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Decentralization, Democracy and

Human Rights: A Human Rights‐based

Analysis of the Impact of Local

Democratic Reforms on DevelopmentNancy Thede

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Decentralization, Democracy and Human Rights: A Human Rights-based Analysis of the Impact of Local Democratic Reforms on Development

NANCY THEDE

Nancy Thede is an anthropologist and Professor of International Relations

in the Departement de Science Politique, Universite du Quebec a Montreal,Canada

Abstract This article is situated at the intersection of the debates over therole of democracy in enhancing development and regarding human rights-based approaches to development. Decentralization acts as a lens through which the interaction of democratization, development, and human rightscan be analysed in concrete local contexts. The analysis presented here, of the impact of decentralization in seven developing countries on localpolitical participation and on the quality of enjoyment of education andhealth as economic and social rights, illustrates some of the limits of thedemocratization process, and the policy relevance of a rights-basedapproach to this process. By approaching decentralization as aneminently political process, I will attempt to gauge whether or not theprocess potentially contributes to addressing the limits of democratization, particularly as concerns problems of exclusion.

Key words: Decentralization, Democratization, Human rights, Localdevelopment, Local services

Introduction

Democratization, development and human rights are increasingly recog-nized to be related processes with complex interactions amongstthemselves. Development itself is being redefined to reflect its nature asa multidimensional phenomenon, and can be construed to mean the fullrealization of human potential. Democracy is also conceived as key to thatprocess, and has since the mid-1990s become included as a legitimate fieldfor development cooperation. The idea that human rights are a necessary complement to both has been widely affirmed (for example, in the 1993

Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action); the definition of poverty from a

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2009

ISSN 1945-2829 print/ISSN 1945-2837 online/09/010103-21 # 2009 United Nations Development Programme

DOI: 10.1080/14649880802675317



human rights perspective1 is eloquent in its illustration of the relationshipamongst the three processes. Moreover, research has revealed that themajor shortcomings of democratization processes of the ‘third wave’ arerelated to the non-effectivity of rights (civil, social and economic rights in

particular) for broad sectors of the population. Major reforms have beenintroduced at the local level in new democracies within decentralizationprogrammes. An examination of the inter-relationship of the threeprocesses (development, democratization, human rights) in the contextof decentralized local governance will allow us to identify some of their strong points and lacunae. Additionally, by applying criteria based onhuman rights principles and standards, we can pinpoint the specific areas where progress has been made and where it is wanting.

This article examines this triangular relationship in the context of decentralization using research material from seven developing countries.The next section explains the general context of decentralization reformssince the early 1990s and its links with democratization. The third sectionsets out some of the major characteristics of decentralization processesand their variation from one country to another. In the fourth section,material from the seven case studies demonstrates the variety of impacts of decentralization on development, democracy and rights. The followingsection provides a human rights-based analysis of two specific areas withindecentralization, those of primary health and education. The conclusionhighlights three issues: the impact of decentralization on human rights;the impact of decentralization on democratization; and the impact of improved social rights on deepening democracy. It maintains that progress

has been made on all three of the interrelated processes in the context of decentralization, but that a human rights-based analysis reveals issues thatotherwise tend to remain invisible (such as problems of accountability),and thus allows us to better understand not only progress but also theobstacles to democratization and development in the local context.

Decentralization policies and democratization

The promotion of decentralization has become a concerted policy on thepart of donor agencies and the international financial institutions, andbelongs to a series of governance reforms promoted since the early 1990s.The explicit objective of such programmes is to improve transparency,participation and accountability in political systems. They have given riseto numerous debates amongst practitioners and researchers regardingtheir underlying political and economic aims and their impact for localcitizens. One of the main themes of this debate is whether decentralizationpromotes further democratization, or simply allows the central state todivest itself of responsibilities at the expense of local communities.

Decentralization as democratic reform over the past 15 years has beeninspired by two separate political logics: on the one hand, that of the pro-

democracy movements in southern countries; and on the other, the

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governance reforms piloted by the international financial institutions(IFIs). The pro-democracy movements (Philippines, West Bengal, theformer Soviet Union are cases in point) — broad coalitions within civilsociety that played a key role in overturning authoritarian regimes — saw

decentralization as a safeguard against the concentration of political power in the hands of non-democratic leaders: it would allow for greater citizenparticipation in the political process at all levels. For the IFIs, on the other hand, these measures were conceived as a means to overcome thepersistent obstacles to transparency, aid effectiveness and access to basicsocial services in developing countries. While the IFIs also refer to thedemocratizing potential of decentralization, they construe it instrumen-tally, as a means of enhancing the attainment of other objectives. In theactual development of decentralization policy and its application, thesetwo trends converge around the necessity for devolution of power andresponsibility to local government, but each targets distinct priorities,assumptions and objectives. Thus, the apparent consensus as to the needfor decentralization often obscures heterogeneity of interests andobjectives. This is rendered even more complex in some cases by thepresence of a third type of actor; namely, regionalist movements (as inBolivia) that exert strong pressure on central government for regionalautonomy, their concern being to devolve power to a middle stratum of political actors, rather than to the local level. This may explain why assessments of decentralization tend to diametrically opposed conclu-sions: some authors claim that it is simply one more aspect of the neo-liberal prescription for downsizing the central state (for example,Campbell, 2001; Kohl, 2002, p. 465), while others are equally adamantthat genuine or ‘democratic’ decentralization contributes to bothdemocratization and development (Manor, 1999; Jutting et al ., 2005, p. 2).

Underlying these competing claims is the fact that most of theresearch on the subject lacks a properly political framework for under-standing the dynamics of the local political sphere. In order to adequately comprehend the process and impacts of decentralization, it is necessary toconceptualize it first and foremost as political process; that is, as a series of conflicting — although sometimes convergent — initiatives by differentgroups and individuals attempting to promote specific interests and ideals,

and translating differential symbolic and material investments or stakes inthe potential outcomes of the change in the local balance of power thatdecentralization represents.

Seen in the context of the lacunae of the third-wave democracies,decentralization does appear to hold out at least a potential remedy for addressing their limits. These are of two orders. The first is that labelled variously as ‘uncivil’ democracies (Holston, 1998), ‘truncated democracy’(Thede, 2002), ‘illiberal democracy’ (Oxhorn, 2003), and so on. All theseanalyses refer to what O’Donnell (2001) aptly describes as political systems where political rights (the rights to vote, to free, fair and periodic

elections, to stand for election, etc.) are well institutionalized and

Decentralization, Democracy and Human Rights

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effective, but where all the other rights generally considered to be anintegral part of liberal democracy — civil rights (notably equality beforethe law, access to justice), but also economic, social and cultural rights(and O’Donnell demonstrates their enabling role with respect to political

rights) — are poorly and unequally institutionalized and are not effectivefor large sectors of the population. Furthermore — and this is the secondorder of limit referred to above — Thede (2005) has shown that, althoughdemocratization has opened the political sphere to a broader spectrum of political tendencies than previously, the political personnel continues tobe drawn from the same social classes. In other words, despitedemocratization, certain sectors of the population — women, indigenouspeoples, the poor and others — continue to be excluded from effectiveexercise even of their political rights. These lacunae illustrate the intimaterelationship between effectiveness of rights (particularly those recognizedin the international human rights instruments), the quality of democracy,and the social and economic conditions that are to a large extent theterrain of development efforts.

Can decentralization overcome these obstacles by deepening democ-racy? Yes, but only to the extent that decentralization delivers on its promisesof enhancing access to the political sphere for local citizens and of renderingrights more effective. The task is to assess whether such a trend actually existsin concrete cases of decentralization in new democracies.

In fact, decentralization processes are underway in the majority of new democracies in the developing south and in countries of Eastern andCentral Europe. These reforms have transferred responsibility for —

amongst other things — delivery of basic social services to municipalgovernments. Most of these services are also internationally protectedhuman rights, such as health, education, housing, water and sanitation.2

The rest of this article will address the nature of the inter-relationshipsamong the three processes under review by presenting an overview of decentralization processes and impacts in seven third-wave democracies(Bolivia, West Bengal in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Senegal,Tanzania, the Ukraine),3 looking specifically at questions of participationand access to health and education.

Variation of decentralization processes

Despite the apparent consensus surrounding the desirability of decen-tralization in developing countries, and despite the uniform nature of the‘decentralization prescription’ from the donor community, it remainshazardous to generalize about decentralization, either amongst or withincountries. Local political context is a major determinant of the specificcontours that decentralization can adopt. Indeed, a political analysis of decentralization must start from the premise that any reform must beunderstood within the context of how it is ‘inhabited’ by political forces at

work in the local arena.4

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Notwithstanding this, international donors propose a surprisingly consistent menu of prescriptions for decentralization, including election of local authorities, a redefinition and redistribution of powers and responsi-bilities between central government and local governments (LGs), and the

creation of citizen oversight bodies. Their rationale for such changes iscouched in terms of greater democratization, efficiency, transparency,participation, a better match between government programmes, citizenpreferences and local conditions, better access to basic services, eliminationof corruption, and increased local resource mobilization (see, for example,Litvak etal ., 1998; Burki etal ., 1999; OECD-DAC GovernanceNetwork, 2003;UNDP, 2004). Clearly, it would appear relatively easy to predict that theconcrete results will not always correspond to such an optimistic list of expectations. In particular, many decentralization sceptics predict that localelections will not automatically bring about greater participation and lesscorruption, and they express their preoccupation that social service delivery will suffer, particularly in areas where the local tax base is skimpy (amongstothers, Kalin, 2000; Schou, 2000; Johnson, 2001; Ribot, 2002; Hiskey andSeligson, 2003; Kohl, 2003).

Why, then, do pro-democracy movements, as well as a broad range of social movements, want decentralization? Three central ambitions of civilsociety movements (local democratization, exercise of citizen voice in localdevelopment priorities, devolution of political power) are part of the‘decentralization package’ as it has been implemented — albeit withenormous variations — in the over 80% of developing and transitioncountries that are applying it.

Decentralization is the devolution of power, responsibilities andresources from the central state to regional and local levels of the politicaland administrative structure (Manor, 1999).5 It thus covers a huge variety of institutional arrangements, and, although there is no single recipe for decentralization from one country to another, there are several featuresthat can nonetheless be found in the majority of decentralizationarrangements.

First, democratization of the local political sphere is instituted in mostcases. This can take a range of forms, the most basic being theinstitutionalization of local elections for mayor, city councillors and other positions. Other, less common, forms include the creation of innovative venues for public participation and oversight. Such venues include localdevelopment committees (Philippines), health and education councils(Senegal, Tanzania, Bolivia), elected oversight committees (Bolivia), andparticipatory development planning processes, often including participa-tory budgets (Bolivia, Tanzania).

A second feature is devolution of the responsibility for a varying set of social services previously directly provided by the central state. These mostoften include primary health and primary education, but also sometimessocial housing, water and sewage disposal, and occasionally others such as

agricultural development, environment, tourism, and so forth.


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The third general feature is the transfer of financial, and in some caseshuman, resources from the central state to the municipalities to enablethem to undertake the transferred responsibilities. The amount of financialtransfers is often a bone of contention, and may be determined on the

basis of a formula (Philippines, Bolivia, West Bengal)

6

or is discretionary (Senegal, Tanzania), the second option obviously being problematic for LGs and subject to non-transparent manipulation by central authorities.Transfer of human resources can also be quite problematic by provokingresistance from unions, especially in cases where the financial resources of municipal governments (thus, their capacity to pay public employees) areunstable due to discretionary transfer payments. The actual level of transfers thus varies widely from one country to another, and is more or less adequate to cover the real costs of the responsibilities that have beentransferred.7

The fourth common feature is the authorization to LGs to raise their own funds through a variety of local taxes, fees, private borrowing anddirect recourse to international development funds. This is one of themost highly contested aspects of decentralization, since it may easily giverise to radical disparities in service delivery between localities with a goodtax base (through tourism, commerce and industry, etc.) and those poor,isolated communities with few resources. It may also become a breedingground for irresponsible borrowing and even corruption. Moreover, notall LGs have equal capacity to solicit and obtain international developmentfunding.8 Critics thus often tend to see this as evidence of the neo-liberalbias of decentralization programmes, in that this is the aspect of theprocess that most clearly allows the central state to divest itself of financialcommitments and to put unrealistic demands on local authorities andcitizens.

Each decentralization process has a legal framework, and the type of legal recognition can be extremely important in determining the level of stability of the process, and is a reflection of the political support it has onthe part of the central government. The strongest form of institutionalbacking for decentralization is through constitutional amendment (WestBengal, Philippines, Tanzania, Ukraine). A less stable form is a specific law or set of laws defining and implementing the process (Bolivia, Senegal).

Finally, the weakest form of institutionalization is decentralization throughdecree or through ad hoc or sectoral policy statement (Pakistan).9

Table 1 summarizes the above features and illustrates the variety of arrangements in the seven countries that are part of this sample.

Numerous factors underlie the variations that appear in thiscomparison. They are largely due to the specific configuration of political forces and influences at play in a given country, and the fact thatprecise contours of the decentralization process evolve over time as aresult of changing political alignments. Bolivia can serve as anillustration here: the Sanchez de Lozada regime instituted decentraliza-

tion with the Law of Popular Participation in 1994, in a context where it

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Table 1. Variety of decentralization arrangements.

Country

component

Bolivia Philippines India (West

Bengal)

Senegal Tanzania

Legal framework Laws of: PoliticalParticipation (1994);

Decentralization

(1995); Municipalities

(1999); National

Dialogue (2001)

Constitution(1987); Local

Government

Code (1991)

Constitution (73and 74 Amm.

1993); West

Bengal Municipal

Act (1994)

Law of Collectivities;Law of Territorial

administration; Law

of Transfer of

Responsibilities (all

1996)

Constitution(1984 Amm.),

eight laws

Responsibilities

transferred

Primary health and

education,

infrastructure, local

hospitals, local

development,

culture, sports,

gender

Health, education,

housing social

welfare, environ-

ment, agriculture,

public works,

tourism,

investment, etc.

Public health,

slum

improvement,

water,

sanitation, others

Health, education,

habitat, planning,

natural resource

management, youth,

sports, culture,

others

Health,

education,

water, others

Revenues Formula: 20% of

national budget;

local taxes;

international

cooperation

Formula: 40% of

central govern-

ment revenues;

local taxes; direct

loans

Programme-based

from central and

state government;

Local fees

Varying level of core

funding; local taxes;

international coop-

eration

Programme

based; local

taxes

Local electoral

system

Political parties and

citizen candidates;

reserved seats

Political parties Political parties;

reserved seats

Political parties Political parties

reserved seats

Participation

mechanisms

Territorially Based

Organizations (OTBs),school and health

committees,

monitoring committees

Local

developmentboards

Ward and village

assemblies

Elected health

committees; othersat discretion of

local council

Health and

schoolcommittees

Note: Adapted from ICHRP (2005).

1 0 9



was under no pressure from social movements to do so but where there was a strong push from regional elites in the resource-rich Amazonianbasin for autonomy (which Sanchez thus tried to undercut throughdecentralization), at the same time as he had strong support from

international donors for his economic reforms, and they strongly supported his decentralization plan, which eventually won over supportfrom social movements due to its progressive provisions for localparticipation. When the more right-wing Banzer government came tooffice, it redefined some aspects of decentralization, most notably by adding regionalization to satisfy pressures from regional elites for autonomy. The opening of the local political sphere, and the introduc-tion of LGs in rural communities, stimulated the rise of the Movimiento

al Socialismo (the party of President Evo Morales, elected in December 2005) by giving it a foothold in a large number of municipalities, beforeit was able to make inroads into national politics. In a new set of developments, the government and social movements allied with it arenow proposing that the Constituent Assembly transforms the process toallow for traditional forms of local self-government. Thus, far from beinga strictly administrative arrangement, the nature of decentralizationprocesses is determined by the interaction of the different political andsocial forces that see the local level as a stake in political struggle at thenational, as well as subnational, level.

Sectoral impacts of decentralization

The comparison of the seven countries examined here demonstratesseveral general trends concerning the areas of LG responsibility. In all of them, venues for political participation and voice have broadened: in all,LGs are now directly elected by the local population. In most, however — with the exception of Bolivia, where citizen coalitions can field candidates — only candidates of officially registered political parties can stand for election. In some countries, a proportion of the seats on the local councilare reserved for minority groups that would otherwise have little chance of electing their representatives (women in Bolivia, Tanzania, West Bengal;scheduled tribes and castes in West Bengal; religious minorities inPakistan). In addition, certain innovations allow for greater citizenoversight of the activities of the elected local administration: electedoversight committees in Bolivia, or periodic citizen assemblies in WestBengal or Tanzania. Collaborative planning mechanisms have beeninstituted in the form of consultative local planning exercises (Bolivia,Tanzania — in principle also in Pakistan) or local development councils(Philippines). In some countries, sectoral mechanisms for citizen inputexist: health committees in Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania; educationcommittees in Bolivia and Tanzania. Furthermore, some LGs havethemselves created venues for citizens. This has taken place in individual

municipalities in Senegal and Philippines, and it illustrates how some local

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forces make use of the new political space created under decentralizationto expand participation.

As a result, the potential for citizen participation and voice hasincreased in all cases under decentralization, whatever the institutional

arrangement. There is, however, enormous variation from one locality toanother in the way these activities are carried out, and in their results — ranging from constructive cooperation between authorities, civil society organizations and individual citizens, to extremely perverse applicationssuch as persecution of women and scheduled caste councillors in someIndian states (although not in West Bengal) (Mathew, 2002), elite captureof health committees in Senegal (Institut Africain de Gestion Urbaine,2000), and recycling of traditional political party elites at the municipallevel and deadlocks between the local administration and oversightcommittees in Bolivia (Lujan Veneros, 2004), to name but a few. Here,

again, the wide variation even within a single country, where allmunicipalities are under a single regime of decentralized politicalinstitutions, is due to the resilience of the forms of domination andpolitical conflict present in the local political arena prior to theintroduction of institutional reforms under decentralization. At the locallevel as well, then, decentralization must be approached as an issue atstake in the evolving power relations amongst existing and emerging socialactors.

As concerns the impact of decentralization in the major areas of responsibility transferred to LGs, we will concentrate on issues of primary health and education, since these are the two sectors most commonly under municipal authority in the various countries in our sample (allexcept West Bengal, where primary education is not devolved tomunicipalities) and are central to development objectives. Both arehuman rights protected by the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights. They have also been substantially elaboratedupon in General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) and by the Special Rapporteurs onEducation and Health. Local government responsibility differs somewhatin character and scope from one country to another in each case;therefore, our analysis of impacts will be based on the broad common-

alities from one case to another.In the field of primary education, LGs are most often responsible for

providing and maintaining basic infrastructure (classrooms, furnishings,sometimes teacher housing) and facilitating dialogue between parents andschool authorities and personnel through education committees. In mostcases, teachers are hired and paid through the national Ministry of Education, while LGs are at least partially responsible for financingconstruction of infrastructure (often through mobilizing community labour). In order to raise funds, some municipalities charge parents anaccess fee per pupil (in Tanzania, one-half of the municipal resources for

primary education come from such fees, according to Gershberg and


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Winkler, 2004). Observed results in every case we studied are unequivocal:the number of classrooms in local communities has increased across theboard, as has pupil enrolment, including amongst girls. There are also,however, signs of creeping discrepancies amongst communities, due to

the unstable character of financial transfers, on the one hand, and thepotential of the local tax base to generate additional revenues, on theother. Wealthier communities go beyond their mandate to providesecondary or specialized education facilities and to hire their ownteachers.

From the perspective of international human rights (IHR), the centralstate is the ultimate guarantor of the obligations to respect, protect andfulfil rights, even where responsibility for implementation has beendevolved to lower levels of government. This means that the centralgovernment must develop national criteria and monitoring systems to

ensure compliance with its international human rights obligations. IHR law requires that compulsory primary education be provided free of charge to all children (UNCESCR, 1999a, para. 1; 1999b, para. 10). Theimposition of charges, whether overt or veiled, by LGs or by individualschools is thus prohibited. Moreover, the prohibition on discrimination issubject neither to progressive realization nor to availability of resources(UNCESCR, 1999b, para. 31): this applies to discrimination based ongender, ethnic, religious or linguistic origin, or geographic location,amongst others. In fact, though, as noted above, a trend is emergingtowards greater access to such services in wealthier municipalities. Hence, while the increases in educational infrastructure are enhancing access tothe human right to education, growing resource disparities amongstlocalities may undermine it.

The picture in the area of primary health is more complex. In all our cases, LGs have responsibility for primary health. This usually meansprovision of the infrastructure for health posts and clinics throughout theterritory of the municipality, while the Ministry of Health provides medicalpersonnel and pharmaceuticals. In all cases, the quality and quantity of theprimary health service at the local level has increased, including in ruralareas. In addition to transfer payments from the central government, incountries participating in the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC II)

programme (e.g. Bolivia, Tanzania), LGs receive funds from the ‘commonbasket’ for health. In most cases, LGs have introduced fees for access tohealth services and medicines. In general, pregnant women and infantchildren are exempt from access fees, and in some cases they are coveredby a national government health insurance programme. Some LGs sellmedicines as a means of reimbursing costs incurred. Here again, wealthier communities tend to go beyond their mandate by directly hiring additionalhealth personnel and acquiring a broader range of pharmaceuticalproducts.

The provisions in IHR law regarding health are similar to those

concerning education: all people are entitled to the highest attainable

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standard of physical and mental health; it remains the responsibility of thecentral state to ensure this. Discrimination on any grounds is prohibited.In addition, health is dependent on the realization of other rights, such asfood, housing and environmental safety. Gender equality and diversity

(sexual, ethnic) take on particular importance when assessing access tohealth (see Hunt, 2004).Governments have a particular responsibility to promote health, in

addition to respect, protect and fulfil that right. Here, as in education, theincreased infrastructure provided by decentralization advances the right tohealth, while the growing inequalities amongst communities and variousforms of — sometimes implicit — economic and social discrimination arehindering it.

In summary, decentralization has had positive impacts on politicalparticipation in at least some cases, and has increased access to basichealth and education services for the vast majority of the population indeveloping countries, including the rural poor. It has made moreresources available to LGs to undertake programmes in these areas.True, this situation must be set against the context of structuraladjustment that immediately preceded it, where social services were virtually abandoned by central governments under pressure from theIFIs (Mukandala and Peter, 2004): it is thus not necessarily decentraliza-tion per se that is behind these improvements, but rather the infusion of new resources for social services in itself. At the same time, in most casesthe financial transfers from central to local governments are far fromadequate to cover the costs of the responsibilities transferred. This

widespread problem of unfunded mandates has deepened the depen-dency of LGs on international donors, and in many cases on lendinginstitutions.

A human rights perspective on decentralized health andeducation

On first glance, the development impact of decentralization appearsmoderately positive — perhaps surprisingly so, given the criticisms of decentralization as being part of the Washington Consensus inspired driveto downsize the state. Decentralization has in effect made more resourcesavailable for local service delivery in basic health and education. In somecases, it has gone much further than that, as well. To the extent that thedevelopment agenda can be seen to be adequately reflected in the trend topoverty reduction,10 the improvement in access to primary services for thepopulation in general might be taken as a reasonable indicator of enhanced development. Certainly, if sustained over the mid-term, better health and education services for the entire population should result inimproved levels of human development. On this basis, some wouldconsider that the human rights to education and health are thus fulfilled.

From a human rights perspective, however, a strictly quantitative basis for


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assessment is inadequate, and is not consistent with a multidimensionalapproach to development, as outlined in the Introduction.

A human rights approach is intrinsically holistic in that it takes intoaccount the qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions of an activity or

policy. Rather than a static set of legal norms, standards and treaties,human rights can be taken as a body of criteria that can be analytically applied to reveal the extent of progress or obstacles in democratizationand development processes. Indeed, the content of economic and socialrights such as health and education goes far beyond quantitative measures,and includes considerations regarding equity, participation, non-discrimi-nation, quality and others.

Although the qualitative principles underlying ‘the’ human rightsapproach have not been formally defined, it is possible to construe ananalytical matrix of such principles on the basis of the major documents.

Our proposal

11

is based, on the one hand, on a reading of the principlesunderlying the human rights framework in general and, on the other, onthe four standards specific to economic and social rights, proposed by theSpecial Rapporteur on Health (Hunt, 2004) and on Education(Tomasevski, 2004).

The three underlying principles are the following:12

N Participation: Included in both the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights and in the interpretation of economic and social rights,13

participation is the right to take part in the political decisions affectingone’s life; it must be free and meaningful, as well as comprehensive.

People are entitled to participate in planning and monitoring theimplementation of a right.

N Non-discrimination: This is an immediate and non-derogable obliga-tion of states, and discrimination cannot be justified on any grounds(e.g. religious, gender, ethnic, age, class, physical, etc.). It implies bothequity and inclusion.

N Accountability: IHR set out duties and responsibilities, and establish theprinciple that the conduct of duty-bearers (most notably, the State)should be assessed and that legal recourse must be provided to rights-bearers in order to ensure respect of states’ international obligations.

When applying these principles to the issue of decentralization, it isessential to remember that local government constitutes a tier of the State,and is therefore also bound by the international obligations contracted by the central state.

Four standards for economic, social and cultural rights have beenexplicitly set out in the work of the Special Rapporteurs on education andhealth; they have subsequently been integrated into the GeneralComments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,elaborating on the content and implications of each right. These four standards cover both qualitative and quantitative aspects of rights, and all

four must be met for each and every right. They are the following:

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N Availability: The service designed to implement the right must exist insufficient quantity to meet the needs of the entire populationconcerned.

N Accessibility: The geographical distribution and cost of services must be

such that all sectors of the population can use them withoutdiscrimination. Primary education must be provided free of charge.The State must provide services to those who cannot afford them ontheir own.

N Acceptability: The provision of services must respect cultural values,norms and practices of all groups within the population. They must beof good quality.

N Adaptability: The form and content of the service should adapt todiversity and changing needs, context and standards.

Although it is impossible to make a hard-and-fast distinction between the

two dimensions, it is analytically useful to separate as far as possiblequalitative results from quantitative ones, so that the former are notconcealed by the latter. Thus, whereas the first two standards concernmainly quantitative issues (numbers of people served, costs, etc.), the thirdand fourth standards aim to test for qualitative transformations (culturalsensitivity, variability, flexibility, etc.).

These principles and standards can be used to construct ananalytical matrix for assessing specific aspects of decentralization: seeTable 2. Each of the four standards is applied to the issue under consideration, and is additionally analysed in terms of each of the three

principles. By using the principles (participation, non-discrimination,accountability) and standards (availability, accessibility, acceptability andadaptability) as a matrix rather than as a set of discrete indicators, it ispossible to locate specific gains or shortcomings in — for example — local government programmes in health, education or other areas. Thefollowing example shows how this matrix can be applied to analyse localprimary education services.

By applying the matrix, it becomes evident that a series of issues wereobscured by the positive quantitative results readily discernible indecentralization processes (i.e. more classrooms, more health posts,etc.). The matrix leads us to examine each of the principles on the basis of the four standards, thereby highlighting both quantitative and qualitativedimensions. Findings and results can be briefly stated as follows.

In the area of participation, many new mechanisms have beenestablished at the local level, and the number of people involved — particularly amongst the traditionally excluded (women, indigenouspeoples) — has increased. To that extent, the standards of availability and accessibility of means of participation show progress. But what of thequality of that participation? It is free, but is it meaningful? The extent to which the excluded bring their own priorities and perspectives to thesenew political fora is often minimal. Local elites of various stripes continue

to set priorities, even in such grassroots venues as local health committees.


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The qualitative development of participation (acceptability, adaptability)has not automatically followed its quantitative progress.The same holds true of non-discrimination or inclusion: while efforts

have been made to increase the number of services (availability) for excluded communities (e.g. in rural areas) and to reduce physical or financial obstacles to reaching them (accessibility), very little has beendone to ensure their effective access by adapting services to traditionalpractices or local languages, or — for that matter — social barriers(acceptability, adaptability).

As concerns accountability, often one of the key justifications for decentralization in the eyes of donors, important efforts have been madeto render local government accountable to citizens. Elected LGs have beena centrepiece of this strategy but, while necessary, they are not sufficient toensure rights-based development. The imperative of re-election over-shadows the commitment by local administrations to implement pro-grammes in a manner that fulfils human rights obligations. In particular,LGs tend to spend their resources on projects with rapid visibility, rather than on investments that take time to reveal their benefits. Thus, electionsin and of themselves are rather blunt instruments of accountability. Inorder to provide genuine accountability for specific commitments andactions, mechanisms of legal accountability, including judicial recourse,

are necessary and are a fundamental component of human rights

Table 2. Matrix for the application of standards and principles (example of the right to education).

Standard Content Principles

Availability Does compulsory, free

primary schooling exist in

sufficient quantity throughout the territory?

Do venues for free and meaningful participation of

parents, teachers, pupils exist in all schools?

Is schooling non-discriminatory?Do school and municipal authorities provide timely and

accurate accounts of their responsibilities? Do they

respect , protect and fulfil the right to education?

Accessibility Are schools physically and

financially accessible to the

entire school-age population

throughout the territory?

Are pupils/teachers/parents able to participate without

financial or physical barriers?

Are any specific groups systematically discriminated

against in their access to schooling?

Are mechanisms to ensure accountability accessible to all

persons throughout the territory?

Acceptability Are content and pedagogy

geared to the capacity and

cultural diversity of pupilsand their communities?

Do the process and content of participation take into

account the cultural diversity of the population?

Are all cultural groups and minorities equally served, without discrimination?

Do accountability mechanisms allow for cultural

diversity?

Adaptability Do the structures, content

and processes of education

evolve according to changing

internal and external needs

and demands?

Do the nature and form of participation evolve with these

changes?

Is there a view to counter new forms of discrimination?

Do the efforts to respect , protect and fulfil take into

account the changing context?

Note: Adapted from ICHRP (2005).

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requirements. Such modes of accountability are virtually absent fromdecentralized local government, and this lack of enforcement of account-ability constitutes a major weakness of decentralization: even thequantitative standards, in this case, are poorly met.

The results for each of the four standards individually — availability,accessibility, acceptability and adaptability — also demonstrate discre-pancy between quantitative and qualitative outcomes. On the first twocounts — largely quantitative in nature — new programmes andmechanisms have been put in place in most decentralization programmes. As mentioned above, more basic health and primary education facilitiesexist and they are used by a greater number of poor people. The other twostandards are arguably of a more qualitative nature, and the results are notas unequivocal as for the first two. In fact, in the vast majority of cases very little has been attempted to enhance the qualitative aspect of decentraliza-

tion of social services. An assessment of the results of decentralization initiatives on the basisof the human rights matrix produces a more holistic view of itsdevelopment impact. By rendering explicit the requirements of thehuman rights framework, the matrix obliges us to look further than thequantitative results, favourable as these may appear. The link it establishesbetween qualitative and quantitative criteria forces the analyst to examinea variety of dimensions that might otherwise have remained outside theanalysis because they are often absent from decentralization schemes. Thematrix reveals two issues. First, decentralization has in most cases led toimprovements in the number of basic services available to localpopulations, and in the variety and accessibility of entry points to them.It is important to underline this, as it is sometimes assumed in the criticalliterature that decentralization will lead to no real improvement in servicesfor the population. Second, however, such quantitative improvements donot fulfil a rights-based agenda for development, an agenda that calls for both qualitative and quantitative results. The qualitative requirements of human rights are not satisfied in most decentralization schemes underway in developing countries. Such strictly quantitative results may not fulfil adevelopment agenda either, since qualitative considerations such asempowerment are increasingly part of the definition of development itself.

An eloquent example of the complex relationship between thequantitative and the qualitative is provided by field research in Bolivia (dela Fuente and Vasquez, 2005). There, despite evidence that decentraliza-tion has had no demonstrable impact on poverty reduction, peopleinterviewed from rural indigenous communities claim that decentraliza-tion has brought them greater wealth. The apparent contradiction isexplained in part by the greater access to basic services (particularly primary education), which opens greater prospects for future economicadvancement, especially of off-spring. But, perhaps more important hasbeen the introduction of mechanisms for local voice and control over

decision-making: citizens feel empowered as never before and, as a


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consequence, consider themselves wealthier. This example highlights theintimate link between the subjective and objective dimensions of poverty or development — or, rather, the impossibility of assessing suchphenomena exclusively or primarily on the basis of tangible ‘measurables’.

It also suggests that the political dimension of development (i.e.democratization) is at least as precious to the rural poor as its economiccontent and impact.

Conclusions

This article began by placing the decentralization agenda for southerncountries in the context of the two poles of democratization anddevelopment. By attempting to understand decentralization as aneminently political process, it aimed to assess whether the process

contributes to addressing the limits of third-wave democracies, particularly as concerns problems of social and political exclusion. An approach basedon human rights was seen to be appropriate, since the lacunae of new democracies are situated to a large extent in the fact of the non-realizationof social and economic rights. What do the results of this transversal study reveal, therefore, about the triangular relationship amongst social rights,decentralization and democratization?

The question can be analysed on three levels: first, the nature of theimpact of decentralization on key social rights (in our case, primary healthand education); second, what is the effect decentralization on democra-

tization?; and, finally, is there evidence of a positive relationship betweenimproved social rights and deepening democracy?

Impact of decentralization on social rights

Using the internationally protected human rights to primary health andeducation as proxies for the broader category of economic and socialrights is justified, in our view, by the status of these rights in both adevelopment perspective (because of their necessity for the sustainable well-being of individuals and communities) and in one that centres ondemocratization (due to the role of these two rights in enabling citizens toexercise other rights).

The results of our study are similar as concern the two rights analysed.Decentralization appears to have introduced a contradictory movementconcerning health and education. On the one hand, it has infused moreresources to the local level and thereby made available more venues andmore accessible ones for health (local clinics and health posts) andeducation (more classrooms, more teachers, progress in the number of school-age children enrolled). In this sense, it has been positive. On theother hand, it also introduces a trend towards greater differentiationamongst municipalities, with those possessing greater resources able to

provide themselves with higher quality services than less well endowed

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localities. The development of this trend, if left unchecked (e.g. by targeted central government programmes and policies), is likely toaccentuate exclusion, since the less fortunate localities are precisely those whose members are in their majority from traditionally excluded groups.

In addition, the analysis we carried out using the grid composed of human rights principles and standards shows that the quantitativerequirements tend to be fulfilled by decentralization, whereas thequalitative requirements remain elusive.

Democratization in decentralization

Decentralization processes have gone some way towards democratizationthrough introducing political reforms for representative democracy at thelocal level. The most common of these is the introduction of periodiccompetitive elections for local political bodies. Some systems build inmethods of representation of the excluded, through reserved seats. Thesereforms are also often accompanied by the introduction of venues for participatory democracy, such as consultative development plans, partici-patory budgets or tripartite sectoral committees.

These are important for democratization. Local elections are anecessary aspect of democracy. But are they sufficient to ensure genuinerepresentation of the traditionally excluded? The answer varies from onemunicipality to another within a single country: competitive elections canallow the excluded to organize and elect representatives with a broader political programme. But often the local electoral dynamic has seen former elites recycle themselves as new democrats, and even those elected toreserved seats may toe the party line rather than advocate for the excluded.Participatory venues can increase democratic participation, but they canalso be rendered ineffective or even counter-productive through becomingdominated by elites or specific interest groups.

These observations highlight the assertion made at the outset of thisarticle — that decentralization takes place in, and becomes part of, apolitical sphere that is rife with competition and occupied by pre-existinghierarchies, alliances, conflicts and configurations of power. The localpower context into which decentralization is introduced will shape the

reforms and structures to an extent that makes each locality an individualcase. Democratization is advanced through the introduction of elections,but this does not necessarily increase access for the excluded. It does,however, create the potential space for that access.

Social rights and democratization

As the human rights grid used above illustrates, social rights intertwine acomplex combination of economic and political, quantitative andqualitative dimensions. In general, the progress brought about by

decentralization has been in the quantitative dimensions. But, as the grid


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also demonstrates, the two are difficult, if not impossible, to separate. Theonly unequivocal evidence is that primary health and education are moreavailable and more accessible at the local level, including to the poor andto those communities that benefited little from them prior to decentraliza-

tion.Does the enhancement of access to social rights improve democracy?There is as yet tenuous evidence that this is the case. First, because of themutually reinforcing relationship (as reported from Bolivia, above)between greater democratic space, greater access to primary health andeducation, and the opinion of the excluded that they are indeed better off.Second, the probability that better health and higher levels of literacy willcontribute over time to more active and informed participation in thedemocratic process, particularly by those who, without decentralization, would have fewer prospects for doing so.

In sum, does decentralization deepen democracy by rendering humanrights more effective? The answer, based on this survey of seven countries,is a very qualified ‘yes’. Decentralization creates toe-holds for theexcluded, by providing new venues for access to basic services and for political voice. But the actual ability of the excluded to benefit from themplays out differently in each context, and in relation to the localconfiguration of political power. An analysis based on internationalhuman rights principles and standards is instrumental in rendering visiblethe complex relationship between the political and the economic in theprocess of institutionalization of social rights.

Notes

1 The following definition of poverty was developed by the Office of the HighCommisioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2002: ‘‘the sustained or chronicdeprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic,political and social rights’’ (Robinson, 2004, p. 28).

2 The status of these services as internationally protected human rights is clear in theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), ratified by 155countries as of January 2007.

3 The field research was carried out by the author within the framework of a study for the

International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP, 2005) in collaboration withlocal teams in each site during 2004–2005, and is completed by documentary researchon decentralization and local services in a broad range of developing countries.

4 The concept of ‘local arena’ has been developed by Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (1999,2003, 2004) in his work in Niger.

5 This process corresponds to Manor’s definition of ‘democratic decentralization’, whichshould be distinguished from de-concentration and other forms of restructuringresponsibilities between the centre and local governments, but where the central stateretains control over the entire process and resources.

6 Undoubtedly the most interesting formula from the perspective of local government isthat applied in the Philippines, where 40% of national government revenue istransferred to LGs on the basis of a complex calculation that takes into account local

population as well as levels of poverty.

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7 Tanzania has established ‘National Minimum Standards’ in key areas of transferredresponsibility, such as education and health. They are however, insufficient to meeteven the National Minimum Standards. Boex and Martinez-Vasquez (2003, p. 11)maintain that central government transfers for education are sufficient to attain only 60% of the National Minimum Standards. Therkildsen (2000, p. 410) signals that direct

user payments provided 30% of funds for primary education and this level wasincreasing.8 This has given rise to a thriving consultancy niche for non-governmental organizations

and firms, often hired by local governments to prepare and even execute projects to bepresented on behalf of the LGs to international donors. Additionally, consultants arehired to design the local development plan.

9 Changes in government can significantly modify the contours of the legal framework,particularly where it has not been written into the Constitution. The Bolivian example,explained later in the article, is instructive in this regard.

10 Contrary to early expectations, it is now widely established that decentralization hasnot had a clear impact on poverty reduction (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000, p. 114; Boex, 2003,p. 381; Crook, 2003, p. 79; Jutting et al ., 2005).

11 This matrix was developed with a group of human rights experts from variousgovernmental, UN, non-governmental organization and academic backgrounds, in theframework of the ICHRP project on local government and human rights (see ICHRP,2005).

12 Others have defined the central principles of human rights slightly differently. TheDepartment for International Development (2000, p. 7) defines them as participation,inclusion and fulfilling obligation, and Mary Robinson — former UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights — considers them to be ‘‘participation, empower-ment, accountability, non-discrimination and express linkages to international humanrights norms and standards’’ (Robinson, 2004, p. 38).

13 For example, in General Comment 15, The right to water (E/C.12/2002/11, para. 37 and24).

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