (2005), “Metropolitanizationand Political Change”, Wies baden: VS-Ver-lag.

Huang, Jingnan, Xi Xi Lu and Se llers, J.,2008, A Global Comparative Analysis of

Urban Form, Landscape and Urban Plan-ning (forthcoming).

Ingram, G., 1997, Patterns of Metropolitan

Development: What Have We Learned?

Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Jouve, B. and Lefèvre, C. (eds.), 2002,Local power, territory, and in stitutions in

European metropolitan regions, London:Frank Cass.

Kennedy, L. 2007, Regional Industrial Poli-

cies Driving Peri-Urban Dynamics in

Hyderabad, India, Cities 24(2): 95-109.


Kübler, D., 2005, Problems and prospects of

metropolitan governance in Sydney: to -

wards ‘old’ or ‘new’ regionalism?, City Fu tu -res Research Centre, University of NewSouth Wales, 43 p.

Laquian Aprodicio A., 2001, Metro Manila: Par-

ticipation and Inclusion in A City of Villages, in:Blair A. Ruble, Richard E. Stren, Jo seph S.Tulchin and Diana H. Va rat (eds.), “Ur ban Gov-ernance Around the World”, Wa shington, D.C.:Woodrow Wilson International Center forScholars: 74-110.

Laquian, Aprodicio A., 2005, Beyond Me tro -

polis: The Planning and Governance of Asia’s

Mega-Urban Regions, Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press.

Lipton, M., 1977, Why Poor People Stay

Poor: Urban Bias and World Development,Avebury, UK: Aldershot.

Marcuse, P. and Van Kempen, R. (eds.),2000, Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Or -

der, London: Blackwell.

Marks, G. and Hooghe, L., 2003, Unraveling

the Central State, But How? Types of Mul ti-

Level Governance, American Political Sci-ence Review 97(2): 233-43.

Markusen, Ann R., Lee, Y. S. and Di bio -vanna, S. (eds.), 1999, Second Tier Cities

(Minneapolis, MN: University of MinnesotaPress).

Martinotti, G., 1997, The New Social Mor-

phology of Cities, UNESCO-MOST, Discus-sion Paper Series No.16, Paris, UNESCO.

METROPOLIS, 2005, Politique-cadre pour

les régions métropolitaines proposée par le

secrétariat régional Métropolis-Amérique

du Nord, Montréal, April 2005.

METROPOLIS, 2005, Rapport de la Com-

mission permanente présenté au 8ème

Congrès de Metropolis, Berlin, 11-15 May.

METROPOLIS, 2007, Information on Me -

tro po lises, retrieved June 15, 2007 athttp://www.metropolis.org/index.php?action=mostrar_contenidoandid_seccion=88andtemplate=interior.

Mollenkopf, J., 1983, The Contested Ci ty.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mongin, O., 1998, La Ville émergeante. Pa -ris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Ostrom, E., 2000, The Danger of Self-Evi-

dent Truths, PS: Political Science and Po -litics Vol. 33, No. 1 (March): 33-44.

Ostrom, V., Bish, V. and Ostrom, E.,1988,Local Government in the United States,San Francisco: ICS (Institute for Contem-porary Studies) Press.

Overman, H. G. and Venables, A. J., 2005,Cities in the Developing World, Cen tre forEconomic Performance Discussion PaperNo. 695. London: Centre for Economic Per-formance, London School of Economicsand Political Science.

Pack, J. R., 1998, Poverty and Urban Pu blic

Expenditures, Urban Studies 35(11):1995-2019.

Rakodi, C. with Lloyd-Jones, T. (eds.),2002, Urban Livelihoods: A People-Cen-

tred Approach to Reducing Poverty, Lon-don: Earthscan.

Razin, E. and Hazan, A., 2005, Me -

tropolitanization and Political Change in

Israel, in: Hoffmann-Martinot, V. and Sell-ers, J. (eds.), 2005, “Metropolitanizationand Political Change”, Wiesbaden : VS-Ver-lag (Urban Research International, 6):395-423.

Sancton A., 2005, The Governance of Me -

tro politan Areas in Canada, Public Admin-istration and Development Vol. 25, No. 4,October: pp 317-327.


BIBLIOGRAPHY342

Sancton A., 2001, Canadian Cities and the

New Regionalism, Journal of Urban AffairsVol. 23, No. 5: 543-555.

Sassen, S., 1991, The Global City. Ox ford:Oxford University Press.

Satterthwaite, D., 2004, The Underestima-

tion of Urban Poverty in Low and Middle-

income Nations. IIED Poverty Reduction inUrban Areas Series Working Paper 14.London: IIED.

Segbers, K. (ed.), 2007, The Making of

Glo bal City Regions. Baltimore: Johns Hop-kins University Press.

Sellers, J., 2002, Governing From Below:

Urban Regions and the Global Econo my.Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sellers, J., 2005, Metropolitanization and Po -

li tics in the United States: From Single Model

to Multiple Patterns, Hoffmann-Martinot, V.and Sellers, J., “Metropolitanization and Polit-ical Change”, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Sellers, J. and Lidström, A., 2007, Decen-

tralization, Local Government and the Wel-

fare State, Governance (forthcoming).

Souza C., 2005, Brazilian Metropolitan Re -

gions: Regime Change and Governance

Va cuum, Public Administration and De ve -lop ment Vol. 25, No. 4, October: 341-350.

Stren R. and Cameron, R., 2005, Metropol-

itan Governance Reform: An Introduction,

Public Administration and DevelopmentVol. 25, No. 4, October: 275-284.

Taylor, P. J., 2003, World City Network,New York: Routledge.

UNCHS, 2003, The Challenge of Slums.

Glo bal Report on Human Settlements

2003. Earthscan: London.

UNCHS, 2005, World Urbanization

Prospects: The 2005 Edition. New York:United Na tions Economic and Social Divi-sion. Re trie ved online January 20, 2007 athttp://www.un.org/esa/population/publi-cations/WUP2005/2005wup.htm.

Veltz, P. 1996, Mondialisation, villes et ter-

ritoires, Paris: Presses Universitaires deFrance

Vogel R. K., 2001, Reforming Tokyo

Me t ro politan Government, in: Ru ble, B. A.,Stren, R. E., Tulchin, J. S. and Varat , D.H. (eds.), “Urban Governance around theWorld”, Washington, D.C.: Woo drow Wil-son In ternational Center for Scholars: pp.114-148.

Wirth, L., 1942, Proceedings, National Con fe -

ren ce on Planning, 1942. Chicago: AmericanSociety of Planning Officials: pp. 141-151.

Wood, R. C., 1964, 1,400 Governments:

The Political Economy of the New York Re -

gion, Garden City: Doubleday An chor.

Zeigler, D. J. and Brunn, S. D., 1980,Geopolitical Fragmentation and the Pattern

of Growth and Need, in Brunn, S. D. andWheeler, J. O. (Eds.), The American Metro-

politan System: Present and Future, NewYork: John Wiley, Scripta Series in Geogra-phy (with Don J. Zeigler): pp. 77-92.


Conclusion

Aalborg C., 1994, Charter of European

Cities and Towns To wards Sustainability,

Agreement approved by the participants atthe European Conference on SustainableCities and Towns in Aalborg, Denmark on27 May 1994.

Amin, A. and Tomaney, J., 1995, The Re -

gional Dilemma in a Neo-liberal Europe, inEuropean Urban and Regional Stu dies No.2: 171-188.

Shlomo, A., Sheppard, S. and Civico, D.,2005, The Dynamics of Global Urban Ex -

pan sion. Transport and Urban DevelopmentDepartment. World Bank, Wa shington D.C.,September.

Annez, P., 2006, Urban Infrastructure Fi -

nan ce from Private Operators: What Have

We Learned from Re cent Experience?,

World Bank Research Working Paper 4045.

Beaverstock, J, Smith, R. and Taylor, P.,1999, A Roster of World Cities, Cities 16

(6): 445-458.

Boadway, R. and Shah, A. (ed.), 2007, In ter -

go vernmental Fiscal Transfers. Prin ci plesand Practice. Public Sector Go ver nance andAccountability Series. Wa shington, DC:World Bank. 572 p.

Cabrero, E., 2007, Government Decentral-

ization and Decentralized Governance in

La tin America: The Silent Revolution at the

Local Level? pp. 156-169 in Cheema, S.and Rondinelli, D., “Decentralizing Gover-nance. Emerging Concepts and Practices”.

Campbell, T., 2003, Decentralization and

the Rise of Political Participation in La tin

Ame rican Cities. “The Quiet Revolution”.Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cheema, G. S. and Rondinelli, D. A, (eds.),2007, Decentralizing Governance. Emerg-

ing Concepts and Practices. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution Press and theAsh In s titute for Democratic Governanceand Innovation. 326 pp.

Cohen, J. and Peterson, S., 1999, Admin-

istrative Decentralization. Strategies forDe ve loping Countries. West Hartford, CT:Kumarian Press. 207 p.

Council of Europe, 1985, European Charter

of Local Self-Government. Strasbourg,Fran ce. October.

Crook, R. and Manor, J., 1998, Democracy

and Decentralization in South Asia and

West Africa. Participation, Accountabilityand Performance. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. 348 p.

Devas, N. and Grant, U., 2003, Local Gov-

ernment Decision-Making—Citizen Partici-

pation And Local Accountability: Some Evi-

dence From Kenya And Uganda, PublicAdministration and Development 23 (4):307-316.

Edralin, J. S., (ed.) 1998, Metropolitan Go -

vernance in Asia and the Pa cific. Tokyo: UNCenter for Regional De ve lopment, Nagoya,Japan.

Ehtisham, A. and Tanzi, V. (eds.), 2002,Managing Fiscal Decentralization. London:Routledge.

Friedmann, J., 2001, Intercity Networks in

a Globalizing Era. pp. 119-136 in Scott, A.(ed.), “Global City Re gions: Trends, The-ory, Policy”. Oxford: Ox ford UniversityPress.

Government of Bolivia, 2006, Strategy of

Fiscal Decentralization. Framework for Ac -tion. Office of the President and Ministry ofHa cienda. La Paz, Bolivia.


BIBLIOGRAPHY344

Harris, N., 2003, The Return of Cosmopol-

itan Capital. Globalization, the State, andWar. London: I.B. Tauris.

Haggard, S. and Webb, S., 1994, Vo ting

for Re form. Democracy, Political Li be ra li za -tion, and Economic Adjustment. Wa shing -ton, DC: World Bank.

Hickey, S. and Mohan, G., 2005, Relocat-

ing Participation within Radical Po li tics of

De velopment, Development and Change36 (2): 237–262.

Inter-American Development Bank, 2002,Making Decentralization Work in Latin

Ame rica and the Caribbean. A backgroundpaper for the subnational developmentstra tegy. Sustainable Development De -part ment, Inter-American DevelopmentBank. Washington, DC: IDB.

———. 1996, Frame of Reference for IDB

Action in Programs for Modernization of

the State and Strengthening of Civil Soci-

ety. GN-1883-5. Strategic Planning andOperational policy department. Washing-ton, DC: IDB.

Johnson, C., Priya, D. and Start, D., 2005,Grounding the State: Devolution and De -

velopment in India's Panchayats, Journalof Development Studies 41 (6): 937–970.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M.,2007, Governance Matters VI: Governance

Indicators for 1996-2006, July 2007,World Bank Policy Research Working PaperNo. 4280. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=999979.

Kjellstrom, T., Ercado, S., Sami, M., Ha ver -mann, K. and Iwao, S., 2007, Achieving

Health Equity in Urban Settings, Journal ofUrban Health 84 (3): 1-6.

Laquian, A., 2005, Beyond Metropolis. ThePlanning and Go vernance of Asia’s Mega-Urban Regions. Washington, DC: WoodrowWilson Center. 488 p.

National Research Council, 2003, Cities

Transformed. Demographic Change andIts Implications in the Developing World.Wa shington, DC: US National Aca de miesof Science. 529 p.

Nelson C. A. and Foster, K. A., 1999, Me -

tro politan Governance Structure and In -

come Growth, Journal of Urban Affairs 21(3): 309-324.

Nickson, A., 1995, Local Government in

La tin America. London: Lynn Reiner Pub-lishers. 315 p.

Oates, W., 1972, Fiscal Federalism. NewYork: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Panniza, U. and Yanezs, M., 2006, Why Are

La tin Americans so Unhappy about Re -

forms?, IDB Research Department Work-ing Paper No. 567. Inter-American Devel-opment Bank. Washington, DC.

Peterson, G., 1997, Learning by Doing: De -

cen tralization and Policy in Latin America

and the Caribbean. Discussion Series, La tinAmerica Technical Department. Wa shing -ton, DC: World Bank.

Rodden, J., Eskeland, G. and Litvack, J.,2003, Fiscal Decentralization and the Chal-

lenge of Hard Budget Constraints. Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press. 476 p.

Rojas, E., Cuadrado-Roura, J. and Fernán-dez Güell, J. M. (eds.), 2005, Gobernar las

me trópolis. Washington, DC: Inter-Ameri-can Development Bank.


Rothblatt, D. N. and Sancton A. (eds.),1993, Metropolitan Governance-Ame ri -

can/ Ca na dian Intergovernmental Per-

spectives. Vo lu me One, North AmericanFe deralism Pro ject. Institute of Govern-mental Studies, University of California,Berkeley.

Salmon, P., 2002, Decentralization and

Supranationality: The Case of the Euro-

pean Union, in Ehtisham, H. and Tanzi, V.,“Ma na ging Fiscal De centralization”. Lon-don: Routledge.

Smoke, P., 2007, Fiscal Decentralization and

Intergo vern mental Relations in De veloping

Coun tries: Navigating a Viable Path to Re -

form. In De centralized Governance: Emer -

ging Concepts and Practice, Cheema, G. S.and Rondinelli, D. (eds.), Washington, DC:The Brookings Ins titution.

———. 2003, Decentralization and Local Go -

vernance in Africa, Special Issue. Pu blicAd mi nistration and Development 23 (4):7–16.

Spink, P. K., 2005, Growing Use of Conve-

nios, in Metropolitan Governance of Brazil.

Paper presented at University of Texas,Austin Conference on Metropolitan Gover-nance. March.

Stren, R. and Cameron, R., 2005, Metro -

po litan Governance Reform: An In tro -

duction, Public Administration and De - velopment 25 (4): 275–284. SpecialIssue: Metropolitan Governance Re form.

Swyngedouw, E. A., 1992, The Mammon

Quest. ‘Globalization’, In ter spatial Compe-

tition, and the Monetary Or der: The Con-

struction of New Scales, pp. 39-67 in Dun-ford, M. and Kafkalas, G. (eds.), “Ci tiesand Regions in the New Europe,” London:Belhaven Press.

Tendler, J., 1997, Good Governance in the

Tropics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Press.

Wescott, C., 2005, Fiscal Devolution in

East Asia. Asian Development Bank,Regional and Sustainable De velopmentDepartment. Manila: ADB.

Wescott, C. and Porter, D., 2002, Fiscal De -

centralization and Citizen Participation in

East Asia, Paper prepared for the AsianDe velopment Bank INDES workshop onFis cal Decentralization and Citizen Partici-pation in East Asia.

World Bank, 2003, Making Services Work

for Poor People. World Development Re -port 2004. London: World Bank and OxfordUniversity Press.

World Bank, 1997, World Development

Report 1997: The State in a Changing

World. Oxford: Oxford Uni versity Press.354 pages.


E C O - A U D I T

Environmental Benefits Statement

The World Bank is committed to preserv-ing endangered forests and naturalresources. The Office of the Publisher haschosen to print Decentralization and

Local Democracy in the World on recycled paper with 30 percent post-consumer waste, in accordance with therecommended standards for paper usageset by the Green Press Initiative, a non-profit program supporting publishers inusing fiber that is not sourced fromendangered forests. For more informa-tion, visit www.greenpressinitiative.org.

Saved:• 32 trees• 22 million British

thermal units of total energy

• 2,817 pounds ofnet greenhousegases

• 11,695 gallons ofwaste water

• 1,502 pounds ofsolid waste

This publication can be obtained electronically from UCLG or the World Bank:

www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/gold_report.asppublications. worldbank.org/ecommerce

Generalitatde Catalunya

ISBN 978-0-8213-7734-5

SKU 17734

Decentralization and local democracy in the world

The first Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization (GOLD) Report is one of the main products of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). It constitutes a global reference on decentralization by presenting the contemporary situation of local governments in all regions of the world. The report analyzes local authorities in each continent under three main themes: the evolution of territorial structures; responsibilities and power, management, and finances; and local democracy. An additional chapter is dedicated to the governance of large metropolises, where rapid growth presents major challenges, in particular in the fast-developing countries of the South. This report also offers a comparative overview of the different realities concerning the state of decentralization, and how the basic indispensable mechanisms for local democracy do, or do not exist in some countries. Relationships between the state and local authorities are evolving toward innovative forms of cooperation. In this context, the role of local authorities in the development of global policies is increasingly recognized. The GOLD Report is the first of what will be a triennial publication.

UCLG represents and defends the interests of local governments on the world stage, regardless of the size of the communities they serve. Headquartered in Barcelona, the organization’s stated mission is: To be the united voice and world advocate of democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives and interests, through cooperation between local governments, and within the wider international community.

decentralization and local democracy in the world

Documents