DeceptioninWarJonLatimer

AllRightsReserved

Copyright©JonLatimer2001,2015

Firstpublished2001byJohnMurray

Thiseditionpublishedin2015by:

ThistlePublishing36GreatSmithStreetLondonSW1P3BU

www.thistlepublishing.co.uk

Tomyfather,whostarteditall…andtoCCoy,3(V)RWF,andallwhoservedinit

ContentsIllustrations

Preface

Maps

Introduction

1.AHistoryofBluffinWarfare

2.TheInformationBattle

3.ThePrinciplesofDeception

4.TheMethodsofDeception

5.TacticalandOperationalDeception

6.StrategicDeception

7.NavalDeception

8.DeceptioninAirOperations

9.OperationBodyguard

10.Maskirovka

11.DeceptioninCounter-RevolutionaryandIrregularWarfare

12.TheFutureofDeception

Notes

Bibliography

Illustrations1.TheFrenchsurrenderatGoodwickSands,Fishguard,1797

2.QuakergunsnearCenterville,1862

3.DummyhorsesbeforetheBattleofMeggido,1918

4.AstoreattheRoyalEngineersCamouflageSchoolcontainingdeceptivedevices

5.CartoonbyOsbertLancasteron‘fifthcolumnists’

6.Dummytanksinvariousstagesofconstruction

7.SecondWorldWardummytanksintheMiddleEast

8.Plaster‘brickwork’beingmadetocoverpillboxesinFrance,1940

9.AdecoybuiltbyPolishtroopsinItaly

10.Aninflatable‘Shermantank’

11.‘Hurricane’fightersassembledatafactoryinCyprus

12.A‘Sunshield’device

13.ThedummyrailheadatMisheifa,1941

14.Snipersintraining

15.TheAdmiralGrafSpeeburnsinMontevideoharbour,1939

16.R-classbattleshipsandaircraft-carrierinScapaFlow,July1940

17.HMSHesperusinatypicaldazzlecamouflagescheme;HMSBelfastshowingfalsebowandsternwaves

18.Airfieldcamouflage

19.Adummyairfield

20.Decoyfireequipment

21.SimulatedbombdamageatRheine

22.Hamburgbeforeandaftercamouflage,1941

23.AcloudofWINDOWreleasedoverEssen,March1945

24.Dummylandingcraftandadummy25-pounderandQuadtractorbeforeD-Day

25.Smoke-generatingequipment,March1945

26.Membersofacounter-gangpreparetogoonpatrolinKenya

27.Psyopsleaflet,January1991

28.AnM1Abramsdecoy

29.ASaabViggenfighteranddecoyThe author and publishers would like to thank the following for permission to reproduce illustrations: Plate 1,

CarmarthenshireCountyMuseum;2,LibraryofCongress;3,4,8,9,10,11,14,15,16,17,19,20,21,22,23,24and25,ImperialWarMuseum; 5, JohnMurrayArchive; 6, 7 and 12, TankMuseum; 13 and 18, Public RecordOffice; 26,BritishArmy;28,TVICorporation;29,SaabBarracudaAB.

PrefaceAlthoughthisworkisintendedforthegeneralreaderratherthanasanacademictomeormilitarymanual, Imake no apology for the inclusion of endnotes. In his excellentTheAtlanticCampaignDanvanderVatexpressesaviolentdislike for texts ‘bespatteredbynumbers’, but these notes are often of considerable value to anyonewishing to pursuespecificpoints.Theyareallrelatedtothesourcematerial,andthefewadditionalfootnotesincludedmerelyprovidedetailsthatdonotproperlybelonginthemaintext.

Agreatmanypeoplehave contributed to thisbookand Iwould also like to thankothers who have contributed elsewhere in the meantime. In particular, my old friendMarcus Bennett, police officer and captain in the Royal Welsh Regiment, has been averitablemother lodeof ideas andhelp; similarly JohnHall, lecturer inSpanishatUWSwanseaandformerintelligenceofficerwith4RRW,hasprovidedmewithcopiousleadson sourcematerial and excellent advice, as have AllyMorrison,Major James EverardQRL,MartinCoulson,(alsoalectureratUWSwanseaandformercommandingofficer,RMonRE(M)),NickPope,MarcusCowper,GeorgeFortyandDavidNicolle.

Thestaffat thecitylibrary,Swansea,andUWSwanseahavepatientlyfiledallmyinter-libraryloanrequests;thestaffattheImperialWarMuseumandDavidFletcherandthestaffattheTankMuseumlibrary,andJillianBrankinattheAustralianWarMemorialhavebeenever friendlyandhelpfulover thepastyear. JonGuttmanatMilitaryHistorymagazine has been very patient and helpful, and thanks are also due to the staff of theother titles at Primedia History Group. Thanks also to Lee Johnson at Osprey andespeciallytoJohnMcHugh,KevinEnrightandChristopherSamuelforputtingupwithmewheninLondon.Iwanttothankmyagent,AndrewLownie,formakingitallhappen(andAdrianWealewho–albeitinadvertently–putusintouch),GrantMcIntyreandeveryoneatJohnMurray,andMatthewTaylor,whoeditedthetypescriptmeticulously.

SwanseaNovember2000

Maps1.Marlborough’sGrandDeception:TheMarchtotheDanube,1704

2.TriumphoftheObliqueApproach:TheBattleofLeuthen,5December1757

3.OperationBERTRAM:ElAlamein,23October1942

4.The3rdBattleofGaza,28–31October1917

5.OperationMATADOR:5DCLI’sAttackonLePlessisGrimault,7August1944

6.AlliedDeceptionOperationsin1943

7.StrategicDeceptionandtheInvasionofEurope,1944

8.OperationalDeceptionforOVERLORD,6June1944

9.OperationBAGRATION:TheDestructionofArmyGroupCentre,23June–10July1944

10.OperationDESERTSTORM:The‘HailMaryPlay’,24February1991

MessieurslesmaréchauxMurat,Lannes,andBelliardgetontheirhorsesandridedowntothebridge.(ObservethatallthreeareGascons.)‘Gentlemen’,saysoneofthem,‘youareawarethattheThaborbridgeisminedanddoublymined,andthattherearemenacingfortificationsatitsheadandanarmyoffifteenthousandmenhasbeenorderedtoblowupthebridgeandnotletuscross?ButitwillpleaseourSovereigntheEmperorNapoleonifwetakethisbridge.Soletusthreegoandtakeit!’‘Yes,let’s!’saytheothers…

Thesegentlemenrideontothebridgealone,andwavewhitehandkerchiefs;theyassuretheofficerondutythatthey,themarshals,areontheirwaytonegotiatewithPrinceAuersperg.Heletsthementerthetêtedupont[bridgehead].Theyspinhimathousandgasconades,sayingthatthewarisover,thattheEmperorFrancisisarrangingameetingwithBonaparte, that they desire to see Prince Auersperg, and so on. The officer sends for Auersperg; these gentlemenembracetheofficers,crackjokes,sitonthecannon,andmeanwhileaFrenchbattaliongets to thebridgeunobserved,flingsthebagsofincendiarymaterialintothewater,andapproachesthetêtedupont.Atlengthappearsthelieutenant-general,ourdearPrinceAuerspergvonMauternhimself.‘Dearestfoe!FloweroftheAustrianarmy,herooftheTurkishwars!Hostilitiesareended,wecanshakeoneanother’shand…TheEmperorNapoleonburnswithimpatiencetomakePrinceAuersperg’sacquaintance.’Inawordthosegentlemen,Gasconsindeed,sobewilderhimwithfinewords,andheis so flattered by his rapidly established intimacywith the Frenchmarshals, and so dazzled by the sight ofMurat’smantleandostrichplumes,thattheirfiregetsintohiseyesandheforgetsthatheoughttobefiringattheenemy.TheFrenchbattalion rushes to thebridgehead, spikes thegunsand thebridge is taken!Butwhat isbestof all is that thesergeant inchargeof thecannonwhichwas togive thesignal tofire theminesandblowup thebridge, thissergeantseeingthattheFrenchtroopswererunningontothebridge,wasabouttofire,butLannesstayedhishand.Thesergeant,whowasevidentlywiserthanhisgeneral,goesuptoAuerspergandsays:‘Prince,youarebeingdeceived,herearetheFrench!’Murat,seeingthatallislostifthesergeantisallowedtospeak,turnstoAuerspergwithfeignedastonishment(heisa trueGascon)andsays:‘Idon’trecognizetheworld-famousAustriandiscipline, ifyouallowasubordinate toaddressyoulikethat!’Itwasastrokeofgenius.PrinceAuerspergfeelshisdignityatstakeandordersthesergeanttobearrested.Come,youmustownthatthisaffairoftheThaborbridgeisdelightful!

LeoTolstoy,WarandPeace

‘Allwarfareisbasedondeception.Therefore,whencapable,feignincapacity;

whenactive,inactivity…Offertheenemyabaittolurehim;feigndisorderandstrikehim…

Pretendinferiorityandencouragehisarrogance.’

SunTzu

Introduction‘Partoutlaviolenceproduitlaruse.’

BernardindeSaint-Pierre

‘SURPRISE IS A Principle of War… [It] should primarily be directed at the mind of anenemy commander rather than at his force. The aim should be to paralyse thecommander’swill.’1Surpriseisthegreat‘forcemultiplier’–itmakesonestrongerthanisphysically the case. Surprise can be achieved by a variety of methods: by forgoingpreparationsthatanenemymightexpectonetomake,byattackingatanunexpectedtime,byusinggrounddeemedimpassable(aswiththeGermandrivethroughtheArdennesinMay1940), throughboldand innovative tacticsorby theemploymentofpowerfulnewweapons(theT-34tankcameasaterriblesurprisetotheGermansintheUSSRin1941).However,amongthemanyfactorscontributingtotheachievementofsurprise,surelythemostimportantisdeception.2

Itmightbearguedthatsecurityisanevenmoreimportantconcern,butinbattleitisnot sufficient for a commander to avoid error; he needs actively to cause his enemy tomakemistakes.3Deceptionisanactivemeasurewithpreciselythataim(requiringsecurityamong other things and including passive elements such as camouflage), and since thestratagem,or rusedeguerre, is as old aswarfare itself, it is a foolish commanderwhoignoresit.Indeed,thegreatestgeneralsinhistoryhavebeenmastersofit,andithasbeenthedownfallofmanyanother.

Everybody employs deception at times, either to gain an advantage or for morealtruisticreasons.Althoughadultsreprimandtheirchildrenforlying,theythemselveslieallthetime,especiallytotheirchildren.Deceptionissuchanintegralpartofourlivesthatweoftenfailtorecognizeit.Surveysindicatethatpoliticiansaredistrustedbecausetheyare perceived as deceitful, but everyone recognizes that a certainmeasure of ‘economywiththeactualité’isanecessaryrequirementoftheprofession.Ifpoliticiansalwayssaidexactlywhattheythought,theywouldhaveveryshortcareers.

There is, as the saying goes, nothing new under the sun, and as we examine thehistoricaldevelopmentofdeception inwarwewill see thesame themesand techniquesrecurring and repeating themselves in subtle newways.However, this book is intendednotasahistoryofdeception–thatwouldbealifetime’swork–butasanexaminationofthe art of deception. To be successful, the deceiver needs to know and understand themindoftheenemycommander.

Rashness,excessiveaudacity,blindimpetuosityorfoolishambitionarealleasilyexploitedbytheenemyandmostdangeroustoanyallies,forageneralwithsuchdefectsinhischaracterwillnaturallyfallvictimtoallkindsofstratagems,ambushesandtrickery.4

Theplaceofself-deceptionin thisprocess isanimportantone.Ourperceptionsdevelopthrough theprocessof learning,but areoverlainbya sociological andculturalbaggagethatcorrelatestoourprejudices.Muchofthetimeweviewourexperiencesthroughthesemental templates, and whatever does not fit our prejudices tends to be overlooked ordiscarded.

Theelders inmost societieshave traditionallybeen regardedas the repositoriesof

collective wisdom, which tends to reinforce conservatism in thought – a particulartendencyinthemilitarythatNormanDixonhighlightsinhisbookOnthePsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence.Understressthistendencytendstobefurtherreinforced.Wehatedisorderandconfusionandoureverymentaleffort tries to impartorderandmeaning toevents; even when information is limited or contradictory, we remain eager to drawconclusions.Andsincethemindcanonlycopewithsomuchinformationatanyonetime,weare forced to filterandprioritize the informationstream.Thus itcanbesaid thatalldeceptioninwarshouldbebasedonwhattheenemyhimselfnotonlybelieves,buthopesfor.5

Information is a premium commodity on any battlefield and increasingly vastamountsofitarerequiredforsuccessfuloperations,withmanymeansbeingemployedtocollectandprocessit.Consequently,skilfullyconveyedfalseinformationoftenhasgreatinfluence on the mind of an enemy and the course of operations. Since militaryorganizations look through doctrinal and physical templates as well as the mentaltemplatesof its individualmembers, it is this thatprovides thebasis fordeception.Theinformationanenemyrequirestomakedecisionscanbemanipulated,ifoneunderstandsthetemplatesheisusing.Andareputationforbeingcraftyanddeceptivewillenhancetheanxietyanduncertaintyofone’sopponent.6

Waristhemostextremeconditionthatmostpeopleareeverlikelytoface.Itisnota‘gentlemanly’ pursuit but often a matter of survival requiring ruthless measures in itspursuit.Soitisveryoftenintimesofweaknessthatcommandersfirstthinkofdeceptionasameansofeveningtheodds.TheMarxist–Leninistsystem,withitsbeliefininevitableandpredictabledialecticalchange,acceptedthatanythingthatpromotedthatchangewasdesirableifnotessential,andthatdeceptionwasthereforealegitimatetoolinpeaceandwar(astheSovietsdemonstratedbetween1941and1945).IntheWest,ontheotherhand,deception is often seen as immoral, andmore than one authority has claimed that, as aresult, Americans resort to deception only reluctantly or else do it poorly.7 In fact,however,manyAmericansdisplayedanaturalflairfordeceptionduringtheCivilWar,justastheyhadduringtheRevolutioneightyyearspreviously.

Yet for a long time deception did indeed run counter to theAmerican concept ofmilitary honour. There was a strange reluctance among some Americans during thetwentieth century to accept it as part of modern warfare, and certainly the AmericansresortedtodeceptiononlyintermittentlyduringtheSecondWorldWar.8ColonelWilliamA.Harris,theprincipalAmericandeceptionofficerinEurope,wasconvertedtobeliefinthe value of FORTITUDE SOUTH (part of the deception cover plan for the Normandylandings in 1944) only after its success.9 Perhaps by this stage the Americans feltsufficiently strong towin thewarwithout resort todeception,whereas earlieron,whentheywereweak as a result of the Japanese attack onPearlHarbor, theUSNavymadeextensiveuseofit.Yetdeceptioncanclearlybebenign:wereitnotforBODYGUARD(theoverall plan of which FORTITUDE was a part) the defeat of the Third Reich wouldundoubtedlyhavebeenyetmoreprotractedandbloody.

TheBritish, despite their reputation for ‘fair play’, have long showna remarkableflair for deception, and by the end of the Second World War they had an unrivalledmastery in the art of military deception (which they have since largely forgotten). In

contrast,themostefficientmilitarymachineofthepastcentury–thatofGermany–hasbeen less strongly inclined towards deception, except in the form of Hitlerianmachinations.WhiletheGermanArmyhasalwaysunderstoodtheimportanceofsurpriseandhasconsistentlyachievedit,itspreferredmethodhasgenerallybeentheonedescribedbyFredericktheGreatas‘speedandviolence’.

Thepurposeofthisbookistodescribeandexplainthesystematictellingofliesforspecificallymilitarypurposes.Inthiscontextwearedealingwithverycreativemindsthatseektoweavedelicatetapestriesofinformationinafragileandhostileenvironment.Itisadifficultprocessthatcombinesgreatriskwiththepotentialforenormousgain.Themosteffectivedeceiversdisplayanunorthodoxyofthoughtthatisusuallylittleappreciatedinapeacetime army. Perhapsmore than any other branch ofmilitary endeavour, successfuldeception is an art rather than a science, although science increasingly provides thetechnicalmeansbywhichdeception iscreated.Manyof thebestpractitionershavehadbackgrounds inboth thevisualand theperformingarts,but theartofdeception ismostsuccessful when applied patiently, with proven techniques guided by solid principles.Thesewewillexamineinthelightofexamplesfromhistory,butwithparticularreferencetothetwentiethcentury,whentechnologytransformedthetechniques,ifnottheprinciplesof deception, and thus complicatedmatters considerably. Somewould say thatmoderntechnology renders deception more difficult but throughout history deceivers haveexploited the latest technologicaldevelopments.The informationrevolutiontakingplacetodayishavinganimpactcomparabletothatoftheindustrialrevolutionandwillprobablybeaccompaniedbychangesonasimilarscaleinthenatureofwar;butdeceptionwillnodoubtcontinuejustaslongaswarfaredoes.

And,ofcourse, thereissomethingdeliciously,wickedly,entertainingaboutpullingthewooloveranopponent’seyes.Welcometoabookpackedwithsuchlies.

1

AHistoryofBluffinWarfare‘Butnowchangeyour themeand sing tousof the stratagemof theWoodenHorse,whichEpeiusbuiltwithAthene’shelp,andwhichthegoodOdysseuscontrivedtogettakenonedayintothecitadelofTroyasanambush,mannedbythewarriorswhothensackedthetown.’

Homer

DECEPTIONINANCIENTANDMEDIEVALWARFARE

DECEPTIONONTHE battlefield is surely asold aswarfare itself.Oneof themost famousearly examples dates from c. 1294BC,when PharaohRamses II of Egypt led his armyagainst theHittitestrongholdofKadesh.TwoHittite‘deserters’cametohimoffering toleadhimagainst their former comrades. Instead, they ledhim into anambush thatverynearlyproveddisastrous.

Some400yearslaterandnotfaraway,ancientIsraelwasoverrunbytheMidianites(nomadicArabtribesmenwhoregularlybroughttheirflockstograzethelowlandswheretheIsraeliteshadsowntheircrops).Gideon,sonofJoash,resolvedtodrivethemoff.Inseven previous years the Israelites had hidden in the hills on the approach of theMidianites, and itwaswithdifficulty thatGideon assembled just 300men for the task.Onlyguilecouldachievewhatnumberscouldnot.Gideon first tookcare toensure thattalesofsignsandportentsmarkingtheriseofagreatnewIsraeliteleaderfiltereddowntotheMidianitecamp.Theneachmanwasissuedwithatrumpet,apitcherandatorch.Thetorcheswere lit and carefully concealed under the pitchers, and,with their trumpets intheirhandsanddividedintothreecompanies,the300tookuppositionsaroundtheenemycamp. At around midnight, when theMidianites were known to change their sentries,Gideon’s men gave out an almighty cry – ‘The sword of the Lord and of Gideon!’ –accompanied by loud blasts of trumpets and the waving of hundreds of torches. TheMidianites,convincedthattheywerebeingattackedbyagreathost,weresenttumblinginpanic for the fords on theRiver Jordan, harried all thewayby the Israelite population,whichroseenmassenowitsenemieswereontherun.Gideonrelentlesslypursuedthemtoensurethefullexploitationofhissuccess,and‘thedayofMidian’becameaproverbinIsraelfortotalvictory.1

ThenameofSunTzuisnowadayssynonymouswiththeideaofdeception.HisArtofWar has been a key reference source forChinese strategists andmilitary leaders forover2,000years,althoughitwasproperlytranslatedintoEnglishonlyatthebeginningofthe twentieth century. The exploits of the Ch’i general Sun Pin in 341 BC provide aninteresting example of the theories of Sun Tzu in combat. Before his invasion of theterritoryofWei,SunPinassessedthesituationwithanadvisor,whosaid:‘ThesoldiersofWei are fierce and bold, and despise the men of Ch’i as cowards. A skilful strategistshouldmakeuseof thisand lure themwith thepromiseofadvantage…[L]etus lightahundredthousandfireswhenourarmyentersWei,fiftythousandthenextday,andonlythirty thousand on the third day…’, thereby indicating to theWei general P’angChuanthatthearmyofCh’iwasexperiencingmassdesertionsandencouraginghimtorushtotheattack.P’angChuantookthebaitandledhisforcesthroughanarrowgorgepreselectedby

SunPinfortheambush.AsafinalfinesseSunPinpostedasign.Whenhearrivedattheambush site,P’angChuan called for a torch to readSunPin’s sign,which said: ‘P’angChuandiesbeneaththistree.’ThelightingofthetorchwasthesignalforSunPin’sarcherstoshoot.2

By virtue of the serious nature of war, it may sometimes be justifiable and evennecessary to deceive one’s own side. During the march from Spain to Italy the greatCarthaginiangeneralHannibalBarca,probablythegreatestexponentofdeceptionintheclassicalworld,founditnecessarytodeceivehisownelephants.HisarmyhadtocrosstheRiverRhône,buttheelephantsaccompanyingitwouldonnoaccountenterthewater.SoHannibal’spioneersbuiltrafts,twoofwhichwerefirmlylashedtogetheronthebank,withfurther rafts then added to form a pontoon projecting some200 feet into thewater andmadeabsolutelyfastagainstthebank.Twomoreraftswerethenaddedattheendofthepierwithtowinglinestoboatsintheriver,butwithlashingstothepierthatcouldeasilybecut.Thewholepierwasthencoveredwithearthtomakeitappearlikeanextensionofthe bank and two female elephants led the way – to encourage the others. When theelephants were standing on the final rafts the lashings were cut, and once they foundthemselvesinmidstream,theelephantshadlittleoptionbuttocompletethecrossing.Theprocesswas repeated, and although a few elephants tipped into the river in panic, theyswamtherestofthewayandtheoperationwassuccessful.3

Of course, it ismore common for opposition from the enemy tomakes deceptionimperative. During the rebellion of Vercingertorix in Gaul in 52 BC Julius Caesar wasmarching into the country of theArverni towards the town of Gergovia, following thecourse of theAllier, awide river that flows into the Loire nearNevers.VercingertorixbrokeupallthebridgesacrosstheAllierandmarchedhisforcealongtheoppositebank,keepingCaesarinviewandplanningtocontestanyattemptedcrossing.HeplacedpatrolswherevertheRomansmighttrytobuildabridge,anditseemedthatCaesarwouldbeheldupallsummersincetheriverwasnotnormallyfordableuntiltheautumn.Caesarcampedin woods near one of the broken bridges for the night and the following morninginstructed two legions to remain concealed there; he then broke the other four legionsdownintocompaniestogivetheappearancethatallsixlegionsweremarching,andsentthemwiththeentirebaggagetraintomarchasfarastheycould.Havingwaitedforthemto get clear, Caesar then emerged from hiding and quickly rebuilt the bridge on theoriginal piles,whichwere still intact. The legions then formed a bridgehead on the farbank and Caesar recalled the main body. Shocked, Vercingertorix marched away toGergovia.4

Deceptionwas such a common aspect of ancientwarfare thatwhen Julius SextusFrontinuswrotetwovolumesontheartofwarinthefirstcenturyAD(thefirstofwhichisnowlost), thesecondvolume,calledStratagems,wasentirelydevoted to thesubject. InfourbooksFrontinusdescribesallmannerofmilitarytricksandsleightsofhandfromtheancientworld.YetpubliclytheRomansshowedahaughtycontemptforsuchtactics.

During the early Middle Ages the Western creed of chivalry frowned upondeception,which,sincemostbattleswerefoughtatclosequarters,appearedinanycasetohavelimitedapplication.5Furthereast,however,waranddeceptionwerestudiedasanartforcenturiesafter the fallofRome. Indeed, theByzantinessufferednoteven the tiniest

hintofchivalricsentiment,buthadratheraburgeoningprofessionalprideintheirskillatdeception.AmongthegreatestofallthesoldiersofthisperiodwastheByzantinegeneralBelisarius.Asuperbfighterandtrainerofmen,heservedhisungratefulmaster,EmperorJustinian, with unswerving loyalty and skill. The parsimonious emperor frequentlyentrusted Belisarius with difficult missions but never allocated him the resources toachievethem.DeceptionisoftenthelastresortofcommandersinpositionsofweaknessandBelisariuswasalwaysconsideringwaystooutwithisopponentbystrategemasmuchasbyfighting.6OtherByzantineleadersalsosawdeceptionasbeingperfectlynatural inwarfare.Theyconsidereditabsurdtospendbloodandtreasureonachievingtheiraimsifthese could be achieved by skill, and thus developed a strong predilection for ruses,stratagemsandfeignedretreats.InhisTacticaEmperorLeoVIdemonstratesnoshameinsomeoftheover-ingeniousstratagemsused,andrecommendsonetrickinparticularthatremainedinuseintothetwentiethcentury–thatofwritingtreasonableletterstoofficersin the enemy camp and ensuring they fall into the wrong hands. He also goes on todescribe how nothing worked better against the Franks and Lombards than a feignedflight,whichtheyalwaysfollowedhastily.7

It is likely that theNormans learned from theByzantines this tacticof the feignedretreat. Norman adventurers first settled in Sicily in 1016 and established a permanentstronghold atAversa.TheByzantine army that invaded easternSicily in 1038 includedmanyNormans,whoservedasmercenariesinanumberofarmiesandwhosubsequentlyspread all over southern Italy. In 1060 Robert Guiscard (whose name meant ‘wily’ inNorman French) began the Norman conquest of Sicily, which included a prolongedcampaignagainsttheByzantines.Shortlyafterwards,DukeWilliamofNormandyinvadedEngland to seek its crown. The English under KingHarold occupied a strong positionalongahilltopnearHastings,andaftertheNormanarchersfailedtomakeanimpressionontheEnglishline,theinitialassaultsbyheavilyarmouredcavalryandfootsoldierswerealsorepulsed.WilliamofPoitiersthenstatesthattheNormans,‘realizingthattheycouldnot overcome an enemy so numerous without great loss to themselves… retreated,deliberately feigning flight’. The Breton cavalry on the left of the Norman line weredefinitely the first to break, andmany of the remaining troops followed suit, believingDukeWilliamtobedead,buthequicklyrodealongthelineandrallieditbeforeturningonapartyofEnglishthathadfollowedtheBretonsanddestroyedthem.HethenrenewedtheassaultonthemainEnglishposition.All thecontemporarysourcesrefer to thisruserepeatedly drawing groups of English in pursuit, whereupon they were destroyedpiecemeal.AlthoughthistactichadalreadybeenusedbytheNormansatArquesin1053andMessinain1060,scholarshavelongcontinuedtodebatetheveracityofthesereports.8

HansDelbrückinsistedthatafeignedflightwasbeyondthecapabilitiesofmedievalcavalry.9On the other hand, SirCharlesOmanhad no doubt that ‘a sudden inspirationcame to William… After all, Guy of Amiens, an absolute contemporary, describes itclearly.’10 More reasonably, Hastings was probably too disjointed a battle for thenecessarycontrolofafeignedretreattobeexercisedallalongtheNormanline,anditisperhapsmorelikelythatlocalwithdrawalsdrewgroupsofdefendersfromtheirpositionsinaseriesofretreatsandcounter-charges.Whateverthetruth,thebattlehassinceearnedareputationasanexampleofmasterfultacticaldeception.

A feigned withdrawal would undoubtedly be a difficult manœuvre to achieve inbattle, since it would put the troops involved at great risk. Nevertheless, the SaracenswouldoftentrytofeignwithdrawalwhilefightingtheCrusaders,sometimesfordaysonend, inorder todraw theirmoreheavily armedopponents onto favourableground.Thefeignedwithdrawalwasalso a favourite tacticof theMongols.A light cavalry corpsof‘suicidetroops’calledthemangudaiexistedforthepurpose(thenamewasnotsomuchajobdescriptionasatributetothesoldiers’bravery).Theywouldchargetheenemyalone,break ranks and run in an attempt to lure the enemy to destruction. The larger themangudai, the more effective would be the lure: where the ground was open andfavourable,itcouldcompriseuptohalfthearmy.Iftheenemydidgivechase,theywouldfindthemselvesshoweredwitharrows;oncethequiverswereemptied,theheavycavalrywouldcharge,alwaysthefinalstageintheMongolbattleplan,deliveredatthetrotandinsilenceuntiltheordertogallopwasgivenatthelastpossiblemoment.AstheMuscovitesfoundtotheircostattheKalkaRiverin1223,theresultwasabsolutelydevastating.11

TheMongolswouldgladlyuseanymeanstogainanadvantage,andmanyoftheirinspirational expedients were produced by allowing junior commanders to use theirinitiative. As soon as the plan of campaign had been agreed at the kuriltai (the greatcouncilofwar),rumourswouldbedeliberatelyplantedexaggeratingthenumbersoftheirarmy. This simple and effective deception was then given credibility by theMongols’extreme manœuvrability and speed, as demonstrated in their campaigns against theKhwarezms inCentralAsia, inwhichanarmyofmore than200,000men,operating infourcorpsacrossa200-mile frontage, introduceda scaleandspeedofwarfarenot seenagain until Napoleon’s day. The Mongols could strike terror into their opponents byappearinginstrengthindifferentplacesatthesametime,andsinceeachMongolwentoncampaign with a number of horses (the numbers quoted vary, but five per man seemsreasonable),themountingofdummyridersonsparehorsesenabledthemtomultiplytheirapparentnumbersfurther.12

TheMongols liked tooperateduring thewinter,when theywouldbeable tocrossfrozen marshes and rivers. To find out if the ice would support them, they wouldencouragethelocalpopulationtotestit.InHungaryinlate1241theMongolsleftcattleunattendedon the leftbankof theDanube in sightof starving refugees theyhaddrivenacrosstheriverearlierintheyear.WhentheHungarianscrossedtherivertorecoverthecattle, theMongols swiftly followedup.Another commonMongol ploywas the use ofsmokescreens(usedbytheGreeksasearlyasthePelopponesianWars,c.431–404BC),bysending out small detachments to light enormous prairie fires or shooting containers ofburningtarfromtheirimprovisedartillery.AttheBattleofLiegnitzin1241theysetfiretoreeds, and on other occasions they would light fires in inhabited regions in order todeceivetheenemyastotheirrealintentionsandtocovertheirmovements.13

BythemiddleofthethirteenthcenturytheCrusaderstatesoftheMiddleEastfoundthemselvessqueezedbetweentheMongolconquerorsofPersiaandtheMamelukeEmpireofEgypt.AstheMongoltiderecededfromSyria,sotheMamelukeSultanBaybarsfinallycapturedthegreatCrusaderfortressofCracdesChevaliersfromtheKnightsHospitallerin1271.Beforetheuseofgunpowderbecamewidespread,acastleofsuchpowercouldbetaken only by starvation or trickery. Baybars commenced his siege between 18 and 21

February andmanaged to storm the forward defences and the barbicans. But themainkeepordonjonwaspracticallyimpregnable,andBaybarsrealizeditcouldbetakenonlywithheavylossesoraprolongedsiege.Instead,hepassedaforgedletterintothekeepinwhichtheKnights’commanderorderedthegarrisontosurrender.Whethertheyfellforthetrick orweremerely aware of the helplessness of their position, theKnights complied,despitehavingsuccessfullyresistedallprevioussieges.14

The garrison withdrew to Tripoli, where Prince Edward of England arrived soonafterwards. Edwardwas virtually the last greatCrusader, but accomplished little beforereturningtoEngland,wherehesoonbecameoneofthecountry’sgreatestwarriorkings,EdwardI.Assuch,heconqueredWalesandbuiltaseriesofmagnificentcastlestoenforcehiscontrol.DuringtherebellionofOwainGlynDŵrin1401,KingHenryIVappointedHenryPercy,thefamous‘Hotspur’,tobringthecountrytoorder.InMarchHotspurissuedanamnestywhichappliedtoallrebelswiththeexceptionofOwainandhiscousinsRhysand Gwilym, sons of Tudur ap Gronw of Penmynydd (forefather of King Henry VII).Mostofthecountrywasmightilyrelievedandagreedtopayalltheusualtaxes.15ButtheTudursknewthattheyneededabargainingchipiftheyweretoliftthedirethreathangingoverthem.TheycoollydecidedtocaptureEdward’sgreatcastleatConwy.

Althoughthegarrisonamountedtojustfifteenmen-at-armsandsixtyarchers,JohndeMassy‘ofPodyngton’(PuddingtoninCheshire)hadputthecastleinareasonablestateofdefenceanditwaswellstockedandeasilyreinforcedfromthesea;andinanycase,theTudurshadonlyfortymen.Theyneededaruse.OnGoodFriday,whichalsohappenedtobe 1 April – All Fools’ Day – Massy and all but five of the garrison were attendingtenebraeinthelittlechurchinthetownwhenacarpenterappearedatthecastlegatewho,accordingtoAdamofUsk’sChronicon,‘feignedtocomeforhisaccustomedwork’.Onceinside,thecarpenterattackedthetwoguardsandthrewopenthegatetoallowGwilymandmostofthegangtorushin.Therestwaitedoutside,readytoambushanyattempttoretakethe castle. Although Hotspur arrived from Denbigh with 120 men-at-arms and 300archers,heknew itwould takeagreatdealmore toget inside so formidablea fortress.Forcedtonegotiate,hedulygavetheTudurboystheirpardon.16

Medieval armies were ad hoc affairs, formed for the duration of hostilities andcommanded by captains whose obligations were usually feudal, and who generallyregardedeachotherasequalswhethertheyledfiftymenorfivethousand.Disciplinewaslacking and unit training practically non-existent. This state of affairs came to an endduringthelatefifteenthcentury,whentheSwissfoughtforindependenceand,havingwonit,hiredthemselvesoutasmercenaries.Theresultwasthedemiseofthemedievalpatternof warfare based on feudal obligation as mercenaries came subsequently to dominateEuropeanarmies.Warfarehadneverachievedtheidealsthatchivalryclaimedforit,butanewawarenessofthepossibilitiesofstrategem,andawillingnesstouseit,weretomarkwarfare as it grew into a profession. In 1513 the Flemish defenders of Tournai paintedlengthsofcanvastoresemblefortificationsanddeceivetheEnglishattackersastothetrueextent of the defences – but then, the Flemish always were accomplished landscapeartists.17

THERENAISSANCEANDTHEAGEOFREASON

TheonlyworkpublishedduringhislifetimebyNiccolòMachiavelli–oneofthegreatestthinkersoftheRenaissance–wasTheArtofWar.Likethatofmostofhiscontemporaries,Machiavelli’s military work was inspired by the ancients, particularly Polybius andVegetius. It rejected the values that underpinnedmedievalwarfare and took an entirelypractical view of the subject, with victory as the sole criterion for success and anacceptance of every type of trickery as legitimate. Machiavelli described the idealcommanderasonecapableofconstantlydevisingnewtacticsandstratagems todeceiveandoverpowertheenemy.18ButalthoughthiswasatimewhenfirearmswerestartingtoappearinquantityonbattlefieldsalloverEurope,itwasnotgunpowderthatunderpinnedthischangeinapproachsomuchastheneedtointroducedisciplineandtrainingofasortunknowninmedievalarmies.

Machiavelli’s writing inspired Justus Lipsius, who in turn inspired Maurice ofNassau.LipsiussaidthatwhoevercouldcombinethetroopsofthedaywiththedisciplineoftheRomanartofwarwouldbeabletodominatetheearth,anditwasthedevelopmentofdrillandtheformationofthemoderninfantrycompanyrequiringprofessionalofficersandsoldiersbyMauriceand,later,KingGustavusAdolphusofSweden,thatformedthetruebasisofthemilitaryrevolutionthataccompaniedtheRenaissance.19Atthesametimeeachintroducedahigherproportionofmusketeerstopikemenintheirregiments,andwiththe inventionof thebayonet at theendof the seventeenthcentury the roleof firepowerincreased,sothatthecavalry(anditsassociatedchivalricideal)wasnolongermasterofthe battlefield. Along with this transformation in the nature of warfare came atransformation in thepolitical patterns that produced it,with thedevelopment of nationstates.Bythebeginningof theeighteenthcenturymoststatespossessedstandingarmiesofficeredbyprofessionalsoldiersforwhomdeceptionwasanaturalpartofwar.

Suchmodernconceptsascoalitionwarfarebegantoappear,alongwiththedivisionofwarfare into the tactical,operationalandstrategic levels(whichwemightsimplifyasthedirectionofarmiesonthebattlefield,betweenbattlefieldsorbetweentheatresofwar).During theWar of the Spanish Succession John Churchill, first Duke ofMarlborough,providedamagnificentexampleofstrategicdeception.In thespringof1704theFrenchand their Bavarian allies seemed poised to capture Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarianempire,andstrikeastrategicblowthatwouldendtheGrandAlliance,ofwhichGreat Britainwas part.With a revolt taking place inHungary, therewere only 36,000ImperialtroopsunderPrinceLewisofBadeninapositiontodefendthecity,menacedbythesamenumberofBavariansinthevicinityofUlmandasmanyFrenchagainunderthecommand ofMaréchal Tallard,waiting tomarch through theBlack Forest and join theBavarians for an advance along theDanube.On returning fromEngland to resume hiscommand of the Anglo-Dutch forces in the Netherlands, Marlborough devised anaudaciousplantosaveVienna.HewouldmarchacrossEuropetotheDanubeacrossthefaceoftwoFrencharmiesandremovethethreattotheAustriancapital–aplanthatcouldonlysucceedthroughdeception.

FacingMarlboroughinFlanderswere90,000FrenchtroopsunderMaréchalVilleroi.It was obvious that the Dutch government, the States-General, would never agree toMarlborough abandoning the north. He therefore had to persuade them that he wasplanning to advance down the Moselle, a logical extension of the previous year’scampaigns.Atthesametimeheputintrainacomplexschemetoensurehisadministrative

requirementswouldbecateredforalonghisrealroute.AftersettingoutfromBedburgon19Maywith21,000men,hecollectedareinforcementof5,000HanoverianandPrussiantroopsatKoblenzandcrossedovertotherightbankoftheRhineonthe26th.Themarchcontinued,nowseemingtothreatenthegreatcityofStrasbourg(aboutwhichKingLouisXIVofFrancewasespeciallysensitive,sinceithadonlypassedintoFrenchpossessionin1681).MarlboroughthreateneditbyorderingthegovernorofPhilippsburgtobuildalargebridgeofboatsandamasssuppliesasifforacrossing.Tallardwaspartiallydeceivedbythis and delayed marching on Ulm while awaiting new instructions from Versailles.Instead,Marlboroughwasabletocrosstwomajorobstacles,theriversMainandNeckar,andthenswingawayfromtheRhinetowardstheDanube.HeonlyinformedtheDutchofhis true intentions on 6 June.AsVilleroi had been shadowingMarlborough, theDutchremained safe from an offensive and Marlborough promised to return immediately inbargesalong theRhineat eightymilesaday should itprovenecessary.Asa result, theStates-Generalvotedhimtheir fullsupporton10Juneandagreed to release theDanishcontingentof10,000menasareinforcement.20Itwasatrulybrilliantfeat,covering250miles in fiveweekswithonlya tiny lossby thewayside, the resultof foresight, superbplanningand,inanagewhensecuritywaspracticallyunheardof,secrecy.ThecampaignculminatedinthedecisivedefeatofTallardattheBattleofBlenheimandtheremovalofthethreattoVienna.

Inthedayswheninformationcouldonlybepassedasfastasahorsemancouldride,and when armies could expect to march at little more than ten miles a day, theopportunitiesfordeceptiononsuchascalewereveryrare.Marlboroughhadnotonlytoplanforsuchcontingenciesas the issue toeachmanofnewshoesatHeidelberg,but tomakeallthenecessarydiplomaticarrangementswiththevariousGermanprincesthroughwhose territory he had to pass, organizing credit with bankers and the laying-in ofprovisions.ThesearrangementscouldnotbekeptsecretfromtheFrench,butwhatcouldbe kept secret was the true intention behind them and this formed the basis for thedeception.21

Atthestartofthewarin1701,theothergreatgeneraloftheage,PrinceEugèneofSavoy-Carignan,demonstratedsimilarskillatwhatwouldnowbecalledtheoperationallevel.FollowingameetingoftheAustrianwarcouncil,EmperorLeopoldgaveordersfortheHabsburg army to enterMilan, but therewere to be long delays before they couldbegin. Meanwhile, in February 1701, the French were permitted into Savoy and KingLouis XIV sent forces to strengthen the French garrison of Milan and to occupy thefamous fortressesof the ‘Quadrilateral’ –Verona andLegnagoon theRiverAdige, andPeschiaraandMantuaontheRiverMincio–controlofwhichensuredstrategiccontrolofItaly.TheDukeofMantuaallowedtheFrenchtoassumecontrolof thePovalleyunderMaréchalCatinat,sothatEugène’sfirstproblemwouldbesimplytoget intoItaly.WiththeFrenchinoccupationfromSavoytothebordersofVeniceandthepassesblockedfromtheTyrol intoLombardy,Catinatboastedthat inordertoenter thecountrythe‘Imperialarmywouldhavetogrowwings’.

Eugènecommandeda forceof30,000menassembledatRovereto inSouthTyrol.‘Letusonlystartmarchingandwewillsoonfindallies,’heboldlydeclared;butfindingallieswas the least ofhisproblems,given that theFrenchoutnumberedhimbyat least10,000menandblockedthegorgeoftheAdigeleadingfromRoveretotoVerona,theonly

apparentapproachroute intoItaly.According to local legend,neithercartnorhorsehadbeen able to reach the plain by any other route, so savagewere themountains aroundabout,soitseemedthatCatinat’sboastwasnoidleone.ButEugèneunderstoodthatthelegend also served to provide a cover plan, and simulating preparations for a frontalassault onCatinat, he chose instead to take his troops over themountain tops eastwardtoward Vicenza, even though this would infringe Venetian neutrality. Hundreds ofTyroleanpeasantswere conscripted to shovel away the snowand cut paths through thewildTerragnoloandFreddavalleysbeforethetroopscouldbeginthemarchon26May.Fifteenpairsofoxenwereharnessed toeachgunanda totalof6,000horseand16,000infantryscrambledoverMonteBaldointoItaly.Soeffectivewashisdeceptionthataslateas30MayCatinatwas issuingwarningsofanattackfromthenorthalong theAdige. Itwasatrulyremarkablefeatandimmediatelycapturedthepublicimagination.Eugènewascompared to Hannibal and his name became forever linked to the region: a mountainstreamfromwhichhedrank isknownto thisdayas theFontanadelPrincipioEugenio.Catinatwastakencompletelybysurpriseandneverregainedtheinitiative.22

Marlboroughalsowentontocreatecleverdeceptionsattheoperationalandtacticallevels,andmanagedtorepeatoneparticulartrickontwoopponents.InFlandersin1705Maréchal Villeroi was defending a formidable defensive position called the Lines ofBrabant. On the evening of 17 July Marlborough’s engineers built a series of twentypontoonbridgesacrossthestreamoftheMehaigne,suggestingamovetothesouthtojoinupwiththeDutch,whoatthesametimeadvancedtowardsNamurinthesouth-west.Thatnight Marlborough broke camp and (literally ‘stealing a march’) instead turned north,ordering theDutch to followup over the pontoonswhileVilleroiwasmoving to coverNamur.AtdawnthefollowingdayMarlboroughcrossedthroughthelinesunopposedatWanghe,forcingVilleroitoabandonhispositionandretireonLouvain.23

In1711MarlboroughrepeatedtheprocessontheplainofLens.HisintentionwastocaptureBouchainbutfirstheneededtosecuretheareaaroundArleux,justinfrontofthemainlineoffortifications.AwarethataFrenchreactiontoitscapturewouldbeinevitable,hedispatchedaforcetotakeandfortifyit.Sureenoughhisopponent,MaréchalVillars,sentoutasallytoretakethetown.Despitesendinghissuperbandtrustedquartermaster-generalWilliam,EarlCadogan,toitsaid,Arleuxfell.ItwasatthispointthatVillarsgavethecourtinVersaillesrepeatedassurancesthathislineswerethenonplusultra(‘nothingfurther is possible’) of the Duke of Marlborough. In fact, Cadogan had secretly beeninstructedtoallowthefallofArleux,andMarlborough’sraredisplayofpublicrageatthenewswasundoubtedlyforthebenefitoftheFrenchspieshebelievedwereallaround.Asif tomakeup for the ‘affront’heclaimed tohavesuffered,hemovedhismaincamp toVillers Brulin in thewest,making a clear show of planning to attack the lines in theirstrongest section by ostentatiously riding out on 4 August to reconnoitre them, whileVillarsrespondedbybringingupallavailablereinforcements.

Meanwhile, the guns and pontoons needed were moving in dead ground behindVimyRidge to the east. The troopswere formed into four columns andmoved quietlyawayby2100hours, leaving their camp firesburningbehind them.By the timeVillarsrealizedwhatwasafootitwastoolate.WhenMarlboroughreceivedareportthatArleuxandthelinesbehinditweredeserted,hepassedthenewsalongthecolumnandaskedittomake an extra effort. The soldiers respondedmagnificently: the 18thRegiment of Foot

completedthirty-ninemilesineighteenhours,andby0800hourson5AugusttheDukeand his cavalry advance guardwere pouring through the lines nearArleux.VillarswasforcedtoretiretoCambrai.24

Suchamanœuvre,whereacommandermakesashowwithoutintendingactuallytoengage theenemy, isknownasademonstration.Ashowwhichdoesengage theenemywith a portion of one’s force is known as a feint, and was a favourite ruse of theFrancophile philosopher King Frederick II of Prussia (Frederick the Great). ‘You reapgreaterbenefitfromtheskinofafoxthanfromthehideofalion,’hewrote,andwentontodescribehow‘weendeavour toconceal the realplanand tocreatean illusionfor thebenefit of the enemy by feigning views we do not hold.’25 Frederick’s voluminouswritingsincludehisSecretInstructionstohisgeneralsandtheMilitaryTestamentsof1752and1768.Althoughheneversynthesizedhis ideasintoasingletreatise, theseandotherworks give an insight into his thoughts at various times. Since ‘a ruse might succeedwherebruteforcemightfail,’hemadefrequentuseofdoubleagents,plantedmessages,showy concentrations of troops or transport, or deceptive arrangements of his forces incamp.26 While not an innovator in the fashion of Maurice or Gustavus Adolphus,Frederick did devise the Attack in Oblique Order. This was designed to maximize theeffectivenessofPrussia’snumerically inferiorarmiesby feintingagainstonepartof theenemy’slinebeforeconcentratingbyrapidmanœuvretorollitupfromtheflank,atacticusedmostnotablyattheBattleofLeuthenin1757.

Following defeat by the Austrians at Kolin on 18 June, which enabled them torelieve Prague, Frederick was forced onto the defensive. After defeating the French atRossbach on 5 November he rushed his small army of 36,000 men back to Silesia,determined to attack the combined 70,000-strong Austro-Russian army commanded byPrinceCharlesofLorraineandMarschallLeopoldvonDaun,whichwasblockingtheroadtoBreslau.Withonlyhalf thenumbersofhisopponentsitwasaboldmoveindeed;butFrederickfelt thatboldnessaidedbydeceptionwouldmakeupfor thedisparity.27Afterrising at 0400 hours, the army was soon on the march in two great wings of infantryflankedbycavalrywithapowerfuladvanceguardtothefore.ByastrokeoffortunethegroundoverwhichthebattlewasfoughtwasthePrussianarmy’speacetimetrainingarea.NearthevillageofBorne,AustrianoutpostswerequicklydriveninandFrederickmadeareconnaissance.TheAustrianrightwingwasanchoredonanoakforest,but the left fellshortofLakeSchweidnitzer-Wasser.Mostimportantly,hecouldseethatthehighgroundof the Schleier-Berg and the Sophien-Berg offered a covered approach towards theAustrianleftatSagschütz.Hethereforemadeadeploymentasiftoattackdirectlytohisfront,convincingCharlesthathewouldhittheAustrianrightandpromptinghimtobringforwardninebattalionsfromthereservetotheareaofNippern,welloveranhour’smarchfromSagschütz.Meanwhile,themarchingPrussiancolumnshaddisappearedfromview,thankstoFrederick’sintimateknowledgeoftheterrain.

As themainbodymoved toassault theAustrian left, theadvanceguardcontinuedforward in a feint towards the right-centre. Shortly after noon the main body was inposition to assault from the south through the village ofLeuthen, heavily supported byartillery.Atfirst,Charlessoughttosendindividualbattalionstomeetthisnewthreat,butwithhiscavalrydrivenfromthefield,hewasforcedtorealignhisentiredefencetoface

south.Atabout1530hoursthePrussiansopenedaconcertedattackagainstthisnewline,takenintheflankbyPrussianartilleryfire.Leuthenfellafterthirtyminutesand,withthelightrapidlyfading,theAustriansfellbackintotaldisorder,whichquicklyturnedtorout.The Prussians lost a little over 6,000 men but they inflicted 22,000 casualties on theAustrians(includingaround12,000prisoners).Itwasprobablythegreatestvictoryofthecentury.28

THEDUALREVOLUTION

During the late eighteenth century theworldwasoncemore transformedby revolution,bothpoliticalandindustrial.ThisledtoprolongedwarfarebetweenFranceandmuchofthe rest of Europe, duringwhich time theBritishArmywon its only battle honour forserviceonhomesoil,and itsmostbizarre:Fishguard,1797. Itbelongs to thePembroke(Castlemartin) Yeomanry and, if more boozy than bloody, it represents a minormasterpiece of bluff over brute force and remains a tribute toWelsh pluck.29 TheobaldWolfeTone,founderoftheSocietyofUnitedIrishmen,arrivedinFranceinearly1796toseek aid to establish an Irish republic. In Paris he met another dashing youngman ofaction,LazareHoche,commanderoftheArméedesCôtesdel’Océan.HocheenvisagedacoupdemainagainsttheCornishcoastby1,600FrenchregularsandasecondlandinginWaleswiththeaimofestablishingapeasantuprisinginBritain.Hewasintheprocessofputting these modest proposals into effect when word arrived from the governingDirectorythatsomethingrathermoregrandwasbeingplanned.Theseexpeditionsweretobecomesubsidiarydiversionstothemaineffortofputting15,000menashoretoassistintheliberationofIreland.

TheexpeditionfellfoulofarisinggaleoffBantryBay,andforafortnightHoche,ToneandtheirarmywereborneaboutonthebackofanAtlanticgale,whichforcedthemto abandon the attempt. Immediately afterwards, the plans for raids on Cornwall andWalesweredustedoffagain;theCornwallschemewasthendropped,butTonehadspentsomeofhistimeintranslatingordersfortheAmericanleaderoftheexpeditionaimedatWales, William Tate. Tate’s orders were to land within five miles of Bristol at dusk.HavingdestroyedwhatwasthenEngland’ssecondcity,hewastocrossovertotherightbank of the River Taff and march on Chester and Liverpool. His ragtail ‘army’ wasassembledfromthedregsoftheprisons,pressedémigrés,andafewreleasedprisonersofwarwhoevidentlydidnotknowwhattheyhadvolunteeredfor.TheywereissuedBritishuniformscapturedatQuiberonanddyeddeepbrown,whichearnedthemthetitleLégionNoire.

AftertheyhadraidedIlfracombeconditionssimplywouldnotpermitthepassageuptheBristolChannel.TatethendeclaredCardiganBayhisalternativeobjective,andcoursewasduly set.The squadronwas sightedon themorningofWednesday22February offNorthBishopRock.*Shortly afterwards,Tate’smen seized a localman, JohnOwenofPencaer,fromhissloopBritanniaandquizzedhimastothedefencesofthearea.Helpedby some brandy, he greatly exaggerated the defenders’ numbers, but his estimate stillamounted to less thanhalf thatof the invaders.Soon seventeenboatloadsofuniformedcutthroats andbrigandsdescendeduponaspeaceful a spot as exists inWesternEurope.Forty-sevenbarrelsofgunpowderand2,000standsofarmsfortheproposeduprisingwerealsolanded.

Todefendthearea,JohnCampbell,LordCawdor,proceededtoassumecommandofthe400assortedmen,includingtheCastlemartinYeomanry,assembledatHaverfordwest.ThesethensetofftowardsFishguard,whilemostoftheFrenchtroopswerebusylootingthe surrounding countryside and getting into skirmishes. One local woman, JemimaNicholas, a 47-year-old cobbler, marched resolutely out to Llanwnda armed with apitchfork and promptly rounded up twelve Frenchmen, whom she brought into townbefore departing to look formore.Cawdor’s force arrived as the eveningdrewon, andplannedanimmediateattack.Butthefightneverdevelopedastheycouldnotmanœuvretheirimprovisedartillerythroughthenarrowlines,andtheydecidedtowaitformorning.

Dismayedbywhathesaw,Tatedecidedtoseekterms.Ateighto’clockhesenthissecond-in-command,theformerBarondeRochemure,andhisEnglish-speakingADCtodeliveramissive:

Sir,TheCircumstancesunderwhichtheBodyofFrenchtroopsundermyCommandwerelandedatthisplacerenders it unnecessary to attempt any military operations, as they would tend only to Bloodshed andPillage.TheOfficersof thewholeCorpshave therefore intimated tome theirdesireof entering into aNegociationuponPrinciplesofHumanityforasurrender.IfyouareinfluencedbysimilarConsiderationsyoumaysignifythesamebythebearerand,inthemeanTime,Hostilitiesshallcease.30

Cawdormusthavegreetedthisdevelopmentwithdelightandmayhavealsobeentemptedwhen, shortly afterwards, de Rochemure announced that the only detail requiringagreement was the repatriation of the French at the British government’s expense. ButCawdor refused even to contemplate this and, cleverlydisguisinghisweakness, offeredthefollowinggrandiloquentreply:

Sir,TheSuperiorityof theForceundermycommand,whichishourlyincreasing,mustpreventmytreatingupon anyTerms short of your surrenderingyourwholeForcePrisoners ofWar. I enter fully intoyourWishofpreventinganunnecessaryEffusionofBlood,whichyourspeedySurrendercanaloneprevent,andwhichwillentitleyoutothatConsiderationitisevertheWishofBritishTroopstoshowanEnemywhosenumbersareinferior.31

ThiswasanoutrageousbluffbutitpromptedTatetocommunicatethefollowingmorningthathewouldsurrenderunderanytermsandarticlesweredulyprepared.

TatemusthaveseenthatheoutnumberedCawdor’srag-tagarmy(manyweresailorsandatleastafifthwerevolunteercivilians).Yetaprocès-verbaldrawnupbyhisofficerson25FebruaryandsignedbyhimspokeoftheBritishcomingatthem‘withtroopsoftheline to thenumberof several thousand’.32Thousands of people gathered towitness theLégionNoire laydown itsarmsonGoodwickSands, includingwomenclad in the thenfashionablescarletmantlesandlow-crownedroundfelthats.ThesemayhaveappearedtotheFrenchlikeBritishArmyredcoatsatadistance.TheofficialFrenchhistorianCaptainDesbrière refers to ‘un rassemblementde femmesgalloises’,anda letter fromJohnandMaryMathiastotheirsisterinserviceinSwanseadescribes‘nearfourhundardWomeninRedFlanes andSquierCambelwent to ask themwere they to fight and they said theywere’. It is easy to picture a crowd ofwomen coming towatch the proceedings beingaskedby‘SquierCambel’iftheyhadcometofight,andbeingeagertotakeahand.Thedeceptionmaynothavebeenintentional,butitseffectwasthesame.33

IninvadingBritain,TateachievedonethingthatalwayseludedNapoleonBonaparte,

one of the world’s greatest generals and a master of deception.34 Napoleon was avoraciousreader,butheleftnobodyofwritingtostudentsofhismilitaryart.Instead,hisart was handed down by his actions and the reports of others. Like Marlborough andFrederick,Napoleonwasnotsomuchamilitaryinnovatorasaskilledmanipulatorofthetools available.Although he disliked categorizing hismethods, he operated three broadtypesofmanœuvre.35Themanœuvre sur lesderrières (or strategical envelopment)wasdemonstratedearlyinNapoleon’scareerbytheManœuvreofLodiin1796.HerehewasfacedwithacrossingoftheRiverPo,whichwascontestedbytheAustriangeneralJohannBeaulieu.Napoleon’splanwastodistractBeaulieuwhilehehimselfmovedeastwardstoPiacenza; there he would establish a bridgehead from which, if he could capture thecrossings over the River Adda which flows south into the Po, he would threaten theAustrianrear.ThiswasachievedbymountingdemonstrationsthatappearedtopresageacrossingintheareaofValenzawhileachosenforcemarchedhardfortherealobjective,thussucceedingingettingbehindtheenemyandthreateningtocutitoff.36

WhenNapoleon came to prominence, the FrenchArmy had been as imbuedwithrevolutionary fervouras the restof thecountry. Itburntwithapatriotic zealpreviouslyunseen,andthelevéeenmassecreatedthefirstmassconscriptarmies.MarlboroughandFrederickhadbeenforcedtokeeptheirmuchsmallerarmiestogether,largelyforlogisticreasons(troopswerenotallowedtogoforagingforsuppliesforfearofdesertion,soallsupplieshadtobecarriedinlargewagontrains),buttheFrenchrevolutionaryarmywascapable of operating with greater freedom of action and less reliance on depots thanpreviously. The patriotism of its soldiers meant they could be trusted to forage forthemselves,andsincetheywerefightinglargelyonforeignsoil,theburdendidnotfallonFrance.Napoleonrealizedthattheeighteenth-centurypatternofsiegewarfarehadledtoendless logistical problems, and since the large armies available tohimmeant he couldscreen off fortresses and not worry about sieges, the logistic apparatus that previouslylimitedanarmy’sfreedomofmanœuvrecouldbedispensedwith.37

Giventhesefactors,Napoleoncreatedhisgreatestinnovation–thearmycorps.ByorganizingtheGrandeArméeintoall-armsgroupings,eachcapableofindependentactionandoflookingafteritselfuntilsupportarrived,hewasabletoadvanceonawidefrontagein amanner not seen since theMongols, thus enabling him to cloak his intentions andmaineffort.Asaresult,hismarchtotheDanubein1805markedthetransitionbetweeneighteenth-andnineteenth-centurywarfare.Hewasabletoadvancewith200,000menonafrontageofnearly200miles,reducingto70mileswhenhereachedtheriver,andtotrapan Austrian force of 27,000 men at Ulm under the totally bemused Karl Freiherr vonMack,aswellastakingafurther30,000prisonersinthedaysthatfollowed.Unabletopullasimilar trickon theRussianswhowerecomingup tosupport theAustrians,Napoleonskilfully feignedweakness, and the combinedAustro-Russian army advanced to attackhimatAusterlitz.FromthecommandingPratzenheightstheAustro-RussianforcelookeddownonNapoleon’sapparentlyweak rightwing,andmoved toencircle it in fourgreatcolumnstotalling40,000men.Havingthusluredthealliesoutofposition,Napoleonwithperfecttimingunleashedpreviouslyconcealedtroopsintothegapcreatedinthecentreofthe Austro-Russian line, and achieved his greatest tactical victory.38 Thereafter, hisdecisiontoinvadeRussianotwithstanding,heprovedperhapsmoreskilledasastrategist

thanasatactician.39

Warfare and revolution continued throughout Europe for the remainder of thenineteenth century, butwhileBritain andFrance in particular also took the opportunitythat industrialization presented to extend their empires, another truly great commanderweldedatribeofperhaps1,500intoamightynationthatinduecoursewouldhumblethegreatest empireof all.KingShakaof theZulusdevelopeda revolutionarywarmachinebasedonthestabbingassegaiandaregimentalsystemthatsweptallbeforehim.Hewasalso a great deceiver and delighted in luring the enemy into positions favourable tohimself.40InhisfirstfullbattleagainsttheButeleziin1816hebunchedhisregimentsatthe outset and had hismen carry their shields on edge tomake his force appear small.Whenthehornsofhis famousbull’sheadformationracedout, thewarriors turned theirshieldsoutwardsmakingthearmyinstantlyappeardoubleitsoriginalsize.41AttheBattleofGqokliHillin1823ShakafacedafargreaterforceoftheNdwandwe.HesenttheZulucattleoffwithasmallescort,butdeliberatelyleft theherdvisibleinordertodrawoffaportionoftheenemyinpursuit;then,abandoninghisusualtactics,heoccupiedapositionontopofthehill,whereheconcealedhisreserveinadeepdepression.Aftertheirinitialassaultshadbeenresisted,theNdwandweformedacolumn,intendingtodriveShakaoffthehillontoacordonatthebottom.Instead,theywereinturnsurroundedbythehiddenreserve,acombinationofskillandcunningthatbroughtoffShaka’sgreatestvictory.42

THEAMERICANCIVILWAR

Western technological development transformedwarfare and eventually swept away theZulus’ world. Although many of the developments for which it is famed – the use ofrailways, telegraph and ironclad steamships–werenot in fact new, theAmericanCivilWarisneverthelessoftenreferredtoasthefirst‘modernwar’.Intermsofscale–withitsmassarmies,massproductionandmasscasualties–itcertainlydidrepresentmodernity,butitwasfoughtusinglargelyNapoleonictacticalmethods.

FollowingadisastrousopeningtothewaratFirstBullRun(orManassasJunction)in1861,theUnionappointedMajor-GeneralGeorgeB.McClellanasgeneral-in-chief.HisurgenttaskwastoreorganizeandtraintheArmyofthePotomac,bothforthedefenceofWashington DC and for future offensive operations with a view to capturing theConfederatecapitalofRichmond,Virginia.‘Icandoitall’,McClellanassuredPresidentAbrahamLincoln.McClellanwasknownas ‘theYoungNapoleon’andaffectionatelyas‘LittleMac’byhistroops.Hewasanableadministratorandtrainer,butlackedresolutionin the face of the enemy. At this time the Union intelligence service was run by thePinkertonDetectiveAgency,foundedbytheex-GlaswegianAllanPinkerton,whichlaterbecamerenownedthroughouttheWest.Asamilitaryintelligencebureau,however,itwashopelessly inadequate and provided wildly exaggerated reports of rebel strength in theareaimmediatelysouthofWashington.Despiteampleevidencetothecontrary,Pinkertonreported Confederate forces as totalling 270,000 men, with 150,000 within strikingdistanceofWashington.LittleMacrefusedtomoveuntilhehad270,000menofhisown.

TheninSeptemberrebelpicketsweredrivensurprisinglyeasilyfromapositiontheyhadoccupiedwithinafewmilesofWashington,revealingthatthegunsMcClellan’sspieshadassuredhimweretrainedonthecapitalwerenothingmorethanstrippedlogs,painted

black with wagon wheels tacked onto the side: one scornful reporter christened them‘QuakerGuns’.43Lincolnbecameso frustratedwithLittleMac’s lackof resolution thatwhen the latter was ill early in 1862, Lincoln told aWhiteHousewar council that ‘ifGeneralMcClellandoesnotwanttousetheArmy,Iwouldliketoborrowitforatime’.44Eventually however,McClellan was persuaded to take the offensive, albeit not via thedirectroute(whichheremainedconvincedwasstronglydefended)butbyalandingontheYork–JamespeninsulaandapproachingRichmondfromthesouth-east.TheConfederatesinfrontofWashingtonthenabandonedtheirpositiontorevealanentirebatteryofQuakergunsatCenterville.

OnthepeninsulaLittleMac’sarmy,whichtotalledover120,000men,wasinitiallyfaced by just 8,000 Confederates under John Bankhead Magruder, a lover of amateurtheatricsknownas ‘PrinceJohn’becauseofhis lavishparties, fancydressuniformsandpomposity(heevenaffecteda‘HorseGuards’lisp).Friendsrecountedhowhehadtriedtoimpress visitingBritish officerswith his dinner andwines and displayed surprisewhenaskedhowmuchAmericanofficersearned,sayinghehadnoideaandwouldhavetoaskhisservant.This,likehisentirelifestyle,wasinfactagrandbluff;hehadnoindependentincomeatall.45Nowhesettobluffingwithawill.

Having anchored off FortMonroe on 2April 1862,LittleMacwas initially filledwith optimism but soon became despondent when the roads proved far worse thanexpected, slowing his baggage and artillery. AlthoughMagruder had built his defenceworkswithgreatenergy,hehadathirteen-milelinetodefendandthereweresimplynotenough guns to cover it: he had been able to secure just fifteen, including light fieldpieces, and had barely sixty rounds for each. Therefore hemade up the numbers withQuakerguns,hopingtoreplacethemallwithrealonesinduecourse,butMcClellanhadarrivedbeforehehadachance.SoMagrudermixedQuakergunswithrealonesalongtheline,hopingthiswouldprovesufficienttodelaytheadvancingenemyjustenough,whichwith the cautious McClellan proved the case. With 67,000 men immediately to hand,McClellancouldhavebrushedMagruderaside,buttoaddcolourtothedeception,PrinceJohnconspicuouslymovedhishandfulofunitsaboutandorderedhisbandsmen toplayloudlyafterdark,whilehehimselfrodeostentatiouslyaboutwithacolourfulfollowingofstaff officers. One battalion was sent to march along a road that was heavily wooded,exceptforasinglegapinplainviewoftheUnionlines.Inanendlesscirclethroughthesameclearingtheysweptpastinseeminglyendlessarray.‘[We]havebeentravellingmostoftheday,seemingwithnootherviewthantoshowourselvestotheenemyatasmanydifferentpointsofthelineaspossible,’wroteanAlabamacorporal,‘Iamprettytired.’46

Itworked all too easily.LittleMachalted his infantrywhen it could havewalkedthrough theConfederatepositionatanypoint it choseandorderedhisartillery tobeginprobing the defences. As early as 7 April he was telegraphing Washington to whine:‘General J. E. Johnston arrived in Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. ItseemsclearthatIshallhavethewholeforceoftheenemyonmyhands,probablynotlessthan 100,000 men and possibly more.’ He believed therefore that his own force was‘possiblylessthanthatoftheenemy’.Noattackcouldsucceedand,‘wereIinpossessionoftheirentrenchmentsandassailedbydoublemynumbersIshouldhavenofearastotheresult.’Despiteintelligencereportsthattheenemyhadnomorethan15,000men(which

McClellanacknowledgedasearlyas3April),theYoungNapoleonbelievedthatnobody,stilllessaprofessionalsoldier,wouldtrytoholdsoprecariousalinewithsofew.47On5AprilMcClellandeclared,‘IcannotturnYorktownwithoutabattle, inwhichImustuseheavyartilleryandgothroughthepreliminaryoperationsofasiege.’Infact,bythe11thMagruder’s force still amounted to just 34,000 men and Johnston did not even reachRichmonduntilthe12th.WhentheConfederateseventuallyretiredonthenightof3May,just as Federal siege preparations were being finalized, their forces amounted to only56,000men.McClellan,whohadbeendeeplyimpressedbyhisvisitasanobservertothesiege works of Sebastopol in the Crimea seven years previously, was probably moreimpressed with the works facing him than the apparent size of the garrison.48Nevertheless, the diarist Mary Chesnut recorded that ‘it was a wonderful thing how[Magruder] played his ten thousand beforeMcClellan like fireflies and utterly deludedhim–keepingdownthereeversolong.’49

Another Confederate general put on a command performance in May 1862. AtCorinth, Mississippi, following the Battle of Shiloh, Major-General Pierre G. T.Beauregard sent ‘deserters’ to theUnion lineswithcarefully rehearsed stories abouthis‘offensive’planstogetherwithcavalryraidstospreadpanicandrumour.Butheknewhecouldnotholdthetownifitcametoasiegeanddecidedthat,inordertosavehisarmy,aretreatwasnecessary.Keepinghisplansasecretfromallbutthosewhostrictlyneededtoknow, he arranged to evacuate the wounded, send on baggage and even remove thesignpostsbeyondthetowntohinderanypursuit.Meanwhile,withallhisbandsplaying,aregimentwaskeptcheeringthetrainsthatarrivedtotakeawayhiswounded,toconveytheimpressionthatreinforcementswerearriving.

Whenthe timecame to tell thefront-linesoldiers that theywere towithdraw, theywerehappytojoininthefun.Theystoleoutoftheirtrenchesthatnight,leavingdrummerboyswithwoodsuppliestotendtheirfiresandbeatreveilleinthemorning,togetherwithasinglebandtoplayatvariouspointsandadetachment tocontinuecheering thesingletrainofemptycarsthatrattledbackandforthinandoutofthestationallnight.At0120hours thatmorning theUnion commander,Major-General John Pope, sent word to hissuperiorsthat‘theenemyisreinforcingheavily,bytrains,inmyfrontandonmyleft…Ihavenodoubt,fromallappearances,thatIshallbeattackedinheavyforceatdaylight.’50Instead, when daylight came, according to Brigadier-General LewWallace, the Uniontroopsfound‘notasickprisoner,notarustybayonet,notabiteofbacon–nothingbutanemptytownandsomeQuakerguns’.51Worse,thedummygunswereservedwithdummygunnersfashionedfromstrawandolduniforms.

Nathan Bedford Forrest, ‘the Wizard of the Saddle’, was described by WilliamTecumsehShermanas‘themostremarkablemanourCivilWarproducedoneitherside’,althoughthisdidnotpreventShermanorderingthatForrestbe‘hunteddownandkilledifit cost ten thousand lives and bankrupts the federal treasury’.52 Forrest’s instinctive,brilliant commandof cavalry includeda flair fordeception:he consistentlymanaged toexaggeratehisstrengthbyaconsiderablemargin.Whenhecrossed theTennesseeRivernearCliftonon17December1862,heneededtocompletehistaskbeforetheUnionhadtimetoconcentrateforcesforhisdestruction.HavingcapturedsomeUnioncivilians,hedrilledhismenasinfantryintheirpresencebeforeallowingthecivilianstoescape,andin

thiswayspread the rumour thathiscommand includeda largebodyof infantry.By thesame tokenhismenalwayscarriedanumberofkettledrumswhich theykeptbeating tofurtherreinforcetheimpressionthattherewereinfantrywithhim.53

InApril1863ForrestwasgiventhetaskofdefeatingaUnionraidintoAlabamabyColonel Abel D. Streight. When Forrest finally cornered Streight and demanded hissurrender,Forrestclaimedtohaveacolumnoffreshtroopsathand.‘Ihaveenoughmentorun straight over you,’ he said.54 Streight refused even to contemplate laying down hisarms unless Forrest could prove this was so, but Forrest would not show his hand.Meanwhile,aspreviouslyinstructed,Forrest’sartillerycommanderrepeatedlybroughthistwogunsoverariseintheroad,intocoverandroundagain,whichStreightcouldobserveoverForrest’sshoulder.‘NameofGod’,criedStreightatlast,‘howmanygunshaveyougot? There’s fifteen I’ve counted already.’ ‘I reckon that’s all that has kept up,’ saidForrest, looking roundcasually.55Streight returned to his own line and soonafterwardssurrenderedtoaforcelessthanhalfthesizeofhisown.

Forrest,whorosefromprivatetolieutenant-generalduringthewar,capturedAthens,Alabama,on24September1864bybluffandsheerforceofpersonality.Hesentaflagoftruce to Union Colonel Wallace Campbell with a note demanding immediate andunconditionalsurrender,likeCawdoratFishguard,‘tostoptheeffusionofblood’.Whenthe twopartiesmet, he insisted (as heoftendid) that if hewas compelled to storm theworksofthefortinwhichCampbellwasensconceditwouldresultinthemassacreoftheentiregarrison.Forrestclaimedtohaveover10,000men,butCampbellwouldonlyagreetosurrenderifhecouldseethemforhimself.ForrestagreedtoallowCampbellandoneotherofficertoreviewhisarrayandCampbellreturneddulyconvincedthatForrestindeedcommanded8–10,000menwithnineguns,andthatitwouldbemurdertoattemptfurtherresistance. He had been stalling in the hope that reinforcementsmight arrive, but nowagreedtosurrender.Infact,Forrest’scommandamountedtoonly4,500,buthemadethesumtotalofhiscommandaddupto10,000intheeyesofhisopponentbyapracticeheoftenused.Hedisplayedaportionofhistroopsdismounted,asinfantry;oncetheUnioncolonelhadpassedtoanotherdetachment,thesemountedandmovedpositiontoappearascavalry.Healsomovedhisgunsabouttogiveasimilarimpression.However,Campbellwasnotwrongabout thearrivalofreinforcements.Thesearrivedshortlyafterwardsandwerealsocompelledtosurrender.56

B-PATMAFEKING

Another man famed for his love of amateur theatrics was Colonel Robert StephensonSmyth Baden-Powell. B-P (as he was universally known) was the hero of the SecondAnglo-BoerWarandarguablysavedSouthAfricafortheBritish.57AlthoughthesiegeofMafekinglost itsstrategicimportancewithinafewweeksof itsstart, theBritishpublic,rockedbythedisasters inDecember1899collectivelyknownasBlackWeek,combinedwith the ignominy of thousands of British regulars being cooped up in the sieges ofKimberley and Ladysmith, were enthralled by B-P and Mafeking. Here, it seemed, abunchofamateursunderanobscurecolonelwasmakingfoolsoftheBoers.Infact,thesewere precisely B-P’s instructions. ‘As an actual feat of arms’, he wrote later, it ‘waslargely a piece of bluff, but bluff which was justified by the special circumstances’.58

Meanwhile,hissardonicdispatches–‘Oneortwosmallfieldgunsareshellingthetown.Nobodycares’–furtherendearedhimtotheBritishpublic.

InJune1899,withwar inSouthAfricaapproaching,B-Pwassentwith thegrand-sounding position of Commander-in-Chief, North-West Frontier Forces, to raise twobattalions of mounted infantry and to co-ordinate the police forces of the region.Furthermore,hehadsecret instructions incaseofwar toraidTransvaalanddrawoffasmany Boers as possible from the vulnerable Cape Colony and Natal. In fact, thetomfooleryandbluffwithwhichhemadehisreputationwerepartofhisordersfromtheWar Office.59 But at the end of September, with hostilities imminent, the Capeadministration forbadehimaccess to the town, forcinghim tobluffhisway inpast theauthorities: ‘I got permission from the Cape to place an armed guard in Mafeking toprotectthestores;butas thestrengthof theguardwasnotstipulatedImovedthewhole[Protectorate] regiment into the place without delay.’60War was declared by PresidentPaulKrugerofTransvaalon11Octoberand theBoers swallowed thebaitofMafekingwhole,immediatelyinvestingitwitharound8,000men.

Thescratchgarrisonamountedtojust48officersand1,183men;notallhadmodernweapons and there was no modern artillery. Unable to raid Transvaal, B-P set aboutachieving his aim from within the confines of the town, but there was no way ofpreventingtheBoersfromcuttingMafekingofffromsupplyandreinforcement,andeventhemostsanguineestimateput reliefsixweeksaway.B-Pwasalmostalone in thinkingthateven the initial assaultcouldbe turnedback.Hewanted toconvinceCommandant-General Piet Cronje that the toothless lion of a town had in fact got sharp claws. Heimmediatelysetupachainofoutpostsonafive-and-a-half-mileperimeter,awideareaforsosmallaforcebutoneatsuchdistancethathehopedwouldpreventanoverwhelmingrushandwhichincludedthe6,000nativesintheBaralongtownship.Onefortwasbuiltamileandhalftothewestoftherailwaywithmoundsofearth,sandbagsandtwooutsizedflagpolesclearlymarkingitashisownheadquarters.Induecourseitdrewmuchenemyfire,ashehopeditwould:itwasadummy.Thornbushwaswovenintozarebainsteadofbarbedwireandsuitablehouseswereloopholedandprepared.TrenchesweredugandabreastworkmadeofstoneattheoldfortonCannonKopje.Allthesepositionswerethenlinked by telephone to Dixon’s Hotel, where B-P set up his real headquarters with alookout position that gave him a fine view of the area. Food did not appear to be aproblemsincefewpeopleexpectedasiegetolastlong.TheDutchamongthepopulationpositivelygloated, but thenumerousBoer agents in townwouldprove invaluable to itsdefenders.

Work on the defences included strings of natives continuously carrying boxesgingerlyabouttown,tellinganyonewhoaskedthattheymustnotbedropped.‘Minefields’soonbeganappearingallroundtownwithprominentwarningsignsinDutchandEnglishand givenwider publicity by official announcements. B-Pmade a very public show oftest-firingone.‘Witheveryonesafeindoors,’helaterwrote

MajorPanzeraandIwentoutandstuckastickofdynamiteintoanant-bearhole.Welitafuseandranandtookcoveruntilthethingwentoff,anditdidwithasplendidroarandavastcloudofdust.Outofthedustemergedamanwithabikewhohappenedtobepassing,andhepedalledoffashardashecouldfortheTransvaal,eightmilesaway,wherehenodoubttoldhowbymerelyridingalongtheroadhehadhitoffamurderousmine.Theboxeswerefilledwithnothingmoredangerousthansand!61

Slowly the ringwas tightened but for some days, apart from probing actions, theBoersdidlittle.ItwasapparentthatCronje’saimwasamorale-boostingbloodlessvictory.TheBoerswereincontrol.Orsotheythought.Theperimeterwasneverentirelyclosed,enabling information at least to pass both ways. B-P kept another 1,200 Boers idlywatchingthesouthernstretchoftheBechuanalandborder.WeeksearlierhehadwrittentoanoldEnglishacquaintancewho ran a farm just insideTransvaal to thenorth,warninghimoftheapproachofa‘ThirdColumn’.B-Pknew,however,thatthemanwasdeadandthat consequently the letterwouldbeopenedand its contentspassed to theenemy.The‘ThirdColumn’onlyeverexistedinthemindsof theBoers.Lieutenant-ColonelHerbertPlumer’s 500men of the Rhodesia Regiment did exist, though, and theymade a greatshow of themselves to occupy another 2,000 Boers along the Limpopo River andpromptedurgenttelegramsfromKrugerasking‘whereisPlumer?’andurgingtheBoersto‘watchPlumeratallcosts’.62

TheBoer reluctance toattacknowsuitedB-P,at leastduring theday.Atnight layobvious danger until one evening, shortly after sunset, an intensewhite light shone outfromoneofhisoutposts.Shortly thereafter (orpossiblyat the same timefor theBoers,were notoriously bad timekeepers) another appeared at a different location and thenanother, until it seemed to the Boers that they faced not only mines but also manysearchlights.SergeantMoffat,inchargeofthegarrisonsignallers,assistedbyMrWalkerof the South African Acetylene Gas Company, had rigged a contraption by solderingbiscuittinstogethertoformarectangularconewithagleaminginteriorandanacetylenetorchthroughthebottom,allattachedtoalongpole.Theyquicklymovedthisfromforttofort,whichgreatlyimpressedtheBoerswhenshoneintheirgeneraldirection.63Anothercontrivancemadefrombiscuittinswasamegaphonethatcouldclearlyconveywordsofcommand more than 500 yards. This was deployed in forward positions to broadcastcarefullyrehearsedconversationsinwhichB-Pplayedtheleadingrole,issuingorderstonotional subordinates to prepare to attack with fixed bayonets. The Boers were scaredwitlessby thisweaponandits threatwoulddrawawildbarrageofmusketry,disclosingtheirownpositionsandassistingthewatchingBritishsnipers.64SucheffortsconformedtoB-P’sgeneralinstructionstothegarrisonto‘blufftheenemy…asmuchasyoulike’.65

B-P published some correspondence between himself andCronje inwhichCronjeadmittedthatMafekingcouldnotbetakenbyassaultandB-Pagainreferredtohismines.SeventimesthroughOctoberandNovemberB-PsentoutsortiestogivetheBoerswhathecalled‘kicks’.Althoughexpensiveincasualties,theyhadthedesiredeffectofkeepingtheattackersonthebackfoot.GreaterresolutionwouldsurelyhavesweptthedefendersawaybutKruger,althoughheinstructedCronjeto‘makeanendofit’,ruledoutattackslikelytoresultinmorethanfiftycasualties.

When news arrived of the investment of Ladysmith, early relief was clearlyimpossible and led on 17 November to the introduction of rationing. Thankfully, thisindicationofthefuturewasovershadowedthefollowingdaybythenewsofthedepartureofCronjeandmostofhismen.B-Pandhistworegimentsof‘loafers’staffedbyadozenImperial officers had produced an important strategic victory, distracting Cronje and aquarter of the Transvaal’s force, including a score of modern guns, for over a month.GeneralJ.P.Snyman,whoreplacedCronje,madenoattempttotakeMafekingbyassault

andboth sides settleddown fora longwait.About seventy shellsadaywere fired intoMafekingthroughoutNovemberandDecember,tolittleeffect.B-Pcontinuedtosupervisethe improvement of the defences and, on noticing theBoers stepping high over barbedwireattachedtowoodenpickets,setoutpicketsofhisownwhichhismenostentatiouslysteppedover – theywere tiedwith string.66With alertness and guile hemaintained thedefence against what remained considerable odds. After 217 days Snyman finallydeparted.B-Phaddisplayedthe‘audacityandwariness’recommendedinhisoriginalWarOfficeinstructionstogetherwithanutterlyruthlesswilltowinwhich,combinedwiththeirresolutionofbothCronjeandSnyman,hadbroughthimadeservedvictory.

Finally, the beginning of the twentieth century provides one particularly cold-bloodedandcallousexampleofageneraldeceivinghisownside.TheperpetratorwastheGermangeneralErichvonFalkenhayn,at theBattleofVerdun in1916.Following theirdefeatatthehandsofPrussiain1870theFrenchbuiltastringoffortificationsbetweentheSwiss and Belgian frontiers while they nursed their plans for revenge. The principalstrongpointof this system,already fortifiedby theRomansand laterbyVauban,wasatVerdun. InDecember 1915 Falkenhayn, who had been appointed Chief of the GeneralStaff,addressedamemorandumtotheKaiserinwhichhearguedinaconvolutedfashionthatGermany’s principal enemywasBritain and that thebestway to defeat herwas toknocktheFrenchArmyoutofthewar.HewentontodescribeobjectivesthattheFrenchwouldthrowineveryavailablemantoretain,andasaresultofwhichtheirforceswould‘bleedtodeath’.Ifthiswerenotchillingenough,theplanthatheproposedinvolvedtheGermanFifthArmylaunching‘anoffensiveinthedirectionofVerdun’;yetCrownPrinceRupprecht of Bavaria, who commanded the Fifth Army, never saw the originalmemorandum and in due course issued orders ‘to capture the fortress of Verdun byprecipitatemethods’.Falkenhaynapprovedthisorder,eventhoughhehimselfhadnosuchintention,sincethecaptureofVerdunwouldremovethecarrotthatwasdesignedtodrawthe French into the mincer. Apparently, he calculated that the Fifth Army would fightbetteriftheythoughttheyweretocapturethefortressratherthanengaginginabattleofattrition.FalkenhaynwentontopromisetheCrownPrincethatadequatereserveswouldbe available but deliberately withheld them. Of all the deceptions wrought over thecenturies,fewexamplesaremorecynicalthanthis.67

2

TheInformationBattle‘Allthebusinessofwar,andindeedthebusinessoflife,istoendeavourtofindoutwhatyoudon’tknowbywhatyoudo;that’swhatIcall“guessingwhatwasattheothersideofthehill”.’

TheDukeofWellington

THEINTELLIGENCEPROCESSANOLDFRENCHbookonbridgesupposedlystartedwiththewords:‘Rule1.Alwaystrytoseeyouropponent’scards.’Naturally,ageneralwhoknowshisopponent’sintentionshasasimilaradvantage.Thedeceiverknowsthattheenemyalsowantstoseehiscards,andhispurposeistodisplayfalseones.Aknowledgeoftheenemy’sintelligencecapabilitiesandweaknesseswillfacilitatefeedinghimfalseinformationandhelpensurethatheacceptsit.If theenemyhasapredilectionforparticularsourcesofinformation,deceptionplanningcanbetailoredaccordingly:thedeceivermustknowwheretoputtherightcardssothattheywillbeseen,noticedand,mostimportantly,actedupon.

Intelligencehaslongbeenassociatedinmanypeople’smindswithespionage,thankslargelytospyfiction.Butforcenturiesthewordintelligencemeantnewsofanysort,andnewspaperswouldheadtheircolumns‘ForeignIntelligence’or‘DomesticIntelligence’.Inmilitaryparlanceitisimportanttodistinguishbetweeninformationandintelligence.Theformermightbeabaldfactsuchas‘theenemyhasarrivedat theriver,’while the latterconcerns thesignificanceofsucha fact: if, forexample, theenemy’sbridgingpontoonsare in thenextcountyhewillbeunable tocross theriver forsome time. Intelligence isthus theprocessof recordingnew informationand relating it towhat isalreadyknown,determiningthecredibilityofthesourceandthenanalysingit.Informationthereforeonlybecomesintelligenceafterithasbeenprocessed.Thebusinessofcollectinginformation–about theenemy (preferablywithouthisknowledge)but alsoaboutphysical conditions,localsupplysources, thepopulationoranyother factor thatmightaffectoperations– isreconnaissance.Surveillanceinvolvesthesystematicobservationofselectedareasandisaninherentpartofreconnaissance.Italsohelpstoprovidesecurity,whichaimstoensurefreedom of action and prevent or restrict the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillanceactivities. However, none of this is as easy as it sounds, especially in the face of theenemy’sownreconnaissanceandsurveillanceactivities.

Thespecificpurposeofmilitaryintelligenceis toforecastwhattheenemywilldo,whereandwhenhewilldoit,howandinwhatstrength.Tobeofanyuse, thismustbedisseminatedtodecisionmakersasquicklyaspossible.Itthusbearsacertainsimilaritytoweather forecasting, always bearing in mind that there is a distinct and importantdifferencebetweenanenemy’scapabilities (whichare relativelyeasy todefine)andhisintentions (which seldom are). This is especially true when viewed in the context ofHelmuthGrafvonMoltke’sobservationthatiftherearethreecoursesofactionopentotheenemy, he invariably chooses the fourth. Prediction inherently involves a measure ofinformedguesswork, and as a result some commanders have felt their guesses to be asgoodasthoseoftheirstaff,regardingbriefingsasnomorethanameansofbringingthemuptodateonwhathashappenedratherthanonwhatwillhappen.Insuchcircumstances

the intelligence staff becomemerely diarists and historians. Thismay be significant tothose seeking to deceive them: attempts to deceive the Japanese in Burma during theSecondWorldWar frequently failedbecauseof theconceitand inflexibilityofJapanesecommandersontheonehand(makingAlliedeffortstoinducethemtochangetheirplansunlikely)andthe lowesteeminwhichtheJapanese intelligenceservicewasheldontheother (it was woefully inefficient and frequently ignored).1 By contrast, the accuratepredictionbyGermanintelligencethat theFrenchandBritishwoulddonothingenabledAdolfHitlertoleavejusttwenty-threeweakdivisionscoveringtheWestwhileheoverranPolandinSeptember1939.

Tocomparethetaskofbuildinganintelligencepicturetothatofamakingajigsawpuzzleistoosimpleananalogysinceajigsawisneatandsystematic,whereasa‘greatpartofinformationobtainedinWariscontradictory,astillgreaterpartisfalse,andbyfarthegreatestpartisofdoubtfulcharacter’.2Amoreusefulanalogyisthatofpaintingapicture,where each stroke of the palette knife is a piece of information. Compare the paintingstylesofaneo-ImpressionistsuchasGeorgesSeuratandanabstractartistsuchasJacksonPollock.Seurat’sstyle(knownas‘divisionism’or‘pointillism’)islikeaformofmosaic,inwhich colours are applied to the canvas in a seriesof small spots that,whenviewedfrom a distance, reveal a clear image of people and landscape.3 In contrast, Pollock’scolouredmosaicsareabstractanddonot takearecognizableform.In intelligencetermsthis abstraction is interference or ‘noise’ – contradictory indicators, missing data, fast-movingeventsandtimelagsbetweendatacollectionandanalysis,andpurechance–allofwhichinhibitaccurateintelligenceassessment.4Theaimoftheintelligenceofficeristowatch thepictureas it takes formandpredictwhat itwillbecome.But inattempting tocreate a misleading image the deceiver is not trying to fool the opposing intelligenceofficersomuchastheopposingcommander,aprocessthatrequiresanunderstandingofboth the opponent’s intelligence processes and, as the Japanese have demonstrated, theenemycommander’sattitudetowardsit.

The intelligence process takes the form of a simple cycle. The first action isdirection: the commander must tell his staff what he needs to know so that they canallocate resources to collect information. Collection forms the second stage, and as theinformation comes in, it must be processed into intelligence and then disseminated tothosewhoneed it.Byconstantly re-evaluatingwhat isknownbywhat isnot, thecyclecontinues.Fromadeceiver’spointofview,thecriticalphasesoftheenemy’sintelligencecycle are the collection and processing phases. It is towards the enemy’s sources andagenciesthatfalseinformationmustbedirected,andaknowledgeofwhatheislookingforduringprocessingwillassistinsendingthe‘correct’wronginformation,sinceitisbyreading‘signatures’ofoperationthatintelligencestaffsmakepredictions.Forexample,acombination of knowing what purpose a particular piece of equipment fulfils, and itsrelativepositionintheorderofbattle,canbeusedasasignature.Certainequipment,suchasparticularanti-aircraftsystems,mightbeheldatcorpsorarmylevel,andtheirpositionsmight therefore indicate either a corps headquarters or an army axis of advance. If onesideisdefendingariverline,thelocationoftheenemy’sbridgingequipmentmayindicatewhereanattemptatacrossingwillbemade.Eacharmyhasitsowncharacteristics,whichmustbecarefullystudied,andknowledgeofone’sowncharacteristicsimmediatelyopensdeceptivepossibilitiesforthedisplayoffalseones.

However, intelligence was long considered the poor relation. At the start of theSecondAnglo-BoerWar in 1899, the IntelligenceDepartment at theWarOffice had abudget of just £20,000 to cover thewholeworld (a quarter ofwhichwas governed byBritain,whichhadmadequiteafewenemiesintheprocess).5BythetimeAldousHuxleynoted the distinction in the Encyclopedia Britannica between the separate articles on‘Intelligence,human’, ‘Intelligence, animal’ and ‘Intelligence,military,’* therehad longbeenacommonperceptionofsomethingunrealabouttheconceptofmilitaryintelligence,as though all soldiers are idiots by nature. Folk memories of the First World Warreinforced this fallacy, obscuring the transformation in the nature of warfare that hadsubsequently taken place, which in the field of intelligence included the significantdevelopments of electronic warfare (EW) and aerial photography. However, theimportanceofproperintelligencewasincreasinglyunderstoodbytheBritishandin1940itwasformalizedintheArmywiththeformationoftheIntelligenceCorps.If inFrancetheDeuxiémeBureauwasefficientandgoodatitswork,inGermanyintelligencebecameincreasingly fractured as Adolf Hitler’s cronies sought to carve out little empires forthemselves. Meanwhile, both the USA and Japan disregarded the importance ofintelligence,withshort-termandlong-termcatastrophiceffectsrespectively.

SOURCESANDAGENCIES

Anintelligencesourceisanyoneoranythingfromwhichinformationcanbeobtained.Anintelligence agency is any organization or individual dealing in the collection ofinformation for intelligence use. Before the second half of the nineteenth centuryintelligenceorganizations,iftheyexistedatall,wererudimentaryandoftenreliedononeperson’sdriveand ingenuity,veryoften thatof thecommanderhimself.TimeandagainMarlborough used ruses and speed to conceal his intentions and to divine those of theenemythroughsuperiorintelligenceactivitiesmastermindedbyCadogan.6NotonlywasCadogan in charge of Marlborough’s administrative arrangements, he was alsoMarlborough’schiefofstaffandchiefofintelligence.Anofficerwhoseattentiontodetailtransformed Marlborough’s broad concepts into practicable orders, Cadogan providedsecurityforthearmy’strainandcarriedoutmyriadancillarydutiesandspecialmissions.He ran ‘correspondents’ in Mons and Lille and, disguised as a peasant, personallyinvestigated theLinesofLaBasséebefore theBattleofMalplaquet. ItwasCadogan towhomMarlborough turnedwhenever therewasneed for a reconnaissanceor to lead anadvanceguard.

Almost all intelligencewas derived from spies, prisoners, locals and other people(whatistodayreferredtoashumanintelligenceorHUMINT)orelsebyreconnaissanceonfootorhorseback,withthepossibleassistanceofhighgroundoratelescope.FredericktheGreatwrotethat‘ifyouknowtheenemy’splansbeforehandyouwillalwaysbemorethanamatch forhim,evenwith inferiornumbers,’7 andhehimselfdevotedmucheffortandimagination to gathering intelligence, especially the long-term strategic kind. A Jew, I.Sabatky, acted as Frederick’s liaison with corruptible Russian officers (many of whomwereinfactGerman)andhehadatleastonespyinthecampoftheAustrians.Personableandresourcefulyoungmenactedas‘sleepers’inVienna,wheretheymeltedintosocietyandgotthemselvesonintimatetermswiththeservinggirlsofthegreatladies.

The discoveries made by these young Adonises were quite incredible. Some of these gentlemen

maintainedliaisonswiththeViennesechambermaidsforacoupleofyearsonend,andtheywrotereportswhichcontainedfargreaterandmoreimportantdisclosuresthanallthedespatchesoftheenvoys.8

However,day-to-dayoperationalintelligencewasusuallylackingaltogether.Inthisrespect,Frederick’s spieswereof littleuse tohim forhepaidmostof thempoorlyandthenrefusedtobelievethemwhentheybroughthimbadnews.(Fromastrictlymilitarypoint of view, spies have seldom proved effective sources of information.) Frederick’sstaffwasverysmall,andthemyopickinghimselfbecametheeyesofthearmywhenherodeouton reconnaissancewith the advanceguardor a little escort.He lookedoutnotonly for thepositionsof theenemy troopsbut also for signs suchas smoke fromcampfires and bakeries or for any indication that theAustrianswere on themove.Thiswasdangerouswork,foritbroughthimwithinthezoneoftheenemyoutposts.9

CavalryhasplayedamajorroleinreconnaissancefromatleastthetimeofHannibalandhisexcellentNumidians.OneofthehallmarksofNapoleon’sartofwarwashisuseoflight cavalry – hussars, lancers and chasseurs. They scurried ahead of the hurryingcolumnsformingadensemobilescreen,scientificallyprobingeveryvillageandemptyingevery postbox in their search for information about the enemy, perhaps capturing aprisonerortwoorfindingahandfulofdeserters,andlisteningtolocalgossip.FromthismassofinformationNapoleonandhisstaffwouldatleastbeabletoestablishwheretheenemywasnotsituated,andthusbuildupanideaofwherehemightstillbe.10Similarly,the Confederate general Robert E. Lee relied on the cavalry of J. E. B. Stuart forinformationonthewhereaboutsoftheArmyofthePotomac:theabsenceofStuartforaweekbeforeandat thebeginningof theBattleofGettysburg famouslydeprivedLeeofcriticalinformationandisoftencitedasareasonforthefailureofthatill-fatedincursioninto Pennsylvania. But Lee made careful use of other sources too, including Northernnewspapers, scouts, spies and friendly civilians who came through the lines. He had ahighlydeveloped intelligenceprocedure inwhichhenotonly tried toputhimself in theotherman’sposition,butactuallytobecomethatman.11

Inmodernmechanizedwarfaregroundreconnaissancecontinuestoplayavitalrolein gathering information. In British parlance close reconnaissance applies to activitiesconductedwithinafewkilometresof thefront lineandiscarriedoutfromaunit’sownresources,usingfootpatrolsandobservationposts.Mediumreconnaissanceisaspecialisttask still carried out by cavalry regiments (albeit mounted in armoured vehicles) at adistance of anything up to fifty kilometres ahead of the front line of one’s own troops.Long-range reconnaissance is also a specialist task, often carried out by special forces.The British Army has traditionally relied on stealth as the means of obtaining suchinformationandhasequippeditsrecceunitsaccordingly.TheRussiansontheotherhand,andtoalesserextenttheGermans,havealwaysbeenhappytofightforinformation,usingsmallall-armsgroupstoforceanopponenttorevealhishand.Otherspecialistmeansofreconnaissance include sound and flash location of artillery positions, artillery locationandgroundsurveillanceradarswhich,withthewidevarietyofnightviewingdevicesandmany other specialist sensors that are available nowadays, make the task ofreconnaissanceandsurveillanceanincreasinglycomplexone.

Two significant sources throughout history have been captured enemy documentsandprisonersofwar,althoughthereliabilityofbothisveryquestionable:documentscan

easilybeplantedandprisonersarenotalwaystrustworthy.WhencampaigninginSpainin195BC, Marcus Cato sent 300 men to attack an enemy post with the express aim ofcapturingaprisoner,who‘undertorture,revealedallthesecretsofhisside’.12FredericktheGreat, a true scion of the Enlightenment, eschewed torture and interrogated enemyprisonersanddesertersinperson,butheseldomderivedanythingofvaluefromthem.Thepeoples ofmost of his theatres ofwar –Bohemians,Moravians andWendishSaxons–were recalcitrant and unreliable. Some prisoners are naturally loquacious, however. AUnion staff officer of theAmericanCivilWarwrote years later that: ‘TheConfederatedeserter was an institution which has received too little consideration… He wasubiquitous,willingandaltogether inscrutable.Whetherhe told the truthora lie,hewasalwaysequallysuretodeceive.Hewassometimesarealdeserterandsometimesamockdeserter.Ineithercasehewassuretobeloaded.’13Ontheotherhand,Japaneseprisonerscaptured during the Second World War, although fairly few in number, proved quitevaluable sources of accurate information. Because their creed refused to accept theconceptofsurrender,theywerenevertaughthowtobehaveiftheywerecaptured.14

Signalsinterceptbeganthefirsttimeamessengerwaswaylaid,butitdidnotbecomea systematic part of the intelligence effort until technological change provided greateropportunities.WhenthelargelyforgottenherooftheRoyalNavy,ThomasCochrane,wasinvolvedinraidingtheFrenchcoastbetweenPerpignanandMarseillein1808,oneofhistargetswasasemaphorestation.TheFrenchGardeNationale,terrifiedbytheapproachofthemanNapoleonchristenedleloupdesmers(‘thewolfoftheseas’),retreatedbeforetheBritishraidingpartyandwatchedwhileitburnteverything.Whentheyreturnedtoassessthedamage, theywererelievedtofindthehalf-burntremainsof theirsignalcodebooksand believed the brutishBritish had failed to realize their value. In reality, the charredbookshadbeenplantedtoreassurethemofpreciselythis,forCochranehadinfactnotedthe secret wigwag code and passed it on to his superior, Admiral Lord CuthbertCollingwood.FromthenonanyBritishshipswithinvisualrangecouldreadFrenchsignalstationmessages.

Theinventionofthetelegraphopenedanewdimensionincommunications.Thefirstattemptatlinesignallingwasmadein1839,butthereisnorecordofanyoneinterferingwithBritish communicationsduring theCrimeanWar fifteenyears later.By1850 therewere over fifty commercial telegraph companies in the United States, and during theAmerican CivilWar President Abraham Lincoln received the majority of his situationreportsbythismeans.Thefirstcavalryraiderofthatwartocutatelegraphlinecouldbesaidtobethefatherofelectronicwarfare,althoughperhapsthelaurelsforinventingthisnew means of warfare should really go to the Confederate cavalry general John HuntMorgan,who employed a telegraphist to interceptmessages from theUnion authoritiesandtosendfalseones.

On 4 July 1862 Morgan set out from Knoxville, Kentucky, on a sweep throughUnion-controlled Tennessee, during which he captured seventeen towns, captured andparoled1,200Unionregularsand1,500homeguarders,andevenrecruited300additionalvolunteers.SoonafterwardshebrokeuptheUnioncommandsent inpursuitofhimandcaptureditscommanderandstaff.Duringthistimethetelegraphistwouldsometimeschatwaggishly to enemy operators, and even went so far as to complain indignantly to

Washington in Morgan’s name about the poor quality of the mules that were beingcaptured.15Not that itwasalwaysnecessary to tap thewire.J.O.Kerbey,aUnionspy,wouldleanagainstthewallofabuildinginRichmondnearthewindowofaConfederatesignallerwhosemessageshecouldoverhearbeing transmitteduncoded.Kerbey listenedto the tap of the hammer on the transmitter and sentwhat he heard by a secret courierservicetoWashington.16

GuglielmoMarconi’sinventionofradiointheformofwirelesstelegraphywassoongivenamilitaryapplication.ThefirstsignalsweretransmittedacrosstheAtlanticin1901and by the beginning of theRusso-JapaneseWar of 1904–5most ships in the fleets ofRussia and Japanwere fittedwith it.Thewarbeganwith a Japanese surprise attackonPortArthur,butduringthefrequentrepeatattacksRussianradiooperatorsstartedtonoticea great increase in Japanese signals in their headphones long before any sighting wasmadeoftheenemy.ThustheRussiansweregivenwarningofimpendingattacksandwereabletoputtheirownshipsandcoastalbatteriesonalert.WhenseveralRussianshipsweredispatched fromVladivostok to launch a surprise attack on the Japanese naval base ofGensan, they intercepted radiocommunications indicating that Japanese shipswerealsoheading for Gensan, and promptly abandoned their plans, whichmight otherwise haveendedindisaster.On8March1904theJapaneseattemptedtocarryoutanattackontheinnerroadsofPortArthur,planningtodirectthefireoftwocruisersfromoverthehorizonbyradio fromasmalldestroyernear thecoast.WhenaRussianwirelessoperatorheardthe exchange of signals, although he did not really understand what was going on, heinstinctivelypressedhistransmissionkeyinthehopeofsomehowinterferingwiththem.TheJapaneseships,unabletofireaccuratelyasaresultofthisfirstexampleofjamming,wereforcedtowithdraw.

Thefailureof theRussianadmiralZinoviyPetrovichRozhestvenskiy toappreciatethefullsignificanceof radiocommunications led todisastrousandhumiliatingdefeatattheBattleofTsushima,butthiswasasignthatelectronicwarfarehadcomeofage.17Onland,radiointerceptwasfirstusedeffectivelyon19August1914,whenaBritishArmyradiovanatLeCateauinterceptedGermanmessageswhichitpassedontoGHQ.OntheEastern Front soon afterwards the German generals Erich Ludendorff and Paul vonHindenburgwereabletolearnofRussiantroopmovementsbyinterceptingtheirprimitiveradiotransmissionsandconsequentlytodestroytheRussianSecondArmyattheBattleofTannenberg.MaxHoffmannlaterrecordedthat‘wehadanally,weknewalltheenemy’splans’.18

The basic principles of intercept, direction finding and analysis were soonestablished, but the continuing primitive nature of the technologymeant that radiowasseldomemployedbelowbrigadelevel,wherethefieldtelephonewasthemainmeansofcommunication. It was not until 1915 that the British general staff, concerned at theapparenteasewithwhichtheGermansanticipatedtheir tacticalmoves,realizedthat thistoocouldbetapped.TheGermanshaddevelopedasensitivedetectorandamplifierusingvacuumtubeswhichpickedupthefeebleearthcurrents.Thisledtothedevelopmentofanoise jammer and in due course the British also developed their own highly sensitiveamplifier,capableofdetecting telephonesignalsup to fivekilometresaway.Eventually,otherdevices raised the levelof security.TheFullerphone, forexample,waspractically

undetectableunlesstheinterceptorphysicallytappedthewire.Furtheradvanceswerealsomadeinradiodirectionfinding,whichinthe1930swasrefinedanddevelopedinBritainbySirRobertWatson-Watt toproducethefirstoperationalradar,whichplayedacrucialroleduringtheBattleofBritain.By1939theGermanshadalsoproducedanoperationalradar system and at this point therewas a divergence between air and naval electronicwarfare on the one hand, increasingly concerned with the protection or destruction ofplatforms(shipsandaircraft),andlandwarfareontheother.19

Theplethoraofelectronicwarfaretermsandacronymscanbemisleading.Electronicwarfare (EW) is divided into three branches: electronic counter-measures (ECM),electronic supportmeasures (ESM) and electronic protectionmeasures (EPM, formerlyknownbytheunwieldytermof‘electroniccountercounter-measure’orECCM).EPMaredefensiveandincluderadiosilence,codeandtechnicalmeasures,alldesignedtoprovidesecurity,protectone’scommunicationsanddenytheenemyinformationfromESM.Thisiselectronicreconnaissance(listening),fromwhichintelligenceisderived.Onceanalysedandcollated, thisbecomes signals intelligence (SIGINT, aphraseusually applied tonon-battlefield transmissions such as diplomatic and other government signals),which is inturn divided between intelligence from communications systems (COMINT, orcommunications intelligence)andnon-communicationselectronicsystemssuchas radar,telemetry and guidance systems (ELINT, or electronic intelligence). ESM or electronicreconnaissance beginswith searching the frequency spectrum for enemy transmissions.Oncefound,theycanbeinterceptedandlistenedto,althoughtheyarelikelytobeencodedand it may not be possible to read them. Nevertheless, traffic analysis can revealconsiderable information, and if they can be read theymayprove invaluable.The finalstage of the process is direction finding (DF). On most nets the control station willprobablybethemostfrequenttransmitterandthis,combinedwithotherinformation,mayindicate a headquarters. ECM are designed to disrupt and attack enemy transmissionsthrough jamming, neutralization and the feedingof false information through electronicdeception(ED).

The importanceof radio inmodernwarmeans that thedeceiverseeks todominatethe enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, so that false information can beconveyed and genuine information denied. It is also imperative to control use of theelectromagnetic spectrum by friendly forces. British commanders in the Middle EastduringtheSecondWorldWarbecameparanoidaboutspiesinandaroundGHQinCairo,whoitwasbelievedwereleakingtacticalplanstotheGermans.ItwastheGermans’useof radio intercept that enabled them to divineBritishmoves, a taskmade considerablyeasierbythelaughablenaivetyofBritishoperatorswhoused‘veiled’speechratherthanpropervoiceprocedure.Theybelieved,forexample,thatreferencestocricketandhunting(forexample,‘returningtothepavilionfortea’asaeuphemismforreplenishmentoffueland ammunition) were sufficient to confuse the listening Germans.20 Only when 9thAustralianDivisionoverrantheGermaninterceptunitatTelelEisainJuly1942didtheextent of intelligence that the Germans derived from this source become apparent.However, the consequences for deception of this rather distasteful discovery wereconsiderable.TheincreasingrelianceoftheGermansonESMasameansofintelligencegathering,especiallyasAlliedcontroloftheairdrovetheLuftwaffe’srecceaircraftfromtheskies,wasitselfopentoexploitationlaterinthewar.

Oneof theprinciplesof good intelligence is that informationneeds corroboration.RadioDFisfairlycrude(atarangeoffortykilometresatargetmightbedivinedwithinaboxmeasuringeightkilometresbyfive)butitcanbeusedtodirectothermeanssuchasaerial reconnaissance.Aircraft and photographywere other developments that radicallyalteredthebusinessofreconnaissanceandbecameofenormousimportancetodeceivers.Everythingontheearth’ssurfaceformsapatterntotheeyeoftheaircameraorairborneobserver, and man-made changes are often very conspicuous unless they continue thepattern or conform to it.21 The first use of an observation balloon in anger was at theBattleofFleurusin1794,onlyelevenyearsafterthefirstmannedflightinaMontgolfierhot-airballoonbyPilâtredeRozierandtheMarquisd’Arlandes.Thefirstphotographwastakenin1826byJosephNicéphoreNiepce,butitwasnotuntil1858that thefirstaerialphotographwastaken,byGaspardFelixTournachon,betterknowninfashionableParisiansocietyasNadar.22

Balloons were used on operations on numerous occasions in the late nineteenthcenturyasarmieswereoftendeployedoverfrontsofmanymilesandthusrequiredwiderobservationtobeaccuratelylocated.TheArmyofthePotomac’sAeronauticDepartmentwasdirectedbyThaddeusLowe,acivilianballoonistonacolonel’ssalary.Theballoonwas filled by portable coal-gas generators and Lowe dutifully reported all he saw toMcClellan’s headquarters using a telegraph carried in the basket (and greatly assisting‘Prince John’Magruder in his peninsular deception).But the potential of the aeroplanewhenitarrivedfailedtoconvinceeveryone.TheeminentFrenchgeneralFerdinandFochdeclared in 1910 that for army use ‘l’avion c’est zéro!’ During the following year’smanœuvres, however, his colleague Joseph-Simon Galliéni captured a colonel of theSupremeWar Council and his entire staff thanks to a reconnaissance aeroplane.23 Thesameyear theItaliansmadethefirstuseofpoweredaircraft inwaragainst theTurks inLibya.CapitanoCarloPiazzaborrowedacamerafromthephotosectionoftheEngineerCorpson23February1912,andtheresultsweresoimpressivethathiscolleagueRicardoMoizo immediately followed suit. While they produced few prints, they did highlightinaccuraciesonmapsandthepossibilitiesforthefutureweredemonstrated.24

The British Expeditionary Force that went to France in August 1914 wasaccompaniedbyfoursquadronsfromtheRoyalFlyingCorps,whosesolepurposeatthetimewas reconnaissance.Tactically, thismeant artillery observation and the locationofenemy batteries, reporting trench locations and in due course hampering the enemy’sattempts to do the same. Strategic reconnaissance in 1914meant anything beyond fivemilesof the front,and the limitationsof simpleobservationsoonbecameapparent.Theability of the camera to record information accurately and reliablywas soon put to usetherefore,initiallybyNo.3Sqn,whichhadpioneeredphotographictechniquesbeforethewar.LieutenantG.F.PetymantookthefirstfiveexposuresovertheGermanlineson15September.Bythefollowingyearthelavishequipmentandcentralizedfacilitiesavailableto the French comparedmost unfavourablywith theadhoc arrangementsmade by theBritish.MajorW.G.H.Salmond,officer commandingNo.3Sqn, recommended that asimilarorganizationbeadoptedbytheBritishandanexperimentalsectionwasformed.Indue course a magazine was developed that enabled exposures to be made in rapidsuccession and stereoscopy greatly enhanced the value of the resulting photos.25 (Ifapproximately sixty per cent of overlap is achieved on two prints, a stereoscope will

permit three-dimensional viewing, from which far more information can be derived.)However, it was a long time before the techniques of photo reading and interpretationwere fully explored and appreciated; in the meantime the RFC had to cope with anti-aircraft fire and the scourge of the Fokker fighter. Nevertheless, by 1918 every majorapplicationof photographic reconnaissance to be used for the next fifty years hadbeentriedandtested.

During theSecondWorldWarBritain’s PhotographicReconnaissanceUnit (PRU)divided interpretation into three phases. First phasemeant immediate reporting of newitems such as ship and aircraft movement, rail and canal traffic and bomb damageassessment. Second phase reportswere producedwithin twenty-four hours and coveredgeneralactivity,andwerecollatedwiththeday’saccumulatedcoverage.Thirdphasewasthe very detailed statements prepared for specialist requirements, usually on fixedinstallationssuchasairfields, factoriesand importantexperimental facilities.As thewarprogressed, third phase was dealt with by the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) atMedmenham,nearHenley,whichbecameexpertindiviningthestrategicimplicationsofwhat it saw, enabling the discovery and subsequent bombing of targets such as the V-weapontestsiteatPeenemünde.PhotographyalsoallowedthestateofconstructionofU-boats at Kiel and Bremen to be measured. David Brachi, one of the RAF’s photospecialists, remarked at the time that ‘the Germans are so methodical about theircamouflage that once you get to know theirmethods you can tell quite a lot from thecamouflageitself’.26

By comparison,while in 1939 theGermans possessed farmore photo interpreters(PIs) than theBritish, theyhaveoftenbeencriticized fornotusingstereoscopes in theirday-to-dayworkandforrelyinglargelyonnon-specialistNCOs,areflectionoftheirviewthat photo interpretation was a mechanical process.27 But there was a significantdifferenceinapproach.WhiletheRAFconcentratedonstrategictargets,withthetaskingcomingfromahighlevelsuchasCoastalorBomberCommand,theLuftwaffewasgeareduntilaslateas1943towardsthetacticaldemandsofBlitzkriegandtowardssupportingthearmy in the fluid and fast-changing environment of a battlefield. The RAF’s PIs thusbecame experts in strategic subjects such as shipping and airfields,while theLuftwaffeconcentrated on battlefield terrain and fortifications. (The RAF also provided tacticalreconnaissance,or‘TacR’,insupportofthearmy,mainlyfromspecificallytaskedarmyco-operation squadrons.) This lack of a strategic dimension to Luftwaffe operationsproveda seriousdrawbackas thewarprogressed,andcontributedgreatly toGermany’sultimatedefeat.28

SECURITYSecurity is as fundamental a principle ofwar as intelligence. Frederick theGreat oncedeclared that if he thought his coat knew his plans, he would take it off and burn it.Detailedknowledgeoftheenemy’sreconnaissanceandintelligencecapabilitiesarevitalifone’ssecretsaretobepreserved.

Field or operational security involves the concealment of one’s own strengths andintentionsfromtheenemy.ThusNapoleon’scavalry,whilegatheringinformationontheenemy, also prevented the enemy from reciprocating: acting as a moving screen, it

disguised Napoleon’s operations from enemy patrols and protected his lines ofcommunicationandoperationalbasewherethedepots,hospitalsandparksweresituated.Beforeacampaignopened,Napoleonhabituallyloweredthecurtainofmilitarysecurity.The press, so often a source of information about impending military moves in theeighteenthcentury,wasruthlesslycontrolledand‘tuned’ toproduce the information thatNapoleon wished the enemy to have. Weeks before any move the frontiers of Francewould be closed to foreigners and the secret police would redouble their activities inwatching suspects. At the same time elaborate deception schemes and secondaryoffensives would be devised and implemented to confuse the foe and place him offbalance.ThusNapoleon employedmethods thatwere to become common in twentieth-centurywarfare.

For the purposes of both security and deception Napoleon was in the habit ofcontinually altering the composition of his major formations – adding a division here,taking away a brigade there, creating an occasional provisional corps d’armée for aspecialmissioninmid-campaign–measuresthatservedtoconfusetheenemystillfurther.On 16 October 1805, for instance, Austrian intelligence learned that outside UlmMaréchalJeanLannes’sVCorpscomprisedtheinfantrydivisionsofgeneralsOudinotandGazanandthelightcavalryofTreilhard.Butfromthe24thofthesamemonthLannes’scommand included twomore infantry divisions transferred fromNey’s andMarmont’scorpsandnofewerthanthreemorecavalryformationsfromMurat’scavalryreserve.Nosoonerwasthisintelligencediscoveredanddigestedbytheenemy,however,thanitwascompletely out of date, for themoment theFrench advance passed theRiverEnns, thesame administrative and operational flexibility enabled Napoleon to withdraw threeinfantry divisions from Lannes and form them into a new provisional corps (the VIII,underMortier). Thus at no time could the enemy rely on the accuracy of informationconcerning the strength of the French or the placing of their units.* As the distancebetweenthetwosidesclosed,securitybecamemoredifficulttomaintainandbothwouldreceiveastreamofinformation–someofitmisleading,tobesure,butmostofitrelevant.Then,when the ‘veilwas torn’,Napoleonwould relyonspeedofmovement,extendingthe length of marches and forbidding all foraging, and then the jealously conservedsuppliesoftherationconvoyswouldbedistributed.29

The larger a proposed operation, the more difficult that concealment becomes.Operational security is most effective when applied systematically; it must be directedfrom the highest level and must concentrate on critical activities, identifying whatindicatorsanenemywilllookforandwhatinformationthesemightconveytotheenemy(bridgingequipment,forexample,willobviouslysuggestanintentiontocrossariver).Itmustalsotakeaccountoftheenemy’sreconnaissance,surveillanceandtargetacquisitioncapabilities, so thatmeasures can be designed to neutralize these. (There is no formofcamouflagemoreeffectivethanputtingouttheenemy’seyes.30)Comprehensivenessandtimeliness are equally important here: assessmentsmust bemade before and during anoperation and continuously revised, since any protectionmeasures takenmust appear anormal part of activity: routines can thus both aid security and provide a basis fordeception.Finally,asineverymilitaryactivity,theplanmustbecapableofchangeatshortnotice.

Theveryidentityofageneralmustbesubjecttosecurity,anddeceptioncanaidthis.

Hannibalwaswell awareof the ficklenessofhisCelticalliesand,havingonly recentlyestablishedfriendlyrelationswiththem,hewasonhisguardagainstattemptsonhislife.Hethereforehadanumberofwigsmade,andtheseheconstantlychanged,alongwithhisstyle of dress, so that even thosewho knewhimwell had difficulty recognizing him.31Similarly, a general’s personal routine can be an indicator of forthcoming operations.General Sir Archibald Wavell and his field commander, Lieutenant-General RichardO’Connor, took enormous care to ensure that security was watertight for their greatoffensive Operation COMPASS in western Egypt in December 1940. Only those whoabsolutely needed to know were involved in the planning, and when a rehearsal wasnecessary,nobodytakingpartknewtherealpurpose.Asecondtrainingexercisewasthenscheduledandjustforty-eighthoursbeforethiswasduetostart,operationalorderswereissuedinsteadoftraininginstructions.WavellhimselfconspicuouslyattendedtheracesinCairowithhisfamilyon7December,andthenattendedadinnerpartyforseniorofficersthat evening. The operation started the following night. The Egyptian prime minister,HusseinSirryPasha,whotookgreatpridein‘havingsourceswhokeepmeinformedofallthatgoeson’,congratulatedWavell‘onbeingthefirsttokeepasecretinCairo’.32

COUNTER-SURVEILLANCEBeforeoffensivedeceptionmeasurescanbeplanned,friendlysurveillanceeffortmustbedirected towards establishing the type and density of the enemy’s sources and towardslookingforweakspots.Asanaidtosecurityandanintegralpartoftheinformationbattle,counter-surveillance, involving all those active and passive measures taken to preventhostilesurveillanceofaforceorarea,formsthefirstcategoryorlevelofdeception.Theseessentiallydefensivemeasuresarenot,however,strictlydeceptiontechniquesintheirownright.Deceptionaims tomislead theenemy intoadoptingapredictablecourseofactionthatcansubsequentlybeexploited.Lackof informationandconfusionarenaturalstatesonthebattlefield,andreinforcingtheseconditionsfortheenemybycounter-surveillancecan contribute to surprise, security and deception. But an enemy deprived of allintelligenceorfacedwithambiguousinformationmayreactunpredictably,andhisactionsmaynotnecessarilybeexploitable.Nevertheless,denialofgenuineinformationisalwaysanimportantobjectiveandconfusionmayinsomecasesbeausefulmethodofsupportingdeceptionbyunderminingtheenemy’sintelligenceeffort.

Activecounter-surveillancemeasuresincludeattackingenemyreconnaissanceforcesand passive ones include camouflage, the use of smoke, absence of movement, radiosilenceandalltheothermeasurestakentoconcealthepresenceofforcesorinstallationssuchassupplydumps.Inthefaceofmodernhigh-technologysurveillanceequipmentsuchas radar, thermal pointers, night-viewing devices and drones (remote piloted vehiclescarrying cameras and other devices) this concealment is extremely difficult, but whatcannot be hidden or disguised can be misrepresented. The priorities for defensivedeception measures should be related to the enemy’s reconnaissance priorities andcapabilities, underlining again the need to understand as far as possible the enemy’sintelligencecycle.

Camouflage is a key element of counter-surveillance. In March 1918 the BritishGeneralStaffissuedapamphletcalledThePrinciplesandPracticeofCamouflage,whichdistilledfouryearsexperienceofmodernwarfare.Itstatedquiteclearlythat‘Deception,

notconcealment,istheobjectofcamouflage.’33Itdefinedcamouflageas‘concealmentoftheactorfactthatsomethingisbeingconcealed’andcontinued,‘deceptionistheessenceofit.’ThewordisderivedfromtheFrenchslangwordcamoufler(‘todisguise’)andwasfirst used by hunters. There are isolated instances of its use in ancient and medievalwarfare,butformostofhistorywarfarewaslargelyconfinedtoclosequartersanditwasnotuntiltheadventoftherifleasaneffectivemilitaryweaponintheeighteenthcenturythat camouflage began to be developed, initially by irregular units fighting in NorthAmerica.The first unit to beuniformed entirely ingreenwas theNewYorkMilitia, in1795. In 1797 a 5th Battalion was raised mainly from Germans for the 60th (RoyalAmerican)Regiment,andbecamethefirstBritishunittoweargreen.

Certainlyagreen-cladsoldierwouldbelessconspicuousatargetthanoneinscarlet(although theBritish soldier’s red coatwas less conspicuous than itmight seem, sinceweathering soon reduced it to a shadeofbrown).But theeffective rangeof themusketwasonlyaround100yardsandeventheriflesoftheperiodwereonlyeffectivetoaround300yards.Moreover, since themuzzle-loading technologymeant that the rateof fireofthemusketwas seldommore than three rounds perminute, even in the hands ofwell-trainedtroops,inordertogenerateeffectivefirepoweritremainednecessarytomanœuvreincloseorderandfireinvolleys.Inanycase,experimentscarriedoutbyCaptainCharlesHamilton Smith early in the nineteenth century, involving rifle shots at a range of 150yards,provedthattheleastconspicuouscolourwasactuallythelightgreyuniformwornbyAustrianjägers.Greenwasactuallychosenbecauseofitsassociationswiththeroleofhunterplayedbythoseunitsequippedwithrifles.Theformationofaregimentofriflemen,thefamous95th,sawtheirdressbeingofthesame‘riflegreen’asthe5thBattalion,60thRegiment.34

Following theNapoleonicWars,partof theBritishArmywasalmostcontinuouslyengaged in India. From the 1830s onwards therewere also a number of small wars insouthernAfrica,wherethetroopsdrewontheexperiencesofEuropeansettlersandwerequicker to adapt to bush warfare. Many officers wore hardly any uniform at all, anddressedforthebushfromstoresinfrontiertowns.In1851the74thHighlandersdiscardedtheir red coatees in favour of brownish-grey canvas smocks, albeit for reasons ofserviceabilityrather thancamouflage.TheCorpsofGuideswereraisedfromamongtheSikhsbyHarryLumsdenin1846,followingtheSikhWars.In1848theyweredressedinkhaki (from the Hindustani khak, meaning ‘dirt’) or ‘drab’ as it was officially called,introduced byLumsden andWilliamHodson.During the IndianMutiny of 1857–8 thefirst British regiment to adopt khakiwas the 52nd Light Infantry, whose normalwhitesummer clothingwas dyed in the local bazaar before the regiment left for the siege ofDelhi.The61stRegimentdyedtheirkitasortofbluish-brownataboutthesametimeandbytheendofthemutinymostregimentshadfollowedtheexamplewithwhatevercametohand, including earth, tea and curry powder.35 On 21 May 1858 the adjutant-generalannounced‘thatforthefuture,thesummerclothingoftheEuropeansoldiersshallconsistoftwosuitsof“khakee”’.

In1868anexpeditionaryforcesenttofreeEuropeanhostagesbeingheldbythemademperor Theodore of Ethiopia saw the first use of khaki outside India, and during theSecondAfghanWar(1878–80)whitecoatswereagainstainedwithtea.Khakidrillservice

dress was formally introduced into the Indian Army in 1885, and in 1896 a standardbrownkhakiwasintroducedforallforeignserviceoutsideEurope.Soonafterwards,astheexperienceoftheSecondAnglo-BoerWarreinforcedtheneedforcamouflageinthefaceoftheawesomepowerofthemodernrifleandsmokelesspropellant(onmanyoccasionsBritishtroopshadbeenpinneddownbyinvisibleenemiesfiringfromuptoamileaway),scarletwasbanishedtoceremonialdutiesforevermore.36

The US Army, which had similar experiences during the Spanish–AmericanWar(1898–1901),also introducedkhaki foralloccasionsother thanceremonialandmostofEuropesooncaughtup;promptedby theirnewlyacquiredpossessionsoverseas and theexperiencesof thepoliceandschütztruppen raised toguard them, thePrussians in1908adoptedfeldgrau(‘fieldgrey’);therestofGermanyfollowedsuitin1910andthecolourbecametheirhallmarkbetween1914and1945.TheItalianschoseagrey-green in1906andtheRussians,alsoasaresultofexperienceduringtheRusso–JapaneseWar,adoptedkhakiin1908.37ThenotableexceptionwastheFrench.In1912theFrenchMinisterforWar,AdolpheMessimy,visitedtheBalkans,wherehewasimpressedbythewaythedull-coloured uniforms in use there blended into the landscape. He returned to Paris andproposed a similar transition for the FrenchArmy,which still wore basically the sameuniform as it had in the 1830s. The reaction was one of total indignation that anyoneshould somuch as dare to tamper with the glorious traditions of the French Army. Ingovernment hearings the offensive spirit engendered by the traditional blue tunics, redkepisandred trouserswasdeemed indispensable.Asone formerwarministerdeclared:‘Lespantalonsrouges,c’estlaFrance.’Theywereretained,andMessimylaternotedthatthis ‘blind and imbecile attachment to themost visible of all colourswas to have cruelconsequences’.38Whenwarcamesoonafterwards, theFrenchThirdandFourthArmiesploughed headlong towards Germany into the teeth of withering fire. Thousands ofFrenchmenpaidthepriceofthelessonofcamouflage,whichwouldcometofullmaturityduringtheFirstWorldWar.

TheWaffen-SSwere the first to develop clothingwith disruptive patterns and theGermans, and to a lesser extent theSoviets,madeextensiveuseof this sortofmaterialduring theSecondWorldWar.TheWesternAlliesmadeonly limiteduseof it (notablyBritish parachutists and US Marines), but practically every army in the world hassubsequently adopted it in one form or another.39 However, patterned camouflage ofequipment to prevent easy observation, especially from the air, was a much earlierinnovation.DuringtheFirstWorldWarpatchesofblackwereaddedtomottledgreensandbrownswhenitwasfoundthishelpedtobreakuptheshapeofagunorvehicle.InFrancethe ideawas thatofa fashionableParisianportraitistserving in theartillery,GuiranddeScevola.In1914hepaintedsomecanvassheetstothrowovergunswhentheywereoutofaction.PabloPicasso,travellingthroughParisandseeingacamouflagedgundeclared:‘Itiswethathavecreatedthat.’40TheGQG(FrenchHighCommand)weresoimpressedbythis idea that they gave de Scevola a commission (in both senses) and recruited otherpainters,includingAndréSegonzacandJacquesVillon,toformamobilecorpswhosetaskwas to travel the line camouflaging artillery, airfields and observation posts. By 1918some 1,200 men and 8,000 women were employed in workshops under de Scevola’ssupervision;theartisthimselfwasalwayselegantlydressedinwhitegloves.

Promptedtoalargeextentbyanotherartist,SolomonJ.Solomon,theBritishsoonadopted similarmeasures.One of Solomon’s first taskswas to create observation poststhat looked like trees.Responsibility for camouflagewasgiven to theRoyalEngineers,whichformedaSpecialWorksPark,headedin1916byLieutenant-ColonelFrancisWyattMC;thepaintersinvolvedincludedHenryPaget,WalterRussellandAlanBeeton.Bythefollowing year the park had a strength of 60 officers and 400 other ranks, employinghundredsofFrenchwomen togarnishcamouflagenets and supplying theneedsof fourBritish armies in the field. The Germans employed the avant-garde artist FranzMarc,who, inabreakfromfrontlineservicewith thecavalry,wasemployedpaintingwhathecallednine‘Kandinskys’onmilitarytarpaulins.MarchimselfsubsequentlyreturnedtothefrontlineandwaskilledatVerdunin1916.

Thearrivalofpeacein1918putcamouflagetothebackofBritishmilitaryprioritiesduring the1920sand1930s.However, followinga reportbyBrigadierAndrewThorne,commanding1stGuardsBrigade,theWarOfficecommissionedFrederickBeddingtontoinvestigatedisruptivepaintpatterns forvehiclesandwhen theSecondWorldWarbrokeout,BeddingtonwasputinchargeoftheCamouflageExperimentalSection.Acamouflagefactory was set up at Rouen, but everything was abandoned following the Germanbreakthrough in May 1940. With the Army’s deficiencies so brutally exposed andcamouflage and deception suddenly vital, the section was turned into the CamouflageDevelopmentandTrainingCentre (CDTC)atFarnham.PainterssuchasEdwardSeago,FrederickGoreandJulianTrevelyan,alongwithdesignersandarchitects,wereturnedintostaffofficers(camouflage)andpostedtoheadquarters throughouttheMediterraneanandFarEasttheatres.TheAmericansbycontrastorganizedcamouflagebattalionsascombatunitsratherthanmerelyproducingspecialiststaffofficers,andattachedonesuchunit toeacharmy.ThedrivingforcebehindthemwasLieutenant-ColonelHomerSaint-Gaudens,whohadplayedanimportantroleininstillingcamouflagedisciplineintothe‘doughboys’intheFirstWorldWar.41

OtherproductsoftheCDTCincludedtheWestEndmagicianJasperMaskelyneandthe film-makerGeoffreyBarkas,bothofwhomwroteaccountsof theirexploits.Barkaswas posted to GHQMiddle East, where he becameDirector of Camouflage. There herapidlydecidedthatcamouflagewasnotsomethingthatcouldbeconfinedtospecialists;allranksandallarmswouldrequiretraininginthetechnicalaspects,andseniorofficerswouldneedtounderstandwhatwasmeantbydisruptionandcountershading,andrequiretraining in the interpretation of air photos and deception. Furthermore, large-scaleworkshop facilitieswere needed to produce the vast quantity of necessarymaterials.AMiddleEastversionof theCDTCwassetupatHelwan,nearCairo,andNo.85(SouthAfrican)CamouflageCompanyprovidedthetrainingcentreandsixmobiledetachments.TogetherwithNo.1CamouflageCompany,RoyalEngineers(alargeunitof7officersand267men,formedfromBritishandPalestinianJews),theylaidthebasisforcamouflagetobeemployednotmerelyasapassive,defensivemeasure,butforactivedeception.Manylessons that the British had learned some twenty-five years’ before when the EgyptianExpeditionaryForcefoughttheTurksinPalestine,hadnowtoberelearned.However,theMiddle East would provide the British with a proving ground for the development oftacticalandsubsequentlyoperationaldeceptiontechniquesthatwouldbeemployedtoanunprecedenteddegreeandconsiderableeffectduringthesecondhalfofthewar,andwhich

wouldinduecourseenabletheimplementationofeffectivestrategicdeception.

3

ThePrinciplesofDeception“Thereisnomorepreciousassetforageneralthanaknowledgeofhisopponent’sguidingprinciplesandcharacter,andanyonewhothinkstheoppositeisatonceblindandfoolish…Inthesamewaythecommandermusttrainhiseyeupontheweakspotsinhisopponent’sdefence,notinhisbodybutinhismind.’

Polybius

FOCUSDECEPTIONMUSTALWAYS be aimed clearly at themind of the enemy commander, at themanwhomakesthedecisions,whetheritbetheheadofstateofacountryoranordinarysoldier.Allhumanbeingsarepronetocertainpsychologicalvulnerabilities.Ourlearningprocessesareconditionedbyourphysical,culturalandsocialenvironment,andwetendtocompare whatever situation confronts us with the templates, formed by experience,through which we view the world. This is particularly true of military organizations,where rank and experience count formore than practially anything else. InTheWorldCrisisChurchillcommentsthat

thefirmlyinculcateddoctrinethatanAdmiral’sopinionwasmorelikelytoberightthanaCaptain’sandaCaptain’s thanaCommander’sdidnotholdgoodwhenquestionsentirelynovel incharacter, requiringkeenandboldmindsunhamperedbylongroutine,wereunderdebate.

Itiscommonpracticetotellleaderswhatitisbelievedtheywanttohear.Churchillalsonotedthat‘thetemptationtotellachiefinagreatpositionthethingshemostlikestohearis the commonest explanation of mistaken action. This tendency is noticeably strongeramongtotalitarianregimes,asHitler’sandStalin’ssycophanticadherentsdemonstratedtotheir cost. It is not surprising therefore that commanders are sometimes led to jump toconclusions,eitherprematurelyoragainsttherunofevidence.Themindissusceptibletobeingluredtowardsparticularinformation,andmisledbyitsownpreconceptions.Inthiscontext the intelligence chief may be an important conduit by which the deception isconveyed,butultimatelythetargetmustbetheenemycommander.

ACTION

In 1940 General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, formed aspecialist unit under Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke which became known as ‘A’Force.Itspurposewastodeviseandconductdeceptionoperations,anditsfirstoperationwascode-namedCAMILLA.1WavellwantedtheItaliansinAbyssiniatothinkhewasaboutto attack them strongly from Kenya in the south, driving on into occupied BritishSomaliland,fromwhereoperationswouldbeconductedintoAbyssiniaitself.ThiswasinordertodrawtheItaliansawayfromthenorth,wherehisgenuinemaineffortwastobemadefromSudan.Plentifulresourcesweremadeavailableto‘A’Force,butthedeceptionwent, if anything, too well. The Italians retired, presumably because they believed thenotionalattackfromthesouthwaslikelytosucceedandthatbywithdrawingtoashorterlinetheycouldcreateastrongerdefence.Atthesametimetheysentreinforcementstothenorthern flank,where the 4th and 5th IndianDivisions eventually had a fierce fight to

overcometheformidabledefencesatKeren.2

Some time in early 1942 Clarke, now promoted colonel, sat down to write asummaryofthelessonshisunithadlearned.‘Itisimportanttoappreciatefromthestart’hewrote,

thattheonlypurposeofDeceptionistomakeone’sopponentACTinamannercalculatedtoassistone’sownplansandtoprejudicethesuccessofhis.Inotherwords,tomakehimdosomething.TooofteninthepastwehavesetouttomakehimTHINKsomething,withoutrealizingthatthiswasnomorethanameanstoanend.Fundamentally itdoesnotmatter in the leastwhat theenemy thinks: it isonlywhat lineofactionheadoptsasaconsequenceofhislineofthoughtthatwillaffectthebattle.AsaresultweresolvedtheprinciplethatacommandershouldtellhisDeceptionstaffwhathewantstheenemytoDO...whileitisthedutyofthelattertodecide,inconsultationwiththeIntelligenceStaff,whatheshouldbemadetoTHINKinordertoinducehimtoadopttherequiredcourseofaction.3

Thedeceiver’sprincipalaimisthustosupportthecommander’smissionandhisconceptof operations. A secondary goal might be to degrade the enemy’s reconnaissance andintelligence capacity, but that is of relativelyminor importance to a deceiver: toomuchambiguitycanmaskthestory.

Deceptioniscreatedbymanipulatingperceptions.Thefirsttaskistoidentifyabiasor, ifnecessary, tocreateone. It isalwaysmucheasier to reinforceaperception than tochangeone,and ifoneknowswhatanenemyexpectswillhappen(orbetterstill,hopesfor) then any deceptionwill be on firm foundations. Then one feeds information, true,false,partially trueandmisleading, inorder to reinforce thatperceptionwith theaimofinducing a reaction. British doctrinemaintains that deception has fourmain objectives.Thefirst is toprovideacommanderwithfreedomofactiontocarryouthismission,bydeludingtheenemyastohisintentionsandbydivertingtheenemy’sattentionawayfromtheactionbeing taken, inorder toachieve theaim.Thesecondis tomislead theenemyand persuade him to adopt a course of action that is to his disadvantage and can beexploited.The third is togain surprise, and the fourth is to save the livesofone’sowntroops.4 The first of these objectives corresponds broadlywith counter-surveillance, thelargelydefensivemeasuresdiscussedabove,suchascamouflage.SincetheSecondWorldWar there has been a growing tendency to regard these as the be-all and end-all ofdeception,buttheactive,offensivemeasurestowhichClarkerefersrequiremorethanjustalickofpaint.

CO-ORDINATIONANDCENTRALIZEDCONTROL

Creativity and originality are absolutely fundamental in planning any deception, butthereafterthedeceivershouldbeguidedbyprinciplesregardedbyClarkeasnomorethancommon sense. It is incorrect to think that deception is a function of the intelligencebranchofthestaff.Controlshouldlieinsteadwiththeoperationsstaff.‘Op[eration]saretheuseranddictatetheObject,direct thetempooftheplananddecidewhenitmustbereplaced.’5Althoughintelligencehasacrucialroletoplayinpreparingandmonitoringtheeffectivenessofanydeception,itmustalwaysbecontrolledbytheoperationsbranchsincethey have the executive power to implement it. In order to serve the commander’spurpose,deceiversmustbeinconstanttouchwithhisthoughts.Thisisatwo-wayprocess,andwhile the deception staff workswithin the operations branch its head should havedirectaccesstothecommander.6

Asuccessfuldeceptionwilloccuronlyifallthestaffbranchesresponsiblefortheirvarious aspects of operational planning are properly co-ordinated. The overall planningmustbeanoperationsmatter,butthelatterwillhavetoworkverycloselyindeedwiththeintelligencebranchandpossiblywithlogisticsandartillery,andparticularlywithengineerandcommunicationsstaff.Commandmustbeexercisedatthehighestlevelbut–unlike,for example, theoperationof artillery,wherecommand is exercisedat thehighest levelbutcontrolisdevolveddownwardstoachieveflexibility–itisimperativethatdeceptionbe not only centrally commanded but also centrally controlled. Modern professionalarmies like to promote initiative in junior ranks, andwhen fighting a battle thismakeseminentsense.Butwhenpaintingacomplexanddelicatepicture,itisvitalthatdirectioniscloselyadheredto.

During the First World War the Admiralty’s Director of Naval Intelligence wasAdmiralSirReginaldHall,knownas‘Blinker’Hallbecauseofaslighttickinoneeye.Hewassomethingofamaverickandfascinatedbyanythingtodowithspies,deceptionandwhatmight be called ‘dirty tricks’. This aspect of the subject is far removed from thegenuine,methodicalandpainstakingrealityofmostintelligencework,butthetwofacetsareoften inextricablyentwined.7Hall isbestknown for thebrilliant signals intelligencework conducted in Room 40 by his cryptographers, but he took this further by havingprinteda‘SecretEmergencyWarCode’book,whichhethenallowedtofallintoGermanhands bymeans of a diplomatic courier in neutral Rotterdam.He then encouraged theGermans to have confidence in the codebyusing it for seemingly important signals. Itwas thenused todeceive them, first over aplan to ‘invade’Sylt, an island in thenorthFriesianchainoffthecoastofGermany.Second,heputoutastoryinAugust1916,whentheBattleoftheSommewasraging,thattheBritishintendedtoinvadenorthernBelgiumwiththeaimofpersuadingtheGermanstodrawtroopsawayfromthebattlefronttocoverthis threat. With great skill Hall allowed the Germans to piece the story togetherthemselves andused the secret code to instructwarships due to escort the ‘invasion’ toformupinthreegroupsbasedonDover,theThamesestuaryandHarwich.Asthesewerethemain supplyports for the troops inFrance, therewasno shortageof shipping for aZeppelincaptainorapilottoreport,andsincetheonlyrecipientofthesesignalswastheGermanY-Dienstradiointerceptservice,itdidnotinterferewithactualnavaloperations.Hall added to this deceptionwith a special printing of theDailyMail, a few copies ofwhich were sent to the Netherlands. This was soon followed by another edition fromwhich a prominent article was removed, as if it had been censored, suggestingpreparationsalongtheeastcoastofEnglandinvolvingflat-bottomedboats.TheGermansrespondedbydeployingtroopstothethreatenedarea.

TheproblemwasthatnooneintheAdmiraltyhadinformedtheWarOfficeofthisscheme,andtheGermantroopmovementstowardsthecoastofBelgiumledtotheworstinvasion scare of thewar.Without a co-ordinated and reliable intelligence and counter-intelligencenetworkwithwhichtomonitortheGermanreaction,Hallcouldnotbecertainthatthiswasonlyaresponsetohisdeception,andhethereforekeptquietabouthisruse.While it is easy to see the faults in such a scheme, it should be remembered that co-ordinatedstrategicdeceptionwasinitsinfancyandthatHall’sprimaryconcernwasnaval.TherewasnoJointPlanningStafftoadvisehimandasDNIhewasalongwayfromthecentreofoperationalplanning.Butbothoftheselessonswerelearnedintimeforthereal

invasionofEuropein1944.8

PREPARATIONANDTIMING

Preparationiscrucial.Apoorlyplanneddeceptionmaybeworsethannodeceptionatall.Andinthisprocesstimingispossiblythemostcriticalfactor.

EveryDeception Planmust be given time towork. It is no good telling aDeception Staff to try andinfluenceanenemy‘atonce’.ThePlanmustbeaimedatmakinghimactinafavourablemanneronlyatsomeselectedfuturedate,whenitsimplementationhashadafairchanceofexertingsomeeffect.9

There needs to be enough time to develop the concepts and to ensure the deceptionplannersandimplementershavetimetopaintthepicture.Plannersmustbeawareofthetimeagivenmeasurewilltaketoproducethedesiredeffectinthemindofthetarget,andforthetargettoreactasdesired.

Theplanningprocessmustfollowalogicalprogression.First,thecommandermustdecidewhatheisreallygoingtodo.Deceptiononlybecomespossiblewhenoperationalintentionshavebeendetermined.10Second,acoverplanshouldbecreatedbasedon theprinciples of credibility and timing. This must follow the real plan, not dictate it: anyattempttofit thereality to thedeceptionisdoomedtofailure.11Especiallyat thehigherlevels (operational and strategic), deception achieves results by a steady increase ofmomentumand itmustbeappreciated that it takes timeboth togainmomentumand toloseit.Employingdeceptionattheeleventhhourmaynotonlybetoolatetosucceedbutmayactually interferewith thegenuineplan.12The reaction timeof the target’s sourcesmustbecalculatedandthetimingofthedeceptionplannedaccordingly.Timingshouldbelogical so that combat indicators follow the sequence the enemywould expect, and thedeceivers need therefore to understand the enemy’s intelligence and decision-makingprocess.Ideally,theywillalsohavesomesortoffeedbackontheprogressoftheireffort.Thisfurtherreinforcestheneedforasinglestaffelementtoberesponsibledirectlytothecommanderforproperco-ordinationofthoseimplementingandevaluatingthedeception.This staffofficerensures that the real andcoverplansarecomplementaryandmutuallysupporting.AsDudleyClarkelearnedthroughdifficultexperience,‘deceptionwillpayitsbest dividends when both planning and implementation by all methods is made theresponsibilityofonecontrollingmind.’13

SECURITYAdeceptionplannerwhoinsertshismessageintotoomanychannelsrisksmisleadinghisownsideandalertingenemyanalysts.Inordertoensurethathismessagewillbereceived,hemustbeginbymakingsurethereisalownumberofchannelsthattheenemywillfindproductiveorpromising;inotherwords,gooddeceptionbeginswithgoodsecurity.14Twolevelsofsecurityarerequiredinanydeceptionplan:first,thegenuineoperationplanmustbesecuresothattheenemycannotdetermineone’strueintentions;second,thedeceptionplanmustitselfbeequallysecure,ifnotmoreso.Themereexistenceofadeceptionplan,letalonethedetails,shouldbeknownonlybythosewhoneedtoknow.Intheearlyperiodof theGreatPatrioticWar (as theSoviets called theEasternFrontof theSecondWorldWar)lossorcarelesstransmissionofplanningdocumentscompromisedSovietoperationsingeneralandmaskirovka (‘deception’) inparticular.Theytherefore implementedfierce

securityrestrictionsonthenumbersofplannersanddocumentsinvolvedinanyoperation,andcommunicatedonlywhatasubordinateneededtoknow,andonlywhenheneededtoknow it (and neverwhy hewas engaged on any particular task, however odd itmightseem).15DudleyClarkealwaysplayedhiscardsveryclosetohischestbuthismannerwassopleasanthecouldgetawaywith it. Ifanybodyshowedinterest inhisworkhewouldstarttellingfunnystoriesonacompletelydifferenttopic.16

Breaches of security, however, need not compromise either an operational or adeceptionplan.Someleaksmaynotbenoticedbyatarget,eitherbecausehisintelligencefailstopickthemuporbecausehispreconceptionsmayinducehimtomisinterpretthem.Itcouldevenbearguedthatthebiggertheleak,thelesslikelythetargetistobelieveit:hemaysuspectthattheleakitselfisadeception.17WhenaGermanmilitaryplanecarryingMajorHelmutReinbergeroftheLuftwaffeandcontainingplansfortheintendedGermaninvasionof theWest, includingBelgiumand theNetherlands,madea forced landingatMechelen-sur-MeuseinBelgiumon10January1940,thereactionamongbothBritishandFrench High Commands was that the documents were a plant.18 A deceiver shouldthereforeavoidsuch‘windfall’inputsunlesstheyareverycleverlydisguisedandpartofawiderplan.If,ontheotherhand,agenuinedeceptionplanisdiscovered(anditishardlysomethingacommanderwouldwanttorisk),securitymeasuresshouldensurethateveninthis case the enemy does not discover the commander’s real intentions, preferably byleavingseveralinterpretationsopen.

CREDIBILITYANDCONFIRMATION

Adeceptionwillnotsucceedinitsaimiftheenemydoesnotbelieveeitherthesourceorthecoverplan.Inthefirstinstance,forexample,ifdeceiversrelyondoubleagentsorfalseradiotraffic,thenthedoubleagentmustappeartotheenemytobereliableandfalseradiotrafficmustconformtonormalpatterns.Iftheenemyhasanydoubtsastothereliabilityofhissources,forwhateverreasons,thedeceptionislesslikelytosucceed.Andforthecoverplantobecrediblethedeceivermustbecapable,inthetarget’seyes,ofdoingwhattheliesuggests he will do. What is actually possible is less important than what the enemybelievestobepossible.19During1943theAlliestriedtopersuadetheGermansthattheyintended a cross-Channel invasion of the continent in September under the code-nameCOCKADE, principally with the aim of drawing the Luftwaffe into battle. The Germanresponsewasextremelydisappointing:theymadenoefforttoreinforce theFrenchcoastandcontinued todispatch reinforcements to theEasternFrontbecause their intelligencereported that ‘the resources in Great Britain are insufficient to permit any attempt toinvadethecontinentthissummer.’20

Thecredibilityofacoverstorycanbeenhancedwhen thestory isconfirmedbyavarietyof sources.Good intelligencewill always seekcorroborationof informationanddeceiversmust seek toprovide it.Forexample, if anairphotograph revealswhat lookslikeanenemydefensiveposition,thiscouldbeverifiedbyagroundpatrolgoingoutandseeingmenmovingaboutonit.Ifsubsequentlythesoundsofbattery-charginggeneratorsandfieldcookersareheard,heatsourcesaredetectedwithathermalpointer(agadgetthatindicates the direction fromwhich the heat is coming), radio direction-finders confirmradiotrafficemanatingfromit,andthesmellofcookingisborneonthebreeze,itmight

be reasonable to assume that the position is not a dummy one. However, all of thesesources can be simulated and if the deception is skilfully planned and executed, itwillrequireequalskill,alliedtoknowledgeandexperience,inordertodetectit.21

Thisisparticularlytrueifthepiecesofinformationareallowedtoreachtheenemyinsuchawayas toconvincehim thathehasdiscovered thembyhisowneffortsorbyaccident. Ifheputs themtogetherhimself,giventhenatureof‘noise’ in theintelligencecycle,heisfarlesslikelytobelievethattheintendedpictureisadeception.22Similarly,ifhehashadtoworkhardforhismaterialheismorelikelytodefenditsinterpretationwithconviction.However,thisdoesnotmeanblanketcoverageiseithernecessaryordesirable.Itisbotheasierandmoreeffectivetouseafewprovenchannelsratherthantodissipateenergyonawidevariety,thevalueofwhichmaybedubious.23Thedeceivershouldselectthose sources which are most easily fooled while neutralizing the remainder by activecounter-surveillancesothatthetargetignores,twistsorexplainsawayanydetailsthatdonotfit.TheBritishlearnedthisearlyonduringtheSecondWorldWar.

The sources themselves are of vital importance. Intelligence sources are usuallyrankedaccordingtotheirreliability,andafew‘reliable’sourceswillprobablycarrymoreweightthanmany‘unreliable’ones.TheGermansbelievedrathernaïvelyintheefficacyof spies inwartime,whereas theBritish accepted fairly earlyon the immensedifficultyand danger inherent in espionage in enemy territory in time of war.24 This GermanrelianceonagentsinBritain,reinforcedbythefactthattheyhadfewalternatives,tendedto make them overlook errors rather than question the validity of this source.Consequently,sincealltheagentstheysenttoBritainwereturnedagainstthemasdoubleagents, andwith aerial reconnaissance unable to provide corroboration, it was easy forthemtobedeceivedbytheAllies.25(BritishsuccessinturningGermanagentsintheUKdid not, however, prevent the entire British network operating in theNetherlands frombeingturnedandrunbytheGermans,anepisodeofastonishingincompetence.)

DudleyClarkehadanotherprinciple:theliewassopreciousthatitshouldalwaysbeattendedbyabodyguardoftruths.Byknittingthecoverplanintothelesscriticaldetailsoftherealplanwhereverpossible,notonlycouldthetargetconfirmthestoryforhimselfbut the likelihood of leakswas reduced.Truthsmade up at least eighty per cent of theinformationthat‘A’Forcefedtotheenemy,eveniftheystemmedfromdummyfleetsandtanksorfalsedivisionalsignspaintedconspicuouslywhereAlliedtroopswerepracticallynon-existent.ThuseightypercentofthematerialwasconfirmablebytheGermansfromother sources of information, and this made it easy to create a lethally misleadingpicture.26ThedeceptionforOperationTORCH(theinvasionofNorthAfricainNovember1942)was found tobeeffectivewhere thebuild-up inGibraltarhadbeenpassedoff asaimedat the reliefofMalta,while threats toFranceandNorwaywere found tobe lesscredible,underliningthefactthat‘coverstoriesoughttobeasnearthe“realthing”as…safelypossible’.27

FLEXIBILITYVonMoltkeobservedthatnoplansurvivescontactwiththeenemy.Inwaruncertaintyistheonlythingthatcanbeguaranteedwithanycertainty,andflexibility(itselfaprincipleof war) is of particular importance to any plan, whether operational or deceptive.

Deceptionplans should takeadvantageofelements, suchas terrainandweather, andasreal conditionschange somust the lie, if it is toavoidexposure.28Theability togaugefeedback from the target is invaluable in this respect, since the effectiveness of certainstrands of deception, or of the developing thoughts and intentions of the target maypresentanunexpectedopportunity,almostcertainlyfleeting.Giventhatfeedbackisitselfsubject to the same problems of evaluation as any other intelligence, it is rare to haveavailablesuchareliablesourceasthedecryptsofthehigh-levelGermansignalsinterceptscode-namedULTRAusedbytheBritishduringtheSecondWorldWar.Eventhen,decodingsuchavaluablesourceintimetomakeuseofitwasaknife-edgebusiness,butitdidgiveapricelessinsightintothereactionofHitlerandhisstafftoBritishdeception,andmadethemorecomplicatedplanspossible.29Italsoenabledtheflexibilitybywhich,whentheGermansretainedlargeforcesinthePasdeCalaisaftertheNormandylandings,theAllieswereabletospinoutthedeceptionplanFORTITUDESOUTHforalmosttwomonths.

4

TheMethodsofDeception‘Ihavealwaysbelievedindoingeverythingpossibleinwartomystifyandmisleadone’sopponent.’

A.P.Wavell

INTHEIRBOOKStrategicMilitaryDeceptionD.C.Daniel andK.L.Herbig identify twotypes of deception: the ‘ambiguity-increasing’ variety (or A-type) and the ‘misleadingvariety’ (orM-type).1A-typedeceptionsaim tohinder the identificationof the trueaimlongenoughtopromoteinactionintheenemy(forexample,bydelayingmobilizationordeploymentofreserves).Theliestoldmustbesufficientlyplausibleandconsequentialtodemandattention,orelseforce theopponent tocovermultiplecontingenciesandspreadhisresourcessothinlyastobevulnerabletoaconcentratedstrike.ExamplesofthistypeareHitler’s invasionof theUSSR in1941andEgypt’sassaultacross theSuezCanal in1973. The aim of an M-type deception, on the other hand, is to reduce ambiguity bysuggestingthatoneparticularoptionismostlikely,thusinducingthetargettoconcentrateoperational resources in thewrongplace, aswith theAllies’ threat to thePasdeCalaisbeforetheNormandyinvasionof1944.Inpractice,however,thedistinctionbetweenthesetwotypesisoftenblurred.

Virtually all strategems and manœuvres of war are variations on a few simplethemes.2Therearefiveprincipalcategoriesofdeception,whichmightbeenlistedsinglyor incombination toproduceeitheranA-typeorM-type response.Thefirstcategory iscounter-surveillance,consideredabove.However,therewillbetimeswhenacommanderdeliberatelywants to attract the enemy’s attention in order tomislead him.The secondcategoryofdeceptionthereforecomprisesdisplaysthataredeliberatelyintendedtocatchthe enemy’s eye, and includes all decoys, mock-ups, dummy positions, equipment andobstacles,simulatedtracksofwheeledvehiclesandarmour,smokeandheatsources,radiotrafficandelectronicemissions.Thesecanbeusedtoportrayaunitthatdoesnotexist,togivetheimpressionthattherearepowerfulforcesinanareawherethereareactuallyveryfew,ortodisguisethetruenatureandstrengthofashiporunitthatcannotbeconcealed.Thethirdandfourthcategoriesinvolvethemanœuvringofforces.Thethirdcategory,feintoperations,comprisesmovementsmadewiththeobjectofdeceivingtheenemyastothetiming,weightordirectionofthemainattack.Diversionaryraidshavethesameeffect,aswillafeignedwithdrawal.Inthefourthcategoryaredemonstrations,whicharesimilartofeintsbutwiththeessentialdifferencethatademonstrationisashowofforceonafrontwherethedeceiverhasnointentionoffighting.Thefifthcategorycomprisesruses:tricks,strategemsorcunningstuntsdesignedtodeceivetheenemy.

DECEIVINGTHESENSESTobesuccessfuladeceiverneedsimaginationandasenseoftheatre.DeceptionduringtheAmericanCivilWarwasbynomeansconfinedtotheConfederacy.DuringMajor-GeneralU.S.Grant’sVicksburgcampaignMajor-GeneralWilliamT.Shermanwassenttomakeademonstration up the Yazoo River, where his men were exhorted by their red-hairedcommanderthateverymanwasto‘lookasnumerousaspossible’.4Evenmoretheatrical

was the trick attributed by Frontinus to the Athenian Pericles. Having notice a grovededicatedtoPlutoandvisibletobotharmies,

hetookamanofenormousstature,madeimposingbyhighbuckskins,purplerobesandflowinghair,andplaced him in the grove, mounted high on a chariot drawn by gleaming white horses. This man wasinstructed to drive forth, when the signal for battle should be given, to call Pericles’ name, and toencouragehimbydeclaringthatthegodswerelendingtheiraidtotheAthenians.5

Theenemypromptlyfledthefield.

OnememosenttoanAmericanunitengagedindeceptionduringtheSecondWorldWar criticized the men’s attitude for being ‘too much MILITARY and not enoughSHOWMANSHIP’; the writer went on to inform the soldiers that they must considerthemselves‘atravellingshow’.Presentationsrequired‘thegreatestaccuracyandattentionto detail. They will include the proper scenery, props, costumes, principals, extras,dialogueandsoundeffects.WemustrememberthatweareplayingtoaverycriticalandattentiveRadio,Ground andAerial audience. Theymust all be convinced.’ The authoralsoadmonishedacolonelofcamoufleurswhohadinstructedhismenthatalltheyneeddowas inflate theirdummy tanks,afterwhich theycouldgo tosleep. ‘This isverybad“theater”.TheColonelforgotwewereinshowbusinessandthoughtweweredealingwithrealtanksandrealtankers…Theymustrepair“Tanks”,hangoutwashing,golookingforcider,andgenerallymillaboutinGIstyle.’6

TheAmericanCivilWarprovidesanotherexampleofhowcorroborationviaothersenses such as sound and smell can be used to add credibility to a dummyposition. InSeptember1863UniongeneralWilliamS.RosecranswishedtocrosstheTennesseeRiverwithout bloodshed and capture Chattanooga. A Southern officer later told a Northerncorrespondent that ‘when yourDutch generalRosencranz [sic] commenced his forwardmovementforthecaptureofChattanooga,welaughedhimtoscorn.WebelievedthattheblackbrowofLookoutMountainwouldfrownhimoutofexistence,andhewoulddashhimself to pieces against the many and vast natural barriers that rise all aroundChattanooga.’ Instead, keeping his main body well back from the Tennessee River,Rosecransdemonstratedupstream;heorderedthreebrigadestolightbonfireseverynightclosetoallpossiblecrossings,andspecialdetailswereinstructedtochopandthrowwoodscrapsintothetributaries,whileothersbashedawayonemptybarrelstoimitatethesoundof boat-building. On 21 August he added artillery attacks on the town itself andRosecrans’opponent,BraxtonBragg,withdrewabrigadethathadbeenguardingtheareaof Bridgeport some fifty miles downstream. A Union crossing was then immediatelyeffectedatthreesitesdownstreamincludingBridgeport,whereapontoonbridgewasbuiltto replace the destroyed railway bridge. Rosecrans’ entire force was across by 4September,andon8SeptemberChattanoogafellwithoutashotbeingfired.7

Smells,especiallyofcooking,areeasilycreated,andifnowadaysitisunlikelythatrealistic sounds can be reproduced by so simple an expedient as bashing barrels,nevertheless modern recording and amplification equipment present enormouspossibilities.Thesoundsofbattle– tankmovement,bridge-buildingandsoon–canbevery effectively imitated, especially at night or in smokescreens or where the enemy’saerialrecceisweak.OneplacewheresonicdeceptionwasdevelopedbytheBritishduringthe SecondWorldWarwas LagganHouse. There it was considered vital to be able to

reproduce the sounds of specific types of tank, such as Shermans or Churchills, sinceexperiencedsoldierscouldbeexpectedtospotthedifference.8Butsonicdeceptioncouldalsohaveagreatpsychologicaleffect,particularlyatnight,asGeoffreyBarkasnoted:

Iseeitasapurelyemotionalattackonthenerves.Asenseoftensionorfearisoftenbuiltupinthemindsof a cinema audience by arbitrary and illogical use of sound accompanying a picture… Sounds bythemselves are very frightening at night if they are associatedwith ideas that have caused the listeneracute apprehension or suspense. In the circumstances the average listener does not stop to work outwhetherthesoundsarestrictlylogicaloraccurate.Hishairjuststandsnaturallyonend.Iknowminedoeswithinthelimitedscoperemainingtome…Itwouldbeamostunusualenemysentryorlocalcommanderwholistenedcarefullyandthensaid,‘Allrightboys,gobacktobed.ThatnoiseisaGeneralGrant[tank]andIknowforsurethattherearenoGeneralGrantswithinfiftymiles.’9

DOUBLEAGENTS

Spiesofonesortoranotherhaveforcenturiesprovedamajorsourceofinformation.Theirefficiencyandreliabilitydependonagreatmanyvariables.ForalongtimePrinceEugèneofSavoy-CarignanhadthepostmasteratVersaillesinhispay.Thepostmasteropenedtheletters and orders that the French court dispatched to its generals and sent copies toEugène,whousually received themsooner than theFrenchcommanders.Doubleagentshave long been used to convey false information to the enemy, as Frederick theGreatwrote:

[François,Ducde]LuxembourgwonoverasecretaryoftheEnglishkingwhoinformedhimofeverythingthatwasgoingon.Thekingdiscoveredhimandturnedthedelicateaffairtohisadvantagebyforcingthetraitor towrite [to]Luxembourgand let himknow that the allied armywouldmakea large forage thefollowing day. The French were nearly caught by surprise at Steinkirke [1692] and would have beenentirelydefeatediftheyhadnotfoughtwithextraordinaryvalour.10

It is in the twentieth century, however, that double agents havemade the biggestimpact. JohnMasterman’s The Double Cross System gives the impression that Britishdeception of the enemy in the SecondWorldWar rested solely on the control of theiragents and the feeding of false information through that channel.Masterman, however,wasnot themastermindhe seems tohave thoughthimself tobe. (‘I…hadamore thanaverageshareofthatmoralandintellectualsuperioritywhichis…thecurseoftheBritishliberals.’11)Onthecontrary,organizeddeceptionstartedintheMiddleEastinlate1940asanormalmilitaryoperation,inthecourseofwhichitwasfoundconvenienttomakeuseof‘turned’agentsdeliberatelytomisleadtheItalians,Germansand,later,theJapanese.Thetechniqueforusingtheseagentsinsupportofdeceptionplans(asdistinctfromthemoreusual tasks of penetration and counter-espionage)was developed there by ‘A’Force, aswere all the other deception devices and arrangements later used so successfullyworldwidebytheBritishandtheAmericans.

While physical display may be ambiguous (it cannot, for example, disclose thecommanders’ names), electronic deception also has limitations. Apart from needingconsiderable resources and skill todisclose false information, there is noguarantee thattheenemywillhearorisevenlistening.Doubleagents,however,combinetheprecision,certainty and speednecessary for deception at long range andover an extendedperiod.Butphysicalandelectronicdeceptionshouldberegardedasnecessarysecuritymeasuresinsuchinstances,sinceiftheenemydoesbreakthesecurityring,hewillfindnothingtocontradictand,ifpossible,somethingtoconfirmthestory.12

Theuse of double agents in theSecondWorldWar came about simultaneously inBritainandEgyptbutwasdealtwithentirelyseparatelyinthetwocountries:inLondonbysectionB1aofMI5underLieutenant-ColonelT.A.Robertson,andinCairobySecurityand IntelligenceMiddleEast (SIME),whichwassetup inApril1940andunderwhoseumbrellaallmatterspertainingtosecurityandintelligencematterswerecombined.ThereCaptain(laterColonel)W.J.Kenyon-Joneswaschosennotforhisacademicqualificationsbut his business and athletic ones: hewasmanaging director ofRonson’s and aWelshrugbyinternational.HewouldinduecoursebecomedeputyheadofSIME.TheheadwasdirectlyanswerabletoWavellasthecommander-in-chiefandwhen‘A’Forcewascreated,althoughanoperationalunit,itutilizedmainlyintelligencechannels.SIMEwasinfactaremarkable amalgamation of all security and intelligence affecting theMiddle East, inwhich officers fromMI5 andMI6 worked closely together regardless of their originalallegiance. Given that the latter’s presence in the Middle East was embryonic, ‘anyintelligencejob’saidKenyon-Jones,‘particularlyofanunorthodoxnature,whichcouldn’tfind a home, tended to come toSIME’.Thus, the case officers of ‘turned’ agentswereappointed by SIME, even though the original case had been promoted by MI6 andprobablybelongedtothem.13

Theoperation that subsequentlybecameknownasCHEESE beganwhenSIMEwasnotifiedbyMI6thatthelatterhadreceivedanofferofservices,notmerelyasanagentbutasadoubleagent,fromanItalianJewwhoworkedfortheServizioInformazioneMilitare(SIM,orItalianmilitaryintelligence).Kenyon-Joneswaschosentomeettheagent,code-named MOSES, in Cairo, where he had come ostensibly to set up a network amongdissatisfiedEgyptianArmyofficersand themanyItaliannationals resident there. ItwassoondiscoveredthatthelinksMOSESproposedtoestablishwerelargelynotional,afurtherbonus since it enabledKenyon-Jones tocreateawhollynotionalagentcalledLAMBERT,who would report to MOSES once the latter returned to Bari. When the contact wasestablished, itwas thebiggest thrillof thewar forKenyon-Jones,butneitherhenorhischief,ColonelRaymondMaunsell,quiterealizedatthetimethesignificanceofwhattheyhad started. From then on, itwas up to ‘A’ Force to nominate the information that theCHEESEsyndicatepassedonbutlefttoSIMEtoruntheactorsandtodecidewhichwouldbethemosteffectiveconduit.Asthewarprogressed,furtheradditionsweremadetotheCHEESE network including STEPHAN, an Austrian Jew who, as ULTRA decrypts laterdemonstrated,wasthemosthighlyregardedasfarastheGermanswereconcerned.SIGINTalsoshowedtheBritishthattherewasnogenuineAxisespionagenetworkintheMiddleEast,althoughtheGermansdesperatelywantedone,andastheirabilitytoconductaerialreconnaissancewasreduced,sothisdesperationincreased.Inthemoodofoverconfidenceinspiredbythesuccessof1940theGermansfailedtobuildupanetworkinSyriaorIraqbeforetheexpulsionofVichyforcesortheRaschidAlirebellioninIraqin1941.BythetimeoftheBattleofElAlameininOctober1942theyweresatisfiedtheyhadestablishedin Egypt, through CHEESE and others, an espionage organization of supreme qualityexactlyastheyhadenvisaged.Theythereforeactedwithcompleteconfidenceandwhentheinformationsuppliedbythisnetworkwasconfirmedbywirelessinterceptsinthefield,they found themselves quite, quite wrong, although any blame was attributed tocamouflagebytheBritish.Thiswastheessenceof‘A’Forceoperations.14

From the beginning of 1942, with deception becoming increasingly important,

DudleyClarke insisted thatcertainagentsbeallocatedsolely todeceptionpurposesandtheCHEESE network became that of ‘A’ Force. In theMiddle East private armies werebroughtfirmlyundertheGeneralStaffandoperatedunderthecontrolofthecommander-in-chief,unlikethesituationinBritain,wherethechainofcommandandmeansofcontrolwerenotclearlydelineated.15Clarkelaiddowncertainprinciplesfortheemploymentofdouble agents: the contacts of an agent used for passing deception should be entirelynotional,asshouldbehisownespionageactivities;adeceptionagentmustnotbeallowedaccess to the outsideworld, irrespective of his own allegiances; and no deception linkshouldeverbeusedforintelligencepurposesotherthandeception.Shouldthisoccurforanyreason, then the linkshouldcease tobeusedfordeception.16TheseprincipleswerenotfollowedinLondonandtheresultsverynearlyproveddisastrous.

ELECTRONICDECEPTION

Electronicdeception(ED)cantaketwoforms:physical(forexample,deflectorsandchafftointerferewithradar)orelectromagnetic(suchasfalseradionets).Thelatterinturncantake three forms: imitation, manipulation or simulation. Imitation is by far the mostdifficulttoachieveandtheeasiesttoreveal,whichmakesitadangerouspropositionfortheimitator.Byappearingontheenemy’sradionets,issuingfalseordersforexample,itispotentiallyverydamaging.Butiftheradioproceduresofthetargetareofahighstandardandifthelanguageskillsoftheimitatorarenot,imitationmayprovecounter-productivesince,oncediscovered, theenemy is likely to takesteps to improvehisprocedures,andthismightdrasticallyreducetheintelligencevalueofintercepts.

Manipulation and simulation are far more common. The former involves alteringone’s own electronic order of battle (the normal ‘signature’ of one’s radio nets andprocedures).Byfalsetrafficlevelsandcontrolledbreachesofsecuritytheenemymaybedenieda truepictureofone’s intentionsandgenuineorderofbattle.Thusmanipulationcontributes tosecurity.Simulation,on theotherhand,canbeused topaintacompletelyfalse picture, to create electronically a false order of battle or inaccurate locations of agenuineorderofbattle. Itwillalmostcertainlybepartofa larger scheme including thedisplay of dummy equipment and perhaps ‘special means’ (double agents) used tocorroborate the deception. Two important policy aspects are worth noting. The enemycannot be given the designation of the formation by this means, nor can intentions berevealed, except insofar as these may be deduced from the type and grouping offormationsandthecharacteroftraining.InBritainduringtheSecondWorldWardummytraffic was forbidden on the ground that the German cryptographers might deduce itsnaturefromitspattern.TheoppositeviewwasheldintheMediterraneantheatre,whereitwas believed that any increase of ‘live’ or genuine traffic added ‘depth’ to the ciphermaterial andmade it easier for the enemy to break it. Eitherway, live traffic certainlyinvolvesmoreandveryhighlyskilledwork.Italsorisksleakageinthetrafficfromasliponthepartofanoperator,whichcannotarisewithdummymessages.17

PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS

Considerationmustalsobegiventopsychologicaloperations(Psyops).TherehavebeeninstanceswherePsyopshavebeenenlistedtoassistdeceptionschemesandmuchPsyopshardware may also play a deceptive role: loudspeakers, for example, may serve both

functions,butthereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenthetwo.TheunderlyingprincipleofgoodPsyops(andofpropagandaingeneral)isthattobemosteffective,theymustdealwith the truth and nothing but the truth – although not necessarily the whole truth.Deception,ofcourse,dealswithlies,anditsaimsarethereforefundamentallyatoddswiththose of Psyops. The latter can assist deception by helping to provide it with the‘bodyguard of truth’ necessary to protect the lie, but thosewho practise eithermust beextremelycarefulthattheydonotcompromisetheother’sposition.Forexample,itmustbe rememberedwhendesigningPsyopsmaterials, thatnocommanderwouldeverallowoperational details to be broadcast before execution and any intelligent enemy wouldknowthat.18Psyopswillonoccasionpermitalie,eitherintheformof‘black’propagandapurportingtocomefromafalse(usuallyenemy)source,orifthelieisverycredibleandservesaspecificaim.CredibilityisoneprinciplesharedbydeceiversandPsyops,sinceifaPsyopsmessagecontainsanabsolutetruththatisnotperceivedascrediblebythetargetaudience,thenitwillprobablyfail.

Nevertheless,Psyopsandthepatternoftheirusemayactasintelligenceindicatorstoanenemy.Ifleafletsaredroppedinaparticularplace,forexample,thismaysuggestthatoperationsarebeingplanned in thatdirection. It isobviouslynecessary therefore toco-ordinatePsyopsanddeceptionfromthehighestlevel.DuringpreparationsfortheinvasionofSicilyin1943(OperationHUSKY)deceiverslookedtothePoliticalWarfareExecutive(as the Psyops branchwas then known) to assist them by controlling the numbers andlocations of leaflets dropped that called upon the Germans to surrender. One area thedeceivers wished to leaflet was the south of France in order to suggest forthcomingoperationsthere,butaircraftwerenotavailableintheMediterraneantodothisandaircraftbasedinBritaincouldnotreachthatfar.Thereforethethreathadtobedevelopedthroughradiopropaganda.19 This created severe problems since the PoliticalWarfare Executive(PWE)hadtobeverycarefulnottoraisefalsehopesamongresisters;theplanalsoriskederodingthecredibilityofnotonlytheirownradiostationsbutcruciallyoftheBBC,bothofwhichbroadcast to thewholeof occupiedEurope andbothofwhose credibilitywasabsolutely fundamental to the successof theirownoperations.20Asageneral rule, it isprobably safest for Psyops to expound one’s capabilities while making no referencewhatevertoone’sintentions.

SUBSTITUTION:ELALAMEIN,1942The principle of substitution is to make a show of what one wishes the enemy to see(whetherrealorfalse)andthenreplacetheitemwithsomethingofaquitedifferentnatureandsignificance,accordingtotheparticularaim.TheperiodbetweenthebattlesofAlamHaifa and El Alamein during the autumn of 1942 was deemed essential for theregeneration and reinforcement of the forces that would be required to launch theoffensiveoperationsof the latter.TheAxis forces, amounting to some50,000Germansand54,000Italians,werebehindextensiveminefieldsthat,owingtotheseatothenorthand theQattaraDepression to the south, could not be outflanked.Although the EighthArmy under its new commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard LawMontgomery (soonknown to all ranks asMonty), expected to havematerial superiority, at least on paper,someotherwaywasneeded tosecureabreakthrough.The ‘otherway’wasadeceptionplanonascaleneverpreviouslyattempted.AstheEighthArmy’schiefofstaff,Brigadier

FrancisdeGuingand,toldDudleyClarke:Well,thereitis.Youmustconceal150,000menwithathousandgunsandathousandtanksonaplainasflatandhardasabilliardtable,andtheGermansmustnotknowanythingaboutit,althoughtheywillbewatchingeverymovement,listeningforeverynoise,chartingeverytrack…Youcan’tdoitofcourse,butyou’vebloodywellgotto!21

The overall plan for the battle was given the code-name LIGHTFOOT while thedeceptionplan,writtenbyClarke,wascalledBERTRAM;subsidiaryplanswerecode-namedDIAMOND,BRIAN,MUNASSIB,MARTELLOandMURRAYFIELD.Theintentionwastoconcealthehugebuild-upofforcesinthenorthernsectoroftheAlliedlinewheretheattackwasintendedtobelaunchedwhilesimulatingahugebuild-upinthesouth;itwasalsointendedtosuggestthattheattackwouldnottakeplaceuntiltheendofthefirstweekinNovember,wheninrealityitwouldbeginon23October.22TheGHQCamouflageSectionwasgiventhetaskofconcealingthehugedumpsofrations,ammunition,fuelandstoresthatwouldbe accumulated in the northern sector and making it appear that preparations wereproceeding in the southern sector. This was done by disguising the real build-up assomethingmoreinnocuousthanitwasandtheninvitingtheenemytolookatit.

Thefirstproblemwasconcealingthehugequantityofstoresnecessaryforsolargean operation. Fortunately, it was discovered that there were a hundred sections of slittrenchnearElAlameinstation,beautifullylinedwithmasonry.Intothesewereput2,000tonsofpetrol,whichairobserverswereinvitedtolocate.Theytriedandfailed.Foodwasdeliveredatnighton10-tonlorriesandimmediatelystackedintheshapeof3-tonlorriesandsuitablycamouflagedundernets,withanyoverflowstackedbesideitintheshapeofadriver’s ‘bivvie’. Similar methods were used for ammunition, engineer and ordnancestores.BRIANwasaschemetocreatelargefakesupplydumpsinthesouth,counterpartstothose in the north. DIAMOND was a scheme to build a 20-mile fake water pipeline,ostensiblytosupplythelarge‘build-up’inthesouthernsector.Thetrenchtocarryitwasdug conventionally and fake railway line was laid in the trench to simulate the pipe.Beforeeachstretchofthetrenchwasfilledin,thedummypipewasremovedatnightforuse further along the trench. Three dummy pump-houses and fake reservoirswere alsoconstructedand trafficdivertedanddrivenalongside it.23Significantly, itwasbuilt at aratethatsuggestedtheD-Dayofanysubsequentoperationwouldnotbeuntilatleasttendaysaftertherealone.24

In the southern sector therewere real troop concentrations, including 44th (HomeCounties)Divisionand7thArmouredDivisionaswellas4thArmouredBrigade,whichwere detailed to carry out a diversionary attack. During the retreat to El Alamein 4thArmoured Brigade had suffered such severe casualties that it ceased to exist as aneffective fighting formation. It quickly ‘reappeared’, under command ofCaptainVictorJones of ‘A’ Force (promoted temporarymajor and local brigadier) and equipped withdummies,withthetaskofmenacingRommel’ssouthernflank.BythetimeitwasrevealedthroughULTRAthatithadbeenrumbled,ithadreformedas4thLightArmouredBrigade,with the armoured cars of 11th Hussars and some Stuart light tanks operated by 12thRoyal Lancers and the combined 4th/8th Hussars, plus a brigade’s worth of dummiesoperatedbyasquadronof3rdCountyofLondonYeomanry.25Thus,duringtheBattleofAlamHaifa,when theGermans’armoured recce roundedaBritishminefield, theywere

firedonwithrealshellsbyaformationthataccordingtotheirmapswasadummyone.26Atthesametime,thediversionaryattackallowedthedoubleagentswhoweresupportingthedeceptionplantoavoidaccusationsofhavingdeliberatelysentfalsereports.

MARTELLO and MURRAYFIELD were complementary plans that formed the mostimportantaspectsoftheoverallscheme,enablingthestationingofthearmourofXCorpsinassemblyareasclosetoitsstartlines.ThankstoMARTELLO,by6Octoberabout4,000genuine vehicles, 450 dummies andmore than 700 ‘sunshields’were in place. These –originallyan ideaofWavell’s–werecovers that fittedover tanks tomake themappearfromtheairlikelorries.MeanwhileaforceequivalenttoXCorpswasconcentratedinanassemblyareanearElImayid,toaccustomtheenemytotheirpresence.

On6OctobertherewasachangetothegenuineplanLIGHTFOOT.Naturallythishadaknock-on effect onBERTRAM. Originally, theMARTELLO area was expected to be somefifteenntotwentymilessouthofaseriesoftracksthatledbothsouthandnorth.Thenewareacouldonlyportendanattackinthenorth,andanadditionaldeceptionwasrequired.Three staging areas, MURRAYFIELD (NORTH), MURRAYFIELD (SOUTH) and MELTINGPOT,were established astride a series of tracks tending towards the south. The armour wasmovedinto thesestagingareasquiteopenlybetween19and21October.Justbefore theopening of the battle they were moved into MARTELLO under their ‘sunshields’. ThispresentedtheCamouflageSectionwithadifficultandunforeseenproblem,astherewouldnow be gaps left by the tanks moving forward. But Captain John Baker from theCamouflage Development Centre at Helwan, an architect in civilian life, made ‘tanks’from the plaited panels of split palm that the local farm workers used as beds. In aremarkablepieceofimprovisationthousandsofthesepanelsweremadebylocalworkmenandknockedtogetherinrudimentaryformbythreepioneercompanies(oneEastAfrican,oneMauritianandone from theSeychelles) togetherwithNo.1CamouflageCompany,Royal Engineers.Obscured under camouflage nets, theywere all thatwas necessary tocreatethreelarge‘armouredformations’,apparentlycamouflagedandawaitingmovementorders,probablytothesouth.27

Similar conjuring tricks hid their supporting artillery. Plan MUNASSIB involveddigginggunpitswithdummygunsattheeasternendoftheMunassibDepression(southofthesectorwherethemainattackwouldcome)torepresentthreeandahalffieldregiments.Theywere leftwithoutanysignofnormalmovementaround theminorder toconvincetheGermans that theywere dummies. Shortly before the attackwas due to commence,realgunsmovedinandjoinedtheassault,aploythatwasalsointendedtoreinforcetheGerman belief that the main assault was still due to come in the south. Much of thesupporting artillery was hidden in this fashion. A 25-pounder and its limber would behidden under covers called ‘cannibals’ (also designed to resemble lorries), as were thedistinctiveQuadtractors.Nofewerthan360gunswereconcealedinthiswayandreadytolaunch the attack on 23October.28 To bring them forward, theRoyal Engineers had tobulldozetracksfromMARTELLOthroughcannibals1and2tothefrontline.Thishadtobeorganized so that they followed the least conspicuous course, and began from differentplacessoasnottoappearasacoherenttrackschemeuntilthelastminute.29

ToconcealthatthegunsandtankshadmovedfromtherearwasthepurposeofPlanMURRAYFIELD. First Armoured Division and 74th Armoured Brigade (Dummy Tanks)

movedforwardfromWadiNatrumtoElImayidintwostages.ThefirstwascarriedoutopenlyasatrainingexercisetoastagingareasouthofBurg-el-Arab,beforemovingtotheforwardpositionsatnightwithimmediatereplacementbydummies.Thisinvolved1,500vehiclesfrom2ndNewZealandDivision,1,370dummytrucks,64dummygunsand30dummytanksoccupyingthespacevacated,althoughtoaerialreconnaissancenomovehadapparentlyoccurred.30 PlanMELTINGPOT saw10thArmouredDivisionmove fromWadiNatrumbydaytoastagingareafartothesouth,thenreturnatnighttothemainassemblyarea in the north, having left behind amixture of dummy and real equipment.Anotherkindofdisplaywasmade for the first timeatElAlameinbydeploying raftsout to seabetween El Data and Sidi Abd el Rahman to simulate an amphibious assault, using acombinationofnoiseandsmell.Behindasmokescreenthereekofcorditeanddieselwascombinedwithconfusedshoutingandthefiringofflares.Itwasnotespeciallysuccessful,butwasusefulpracticeforfutureoperations.

When General der Panzertruppen Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, commanding theDeutchesAfrikakorps(nowjustonecomponentofGeneralfeldmarschallErwinRommel’sPanzerarmee Afrika), was captured, he said that German reconnaissance had failed tolocateanyincreaseinforcesinthenorth,onlyinthesouth.Hisstatementwassupportedbyotherprisonersandbycaptureddocuments,includingamapthatshowedthesupposedposition of three British armoured divisions as being where the fake concentrations oftransporthadbeen.VonThomaconfessedthathehadbeencertainthattheassaultwouldcomefromtheMunassibregion,totheextentthattwoAxisarmoureddivisionshadbeenretained in that sector until four days after the launch of the real attack. Furthermore,EighthArmyhadbeenabletodeployacompletearmoureddivisionentirelyunknowntotheGermans.31

THEFALSEROUTINE:CROSSINGTHECANAL,1973Repeated often enough, any process becomes a routine of little interest.Many escapesfrom prisoner-of-war camps during the Second World War took advantage of routineevents, the entry and exit of service vehicles, visits of Red Cross officials and thedeparturefromworkofGermanofficers.Sentriesareonlyalertedbytheunusual.32ItwasafterlullingtheIsraelisintosuchafalsesenseofsecuritythattheEgyptianslaunchedtheYomKippurWarinOctober1973.

TheEgyptianplannerswanted to slowdown the Israeli responseandespecially toprevent a pre-emptive Israeli strike before completion of their own build-up. TheArabcountries had carefully studied the lessons of the Six-DayWar. In particular, they paidcloseattention to intelligence, communicationsanddeception, including thosemeasurestakenbytheIsraelisin1967andbytheAlliesbeforetheinvasionofNormandyin1944.Some among the staff had servedwithMontgomery atElAlamein anddrewupon thatexperience. The resulting deception plan was therefore a blend of Israeli andWesterntechniques.Mostimportantly,itcleverlycapitalizedonIsraeliandWesternperceptionsoftheArabsthemselves,includingaperceivedinabilitytokeepsecrets,militaryinefficiencyandinabilitytoplanandconductanysortofco-ordinatedaction.

TheIsraeliconceptfordefenceoftheSuezCanalassumeda48-hourwarningperiodwouldbesufficient,sincetheEgyptianswouldnotbeabletocrossthecanalinstrength

andcouldbequicklyandeasilycounter-attacked.Forthispurpose,theEgyptianscarriedout at least six studies of Israeli doctrine andperceptions, enabling them tomesh thesetogether skilfully in their own deception plan.33 The aim of the plan was to provideplausible–and incorrect–alternative interpretations for themassivebuild-upalong thecanalandtheGolanHeights.Putsimply,thestrategyinvolvedincreasingthe‘noise’thatthe Israelis had to contendwithby a seriesof false alerts.Over theprevious twoyearsthere had been a series of continual escalations and backings down, beginning inDecember1971,whena limitedattackacross theSuezCanalwasavertedonlybecausePresidentAnwarSadatbelievedtheIndo-PakistanWarwoulddrawworldattentionawayfromtheMiddleEast.Ayearlaterasmalleroperationwascancelledwhenthegeneralincommandinsistedthathistroopswerenotready.Theresultwastoestablishanapparentpatternofunexplainedescalationandrapidreleaseoftension.

ByEgyptianaccountstherewerethreesuchalertsin1973:inMay,AugustandlateSeptember.Eachofthesewasaccompaniedbybellicoserhetoric.ThefirstdevelopedoutofthesituationinLebanonfollowinganIsraeliraidonPalestinianheadquartersinApril.Fighting broke out between the Palestinians, who blamed the Lebanese army for laxsecurity, and this led to Syrian units standing to maximum alert. Egyptian newspaperswere instructed to publish civil defence notices and other items to increase thetemperature. The crisis resulted in a split within the Israeli hierarchy. TheMinister ofDefence and Chief of Staff both considered it serious enough to warrant a counter-mobilizationwhiletheDirectorofMilitaryIntelligencedidnot.TheMinistryofDefenceordered mobilization anyway and – perhaps as a result – the situation developed nofurther. This mobilization cost Israel $10 million and military intelligence felt itsassessment had been vindicated.34 The second alert added to this sense of justification,andbythetimeofthethirdthewholethingwaspassedoffbytheIsraelisasnomorethanagitationdesignedforlocalconsumption.35

Whiletheconstantraisingofalertsappearedtobeformingapattern,theEgyptiansdeveloped further ploys to explain this behaviour. The theme was that the Arabs, andparticularlytheEgyptians,wereincapableoffightingawarandpreferredtoworktowardssomesortofdiplomaticsolution.Thissuggestedthatthealertsweremeresabre-rattlingtocreatepressureand toplacatehawkishopinionathome.This in turnplayedonWesternand Israeli belief inArabmilitary incompetence,which theArabs further enhanced byputtingoutthestorythat,followingtheexpulsionofSovietadvisorsinJuly1972,Soviet-suppliedequipmentwasrapidlydeterioratingandtheSovietshadexpresseddissatisfactionwith the level of Egyptian training (which was true). Following the Israeli–Syrian airbattleofSeptember1973SyriandissatisfactionwiththeperformanceofSovietequipmentwasmadeplainandthefreedomofmovementofSovietadvisorswasseverelycurtailed(possiblyasasecurityprecautiontoprotecttheinvasionplans)amidtalkofanEgyptian-styleexpulsion.AtthesametimemeasuresweretakentosuggestthatSadatintendedtotakeEgypt’scasetotheUnitedNations:hetoldaEuropeanforeignministerinthestrictestconfidence that hewould be there inOctober, knowing thiswould be passed on to theIsraelis. These measures culminated in the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference in Algiersduring the first week of September, which passed a resolution calling for IsraeliwithdrawalfromSinai.AvisitbytheRomaniandefenceministertoCairowasannouncedand an important speech by Sadat was scheduled for 18 October, all of which was

designedtosuggestgrowingimpetustowardsadiplomaticsolution.36

Thusthestagewassetforthefinalphase,thecriticalperiodimmediatelybeforetheattack, when Israeli action could have proved catastrophic for the Egyptian cause. Thebiggestproblemwas‘explaining’theunmistakableandunconcealablemovementoftroopsandequipmenttowardstheborders.FollowingtheSix-DayWarof1967theEgyptianshadbegun to fortify their side of theSuezCanal, a process that, although speededup from1972, was still slow enough to conceal its true potential from the Israelis. In lateSeptember troops and heavy equipment began to arrive under the cover of the annualautumn exercises, a common phenomenon.Confusion remained the hallmark, however.Ammunition was conspicuous by its apparent absence, but had actually been sentpreviously by rail at the time of theMay crisis and concealed in underground storagefacilities.Troopsweremovedforwardbydayandappearedtoreturntotheirbarracksatnight,butonlyhalftheunitswouldinfactreturn,thusconcealingthebuild-up.TakingaleafoutoftheIsraelis’book,specialbridgingequipmentwasbroughtforwardincratestohide its significance. Specialist equipment such as water cannon (with which to blastIsraelisandramparts–atechniquedevelopedduringtheconstructionoftheAswanDam)wasbroughtforwardonlyatthelastminute.

The‘exercises’wereconspicuouslyhighlightedinthepapers,anotherfactsuggestingtheyweredesignedfordomesticpoliticalconsumption.Atthesametimeradiotrafficwasblatantduringtheday,andthenwhenthe‘exercises’ended,communicationswerecarriedon by a secure landline system previously installed. Reservists were called up, but inanotherimitationofanIsraeliploytheywerealsoissueddemobilizationorders.AfurthersetoforderswasissuedallowingtroopstogoonaminorpilgrimagetomarkRamadan.Special ‘lazy squads’ saton the canalbank fishing,dangling their feet in thewater andeatingoranges,addingtothegeneralairofunconcern(andmilitaryinefficiency)thattheywished to convey to the Israelis. Security was tight, with operational orders not beingissued to the lower formations and individual units until forty-eight hours before thelaunch. The Israelis later discovered that more than eighty-five per cent of Egyptianscapturedhadnopriorknowledgeoftheplan.Onesoldiersaidtohisplatooncommanderastheypaddledacrossthecanal:‘So,we’renotgoingbacktobarrackstonightthen,Sir?’Others later claimed that the first they knew about it was the sight of their officerskneelingdown topray.37Despitehaving already fought threewars in twenty-fiveyearsandalongbuild-upoftension,theEgyptiansmanagedtoachievecompletesurpriseovertheIsraelis.

THEMASK:GERMANSPECIALFORCES,1940–44Adisguiseisthesimplestofdeceptions,butiscomplicatedinthemilitarybythedifficultyofgainingaccesstoenemyuniformsorequipment.Contrarytopopularbelief,thewearingof enemy uniforms is not prohibited by international law or Article 23 of the GenevaConvention,aslongastheyarediscardedbeforeopeningfire.38AmongthemostfamouspractitionersofthistypeofdeceptionweretheGermanAbwehr’sBrandenburgersoftheSecond World War. The Abwehr was originally the counter-espionage agency of theGerman Armed Forces High Command. (Under the terms of the Versailles TreatyGermanywasprohibited frommaintainingan intelligenceagency.) In1935KäpitanzurSeeWilhelmCanaris tookcharge,provinganablemanfor theintelligencerolethenew

NaziregimewishedtheAbwehrtofulfil.DuringthepreparationsforthePolishcampaignin1939,anorganizationalframeworkforallsortsofcovertactionwasrequiredandthisfelltotheAbwehr.ThesuccessofdisguisedPolish-speakingtroopsinthatcampaignledtotheformationinOctober1939ofBaulehrBataillonzbV800atBrandenburg/HavelinPrussia.Thisunit, involvedin‘constructiontrainingforspecialpurposes’,wasthebasisforthefamousBrandenburgers,whowerelaterexpandedtodivisionalsize,anddestroyedafter being reduced to fighting partisans in Russia. But not before it had been throughsomefamousexploits.39

Afteroperations inScandinavia inApril1940 theBrandenburgerswerefacedwithcriticalmissions in theplanfor the invasionof theLowCountries thefollowingmonth.Over the previouswinter and spring theGermans had spread amood of insecurity andconfusion throughout Europe through rumours of a large and highly organized ‘fifthcolumn’* of clandestine operatives deployed all across the countries they proposed toconquer.Although thesewereuntrue, thebeliefhelped stimulatepanic in the rear areasduringthecampaignofMayandJune1940,causingenormousproblemsfortheAllies.40At a press conference on 21 May 1940 the Dutch Foreign Minister claimed that theGermanshaddroppedparachutistsonRotterdamandTheHaguedressedasnuns,monks,nurses and tramcar conductors. It didnotoccur to anyone that thesewerepatently sillydisguisesfortroopsengagedinanopeninvasion.41Infact,theGermanforcesassignedtoconqueringtheNetherlandswererelativelyweakandbasedonairborneforceslandinginand around Rotterdam and The Hague. Two troop trains were to be rushed across toreinforcethemandwouldbefollowedbythesolepanzerdivisionassignedtothispartoftheoperation.ThismadethecaptureoftherailwaybridgeatGennep,whereitcrossestheRiver Maas from Goch heading towards the western Netherlands, of particularimportance.

Halfanhourbeforemidnighton9May,agroupofBrandenburgersslippedacrossthe frontier disguised asDutchmilitarypolicemen.Theywere ledby aDutch-speakingcorporal to the road linking the villages of Heien and Gennep and into the marshesbeyond.Atdawnthetwotroopsapproachedthebridge,andasagenuineDutchmilitarypolicemen tried to telephoneamessage thatGennep railwaystationwasunderattack,agroupofsixmenapproachedtheeasternendofthebridge,twodressedinDutchuniform,theothersinraincoats.Thesemen–allBrandenburgers–overpoweredtheDutchguards.Itwasnowtimetoseizethewesternendofthebridge.Atelephonecallwasmadetothewesternguardroomwiththemessagethattwomilitarypolicemenandfourprisonersweretobebroughtover.Thefour‘prisoners’werehandedoverinthemiddleofthe400-metrebridge.WhennewsoftheapproachoftheGermantrooptrainseventuallycamethrough,someDutchtroopsonthewestbanktried tosetupadefencewithasolitarygun,but itjammed after the first round and the ‘prisoners’ now overpowered their guards withconcealed weapons, not found in their perfunctory search when handed over. Caughtbetweenthe twofires, theremainingbridgeguardsurrendered,andsoonthemenof theGerman481stRegimentwerespeedingtheirwaythroughthePeeldefencelinetorelievethehard-pressedparachutistsinRotterdam.42

A particularly well-known deception involving disguise was wrought by theGermans during theirArdennes offensive inDecember 1944,OperationWATCH ON THE

RHINE.Specialteamsofsoldiersfrom150thPanzerBrigade,commandedbythenotoriousOttoSkorzeny,wouldbesentaheadofthemaincolumns,dressedinAmericanuniformsandmountedoncapturedAmericanvehicles to seizebridgesandsowconfusionamongtheAmericans inOperationGRIFFIN. Theywould plant rumours and issue false orders,changesignsandmarkersandremoveminefieldsignsandusethemtomarkfalsefields.43Volunteers were called for who could speak English, with emphasis on colloquialAmerican.However, fewwho turned up atGrafenwöhr for training had anythingmorethanthemostbasicknowledgeofthelanguage.Similarly,Skorzeny’srequestforuniformsand equipment yielded only a fraction of his requirements. The volunteerswere taughthowto loungearoundwith theirhands in theirpockets,howtochewgum,howto lighttheircigaretteslikeGIs,andtoreplytoachallengewith:‘Golayafuckingegg!’butideasof anymore practical trainingwere soonwritten off.Nevertheless, organizedmostly infour-manteamsknownasStielau(namedaftertheircommander)andoperatinginJeeps,theyfolloweduptheoffensivethatopenedon16December1944andswiftlypenetratedthecrumblingAmericanfront.44

Inmaterial terms they achieved little: of nineStielau teams, twowere interceptedquicklyandoneactuallyreachedtheRiverMeuse;theyturnedafewroadsignsaround,bluffedoneunit into leaving a village it held, cut telephonewires anddestroyed a fueldump.Oneteamwascourt-martialledandshot,whichoutragedSkorzeny,whoknewthatwearing the enemy’s clothing was not a capital offence unless accompanied by thecarryingofweapons.Whathedidnotknowwasthemenhadarrivedduringanalmightypanic over a supposed plot to kill the SupremeAlliedCommander,GeneralDwightD.Eisenhower, and theAmericanswere taking no chances.45 In this respect the Germanswon a victory. The news of clandestine squads driving all over the rear areas causedconsiderable fright. Montgomery had his tyres shot out by jumpy US guards anddemandedthatEisenhowergivehimanAmericanIDcardsohewouldnothavetowastetimetryingtorememberthenameofBettyGrable’shusbandeverytimehewasstopped.Brigadier-GeneralBruceClarke,commandingthedefenceofStVith,wasarrestedbyhisownmilitarypolice,whoabsolutelyrefusedtobelievehewasanAmericangeneral.‘WeweretoldtowatchoutforaKrautposingasaone-stargeneral,’theysaid.46

THEUNINTENTIONALMISTAKE:THE3RDBATTLEOFGAZA,1917One means of ‘planting’ information on an enemy is to pretend that it comes from adreadful error, act of foolishnessor incompetence. In late June1917,whenGeneralSirEdmundAllenbyarrivedtotakecommandoftheEgyptianExpeditionaryForce(EEF),theBritish and Commonwealth forces advancing on Palestine, the path to Jerusalem wasblocked by strong Turkish forces. Two previous attempts to take Gaza, in March andApril,hadfailedbloodily.AllenbythereforedecidedtoadoptwithminormodificationsaplandevelopedbyGeneralSirPhilipChetwodetochangethepointofattackfromGaza,inthenorth,toBeersheba,intheeast.Thedifficulties,particularlytheneedforthoroughlogistic preparation, could not hope to be concealed, and hopes for success rested onmisleadingtheTurksastothetiming,scaleanddirectionoftheattack.47TheTurkishandGerman commanders already believed Gaza the most logical point of attack, since itfollowedthemainlineofcommunication,minimizedwatersupplyproblemsandofferedthe prospect of naval co-operation.Allenby’s IntelligenceBranch therefore submitted a

plan that aimed to persuade the Turks that a third attack would be launched at Gaza,supportedbyafeinttotheeastatBeersheba–theoppositeoftherealplan.Preparationsforthisoperationbegantwomonthsbeforetheintendeddateofattack,andMajorRichardMeinertzhagenalsobeganbypreparingthe‘ground’onwhichhewouldsowtheseedsofdeceit.

Meinertzhagensenta letterandmoney to theTurkishspymaster, thankinghimforhis assistance, and ensured that itwent to theTurkish intelligence staff. The spymasterwasdulyshotasatraitorwithoutevenbeinginterrogated.HavingthuspreparedtheTurksforthestoryhewishedtotell,andafteranumberofunsuccessfulattempts,MeinertzhagenrodeoutintothedesertsupposedlyonapersonalreconnaissancenearBeershebauntilheencounteredaTurkishmountedpatrol,whichchasedand firedathim.Pretending tobewounded, he dropped a number of articles in the path of theTurks, including a pair ofbinoculars,awaterbottle,andahaversackpreviouslysmearedwithblood.Thiswas thereal core of the deception, sincewithin the haversackwere staff papers that implied anattackagainstGazawithBeershebaasa feint, anotebookdetailing transport,waterandsupply difficulties regarding the Beersheba area, and personal letters from officersstationedaroundBeershebasuggestingthatitwasamistaketochoosetoattackatGaza.

MeinertzhagenwasfairlysurethatinformationplantedinthiswaywouldberejectedbytheGermansandTurksandsodevisedvariousformsofcorroboration.Includedinthehaversack was a cipher book to enable the Turks to read British wireless traffic fromEgypt.Urgentinstructionsrelatingtothelosthaversackweresent,includinginstructionsforMeinertzhagentoreporttoGHQforacourtofinquiry,andwarninghimtoreturnintime for theattackon19November.AnArmynews sheet carriedonunobtrusive ‘lost’notice and routine unit orders alerting the rank and file to be on the lookout for thehaversack,andacopyofthenewssheetwas‘mislaid’intoTurkishhands.Searchesweremadeinthevicinity,whichledtounplannedcorroborationwhentwoBritishsoldierswerecaptured by the Turks. Unaware that it was a deception, they honestly (and thereforecredibly) informed their captors that theBritishheadquarters regarded it as adisaster.48Additionalmeasureswere alsoput inplace.Approximatelyonce a fortnight throughoutthe summer a cavalry reconnaissance would be made towards the Turkish positions atBeersheba,partlyaimedat lulling them intoexpectingonlydemonstrations in thatarea.The logistic preparations had to be conducted in great secrecy at night and carefullycamouflaged.Theseelementswerethengivenover tovisiblenavalpreparationsandtheregisteringofartillerytargetsintheGazaareaon27October.CampsnearGazawereleftstandingandlitatnightwhilethetroopsmovingeastwardwerecarefullyhidden.49

Although captured Turkish documents show that British claims for the deceptionwere somewhat exaggerated (theTurks correctly identifiedmany of theAllied changesandthegeneralmoveeastwards,anddiscountedthenavalthreatbehindGaza),theBritishnevertheless scored a notable success. Immediately before the attack they sawsignificantly increased defence work in front of Gaza and reduced work in front ofBeersheba. Even after the attack commenced on 31 October the German commander,Kress vonKressenstein, failed to believe the reports of its weight and refused to sendreinforcements.50Themainassaultwasentirelysuccessful,capturingimportantwellsandoutflanking the Gaza defences, which the Turks were forced to abandon in a hurry.

Allenby entered Jerusalemon 9December, thus fulfilling a promisemade to the primeminister,DavidLloydGeorge,ofJerusalemasaChristmaspresentfortheBritishpeople.AtthesametimehefulfilledanancientArabprophecythatagreatDeliverer,namedtheProphetofGod,wouldonedaydeliverthemfromtheyokeofTurkishrule.Afterall,theBritish commander’s name could be translated as Allah-en-Nebi (‘Prophet of God’);certainlytheArabslikedtothinkso.

THEPIECEOFBADLUCK:‘THEMANWHONEVERWAS’ThePieceofBadLuckstratagemisavariationontheUnintentionalMistakeinsofarasitaimstosuggestthatapieceofinformationhasbeenlostnotthroughincompetencebutbyaccident ormischance.One exampleof the strategem,OperationMINCEMEAT, is amongthemostfamousofalldeceptionoperations,butitwasinfactonlypartofamuchlargerplan code-namedBARCLAY,whichwas designed to convince theGermans that the nextAllied objective following theNorthAfricanCampaign in 1943would be theBalkans,rather than Sicily. The credit for the part played in BARCLAY by MINCEMEAT must besharedbyLieutenant-CommandertheHon.EwenMontaguRNVR(whowrotethefamousaccount of the story, The Man Who Never Was) and Flight-Lieutenant CharlesCholmondleyRAFofBla.51The idea arose from the crashon29September1942of aBritishaircraftoffthecoastofSpain.Abodyhadbeenwashedashorecarryingdocumentswhich the Spanish authorities hadmade available to theAbwehr. The documentswereunimportant,butitoccurredtoCholmondleythatadeceptionmightbewroughtbysimilarmeans. Having secured the body of a young man in his thirties who had died ofpneumonia,thedistinguishedLondonpathologistSirBernardSpilsburyassuredMontaguthat a Spanish postmortem would not detect that the man had not died following anaircraftaccidentatsea.Whenitwaspointedoutthatthebodywasnotandneverhadbeenveryfit,Montaguassuredaseniorofficerthat‘hedoesnothavetolooklikeanofficer–onlyastaffofficer.’52

OperationMINCEMEATwasnowset inmotion.TheHydrographerof theNavywasconsultedandHuelvachosenasthespotbestsuitedforcurrentstodeliverthebody;theGermanswerealsoknown tohaveahighlycompetentvice-consul there.Thebodywasgiventhenotional identityofMajorMartin,RoyalMarines, ‘serving’on thestaffof theChiefofCombinedOperations,Vice-AdmiralLordLouisMountbatten.His identitywascarefullycrafted.Hewasprovidedwithabriefcasecontainingthreedocuments,includingletters fromMountbatten justifying his making the journey in person and a CombinedOperations special pass. He was also given personal items such as a letter from his‘father’,whichMontagu described as so redolent of Edwardian pomposity that nobodycouldhaveinventedit.53Butcrucially,iftheGermanHighCommandwastobepersuadedto act, then it would need to be provided with a document at a sufficiently high-levelpassingbetweenofficerswhowouldunquestionablyknowtheAllies’trueplans.Thiswasto be a letter from theVice-Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff,General SirArchibaldNye, to the commander of 18th Army Group, General Sir Harold Alexander. It wascarefullydraftedin‘oldboy’style,andfinallyapprovedon13April1943.ItindicatedthattheAllieswereplanninganattackonGreeceunderthecode-nameHUSKY(thecode-nameforthegenuineoperationplannedagainstSicily).PlayingonHitler’scongenitalobsessionwith the Balkans, it used the Dodecanese as cover, with General Sir Henry Maitland

Wilsonasthenominatedcommander.TheDodecanesehadalreadybeenbuiltupascoverforpreviousoperationsandawholeseriesofindicatorsalreadygeneratedtosuggestthisscenario.

Onthenightof30AprilHMSubmarineSeraphfloatedMajorMartinandacapsizedrubber dinghy ashore,wherehewas discoveredby local fishermen at 0930hours.TwoWestEndtheatreticketsshowedthathecouldnothaveleftLondonbeforethe23rd.TheBritish naval attaché in Madrid made urgent representations for his return while theSpanishauthoritiesmadetheirinvestigations.BythetimethebodywasturnedovertotheBritish, thecontentsof thebriefcasehadbeenphotographedandhanded to theAbwehr.MajorMartinwasgivenaChristianburialwithfullmilitaryhonoursandtheprogressofthe documents through theGerman chainwas followedwith interest by theBritish viaSIGINT. The Abwehr reported to Oberkommando derWehrmacht (OKW), the SupremeCommand of theGermanArmed Forces, that the body and its circumstances appearedgenuine and on 12May theWehrmachtführungsstab (OKWOperations Section) issuedinstructions that the greatest threatswere to the Peloponnese and Sardinia and that ‘anabsolutelyreliablesource’indicatedlandingswereimminentintheareasofKalamataandCapeAraxos.54 By the time the Allies landed on Sicily on 10 July only two GermandivisionswereavailabletoassisttheItaliansinitsdefence.Itwouldberash,however,tosuggest this was entirely due to deception measures, since Hitler was already wary ofItalianintentionsandunwillingtorisktroopsgettingcaughtupinageneralsurrenderbyhiserstwhileallies.55

THELURE:8THTACTICALFIGHTERWING,USAF,1967The lure is an ancient tactic particularly suited to creating ambushes.Although closelyassociatedwith irregular or guerrilla warfare, it is by nomeans restricted to it. As theUnitedStatesAirForce(USAF)demonstrated,itcanbeappliedtothehigherreachesoftechnology.WhentheVietnamWarintensifiedin1965,itbecamenecessaryfortheUSAFto develop electronic counter-measure (ECM) equipment and evasive flying tactics tocountertheSoviet-suppliedFansongradars,whichacquiredtargetsfortheSA-2Guidelinesurface-to-airmissile(SAM).ThemostsignificantdevelopmentfromthatconflictprovedtobespecializedairborneECMunitsknownas‘WildWeasels’.

The F-4 Phantom fighters of 8th Tactical FighterWing – the ‘Wolfpack’ – weredeployed to Thailand in December 1965 as part of the USAF’s ROLLING THUNDERbombingcampaign,initiallytoprovideescorttothebomb-ladenandvulnerableRepublicF-105‘Thuds’.BythefollowingSeptembertheyhadenjoyedconsiderablesuccessagainstNorthVietnameseMiG-17s,buttheNorthVietnamesebegantodeployMiG-21sequippedwithAtollair-to-airmissiles,whichposedaconsiderablygreaterthreat.Arisingtollwasbeingextractedonthebombers(the‘Thud’wasobsolescent)andPhantomshadtopulloutoftheprogrammetoprovidecombatairpatrols.TheentireROLLINGTHUNDERprogrammewas verymuch a political one, instigated byPresidentLyndonB. Johnson, and despiterepeatedUSAFrequeststobeallowedtoattacktheNorthVietnameseairfieldsnearHanoiandHaiphong,theseremainedoutofboundstoAmericanbombingattacks.Thereforetheonlyopportunitytomeetthemwasintheair.

InDecember 1966 the commanding officer of 8th Tactical FighterWing,Colonel

RobinOlds,wascalledtoHeadquartersSeventhAirForcetodiscusstheproblem.Itwasdecided toconductanoffensivefightersweep tobring theNorthVietnamesefighters tobattleunderconditions favourable to theAmericans.Thisplan,namedOperationBOLO,wouldbecarriedoutbyusingastrongforceofPhantomstosimulateabombingmissionofF-105 ‘Thuds’ and lure the enemy into intercepting them.ThePhantomswould thenrelyontheirsuperioravionicsandradarorinfra-redguidedmissilestoengagetheenemy,avoidingifatallpossibletheclose-indogfightingthatwastheMiGs’speciality.Fortheraid to appear genuine on enemy radars, the Phantoms had to adopt the same speeds,altitudes,approachroutes,tankerrendezvouspointsandrefuellingheightsoverLaosasareal bombingmission.56 To enhance the effect, the bogus strike force, known asWestForce,adoptedthesamecallsignsandcommunicationsproceduresasthe‘Thuds’andwasfittedwithECMpods,whichatthetimeonlytheF-105scarried.OncetheMiGshadbeendrawn into a fight, their normal escape route into Chinawould be blocked by anotherfighter formation,knownasEastForce,providedby366thTFW.The ‘TimeonTarget’wascarefullyplannedsothatthePhantomswouldarriveinwaveseveryfiveminutesforalmostanhourover theenemyairfields,whichwas theMiGs’estimatedenduranceandwouldgive themno respite.Further supportcame from tankers, specialistECMaircraftandotherfightersoverLaos.57

The operation was complicated, but although the scheduled day – 2 January –providedonlypoorweatherconditionsthatwouldhampertheAmericansandgivecovertotheNorthVietnameseovertheirairfields,itwasdecidedtoproceed.OldsledhisflightoverPhucYenataround1500hoursbuttheNorthVietnamesewereinitiallyslowtoreact.Ittooktwomajorsweepsbeforearadarcontactwasconfirmedandthisaircraftrefusedtoventurethroughthecloudcover.Athirdsweepprecipitatedthebattle,however,bywhichtime a secondWolfpack flight had arrived underColonelDaniel ‘Chappie’ James,whocalled urgently: ‘Olds, you haveMiGs at your six o’clock!’ Breaking to his left, OldsallowedhisthirdandfourthflightcrewstodealwiththisthreatwhilehepursuedaMiGthat popped out of the cloud at his eleven o’clock position. It immediately retreated,followedbytwoair-toairmissiles.ThenanotherMiGappearedfurthertohisleftaboutamile and a half away, which he caught and downed with a Sidewinder heat-seekingmissile.Meanwhile,Olds’numbertwohaddestroyedasecondMiGandhisnumberthreeanother,roughlysimultaneously,whileoneofJames’flightaccountedforafourth.

BynowtheskywasfilledwithwheelingjetsaswellastheadditionaldangerofSA-2 missiles. Olds and James were now running short of fuel and turned to disengage,leaving the battle to Captain John B. Stone’s flight. Stone arrived over Phuc Yen atapproximately1510hourswith threeotherPhantomsand thesemanaged toshootdownanotherthreeMiGsbeforeturningforhome.InunderaquarterofanhoursevenMiG-21s(amountingtonearlyhalfthetotalpossessedbyNorthVietnameseAirForceatthetime)hadbeendestroyedfornoloss,afeatmadeallthemoreremarkablebecauseonlythreeoutof fourteen flights had been able to engage in the cloudy conditions.58 Another smallsuccess was gained four days later by simulating weather reconnaissance aircraft, butthereaftertheUSAFhadtorelyonmorestandardescortandcombatairpatroltacticstobringtheNorthVietnamesetobattle.

THEDOUBLEBLUFF:HANNIBALANDTHEBURNINGBRANDS

Doublebluffcanberegardedaseitherthedeceiver’ssalvationorhisnightmare.59Topulloffadoublebluffthedeceivermustbeveryconfident,orperhapsdesperate.Thereisnomoredifficultdeception,andinordertosucceed,itprobablyrequiresmoreaccurateanddetailedintelligenceofthetarget’smindsetthananyother.Butifsuccessful,thedeceivercanreaptherewardswhilethedeceivedisbusycongratulatinghimselfonhisclevernessatspottingadeception.

Having suffered terrible defeat at the hands ofHannibal at theRiver Trebbia andLakeTrasimene,theRomansinvestedthepowersofDictatorinQuintusMaximusFabius,ashrewdandcarefulgeneralwhowasnicknamed‘theDelayer’.FabiusfoundHannibalinApuliaandcampedsixmilesaway,keepingtheCarthaginianatarm’slength.Fabiushadthe advantage of a larger army with ample provisions, while Hannibal’s forces weredispersed inforagingparties.Fabiuswascriticizedfornotattacking,butpartofhisaimwas to overawe Rome’s allies, who were wavering in their commitment to her. TheApulians remained loyal as a consequence and Hannibal was forced to cross theApenninestowardstheBayofNaples,shadowedallthetimebyFabius,whokepttothehigh ground and refused to be drawn into action, either by the exhortations of hissubordinatesorbyHannibal’seffortstoprovokehim.

Eventually, they reached theheights ofMountMassicus and, asLivydescribes it,looked down upon ‘the most delightful country in Italy… being consumed by fire’.60Although his subordinates were horrified by his reluctance to attack Hannibal, Fabiusremainedunmoved.HehadactedverycleverlysinceHannibalcouldnothope tospendthewinter inCampaniawith no towns under his control, and hewould have to retreatacross the mountains the way he had come, taking with him the vast quantities ofplunderedfood,includingthousandsofcattle.Havingdetailed4,000mentoholdthepass,Fabius encamped his main force on a nearby hill overlooking the approach road andwithinreachoftheimportantLatinWay.

OneeveningFabiuswasarousedfromhisslumbertoseethousandsoflightsonthehillsides,apparentlyheadingforanescapethroughthehillsbesidethepass.Minucius,theMasterofHorseandsecondincommand,demandedthatthearmyberousedandmovedto the footof thepass toblockHannibal’s escape.Fabius suspected that itwas anotherPunic trick and refused to be drawn, saying that the force stationed to guard the passwould dealwith thismovement, as the lightsmovedup and over the crest. Fabiuswasright: itwas a trick, but one thatwas intended to be seen as a trick andFabiuswas itsvictim.61 The troops guarding the pass, however, thought the Carthaginians had foundsomeway to outflank them and rushed up the hill to find the ‘escapingCarthaginians’wereactuallysome2,000oxenselectedfromthevastherdoflootedcattle,withburningbrands ofwood and dried grass tied to their horns, andwhichHannibal’s pioneers haddrivenuptheslope.AstheRomansmilledaroundamongthecattle,theyweresuddenlyattacked by a small force of Carthaginian light pikemen who took advantage of theshadows to cut them down, now leaderless and unable to operate in their usual closeformation. A surge of the cattle then separated them and they waited for the dawn,uncertain ofwhatwas happening. Down in the now unguarded pass,Hannibal and hisarmy, loadedwith the spoils ofCampania,marched unmolested and campedon the farside.AtfirstlightHannibaldispatchedacontingentofSpanishmountaintroopswhofell

upon theRomans,killing about1,000before extracting themselves and thepikemen. 62Notonlyhadthisrusedrawnofftheguardatthepass,butHannibalknewhisopponent:wherehispreviousRomanadversarieshadbeenrash,headstrongandimpetuous,Fabiuswascautiousandcanny.HannibalwasconfidentthatFabiuswouldrefusetobedrawnattheonetimewhenitwasnecessarytoactpromptly.

5

TacticalandOperationalDeception

MALCOLM:

Leteverysoldierhewhimdownabough,Andbear’tbeforehim;therebyshallweshadowThenumbersofourhostandmakediscoveryErrinreportofus.

Macbeth,ActV,Sc.4

TACTICAL DECEPTION IS very often the product of necessity and quick thinking. At theBattle of Brandywine in 1777 the 15th Regiment of Foot earned the nickname ‘theSnappers’: theyconsigned theirsmallsupplyofballammunition to thebestshotswhilethe restof theunit ran from tree to tree, ‘snapping’at theenemywithblankchargesofpowderuntilreinforcementsarrived.1OntheTunisianFrontin1943anuncodedGermanradiomessagewasinterceptedcallingforairsupportonaBritishpositionatagiventime,andstating that the targetwouldbe indicatedwithcolouredsmoke.BritishartillerywasregisteredonanearbyGermanstrongpointandwhentheStukadive-bombersarrivedontime, it was this that they found ringed with smoke. The Stuka attack proved veryeffective.2

Attheverylowest levelofwarthesoldiershouldbeagoodshotandabadtarget.Theprimeexampleisthesniper,whoseartcameofageduringtheFirstWorldWar.Quiteapartfromrequiringsuperbskillatarms,thesniperisalsotrainedtothehighestdegreeinfieldcraft–theabilitytomoveandoperatewithoutbeingseen.Individualcamouflageistaken to its limitwith such items as the ‘ghillie suit’ a camouflage suit that covers thewholebody.Muchofthesniper’sworkinvolvesdetailedobservationandthecollectionofinformation. During the FirstWorldWar the Lovat Scouts (Sharpshooters) were raisedfrom among the Highland gamekeepers (ghillies) of Lord Lovat’s Scottish estates.Originally intended as marksmen, their observational skills were such that they wereemployedtowatchandreportonGermanpositionsandtroopmovementsdeepbehindthefront lines.3 However, snipers have always been regarded with ambivalence by othersoldiers,whoaresometimeshappytoseesniperskilledevenwhenfromtheirownside.Naturally,enemysnipersareprime targetsandat this lowestandmostpersonal levelofwarfare,deceptionplaysaconsiderablepart.

A common response to snipers is the creation of decoys to draw their fire. TheSpecialWorksParkmadepapiermâchéheadsforthistask,butsuchrefinementsarenotalways available. Sergeant Quinn of 1st Airborne Division Reconnaissance Squadron,defending the Oosterbeek perimeter during the Battle of Arnhem in September 1944,constructed adecoyout of apillow, a steel helmet and abroomstick, and exposed it atvarious places and at different times along his unit’s section of the perimeter. It neverfailed to provoke a German sniper into giving away his position and its skilfulemploymentaccounted,itwasclaimed,forseventeenoreighteenoftheenemy.4In1917theSpecialWorksParkevenproducedasetof life-sizedummyfiguresoutofplywood,which could be raised on top of the trench parapet in twos and threes as required and

dropped again, verymuch like targets on a range. Seen through the smoke and dust ofbattletheycouldcreatetheillusionofanattackbeinglaunched.ThefigureswereusedatMessinesRidge in June 1917, by 46th (NorthMidland)Division, as distractions in so-called ‘Chinese attacks’, and again during the breakthrough at Cambrai the followingNovember.5Thesametacticwasusedby9thAustralianDivisionatElAlameinin1942.

ATTACK:LEPLESSISGRIMAULT

Withmodernweaponsmakingcamouflageandconcealmentessential,deceptionhascometopermeate everyphaseofwar at the tactical level.Adeceptionmayneed towork foronly a fewminutes in order to give one side a crucial advantage, and the complicatedintelligenceprocessthatinvolvessignalsinterceptandaerialphotographyisunlikelytobeofimmediateconcerntothosepersonallyengagedinfightingabattle.

Dependingon thenatureof themission,acommandermightchoose to implementanynumberofmeasures togainanadvantage.Inattack,forexample,hemightconductcovert reconnaissance of the real objective while making a more obvious recce of adiversionary one.Hemight construct an obviously dummybridge on the real approachrouteandconductartillerytargetregistrationonthediversionaryobjective.Troopsmightmoveforwardduring thedayand thenbeswitchedatnight.Dustcouldbe raisedandacontrolled breach of radio security might be permitted in a false concentration area,although at the tactical level things tend to be much simpler. The use of feints anddemonstrations isverycommonsinceone is likely tobesoclose to theenemypositionthat these are likely to gain his attention. Smoke and artillery can be used to maskmovementor indeed the lackof it, inorder todraw thedefenders’ attentionaway fromgenuinepreparations.

During theNormandy campaign in the SecondWorldWar,whenAmericanThirdArmybroke through atAvranches to pour first south and then east behind theGermanSeventhandFifthPanzerArmies,Hitler’s insistence therebenoretreathelped tocreatethe Falaise pocket, in which these German armies became trapped. The failure of thecounter-attack at Mortain further drew the defenders into a sack and the two daysbeginningon6Augustsealedthefateof theGermansinNormandy.Drivingsouth-east,American columnsmetwith little resistance, but on the flanks of theMortain salient aframeworkofhedgerowsallowedtheGermanstomountaskilful,coherentandstubborndefence. The commander of Fifth Panzer Army, General der Panzertruppen HansEberbach, finallyabandoned to theBritish the ruinedvillagesofVillers-Bocage,AunayandEvrécyandtheareanorthofMontPinçon,toformanewdefensivelineincorporatingthemountainandstilldisputingeveryinchofground.6

Mont Pinçon is the highest point in Normandy and formed a vital hinge in theGermandefences.Itscapturewasabrilliantfeatofendurancebymenof43rd(Wessex)Division.At thefootof thehill to thesouth-west lies thevillageofLaVarinière,whichcontainsanimportantcrossroadsthroughwhichtheassaulttroopshadpassedandwhichremained under heavy shellfire. On the southern side lies the village of Le PlessisGrimault,intowhichnofewerthansevenroadsfeedincludingthemainroadfromAunay,alongwhich7thArmouredDivisionwaspushingsouthtowardsCondé-sur-Noireau.7The5thBn,DukeofCornwall’sLight Infantry,was resting in reserveon theafternoonof7

August1944,fourmilesfromMontPinçonwithscoutsandcarriersforwardattemptingtolocate the enemy. Late in the afternoon the commander of 214th Infantry Brigade,BrigadierPeterEssame,arrivedtoinformLieutenant-ColonelGeorgeTaylorthathewasto capture Le Plessis Grimault in order to open 7th Armoured Division’s axis. Theyimmediately set out to recce the objective before it became too dark and crawled to apositionontopofMontPinçontoobservethevillage.

Taylorwasdeterminednottorepeatthefrontalassaulttacticsthathadrecentlycosthisbattaliontwentydeadandsixty-ninewoundedinaday’sfightingatJurques,whentheyhad run into unexpected enemy armour. In his memoirs he recounts how detailedinformationabouttheenemytohisdirectfrontwasrarelyavailable,anddescribesinfantrytacticsasbeinglikethoseof‘apolicemantacklingadesperatemaninadarkroom–onehad to findhim firstwithonehandbeforehittinghimwithabaton’.8Consequently,hedevised a plan for a silent night attack by his A Company, closely supported by DCompanyandwithCandBCompaniesheldwellbacktoprovideapowerfulreserveandmaintainflexibility.Meanwhile,theattachedBSquadron,4th/7thRoyalDragoonGuards,wouldmakeanoisydemonstration from thedirectionofLaVarinière.Theywere tobesupportedbyablockbarrage firedby three fieldandonemediumregimentof artillery,togetherwithmortarsandmediummachine-gunscoveringtherightflank.Theaimwastodraw the enemy’s fire, particularly that of his artillery andmortars, andwhen the tanksquadroncommanderaskedforacompanyofinfantryinsupport,Taylorrefused.Instead,he allotted a platoon since the armour would be relatively safe from indirect fire, butinfantryincompanystrengthwouldbeveryvulnerabletoit.

Once the brigadier had accepted the plan and departed to co-ordinate the support,Taylorgavehisorders tohis companycommanders’ and as the light faded theymovedthrough high bracken and birch trees over the crest of the hill. The artillery barragecommencedat2130hoursandthetanks,withtheirsupportingplatoonfromCCompanywelldispersedamong them,advancedalong theaxisof the road fromLaVarinièreandopened firewith theirmachine-guns.Bynow itwasdark,with light signalsbeing firedfromthevillageandstreamsof tracerandheavymortar firebeingdirectedat the tanks,butanammunitionstore thenexploded. ‘Thismagnificentbonfireactedasabeaconforthe attack’, recalls Taylor, and with the plan working, A Company was able to movesilentlyandunobservedinto thenorthernedgeof thevillage.Asthemenwaitedfor thebarragetolift,theyheardtheunmistakablerattleoftanktracks.Thecompanycommander,HarryParker,somewhatoptimisticallybroughtatwo-inchmortarintoaction,andthehugeexplosionthatfollowedshowedthatithadhitanammunitionlorrythatwasintheprocessofreplenishingtheenemytanks.

Parkerthenlaunchedhiscompanyinanencirclingattack,withoneplatoonattackingeithersideandthethirddownthecentreofthevillagealongthemainstreet.Anhourlateritwas all over; theGermans had been overwhelmed before they couldmount effectiveresistanceandwere shaken to find themselves suddenlyattacked fromall sidesat closequarters.Thegarrisonhadcomprisedtworiflecompaniesand,apartfromthirty-onedeadandmanywounded,yielded125prisonersand the tank, foracost to theBritishof twodead, fivewounded and onemissing.Harry Parker described it as a ‘sweet battle’ andTaylor,whowasawardedtheDistinguishedServiceOrderasaresultofthisaction,laterchristened itOperationMATADOR, likening the tanks to thecloakand the infantry to the

sword.9 During the Falklands Conflict almost forty years later 2nd Bn, Scots Guards,mountedasimilarnightattackatMountTumbledown,usingafeintbyonecompanyandsome light armour from the LifeGuards before eventually taking the positionwith thebayonet.

Obstaclecrossingisadifficultenoughoperation,asCaesarfound,butinthefaceofopposition it can be horrendously costly or even fail. In such circumstances deceptionbecomesyetmoreimportant.Thetechniquesareverysimilartothoseofbreachingaline(after Marlborough at the non plus ultra), where a demonstration or a feint maysufficientlyweakenthedefencesatthechosenpointtoeffectthecrossing.Thusmeasuresfor obstacle crossingmight includemoving amphibious engineers up by day through aflanking formation and switching them laterally by night, and routing support andengineertrafficviadeceptionroutesbyday,ostentatiousreconnaissanceofothercrossingsites,simulationofcrossingsawayfromtheactualsiteanduseofadeceptionfireplan.Insuch circumstances use of airborne troops can be very effective in creating diversions.Indeed,judicioususeofsmallforcesinthiswaycanbeveryeffectiveinfixingtheenemyandachievingabroaderaim.Thelastexploitof2ndParachuteBrigadeduringtheItaliancampaign tookplaceon1 June1944,when threeofficersand fifty-sevenmen from6th(RoyalWelch)Bn,ParachuteRegiment,weredroppedanhourbefore last lightwith thetaskofpreventingtheGermans(whowereintheprocessofwithdrawingfromthePisa–RiminiLine)fromcarryingoutlarge-scaledemolitions.Thedropwasdeliveredperfectlyon difficult ground and in daylight, and in order to disguise the small size of the forceBrigadier C.H.V. Pritchardmade extensive use of dummy parachutists. TheGermansweretrickedintobelievingafargreaterforcehadactuallybeenemployedandasaresultmoved a regiment to deal with the perceived threat to their communications; anotherGermandivisionwasforcedtoremaininitslocationratherthanbeingbroughtforwardtoreinforcethetroopsinthefrontline,whichwasthenheavilyengagedwithEighthArmy.10

DEFENCE:THEEASTERNFRONTANDSOUTH-EASTASIADURINGTHESECONDWORLD

WAR

In defensive operations deception serves to blunt the enemy’s attack by diffusing hisenergy onto false objectives and to create conditions for the defender to return to theoffensive. The first aim is to divert enemy recce and electronic warfare effort towardsunproductive areas through counter-surveillance measures, so that the enemy cannotidentify key assets such as artillery and command and communications facilities. Butdeceptioncanalsoprotectkeylogisticassetsandmainsupplyroutes,vitalifoneislatertoreturn to the offensive.As far as defensive battle itself is concerned, deception aims toforce theenemyontogroundofone’sownchoosingand tomake theenemydeployhisforces, especially his artillery, prematurely. By concealing crucialmoves – such as thedirectionandtimingofcounter-attacks–thedefendercaninducetheenemytodeployhisreservesawayfrompositionswheretheycouldinfluencethebattle.

Passivemeasurestoachievesurpriseindefenceareessential,ifonlytoavoidthefulleffectsofenemyartilleryandairpower.Avoidingobviouspositions,particularlythefrontedgesofvillagesandwoods,andseekingthereverseslopesofhillsanddefiladepositions(enabling the defender to bring fire to bear of an attacker’s flank) should be combinedwith the careful camouflage and concealment of all vehicles, trooppositions and stores

(particularly, in modern warfare, against thermal imaging devices). Passive measuresincludetheminimumuseofradioandpreferablytheimpositionofradiosilenceandotheremission controlmeasures: even today field telephones greatly enhance the security ofcommunications.Allmovement,particularlyofreconnaissanceandworkparties,mustbeplanned with concealment in mind. A deception plan should always be considered toreinforce these passive measures, although it is likely to be limited by time restraints:beforeconsideringcreatingdummypositionsadefensivepositionmustbesecuredand,ifpossible, the troops dug in. To succeed, the plan must have a clearly established aim,whichmay includedrawing enemy fire ontounoccupied areas or dummypositions andencouragingtheenemytowastetimeandammunition(andtoexposehimselfneedlessly)bydeployingtoattacksuchpositions.Thesimulationofacrediblealternativetopartorallofthedefensiveplan,forexamplebycreatingafalsefront,mayencouragetheenemytoreactinthisway.

Like all deception plans, those for a defensive position must be centrally co-ordinated. The over-riding principle should be to hidewhat is real and displaywhat isfalse. Althoughmajor facilities and operational positionsmay need special camouflagestoresandmeasuresundertakenbyengineers, it isotherwisesurprisingwhata fewmencan achieve, even today. ‘Trenches’ need only be a foot deep provided the bottoms arelinedwithbranches,andproveveryeffectiveifradarreflectorstorecreatevehicles,heatand smell sources and a smattering of the usual impedimenta are left lying around.However, no dummy position is going to hold up an enemy for ever unless he is verytimid,likeMcClellanatYorktown.

During the SecondWorldWar theGermanswere nevermuch impressedwith thequalityof theSovietmilitarysystem,butSovietdeceptionschemeswentfarbeyondtheconcealmentanddeceptioninherentintheGermans’owncamouflagetechniques.11Intheearlystageofthewar,whentheywereusuallygoingforward,GermantroopsoperatingontheEasternFrontoftenfounditdifficulttolocateSovietdefensivepositions.Patrolsandvanguardunitswouldbeallowedtopassthroughapparentlyuninhabitedregionsonlyfordefences of up to regimental strength to be revealed to themain body.12 FriedrichvonMellenthin,aformerGermanstaffofficer,wrotethat:

TheRussiansoldierisapastmasterofcamouflage,ofdiggingandshovelling,andofbuildingearthworks.In an incredibly short time, he literally disappears into the ground, digging himself in and makinginstinctiveuseoftheterraintosuchanextentthathispositionsarealmostimpossibletolocate…Evenafterlongandcarefulscanning,it isoftenimpossibletodetecthispositions.Oneisadvisedtoexerciseextremecaution,evenwhentheterrainisreputedlyfreeoftheenemy.13

Later in the war the Germans often found themselves responsible for defending vastfrontageswithveryfewmen.Onedifficultywasdecidingwhether toformacontinuousline or concentrate in strongpoints. The strongpoints would afford closer control andgreater strength but leave dangerous gaps. A continuous line on the other hand,wouldmakeSovietinfiltrationmoredifficultandreducelossesfromconcentratedartilleryfire.14

Over the course of the war the Germans became increasingly adept at defensivetactics. Partly because of heavy manpower losses they retained a high proportion ofautomatic and heavy weapons. It was therefore common to hold an outpost line verythinly, to act as a ‘tripwire’ on the attackers–making themdeploy too soon andwaste

artilleryandothersupportona thinlyheldcrust,before tryingto throwtheenemybackwithcounter-attacks.Germanmachine-gunsusedtobecontinuallyswitchedtoalternativepositionsassoonastheyhadfired,partlybecausethishelpedpreventtheirdestructionbyenemy fire but also because it acted to deceive the enemy as to the strength and truedispositionofthedefendingforce.15

Artillery batteries are vulnerable to counter-battery fire but positioning in reverseslopes and among buildings assists their ability to survive. The careful siting of radiosclear of the position (to hinder enemy direction-finding), camouflage and concealmentalsohelptopreventenemyacquisition,asdofalsegunpositionsandammunitiondumps.GHQnotedas longagoas1918that therealvalueofdummybatterypositionswasnotfully recognized: in order to succeed, theymust be planned very thoroughly to presentsubtlyalltheindicationsofagenuinebattery,includingblastmarksandtracks.Adummypositionshouldbelocatedasclosetotherealoneasisconsistentwithsecurity,andtracksmaybeusedforboth.Ifthedummypositionisunsuccessfulassuch,itcanstillactasanalternativefiringposition.16‘Firing’canbesimulatedtodeceiveenemysoundlocatorsbyplacing charges a metre off the ground. Flash simulators should also be used. JasperMaskelynelearnedhowtomakeperfectflashsimulatorsfor25-poundersintheWesternDesert.Unfortunately,therewerenoscalestobefoundinthatpartofNorthAfrica,soheand his men had to measure everything with spoons. Four teaspoons of blackpowderwouldcreatethesmoke,sixdessertspoonsofaluminiumpowdertheflash,andateaspoonofironfilingstheredflame.Differingquantitiescouldbeusedfordifferent-sizedguns.17In order to retain credibility, dummies also need tomove regularly and bemixedwithsomerealgunssothatatleastafewroundslandattheotherend.

In the jungles ofBurma and on the coral atolls of thewestern Pacific, unlike thesteppesofUkraineordesertsofNorthAfrica,visibilityisverylimited.DuringtheSecondWorldWaranAmericancombatpatrolonMakinAtollwaspinneddownbyaJapanesesniper. AnAmerican scout worked his way forward towhere he could see the enemy,crouching in a tree.Carefully, he took aim and fired.The sniper tumbled from the treewithlimbsflailing.Asthescoutraisedhimselftosignalhiscomrades,hewascutdownbya burst ofmachine-gun fire. Later his friends found his target,made of clay and palmleaves, dressed in an old jacket and peaked cap and armedwith awooden pole.18 TheJapaneseweresoadeptatsuchruses thatatfirst theycompletelybaffledtheAmericansandBritish.Their ability togetbehindblockingpositionsandcreatediversionsof theirownwasespeciallyeffectiveinMalayaagainsttheBritish,whoweretiedtotheroadsandmanyofwhosetroopswere infactpoorly trainedandunenthusiasticIndians.Itwasnotlong,however,beforethestrategicinitiativepassedtotheAllies,firsttotheAmericansinthePacific following theBattle ofMidway and later to theBritish inBurma, after twoyears’bitterfightingfollowinganabortiveattemptbytheJapanesetoinvadeIndia.

Many of the places where the Allies fought the Japanese consist of steep razor-backedridgescoveredwithdenseforest.Heretheopportunitiesfordisplaywerenaturallyvery limited,but indefenceJapanese infantrywereexpertatconcealment.Their jacketsoftenhadavarietyof loopsandpockets sewnonto the reverse side toenabledgrassorbranches tobe stuffed into them.Theycunninglyplacedbunkerson the topsor reverseslopesofhills.Thesewere immenselystrong,constructedfromlogsandextremelywell

camouflagedwithgrassandmoss,occasionallyusingnets,butseldomvisiblefrommorethan fiftymetresaway.And theywereequallyadeptatconcealing importantequipmentsuchasaircraft,usingavarietyofdecoysandotherdevices.19Similarly,dummyfiguresandweaponswouldbesetuptodrawfireandgivefalseimpressionsofstrength.Ontheotherhand,thenatureoftheterrainprovidedgoodopportunitiesforsonicdeception:theJapanesewereveryfondofshoutingfalseordersinEnglishorUrduinordertopersuadetroopstosurrender.Otherruseswerebrutallylethal.DeadandwoundedtroopswouldbeusedasbaittoluremoremenintothearcsofJapanesemachine-guns,andextensiveusewasmadeofexplosionsontherearandflanksoftheenemy,usingChinesefirecrackersifnothingelsewasavailable.20Theywerequitepreparedtodigpositionswiththefiringslitspointingbackwardsand to lie lowwhileanattackmovedpastbefore taking it from therear.GuileanddeceptionwereasmuchapartofeverydaylifeinthePacificandSouth-EastAsiantheatresasthemud,theheatandtheinsects.

RELIEFINPLACE:THEHOOK,KOREA

Ifaunitorformationspendsanylengthoftimeinadefensiveposition,itwillneedtoberelievedatsomepointinordertoavoidexhaustion,especiallyifithassufferedsignificantcasualties. Relief in place is the measure by which all or part of a unit or formationoccupyingapieceofgroundisreplacedbyanotherforcewhowilladoptresponsibilityforit.However, themovementsof two forces into andout of the samearea is obviously arisky one,which the enemymightwell seek to exploit andwhich provides himwith aparticularlygoodartillery target.Security is therefore essential, anddeceptionmeasurescancontributegreatlytoit.Co-operationbetweenthetwodefensiveforcesisparamountandcommandmustbeclearlydelineated, especially thepoint atwhich thehandoverofcommandisactuallymade.

Deceptionmay include thesimulationofnormalactivitybycontinuedradio trafficfromtheoutgoingforce,includingtheretentionofoperatorsfromtheoutgoingforceuntilthereliefiscomplete.Atthesametimeradiosilenceshouldbeimposedontheincomingforce.Normaladministrativeandpatrolactivityshouldbemaintained,andpatrolsshouldalsobeconductedbytheoutgoingforceuntil thereliefiscomplete.Theincomingforcemustrestrictthesizeandmovementofitsadvancepartyandonlyusethevehiclesoftheoutgoing force; this is particularly important if the two are equipped with differentvehicles.Artilleryfireanddeliberatevehiclenoisemightbeusedtocoveranynoiseinthereliefandmeasuresneedtobetakentoconcealmovement,includingsmokeandlighttoblind observers and surveillance devices. A demonstration on the flank using smoke,lights, artillery and vehicle movement might be made to indicate an imminent attack,reinforcementorwithdrawalinanadjacentareabut,sincethisissomethingthatmightinitselfdrawenemyattention,againco-operationiscritical.

InthelatterpartoftheKoreanWarsometwentydivisionswerefightingtoholdthelineofthe38thParallel‘indefenceoftheprinciplesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations’.OneofthesewastheCommonwealthDivision,whichwasseparatedfromtheseatothewest only by a division of the United States Marine Corps. Two bastions of defenceformed the cornerstones of the division’s front: Point 355 and Hook Ridge. The fivebattlesforpossessionoftheHooksawmoreBritishbloodspiltandagreaterconcentrationofenemytroopsthananyotherpointintheKoreanpeninsula.Thesecondandcostliestof

thesebattleswasfoughtby1stBn,BlackWatch,inNovember1952,anditwastheBlackWatchwhoonce again held the feature on the prelude to the third battle.By this time,however,theyweredueforrelieffromthecumulativeeffectsofcasualties,patrollingandlackofsleep.Thereliefby1stBn,DukeofWellington’sRegiment,wasscheduledforthenightof12/13May1953,andthehandoverwasdueforcompletionby0700hoursonthe13th. Thorough planning, preparation, briefing and reconnaissance, combined withsecurityanddeceptionwerevital to reduce the risksof thishazardousoperation,whichbeganassoonasBrigadierJoeKendrewannouncedthereliefon9May.

Fortunately,intherun-uptotherelief,therewasrelativelylittleactivityfromenemyartillery and mortars while company and platoon commanders from the Dukes cameforward to reconnoitre the positions they would be taking over. Understanding thecomplicatedsystemofminefieldstotheirfrontwasanothermatter;intwentymonthsthepositionshadbeenoccupiedbyasmanyunits,eachofwhichhadaddeditsownlayertothe barrier. Little of the wire remained to mark the minefields and the Black Watchorganizedpatrolstoshowthenewcomersthegaps.(Astheonlyaccesstonoman’sland,thesewerenaturaltargetsforambushesandmortarfire.)Forthreedaysbeforetherelief,theDukes’signallerswereonthepositiontolearntheintricaciesofthetelephonesystem.Similarly, the BlackWatch signallers remained on the position for three days after themove was completed to ensure that the voices on the radio were Scottish and notYorkshireonesuntil thenewcomerssettledin.Whileconductingtheirrecces, theDukeswere careful to ensure theywore the same badges and head-dress as theBlackWatch.AggressivepatrollinghadbeenahallmarkoftheBlackWatch,andtheyagainformedthepatrolsthatwentoutduringthenightoftherelief,ensuringthateachsectionofthereliefforce found itsplacewithoutconfusion. ‘What’s it like?’whispered theDukes. ‘Bluddyawfu’wasthereply,butinfactnothingawfulhappenedthatnightandtheChineseknewnothinguntillongafteritwasover.21

WITHDRAWAL:GALLIPOLI

Withdrawal is perhaps the most dangerous phase of war. A force that is attempting tomovebackwards isprobablyalreadyatadisadvantage,and inseeking tobreakcontact,almost certainly risks the enemy following up with all his power. The vulnerability ofdefending forces once thewithdrawal has begunmakes both passive securitymeasuresandadeceptionplanessential.Perhapsthebestformofcoverplanforawithdrawalistoencourage theenemy toexpectanattack, likeBeauregardatCorinth,anddependingonthe circumstances a commander may detail a part of his force to engage in delayingoperations. In either case deception should be planned to produce surprise and causeindecision and delay in enemy actions. Security is aided, first, by maximum use ofdarkness for movement and improved by employing phoney minefields and decoypositionsandbymaintainingnormalradiotrafficandartilleryfire.Aunitmightchoosetoaugmentformationsecurityanddeceptionmeasureswithmoreofitsown,butthesemustbecompatiblewiththehigherplan.Passivemeasureswill includeradiosecurity,andnoreference should be made to the withdrawal over any insecure radio net. Unless radiosilenceisalreadyinforce,everyeffortshouldbemadetomaintainthenormalpatternuntilthewithdrawaliscomplete.

Second, themaintenance of routinemust suggest that nothing unusual is about to

happen. Any established routine for harassing fire, artillery adjustment, vehicle andechelonmovement, patrols and so forth, should bemaintained. Activemeasuresmightinclude radio deception, but thiswill be conducted at formation level. Unitsmight useartillery,mortar,tankfireandilluminationtocoverthenoiseofmovementandtodistractandblindtheenemy,aswellasimprovisingandsimulatinglightsandnoisetosuggestthecontinuedoccupationofdefencesafterthewithdrawaliscomplete.Planningmustensurethecarefultimingofbothpreliminarydemolitionsandthedestructionofunwantedstoresandequipment.

TheBritishexpeditiontotheDardanellesin1915hasearnedareputationasoneofthegreatdisastersof theFirstWorldWar.Butdespite theapparent incompetenceof theHighCommand, thewithdrawalwasabrilliant feat;notamanwas lost inanoperationmade infinitely more hazardous by being channelled into narrow beaches and waitingships.Whentheexpedition’slandforcecommander,SirIanHamilton,wasrelievedbySirCharlesMunroon28October1915,Alliedstrengthhadalreadybeenreducedfromawarestablishment strength of 200,000 to 114,000. Hundreds of sick were being evacuatedeveryweekwithoutreplacementandtheentireforcewasbeingsteadilyrundown.Munroreported that theonly realistic option left to the expeditionwas evacuation, aview thatcaused some consternation in London, especially when he added that he expectedcasualties in the region of thirty to forty per cent.22 But with Lieutenant-General SirWilliamBirdswoodappointedcommander,thecabinetagreedon7DecembertoevacuateSuvlaBayandANZACCove,withafinaldecisiononCapeHellespending.

As with so many deceptions, it was not merely a fantastic piece of bluff but asupremelywell-organizedfeatoflogisticalplanning.ThetrickwouldbetopersuadetheTurks that nothing was happening by maintaining routine and manning the front-linetrenchesuntiltheverylastmoment.Theanchorageshadtokeepthepatternalreadyset,sotherecouldbenosuddenarrivaloftransportsinbroaddaylight.Thegradualthinningoutof artillery lines was covered by replacement with dummy guns andmovement of theremainingrealonestoalternativesitesatnight,somethingthatrequiredcarefulplanningandpractice.Bythesametoken,therecouldbenoapparentthinningoutofstoresdumps,medicalunitsordailyadministration.ANZACpresentedthegreatestdangerbecauseheretheTurkishfrontlinewasliterallyonlyafewyardsawayfromthatoftheAustraliansandNewZealanders.AtRussell’sToptheyneededonlytomoveforwardsome300metrestodominate the cove completely with plunging fire.23 In order to lull the Turks intoacceptingperiodsoftotalpeaceandquiet(sotheywouldnotnoticetheperiodwhentheDiggers weremoving away),Major-General Sir Alexander Godley gave orders for thetroops to observe periods of complete silence when not a single shot was to be fired.ShouldtheTurksconcludethattheDiggershadabandonedapositionandmovedintotheopen, theywouldbe swiftlydisabusedof thisnotionbywithering fire.TheTurks soondecidedthatthiswasalljustabaitandthatthetrenchesoppositewereasstronglyheldasever.Inreality,therankswerebeingsteadilythinneddowntoaskeletonforce.

AtSuvlathenorthernsectorwasjoinedtothebaybyonlyafootbridgeacrossacut.Lieutenant-GeneralSirJulianByngdecidedthatthispositionwouldhavetobeevacuatedseparatelyand, inorder topreventTurkishinterferencefromtheirnearbypositionsoncethis was discovered, intermediate lines of defence were first prepared halfway to theembarkationsites,althoughitwasrecognizedthattheseandtheirdefenderswouldhaveto

beabandonediftheTurkspursuedvigorously.ThecombinedgarrisonofANZAC–Suvlaat this timewas85,000men,5,000animals,2,000vehiclesandsome200gunstogetherwithvast stocksof ammunition, rations andother stores.By themiddleofDecember asteady rearward flowwas inprogress,conductedatnightaccording toa strict timetableunder thesupervisionof thechiefnavalbeachmaster.Bythe18ththegarrisonhadbeenhalvedbut thenormalartilleryprogrammecontinued(with theremaininggunners firingtwiceasmanyrounds),snipersremainedasbusyaseverandbarbedwirewascontinuallyrenewed. Men were detailed to loiter around the rear areas and light fires in vacatedmedicaltentswhileworkpartiesfedtheincinerators.Lighterscontinuedtolandboxesof‘stores’(filledwithsand)andwhateverrations thatcouldnotberemovedorburntwereruined and buried during darkness. Everything was done to preserve an air of routine.EvenasmallTurkishtrenchraidmighthaverevealedthetruthbuttheTurkshadtakenjustasmuchofabeatingintheprecedingmonthsofviciousfightingandwereinnomoodtotakerisks.

The soldiers entered into the spirit of deception fully by improvising a number ofingeniousdevices.TheAussies,forexample,inventedthedelayedactionrifle,bywhichfirecouldbesustainedfromatrenchlongafterithadbeenvacated.Ariflewasmountedonaparapetwithastringtiedtothetrigger.Twokerosenetinswerearrangedaboveandbelow,whichdrippedwaterfromtoptobottom.Whenenoughwaterhadcollectedinthebottomtin,thestringpulledthetrigger.Otherswereriggedwithfusesandcandles,andthetimingcouldbevariedtoproduceasteadyflowof‘sniper’fireforhalfanhourormoreafter the troops’ departure.24Mining continued throughout December and Januarywithnotablesuccesses;thelastmineswerescheduledtouseupthefinalstocksofexplosivesandtimedtodetonateafterthelasttroopshadleftthebeaches.

This occurred on the night of 19/20 December 1915. By now only 5,000 menremained at ANZAC–Suvla to face 60,000 Turks. Suvla was evacuated undetected butwithsomeanxiety.Oneof thepierswashitbyenemyshellingduringthefinalmorningandhad tobehurriedly repaired.Butsocarefullywere the forward trenchesvacatedby0130hoursthattheTurkscontinuedtofireatthemallnight.Mineswereexplodedandthenightskylitbythefiresofburningstoresdumps.Nonetheless,theGermanadvisorstotheTurksreckonedenoughstoreswerelefttofeedtheTurkishtroopsforseveralweeks.AtANZACtherewasintensecompetitionamongtheDiggerstobepartoftherearparty.With the Germans sending heavy artillery to bolster the Turks, the evacuation wasbecomingincreasinglyurgentandenemyshellingwasgrowingin intensity.OnthefinaleveningalargeminewaspreparedundertheTurkishpositionoftheNekatANZACandthe duckboards in the trench bottoms were pulled up to soften the footfalls of thosedeparting.Barbed-wire barricades lacedwith booby trapswere prepared,which the lastmantoleave,alwaysanofficer,wouldpullacrosstoimpedepursuit.

By 2200 hours only 1,500 picked soldiers remained. When volunteers had beencalledfor,everymaninabattalionhadsteppedforward:theywereveryreluctanttoleavetheirdeadmatesbehind.Theselastfewbegantowithdrawat0130hours,takingthelastmachine-gunsdowntothebeach,lightingtheminefusesandpullingthewirebarricadesacrosscommunicationtrenches.LonePine,thekeypointintheANZACdefences,wasthesceneofafinalminortriumph.Afterevacuationat0240hoursamineundertheTurksinthe Nek went up with a colossal roar at 0330 hours, as the last few men were being

counted through the various checkpoints down to the beach. Only then were the finalstoresdumpsfired.By0400hourstherewerenolivingdefendersleftatANZAC.Deeplymovedatthethoughtofleavingbehindthegravestheyhadsolovinglytended,oneAussiesaidtohisofficer:‘Ihopetheywon’thearusmarchingoff.’25

The success at ANZAC–Suvla greatly encouraged the planners at Cape Helles,althoughitwasobviousthatarepeatperformancewouldbedifficulttopulloff.Adebatecontinuedonthemeritofwithdrawal;theNavywantedtomaintainthebeachheadtoassistits blockade of the Dardanelles. While this continued, an aggressive posture wasmaintained to persuade the Turks that the Army had every intention of staying put.Removal of unwanted stores, men and animals continued all the same. Reports fromprisonersanddesertersshowedthattheTurkswerekeepingaparticularlyclosewatchontherearareasforsignsofwithdrawalandfrontlineunitshadbeenorderedtokeepupthepressure. The bad weather was making embarkation difficult, and the sinking throughcollisionofatransportearmarkedforremovingthelargenumberofpackanimalsmeantthatmuletransportunitswerefacedwiththesadtaskofdestroyingtheircharges.Withthegarrisondownto19,000menandsixty-threeguns,theTurksincreasedthepressureatthebiddingofLimanvonSanders,theirGermancommander,whowasdeterminedtheBritishshouldneitherstaynorleave.Aheavyattackwaslaunchedon7January,accompaniedbymines and especially heavy artillery support, but it was so thoroughly resisted that theTurks did not press it home. Seventh Bn, North Staffordshire Regiment, in particular,foughtwithsuchdeterminationandtenacitythattheTurkswereconvincedthatevacuationwasnotbeingcontemplated,yetitbeganthatnight.

Bydawnthefollowingmorning17,000menremainedashorebuttheoperationwascontinued as soon as itwasdark following the samepattern as atANZAC–Suvla.FeetweremuffledbywrappingtheminsandbagsandshellingfromtheAsiaticshorecontinuedasithadformonthspreviously.AheavyswellatWBeachseemedtothreatenthesuccessoftheoperation,especiallywhenalighterwasgroundedatGullyBeach,compellingthemen there to move along the coast road for W Beach with their commander, Major-GeneralMaude, at their head.Suddenly,Maude realizedhehad left his luggageon thestrandedlighterandinsistedonreturningforit.HemadeitbacktoWBeachtriumphantlypushingastretchertrolleywithhisbags,whichwerehurriedlybundledaboardaboatasthefinalfuseswerelit.Onceagainasubstantialforcehadmadeawithdrawalinthemostdifficult circumstanceswithout suffering a single casualty.Once they realized they hadbeenduped,theTurkssentupsignalrocketsandsurgedforwardintothevacanttrenches,only to be greeted by the hundreds of booby traps left for them.26 According to vonSandersitwasamasterstrokeand,giventhattheTurksheldmostofthehighground,itcannot be denied. Fortunately, somebody had also seen fit to blind those Turks on thevantage point of Gaba Tepe with a destroyer’s searchlight, both on the night of theevacuationandforseveralnightspreviously.27

Gallipolidemonstrateshowbuildingupamassofsmalltacticaldeceptions,eachunitresponsibleforitsownpartoftheplan,canenableamajoroperational-leveldeceptiontosucceed. In theSecondWorldWar theBritish developed an organization in theMiddleEastthatwasatonceuniqueandhugelyinnovative.Havingbegunwithsmalldisplaysofdummyequipment,theyformedaunittopractisetacticaldeception,thenlearnedhowto

addotherinstruments,providingthebasisforsuccessivelygreaterdeceptionschemesthatinduecourseledtotheultimatedeceptioncoveringtheinvasionofNormandy,OperationBODYGUARD.

DEVELOPINGOPERATIONALDECEPTION:‘A’FORCEWhenDudleyClarkediedin1974,hisobituaryrecalledthatFieldMarshalEarlAlexanderof Tunis had publicly stated that he had ‘done as much to win the war as any otherofficer’.Suchhighpraise fromonesogreat–given thatClarkeattainednohigher rankthan brigadier, was never knighted and remained unknown to all but a few of hiscontemporaries–promptedtheobituarywriter toconcludethatClarkewas‘noordinaryman’.28Iffurtherproofofthiswereneeded,Clarke’scitationfortheUnitedStatesLegionofMerit originated in theWhite House and was personally signed by the president.29DennisWheatleydescribedClarkeas‘asmallmanwithfairhairandmerryblueeyes,anexcellentraconteurandgreatcompanyinaparty’,butwith‘anuncannyhabitofsuddenlyappearinginaroomwithoutanyonehavingnoticedhimenterit’.30DavidMurerecountsClarke’s career in Master of Deception, and Clarke wrote in his own book SevenAssignmentsofhisearlywarexploits(hewasoneofthefathersoftheCommandos).Buthisplanstodescribehisdeceptiontaskwereneverpublished:unlikeSirJohnMasterman,hewaswillingtoconformtothesecurityrulesratherthanfloutthemforhispersonalgain.

The beginning of the Second World War found Britain outnumbered andoverstretchedineverytheatre,not least theMiddleEast,wheretheItaliansmenacedtheBritish in Egypt from Libya and Ethiopia. In each of these countries the garrisonsamounted toaquarterofamillionmen,whileWavelldisposedofnomore than50,000BritishandImperial troopsthroughout theentireregion,alreadychargedwithadifficultenough policing operation. Fortunately for theBritish, behind a taciturn and supremelyundemonstrative natureWavellwas giftedwith one of themost fertile and imaginativemindseverpossessedbyaBritishofficer.Hehadmadesomethingofareputationbeforethewarwritingpamphletsandgivinglectures,andalsoproducedanaccountofEdmundAllenby’s campaigns in Palestine and a biography of his hero (on whose staff he hadserved),inwhichheoutlinedmanyofthemethodsthatwouldlaterbeusedatElAlameinandinotherplaces.‘Everycommander’,wroteWavell inRusesandStratagemsinWar,‘shouldconstantlybe consideringmethodsofmisleadinghisopponent, ofplayinguponhisfears,andofdisturbinghismentalbalance.’31

TheItaliansinvadedEgypton13September1940andoccupiedSidiBarrani,somesixtymilesacrossthefrontier,beforesettlingdownintoaseriesoffortifiedcamps.WavellwaslookingimmediatelyforwaystoattackandinduecoursewasinapositiontolaunchOperationCOMPASS,originally intendedasa‘five-dayraid’.Variousdeceptionmeasureswereput inplace,mainlydisplaysunderauspicesof theGHQCamouflageSection,buttheirsignificancetosubsequenteventsisobscure.AsRichardO’Connor’sWesternDesertForce went on to sweep the Italians out of Egypt and across Cyrenaica, what wassignificant was thatWavell became convinced of the need for a dedicated unit to co-ordinateandimplementtacticaldeception.WavellwrotetoLondonon13November1940requestingthatClarke(whohadservedonWavell’sstaff inPalestinebeforethewar)besenttohimtoformadeceptionunit.ClarkearrivedintheMiddleEaston18December.

ClarkestartedworkwithjusttwootherofficersandtenmeninaconvertedbathroomintheGHQbuilding,andon28March1941theunitwasofficiallydesignatedAdvancedHeadquarters,‘A’Force.‘A’ForcewasanotionalbrigadeoftheSpecialAirService,alsoonlyanotionalbodyatthistime,whichsupposedlyexistedinTrans-Jordan,fromwhereitcould intervene anywhere in theMiddle East.* Eventually, this became 1st SpecialAirService Brigade and Clarke’s unit simply ‘A’ Force.32 ‘A’ Force was always a smallorganization: after three years it amounted to just forty-one officers, seventy-six non-commissioned officers and three units of company strength. It did, however, employnumerous double agents in the various territories under British control – theMediterranean, Iraq, Persia andmuch ofAfrica –most notably theCHEESE network. Itlatercompriseda smallmobileheadquartersoperating throughan ‘AdvancedHQWest’for theAlliedCommander-in-Chief,a ‘TacticalHQWest’ for15thArmyGroup,andan‘AdvancedHQEast’forIraq,IranandEastAfrica.Therewasalsoa‘TacticalHQEast’toservewithanycommanderoperatingindependentlyintheMiddleEast.

‘A’ForceworkedverycloselywiththeGHQCamouflageSectionandusedagreatdealofspecializedkit,muchofitmanufacturedthemselves:thestandard-issueoverheadartillery camouflage net, for instance, designed for use in temperate climes,was foundactuallytomakegunsmoreconspicuousinthedesert.Whereverpossible,localmaterialswere used.33 ‘A’ Force began with Dudley Clarke (then a lieutenant-colonel, RoyalArtillery), Captain Victor Jones, (14th/20th King’s Hussars and an expert in visualdeception) and the small MI9 organization with which it was amalgamated. MI9 wasconcernedwiththerecoveryofescapedAlliedprisonersofwarandothersthroughArabagents,whowerepaidapriceperheadformentheybroughtintoBritishlines.When‘A’Forcegrewsufficientlytorequireheadquartersofitsown,thesewereestablishedaboveabordelloat6KasrelNilinCairo.

AccordingtotheMI9historianM.R.D.Foot,‘A’ForcewascombinedwithMI9forpurposesofcover,sincedeceptionwasmore‘secret’thanescape.Butthetwounitscouldhelp each other and there were a number of personnel in Lieutenant-Colonel TonySimmonds’MI9 staff who were regarded as interchangeable. Most notable was JasperMaskelyne, who worked for MI9 but describes himself in his own book,Magic: TopSecretastheinventorofthedummytanks,submarines,aeroplanesandlandingcraftthatweretheessentialingredientsofphysicaldeception.Doubtlesshisadvicewassoughtandfullyactedupon,butthisworkwasprincipallycarriedoutbyGHQCamouflageSection.34Atthesametime,inGreece,CreteandSyriaMI9operationsenabled‘A’ForcetospreaditsinfluencethroughouttheEasternMediterranean.

With the defeat of the British in Greece and Crete, and their expulsion byGeneralleutnantErwinRommel fromallofCyrenaicaexcept theportofTobruk, thingslookedbleakbythemiddleof1941andWavellswappedplaceswiththeCommander-in-Chief India,GeneralSirClaudeAuchinleck.Auchinleck faced threats toCyprus,whichhadonlya4,000mangarrison,anditwasnowthatoperationaldeceptionbegan.Clarkehad alwaysmade a point of building up a false and exaggerated order of battle.As hepointedout,toofewBritishgeneralswereblessedwithadequatereservesandthebestwaytofillthegapwasbytheorderly,consistentandmethodicalbuildingupofthefalseorderofbattle.TheenemyappreciationofBritish(andlaterAmerican)forceswasincreasedby

theadditionofnotionalbrigadesanddivisions,andlaterevencorpsandarmies.Themainmethodofgiving theseforces theappearanceofrealitywasbyfoisting their identityonvarious non-combatant and even static formations and organizations: areas, sub-areas,training schools, depots and other base facilities. These were renamed as divisions,brigades and units and their vehicleswore divisional signs designed by ‘A’Force.ThiswashelpedbythefactthattheBritishandAmericanswastedfarmoremanpowerthantheGermans on back-up and purely administrative duties. Sufficient radio traffic wasgenerated(ifnotnaturally, thenbysimulation)so thatonceabogusformationhadbeenplacedandidentified(usuallybydoubleagents),itbehavedontheairlikearealone.

Thebuild-upof thisnotionalorderofbattle,especially in theearlydayswhen theMiddle East was swarmingwith spies and informers (nearly 400were apprehended inSyria andLebanon alone),was ‘a dull hard slogging business’. In due course itwouldneverthelessrepeatedlyproveitsvalue.Ithadnoglamourattachedtoit,butmoreexcitingmethodssuchastherunningofdoubleagentswouldhavebeentoothlesswithoutit.Italsomeant deceiving the majority of one’s own side and indoctrinating preoccupied andincredulous officers into a procedure that must have seemed bizarre. Sometimes thedummyformationswereprovidedwithdummyequipment,andfinally,astheroleofthedoubleagentsbecamefirmlyestablished,thenotionalorderofbattlebecamethesubstanceoftheirreports.WhenWavellaskedClarkewhat‘A’Forcewasworthtohim,Clarkewasabletoreply‘threedivisions,onearmouredbrigadeandtwosquadronsofaircraft’.

Eventually three bogus armieswere built up and thesewere to loom large in theminds of the German High Command, supporting their misconception that the Britishwere planning to land in the Balkans in order to seal off central Europe includingGermany from the Russians sweeping in from the east. The identities of these falseformations were leaked by every means available. The system could be tiresome,particularly to theadministrativestaffs,but thiswasasmallprice topay.By theendof1943 the twentyextradivisions in the threenotional armieswere so firmly fixed in themindsoftheGermansthattheywerefarmoremenacingthananybuild-upofBritishandAmericanforcesinEngland.35

In themeantime, however,Rommelwas innowaydeflectedby thenotional10thArmouredDivision,createdbyJonesoutofdummies.Butthe‘7thDivision’wascreatedto ‘reinforce’ Cyprus with a full programme of visual displays involving camps beingerected and movement and administrative orders being issued in abundance. Cyprusbecameashowpieceofdeception.Thegarrisonwascommandedbya‘lieutenant-general’(asubstantivebrigadier),thelandingstripswereadornedwith‘Spitfires’and‘Hurricanes’(fouroutof fiveofwhichwerecanvasandwood)and theCyprusRegiment’s transportwasdecoratedwithdivisionalandcorpssigns.36Acomplete‘defenceplan’was‘lost’ inCairoandwhentheAxiswereagainexpelledfromCyrenaicaduringtheCRUSADERbattlesofNovemberandDecember1941,capturedintelligencesummariesrevealedthisyarnhadbeencompletelyaccepted.37

For Operation CRUSADER in November 1941 a number of operational deceptionswereattempted.FakeconcentrationsoftroopswereassembledattheSiwaandGiarabuboases far to the south (captured the previous year with the assistance of dummyparachutistswhoprovedsosuccessfulthattheItaliangarrisonfledbeforeanyrealBritish

troops arrived). Camps were laid out, complete with the cookhouses, latrines and slittrenchesnecessaryforaforceofdivisionalsize.Followingthebattle,however,aninquiryintothedeceptionreportedthattherehadnotbeenenoughvehiclesormaterialsforfaketentagetogivethefalseconcentrationsagenuinefeel,andmorecritically,synchronizationwiththegenuineoperationhadbeenpoor.Crucially,thelessonwaslearnedthatdeceptionwas unlikely to succeed unless planned with the same thoroughness as a genuineoperation.WhencaptureddocumentslaterenabledtheBritishtoseetheresultsfromtheenemyperspective,theydidfindtheGermansestimatedtheforceatSiwaandGiarabubtoconsist of an infantrybrigade, twoor threearmouredcarunits and theEgyptianCamelCorps (although no effort had beenmade to simulate camels), but the vital question ofwhether the enemy altered his dispositions in any way as a result of the deceptionremainedunanswered.

More successfulwere efforts to protect the vulnerable railhead atCapuzzo,whichwascrucialtosupplyingEighthArmy.ForthisadummyrailheadwasbuiltatMisheifa,tenmilesclosertothefront,whichwasalsopositionedsoastohelptheenemydrawthewrongconclusions regardingBritish intentions.Havingovercomea shortageof rails bymakingdummiesfrom‘flimsies’(four-gallontinsusedforcarryingpetrolandwater),thelinewaslaidoutatthespeedagenuinerailwaycouldbelaidandafaketrainbuiltwithwood, string and canvas.During the build-up toCRUSADER this ‘railhead’was bombedeight timeswhile thegenuine railheadwentunscathed.Amap found lateronacrashedGermanaircraftshowedMisheifaastherailterminus.38

As‘A’Forceexpanded,aspecialdepotwasestablishedinCairofortheproductionofincreasinglylargeamountsofdummyequipment:acompletebrigadewasformed–74thArmouredBrigade–thatwasnotsomuchnotionalaschimerical.ThenewcommanderofEighth Army, Major-General Sir Alan Cunningham, wrote to GHQ that they couldsimulatefeintsonenemyflanks,mixdummyunitswithrealonestoexaggeratetheirsize,and ‘enable real tankunits tomove andbe rapidly substitutedbydummyunits therebymisleading the enemy to our real strength anddispositions’.Apparatuswasdevised forcreatingandconcealing tank tracksandaunit formed tooperate them,101stBn,RoyalTankRegiment.Progresswasalsobeingmadewithsonicdeception,recordingthenoiseof tank movements and broadcasting them through amplifiers provided by a politicalwarfare(Psyops)unit.39

Unfortunately, theproliferationof interest indeception,andofpersonnel involved,caused serious problems as various factions tried to exercise control. In October 1941Cunningham’schiefofstaff,BrigadierJ.F.M.(laterSirJohn)Whiteley,triedtoresolveitby separating ‘strategic’ deception, to be controlled by ‘A’ Force, and tactical andoperationaldeceptioninthefield,whichherecommendedshouldberunbyastaffofficerofEighthArmy,tohandle‘planninganddevelopmentofdeceptionunitsandschemesforthe control of camouflage’. Special deception officers were to be attached to corps,division and brigade headquarters.40While this appeared fine on paper, itmadeClarkevery unhappy.He had learned in 1941 thatwhat differentiated deception in theMiddleEast from its counterpart inLondonwas its centralized control: a single hand drew theplan,whichwouldbe implementedbystaffofficersor failing themby regimentalones,trainedtoobeyorderswithoutaddingrefiningtouchesoftheirown.41Besides,therewere

nofacilitiesfortraining‘deceptionofficers’andconsequentlyCRUSADERwentaheadwithno tactical deception at all. Auchinleck became aware of the shortcomings in thedeceptionorganizationonlyinFebruary1942.Heimmediatelyorderedthatalldeceptionshouldbe theresponsibilityof‘A’Force,whichwouldanswerdirectly to theoperationsbranchofGHQ.

AlmostimmediatelyClarkebeganlayingthebasisoflaterstrategicdeceptionintheMiddleEast.InMarch‘A’ForcecommencedOperationCASCADE,thefirstcomprehensiveorder-of-battle deception plan covering thewholeMediterranean theatre. Thiswould indue course also giveClarke the flexibility to implement the operational-level deceptionplanthatwouldsupporttheBattleofElAlamein.Duringtheremainderof1942‘A’Forcecreated a bogus armoureddivision (15th) and sevenbogus infantrydivisions (includingtwofromIndiaandonefromNewZealand)aswellasaboguscorps(XXV)toaddtothe10thArmouredand7thDivisions.

However, nothing was more important to all deceivers than the breaking of theAbwehrEnigmaciphersatBletchleyParkinDecember1941.NowULTRAextendedintotheenemy’sthoughtsonBritishintentions,enablingdeceptiontobealteredaccordingly,andtotailorplanstofitGermanmeansofinformationgathering.42Moreover,thechancesof success were greatly increased since it revealed German opinions on deceptionoperations,enablingtheireffectivenesstobemonitored.Italsohighlightedtherivalrythatexisted between the plethora of intelligence agencies working in Germany, a result ofHitler’s policy of denying too much power to any one subordinate or organization.Increasingly,‘A’Force’sdeceptionoperationscouldtakeonastrategicdimension.ButinthemeantimetherewasstillthesmallmatterofbeatingRommel,whoduringthesummerof1942droveEighthArmybacktowardstheNiledelta,andwasonlyfinallyhaltednearthe otherwise insignificant railway station of El Alamein. Auchinleck was replaced byGeneral Sir Harold Alexander, and Montgomery was appointed commander of EighthArmy.

MeanwhileithadbecomeclearthatatighteningofsecurityinEgyptwasnecessary.TheEgyptiancourtwasthefirsttarget,asKingFaroukhcameunderBritishpressureandtheweakpremier,Sirry,wasreplacedwiththeBritishnominee,NahasPasha.Atthesametimethebroodofanti-BritishcourtierswereclearedoutandtheGermanCONDORspyringcloseddown.Thiswascausingconsternationat the timesince itappeared thatRommelwasreceivinghigh-gradeintelligencefromwithintheheartofGHQ.Theringwastraced,largelythankstoULTRA,toahouseboatontheNile,butitsubsequentlytranspiredthatthiswas notRommel’s source.On 10 July 1942 at Tel el Eisa theAustralians overran 621RadioInterceptCompany,commandedbyHauptmannAlfredSeeböhm,whowasmortallywounded. The company’s records were found to reveal not only the dreadful lack ofpropervoiceprocedureusedbyBritishradiooperatorsbutalsothatRommel’shigh-gradeintelligence was coming from the American military attaché, Colonel Bonner Fellers,whose‘blackcode’hadbeenbrokenandwhosereportstoWashington,detailingeverylastitemofminute interest,werebeing readby theAxis.Althougha replacement companywassentfromGermany,itneverachievedtheefficiencyofSeeböhm’sunit,andRommelfoundhimselfrelyingincreasinglyonagents’reports,whichmeantCHEESE.TheGermanswerethoroughlyimpressedwithwhattheyhadreceivedsofarandRommelrequestedthatCHEESE‘Sreportsshouldbeavailableinhiscaravanearlyeachmorning.43

Soon afterMontgomery arrived in theatre, he summonedClarke to seehimon19August. ‘A’ Force was at the time trying to divert reinforcements from Rommel bymountinganotionalthreattoCretefromCyprus(OperationRAYON),apparentlywithlittlesuccess.While efforts to create the false order of battlewere later shown to have beensuccessful,theywereasyethavingnodiscernibleeffectontheGermanHighCommand.Rommel attacked as soon as he had sufficient fuel but the British defensive positionpreviouslyselectedbyAuchinleckatAlamHalfawastoostrongtoturn.Intheaftermathof the Battle of Alam Halfa, Montgomery was criticized for not having launched animmediatearmouredcounter-attacktopushtheGermansoffHimeimatHill,whichgaveacommanding view of the southern sector of theAllied line.Apart from the fact that itwould surely have ended with a repetition of British armoured formations dashingthemselvesagainsttherockofGermananti-tankdefences,withhisdeceptionplanalreadyin mind Montgomery asked what would be the point of constructing dummies ‘if theGermanscannotseethem?LeavetheminpossessionofHimeimat.ThatiswhereIwantthemtobe.’44

BERTRAMwastobethelargestoperationaldeceptionplanofthewarthusfar,andacomprehensive radio programme was devised to support the visual illusion thatidentifiable,signature formationsforanyforthcomingattackwere in fact in thesouth.45But, asClarke had long since discovered, operational deception could not be separatedfrom the strategic deception that he was developing concurrently. As composer of thepiece,hewouldbeawayforthisfirstcombinedshowingofitscapabilities,persuadingthescepticalAmericansofitsvalue.Theconductorresponsibleforthedetailedrunningoftheplanwashisdeputy,Lieutenant-ColonelNoëlWild,who joined ‘A’Force inmid-1942,justasthedisastrousGazalabattlewasbeginning.AplantosuggestthatMontgomerydidnotintendtoattackatallwasimplementedthroughthedoubleagentnetwork(OperationTREATMENT). This had been enhanced by the autumn of 1942 by the double agentsPESSIMIST and QUICKSILVER, whose credibility was established by a string of easilyverifiable truths. PESSIMIST now reported a troop exodus across the Syrian desert. (Itshould be remembered that the Battle of Stalingradwas beginning and it seemed littlecould prevent the German drive across the USSR from reaching the Caucasus and itsoilfields.)Thesuccessofthecombinedplansmeantthatwhenthegreatbattleopenedon23 October Rommel was absent in Europe (on sick leave). Only when he returned tocommandtwenty-fourhourslaterdidheregardthesituationas‘serious’.46

Themost important aspect of BERTRAM was that here were all the ingredients offuture deception operations working together. Although essentially an operational-levelplan,itincludedsignificantstrategicelementssuchasthefalseorderofbattleandtheuseofdoubleagents’ reports, togetherwith false radio traffic andconcentrationsofdummylandingcraft,allbackedupbydetailedandco-ordinatedtacticaldisplays.Itisalsonotablethattheconductorofthisscheme,NoelWild,wentontorunthedeceptionfortheinvasionofNormandy.

6

StrategicDeception‘There is required for the composition of a great commander… an element of legerdemain, anoriginalandsinistertouchwhichleavestheenemypuzzledaswellasbeaten.’

WinstonChurchill

ISRAELTOOKTHEworldbysurprisewhenitlaunchedapre-emptiveattackagainsttheArabstates in1967,but theArabnations turned the tables inspectacularstylesixyears later.Anyideasthatsurprisecouldnolongerbeachievedinaworldofspysatellitesandhigh-technologysurveillanceequipmentmustsurelyhavebeendispelledbythetimeEgyptianengineerswerebreakingdownthedefencesalongtheeasternsideoftheSuezCanal,theproductofclevermilitarydeceptionandthe‘noise’prevalentinArabpoliticsandculture(demonstratedagain inAugust1990,whenIraq invadedKuwait).At thestrategic level,‘noise’becomesacrucial factor in thesuccessofdeception. Itexists invariousforms–cultural,politicalandmilitary–andcanbeenhancedorcreatedbythedeceiver.Westernanalysts, for example, have difficulty predicting the course that Arab statesmay adoptsinceinArabiccultureverbalarticulationofimageryisasimportantasreality:

Arabspeech…tendstoexpressidealthoughts,andtorepresentwhatisdesiredorhopedforasifitwereanactualfact.ThereisthusamongtheArabsarelativelygreaterdiscrepancybetweenthoughtandspeechontheonehandandactionontheother.1

Thusmanypoliticalactsaremadefortheirsymbolicvalue,whichleadstodifficultiesofinterpretation.

PresidentAbdelNasser’sposturingbefore theSix-DayWarof1967mayhave ledtheIsraelistoconcludethatsimilarEgyptianbelligerencebeforetheYomKippurWarof1973 was nothing but bluff.2 The Six-DayWar was the product of spiralling tensionswhichescalatedbeyondcontrol.Syria, in the throesof internaldissent, externalized thethreat towards Israel, and Israel countered with its own threats. In the middle ofMayNasser mobilized Egyptian forces and deployed along the Israeli frontier in Sinai, arepetitionofa similar situation in1960.The Israelis,whohaduntilnowconsidered thevariousmanœuvresasabluff,feltgenuinelythreatenedanddecidedtoact.Theylaunchedadevastatingattack,inwhichtheirairforcecameinfromtheseatocatchtheirEgyptiancounterpartsonthegroundanddestroythem.ItseemsthatallNasser’sactionsweretakenin full awareness that Egyptian forces were nomatch for the Israelis, and that he wasacting out of a need to score political points as the self-appointed leader of the Arabworld.3However,IsraelianalystsdetectedasimilarpatternwhenAnwarSadatpreparedtolaunch the YomKippurWar six years later, only to find that this time Egypt was notbluffing.4

The effect of ‘noise’ is amply demonstrated by the imposition of a curfew onBaghdadon28September1973,inreactiontodomesticproblemsandtheapparentthreatofacoupd’état.WhileinnowayconnectedwithEgyptianandSyriandeceptionplans,itcoincidednicelywiththemandaidedthem.Similarly,aPalestiniangroupcallingitselfthe‘EaglesofthePalestineRevolution’hijackedatraininAustriaboundforaJewishtransit

campinSchönau.ManyanalystsbelievethiswaspartofSyrianeffortstodivertattentionaway from theMiddle East and it certainly provided the Syrians with an excuse for amilitarybuild-upagainstpossibleIsraeliretaliation.5

TheArabmedia contribute considerably to the ‘noise’, because while being verytightlycontrolledbythevariousgovernmentsandthusengagedindisinformation,theyarealsocapableofproducingextremelyaccuratereports,usuallyforpoliticalpurposes.Theyare also prone to exaggeration. Four days before theYomKippurWar theMiddleEastNewsAgency(MENA)reported the increasedstateofalert in theEgyptianSecondandThirdArmies.Thesignificanceofthisstorywasobscured,however,byaseriesofreportsfromallovertheArabworldofwar-scarestories.ThesewerepartlyaresultoftheMENAstoryitselfandofIsraeliresponsestoit,butitwasalltooeasyforthecentralstorytobedrownedoutbytheresultinghubbub.6TheIsraeliprimeminister,GoldaMeir,thoughtso:

Ihaveaterriblefeelingthatthishasallhappenedbefore,itremindsmeof1967,whenwewereaccusedofmassingtroopsagainstSyria,whichisexactlywhattheArabpressissayingnow.AndIthinkitallmeanssomething.7

ItwaswithinthiscontextthatEgyptandSyriamadegenuinepreparationsforwar.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is possibly the mostfamousactofstrategicsurprise,andexcitescontroversyto thisday.Whilesomewritersremainconvincedbyaconspiracytheoryviewofevents,therealityismuchlessdramatic:the attack was a simple failure of intelligence collation. Accusations that PresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltdeliberatelyallowedtheattack to takeplacearenotsupportedbyevidence and any suggestion as to motive is very tenuous.8 The Japanese and theAmericans both made mistakes as a result of serious misunderstandings of theiropponents’ mentality and intentions.9 By November 1941 war was already seen asinevitable, as indeed it hadbecomewith theAmerican impositionof anoil embargo inJuly.Butcrucially,thewarwasregardedasbeingmostlikelytoengulfthewesternPacific(asindeeditdid).

Negotiations dragged on between the two sides through out the autumn but theAmericans had access to Japanese high-grade diplomatic signals (code-namedMAGIC),anditwasnotalackofinformationbutafailureadequatelytocollatetheindicationsofforthcominghostilities, togetherwith failures to disseminatewhat intelligencehadbeenprocessed, that led to the Japanese achieving overwhelming surprise on that fatefulmorning.Althoughtherewasanabundanceofindicators,therewasnosingleintelligenceorganization to see the overall picture.RichardHelms (later head of theCIA for sevenyears)statedthattheCIA‘wasfeltnecessarybecausetheJapaneseattackonPearlHarborin1941clearlydemonstratedthatiftherelevantintelligenceavailableinWashingtonhadbeenfittedtogetherinacentralplace,andexamined,wecouldhaveforeseentheattack’.10Added to thishigh-level failure, therewasa fundamentalsplitbetween the twoservices(therewasasyetnoindependentairforce)andfurthersplitswithinthem.

WhentheBritishsenttheirdoubleagentTRICYCLE(aYugoslavcalledDusanPopov)totheUSAinAugust1941,hetookwithhimanexampleofthenewlyinventedmicrodot–givenhimbyhisGermancontroller–whichincludedahighlydetailedquestionnaireonthedefencesofPearlHarbor.InWashingtonhemetJ.EdgarHoover,ChiefoftheFederal

BureauofInvestigation(FBI),whichatthattimewasresponsibleforcounter-espionage.Hoover dismissed the louche playboy (whose code-name supposedly derived from hispreferencefortwowomenatatime)outofhand.HenotonlyoverlookedthequestionsinthemicrodotbutalsoscupperedthewholesecurityliaisoneffortwiththeBritish.HooverfailedtoinformtheNavyorStateDepartmentsaboutthequestionnaire(ofinteresttotheJapanese as much as the Germans now that the Axis was pooling its intelligencegathering) and glibly boasted in his memoirs of interviewing a ‘dirty Nazi spy’ and‘sending him packing’. Not only did Hoover fail to understand the importance ofTRICYCLE, his mission and what he brought with him; he did not care.11 In fact, theJapanesewarmachine remainedgeared towardsSouth-EastAsia rather than the centralPacific and remained readyuntil the lastminute to cancel thePearlHarboroperation ifnecessary.Theydid instituteoperationaldeceptionmeasures– radio transmissionsweremadeintheInlandSeaandatKyushuwhilethefleetremainedonradiosilence–buttheyreliedmoreontightsecuritythanactivestrategicdeceptiontogaintheadvantage.12The‘noise’thatconcealedtheJapanesemoveswaslargelygeneratedwithinWashingtonitself.

OPERATIONBARBAROSSA

Strategic deception had proved essential six months previously, when the world’sbloodiest andmostbrutalwarwas launchedwith theNazi invasionof theUSSRon22June1941. Ithas longbeenasourceofamazement that thiscolossalassaultcouldhavebeen achieved with complete surprise. Yet by a combination of active and passivedeceptionNaziGermanymountedanattackwith150divisionsagainstthelargeststateintheworld.Inthisrespect,accordingtoBartonWhaley,HitlersucceededinmakingStalin‘quite certain, verydecisive, andwrong’.13Again therewere ample indicationsofwhatwas coming, but in this case considerable ‘noise’ was generated by the Germans andamplified by the mind of the oneman that mattered: Josef Stalin. At the lower levelsGerman deception of their own troops and the civilian population through propaganda,troopordersanddiplomaticchannelscontributedtooperationalsecurity.Theconsiderableevidence thatwasavailablewaseitheroverlookedordeliberately ignoredor rejectedbyStalin,proofthatthefocusofthedeceivermustbedirectlyonthedecisionmaker.

AllexecutivepowerwasconcentratedinStalin’shands,andheconsistentlyrefusedto accept the hypothesis that the Germans would attack during 1941, since he wasconvincedthattheycouldnotattackbeforemid-1942.14BothAndreiGromykoandNikitaKhrushchev later noted that Stalin was convinced Hitler would keep his word, partlybecausehewaspetrifiedofaGermanattackandpartlybecauseonceheadoptedanidea,nobody was able to change his mind.15 He believed that any German build-up wouldfollowthepreviouspatternofdemandsandprovocation,whichtheSovietswouldbeableto recognizeandparry in1942,and that theGermanswouldnot launchanattackwhilestillcontinuingasecond(albeitlargelyairandnaval)campaignintheWest.Soconvincedwas Stalin that the Germans would keep their side of the bargain that officers whosuggestedotherwisewereliabletoarrestasprovocateurs.16

Hitler’s first directions to his general staff to prepare plans for an invasion of theUSSR (OperationBARBAROSSA) were given as early as July 1940, before the Battle ofBritainhadevenbegun.Hehad,infact,compellingreasonsforattackingtheUSSRinthe

summerof1941:hewascertainlyconvincedofthenecessityand,giventhathepossessednolandfrontierwithBritainandgivenhowclosehecametosuccessinthatfirstyear,thetheorythatitwasnecessarilyfataltostarta‘warontwofronts’isunsustainable.Infact,Hitlerusedoperationsconducted inonewar tocreate thedeceptionnecessary tohaveachanceofsuccessinthesecond.17Althoughhehopedthatasuccessfulaircampaignand,if necessary, invasion (Operation SEALION) would bring Britain to defeat, a reading ofMeinKampf showshis realconcernhadalwaysbeenwith thehatedBolsheviksand theSlavicpeoples,whomheconsideredsubhuman.ItwasintheEastthathistruedreamsoffindingLebensraumforhismightynewReichwerecentred.

TheUSSRpossessedthelargestarmyintheworldatthetimeandHitlerbelieveditwas getting stronger, in spite of Stalin’s purge of the officer corps from 1937 and thesetbacksinflictedduringthewinterwarwithFinland.WiththedefeatoftheLuftwaffeandtheonsetofwinter,HitlerquietlyorderedtheindefinitepostponementofinvasionplansintheWestandon18NovemberhesignedDirectiveNo.21,orderingpreparationsfor theinvasionoftheUSSRtobecompletedby15May1941.18SEALIONwaskeptoutwardlyinbeingtomaintainpressureonBritainandtodistractattentionfromHitler’spurposesandpreparationsintheEast.19

Inamasterfuldoublebluff troopmovements intended forBARBAROSSAwere tobe‘seen as the greatest deception in the history of war’, supposedly amask for the finalphasesof the invasionofBritain.ByOctober1940troopconcentrations in theEasthadalready jumped from five to thirty-threedivisions, including fivepanzer, twomotorizedandone cavalry division, togetherwith training, logistics and communications facilitiesanddozensofnewairstrips.Concealmentwasnolongerpossible,sotheGermanmilitaryattaché inMoscow informed the Soviets that the oldermen previously stationed in theEast were being replaced by younger men, to free the former for war production andbecausethetrainingfacilitieswerebothbetterintheEastandfreefromBritishairattack.Therewas ‘no reason for the [Soviets] to be alarmed by thesemeasures’.When StalinwrotetoHitlerinearly1941tosayhewasawareofthebuild-upandhadtheimpressionHitlerwas about to attack,Hitlerwrote in reply, confident that nobodybeyondStalin’simmediate circle would see his letter, that the troop concentrations served an entirelydifferent purpose: to regroup and retrain free from British interference. MeanwhileGermantroopsintheEastweregiventheimpressiontheyweretakingpartinadeceptionoperationandtoprovide‘rearcover’foraninvasionofBritain.20

It is tempting to think that the signing of Directive No. 21 rendered all otheroperations subordinate to BARBAROSSA, but two grand deceptions surrounding theoperationcomprisedeventsandcircumstancesthatexistedbeforethedecisiontolaunchitwasmade.TheNazi–SovietNon-AggressionPactofAugust1939,whichhadpermittedHitlertobeginhiscampaignagainstPolandandthesubsequentinvasionoftheWest,andthe continuing resistance of Britain both suggested the the broad strategic outlookremainedunchanged.ItwastheseongoinghistoricaleventsthattheGermansconsciouslyusedasdeceptiveelementsoncethefinaldecisiontoinvadewastaken.21InDirectiveNo.23SEALIONwasmaintainedwithorderstoinflictmaximumpossiblelossesontheBritishand the resultwas theBlitz (the bomber offensive aimed atmajor cities) of September1940–May1941,‘togivetheimpressionthatanattackontheBritishIsles[was]planned

for[1941]’.22

Twofurtherdeceptionswere initiated,under thecode-namesHARPOONandSHARK,intendedtoconvincetheBritishthataninvasionwasplannedforaround1August1941.SHARK,whichcomprisedpreparationsbytroopsinFranceandScandinavia,wasorderedin April and HARPOON, which took the form of naval operations, inMay of that year.During thewinter and springvariousotheroperationsdirectedagainstBritain served toreinforce the general deception regarding BARBAROSSA. Hitler’s negotiations with theSpanish dictator, Francisco Franco, helped to focus attention on the westernMediterranean, as did deteriorating relations between the Germans and Vichy France.Neither of these situations was intended as a deception, but both were convenient.23Meanwhile, with the approval of the pro-Axis government of General Ion Antonescu,HitlersentGermanforcesintoRomaniaon8October1940,amovethatservedtocloudrelations with the Soviets as it raised the question of spheres of influence within theBalkans. Hitler was forced to secure the Balkans against British interference inBARBAROSSA,butatthesametimegenuineoperationsmountedagainsttheBritishintheeasternMediterraneanandtheircontroloftheSuezCanalcouldbeplausiblyincorporatedintothegeneraldeceptionofcontinuingwaragainsttherecalcitrantislanders.

A stable situation in theBalkanswas theminimum requirement for the successfulprosecutionofBARBAROSSA.AstalematebetweentheItaliansinAlbaniaandtheGreeks,whosecountryBenitoMussolinihaddecided to ‘occupy’ ina fitofpiqueatnothavingbeeninformedinadvanceofHitler’soccupationofRomania,wasregardedasacceptablesince it was unlikely to lead to direct British intervention. Ironically, Churchill wasextremelykeentointervene,buttheGreeksrefusedhisoffersincetheaidavailablefromBritish forces in Egypt was too little to be effective and might provoke the Germans.AlthoughsomeelementsofBARBAROSSAwereduetoemanatefromRomania,mostwereconcentrated north of the Carpathians.24 However, the overthrow of the Yugoslavgovernment following its accession to the Axis, and its replacement by a neutralistgovernmentunderGeneralDushanSimovichandthenewlyproclaimedKingPeterIIon27March1941,forcedHitler’shand.HeimmediatelyorderedtheinvasionofYugoslaviain order to safeguard the southern flank of BARBAROSSA, a move that also provideddeceptivepotentialsinceitsuppliedanexcuseforthemovementofhundredsofthousandsof troops intoEasternEurope.Two subsequentGermanoperations,MARITA (directed atGreeceinApril,aftertheGreekshadfinallyacceptedBritishaid)andMERCURY(againstCrete inMay), also served to suggest a reduced possibility of a German attack on theUSSRduringthesummerof1941.

Therefore,GermaninterventionintheBalkans,designedtosecurethesouth-easternflank of BARBAROSSA, also provided a plausible deceptive opportunity. The specificdeceptionwasoneofamisleadingnaturewhich,despitealittleambiguity,helpedexplainthe build-up of troops in Poland. The presence of 60,000 British and CommonwealthtroopsinGreecehelpedrefocusattentiononthewarwithBritainandhelpedtheGermanstomislead theSovietsabout troopmovements inHungary,PolandandRomania,whichcouldbepassedoffaspartoftheBalkanoperations.*Bythesametokenthe transferofGermanforces,includingtheDeutchesAfrikakorps,toassisttheItaliansintheircampaignagainsttheBritishinNorthAfrica,followedbyspectacularAfrikakorpssuccessesinApril

andMay,furtherfocusedattentionawayfromthequietbuild-uptakingplaceinPoland.25

Notthatindicationsoftheforthcominginvasionwereunavailable.GunnarHagglof,responsible for German affairs in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, described the tearfulreactionoftheSovietministerinStockholm,AlexandraKollontai,tohisindicationsthatGermanywaspreparinganinvasion.Hehadnorighttotellhershesaid,andshehadnoright to listen.Ordershadobviouslybeen received from thehighest authority that suchrumoursweretobeignoredordenied.26ThesituationbeingcreatedcouldnotbeallowedtointerferewiththenormalsmoothrunningofSoviet-GermanrelationsandMoscownowcommencedon itsowndisinformationcampaign,mainly through theGermanConsul inHarbin,AugustPonschab,whichwasdesignedtoreassureBerlinthattheSovietsposednothreat.Asbecamepainfullyobviouson22June1941,thiswaswhollyineffectivebutitspursuit served to make German deception ultimately more effective. In March, whenAdmiral Nikolai Kuznetsov gave instructions to shoot downGerman aircraft that wereclearlyinvolvedinphotographicreconnaissancemissions,hewasperemptorilyorderedbyanangryStalintowithdrawtheinstructions.Nothingwastobeallowedtointerferewithacontinuingaccommodationbetweenthetwodictators.27

Yetrumoursof the intendedinvasionhadbeenreportedtoMoscowwithindaysofHitler’s Directive No. 21 being issued, and in February 1941 Moscow receivedinformationincludingtheoutlineplanandatentativedateforcommencementof20May.TheGlavnoyeRazvedyvatelnoyeUpravlenie(GRU,theSovietmilitaryintelligence)hadconsiderableevidenceofanimpendingattack,butitalsobelievedthattheGermanswouldawaitavictoriousconclusionintheWest,anotunreasonablepremise.28Meanwhile, theAbwehrsteppedupitsspyingactivitiesintheUSSR,albeitwithlittlesuccess(theirfailureaccounted in large part for Germans’ appalling lack of quality intelligence on Sovietcapabilities),butnoneofthisarousedparticularsuspicioninMoscow.29

Thesecondmajordeceptiveelement,theNazi–SovietNon-AggressionPact,servedto reinforce Stalin’s convictions. It was a totally pragmatic agreement between twoideologies diametrically opposed to one another. It nevertheless appeared to give bothsides what they wanted, and both made considerable territorial gains as a result.*ThroughoutitsexistenceStalinmadesuretheSovietskepttheirsideofthebargaintotheletter,sendingtrainloadsoffoodandrawmaterialswestwardsrightupuntilthedaywarbegan. Whenever strains appeared, such as those following the German move intoRomaniaandthesubsequentoperationsintheBalkans,theNaziswerealwaysabletopassthemoffasbeingdirectedattheBritish.High-leveldiplomaticcontactsandfurthertradeagreementswereconcludedandthestate-controlledmediaofbothcountriespouredforthsoothingpropagandaforbothinternalandexternalconsumption,contributingenormouslytothesurpriseofbothpopulationswhenthecataclysmcame.30DeceptionoftheGermanpublic (and indirectly the Soviet government)was carried out in the form of radio andpress releases, thedisseminationof rumours, orders to troops andpreparations for statereceptions.On13 June1941Hitler’spropagandaminister, JosefGoebbels,wrote in theNaziorganVölkischerBeobachterthatthefallofCretesignalledtheimminentinvasionofBritain.Inacleverploytheentireissuewasimmediatelyconfiscatedbythepoliceassoonasitreachedtheforeignpresscorps.

Ontheradio,musicalprogrammesinwhichGermansoldierssent inrequestswere

usedtosuggest thatfirst-classformationswerestationedin theWestandonlydefensiveand training formations were stationed in the East; for example: ‘Members of theLeibstandarte [an SS formation originally formed from Hitler’s bodyguard] send theirwounded company commander three bottles of Hennessy and wish him a quickrecovery.’31 The reference to French brandy was designed to suggest that these troopswere somewhere in theWest.As thebuild-up continued inPolandduring the springof1941,itbecameincreasinglydifficulttoconcealthetruth,butitwasputaboutthattheseweredeceptivemeasuresdesignedtoputtheSovietsoffduringtheattackonBritain.

AlthoughtheBritishhadampleevidenceofGermantroopmovements,thesedidnotseemnecessarilytoentailtheinvasionoftheUSSR.Suchapossibilityseemed‘toogoodtobetrue’toChurchill,untilhesawtheoriginalsofpertinentintelligencereports.Itwasthe odd movement of five panzer divisions that crossed Romania on their way toYugoslaviaandGreece,havingbeenrouted toKrakówbefore theYugoslavcoupd’état,that ‘illuminated thewholeEuropeanscene likea lightningflash’.32Onceconvincedbyhisownintuitiveinsight,ChurchillassembledtheevidenceandtriedtopresentittoStalin.ButStalinwasconvinced thatalleffortsbyChurchill todemonstrate the imminentperilweremerelyattemptstoprovoketheSovietsintocounter-measuresagainsttheNazisandtodisrupttheir(sofar)peacefulrelations.TheBritishpassedawarningon19April.Thereceptionitreceivedcanbegaugedbythatofanother.OnthesamedayIsmailAkhmedov,the Tartar acting chief of the GRU’s fourth division (technical espionage), received areport froma source in theCzechŠkodaworks that provided convincing evidenceof aplannedattackontheUSSRbetweenmid-andlateJune.Onitwasscrawledinredpen:AngleyskaiaProvoatsiiaRassledovat!Stalin(‘Englishprovocationinvestigate!Stalin’).33

The flight of Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, to Scotland on 10 May 1941 in anabortive attempt to secure peace surprised everyone; it also served to heighten Stalin’sdeep-rooted mistrust of the British.34 One possible reason for Hess’s flight (which heclaimedtohaveattemptedtwicebefore)washisrabidanti-Communism,combinedwithhis ignorance of the real purpose of the trade negotiations that theGermanswere thenpursuing with the Soviets. These were actually part of their continuing deception,necessarytofinalizetheirplansandpreparations,whichhadbeendelayed.Thebuild-upinPolandcouldalsobepassedoffasnomorethananattemptto‘squeeze’theSovietsinthenegotiations.TheSovietsalsousedthetalksasadeceptionoperation,hopingtosatiatetheGermansanddefuseanypretextforanattack.Theywerepreparedtoprolongandextendthem until it was too late in the year for theGermans to contemplate invasion, duringwhichtimetheycouldcontinuetheirrearmamentprogramme.35

AsMayprogressed,GeneralGeorgiZhukov correctly suggested that theGermanswerecapableof launchinga surpriseattackandproposed that theSoviets launchapre-emptive attack of their own. Stalin quickly ruled out such an option, but thewarningsincreased.Theprize agent in Japanof theNKVD (NarodnyKommissariatVnutrennihkDel, one of Stalin’s state security agencies), Richard Sorge – who had repeatedly sentwarningswhichStalincontemptuouslydismissed–sentanother four inMay, the lastofwhichstatedtheattackwouldbeginwithoutthebenefitofanultimatumordeclarationofwar.Stalindismissedthistoo;hecalledSorge‘alittleshitwhohasjustsethimselfupwithsomegoodbusinessinJapan’andSorgewasreducedtoweeping‘Moscowdoesn’tbelieve

me’inhismistress’sarms.36AsMayturnedintoJunetheKremlinrejectedwarningsfromothersources,includingtheGermanambassadorhimself,theanti-NaziGrafFriedrichvonderSchulenburg,andhiscounsellorofmission,GustavHilger.TheirapproachtoVladimirDekanozov,theSovietplenipotentiaryatthetradenegotiations,wasrejectedoutofhandby Dekanozov, who had ‘no comprehension of the good will’ that motivated them.37Nevertheless, despite the political culture surrounding Stalin, the substance of theconversationwasforwardedtohim.ItwasapparentthatStalinwasconvincedthatHitlerwas‘bluffing’.Inconversationwithhistoadiesin1942Hitlertookcreditfor‘makingtheRussians hold off right up to the moment we launched our attack… by entering intoagreementswhichwerefavourabletoourinterests’.38

The stakes in these negotiations were soon raised beyond anything a reasonablegovernment, let alone Stalin’s, could accept. The purposewas to prolong the talks intoearly June.39 By now even the British intelligence authorities who had not sharedChurchill’sconvictionfromtheoutsetwereconvincedofGermanpreparednesstoinvadeRussia.ULTRA decrypts showed a steady build-up ofLuftwaffe units in Poland and theJointIntelligenceCommittee(JIC)forecastthelaunchoftheoperationasbeingbetween20and25June.40BythebeginningofJuneeastboundrailtrafficwassoextensivethatit‘became obvious even to the layman that large-scale troop concentrations were takingplace’.41WhenZhukovandMarshalSemyonTimoshenko,theDefenceMinister,wenttopresent this evidence toStalin, the latter counteredwith his owndocumentation,whichwasremarkablysimilarinallbutonecrucialaspect.TheGRUchief,General-LieutenantFilippGolikov,knewStalin’sviewthat therewouldbenowarforanotheryearandhadsuppliedhimwithrefutationofTimoshenko’sinformation,inparticularofSorgeandhispredictionthatanattackwouldbelaunchedon22June.GolikovclassifiedasreliableallreportsconfirmingthatGermandeploymentswerepartofSEALION.42

Meanwhile, theGerman build-up continued. The deployment in theEast ofmanyLuftwaffeformationswasparticularlydifficult tojustifyintermsofadefensiveposture.However, during the campaign in the West, in order to conceal preparations for thatcampaign by not deploying high-level headquarters, the Luftwaffe relied heavily onLuftflotte 1 (1st Air Fleet), based in Berlin and with base areas in East Prussia. TheSovietsnowaccepteditspresenceasnaturalandreasonableanditwasgiventhetaskofattacking the entire front on the commencement of the invasion. The task of collatingtarget intelligence fell toMajor Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg, who was forced to resort tomany imaginative deceptions in order to gather his information. Dummy Lufthansafacilitieswere established inHelsinki,whichoperated flights toMoscowandother keypointsstaffedentirelybyLuftwaffepersonnel.Twootherdummyaviationbusinessesweresetup inEastPrussia:oneanair-mapping serviceand theother apilot training school,which systematically sought out Red Air Force targets along the border. GermanimmigrantsarrivingfromtheUSSRwerecarefullyscreenedandfromonesuchimmigrantLoytved-HardegglearnedoftheadvancednatureoftheSovietaviationindustry.43

Operational security involved retaining aircraft well to the west before ‘B-Day’,continuing the bomber offensive against Britain throughout the spring and, by flyingmultiple sorties, making the effort appear greater than was really the case.44OberkommandoderLuftwaffe(OKL,theAirForceHighCommand)tookstepstomakeit

appear that all of Luftflotten 2 and 3 were involved. Generalfeldmarschall AlbertKesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, which was due to operate behind Army GroupCentreintheinvasionandwhichcontrolledaroundhalfthetotalairresourcescommittedtoit,spentasmuchtimeaspossiblevisiblyathisheadquartersinBrusselsratherthanhisalternativeheadquartersinWarsaw.45

Theair forcesoperated frombasesnocloser than fiftykilometres from theSovietborder,butarmyformationscouldnotstartfromsofarback.Theconcentrationofalmost150divisionscouldnotbecompletelyconcealedbuttoreduceitssignificancetheborderareaitselfwasonlyverylightlyheld.Theimpositionofstrictradiosilenceandtheuseofpeacetime railway schedules helped to reduce the impact of these movements and byrestrictinginformationtothereasonforthedeploymentsecuritywasmaintained.Thefirstmention of BARBAROSSA in a corps war diary did not occur until 15 April, and thedivisionalcommandersandkeystaffwerenotinformeduntilamonthlater.46Infact,theGerman troopswere themselves deceived as to their presence inPoland,which seemedvery difficult to explain. The reasons they were given included the better trainingfacilities,securityagainstSovietmovesduringthe‘invasion’ofBritain,andsignificantly,thattheyweredeployingtotheeastasadeceptionforSEALION,thestorytheyalsowishedthe Soviets to believe. Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, the German Army HighCommand)issuedordersforembarkationdrillsandplanstobeissuedforthetransferofthebulkofthetroopsbacktotheWest.AslateasMaythetroopswerereceivingEnglishlessonsandplanningwasbeingconductedonrecentlyissuedmapsofBritain.

Inthelastfewweeksthemovementsincreasedinintensity:twenty-eightpanzerandmotorizeddivisionsmovedfromFranceandGermany,andeighty-sixdivisionsalreadyintheEastmoved closer to the border. The ninety-six infantry divisions of the firstwaveweremarcheduptothefrontieronfootatnightandconcealedinthelargeforestsduringtheday.Thethirty-onepanzerandmotorizeddivisionsofthefirstwaveweremovedonlyfourdaysbefore theattackandecheloned furtherback from theactual frontier.By thusrestrictingcontactwiththepopulationtheSovietagentnetworkswereneutralized.47Onlyintheafternoonof21Junewerethetroopsinformedofthetruenatureoftheirmission.Thenewscameasastunningsurprisetomostofthemdespitetheevidenceofincreasedconcentrationsandotherindicationsofaplannedcampaign;eveninJunemosthadbeenconvinced that their presence in the east was ‘one of Hitler’s large-scale deceptionmeasuresdesignedtoholdtheRussiansincheck’.48

Despite further evidence, includingdetailed (and accurate) operational and tacticalinformation supplied by Sorge, despite the evacuation of dependants from the Germanembassy and the burning of the archives in the basement, and despite reports from theWestern Special Military District of preparations to its front, Stalin flatly refused tobelieve the danger.49 Instead, he hoped that a summit meeting could be arranged, thepromise of which was a false trail cleverly laid by Hitler when the Soviet ForeignMinister, VyacheslavMolotov, visited Berlin in November 1940.With this in mind, acommuniquéwasissuedbytheTassnewsagencyon14June.ThetotallackofresponsestillfailedtostirStalin,althoughevenDekanozovwasnowconvincedandpresentinghimwith forecasts of imminent invasion.50 Finally, on the evening of 18 June a Germandeserterclaimedthathehadstruckanofficer,thathisfatherwasaCommunistandthathe

fearedforhislife.Hestatedthattheinvasionwouldbeginat0400hourson22June.Afterthree days Zhukov received word from the KievMilitary District of the desertion andreportedittoTimoshenkoandStalin,whosummonedthemtotheKremlin.Stalinhadalsoreceived word through Golikov from sources in Sofia and from Sorge and naturallyappearedworried.A directivewas issuedwarning of impending attack but crucially onStalin’sexpressinstructionnoothermeasuresweretobetakenand‘provocation’wastobeavoidedatallcosts.AsBarrosandGregorsosuccinctlyput it,provocationwas ‘thebuckle of Stalin’s belt of erroneous assumptions’. When that night another deserterconfirmed the report of the first, frantic efforts were begun to convene a summit andresume the negotiations that theNazis had so studiously drawn out over the precedingweeks.51Earlythenextmorning,gunsroaredallalongthefrontierandthegreatestwarinhumanhistorybegan.

Thechoiceof22Junefor‘B-Day’waspropitious.AsitwasaSunday,manySovietpersonnelwereonweekendleave.Nevertheless,indiscretionorindisciplinebythetroopsmovingtowithinmetresofborderobstacles,bridgesandothersensitivepointsmighthavealertedtheSovietstoimpendingdoom,hadStalin’stimiditynotensuredthattheborderswereutterlyunprepared.Bytheendofthefirstday’sfightingtheSovietshadlostaround2,000aircraft,mostlydestroyedontheground(itwouldtaketheRedAirForcetwoyearstorecover),andGermanspearheadswereuptoeightykilometresbeyondtheirstartlines.After a week of colossal losses the pressure began to tell. While leaving the DefenceMinistry with Molotov and others, Stalin loudly proclaimed: ‘Lenin left us a greatinheritance and we, his heirs, have fucked it all up!’ Molotov stared at Stalin inamazementbut,liketheothers,wiselysaidnothing.52

IfthesuccessfulachievementofsurprisebytheGermansseemedremarkablebefore,then the overwhelming evidence that was available in plenty of time makes the storyutterly astonishing. Itwould be easy to put it down to the blind stubbornness and self-deceptionofStalin anda system inwhichall powerwasconcentrated inhishands,yetbarely sixmonths later the Japanese achieved an equally astonishing coupwith no lessindicationofwhatwasabouttohappen.

DEVELOPINGSTRATEGICDECEPTION:THELONDONCONTROLLINGSECTIONWhat made British deception during the Second World War unique was its steadydevelopment.Fromanexpedientstartedin thedayswhenthingsappearedunremittinglybleak,itgrewintoaflexibleandhighlyeffectiveinstrumentcapableofgreatlyenhancingoperations at all levels. The story of this developmentwas not seamless orwithout itsproblems,but the idea thatapolicyofaggressivestrategicdeceptionwasbothdesirableandpossiblewasessentiallydowntooneman,Wavell.53

Thekeystosuccessweredoubleagentsandthefalseorderofbattle.WhilebothoftheseelementswerebeingdevelopedunderthewingofGHQMiddleEastduringtheearlywaryears,adouble-agentsystemwasbeingcreatedsimultaneouslyintheUKitself,butcrucially this remained a ‘private army’ for a long time, which nearly destroyed itsdeceptive value in 1943. It started before hostilities began,with aWelsh-born engineercalledOwenstravellingonaCanadianpassport,whowasincontactwithboththeBritishSecret Intelligence Service and the Abwehr. During 1939 the Abwehr sent a radio

transmitter toSNOW (as hewas christened by theBritish),which he duly handed over.Whenwarbrokeout,however,theauthoritiestooknorisksandSNOWwasimprisonedinWandsworth,fromwherehebegantransmittingtoGermanyundertheguidanceofsectionBla of MI5.* Apart from security matters, MI5 was faced with the problem of whatinformationtosend,aproblemovershadowedthroughout1940bytheperilinwhichthecountry stood. In September a meeting was held between the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence and MI5, and referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. For a whileinformation was passed to emphasize the strength of the defences should an invasionoccur. Since this obviously also included naval and airmatters and once startedwouldneedcareful control, in January1941 theWBoardwas created,which consistedof thethree directors of service intelligence together with a representative ofMI5 and EwenMontagu,thenontheDirectorofNavalIntelligence’sstaff,toactassecretary.

Thishappenedwithoutspecificauthorization fromanybody.Theboard reported tonoone andwas responsible tonoone.Yet inorder to function andparticularly topassinformationthatmightbetrue,itwouldrequireclearancefromtheChiefsofStaffwhichmighteitherbe refusedordelayed.At its firstmeetingon8January1941 theWBoarddecidedtoinstitutetheTwentyCommittee(fromtheRomannumeralsfortwenty,adoublecross),whichwouldhavetheexecutiveresponsibilitytoselectandapprovethematerialtobesent,guidedbytheWBoard.ThechairmantheyappointedwasSirJohnMasterman,

a gaunt humourless man, [who] allowed himself to become obsessed with intelligence and his ownimportanceinit,lorditovermanyofhiswartimecolleaguesandquiteanumberofprofessionalregularstaffaswell,andfinallytodefytherulesandpublishabookaboutit.54

At its first meeting six days later the Twenty Committee discussed the problem as itappeared toMI5. Having established quite an extensive network of double agents, thecommitteeknewthatthesewouldhavetosupplyasignificantamountoftrueinformationtomaintaintheircredibility,butalsothat therewassignificantscopefordeception.Thisbeganwith reportson theeffectofGermanbombingand from thenonwards,while theTwentyCommitteemetweekly,theWBoardmetincreasinglyrarely:fourtimesin1943,twicein1944andoncein1945.55

While this arrangement accounted for the control of the double agents, thereremainednodirectionofdeceptionpolicy.NorwasdeceptioninitiallythepriorityoftheTwentyCommittee.Masterman later listedsevenbenefits fromthedouble-crosssystem,ofwhichdeception came seventh.56During 1941 the attention remained focused on airmatters,althoughtheHomeDefenceExecutive(HDE)andtheservicedepartmentsfoundit difficult to supply information to be passed on. In a bid to create something, MI5organizeda ludicrous raidona foodstore thatnearlyended incompletedisaster forallconcerned and, while throughout 1941 and 1942 MI5 and the Twenty Committeeremained geared to defensive misinformation and the tricky business of keeping thedouble agents in existence, it was ‘A’ Force that was developing and refining thetechniquesofoperationaldeception.

By March 1941 ‘A’ Force had already proved its worth tactically and Wavellrecommended that in the light of experiencegained a controlling authority be set up inLondon to co-ordinate deception operations in all theatres of war; each command,however, should have its own deception unit. Dudley Clarke was too busy with the

traumatic events in Greece and Yugoslavia, and with the arrival of Rommel inTripolitania, tomeet theChiefsofStaffCommitteebeforeOctober1941,butheprovedpersuasive.On8OctobertheJointPlanningStaff(JPS)recommendedthatanorganizationalongthelinesofthatinCairobesetup.57Theex-WarMinister,ColonelOliverStanleyMC,was appointed ‘ControllingOfficer’ andHead of the FutureOperational PlanningSectionof the JPS.Stanleybelievedopportunities for deceptionmust be awaited ratherthancreated,andasaresulthecameinforcriticismfromWavell (nowCommander-in-ChiefIndia),whobelievedthatdeceptionshouldbebold,imaginativeandproactive.58 Inanycase,Stanleywasseverelyhandicappedfromthebeginningbylackofsupportfromthe services and the almost complete absence of experience of strategic deception inWhitehall.Thehopelessnessofhispositionwasdemonstratedbyhisbeingpermitted toknownothingaboutMI5’sdoubleagents,onlythatthemeansexistedtoplantinformationontheenemy.

ThefirstattemptatstrategicdeceptionwasanotionalassaultonNorwayapprovedinDecember1941,calledOperationHARDBOILED.Itgavethestaffsomepracticeandservedas cover for the units training for a real operation, the invasion ofMadagascar inMay1942.Thisalsogave‘A’ForcetheopportunitytothreatentheDodecaneseislandsofKosandLeroswithnotional forcesbasedonCyprus.The landingsonMadagascarachievedcomplete surprise, although the deception authorities could not claim a proven success,only that aplausiblealternativewasavailable should thedepartureof theexpeditionbeblown.59Butproblemscontinuedandhalf-waythrough1942,finallyfrustratedbyanineptattempttoinvolveSOE*agentsindeceptionplans,Stanleyresignedhisposttoreturntopolitics.WhileStanleywasbeingreplacedbyhisdeputy,Lieutenant-ColonelJohnBevanMC, Wavell sent a memo to the Prime Minister recommending ‘that policy of boldimaginativedeceptionworkedbetweenLondon,WashingtonandCommandersinthefieldby only officers with special qualifications might show good dividend’.60 Churchillfollowed this up and the JPS proposed that Bevan’s section should be responsible fordeceptiongloballyandknownas‘TheControllingSection’,concentratingonbroadpolicyandco-ordinatingtheatredeceptionplans.TheChiefsofStaffapprovedthesesuggestionsintheirentiretyandtheLondonControllingSection(LCS)cameintobeing.

BevanwasanoldEtonianandheadofarespectedstockbrokingfirmwhohadjoinedthe Hertfordshire Regiment (Territorial Force) in 1911 and had a distinguished recordduringtheFirstWorldWar.Hehadbeeninvolvedintacticaldeceptionduringtheill-fatedNorwegiancampaignofApril1940,waseminentlypracticalandknew–orcouldgettoknow–everyonethatmattered.Hewasundoubtedlyafirst-classchoiceforthepositionasheadoftheLCS,butratherthanreceivingaqualifiedstaffofficerwithexperienceofbothoperations and intelligence as a deputy,Bevan got a committee that included an Indiancivil servant, an actor, a soap factory manager and the novelist DennisWheatley. Themythhassincegrownupthatdeceptionwastheproductofthisgroupof‘giftedamateurs’.Wheatley later wrote that ‘by threats and ruses we had kept 400,000 German troopsstandingidle,inreadinesstorepelattacksthatnevermatured.Notabadperformanceforsevencivilians.’61However,thecreditrightlybelongstosoldiers,notablyWavell,Clarke,Bevan andWild. LCS was not properly integrated into the staff structure and had nocontrolovertheTwentyCommitteeoranyoftheotheragenciesuponwhichitdependedfor implementationof its schemes.AtonepointBevancomplained that ‘noone tellsus

anything or gives us any orders’, and 1943 would show the limitations of thisarrangement.62

Infact,onlytheControllerhimselfandhisdeputy,SirRonaldWingate,anotherex-public schoolboy, were really effective. In the ‘old boy’ network atmosphere thatprevailed,muchvitallyimportantbusinesswouldbeconductedafterluncheonordinnerinclubsandrestaurants.63Butwhattheyneededatthistimewasareviewofallthemeansavailable,includingdoubleagents;fromthis,actioncouldbetakentosupportthegenuineplans emanating from London, in order to co-ordinate them with operational planselsewhere.Thefalseorderofbattleshouldhavebeenstartedimmediatelyandthatworkneeded reliable, professional soldiers. Eventually, this would come to pass, but in themeantime it was ‘A’ Force that remained the repository of deceptive wisdom. Bevanremained in constant touch with Clarke and the two worked closely together, so thatdevicesandplansworkedoutinCairowereeventuallyemployedoneveryfront.WavellhadMajor Peter Fleming (brother of James Bond’s creator, Ian Fleming) spend a fewmonthslearningtheropesinCairobeforestartingadeceptionunitforGHQNewDelhi.OnceEisenhowersetuphisheadquartersinAlgiers,ClarkesentMajorMichaelCrichtontorundeceptiontherewithColonelE.C.Goldbranson,USArmy,andwhenthedeceptionplan for the Normandy invasion required drafting at Supreme Headquarters AlliedExpeditionaryForce(SHAEF),itwasNoelWildwhotookthepost.Theinfluenceof‘A’Forcebecameglobal,andacompositeweaponwasforgedthatfaroutdistancedanythingevenWavellmight have envisagedwhen he first summonedClarke to join his staff in1940.64

Theseedof strategicdeception in theMiddleEasthadbeensownwhenBrigadierJohnShearer,DirectorofMilitaryIntelligenceintheMiddleEastandfounderofSIME,returnedfromBritainintheautumnof1941tofindthataparachutisthadbeencapturedfollowinganairraidonHaifa.ThemanwasGermanandclaimedtobepart-Jewish,andsaidthat,havingbeensecondedtoguideItalianbombersbasedonCrete,hehadtakentheopportunitytotrytoreachrelativesinJerusalem.Themandidnotknowthataradiohehadbroughtwithhimhadalsobeendiscoveredandsuspicionsdulyaroused.IttranspiredthathewasinfactthegauleiterofMannheim.Soonafterwards,anofficerexperimentingwiththetransmitterreceivedananswerfromBari.ThiswasreportedtoShearerwhilethegauleiter languishedinaprisoncampinPalestine,anditwasnot longbeforeanotionalagentwasoperatingas therealagentcode-namedGAULEITER.Beingpart-JewishandanEnglish-speaker, he was given a ‘job’ as a steward in a senior officers’ mess at GHQMiddleEast,wherehecould‘overhear’conversationsandhewouldbefreedfromhavingto answer potentially embarrassing questions since nobody had ‘talked about it in theMess’.SincehecouldnotanswerspecificquestionsputtohimbyhiscontrollerinBari,itoccurredtoShearerthathecould‘overhear’snippetsofacoverplanfortheforthcomingBritish offensive Operation CRUSADER, the preparations for which were impossible toconceal.

WiththeNazisreachingdeepintotheUSSRandthreateningtheoilfieldsaroundtheCaspianSea,GAULEITERwas ideal for reporting radicalandalarmingchanges inBritishpolicy.AfterithadbeenclearedthroughtheseniorcommandersofthethreeservicesandtheMinister of State in theMiddleEast, the cover planwas put out that a greatmove

northwardswastobemadebyNinthArmy,commandedbyGeneralSirHenryMaitlandWilson, and that this was being heavily reinforced from the Western Desert whilepreparations for an offensive there to relieve Tobruk were themselves no more than acover plan. So successful were the various efforts that Rommel was in Athens whenEighthArmycrosseditsstartlineon18November.65

Duringthefollowingspring,asblowafterblowraineddownonthebatteredEighthArmyduringMayandJune,theCHEESEnetworkkeptupreportsofpreparationsinCyprusforadiversionarydescentonCrete.Theseproducedaseriesofreconnaissances,firstbytheRegiaAeronautica(ItalianAirForce)andlaterbytheLuftwaffeitself,oftheairfieldsnotonlyinCyprusbutalsoinLebanon,andoflandingcraftconcentratedintheharboursof Famagusta, Limassol and Larnaca. At the same time a frenziedwireless traffic wasmaintained between Wilson’s headquarters and the ‘corps’ in Cyprus and its notionalbrigades, and between the Admiralty in Alexandria with Haifa, Beirut and the Cyprusports.

InJune1942,whenEighthArmywasingreatperil,theonlyrestraintonRommel’sadvance was the constriction of his supplies from Italy by the submarines and aircraftbasedonMalta.Maltainturnwasunderconstantattack,andifshewastoholdoutitwasimperativethatshealsoberesupplied.TheneedtoeasethepressureonMaltawasacutefromApril and from that time ‘A’Forcebeganbuildingup ‘landingcraft’, ‘aeroplanes’and‘tanks’onCypruswhiletheCHEESEnetworkbeganreportingthebuild-upthroughasub-agentinCyprusandpiecingtogethersmallitemsofinformationindicatingoffensivepreparations against the Greek islands. Although enemy intelligence was interested,accordingtoClarketheoperationwasafailurenevertheless.Theenemydidnotreactinthemannerwanted; no forceswere diverted, norwere they the followingmonthwhensimilarmeasureswereaimedatslowingRommelinCyrenaica.66Nonetheless,thepieceswereslowlycomingtogetherwhenthreemenarrivedbysubmarine inPalestine,shortlyafter the Crete invasion scare, and were immediately captured. The new arrivals, allGreek, were led by the man who became known as PESSIMIST. Another Greek doubleagent, also with two companions, arrived by caique and became QUICKSILVER. Theircontacts included a woman called GALA, whowas notionally a high-class prostitute inBeirut,andathugwho‘served’onaGreekdestroyer.TogetherwiththewhollynotionalagentsHUMBLEandALERTinSyriaandLEMONinCyprus,thepieceswereinplaceforthe‘Balkan Invasion’ that would form the basis of the strategic cover plans for 1943 and1944,whentheAlliestookupthestrategicoffensive.67

In1943Germany’s strategicproblemwasdiffuse: the alliesmight launcha cross-Channel invasion of Europe or, having cleared the Axis from North Africa, launch aknockout blow against a tottering Italy. Matters had not been improved by Hitler’sdeclarationofwarontheUSAfollowingtheJapaneseattackatPearlHarbor.BarelyhadtheBritish achieved a break-out at ElAlamein than another powerfulAllied force hadlandedatCasablanca,OranandAlgiersinOperationTORCH.Tocoverthisnewexpeditiona notional threat wasmounted against the French coast with hardly any resources, butderivingconsiderablebenefitfromtheill-fatedDiepperaidof19August,whichhadputall the coast defences on high alert.A notional attack onNorway – SOLO I –was alsomountedandadeceptionpractisedontheassaulttroopsthemselves,calledSOLOII.This

said that theassaultwouldbemadeonDakar.OperationTOWNSMANprovidedcover forthealltoovisiblepreparationsatGibraltarwithacoverstorythattheywerepartofMaltarelief operations. But this did not account for the landing craft and other amphibiousequipmentandtheLCSwaswaryofplayinguptheDakarstorytoohighlyincaseofalertsbytheVichyFrenchortheKriegsmarine,theGermanNavy.InBarcelonaandtheVaticanindiscreetinquiriesweremaderegardingSicily,andtheresultofalltheseeffortswasthemaintenanceofsecurityandtheachievementofcompletesurprise.68TheAllieswerestillsome way short of true strategic deception, but 1943 would provide the opportunitiesnecessarytohonetheirtechniqueswhiledemonstratingdangerousweaknessesinLondon.OperationsBARCLAYandCOCKADEclearlydemonstrate thedifferencebetween‘A’Forceoperations – closely controlled and co-ordinated from the highest level while workingwith thefullco-operationof theChiefsofStaff–andthoseofLCS–relianton theco-operationoflocalChiefsofSections,whowerenotpartoftheorganizationand,perhapsunsurprisinglytherefore,didnotgetthebackingtheyrequired.

AtCasablancainJanuary1943importantdecisionsweretakenonfutureoperationsthatputtheemphasisontheoccupationofSicily,whileinAprilplanningstartedfortheeventual cross-Channel invasion following the formation and tasking of a staff underMajor-GeneralSirFrederickMorganasChiefofStafftotheSupremeAlliedCommanderDesignate (COSSAC), whose instructions included preparing ‘an elaborate camouflageanddeceptionschemetopindowntheenemyinthewestandkeepalivehisexpectationsofattackin1943’.69This immediatelypresentedBevanwithaseriousproblem,sinceatthis stage no genuine cross-Channel attack was planned. CASCADE, the order-of-battledeceptionintheMediterranean,hadasyetnocounterpartinBritain,andwithoutgenuineor notional forces to create a threat the Germans were unlikely to take one seriously.IncludedinMorgan’sstaffwasasectionresponsiblefordeception,calledOps‘B’,underLieutenant-Colonel John Jervis-Reid. Together with the LCS, Ops ‘B’ drew up a plancomprising threedistinctelementsunder theumbrellacode-nameofCOCKADE.Thefirstelementwas STARKEY, a notional attack by fourteen British and Canadian divisions toestablishabridgeheadaroundBoulognewithaD-Dayof8September.(Thiswasaseriousmistake:astrategicdeceptionplancanneverhavefixed timingssince itwillnever takeplace.)Thiswould involveanavaldemonstration.Threeweeks lateranAmericancorpswouldnotionallysail fromBritain tocaptureBrest,under thecode-nameWADHAM,andfinally, since this would be ‘called off’ for various reasons, five divisions would seizeStavangerinNorwayinOperationTINDALL.70

A false order of battle was now implemented, somewhat belatedly. OperationDUNDAS was supposed to exaggerate the British and Canadian forces, while operationLARKHILL did the same for theAmericans, although a shortage of signalling equipmentmeantthattherewaslittlecorroborativeevidencetoactasback-up.Fortunately,however,once established in theminds of FremdeHeereWest (FHW, the intelligence branch ofOKHresponsibleforthetheatre),theseforceswereusuallyacceptedasgenuine.BasedatZossen, near Berlin, under the command of the patrician Oberst Alexis, Baron vonRoenne,FHWfinallyreportedinOctober1943thattheAllieshadavailableforalandingnofewerthanforty-threedivisions,whentherealnumberwasjustseventeen.71Butthese‘divisions’wereestablishedtoolatetosaveCOCKADE.Withoutforces,realornotional,tomountthethreats,thethreatslackedallcredibilityandfoundered;insodoing,theyrisked

exposingthedoubleagentsthatwouldbesovitaltotherealinvasionthefollowingyear.OveradozensourceswereusedbytheTwentyCommitteetoputacrossCOCKADE,butbyfarthemostvaluablewereTRICYCLEandGARBO.InJulyTRICYCLEwasallowedtogotoLisbon to meet his Abwehr controller, an extremely risky thing to do. Fortunately, hereturnedwithadetailedquestionnairemainlyregardingindustrialproductionandordersofbattleandhewasabletoreingratiatehimselfwithBerlin.GARBO,aSpaniardcalledJuanPujol who had a large network of notional sub-agents, including a clutch of ‘Welshnationalists’, sent a stream of reports which included the date of 8 September for thecross-Channeloperation. Induecoursehewas forced tosendamessageannouncing itscancellation,whichcouldeasilyhavedestroyedhiscredibility.Itwastoproveextremelyfortunateforallconcernedthatthisdidnothappen.72

RepeatedattemptsweremadetoluretheLuftwaffeintobattleoverthePasdeCalais,butwithnosuccess.EvenwhenaflotillaofthirtyvesselsassemblednearDungenessandsailed towithin tenmilesof theFrenchcoast, theGermansdidnot take thebait.Arealinvasion would be a colossal undertaking, and they were not going to be drawn byanythingless.AtnostagewasOKWdeceivedastoAlliedstrategicplans.On11Julyitinformed Gerd von Rundstedt, then Oberfehlshaber West (OB, Commander-in-ChiefWest), ‘the schwerpunkt of the enemy attack on the mainland of Europe lies in theMediterranean and in all probability will remain there.’73 Although Michael Howardsuggests that von Rundstedt’s staff drew ‘highly alarming’ conclusions from thewholeexperience,thereporthequotesdoesnotgiveanimpressionoffearorpanic.74Apartfromsuitableprecautionsagainstraids,CalaisandCaenwereleftwithvirtuallynoreservesandbetween23JuneandtheendofSTARKEYGermanforcesinthewestwereactuallyreducedfromforty-fivetothirty-fivedivisions.ThisnumberbegantoriseagainonlyafterOctober.

The result was that Kesselring, who was nowOB South, had plenty of troops tomakeastandsouthofRome,thuscommittingtheAlliestoalonganddifficultcampaigninItalyand,althoughvonRundstedtremainednervousaboutlong-termdevelopmentsinBritain,hisownstaffnotedthat‘thegeneralmakeupandnumberofagentsreportsgivesrisetosuspicionsthatthematerialwasdeliberatelyallowedtoslipintotheirhands’.75Inotherwords,thedoubleagentswerecomingdangerouslyclosetobeingblown:thereweretoo many of them and some of them were dangerously high-grade. In contrast, rigidselectivity was always exercised in respect of Mediterranean agents to be used fordeception, and many were rejected for being too heavily involved with neutrals orundesirableallies.Outofaverylargenumberarrested,onlyaboutadozenwereeverusedtoformthebasisofspyrings,andoftheseallbutonewasunderpermanentrestraintandatleastfourwerecompletelynotional.Thestrictenforcementofthefalseorderofbattlewithbogusdivisionalsignsprominentlydisplayedresulted incasual travellersdoingtheworkandhelpingratherthanhinderingsecurity.76

By the same token, WADHAM came to absolutely nothing. The US VII Corps,supposedly due to launch the ‘attack’, found itself unable to co-operatewith theNavyuntil two weeks after the notional D-Day, and Brittany remained steadfastly devoid ofGerman troops.Theenemyhadbeenconvincedbyaerial recce ‘anddoubtlessbyothersources’thattheinvasionofEuropewasnotyetdue.77TINDALLwasnomoresuccessful.‘Judging by the lack of enemy recce which this operation was designed to achieve, it

would appear that the operation was a failure.’78 Having begun July with shippingmovements,airfielddisplaysandradiotraffic,TINDALLwasstooddownbeforeitactuallyhadtodoanything,ostensiblytoreleaseforcesforSTARKEY.AnFHWreportdidrefertoathreatofbetweenfourandsixdivisionson29August79andthegarrisonofNorwayneverfell below twelve divisions (albeit static low-grade formations), but any suggestion ofsuccesscanbeattributedtoHitler’sintuitivesensitivitytothreatstoScandinavia.

TheorganizationofdeceptioninBritainhadproveddangerouslyweak.Evenwhendeception had been made an intrinsic part of the operational plan, the various bodiesinvolvedinitwereinnowaysubservienttoitsrequirements.Upuntiltheendof1943theLCS had absolutely no control over the various deceptive components (Bevan laterdescribedhispositionasa‘tinpotpedestal’).TheTwentyCommitteeusedthesameagentsfordeceptionasforcounter-espionageandriskedtheirsubversionorexposure.Thiswasonly resolved later when control was transferred to Ops ‘B’ at SHAEF, making it theoperational deception organization in Britain and leaving LCS to co-ordinate plansworldwide.80

IntheMediterranean,bycontrast,along-standingfalseorderofbattletogetherwithgenuineoperationscreatedscopefordeceptiveones;athreattothesouthofFrancecouldbecreatedby the forcespreparing inNorthAfricawhile Italycouldbewrittenoff as adeadend,and the threat to theBalkans fromNinth,TenthandTwelveArmiescouldbemaintained. Ever since TORCH, the Hungarians and Romanians had been convinced ofAllied plans to land in the Balkans. This was a view they pushed forcefully to theGermans and which found favour, while the continuing success of Josip Broz Tito’spartisans in Yugoslavia had led to the dispatch of a British military mission, focusingattentionyetfurtherontheBalkans.ThesedevelopmentspermittedtheBritishtodisguiseSicily as the real objective by bringing the false order of battle into playwith notionalassaults on Greece, Sardinia and Corsica. Following discussions between Clarke andBevan, ‘A’ Force continued to operate as before,with general guidance from the LCS.There was also the added bonus of the French joining the Allies, under Admiral JeanDarlan,whichmeant theadditionof theDeuxièmeBureauandadditionaldoubleagentsunderitscontrol, includingWHISKERS,LLAMAand,most importantly,GILBERT,whowasultimatelytoproveasvaluableasGARBO.81

OperationBARCLAYwascreatedfromdirectiongivenbytheLCSinApril1943,butitsdetailwasplannedby‘A’Force.ItsprincipalaimwastosecuremaximumsurpriseforOperationHUSKY,theinvasionofSicilyduetotakeplaceinJuly.Itwasalsointendedtoweaken thegarrisonand retard its reinforcement,particularlybyGerman troops, and todrawoffairandnavalforcesthatmightinterferewiththeoperation.Thiswasadifficultandsubtletaskbecause,asChurchillsaidoftherealobjectiveatthetime:‘Anybodybutadamn fool would know it was Sicily.’ The deception was aimed at containing enemyforcesinSardinia,CorsicaandthesouthernBalkansbysimulatingpreparationstoattacktheseareas fromNorthAfricaand theMiddleEast,andalso toencourage theenemytobelieve that Allied amphibious operations would only be conducted in periods of nomoon.82Thecoverstorywas that thiswouldbe the real ‘SecondFront’,but inorder todraw off German troops secondary assaults would be launched against southern andnorthernFrancebyAlexander,whileLieutenant-GeneralGeorgeS.Pattonwouldby-pass

Sicily and Italy, and assault Sardinia and Corsica. The notional British Twelfth Armywould assault Crete and the Peloponnese, supposedly at the end ofMay, but the vitalelementwaspostponementongroundsthatwouldbebelievable,sinceifthingswerebuiltup and nothing happened, enemy vigilance would relax. In fact there would be two‘postponements’,thesecondofwhichwouldtakethenotionalD-DaytotheendofJuly,beyondthegenuineone.83

Asitwasimpossibletopersuadeairforcecommanderstodevotemanyresourcestothe diverse targets necessary to draw off enemy attention, andwith preparations goingaheadinTunisandBizerta,thesewerealwaysgoingtobeadifficultobjectivetoachieve,especially when on 11 June the island of Pantelleria was captured with 11,000 ItalianprisonersandoneBritishcasualty (a soldierbittenbyamule).Amajor radiodeceptionwas created, based largely on Twelfth Army in Cairo, and Victor Jones turned 74thArmouredBrigade into ‘8thArmouredDivision’,whileTobrukwas filledwith dummylanding craft together with a genuine anti-aircraft brigade, fuel and other logisticinstallations. This provided the background for Major Martin’s misfortune, and whatBevancalled‘thecrucialMINCEMEATletter’toldtheGermanswhatothersourcesalreadyledthemtobelieve.TheAbwehrpassedthedocumentstoFHW(whowereusuallyverysceptical about the former’s information) and FHW passed it to theWehrmachtführungsstab(OKWoperationssection).ThroughoutthetwomonthsfollowingthediscoveryofMajorMartin,OKWcontinuedtogivemaximumprioritytoGreece.

ThemeasureofBARCLAY‘S success is that between9Marchand10 July the totalnumberofGermandivisions in theBalkans rose fromeight to eighteen, and inGreecefrom one to eight.84 The formal inquest declared that it was ‘the largest exercise insystematicdeceptionyetattemptedintheMediterraneantheatre’.Captureddocumentsandprisoner interrogation onSicily showed the totality of the surprise achieved, ameasureassistedby thegenuinemovements of the invasion fleetswhich, supposedly targeted atGreece, converged in the general area of Malta and suddenly turned north in thedarkness.85 Indeed, suchwas its success that, as theAllied invasion fleetapproached intheroughandunfavourableweather,theItalianadmiralinchargeofthecoastaldefenceswaswokenwithnews thatanarmadawas in thenarrows: ‘Well,’he said, ‘at least theyaren’tcominghere,’andwentbacktosleep.86

Thesuccessof‘A’Forcewasdueprincipallytothefact thateightypercentof theworkhadalreadybeendoneinthepainstakingassemblyandsellingtotheGermansofthethree almost entirely bogus armies ofCASCADE. Thismeant that in Paiforce (Ninth andTenthArmiesinPersiaandIraq)fullytendivisionswereconcocted,including31stIndianArmoured Division and three from the Polish Army of the East. CASCADE, in fact,comprised isolated (andoften true) itemsof informationprovidedby themilitary,navaland air forces and the various Thirty Committees (the Middle Eastern versions of theTwenty Committee, each chaired by an ‘A’ Force representative and based on Cairo,Beirut and Baghdad) in order to give a misleading overall picture to the enemy. Forexample,theassemblyoflandingcraft inEgyptwithparticularlylargeconcentrationsatAlexandriaandTobrukfelltoThirtyandThirty-OneCommittees;airfieldpreparationsinEgypt, Syria and Cyprus to Thirty-One Committee; and the arrival of 56th (London)DivisioninIraqfromtheWesternDesertintransittoSyriatoThirty-OneandThirty-Two

Committees. Following such items as these would come low-grade observations andgossip,suchasthefearsofCairotaxidriversthatmoreAussietroopswereexpectedfromPalestine,thearrivalofPolishofficersfromPersiaandthearrestofanofficerfortryingtochangespecialGreekmoneyinabarinAlgiers.87

Tomaintain credibility in a long-running deception, it is necessary to possess anescape clause. The constant failure of Ninth, Tenth and Twelfth Armies actually to doanythingmight have been expected to arouseGerman suspicions and the failure of theAllies to invade theBalkans could have discredited the double agents.But three thingsensuredthecredibilityoftheplan.Thefirstwasthemeticulouswaythatthefalseorderofbattlewasmaintained,particularlybyradiotraffic.ThesecondwasthefallofMussoliniand the Italian surrender,whichmade the invasion of Sicily appear to be an expedienttakeninchangedcircumstances.(AfterthelandingonSicilytheGermansdiscoveredthecode-nameHUSKYbutascribedittoanassaultonGreeceinwhichtheassaultforceswereto have taken part.88) The third was the shipping calculation. However strong Alliedground forcesmightgrow, the limited availabilityof shippingandespeciallyof landingcraftrestrictedtheoptionsavailable.TheGermansthereforebelievedthenotionalarmieswerebeingkeptfromactiononlybyashortageofshipping.

The great strength of ‘A’ Force’s deception came from its being a continuousprocess,withmajorcoverplansdovetailingintooneanotherandbasedfirmlyonthefalseorderofbattlewhichClarkehadinauguratedwhenhefirstjoinedWavell.ThusthecoverplantorelieveMalta,basedonaboguscorpsinCyprusbelongingtoNinthArmy(itselflargelybogus),mergedintoandcontinuedtoassistBARCLAY,andBARCLAYwouldgoonto assist BODYGUARD. When there were no longer any real forces to speak of, it waspossibletoabandontruthsforoutrightliesandstilltocontinuetheillusion.89

7

NavalDeception‘...hecommunedwithhiscounsellors,andallwereofonemindtofollowuptheGenoese,sotheyhoistedsailandpursuedafterthem.Butyoumustknowthattheyweredeceived.’

MartinodeCanale

THEAGEOFSAILVEGETIUS, WRITING IN the fourth century AD, describes how Roman skiffs used forreconnaissancehadtheirsailsandriggingdyedVenetianblue

whichresemblestheoceanwaves;thewaxusedtopayships’sidesisalsodyed.Thesailorsandmarinesput onVenetian blue uniforms also, so as to lie hiddenwith greater easewhen scouting by day as bynight.1

Warfareatseahasobviouslybeensubjecttobluffanddeceptionforaslongaswarfareonland. In 1264, during the longwars with Venice, the Genoese decided to intercept the‘caravanoftheLevant’,anannualconvoythattheVenetianssailedtoEgyptandAsia.Thecaravanwas an event of greatmoment. Its dates of departure and returnwere fixed bystrict laws, aswere the numbers ofmen on each vessel and the conduct of the convoyitself.Thecommanders andcaptainswere chosenby theGreatCouncil and in timesofwar the Senate pronounced the chiusura delMare (‘closing of the sea’), a decree thatforbadeanyvesselfromleavingtheconvoy,whilearrangementswouldbemadetoescortitwithwargalleys.TheGenoesewellunderstoodtheimportanceofthisconvoytoVeniceanddecidedtosendSimoneGrillowithtwentygalleys,twolargevesselsandacontingentof3,500men to intercept it. In reply, theVenetiansassembleda forceofno fewer thanforty-seven galleys under ‘a braveman andwise, and sprung of high lineage’, AndreaBarozzi.This‘noblecaptain’setoutforSicilyexpectingtointercepttheGenoesebeforetheyinturncouldattackthecaravan.

AlasforBarozzi,onthisoccasionhiswisdomfailedhim.TheGenoesewereindeedthere,butallhefoundwas‘aboatinwhichthereweremenwhotoldhimoninquirythattheGenoese galleys had passed four days previously, bound for Syria’. After a hastilyassembledcouncilofwar,Barozzi setoff ina fruitlesspursuit andas soonas thenewsreachedVeniceordersweregivenfortheimmediatedepartureofthecaravan,whichhadbeendelayedowing to the supposedpresenceof the enemy in theAdriatic.Grillo nowemergedandputhisfleetintopositionatDurazzotoawaitthearrivalofthecaravan,themovementsofwhichhewaskeptfullyinformedofbyanunderwriteroftheGreatCouncil(who,thechroniclesnotewithbarbedacidity,camefromTreviso).Wheninduecoursethecaravanwas intercepted, its commander,MicheleDuaro, tried bravado, throwing somechickencoopsinfrontoftheGenoeselineandbiddingthemfightthechickens.However,thisservednopurposeandwithnoescortofwarshipsthecaravanwassoondestroyed,asgrievousablowtoVenetianprestigeastohermaterialwell-being.2

Notonlydoesthisepisodeillustrateanearlyexampleofdeceptioninnavalwarfare,but italsoshows the importanceofcommerce tonavalstrategy.While theprinciplesofwarfare and of deception apply equally on land and at sea, there are obviously

fundamentaldifferences.Whilelandwarfareisfoughtwithunitscontainingthousandsofmenandhundredsofpiecesofequipment,navalwarfareisconductedwithdozensofunitsor(moreusually)fewer,eachofrelativelygreatvalue.Moreimportantly,itisfoughtoveravastarea,withnonaturalcover.Thesizeoftheshipsalsomakesithardtoconcealordisguise them and their shapes make identification of their nationality and class quitesimple, so that deception is difficult – but not impossible. Since itwas common in thedaysofsailtocaptureenemyshippingratherthantodestroyit,itwasequallycommonforforeign-built ships to serve with the navies that had captured them, and therefore notunusualtoseethembearingdifferentcoloursfromtheircountryoforigin.*Overtheyearsmany other measures have been adopted to suggest that a ship is not what it appears,givingplentyofscopefortacticaldeception.

ThomasCochrane, tenthEarl ofDundonald,was a daring and inspirational leaderwho was always prepared to use guile combined with forethought and audacity toovercome large odds, in other words a master of deception. He was convinced (andproved) that a single ship correctly handled, preying on coastal shipping and coastdefences, could cause the enemy loss and distress out of all proportion to the effortexpended. He took great pains over the training and welfare of his men and this paiddividends in their performance. His first commandwas the 168-ton brigHMS Speedy,which he operated off the Spanish coast in 1800. Knowing the Spaniards would sooncometorecognizehisvesselforanenemy,herepaintedittoresembletheneutralDutchshipClomer,whichhadbeentradingintheareaforsometime.HealsorecruitedaDanishspeakerwhomheprovidedwithaDanishuniform.TowardstheendofDecemberhegavechasetowhatappearedtobeaheavilyladen,unarmedmerchantman,onlytodiscoverashedrewnearthathetoohadbeenduped.ItwasaSpanishfrigatewithsome200menandheavyguns,whichnowputdownaboat.HeorderedbeloweveryonewholookedBritish,andsethis‘Dane’ to tell theSpaniardstheywereneutrals.Whenthisfailedtoput themoff,oneofhismenhoistedayellowflag(quarantine)totheforetopandthe‘Dane’saidthey were just out of Algiers. The Spanish knew that Algiers was suffering from anoutbreakofbubonicplagueandquicklyreturnedwhencetheyhadcome.

ThreemonthslaterCochranewaschasedbyanenemyfrigate,whichgainedonhimthroughout thedayandwasguidedatnightby the faintglimmerof light from the littlebrig.Butastheydrewneartowardsdaybreak,theenemyfrigatefoundithadbeenchasinga tubwith a lantern in it and thebrigwasnowhere tobe seen.Cochrane laterused thesameruseagain.CommandingthefrigateHMSPallasinMarch1805,hewaschasedbythree French 74-gun ships of the line off the Azores. After conducting a brilliantmanœuvretorunbackonthem,hewaspursuedfortherestofthedayandallnight,butwhentheyclosedinfor thekillall theyfoundwasaballastedcaskwitha lanternmadefasttoit.3

Captain Raphael Semmes and the Confederate cruiser CSS Alabama forged aformidablereputationasacommerceraider.TheAlabamasanknofewerthaneighty-threeUSmerchantmen aswell as the heavier gunboatUSSHatteras (which she lured to herdoom by pretending to be a merchant blockade runner4), and was probably the mostfamousshipintheworldatthetime.TheUSSKearsargehadbeenpursuingtheAlabamafor a year in European waters when, as she lay at anchor in the Scheldt estuary nearVlissingenonSunday12June1864,hercaptain,JohnA.Winslow, receivedwordfrom

the US minister in Paris that his elusive quarry had steamed into Cherbourg the daybefore.Winslow wasted no time and two days later found his prey still in Cherbourgroads,where he stopped engines and lay to.Unable to engagewithin the confines of aneutral port,Winslow retired beyond the three-mile limit required by international law,intendingtointerceptAlabamawhensheemergedHetookprecautionsagainstasurprisenightattackbutwasmostworriedthatAlabamamighttrytoslipaway.Thefollowingday,however,hereceivedanotefromSemmesviatheAmericanvice-consulthatindicatedhisintentiontofightattheearliestopportunityandbeggingWinslownottodepart.

The twoshipswereevenlymatched.Bothwere three-mastedandsteam-propelled,andiftheKearsargemountedacombinedbroadsidefiring365poundstotheAlabama‘stotalbroadsideof264pounds,thelatter’sBlakelygunsoutrangedandweremoreaccuratethan the Dahlgrens of the Kearsarge. However, the speed and manœuvrability of theAlabama were declining and Semmes had intended to put her into dry dock for twomonthsandthoroughlycleanthekeelandoverhaultheboilers.Nevertheless,hewroteinhisjournalthat‘thecombatwillnodoubtbecontestedandobstinate,butthetwoshipsareso evenlymatched that I do not feel at liberty to decline it.’ He had confidence in the‘precioussetofrascals’thatwashiscrew.Besides,hisluckhadneveryetfailedhimandhebusiedthecrewpreparingtheship,waitingforSunday,whichhedeemedhisluckyday.

Sunday dawned bright, clear and cool and after a leisurely breakfast theAlabamawas cheered out to sea by crowds along the mole and in the upper windows of thebuildings,whereafineviewcouldbehadoftheforthcomingaction.Excursiontrainshadbrought sightseers fromParis, andCherbourgwaspackedwithexcitedcrowds shouting‘ViventlesConfedérés!’InanewdressuniformSemmesdeliveredastirringoratorytohismenbefore taking stationon thehorseblock just before themizzenmast.Then at 1057hours,withwatchinhand,atarangeofaboutamile,heaskedhisexecutiveofficerifhewasready:‘Thenyoumayfireatonce,sir.’

Nohitswerescoredastherangeclosedtohalfamile,whenWinslowreturnedthefireandthetwoshipsbegantocircletostarboard,firingfuriouslyateachother.ABlakelyroundscoredadirecthitonthesternpostoftheKearsargebutfortunatelyforWinslowitwasadud.Athree-knotcurrentboretheshipswestwardandasitdidsosotheircirclesbecametighteruntiltherangedroppedtoaboutaquarterofamilebytheseventhandfinalrevolution.Once theywereon target, theUSguns inflicted tremendousdamage.At thesametime,SemmeswatchedinhorroraseverythinghisowngunsfiredattheKearsargebouncedharmlesslyoffthesides,includingsolidshot.Realizingthedesperatestateofhisold vessel, Semmes ordered full sail for the coast butKearsargewas not to be denied.WhenSemmessawthewreckagetowhichthelowerdeckshadbeenreduced,heorderedthecolours tobe struck saying: ‘Itwillneverdo in thisnineteenthcentury forus togodown,andthedeckscoveredwithourgallantwounded.’Captainandcrewabandonedtherapidly sinking ship,whichwentdownat1224hours, justninetyminutesafter shehadopenedtheaction.

Only after the battle didSemmesdiscover that theKearsarge had120 fathomsofsheetchainsuspendedfromscupperstowaterline,bolteddownandconcealedbehindaninchofplanking:hehadbeenfightinganironclad!Semmesprotestedthiswasunfair. ‘Itwasthesamething’,hesaid,‘asiftwomenweretogooutandfightaduel,andoneof

them, unknown to the other, were to put on a suit of mail under his outer garment.’Perhaps, but Commodore David Farragut had employed the same stratagem two yearspreviously,whenheranpastthefortsintoNewOrleans.5

STEAMANDSTEELThedevelopmentof the ironclad increased thesizeandcostofships.At thesame time,improved armaments increased the range atwhich actionswere fought and reduced thescopeforcapture,makingsinkingamorelikelyoutcomeofanactionandthusmakingitincreasingly difficult and expensive to replace losses. But losses must be accepted ifcontrolof theseas is tobegainedandmaintained,as itmustbe ifcommerce is toflowunhindered.However,theofficialhistoryoftheFirstWorldWardescribeshow

byastrangemisreadingofhistory,anideahadgrownupthat[afleet’s]primaryfunctionistoseekoutanddestroytheenemy’smainfleet.Thisview,beingliteraryratherthanhistorical,wasnowhereadoptedwithmoreunctionthaninGermany,wheretherewasnonavaltraditiontotestitsaccuracy.6

OntheoneoccasiontheGermanBattleFleetdidentertheNorthSeatofulfilitsaim,itachievedamarginal tacticalvictoryover theBritish (insimple termsof losses)at theBattleof Jutland,but therecanbenodoubt as to the strategic resultof thebattle.7TheBritishdidnotdeceivetheGermansbutsimplyfacedthemdown,andtheGermanBattleFleetspenttheremainderofthewarsittingidlyinportwhiletheBritishnavalblockadehelpedsqueezeGermanytoultimatedefeat.However,BritishnervousnessoftheGermanBattleFleetforcedhertodenudesomeothervitalpositionsofdestroyers,suchasDover.ThustheDoverpatrolhadtorelyonblufftopreventGermannavalforcesoperatingfromtheBelgianportsfrominterferingwiththevitalcross-Channeltraffic.8

Meanwhile, Britain herself came perilously close to being squeezed to defeat byGermany’s commerce raiders and U-boats during both world wars. An early effort tocounterthisthreatwascamouflagepaintschemes.Transportandcargoshipswerepaintedneutralblue,greyorsea-greeninthehopeofavoidingdetectionforaslongaspossible.Warships, on the other hand, are not looking to avoid contact but instead require everyfightingadvantagetheycanmuster,particularlyintheearlystagesofanaction.Oneresultwas a proposal by an eminent Scottish zoologist, John Graham Kerr, whose study ofmarinevertebratessuggested thatoddpatternsofwhiteandgreymighthelpmakeshipshardertoidentify.AlthoughtheAdmiraltycirculatedhissuggestionsasearlyasOctober1914, it left responsibility to individual captains and was later shelved. It took furtherprompting from another painter, P. Tudor Hart, and an RNVR lieutenant, NormanWilkinson (a marine painter and poster designer who had served in the Dardanellescampaign)whowrote to theAdmiraltyon27April1917, tocreatewhatwasknownas‘dazzle’camouflage.Inpoorvisibility,atlongrangeorathighspeed,thisservedtohinderan observer’s ability to identify a vessel accurately, perhaps long enough to give it aprecious advantage. It also made judging the vessel’s speed more difficult – veryimportantwhentryingtofireatlongrange.Gunneryofficersandsubmarinecaptainshadto ‘track’ moving ships on calibrated range-finders and periscopes, but the patterndistortedtheimageandmadeithardertosecureahit.Refinementsofthesametechniqueincludedfalsebowwavestogivetheimpressionofgreaterspeed,falsewaterlineswhichwere designed to inhibit accurate estimation of range, and painting the upper works alighter colour to blend them with the sky. The effectiveness of the technique was

questionable but it raised morale and was therefore retained, mainly for merchantshipping.9 Nevertheless, during the Second World War the Admiralty Research andDevelopment Section employed the naturalist and artist Peter Scott to develop furtherpatterns.

Thevulnerabilityofshippingtoaircraft,demonstratedamongotherinstancesbythedestructionofHMSRepulseandPrinceofWalesbytheJapaneseon11December1941,made it essential to camouflage ships from the air.On the open ocean, ships could notavoid being spotted by aircraft in the vicinity. For example, a US aircraft north ofGuadalcanal flying at 18,000 feet spotted five destroyers belonging to Rear-AdmiralTanaka’s ‘Tokyo Express’ at a distance of eight to tenmiles, and sighting fast-movingwarshipsatgreaterrangeswasnotunheardofingoodconditions.10Attemptsweremadetodesign patterns that gave some protection from aerial attack, but these were seldomeffective,atleastwhileashipwasatsea.Eventually,technicaldevelopmentssuchasradarandacoustictorpedoesmadedazzlepatternslargelyredundant,buttheycontinuedinusethroughouttheSecondWorldWar.11

Ifashipwas inshore,by itsverynature itmightbe found ifaircraft looked in thebays, rivers and ports. Paint might go some way to protect it in such circumstances,blending itwith its surroundings just longenough toputabombaimeroff,butaphotointerpretercouldprobablyidentifyitsclasspreciselyandthusrevealitsspeed,firepowerandcargocapacity.Nets and,where appropriate, cutvegetationmighthelp tomake thetell-taleshapeofashipblendinwiththeshorelineandbargesandfloatingmaterialcouldbeusedtobreakupthecharacteristicshapeofbowandstern.12

AnotherearlymeasureadoptedtocounterU-boatswasthearmingofmerchantshipsin1915,whichwasfollowedbythecreationofQ-ships.Theseweremerchantshipsarmedwithconcealedgunsandtorpedoesmannedbynavalcrews,designedtoluretheU-boats–which preferred to destroy merchant vessels by gunfire – to a position where theythemselvescouldbedestroyed.*TheQ-shipswereeventuallycreditedwithelevenU-boatkills out of a total for the First World War of 192.13 During both wars the Germansoperated similar ships as merchant raiders. Perhaps the most famous example was theAtlantis,commandedbyKapitänzurSeeBernardRoggeduring theSecondWorldWar,one of nine such shipswhich sank850,000 tons ofAllied shipping andkept theAlliesbusyforthreeandahalfyears.TheAtlantisloggedover100,000milesin622daysatseaand accounted for twenty-twoAllied freighters,makingher themost successful surfaceraiderofthewar.InthecourseofherwanderingsshepretendedvariouslytobetheKrim(Russian),theKasiiMaru(Japanese),theAbbekerk(Dutch)andtheAntenor(British).

Carrying huge stocks of fuel and food, Atlantis mounted behind collapsablebulkheadsanarmamentofone75mmandsix150mmgunsandsixlightanti-aircraftguns,plusfourtorpedotubes,minesandaHeinkelHe-114seaplaneforreconnaissance.Shehada dummy stack and cargo booms and carried a variety of fake foreign uniforms andclothing,maleandfemale,whichthecrewcoulduseasappropriate.Inaddition,therewasa large supply of paint to change her name and the colour of the superstructure. It isperfectly legal for a ship to operate in this fashion, providing it displays the correctnational flag before opening fire, and Rogge adhered strictly to this law, as well asendeavouringwheneverpossibletopickupsurvivors,whoweretreatedgraciously.

Roggetrainedhisgunnerstoshootoutavictim’sradioequipmentfirst,whichwouldallowtheremainderofhisoperationtotakeplaceinslowtime.Nonetheless,astreamofQQQmessages(‘Iambeingattackedbyadisguisedmerchantship’)eventuallyhelpedtheAdmiraltytotrackhimdown.ThefinalcluetoAtlantis‘swhereaboutsinNovember1941was provided by ULTRA intercepts ordering her to resupply submarines south of theEquator.On22NovemberaseaplanefromHMSDevonshire(senttonearbyFreetowntolookforher)sightedasuspiciousmerchantshipandopenedfirewhileAtlantiswasintheprocessofreplenishingU-126.Roggetriedonelastdesperatetrick.Hesignalledurgently(andindignantly)thathewasthePolyphemus,aDutchship,thengavethesignalRRR:anAlliedcipherthatanenemywarshipwascloseby.UnbeknowntoRogge,thiscipherhadrecently been changed to four Rs. A new precautionary system introduced by theAdmiralty to plot the whereabouts of every single known ocean-going merchantmanconfirmedDevonshire‘s suspicions and when word came from Freetown that this shipcouldnotpossiblybePolyphemus,Roggeandhiscrewwereforcedtotaketotheboats.14Afraid of lurking U-boats, Devonshire made off, and after a series of extraordinaryadventuresRoggeandthesurvivorswereeventuallypickedupbyU-boatsandreturnedtoGermany.

THEBATTLEOFTHERIVERPLATEThe introductionof air power and submarines radically transformednavalwarfare.Thesubmarine was eventually defeated by the convoy system among other things, but thethreatposedbythepocketbattleshipsoftheKriegsmarinewassomethingverydifferent.The escorts normally assigned to convoys might be able to deal with submarines, butdestroyersandcorvetteswouldbedefencelessagainstthe11-inch(280mm)gunsmountedbyAdmiralGrafSpeeandDeutschland,bothofwhichhadputtoseabeforetheoutbreakofhostilitiesinAugust1939.

Graf Spee sank just nine ships in her short career, but the success of commerceraidersisnotmeasuredmerelyintermsofsinkings.Theycompletelydisruptedcommercesimply by being at sea and the Royal Navy was forced to deploy no fewer than ninehuntinggroupstolookforher,mostofthemwithdrawnfromothertheatres.TheyaffectedtheoperationsofsoldiersandairmenservingasfarapartasEgyptandSingapore,andtheAllieswerereaping thebenefitsofherdestructionas lateas1944.15Afteroperations intheIndianandSouthAtlanticOceansGrafSpeedevelopedengineproblemsandKapitänzurSeeHansLangsdorff,anxious to increasehis scorebeforeheading forGermany forrepairs,madefor theRiverPlate,whereheexpected to interceptaconvoy.CommodoreHenryHarwood,commandingForceG(thelightcruisersHMSAjaxandHMNZSAchillesandthecruiserHMSExeter),anticipatedthemove.Afteraneighty-minutebattlefoughton 13 December, Exeter was forced to withdraw and Ajax and Achilles forced todisengage.

However,GrafSpeewasalsobadlydamagedandfledtothePlateestuary,whereshesoughtrefugeinneutralMontevideo.Bothsidesnowfaceddilemmas.Anestimatedfourdayswere required for the repairsLangsdorff needed, but international lawwould onlygranthimseventy-twohoursunless theGermanembassycouldpersuade theUruguayangovernment otherwise. Alternatively, he could make a break for neutral but friendlierBuenosAiresfartheruptheestuaryorouttotheopensea.Meanwhile,theBritishwished

to keepGrafSpee in harbour for at least four dayswhile reinforcements rushed to thescene.IfGrafSpeemadeabreakfortheocean,itcouldeasilysinkAjaxandAchillesintheprocess.InthisinstanceadeceptionwasneededtohideBritishweakness.

WhileAchilles,theonlyshipvisiblefromshore,sentastringofmessagesasifothershipswerewaitingjustoverthehorizon,BritishdiplomatsloudlydemandedthattheGrafSpeeshouldleavewithintwenty-fourhours,tosuggestthattheBritishwerekeentofinishheroff.16Forafewdaysatleastitwouldbepossibletopreventherdoingjustthatbythetiming of departingBritishmerchant ships,which could each claim twenty-four hours’graceundertheHagueConvention.Meanwhile,rumourswereplantedbythediplomatsinwaterfront bars and casual conversation with other diplomats to the effect that thebattlecruiserHMSRenownandtheaircraftcarrierHMSArkRoyalhadleftCapeTownon12December andwould shortly be on station. The appearance of another light cruiserfromtheFalklands,HMSCumberland,addedsomecredibilitytothereports.

Langsdorffwassuddenlygivenbriefhope lateon16December,whenhe receivedreportsthatRenownandArkRoyalwereinfactinRiodeJaneiro,onlytobedisillusionedwhen theharbourmaster informedhim thataBritishmerchantmanhaddepartedat1815hours that evening, meaning he could not leave himself until 1815 hours on the 17th.Since his seventy-two hours would be up shortly afterwards and the British squadronoffshorewouldinallprobabilitybeabletoshadowhimanddirectthemorepowerfulunitsto complete his destruction, the following day Langsdorff scuttled his ship and shothimself.17

THEINVASIONOFNORWAY

On2April1940HitlerdecidedtoinvadeScandinavia,settingtheinvasiondateasthe9th.Atmiddayon8April1940,whileonpatrolintheSkagerrak,thePolishsubmarineOrzelsurfacedtochallengealargesteamerthatwasheadingnorth.WhenitdiscoveredthiswastheGermantransportRiodeJaneiro,Orzelgavethecrewandpassengerstimetotaketothe boats before sinking her by torpedo.Orzel slipped beneath the surface again as aNorwegian destroyer and fishing boats arrived to pick up the men in the extremelycrowdedlifeboats.ThelatterwerealarmedtofindthatmanyofthemenpickedupwereGerman soldiers in uniform, who readily announced that they were on their way to‘protect’BergenfromtheBritish.This‘TrojanHorse’transportwasoneofsevenassignedto eightgroupsorganized for the treacherous invasionofNorway,whoseneutralityhadbeenguaranteedbyGermany.However, this timelydiscovery (madepublicbyReuter’sthatsameevening)failed torouse theNorwegiangovernment,whorefused tobelieve itandfailedeventoalertthecoastdefences.MobilizationhadnotyetbeenconsideredandneitherdidtheBritishAdmiraltyreacteffectively,despiteitslongstandingplanstooccupyNarviksoastodenyit–andtheironoreroutefromSweden–totheNazis.18

In fact, theBritish plan had been an important factor in determining the Führer’sdecision, and it also provided a means of deception to the Kriegsmarine, who wereextremely nervous that the Royal Navymight inflict colossal damage on their meagresurface fleet. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, had finallypersuaded the Allied Supreme War Council to mine the Norwegian Leads (OperationWILFRED)on8Apriland,anticipatingaviolentGerman reaction,a smallAnglo-French

force was to be sent to Narvik with other contingents to Trondheim, Bergen andStavanger,inwhatwasknownas‘PlanR-4’.19BritishforceswerethereforeembarkingatGlasgow and Rosyth simultaneously with Germans in Hamburg and Kiel. To preventBritishinterferencewiththeirowninvasion,theGermansusedtheBritishplanasthebasisforafeint.TheB-Dienst(theGermannavalcode-breakingandmonitoringservice,whichhadgiventheGermanswarningofBritishplans)alertedthemtothesailingoftheBritishinvasion convoys and a strong force of battle-cruisers and destroyers would sailimmediately to threaten it. As expected, the heavy units of the British Home Fleetwithdrew northwards to protect their own convoy and left theGermans a free hand insouthernNorway.20

TheGerman invasion groupswent furtherwith their tactical deception, producingdetailed orders for ‘Deception and Camouflage in the Invasion of Norway’. TheseinstructednavalunitstodisguisethemselvesasBritish,witharrangements‘tobemadetoenableBritishwarflagstobeilluminated’.Ifwarningshotswerefiredatthem,theywereto signal: ‘Stop firing.British ship.Good friend.’21TheGerman forceentered theKorsFjordapproachtoBergenat0200hoursonthemorningof9April,aidedbyfog.Whenilluminated by searchlights and challenged by a patrol vessel, a signal from theKölnidentified herself asHMSCairo. This seemed to satisfy theNorwegians, and the shipssweptonunhindered.At0430hoursaNorwegiandestroyerreceivedasignalinEnglishthat ‘I amproceeding toBergen fora shortvisit,’whichprovedsufficient togetby thechallenge.22AtthesametimetheHansestadtDanzigmooredatapierinCopenhagenanddischargedabattalion to seize theDanishcapitalwithhardlya shot fired, and theNazipartyorgantheVölkischerBeobachterprintedabannerheadlinethatscreamed‘GERMANY

SAVESSCANDINAVIA!’23

THECHANNELDASH

TheastonishingsuccessofOperationCERBERUS(theescapeoftheGermanbattle-cruisersScharnhorstandGneisenau from theFrenchportofBrest),whichhumiliated theRoyalNavyinFebruary1942,owedmuchtoGermandeceptionefforts,assistedbygoodfortuneand British lethargy. The British had no intelligence contingency plan after the fall ofFrance in 1940, and relied partly on Polish sources. One large spy ring under RomanGarby-Czeriawskihadplentyofnavalintelligence,butitalsodevelopedcontactswiththeAbwehrandthisprovedfataltoitinearly1942.TheGermanswerethenabletousetheringtodeceive theBritishover theseaworthinessofScharnhorstandGneisenau shortlybeforetheChannelDashwasmade.24GermannavallossesintheNorwaycampaignhadbeen disastrous and went a long way to scuppering realistic hopes of invading GreatBritain.Thelossthefollowingyearofhermostpowerfulbattleship,theBismarck,caughtand sunkwhile running for the sanctuary ofBrest, left the remainder of the forcewithwhichshehadbeenduetooperateeffectivelytrappedthere.Hitlerdecidedthatsomethingdecisivewas about to happen inNorway and that the battle-cruisers, togetherwith theheavy cruiserPrinzEugen, should be redeployed there to operatewithBismarck‘s newsistershipTirpitz.Heinsisted,however,thatthismustbeachievedviatheshortestroute,straightuptheEnglishChannel.

Hitler’snavalplannerswerehorrifiedwhenhandedthisorderon12January1942.It

seemed a suicidal mission since the RAF, which had been using the three ships forbombingpractice,wouldbeinapositiontohammerthemtheentirelengthoftheroute.VizeadmiralOtto Ciliax decided to base his plan on the premise thatwhile the BritishexpectedhimtomakearunuptheChannel,hewouldbeabletodeceivethemastotheprecisetimeandroute.Securitywasessential:noradiotrafficwassentandthecrewswerekeptstrictlyinthedark.SincetheDoverstraitswerethemostvulnerablestretch,itwouldbe reasonable to time the run to pass through them in darkness but thiswouldmean adaylightdeparture.Alternatively,anight-timedeparturecouldusethecoverofaroutinetrainingexercisetoconcealhistrueintentions,atleastuntilthefollowingday.

Ciliaxaccordinglydrewupatimetableforheavyairescortandfordestroyerandfastpatrolboatsupport.Theminesweepingnecessarytocleartheroutehadtobeundertakenvery carefully so as not to alert suspicion, with the last gaps only covered at the finalmoment.AtthesametimeFrenchdockworkerswereallowedtoseedrumsoflubricatingoilprominently labelledLubrifiantsColoniaux (highviscosity forhot climates) and sunhelmetsandtropicalclothingwereorderedfromFrenchsuppliers.Theship’sdepartureonthenightof11Februarycouldnotpossiblybeconcealed,butthestoryoffleetexercisesandgunnerytrialsintheBayofBiscaywasreinforcedbyensuringthattheFrenchharbourauthoritiessentouttheirtargettowingvesselstotheexercisearea,andtugsandnet-layingvesselswerereadyfortheships’‘return’thefollowingday.AhuntingpartywasarrangedatRambouilletonthe12thandmanyseniorofficersacceptedinvitations.

AfterbeingdelayedbyanairraidandwhenScharnhorsthitatorpedonet,thethreeheavyshipswithanescortofsixdestroyersturnedfirstnorthandtheneast.Bydaybreakthey had been joined by fifteen large torpedo boats and thirty fast patrol boats, whileconstantrelaysoffightersprovidedaircover.CiliaxwasrighttoassumethathecouldnotdeceivetheBritishastohisaim,andtheAdmiraltyproducedanestimateatthebeginningofthemonthpredictingabreak-outthroughtheChannel.ButtheHomeFleetremainedatScapaFlowwhiletheFirstSeaLord,AdmiralSirDudleyPound,remainedsceptical.On8February Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip Joubert, Commander-in-Chief RAF CoastalCommand,forecastabreak-outwithinthenextfewdaysandorderedminestobelaidinthemost probablegaps clearedby theGermans,whileCommander (laterVice-AdmiralSir)NormanDenningat theOperational IntelligenceCentre in theAdmiraltypersuadedtheFlagOfficerSubmarines,AdmiralMaxHorton,tostationHMSubmarineSealionoffBrest.

Unfortunately for the prescient Denning, Sealion had withdrawn at the crucialmomenttodeeperwater,thefirstofaseriesofstrokesoflucktoassistCiliax’sdash.TheRAFpatroldetailedtowatchtheporthadbeenforcedtoreturntobasewithadefectiveradarandbythetimeitwasbackonstationitsneighbourhadalsodevelopedadefectiveradar and the weather had deteriorated to provide further cover.Moreover, even whenfullyoperational theBritish radarswereverysusceptible to jamming.Consequently, theGermanswereonly spottedby theRAFat 1035hourson the12thby aSpitfire offLeTouquet as they were approaching the Straits of Dover, charging along at full speed.Attackswerebelatedlylaunchedbutallfailed,andtheonlydamagetheGermansincurredwascausedbyJoubert’smines.25

It was a fantastic result for the Germans, or at least so it seemed. When Pound

telephonedChurchill to say so, the primeminister barked ‘Why?’ and threw the phonedown.Inreality, theonlybenefitderivedwaspropagandaforthesurfacefleet.Tendaysafter reachingsafetyPrinzEugenwas torpedoedoffTrondheimandshe tooknofurtherpartinthewar.AttheendofthemonthGneisenauwaspummelledbytheRAFforthreenights and similarly put out of action (she ended thewar as a blockship in theBaltic).ScharnhorstwaseventuallylostwithmostofhercrewintheBattleofNorthCapeon26December1943.GroßeadmiralErichRaedersaidoftheChannelDash,‘itwasatacticalsuccess but a strategic defeat,’ and in that sense it might be described as the nearestapproximationtotheBattleofJutlandintheSecondWorldWar.26

STNAZAIRE

WhenBismarckmadeherdoomedbreakintotheAtlantic,itwasintendedthatshewouldtakerefugeinFrance.TheAdmiraltywasdeterminedthathersistershipTirpitzshouldbepreventedfromdoingthesame.TheonlyportwithfacilitiescapableofsupportingTirpitzwas StNazaire, which possessed an enormous lock that could be converted into a drydockbypumpingoutthewater.TheoperationwasentrustedtoVice-AdmiralLordLouisMountbatten’s Combined Operations Command, which decided to put the lock out ofactionbyrammingitwithanoldex-Americandestroyer,HMSCampbelltown,disguisedasaGermanMöwe-class torpedoboatand loadedwithexplosives.Theoperationwouldinvolveanapproachofover400milesbyseaandsailingfivemilesuptheLoireestuary.

TheattackerssetoutfromFalmouthon26March1942andcomprised353navaland268commando(Armyraiders)personnelonCampbelltown,sixteenlaunchesandamotortorpedo boat, escorted by another four destroyers. They narrowly averted interceptionwhentheywerereportedbyU-593ontheafternoonofthe27th,andreachedthemouthofthe estuary,where two escorting destroyerswere standing guard.WithGerman ensignsflying, Campbelltown began to move carefully between the mudflats when she waschallengedfromtheshore.ABritishseamandisguisedasaGermanpettyofficermanagedto signal back sufficient genuine German code to enable them to get past the heaviestGermanbatteriesandtoreachwithintwomilesofthetargetbeforethecoverwasblown.Asthecoastaldefencesopenedfireinearnest,theGermancolourswereloweredandtheWhiteEnsignrunup,but thedefenderswereunable toprevent therammingof the lockgates seven minutes later at 0134 hours (just four minutes behind schedule). Thecommandos rushed ashore to createmaximumhavoc and the crewwere taken off.Thefighting throughout the town was intense and one by one the launches supporting theassaultweresunk.As they tried toescape, thesurvivors ran intoGerman torpedoboatsreturningtotheestuaryand,althoughtheseweredrivenoffbythesupportingdestroyers,onlyfourof the launchesultimatelysurvived.British losseswere144killedandaround300 taken prisoner. But ten hours after she had been lodged against the lock gatesCampbelltown‘sthreetonsofexplosiveblewthem(andalargenumberofcuriousGermanofficers)tooblivion.Onthe29thdestructionwascompletedbydelayed-actiontorpedoesfiredfromthelostMTB-74,whichexplodedthirty-sixhourslaterthananticipatedowingto faulty fuses. The British losses, while heavy, were a small price for what was aphenomenal strategic success.Apart fromdenyingTirpitz a refugeon thewest coast ofEurope,theraidfocusedGermanmindsonthevulnerabilityofthatextremelylongcoastandhelpeddivertmenandmaterialstoitsdefence.27

Less successfulwas a similar attempt to destroy Fort Fisher during theAmericanCivil War. The USS Louisiana, an old iron gunboat of 300 tons, was packed withgunpowderanddisguisedasablockaderunnertotry,asthesquint-eyedgeneralBenjaminF.Butler claimed, to abolish Fort Fisher in two ticks of hiswatch. TheLouisiana wassuccessfully brought in close to the fort undetected by its captain, Commander A. C.Rhind, who had been reassured by his admiral that ‘you may lose your life in thisadventure,butitisariskworththerunning.’Unfortunately,theeffectwaslessimpressive.A sentry reported to his relief that he thought the boiler of one of the Yankee shipsoffshore had blown up, andmany of the garrison later said that they slept through theexplosionof215tonsofpowder.Thecommanderofthefortreportedlaconicallythat‘ablockadergotagroundnearthefort,setfiretoherselfandblewup’.28

DOUBLEAGENTS

ThedestructionofScharnhorstofftheNorthCapeandthecatastrophiclossesduringtheBattle of theAtlantic demonstrated the enormous hazards run by theAllied seamen tobring essential supplies toBritain andhelp to thehard-pressedUSSR.Not surprisingly,attempts were made to protect these convoys through deception, and these show theversatilityofthedoubleagents.MuchofthedeceptionpractisedbytheRoyalNavyduringthe SecondWorld War was of a strategic nature, aimed at painting a false picture ofBritain’snavalstrengthandlargelypromptedbytheDirectorofNavalIntelligence,Rear-AdmiralJohnGodfrey.Initially,somemerchantshipsinScapaFlowweredisguisedasR-classbattleshipsandtheaircraftcarrierHMSHermes.Later,however,thedoubleagentswere themaindeceivers and the Japanese themain target.29A shipbuildingprogrammewas announced, as a result ofwhich theCommander-in-ChiefEast Indies acquired twonotionalaircraftcarriersin1943,wheninfacthehadnone.In1945,whenU-boatswerebeing fitted with snorkels that enabled them to recharge their batteries underwater, thepatrollingeffortsoftheRoyalNavyandCoastalCommandwereprovinglesssuccessfulatflushing themout.Theonlyeffectivemeansofcountering themwas the layingofdeepminefields overwhich surface craftmight safely pass.Unfortunately, shortages of bothminesandminelayersmadethis impracticalandsotheAdmiraltyenlistedtheaidof theTwentyCommittee.Double agentTATEwas able to use a previous ‘contact’, notionallyserving inHMSPlover, topassa streamof informationaboutnewminefields, and thiswasmademore credible by adding details of knownU-boat kills before the details oftheselosseswereknowntotheGermans.WhenaU-boatstruckamineandwasforcedtoscuttleitself(bygreatgoodfortune,inthegeneralareaofoneofTATE‘S‘minefields’),theGermansbecameconvincedandclosed3,600squaremilesof thewesternapproaches toU-boats. This not only protected Allied shipping but also moved the U-boats to areaswheretheyweredefinitelynotsafe.30

UNITEDSTATESNAVYDECEPTIONOPERATIONS

AfterPearlHarbortheUSNavywasstretchedtocoveritslargecommitmentsacrossthePacific while the Japanese rapidly consolidated their gains in South-East Asia. It wasimperativefortheUSNavytoconserveitsremainingaircraftcarriers,andtheunexpectedroleofunderdogforcedtheAmericanstoovercometheirdistastefordeceptionwhichwasprevalentatthetime.31TheCommander-in-ChiefPacificFleetandPacificOceanAreas,

Vice-AdmiralChesterW.Nimitz,soonhadtheopportunitytoengagetheJapaneseNavyat theBattleof theCoralSea inApril1942.Nimitzhadanexcellentcryptanalyticstaff,and planned to send the light cruiser USSNashville to conduct radio simulation of acarrier taskforcewhichinrealitywaspreparingto intercept theJapaneseinvasionfleet.This plan came to nought, however, whenNashville ran aground at Midway and wasforced toreturn toHawaii forrepairs. InMayNimitzreceived intelligence thatMidwaywouldbethenexttargetfortheJapanese,andwithseveralweeksavailabletoprepare–duringwhichhereceivedfurtherhigh-qualityintelligenceastotheenemy’sorderofbattle(whichwith fivecarriers, elevenbattleships,eightcruisersand fourteendestroyersgavethemvastsuperiority)–hisdeceptiveoperationsweremorethorough.32

Vice-Admiral William ‘Bull’ Halsey’s Task Force 16 was ordered to leave theSolomonIslandsinMaytoreturntoPearlHarbor,withsecretinstructionstorevealitselftoJapanesepatrolplanesoperatingwiththeinvasionforceheadingforNauruandOceanIslands to theeast.Halsey’s twocarrierswereduly reportedon15May,whereupon theAmericanswithdrew,leavingtheSouthPacifictemporarilyopen.Thesightingofthetwocarriers was sufficient for the Japanese to cancel the proposed invasion of Nauru andOceanandpresentedtheopportunityforaradio-baseddeceptiontobeginlaterthatmonth.Two ships, a cruiser and a seaplane tender belonging to Vice-Admiral Herbert Leary,Commander of Naval Forces Southwest Pacific, based at Melbourne, broadcast trafficmodelledonthatduringtherecentBattleoftheCoralSeawhilecruisingofftheSolomonsandwere answered byLeary’s shore facilities.The Japanese could only conduct trafficanalysisanditappearedtothemthatHalsey’sforcesremainedwhereithadbeensighted.On 4 June the naval staff in Tokyo informed the Midway force that the Americansremainedeastof theSolomons,apparentlyunawareofJapaneseplans.Thiswasdespiteconflicting radio traffic evidence suggesting a force had departed Pearl Harbor forMidway on 30 May.33 The failure of Japanese intelligence and the use of deceptionenabledNimitztoambushtheJapanesestrikeforceatMidway.Hewentontosinkfouroftheircarriersandwresttheinitiativefromthemonceandforall.

Only with reluctance did the USNavy overcome its distaste for deception in thePacifictheatre,whereitultimatelyimplementedaseriesofschemestothreatentheKurileIslandstothenorthofJapanwhilethecampaigntoclearthePacificislandsfromthesouthandeast continued.Noneof these schemes (WEDLOCK,HUSBAND,BAMBINO, VALENTINEand BLUEBIRD) was on the scale of operations carried out in the Mediterranean andwesternEurope,however,andtheycouldnothavebeenresponsiblefortyingdownmorethan 80,000 Japanese troops away from critical areas. Furthermore, their success washampered throughoutbyorganizationalproblemsandby the fact that theplannersweredenied access to important feedback on the effects of their plans. In theMediterraneantheatre,however,auniquenavaltacticaldeceptionunit–theBeachJumpers–wasformedatthesuggestionofLieutenantDouglasFairbanksJrUSNR,whohadcomeacrossDudleyClarkeand‘A’ForcewhileattachedtoCombinedOperations.TheseedwassownwhenClarke suggested to Fairbanks that he return to convince Mountbatten’s Americancounterpart,Rear-AdmiralH.KentHewitt,oftheneedforsuchaforce,whichFairbanksdulyproceededtodo.34

Not that thiswas easy.As Fairbanks later recalled, theHighCommand hated the

entireideaofdeception:TheChiefofNavalOperations,AdmiralErnestKing, thought itwas just ‘boyscout’stuff.Hisattitudewasthatifyouweregoingtofightawarthenjustgetaheadandfightit,don’tdothatkindofthing.TheythoughtthatWarshouldbefoughtasWar…But[H]ewitt,EisenhowerandindeedRoosevelthimselfsawtheresultstheBritishwereachievingandtheywereinclose,friendlyrelationswiththeBritish,sotherewassomefairlyhigh-poweredsupport,whichwonthedayintheend.35

TheBeach Jumpers (the namewas adopted as a cover) operated from 63-footAir SeaRescueboatsthatwerespeciallyequippedwithavarietyofdeceptiondevices,includingballoon-mounted conical radar reflectors, loudspeakers linked to wire recording soundsystemsknownas ‘heaters’, andbombardment rockets.Their training– forwhich therewasnoestablishedprecedent–includedseamanship,gunneryandtheuseofpyrotechnics(including smoke pots and demolitions), as well as courses on electronic counter-measures.36 Their first operational deployment came during Operation HUSKY and wasdeemedasuccess.AGermannewsbroadcaston13JulyreportedtherepulseofalandingattemptbetweenSciaccaandMazzaradelValo,andsubsequentprisonerinterrogationandcaptureddocumentssuggestedthataGermanreservedivisionhadbeenheldinplacetherewhileuncertaintyexistedas towhere todeploy it.37With this initial successFairbanks,who thoroughly understood the principles of deception,was appointedHewitt’s SpecialOperations Officer, and immediately set about establishing liaison with Eisenhower’sAllied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and, most significantly, a very close workingrelationshipwith‘A’Force.

TheBeachJumperswerelesssuccessfulintheiroperationstocoverAVALANCHE,theSalernolandings,anditwasfoundthattheirequipmentandset-upwereinappropriatetotheisland-hoppingcampaigninthePacific.TheirmostsignificantoperationprovedtobeBIGOT,which provided cover for theANVIL-DRAGOON operation in the south of France.There they simulated amphibious threats to areas away from the landings and wereengagedbytwoGermancorvettes.Destroyerandgunboatsupportresultedinthesinkingof these but more satisfying was the evidence of the success of their deception.ThroughouttheD-Dayof15August1944BerlinradioreportedlandingswestofToulonandtotheeastofCannes,andthat‘thousands’ofdummyparachutistshadbeendropped,adding that ‘thisdeceptioncouldonlyhavebeenconceived in the sinisterAnglo-Saxonmind’.38

Since1945therehavebeennomajornavalcombats,onlyskirmishesusing‘pieces’of the new technology that has seen a transformation in naval warfare through theintroductionofsophisticatedsensorsandguidedweapons.Shipsnolongerrelyonarmouror speed for protection, but they do now possess the means to defend themselves byshootingdownattackingmissilesorfiring‘chaff’tocreateelectronicdecoysintheformof false radar echoes.Nor is visible contact necessary to locate the enemyor to launchattacks,forwhichtheyalsocarryawidevarietyofsensors.Theseareallintegratedwithsophisticatedinformation,commandandcontrolsystems.Thetrulyrevolutionarychangehas been in the field of submarines. These have changed from being little more thansubmersiblesthatcouldstayunderwaterforonlyshortperiods(twenty-fourtoforty-eighthours) and which could move only slowly compared to the destroyers that were theirprincipal opponents, to being immensely powerful systems totally independent of thesurface and more manœuvrable than anything on it, carrying colossal strike power,

missiles and torpedoes and a vast array of high-technology sensors. Similarly, aircrafthavegrowninstrikingpowerandspeed,sothatnavaloperationsmustconsidertheseasmajorthreats.

TheUSNavy’sBeachJumpersweredisbandedin1972andabsorbedintootherunitsfollowing the adoption of the Line Function Concept, which recognized that all navalvessels could act as potential deception platforms, that the proliferation of radar andelectronicwarfare specialistsmeant therewas anatural poolof availablepersonnel andthat theBeach Jumpers’ own equipmentwas no longer sufficient for this task. In otherwords,allshipswouldmanipulatetheirsignaturestogiveoffsomeofthecharacteristicsofhigh-valuetargetssuchascarrierswhilenonewoulddisplaythemall,withtheaimofcreatingtargetconfusion.Sincetheearly1970snavalstealthandseabornedeceptionhavebeen dominated by increasingly sophisticated technology.With observation from spaceand with so many sensors, every aspect of a ship’s signature must be considered, andemission control, signaturemaking and the deployment of deception devices (high-techversionsofCochrane’sbarrels)nowcomplementattempts to reduce theradarsignaturesofevenverylargewarships,whileacousticjamming,interferenceanddeceptionaimtodothe same for sonar.39 Nevertheless, all technology has limitations and deception willcertainlyplayasimportantaroleinfuturenavalwarfareasithasdoneinthepast.

8

DeceptioninAirOperations‘Reallifeconsistsofbluffing,oflittletactics,ofdeception,ofaskingyourselfwhatistheothermangoingtothinkIintendtodo.’

JacobBronowski

THE IMPACT OF aircraft on warfare was immediate and, within a short space of time,dramatic.Steady technical improvements rapidly increased thesignificanceofairpowerand enabled it in turn to revolutionize operations on land and at sea. InThe PalestineCampaignsWavelldescribeshowthedeviceslaidouttomisleadtheenemyatBeershebawould have been much less effective without the new squadrons and more modernmachines from home that enabled the air force to wrest command of the air from theenemy in the late autumn. If they are allowed close to deceptive displays, especially iftheyareabletoflylowenoughtomakeobliquephotographs,aircraftarelikelytobeabletoexposethem.Atthesametimeairreconnaissanceprovidesameansforthedeceivertofeedfalseinformationbacktotheenemy.Ofcourse,anti-aircraftdefencesarenecessaryinsuchcases,inordertomakethedeceptionmorecredibleandtopreventtheaircraftgettingtoo close to uncover the deception.Before theNormandy invasion in 1944 anti-aircraftgunners inEastAngliawereordered to fireheavilybut inaccuratelyatpassingGermanrecceaircraft.PeterTooleyrecalledthatthegunners‘wouldgotothepubsinIpswichatnightandofcoursetheyweresworntosecrecy.Thelocalswouldsaytothem:“God!Wecould do betterwith catapults!” The poor chaps had to grit their teeth and say nothingaboutit.’1

Althoughcapableofdefendingthemselvesandofdeliveringamassivepunchwhenairborne, aircraft are extremely vulnerable on the ground. They are thin-skinned andsusceptible to even small-calibre weapons, and their extensive support and technicalrequirements, including airfields and landing strips, are difficult to conceal and easy toattack.Simpleandcost-effectivepassivemeasuresbeganwithcamouflagepaintingoftheaircraftthemselvestoblendthemwiththegroundwhenviewedfromabove,andwiththeskywhen viewed from below.Night-flying aircraftmight be painted black underneath,with the paint extending further up the fuselage the lower the plane’s normal attackaltitude. The appearance late in the SecondWorldWar of unpainted American aircraftdemonstratedafeelingofsecuritythattheirbasesweresafeandthattherewasnoneedforcamouflagepaint.2

Decoyaircraftcanserveanumberofpurposes.Theycandistorttherealstrengthofanairfieldorcansuggestthatadormantfieldisactive.Theycanaddcredibilitytodecoyairfields or draw enemy fire from real planes, although they would need to be veryconvincing to fool photo interpreters.The simplest formof decoy is a two-dimensionalpaintingontheground,butthislacksofthedepthandshadowstobeeffectiveforlong.Carefullydesigneddummyaircraftmay,however,bebuilt fromsimplematerials and ifwellsitedcanproveveryeffective.Butthemosteffectivedecoyswouldbegenuinenon-operational aircraft, always assuming that their non-operability was not too obvious.MajorOliver Thynne showed someULTRA decrypts toDudleyClarke after Clarke had

been away for several days. Among the reports was one that the Germans coulddistinguishbetweenrealanddummyaircraftbythestrutsunderthewings.Whenhesawit,Clarkeaskedabruptly:‘Well,whathaveyoudoneabout it?’‘Doneabout it,Dudley,’saidThynne,‘whatcouldIdoaboutit?’‘Tellthemtoputstrutsunderthewingsofalltherealonesofcourse!’saidClarke.3

Other tell-tale signs that might give away a decoy to a photo interpreter wouldincludealackofmovement,oilstains,tracksorareasofblowngrassfromengine-testing.4ThesebecamereadilyapparentwhenthefirsteffortsweremadetoestablishanetworkofdecoysitesduringtheBattleofBritain.

DECOYSITESSincetheFirstWorldWarmanydifferentvarietiesofpaintschemeandnettinghavebeentried in an effort to conceal or counterfeit potential targets or important navigationalindicators on the ground.Not onlymilitary targets such as airfields, but also importantfactory sites and communications points such as bridges have been disguised (albeitwithoutgreatsuccess).ThefirsttowntobebombedfromtheairwasGreatYarmouthinNorfolk,whichwasattackedbyZeppelinairships in1915.ThefollowingyearanEssexparsondescribedhow

outsideIpswich isaheath.When theIpswichfolkheard thatZeppelinswerecoming, theyplunged thetownintototaldarkness.Thensomewentoutonthecommonandlitabonfirehereandtheretolook(asseenfromagreatheight) like the flareofabigworks.Theyalsoputupa fewacetylene-gas lampsonbusheshereandthere,tolooklikelampsatstreetcorners.Theylitalotofsquibstoattractattention.ThentheywentbacktoIpswichandwaited.Presently,aZeppelinpassedrightoverIpswich,hoveredovertheilluminatedcommon,anddroppedaton-loadofbombsaboutit.Then,havinggotridoftheircargo,turnedandwentbackseaward,toreporttoGermanythatithaddestroyedagreattown.5

In 1940 Britain was forced to adopt any scheme that might give her even theslightestadvantage.Outofdesperationavastweboffaketargetswascreated,onthebasisthat everyGermanbomb that landed in an empty field insteadofdamaging airfieldsorvital industries was a victory. In July 1940 Colonel (later Sir) John Turner, ‘a retiredofficer of drive and initiative’ familiarly known as ‘Conky Bill’, was given theresponsibility for building dummy airfields and other deceptions (apart fromcamouflage).6 A former Royal Engineer and pre-war Director of Works at the AirMinistry,his firstdecoys (withwhichhehadexperimentedbeforeDunkirk)werecrudeinstallationsofparallelflaresdesignedtosimulateemergencyairstrips.7Thesedecoyfires(latercode-namedSTARFISH)wereoperatedmanually inopencountrysideamileor twofromairfields,andsoonattractedLuftwaffeattentionatnight.Flaresites inEastAngliaandKent began to report being bombed and a site atNorthTuddenham, protecting theairfieldatWatton,washittwonightsinarow.8BasedatSoundCityFilms,Shepperton,Turner used the full expertise of the film industry’s technicians to design and improvethesedeceptions,‘inorderthattheenemyshouldnotbedepressedathislackofsuccess’.9

By1NovemberTurnerinformedAirChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortal,ChiefoftheAirStaff,that‘agreatdealhasbeendoneinthedummyfireline.Twenty-sevenhavebeenconstructedtoguardlargeAirForceStationssuchasdepots,trainingestablishmentsetc.’But now the tactics were modified. Until this point decoy fires had been used as‘secondary’ decoys, lit once the target being protectedwas under attackwhile any real

fireswereextinguishedasquicklyaspossible.Turnernowattemptedtousethefiresasa‘direct’decoywithfivesitesselectedaroundLondon,tobelitassoonasthedefendersof11GroupRAFknewtheLuftwaffelineofattack,inanefforttodrawbombingoffLondonitself.10RAFpersonnelwereemployed toensure securityand inorder togiveTurnerafreehandtheorganization,nowchristened‘ColonelTurner’sDepartment’,wasremovedfromthenormalchainofcommand.

Originally, theAirStaffhadordered that trenchesbedugand filledwithoil ‘untilsomething better could be evolved’. This proved highly unsatisfactory: the oil firescracked thesoil, theoil leaked intopondsandstreams,anda ‘chorusofprotestatoncearose from farmers and others which continued long after this hasty type had beenabandoned’.11 The skill of the film technicians at Shepperton, however, produced threenew types of fire: one burning diesel (‘full’), one burning paraffin (‘medium’) and oneburning scrapwood (‘short’),which could bemixed according to the required effect.12Addedtothesewereincreasinglysophisticatedarraysoflighting(‘QLights’or‘QLs’)intheformofredobstructionlamps, landingVsandotherpatterns,andlater,fakerailwaymarshalling yards, factories and other key installations. Where possible, these Q-sitesweresetwellawayfromotherimportantpositionsonenemyapproaches,usually1,800to3,000yards froma ‘parent’ airfield, such asBroomfield (coveringMaidstone),Lenham(covering Detling) or Upton (covering Ossington). Large air bases at Canterbury andChelmsfordwereprotectedbytwositeseachandamajorinstallationnearPlymouthhadno fewer than seven different decoys. There were also a few ‘free-standing’ targetsdesigned to lure raiders; in a number of cases civilians had to be evacuated from thesurroundingarea.

However,Turner’ssuccess led to furtherproblems.AfterLuftwaffepilots reportedthat they had hit and badly damaged an airfield, their recce planes would expect tophotographthisdamageshortlyafterwards;theinabilitytodosowouldriskthesecurityand effectiveness of the decoys. Therefore, fake damage had to be created on the realairfields. Rubble and wreckage, including damaged and unserviceable aircraft, wereunfortunatelyplentiful,though,andcouldeasilybespreadaround.Dummybombcraters,whichcameintwovarieties–oneforsunnydaysandoneforcloudyweather,withmoresubduedshadows–werepaintedonlargesheetsofcanvasandhadtobeorientedtothesun and turned regularly.After pre-testing at Farnborough, theywere nevertheless veryeffective.13

Hitler’s Directive No. 17 targeted not just the RAF but the aircraft industry.14Factorieswere thereforeequally importantsubjectsforTurner’sdeceivers.Followinganaerial recce, a decoywould be set up amile or two away and designed to imitate thegenuineinstallationascloselyaspossible.Theblackoutregulationswouldberigorouslyenforcedatthegenuinesite,butatthedecoywouldbesubtlylesseffective.AstheBattleof Britain reached its climax, the pressure on the airfields in the south and south-eastincreased and a newnetwork (K-sites)was planned for daylight hours.Naturally, thesesites would have to be very much more complete and convincing, requiring scores ofdummyaircraftandpreparedwithlavishattentiontodetail.Eachsiterequiredarunway,maintenance sheds, fuel and bomb dumps and eight or more dummy aircraft. Each‘airfield’wasfurtherenhancedwithtwoanti-aircraftmachine-guns.AswiththeQ-sites,

these were paired with genuine stations andMarham, Debden and Biggin Hill amongotherswereprovidedwithsuchcover.Thecrewsoftwenty,carefullytrainedbyTurnerata secret school set upnearHook inSurrey,workedhard to convey the realismof theirsites bymoving dummies around, creating tracks and rearranging sham supply dumps.FlightLieutenantRobinBrownrecalledthelovingcarewithwhichtheywerebuiltwhenheoverheardaconversationduringanair-raid:

FlightSergeant(agitated):‘Sir!We’rebeingattacked!’PilotOfficer:‘Splendid,Sergeant,Goodshow!’FlightSergeant:‘They’resmashingtheplacetobits!’PilotOfficer:‘Yes,excellent.Carryon!’FlightSergeant:‘Butsir,weneedfightercover!They’rewreckingmybestdecoys!’15

Eventually,ColonelC.W.HinckleoftheUSDepartmentofDefensereportedthattheQ-andK- sites drew no fewer than 440 raids, comparedwith 430 raids on genuine RAFbases. In other words, more than half of the Luftwaffe’s exertions were aimed at theproductsofTurner’simagination.16

WhenthefortunesofwarhadreversedthesituationandtheAllieswerecarryingtheairwartothecontinent,theGermansthemselvesmadeextensiveuseofdecoystoprotectairfieldsandothertargets.OneexampleintheNetherlandswasconstructedwithparticularcare, made almost entirely of wood and including hangars, gun positions, aircraft andvehicles.However, it took so long to build thatAllied photo interpreters had plenty oftime to observe it. The day after it was finished, a solitary RAF plane flew over andcircledthefieldoncebeforedroppingalargewoodenbomb.17

FollowingthedisastrousraidonCoventryon14November1940,itwasdecidedthatonlylargedecoyfireslastingseveralhourscouldhaveanychanceofdrawingtheenemyawayfromtheflamesofaburningcity.TheMinistryofHomeSecuritysuppliedalistofthemostimportanttownsandcitiesandsuitablesiteswerelocated,sothatbytheendofDecembereighteensuchsiteswereinplace,mostlyintheMidlands.ByMarch1941,108were complete and by July the number had reached 155. By mid-1943, 235 wereoperational,althoughbythistimethecourseofthewarmademanyunnecessaryandtheywere beginning to be closed down.18 The effectiveness of these STARFISH fires isdebatable. In good weather they had little chance of succeeding and ignition had tocoincidepreciselywiththebuild-upofenemyairunits,butTurnerclaimedinMay1942thatenemypilots‘weremoreeasilytakeninbythedecoysthantheirpredecessorsayearago’ and that they ‘should be usedmore boldly’.19 Therewere failures, often owing topoorcommunications,andGermanprisoners revealed theyalreadyknewabout someofthe sites (which were then moved), but there were many successes. Perhaps the mostnotablewas that onHayling Island, nearPortsmouth, on 17April 1941.A total of 170high-explosivebombs,32parachuteminesandapproximately5,000incendiaries(ninetypercentoftheattack)wasdroppedonthesite.20Thecontributionofthesiteswasdifficulttoquantifybut,astheofficialviewstated,‘thedeceptionsucceededinmateriallyreducingtheweightofbombsfallingontownsandcitiesintheUK’.21

TheBlitzsawtheheaviestbombingattacksonBritain,butHitler’sdecisiontobreaka cardinal rule of warfare and invade Russia in June 1941 did not mean a completecessation of bombing by the Luftwaffe, and Turner’s men were kept busy. Moonlight

reflectedonbodiesofwaterwasanexcellentnavigationaidtoenemybombers,aswererivers and canals. In early 1942 another innovation, this time the product of theAdmiralty’sDepartmentofMiscellaneousWeaponsDevelopment,turnedwaterwaysinto‘roads’byspraying themwitha fine layerofcoaldustmixedwithfueloil.Attempts toconceal the River Thameswere defeated by the scale of the operation, not tomentiontides,windandhousewivesdownstream,whocomplainedbitterlyofgrimylaundry.22Buton relatively stillwater, suchas theCoventryCanal,whichhelpeddirect aircraft to theheartofBirmingham,itcreatedwhatlookedlikeanasphaltroadevenatgroundlevel:oneoldmanandhisdogfellinthecutwhentheyinnocentlywenttocrossit.23Induecourse,however, electronic navigation aids superseded optical methods, and these requireddifferentcounter-measures.

HAMBURGANDBERLIN

Camouflage schemes such as this were by no means restricted to the British. TwoAmericanreporters,HarryW.FlanneryandHowardK.Smith,wereinBerlinduring1941.ShortlybeforeFlanneryleft,hetravelledthroughtheReichanddescribedhowtheNazishadworkedhardallsummertomakeitmoredifficulttobombobjectivesaccurately.Themost pretentious undertaking was along the East–West Axis, a five-mile long streetrunning from theBrandenburgGate in thecentreofBerlin toAdolfHitlerPlatz,whichwas a guiding arrow to the heart of the capital for attacking airmen. West of theBrandenburgGate, theTiergarten layoneachsideof theAxisformore than twomiles,andhereworkmenerectedsteelpolesfifteenfeethigh,stretchedwirenettingcoveredwithgreenshroudsofclothoverthem,andthetopsofpinesandothertreeshitherandthitherinrows.LamppostswerecoveredwithgreengauzetolookliketreesandthelargeVictoryPillar,amonumenttotheFranco-PrussianWar,wascoveredwithnetting,withtheshinyangel of Triumph that adorned its top dulled so as not to reflect light. Traffic couldcontinueunderthenettingbuttheAxishadbeenblendedintotheTiergarten.Elsewhere,theLützensee,a lake thatshoneasaguide toaviators,hadbeencoveredwithastripofgreynettingtoresembleastreet,althoughwildducksremainedunderthefakebuildings.DeutschlandHalleandotherprominentlandmarksinthatregionwerealsocoveredwithnetting so that they looked like parkswith paths running through them. To further theillusion, open spaces in Adolf Hitler Platz and a park near the Axis were filled withpseudo-structures. Smith reported that the first autumn gale ripped great holes in thenettingandthewholeaffairhadtobereconstructed.24

Hamburg was also camouflaged. To planes overhead the railway station whereFlanneryarrivedresembledapark,andotherbuildings in thevicinitywereblottedfromvieworgivennewoutlines.MoresignificantwerethechangesFlannerywitnessedtothetwolakesinthecentre,theBinnenAlsterandtheAussenAlster.TheselieintheheartofHamburg’s centralbusinessdistrict andare formedby thedammingof theRiverAlsterabout amile before its confluencewith theRiver Elbe. Both basins and the Lombardsriverandrailbridgethatseparatesthemwereeasilyrecognizablefrompre-warmapsandphotographs, and provided a reference point for bombers. TheBinnenAlstermeasured450metresby410metres–ahugeareatocamouflage–andtheannualsnowfallandlargechimneysandoilstorage tanksmadenetting impractical.Also, ithad to remainopen tonavigation.25Flannerysawthat ithadbeencoveredwithscaffoldbuildings,withonlya

narrow lane retained for necessary traffic. Tomake the air picturemore deceptive, theoutlinesofthebasinwerereproducedinapartofthelargerAussenAlster,andthebridgethatrunsbetweenthe twowasrepresentedin thenewposition(thus throwingallbomb-aimingcalculationsoffby300metrestothenorth).Intheharbourwhatappearedtobeahilly islandwith rocks and trees had the end of a factory jutting from the uncompletedparkofwhat,atafewhundredyards,appearedtobeadesertedpieceofland.26

Thisboldattempttodisguisethelandscapeitselfwasultimatelyfutile.TheRAFhadseenthewholethinginconstruction,andduringthehorrendous‘fire-storm’attacksofJulyandAugust1943mostofitwasdestroyed.Notallsucheffortswerefruitless:whileitwasunlikely that the photo interpreterwould be fooled for long, bombers relying on visualidentificationofthetargetmightbeputoffjustlongenoughbywell-executedcamouflage.ButwhentheSovietspaintedbuildingsonRedSquareduringthesummerof1941insuchan attempt, they found that by autumn the paint was fading and the shadowswere allwrong.27 Other attempts elsewhere to camouflage industrial targets were hampered bytheir location being well known. Furthermore, paint alone does nothing to deal withshadows,especiallyonnearbyroads.Nettingmighthelp,butstereoscopicviewingcouldstilloftenseethroughthedisguise.

THESCIENCEOFAERIALBOMBARDMENT

Before the SecondWorldWar the theory of aerial bombardment had struck terror intoauthoritiestheworldover.Estimatesofphenomenalcasualtieswereproducedanditwaswidely held that the bomberwould always get through. By 1939, however, the single-seaterfighterwasfasterandmoredeadlythanthebomber,andalthoughtheUnitedStatesArmyAirForcemadevaliantefforts tobomb indaylight, theemphasis shifted tonightoperations.Asaresultaerialwarfarequicklybecameaplatformforscientiststodevelopaidscarriedfornavigationand,later,targetacquisition;theseaidsinturnbecametargetsfordeceivers. In thesummerof1940measureswere introducedfirst to jamand then to‘bend’ radionavigationbeamsusedbyLuftwaffebombers; later counter-measureswerebroughtintojamthevariousradarsusedtodetecttheplanes.

The first navigational bombing aid the Germans used was called KNICKEBEIN(‘CrookedLeg’)andwasadevelopmentoftheLorenzblindapproachbeam,whichwasinquitewidespreadusebeforethewar.TheLorenzsystemprojectedtwoadjacentbeamsuptothirtymilesfromanairfield;theleft-handonecontainedMorsedotsandtheright-handonedashes,andasteadynotewasproducedwherethebeamsoverlapped.TheKNICKEBEINwasadevelopmentofthisthataddedacross-beamfromanobliqueangletoindicatewhena bomber was over the target. It was a simple technique and easily interfered with,especially after a Heinkel He-111 that crashed in March 1940 revealed some detailedinformation.28

WithChurchill’ssupportanorganizationwascreatedtoinstitutecounter-measures;by October this had been christened No. 80 (Signals) Wing RAF, and was under thecommand of Group Captain E. B. Addison. As the summer progressed, KNICKEBEINtransmitters were identified and it became apparent that stronger jamming transmitters(ASPIRIN) andmore listening stationswould be needed.At about the same time it wasdecidedthatre-broadcastingthebeamfromadifferentpointwouldeffectivelyconfusethe

enemy, a process called ‘meaconing’. However, by late summer it was clear that theLuftwaffe was aware of this interference and had begun to make rapid changes tofrequenciesandtransmissionperiods.29

Itwas also at this time that theLuftwaffe introduced two new beam systems thatwere correctly perceived as blind-bombing systems. The X-GERÄT (X-System) wasdevelopedbyDrHansPendlandusedasetofcross-beamstogiveaccurateinstructionsforthereleaseofthebombload.BecauseittransmittedonadifferentfrequencyfromtheKNICKEBEIN, it was necessary to construct different transmitters (BROMIDE) for counter-measures.Constructionof thesewas aidedoncemoreby components recovered fromacrashedenemyaircraftandinterrogationofthecrew,andasearlyasNovembertheBritishweresuccessfully interferingwith theX-GERÄT system.30Unfortunately, and in spite ofearlywarningsprovidedbyULTRA,therewereinsufficientjammersinplacetopreventtheattackonCoventryonthe14th,andthosethatwereinplacebroadcastat1500Hz,whilethe bomberswere listeningon2000Hz andwere able towork through the interference.Despitethelightingofdecoyfires,449outof550aircraftgotthroughanddidenormousdamage.

An entirely different system (Y-GERÄT) was also identified. This was operatedwithoutacross-beamandwascontrolled fromtheground,provingveryunpopularwithaircrew. By February 1941 a counter-measure had been designed, involving re-broadcastingthesignalfromapowerful transmitterat theBBC’sAlexandraPalace.ThenewsystemhadonlybeeninuseonasmallscaleoverBritain,presumablyinordertotestitand,althoughithadproveditselfremarkablyaccurate,thetestperiodhadalsoproveditsdownfall. DuringMarch it became apparent that the counter-measureswere oncemoreprovingeffective,bycausingthebomberstodropshortoftheirtarget.31ByApril1941theforthcoming invasion of Russia seemed to offer relief to a German air force that hadsuffered its country’s onlydefeat in thewar so far. ‘At last a properwar’, declared theLuftwaffe Chief of Staff, Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek, a comment that reflected awidelyheldviewamongtheincreasinglyfrustratedaircrew.32

Intheirturn,theoperationsthatRAFBomberCommandcommencedoverGermanyin1940wereinitiallybrushedoffbytheNazisasinconsequential.By1941,however,theyweresufficientlyeffective tonecessitate themeasuresdescribedbyFlanneryandSmith.Bythefollowingyear thebombingoperationsweregainingpacebut losseswereheavy,largelybecauseofGermanadvanceswith radar.Asearlyas1936 theyhaddevelopedasystemcalledFREYA,whichwascapableofdetectinganaircraftatfiftymiles.Twoyearslater they produced theWÜRZBURG system, which operated at 5000Hz, a much higherfrequencythananything theBritishhadat the time,and thefirstsystemable toprovideanti-aircraft gunnerswith the height of unseen targets.Together, FREYA andWÜRZBURGmade a formidable combination.With two further early warning radars, MAMMUT andWASSERMAN,theyformedthebasisoftheHIMMELBETTsystem,whichwassetupalongtheapproaches to theReich. Each radarwas assigned a box of airspace and night fightersoperatinginthesameboxwouldbegiveninstructionsbytheradarcontrollerinordertobring them close enough to make contact with the bombers on the fighters’ ownLICHTENSTEINradar.33

By1942RAFlossesweremountinganditwascleartheywouldcontinuetodoso

unlesscounter-measurescouldbe taken,while theChannelDashhighlighted theseriousproblemswithBritishradartechnology.Night-fightercontrolradars,anti-aircraftdirectorradarsandradarscontrollingsearchlightsalloperatedataround200Hz.On28February1942 the fledgelingBritish airborne forcesmade a daring raid on the coast of northernFrance and snatched an entireWÜRZBURG radar set from its site at Bruneval, near LeHavre. More equipment was captured later in the year after the German defeat at ElAlamein, and from these scientists at the Telecommunications Research Establishment(TRE) at Malvern were able to produce jamming devices. The first of these wasMOONSHINE,inventedbyDrJoanCurran(of‘Laboratory15’basedatHarvardUniversity,whichwastheUSequivalentofTRE).ThisamplifiedthesignalfromFREYAandgavetheimpressionthatasingleaircraftwasinfactmany.

Thedeceptivepossibilitieswereimmediatelyappreciatedandaspecialunit,No.515SqnRAF,was formed inApril1942equippedwithobsoleteDefiant fighters fittedwithMOONSHINE.During the spring and summer it was very successful at drawing attentionawayfromgenuineoperations,attractinganythingupto300enemyfighterstothewronglocation. However, the Germans deployed many more FREYAS and many moreMOONSHINE-equippedaircraftwouldbeneeded.Moresignificantly, itwasonlyeffectivein protecting tight-knit formations in daylight, whereas Bomber Commandwas turningalmost exclusively to night operations conducted inwidely dispersed streams. No. 515Sqnflewits lastMOONSHINEmissioninDecemberandthenre-equippedwithMANDREL,anAmerican jammingdevice used aheadofRAFnight raids andUSEighthArmyAirForcedaylightraidsthroughout1943.34

As the offensive intensified, and given the inherent difficulty of night bombing, anew navigation aid became necessary. One had been conceived as early as 1938, butserious work commenced only in June 1940. This was called GEE and relied on threeground transmitters set 100 miles apart. These emitted pulses in given patterns onto aspecialGEEmapofEurope,andgaveanaccuracytowithin6milesatarangeof400.ThesystemwasmuchmoreeffectivethananyofthepreviouslydescribedGermansystems,atleastuntil theGermansdeviseda counter-measure.ByMarch1942aroundone thirdofBomberCommandaircraftwasequippedwith thesystemand thedecisionwas taken tocommence operations using it. It proved very effective, but the Germans respondedquicklyandtookstepstojamit,beginninginAugust.ByNovemberGEEwasusefulonlyin areas outside German control. That it survived this long, given that several aircraftequipped with experimental versions were lost as early as August 1941, was due to adeceptionwroughtbyDrR.V.Jones.BycarefulmodificationandthroughdoubleagentshesucceededinpersuadingtheGermansduringthecrucialdevelopmentperiodbeforeitsoperationaldebut,thatitwaslittlemorethanacopyoftheKNICKEBEIN.35

During the summer of 1943 British losses reached such heights (275 bombers inJunealone)thatpermissionwasfinallygiventouseWINDOW.ThiswastheBritishcode-nameforblackpapercoatedononesidewithaluminiumfoilandcutintostripsmeasuringthirty centimetres by one and a half centimetres – half the wavelength of the GermanWÜRZBURGandLICHTENSTEINradars.Whendroppedinbundlesof2,000atarateofonebundleperminute,itwould‘snow’thetubesoftheseradarsandcreatetheimpressionofenormousnumbersofaircraft.Theprinciplewasnotnewandhadbeenconsideredbybothsides.MetalstripshadbeendroppedbytheRAFinanattempt toconfuseGermananti-

aircraftgunnersinNorthAfricain1941,butthisprovedunsuccessful(probablybecausetheGermanswereusingsoundlocatingsystems).However,fearofgivingtheideaawayheld both sides back. Tests continued during 1942, but Air Chief Marshal Sir SholtoDouglas, Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command, persuaded his opposite number atBomberCommand,AirChiefMarshalSirArthurHarris,nottouseitincasetheGermansshould choose to renew their own bombing offensive. In reality, the Germans were sohorrifiedbytheimplicationsfromthetrialsoftheirownversion,code-namedDÖPPEL,thatLuftwaffe chief Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring ordered all evidence of it to bedestroyed.

OtherdevelopmentsfinallyhelpedprovideanexcellentopportunitytouseWINDOW.TheseincludedtheintroductionofH2Sradar,whichgaveapictureoftheground,andthedirectional systemOBOE, which was particularly suited to theMosquito aircraft of thePathfinderforce.Furthermore, theAmericanSCR270night-fighterradar–whichcoulddistinguishbetweenaircraft,WINDOWandtheSERRATEradardetectiondevice–hadalsorecentlybeen introduced. (The latterenabledBritish fighters tohome inon theGermannightfighters’LICHTENSTEINradar.)VastquantitiesofWINDOWwouldbeneeded(around400tonspermonth)andwhensuitablylargestockpileshadbeenbuiltupitwascarriedforthefirsttimeintheGOMORRAHraidsonHamburg.Thefirstofthesetookplaceon24/25July 1943 and involved 791 bombers,which dropped 2,284 tons of high explosive andincendiaries, creating a terrible firestorm two and a half miles high. The HIMMELBETTsystemwasswampedandreportedaraidbyover11,000aircraft;asaresult,onlytwelvebomberswerelost.Inthreefurtherraidsanother10,000tonsofbombsweredroppedandinlaterraidsontheRuhrinAugustbomberlosseswerehalvedtoaroundthreepercent.

Asusual,theLuftwaffewasquicktorespondwithdifferenttactics.ButforawhiletheonlyGermanresponsewasmoreelaboratedecoys.AnattackonHamburg inMarch1943hadbeenfoiledwhenthePathfinderforce,followingthepathof theRiverElbeinthemoonlight,hadcrossedasitethatlookedverymuchliketheAussenAlster,whichhadbeenproducedbyarmyengineersdammingastream.OneoftheH2S-equippedbombershadafaultysetandtheblurredpicturelookedsufficientlylikeHamburgforhimtodrophismarkers.Althoughtheremainderwenttheextratenmilestotherealcity,thedamagewasdone.Onlyseventeenbombersattackedtherealtarget,while344attackedthedecoy,believing the real markers were themselves decoys.36 This was an isolated Germansuccess, however, andmeasures such as diverting anti-aircraft guns to decoy sites andsetting off dummy marker flares failed to disrupt the bombing, partly because of theimprovedskillof thePathfindercrews,partlybecauseof thepoorqualityof thedecoysand partly because bomber crewswere thoroughly briefed as towhat sort of decoys toexpect.37

1.TheFrenchsurrenderatGoodwickSands,Fishguard,1797.Amongthewatchingcrowdsarewomenintraditionalcostume,whomayhavecontributedtotheFrenchdecisiontocapitulate

2.QuakergunsnearCenterville,1862.‘PrinceJohn’MagruderhadjustfifteenrealgunsontheYork-JamesPeninsula,butbysupplementingthemwithQuakergunshestoppedanarmy

3.BeforeAllenby’sclimacticBattleofMeggidoin1918thousandsofdummyhorsesweremadefromcanvasandwood.Sleighsdrawnbymulesraisedcloudsofdustwhentheywouldbeexpectedtogotowater

4.AstoreattheRoyalEngineersCamouflageSchoolduringtheFirstWorldWar,containinghundredsoffigures,papiermâchéheadsandotherdeceptivedevices

5.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,fearof‘fifthcolumnists’ledtosomeabsurdstories,satirizedbythisOsbertLancastercartoon.Butthepaniccausedinrearareascouldbegenuine

6.Dummytanksinvariousstagesofconstructionfromwoodandcanvas.Suchdummieshaveoftenbeenimprovisedusingwhatevermaterialshappentobeavailable

7.DummytanksonthemoveintheMiddleEastduringtheSecondWorldWar

8.Moreelaboratematerialsaresometimesrequiredforcamouflage,suchasthisplaster‘brickwork’beingmadetocoverpillboxesinFrancein1940

9.AdecoybuiltbyPolishtroopsinItalyduringtheSecondWorldWar

10.Aninflatable‘Shermantank’–quickandsimpletouse.Butsuchequipmenthasdrawbacks:itwillsagorexpandwithatmosphericchanges,andrubbertanksleavenotracks

11.Sometimesentiredefencesarebuiltonalie.Here,‘Hurricane’fightersareassembledatafactoryinCyprusduringtheSecondWorldWar

12.A‘Sunshield’deviceforturningatankintoa‘truck’.Resourcesthatcannotbehiddencanatleastbedisguisedassomethingelse

13.ThedummyrailheadatMisheifa,1941.Theentiremarshallingyardwasbuiltfromwoodandcanvas,andrailsweremadefromfour-gallontinsnormallyusedforcarryingfuelandwater

14.Snipersintraining.Inthetopphotographthreesnipersareaimingatthecamera,showinghowdifficultitistoseeproperlyconcealedtroopsevenatshortrange

15.TheAdmiralGrafSpeeburnsinMontevideoharbour,1939.Cleverdiplomaticnoisesforcedhercaptaintoscuttleherratherthanfaceanenemythatshecouldhavecrushed

16.TheseR-classbattleshipsandaircraft-carrierinScapaFlowinJuly1940areinfactfleettendersdisguisedwithcanvasandwood

17.HMSHesperusinatypicaldazzlecamouflagescheme

HMSBelfastsnowingfalsebowandsternwaves,alldesignedtohindertargeting

18.Airfieldsareconspicuousandvulnerabletargets,andeffortstomakethemhardertoidentifyareessential

19.Adummyairfieldisanenormousundertakingifitistoconvincetheenemy.Itmustpossessallthecharacteristicsoftherealthing,includingmanybuildings

20.Amongtherequirementsforsuccessfuldeceptionistheabilitytorecreatedamage.Whilecinematicspecialeffectstechniquesaredesirable,theyarenotalwaysavailable,asthiscrudedecoyfireequipmentshows

21.ThisrunwayatRheineinnorthGermanyappearstobeinoperable.Butexaminationthroughastereoscopeofthisphotoandanotheroneslightlyoffsetrevealedthatthebombcratersontherunwaywerefakes

22.Hamburgbeforeandaftercamouflage,1941.AfakeLombardsbridgehasbeenbuiltsomedistancetothenorthoftherealoneandtheBinnenAlstercoveredover

23.AcloudofWINDOWreleasedoverEsseninMarch1945.Oftenreferredtotodayas‘chaff’,itisusedbyshipsandplanesasadecoyagainstradar-guidedmissiles.Flaresareusedtodecoyheat-seekingmissiles.

24.Dummylandingcraftdisplayedinanestuaryandadummy25-pounderandQuadtractorinsouthernEnglandbeforeD-Day

25.Smoke-generatingequipmentdeployedforthecrossingoftheRhineinMarch1945.Hugesmokescreenscanbemadetolastfordaysonend

26.Membersofacounter-gangpreparetogoonpatrolinKenyaduringtheMauMaurebellion.Themanontherightisawhiteagentdisguisedasarebelguerrilla

27.AspartofOperationDESERTSTORM,thisPsyopsleafletwascarefullydesignedtoreinforcetheIraqifearofanamphibiousassaultonKuwait.SuchleafletswereputinbottlesandbeganfloatingashoreonedaybeforetheAllied

deadlineof15January1991

28.AnM1Abramsdecoy.Moderndecoysmustcoverallspectraandthisexamplecomeswithaheatingelementanda1kWgasgenerator

29.ASaabViggenfightersitsnexttoadecoy.Anenemypilotflyingathighspeedwouldfinditalmostimpossibletodistinguishtherealone

TheRAFnowtooktolaunchingdiversionaryattacksbysmallgroupsofMosquitoesdropping largequantities ofWINDOW away from thegenuinedirectionof attack. ItwasfoundthatdroppingWINDOWincontrolledpatternscouldproducetheimageofanaircraftformation on a radar screen. In due course, however, anti-WINDOWmodificationsweredevelopedforGermanfightercontrolandgunlayingradars,togetherwithhomingdevicesforH2S, and loss rates among the bombers soon began to climb again. The nextRAFmovecameonthenightof26October1943,when569bombersweresenttoraidKassel.Ithadbeenfoundthatnotonlydirectionalbeams,butalsovoicetransmissions,couldbebroadcastintotheheartofGermany.FluentGermanspeakerscouldthereforesend‘spoof’instructions to the German night fighters. Once more the Germans found a counter-measureandthereaftertheBritishresortedtolong‘test’transmissionstotakeup‘airtime’.When thismethod failed, they gave readings fromparticularly boringGerman classicalworksorrecordingsofHitler’sspeeches.38

InAugusttheGermanshadintroducedtheWILDESAU(‘wildsow’)tactic,wherebysingle-seat fighterswould be concentrated over the bombers’ target and use searchlightillumination for target acquisition. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, this meant that itscontrollerswereevenmorereliantonaccurateinformationastothebomberforce’stargetanddirectionof approach.The short-range single-seaters’ lackof radar gave them littleother chance of intercepting the bomber stream, and if they fell for a diversionary raidtheywouldendupchasingMosquitoes.TheBritishquicklycaughtontotheWILDESAUand launched more diversionary missions, with their deception tactics becoming evermorecomplicated.39 In spite of this chicanery, itwas theLuftwaffe that held the upperhandduringtheperiodfromNovember1943toJune1944,asaresultofimprovedradarandmassattacksbyeveryavailablefighter.

Harriswasconvinced that a final effortbyBomberCommandwouldend thewar,andhechosetomakeitinwhatbecameknownastheBattleofBerlin.Atthesametimethe Luftwaffe introduced a tactic called ZAHME SAU (‘tame sow’) which fed radar-equippednightfightersdirectlyintothebomberstream,andbeganinterceptingbombersasfaroutastheNorthSea.ItprovedaseriousdefeatforBomberCommand,althoughonethatHarrisdidnotacknowledgeuntilMarch1944,bywhichtime1,128aircrafthadbeenlost.The culminationwas the disastrousNuremberg raid of 30March.CarefulGermanmonitoringofH2StransmissionsshowedtwoMosquitofeintsonKasselandCologneforwhat theywere, and allowed 246 fighters to attack themain force as itwasmonitoredalong its long route into southernGermany.The loss of 107bomberswas catastrophic.However,theBattleofBerlinalsocoincidedwiththeformationon23November1943of100(BomberSupport)GroupRAF,underAirCommodore(laterAirVice-Marshal)E.B.Addison–previouslyCOofNo.80(Signals)Wing,which it incorporated–controllingthe various electronic warfare squadrons and several Mosquito fighter squadronstransferredfromFighterCommand.Itwas100GroupthatwouldultimatelygiveBomberCommandtheedge.

It took somemonths to train and bring 100Group up to strength but, despite thedisasteroftheNurembergraid,oncefull-scaleoperationswereinitiatedmainforcelosseswere cut by eighty per cent.40 Four days before Nuremberg, a raid was launched thatappeared to be following a route leading deep into Germany. Instead, it swung away

withoutwarning tobombEssenand return toBritainhaving lostonlyninebombers (atleast three from anti-aircraft fire); sixteen German fighters were destroyed in the raid,manyinaccidents.Followingoperationsinsupportof theAlliedinvasionofNormandy,BomberCommand resumed its full-scaleoffensiveagainst theReich in June1944.Thetask of 100Groupwas aggressive aswell as deceptive.Mosquito squadronswere nowalso equippedwith an improved SERRATE system and a device called PERFECTOS whichwasdesignedtotripthetransponderscarriedbythenightfightersinthesamewayastheirgroundstations.

Thesecombinedmeasuresmadedefencealmostimpossibleandcreatemoskitopanikamong the Germans, who found it increasingly difficult to identify and intercept thebomber streamswhile their night fighterswere increasingly vulnerable to those of 100Group, particularly around their own airfields or flying holding patternswhile awaitingorders.TheaceHansKrauseresortedtoapproachinghisbaseinapowerdivefrom10,000feet, followed by an immediate landing on the dimly lit airfield to throw any lurkingBritishaircraftoffthescent.Naturally,suchextrememeasuresledtoasharpincreaseinlossesthroughaccidentsandcontributedfurthertothewarofattritionthateventuallyledtothedefeatoftheLuftwaffe.41

OthersquadronswithinthegroupoperatedFlyingFortressandLiberatoraircraft,allequippedwithavarietyofelectronicequipment, suchasAIRBORNECIGAR andMONICA,and carrying WINDOW and marker flares to lay false trails. The German air and civildefenceswere increasingly stretched as the bombers ranged further and, thanks to 100Group, received less attention. On the night of 4 December 1944 Bomber Commandlaunchedfourfull-scaleraids,involving892heavybombers,onKarlsruheandHeilbronninsouthernGermanyandHammandHagenintheRuhr.Atotalof112aircraftfrom100Group flew in support over ‘HappyValley’, as the central Ruhrwas known.Almost ahundrednightfightersweresenttocounterthefalseraidandkeptoccupiedthereuntilitwastoolatefortheirdeploymentagainstthebombers,whichsufferedonlyoneandahalfpercentlosseswhile100Groupinflictedsubstantiallossesontheenemy.Thefollowingnight553aircraftattackedSoest,Duisburg,NurembergandMannheim,supportedby76aircraft from100Group; only one aircraftwas lost.The followingnight no fewer than1,291 bombers attackedBergesburg,Osnabrück,Giesen, Berlin, Schwerte andHannau,supportedby89aircraftfrom100Group,ofwhichonewaslost.Lossamongthebomberswas1.7percent.42

Towards the end of the war the Germans continued to develop counter-measures.Radarscouldbe jammed,althoughat this timejammingtechniqueswereprimitive.Onevery imaginative idea was the use of radar reflectors, particularly floating ‘corner’reflectorswhich,whenmoored in largenumbersaroundwaterbodies,couldcompletelyalter the representationof thesebodiesonAllied radar sets.Theycouldalsobeused tosimulate targets in an attempt to induce bombers to drop their bombs in a nearby lake.Thesereflectorswerealmostuselessinclearvisibility,butinbadweatheroratnighttheycouldbeveryeffectiveandwereeasilyrelocatable.Hadtheybeenusedinlargequantitiestogetherwitheffectivejamming,theymighthaveprovedveryeffectivebuttheGermanseitherhitontheideatoolateorlackedthematerialsorfailedtorealizeitspotential.43

Although it played a significant part in the success of Bomber Command’s

operations and saved countless aircrew lives, the deception wrought by 100 Group’stechnologywasnot in itself decisive.Probably the singlegreatest factor in theultimatedefeatoftheLuftwaffewastheabilityoflong-rangefighterstosupportAmericandaylightraids and heavy attacks on fuel plants. The P-51Mustang was one of the outstandingaircraftof thewar,andon11April1944 itprovidedanexampleofoneof thesimplestbluffs in aerial warfare. The citation for the Distinguished Service Cross awarded toSecond Lieutenant HenryW. Brown USAAF describes how despite having previouslyexpended his ammunition in a successful action, ‘he observed four enemy fightersattacking two friendly fighters’ and that ‘although completely defenseless’ and ‘withcomplete disregard for his safety, at once flew in to assist the friendly fighters. Hisdeterminationandboldnessforcedtheenemytobreakoffthefight.’Whatthecitationfailstomentionwas that the two friendly fightersBrown had rushed to help then promptlybolted,leavinghimalonewithfourangryenemythatheonlyjustmanagedtoavoid.Forsomehoursafter themissionhewonderedwhoitwas thathad lethimdown.Whenthepilotswereidentifiedinanothersquadronnearby,heconfrontedthetwointhebar:‘Whatthehellareyouguysdoingrunningoffandleavingme?’hedemanded.‘Heck,wewereoutofammunition’,theyreplied.44

OPERATIONCROSSBOW

One effect of the areabombing strategy adoptedbyBomberCommandwas to create ademand from theGerman population for retaliatorymeasures, and this was one of thereasonsthatHitler initiatedtheV-weaponprogramme.45TheevidenceofsuchaschemegrewrapidlyandphotointerpreterseventuallyledtheAlliestoPeenemündeontheBalticcoast of Germany, which, despite being protected by a large decoy site, was heavilydamagedinaraidon17August1943.Althoughthissettheprogrammeback,thesearchforprobablelaunchsiteseventuallydiscoveredmysteriouscurvedrampsattheBoisCarréinnorthernFrance.TheAlliedairforcesdroppedsome30,000tonsofbombsonvariousrelated targets (more than half asmuch again as theGermans had dropped on Londonduring theBlitz) and completelydisrupted theprogramme, forcing theGermans to startagain from scratch. This time they simplified the bases and carefully concealed them,mostlyinwoodedareasbetweenLeHavreandCalais.Everythingwaskeptundercoverandsecuritywasseverelytightened.Whenthefirstofthesenewsiteswasdiscoveredbythe patient photo interpreters inApril 1944,with theNormandy invasion barelyweeksaway,theAlliesfelttheyoncemorehadtheupperhand.ButtheGermansadoptedaverysubtle deception by secretly reoccupyingmanyof the original sites, by nowabandonedand ignored, carefully leaving all thewreckageundisturbed– a sort of reverse decoy–whichthephotointerpreterssimplycouldnotsee.

TheV-bombonslaughtcommencedon13June,andonthenightof15/16June217missileswerefired.TheTwentyCommitteeimmediatelybeganfeedingfalseinformationviaagentsGARBO,BRUTUSandTATEsuggestingthattheywerefallinginawidearctothenorth and west of the city centre. Two days later GARBO wrote a letter decrying theeffectivenessoftheweaponandstatingthatonlyseventeenpercentofthemhadlandedin‘GreaterLondon’.ThetruefigurewasnearerthirtypercentandasmoremissilesfelltheAirMinistrywasable to assess themeanpointof impact (MPI) asbeingaroundNorthDulwich station.46 The aim of the AirMinistry and the HomeDefence Executivewas

thereforetopreventtheGermansfromcorrectingtheiraim,asDr.R.V.Jonesdescribedit,bygiving

correctpointsofimpactforbombsthattendedtohavealongerrangethanusualbutcouplethesewiththetimesofbombsthathadinfactfallenshort….Thereforeiftheymadeanycorrectionatall,itwouldbetoreducetheaveragerange.47

Extensivediscussionsfollowedamongthevariousgovernmentdepartmentsaffectedby the proposeddeception, someofwhomwere concerned at any attempt to divert thebombs since theymight causemore harm.At the same time the demands of themajorNormandydeceptionplan,FORTITUDESOUTH,hadalso tobeconsideredandGARBOwas‘arrested’. As as a result, on 12 July both GARBO and BRUTUS were prohibited by theGermans fromsending information regarding the flyingbombs.However,by the timeapolicy had been agreed by theWar Cabinet, the Allies were close to overrunning thelaunch sites in northern France.What servedmost to deceive theGermanswas in factreports from a freelance agent inMadrid calledOSTRO,whose accountswere based ongossip,imaginationandwhateverhecouldgleanfromthenewspapers.TherealsuccessofCROSSBOW from the British point of view was that it maintained the credibility of itsagents.ThisprovedinvaluablewhentheV-2rocketsbeganfallinglaterintheyear.TATEand ROVER put over information on the basis previously described for the V-1s, andalthoughthereisnoclearevidencethatitwasspecificallythesereportsthatledtoashiftin theMPI, a report from theMinistry ofHomeSecurity indicated that a further 1,300peoplewouldhavediedand10,000beeninjured,aswellasseveredisruptioncaused,hadthemissilesindeedbeenfallingbetweenWestminsterandthedocks,astheGermanswereledtobelieve.48

AERIALDECEPTIONSINCETHESECONDWORLDWAR

Tactical deception and developments in electronic warfare made a considerablecontributiontoAlliedsuccessintheSecondWorldWarandsavedcountlessaircrewlives.Perhaps more significantly, air units were formed for the first time and equippedspecifically to carry out this role. As is so often the case, these lessons were quicklyforgottenintheimmediateaftermathofthewar,butwerethenrevivedanddeveloped,andsincethewartherehavebeenphenomenaldevelopmentsinbothaircraftandsophisticatedavionics systems. Aircraft themselves are faster and more powerful, ranging from fastagile fighters throughversatilemulti-role fighter–bombers to the colossalB-52bomber,which dwarfs the Lancaster and Super Fortress of the Second World War. Moresignificantly,aerialwarfarenolongerinvolvesgettingascloseaspossibletoone’stargetin order to shoot directly at itwith cannon ormachine-guns, or to lob free-fall bombs.Instead,itreliesonsophisticatedmissiletechnology,basedonradarorinfra-redsystems.Similar systems now equip ground-based air defence units and tactics have beentransformed,leadinginturntodefensiveflaresandchaff(bundlesofWINDOW)toactasdecoysanddrawoff attackingmissiles.Flyingat lowaltitudeandhigh speedsmayputaircraftundereffectiveradarcover,butalsomakesthemvulnerabletogroundfire.

The development of ‘Wild Weasel’ electronic counter-measure aircraft led tospeciallyequipped fighter–bomberunits,designed toseekoutanddestroyenemyradar-controlled gun andmissile systems in a role calledSuppression ofEnemyAirDefence(SEAD).Ifanenemyradarisactivated,itcanbelocatedandattackedwithanti-radiation

missilesthathomeinonradaremissions.SincetheVietnamWarsuchunitshaveformedacrucialelementinsecuringcontroloftheair.Morerecently,so-called‘stealth’technologyhas been designed to make aircraft radar ‘invisible’, using radar-absorbent materials,carefullydesignedshapesand‘cancellation’technology(avionicsthatpredictanaircraft’sreflective signalat agiven frequencyandangle inorder to transmita signalwhichwillcancel the signature). ‘Stealth’ technology also includes techniques tomask sound andinfra-redsourcessuchasengineexhausts.Althoughtheprimarythreatwasseenforalongtimeasbeingfromradar-guidedweapons,aUSDepartmentofDefensestudyshowedthatinthetenyearsto1985ninetypercentoftacticalaircraftdestroyedwerevictimsofinfra-redsystems.49Suchtechnologyisincreasinglybeingappliedtolandandnavalunitswhiletoweddecoys,inuseatseasincethe1940sasamethodofcounteringacoustictorpedoes,havebeenadoptedsincethe1980sintheformofasmallradarjammertowedbehindanaircraft.However, counter-‘stealth’ techniqueswere soon identified, since it seems eachmeasureisquicklymetbyacounter-measureinaprocessthatseemslikelytocontinueformanyyearstocome.

9

OperationBodyguard‘Inwartime,truthissopreciousthatsheshouldalwaysbeattendedbyabodyguardoflies.’

WinstonChurchill

PROBABLYTHEMOSTcomplexandsuccessfuldeceptionoperationinthehistoryofwarfarewas thegroupofplanscoveringOperationOVERLORD, theAllied invasionofEurope in1944.Thevastscaleoftheundertakingmeantthatavarietyofdeceptionoperationswasneeded (six principal and thirty-six subordinate plans, together with an array of minordetails);eachoperationwasgivenaseparatecode-nameandcombinedundertheumbrellacode-nameofOperationBODYGUARD.Whileatthegrandstrategiclevelitcanonlybesaidtohavepartiallysucceeded(effortstopersuadetheGermansthatthemaineffortwouldbedirectedanywhereotherthanthewesternshoresofthecontinentweredoomedbythesizeoftheundertaking,ifnothingelse),operationallyitwasanoverwhelmingtriumph.

TheactualplanforassaultingtheFrenchcoast,OperationNEPTUNE,involved6,483shipsandcraftofalltypesandover13,000aircraft.InadditiontoamillionorsoBritishandCanadiantroopswhohadbeenpreparingforyears,oneandahalfmillionAmericanswereinBritain–someofthemveteransofNorthAfricaandItaly,butmanymorenewlyarrivedfromtheUSA,afterasix-monthtrainingperiod,havingneverheardashotfiredinanger. Millions more waited to follow direct from America, and naturally there wasconsiderablenervousnessatalllevelsofcommandattheenormousriskssuchanoperationentailed.Thesefearswereapparentlyjustifiedon28April1944,whenconvoyT4,takingpartinthepre-invasionExerciseTIGERinLymeBay,wasattackedbymaraudingGermanE-Boatsand ‘trappedandhemmed in likeabunchofwolvescirclingawoundeddog’.1Sevenhundredandforty-nineAmericanservicemenlosttheirlives,andthevulnerabilityof projecting a vast force across defended seas was painfully demonstrated. As Pattononcesaid:‘Inlandingoperations,retreatisimpossible.’2

On the far side of the Channel the Germans were expecting an invasion. It wasunderstoodbyOKWthat the invasionrepresentedadecisivepoint in theconductof thewar.IfitcouldbesuccessfullydefeatedthanitwouldreleaseasmanyasfiftydivisionsfortheEastern Front. TheGrandAlliancewould be paralysed if not shattered, and such adefeatwouldalsoprovidethetimetheGermansneededtodeploythenewweapons–jetaircraft, long-rangesubmarinesandV-weapons–thatHitlerbelievedwouldensurefinalvictory.Butdefeating the invasionwascomplicatedby thedifficultyofpredictingwhenand where it would occur and Hitler was obsessed with defending every inch of theEuropean coastline, however unlikely the threat.The landings could come, he said, ‘onany sector of the long western front from Norway to the Bay of Biscay, or on theMediterranean–eitherthesouthcoastofFrance,theItaliancoast,ortheBalkans’.3Thismeant spreading his resources thinly and hoping tomaintain strong enough reserves tothrowtheAlliesbackoncetheyhadshowntheirhand.Infact,whatevertheAlliesmighthavewantedtodo,thefundamentalconsiderationsofsupplyandaircoverpresentedthemwithonly two feasiblealternatives for a large-scale invasion,Normandyand thePasdeCalais.4 Either way, it was apparent to both sides that theAllies would have only one

chance to effect a lodgement and, as Hitler himself said, ‘once the landing has beendefeateditwillundernocircumstancesberepeated’.5TheAlliescouldnotaffordtofailandwouldneedeverypossibleassistance.

ThedefencesinnorthernFranceagainstaseaborneassaultwereformidable.Undervon Rundstedt, Germany’s senior field commander, were two Heeresgruppen (‘armygroups’)inFranceandtheLowCountries.AlthoughvonRundstedtwasundernoillusionsas tohis truepowerunderHitler’s control (‘mysoleprerogative’,he said later, ‘was tochangetheguardinfrontofmygate’),6hewasknowntodisposeofsomesixtydivisionsand for all Hitler’s interference he would still be a prime target for the deceivers.Heeresgruppe B comprised Fifteenth Army, which covered the area from the ScheldtestuaryinBelgiumwestward,includingthePasdeCalaisalmosttotheRiverOrne.OnitsleftflankSeventhArmycoveredNormandyandBrittany.IntheFrenchinteriorandsouthHeeresgruppe G comprised First and Nineteenth Armies. Elsewhere, there were strongforcesholding Italy,Scandinavia and theBalkans.Thediversionof these strongenemyforcesawayfromthechosencrucibleofoperationsinNormandy,bothfromoutsideandwithintheWesterntheatre,wastheaimofthecarefullyco-ordinateddeceptionplans.

GERMANINTELLIGENCEAllied intelligenceagencieswerewellawareof thestateofaffairswithin theReichandoccupied territories. The assistance of resistance organizations across Europe and thealmosttotalcontroloftheskiesforthepurposeofaerialreconnaissancegavethemahugeadvantage in information gathering, to say nothing of the insights provided by ULTRA.Furthermore,variousGermanagenciesweredissipatingtheirenergiesonthecreationofafeindbild or picture of the enemy and his intentions. FHWwas but one agency dealingwithintelligence,andvonRoennefoundhimselfincreasinglycompetingnotsomuchwiththeAbwehraswith theSicherheitsdienst (SD, thesecuritybranchof theSS).When theAbwehrwasabruptlydisbanded inFebruary1944asa resultof its involvement inanti-Naziintrigues,GermanintelligencewasthrownintoconfusionfromwhichbothFHWandanother rival, Amt VI of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA),* commanded byBrigadeführerWalterSchellenberg, found themselves reporting toErnstKaltenbrunner’sSD.Kaltenbrunner’s tendency for personal reasons to sendwhat he regarded as ‘vital’information straight to Hitler or his lackey Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of theWehrmachtführungsstab, meant little intelligence worthy of the name was properlycirculated.7Theseagencies,already reelingunderawelterofclaimsandcounter-claimsfrom false radio intercepts, double agents, camouflage, decoys and diplomatic rumours,foundthemselvesunabletofiltertruthfromfantasy,andtheAlliesknewit.

THEOVERALLPLANAtthestrategiclevel,itwashopedthatbythreateningwidelyscatteredareasofoccupiedEurope the Germans would be persuaded to maintain unnecessary strength in theseperipheries,thusleavingFrancerelativelyweaklydefended.8InOctober1943Bevanputforwardadraft plan code-named JAEL.Thiswould threatenmajoroperationsboth fromBritainandintheMediterranean,butatthisstagenoneoftheideasfortheactuallandingshadbeenformalizedandthedeceptionplanswerecorrespondinglyunconvincing.

AtthesametimetheplanningstaffatCOSSAC,puttingtogether thedetailsof thegenuine operation, produced a tactical deception plan named TORRENT that alarmedBevan.Heunderstood theneed to tie deception tooperational reality and, amongotherthings, disliked the amateurish way that it planned for the period after D-Day. Hepersuaded the Combined Chiefs of Staff to shelve it until after the meetings betweenRooseveltandChurchillendedinCairoinJanuary1944,afterwhichthefinaldetailswereto be nailed in place and TORRENT would then form the basis of ‘theOVERLORD coverplan’.9 It was, however, agreed that this plan should be provisionally circulatedimmediately, as some measures would take time to become effective. Radio silenceswould need to be imposed so that the enemywould not recognize the genuine silencemaskingOVERLORD.Dummybuild-upsandgenuineconcealmentwouldalsorequiretimetoimplement.10

TheresultofthevariousconferenceswasthedecisiontolaunchOVERLORDinMay1944,anditwasalsoagreedtolaunchOperationANVILsimultaneouslyagainstthesouthof France. Eisenhower was nominated Supreme Allied Commander at Tehran* inDecember1943,andJAELwasrenamedOperationBODYGUARDbeforereceivingitsfinalapprovalfromtheCombinedChiefsofStaffon25January1944.11Implementationcouldnowbegin in earnest, andBevanhadNoelWild from ‘A’Force appointed toheadOps‘B’,thecriticalexecutivepostfordeceptionwithinEisenhower’sSupremeHeadquartersAlliedExpeditionary Force (SHAEF). The aimwould be to persuade theGermans thatalthougha large-scalecross-Channeloperationwas indeedbeingprepared, itwasbynomeans theonlyplannedstrokeand thatanyway itwasnotdueuntil late in thesummer.Brigadier-GeneralHaroldR.Bullof theG-3(Operations)staffatSHAEF,described theaimsofthecoverplanasbeingto:

CausetheWehrmachttomakefaultytroopdispositionsbymilitarythreatsagainstNorway…DeceivetheenemyastothecorrecttargetdateandtargetareaofOperationNEPTUNE...InducetheenemytomakefaultytacticaldispositionsduringandafterNEPTUNE,bythreatsagainstthePasdeCalais.12

Within BODYGUARD the principal plans consisted of the threat to Scandinavia, whichwouldbedevelopedthroughFORTITUDENORTH,supportedbydiplomaticdeceptionintheform of GRAFFHAM and ROYAL FLUSH. The threat against the Pas de Calais would bedevelopedasFORTITUDESOUTH,supportedbyIRONSIDE.MeanwhileintheMediterraneanelementsofROYALFLUSHwouldfurthersupportoperationsZEPPELINandVENDETTA.

STRATEGICDECEPTION:FORTITUDENORTH,ZEPPELINANDVENDETTA

The Germans knew that they could not weaken the Eastern Front and to begin withbelievedthatonlyFrancewouldbetargetedforinvasion.OKWheldthataforceofeightdivisionscouldbeassembled fromtheperipheryofoccupiedEurope–ScandinaviaandtheBalkans–todrivetheinvasionbackintothesea.13ByJanuary1944thatsynopsishadtobealteredasthreatsappearedtoindicatethat,althoughthemaininvasionwouldcrossthe narrow Straits ofDover, subsidiary attacks against the very areas fromwhich theirreactionforcewastocomecouldalsobeexpected,andthustheseareascouldnotaffordtobeweakened.

Aftermany years’ experience the deception staff knew that in order to ensure thecoherenceofthemyriadtinydetailsnecessarytobuildacrediblepictureinthemindsof

theirtargets,theircoverplanshouldbeproducedasifitwereforagenuineoperation.ForthebenefitofNEPTUNE,thebesttimetolaunchaninvasionofNorwaywouldbeafterD-Day,sothatalltheformationsinNorwaywouldremaintherewhilethegenuineoperationtookplace.ScotlandwastheobviousassemblyareaforanygenuineinvasionofNorway,soitwasalsotheobviousassemblyareaforanyfictionalinvasionofNorway.Adetailedplan involving an initial landing of two divisions in the north to capture Narvik anddesigned toattractGerman forces tomeet itwouldbe followedbya landing tocaptureStavanger airfield and land further reinforcements, with Bergen, Trondheim, andeventuallyOsloforobjectives.AswellaspersuadingtheGermanstoretainforcesawayfrom the crucial battlefields, a principal aim of FORTITUDE NORTH was to make thembelieve that the invasion of France was planned for a later date than in reality. Thescenario therefore suggested an attack timed onemonth before the invasion of France,whichwould supposedly be at the end of July.Once thiswas established, the notionalBritishFourthArmycouldbecreatedinordertocarryoutthenotionalplan.

FourthArmywasbasedontheexistingScottishCommandunderLieutenant-GeneralSirAndrewThorne.Usefully, ‘Bulgy’Thornehadbeen themilitaryattaché toBerlin in1934 andwas knownpersonally toHitler.AlthoughThorne commanded the formation,the man appointed to run the detailed deception was fifty-year-old Colonel RoderickMacLeod,who,theLCSdiscovered,wasanauthorityonmilitarylegerdemain.Manyofthe troops forming the deception were genuine enough, including the 3rd InfantryDivision,which,whilecarryingouttoughassaulttrainingontheMorayFirthfortherealinvasion,wasblissfullyunawarethatthisservedadualpurpose.PercyNunn,adriverwith52nd (Lowland)Division, recalled receiving lessons inNorwegian and hard training inmountainwarfare.Longafterthewarheremaineddoubtfulthatitwasallmerelyasham.InDecember1943thedivisionwasmovednorthand

Wewere issuedwith shoulder flasheswhich said ‘Mountain’.Theywere quite obvious.We all sewedthose on and that was added to our divisional sign, so that we were a pukkaMountain Division. InDundee,downintheharbourarea,youcouldn’tmissaconsiderabledisplayofsnow-clearingequipment,giantsnowploughsandbulldozers.Itlookedlikebusiness.14

Therealandnotionalunitscametoacombinedtotaloftwocorpsofsixdivisions.

MacLeod’s greatest contribution came in the form of providing the detailed radiotrafficthatarealarmywouldproduce,underthecode-nameSKYE.Initiallyhehadseriousdifficultygettingenoughqualitystaffandproposedthatherestricthiseffortstosimulatingacorps.ButSHAEFinsistedthatanarmywouldbeneededtoassaultScandinavia,soanarmy there would be.15 Since Scottish Command had no ready-made specialist signalsunit,ateamwasmadeupfromIICorpsand9thArmouredDivision,bothformationsintheprocessofdisbandment,towhichwereaddedpersonnelfromScottishCommandandvarious units.16 To be convincing there needed to be not only the main headquarterselementsandlargeformationssuchasnotional80thDivision,butthemyriadsupportingunits necessary to administer so large a force, thus stretchingMacLeod’s resources andingenuity.Consequently,55thFieldDressingStation,87thFieldCashOfficeanda filmand photographic sectionwere among the units invented to give authenticity to FourthArmy.17 The radio traffic dealt with ski training, requisitions for heavy boots and theperformance of tank engines in sub-zero temperatures, all details appropriate to an

invasion of Norway.18 Notional naval forces were created and notional amphibioustrainingcarriedoutbetweenthevariouselements.

Theradiodeceiversexpectedanaudience.Germany’svariouswirelessinterceptandcryptanalyticserviceswereskilledatintercepting,locatingandinterpretingmessagesandpatterns.Theycould absolutelynot afford to ignore the traffic aroundBritain.Ensuringthattheybelievedwhattheyheardwasanothermatter,however,andenormouscarewasneeded in preparing the transmissions since a single mistake could blow the wholedeception.19 Similarly, the Germans could be expected to seek corroboration whereverpossible, and various visual deceptionswere prepared for the Luftwaffe to photograph.Every available shipwas anchored in the Firth of Forth, togetherwithmakeshift troopbarges and landing craft, often lovingly embellishedwith smoke from funnels, lines oflaundry, and music blaring from cabins. A carrier-borne aerial reconnaissance of theNarvik area, Operation VERITAS, was carried out on 26 April. The RAF simulated thetransferoffourmediumbombersquadronsfromEastAngliatoeasternScotlandandmadedisplays of real and dummy aircraft around Peterhead, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Apartfromtwin-engine‘bombers’,inflatablerubbertankswere‘driven’intopositionscompletewith‘tracks’andnotquiteeffectivecamouflage.Plywoodgliders,pilesofcratesandfueldrums were accumulated. Local newspapers joined in, carrying spurious reports ofsportingandsocialevents,includingmarriagesofsoldiersandlocalgirls.

InIcelandthedoubleagentsCOBWEBandBEETLEreportedabuild-upthereasaimedatnorthernNorwayandon12AprilBRUTUSdescribedtheinsigniaofFourthArmyanditsfictitiouscomponents,IICorpsandVIICorps,tohiseagercontroller.Healsomentionedan American corps that he could not identify and spoke as though the Germans weretotallyfamiliarwiththeoperationandweremerelyunsureastoitsexactdate.On4Mayhe reported the arrival of the Russian Klementi Budyenny, ostensibly to co-ordinate aSoviet attack fromPetsamo.Meanwhile, FREAK ‘met’ anAmerican liaison officer fromXV Corps in Northern Ireland attached to Fourth Army in Edinburgh, for which hereceivedcongratulationsfromhiscontrol.HAMLETsentamessagefromhis‘contact’intheMinistryofEconomicWarfare,sayingthattheministryhadremovedfilesunderstrictestsecrecy referring to installations in Alesund, Bergen, Oslo, Narvik, Stavanger, Moss,Porsgrund,KristiansandandTrondheim,abeautifullysubtlewayof tellingtheGermansthat the invasionwould be divided in two, as per the cover plan.20MUTT, JEFF and inparticular GARBO were enormously valuable, sending a steady stream of informationconfirmingthebuild-upinScotland.

SupplementingFORTITUDENORTHwasOperationGRAFFHAM.Thisaimedtopersuadethe Germans that the Swedes were being enlisted to assist in the proposed attack onnorthern Norway. It was a combined effort by the British, Americans and Soviets,involvingvariousdiplomaticsubterfugesandotherelements,includingtheriggingoftheStockholm stock market to raise the price of Norwegian securities and imply theanticipated liberation of Norway.21 GRAFFHAM produced no dramatic results, but it didhavesomeeffect.Mostnotablewasthevisitof‘AirVice-Marshal’Thornton,formerAirAttaché,tohisoldfriendGeneralNordenskiold,theCommander-in-ChiefoftheSwedishAirForce.Carefultoarriveandleavebythebackdoorincivilianclothes(sinceheknewtheGermanswouldphotographhim),heproposed that theplanned invasionofNorway

would lead tomany civilian deaths and that Nordenskiold should seek to persuade theSwedish government to enter Norway as a police force to protect the rights of non-combatants.

TherisksrunbydeceiversareamplyillustratedbythefactthatThornton,inrealityan air commodore, had difficulty with the AirMinistry Pay Branch over his expensesclaimsattheairvice-marshalrateuntilamemberoftheairstaffcametohisrescue.22Theeffectofallthiswaspartiallysuccessful.FHWdulyreportedon28Maythat

Credible-soundingreportedoverturesbyanEnglishAirForceofficerinSwedenwhichwereapparentlyaimedatobtainingairbases inSweden for invasionpurposes,maybe interpretedas ahintof aminorlandingoperationbeingplannedinsouthNorwayorDenmark.Thelikelihoodofamorepowerfullandinginthosepartsaspartofalargeoperationalstrategyisstillconsideredtobeslight.23

TheGermans believed in the existence of Fourth Army, but did not take the threat asseriously aswas hoped, given the problems that providing air cover for such a schemewouldinvolve.FHWobservedasearlyas1Marchthat

WhattheenemyleadershipisuptointhepresentstageofoperationsistodoeverythingpossibletotiedowntheGermanforcesonsubsidiaryfronts,andindeeddivertthemfromthedecisiveAtlanticfront;andseeingthattheyhavealreadytriedtodothisinItaly,itseemspossiblethattheyhavedecidedtodothesameintheScandinavianregion.24

Indeed,thoserealistsnotedon25MaythatshippingineastScottishharbourswasrathersparseandthatithadconsiderablyincreasedinthePortlandarea,‘permittingthetransportoftenormoredivisions’.25

WhileFHWhadfewdoubtsas to the trueschwerpunkt, someeighteendivisions–around200,000men–werebeingmaintainedinScandinavia,wellawayfromthedecisivefront.TheseforceswereputinastateofreadinessinMay,restrictingthedepletionoftheirgarrisons,and in themiddleofMayafirst-classdivisionwassent toNorway.AlthoughOKWdecidedthatthetroopsinScotlandwerecapableofonlylimitedoperationsagainstNorway andDenmark, they believed that the possibility of an attack remained and theFührerrefusedtoweakenwhathetermedhis‘ZoneofDestiny’.26Thiswoulddoubtlesshaveamusedthe twenty-eightofficersand334otherrankswhofinallyservedasFourthArmy.

Ironically,asvonRoenneatFHWcametoseethethreattoNorwayforwhatitwas,sothisreinforcedtheconvictionthatiftheAllieswerepreparedtogotosuchlengths,itcouldonlybetodivertattentionfromthemostobvioussolution,alandinginthePasdeCalais.TheAllieddeceiversthusinadvertentlysucceededinluringtheGermansintothetrap of a double bluff.With every piece of evidence, real or illusory, theywould nowreinforce their determined belief in the threat to the Pas deCalais. Since this areawasalready being defended by three times as many troops as any comparable stretch ofcoastline,itseemedobvioustomanyGermansthattheAllieswoulddoeverythingintheirpower to persuade them that the landings would come elsewhere; and the GermanresponsewasthatwiththeAllies’notorietyforskilfuldeceptionthebestcoursewouldbetokeeptheirtroopswheretheywereandremainalert.27

Meanwhile,otherplanswereinstitutedinthediplomaticfield,notablyROYALFLUSH,designed tobringpressureonneutrals around theperiphery, inparticularSpain,Turkey

andSweden.However,theGermanintelligenceagenciesweresingularlyunimpressedbyinformationderived fromAllied embassies inneutral countries.FHWreported that ‘forquite a long time the Anglo-Saxon embassies have been recognized as outspokendeceptioncentres,fromwhichnotasinglepieceofreliablenews,butmanyfalsereports,havebeencoming.’28Moresignificantwas theMediterraneandeceptionplan,OperationZEPPELIN,nolesscomprehensivethanFORTITUDE,andutilizingtheconsiderabletalentsof‘A’ Force, among others. The aimwas tomount a threat against the Balkans and thuspreventthetransferoftroopsfromtheMediterraneantheatretoFrance.Clarkeemployedevery trick in the deceiver’s armoury, using every branch of the armed forces andincluding radio, visual and propaganda exercises involving Ninth, Tenth and TwelfthArmies,oncemorecomprisingreal formations(10thIndianDivision)andnotionalones(8th Armoured Division, 34th British Infantry Division). Hitler referred to ‘the provenpresenceof battle-strength enemydivisions inEgypt’.29 In reality, therewere just threedivisions,noneofwhichwascapableoftakingthefield.TheGermanHighCommandwasreceptivetothesethreatsandadirectiveof1January1944fromOKWtotheCommander-in-Chief South-East even went to far as to warn him that Allied stress on north-westEuropemightbeacoverforablowintheBalkans.30

OperationFOYNESwasaplan initiatedby theLCS toconceal the transferof eightbattle-traineddivisionsfromItalytoBritainwhichbeganinNovember1943.Theaimwasboth to exaggerate the strength in the Mediterranean and to minimize the build-up inBritain as part of the policy of ‘postponement’. The sudden appearance of Africa StarmedalribbonsonbattledressthroughoutBritainwasputdownto‘instructors’broughttotrain the less experienced formations due for the invasion. Before the end of 1943 theGermanswerealreadybeginningtonoticethattheseeightdivisionshaddisappearedfromtheItalianfrontandmighthavereturnedtoBritain.AletterfromaBritishsoldierthatfellinto German hands told them that ‘the Scottish division which came from Italy willpresumablytakeplaceinthegreateventsduetotakeplace.’Theythereforededucedthat51st (Highland) Division had returned to Britain and was to take part in the invasion.However,inspiteofthisandotherindications,includingthetransferoflandingcraft,theytended to place the FOYNES divisions in the base areas of the Italian front and did notaccept the transfer of these divisions as fact until notified by one of the controlledagents.31

ByMarchtheGermanswerebeginningtoconsidermovingtroopsfromtheBalkansto western Europe when an event occurred quite outside the scope of anything thedeceptionstaffscoulddevise.TheopeningtheSovietoffensiveonthesouthernpartoftheEasternFronton4March led instead to the transferof formations to stem thisnewredtide.Meanwhile, the effect ofWANTAGE, the latest in the series of false order-of-battleplans,began topaydividends.ByMayOKWwas seriouslyalarmed. Jodl’sdeputy, thenewly promoted General der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, produced an appreciationclaimingthat‘unquestionable’sourcesconfirmedtheAlliesplannedtoassaulttheBalkansfromEgyptandLibya.32IntheMediterraneantheatretheoverestimationwasasmuchaseighty-fivepercentandplayedamajorpartinpreventingthemovementofGermantroopsfromthattheatretothecrucialarenaofnorthernFrance.33

Unlike in Scotland, however, matters in the Mediterranean were complicated by

plansforgenuineoperations.AtTehranithadbeenagreedthataninvasionofthesouthofFrance would be mounted simultaneously with OVERLORD. Appropriately (but ratherinsecurely) code-named ANVIL, this operation was renamed DRAGOON and postponedowingtoashortageoflandingcraftandthelackofsuccessinItaly,includingthelandingsatAnzio.AthreattoGermanforcesinthesouthwasdesirabletoassistoperationsinthenorth, but obviously this would complicatematters whenDRAGOON with its associateddeceptionplan,FERDINAND,wentforward.‘A’Forcewasgiventhetaskofkeeping theseGerman reserves away fromNormandy until D+25 under the code-nameVENDETTA. Athreatwas developed fromUS SeventhArmy inNorthAfrica to theNarbonne region,convenientlywellclearoftheToulon–Niceareawherethegenuinelandingswereduetotakeplace.GermansourcesrevealonlypartialsuccessforVENDETTA,althoughironicallyFHWdrewattentiontothenotionalvisitofMontgomery,suggestingthatitmightpresageoperationsinthesouth.Infact,thiswasLieutenantCliftonJames,takingpartinOperationCOPPERHEAD, intended to draw attention away from impending operations in northernFrance.

AlthoughduringthefirstweeksoftheBattleofNormandyaninvasionofthesouthof France was not seen by the Germans as imminent, preparations were neverthelessmade. (Although it reported increasing activity in North African ports, OKW saw anysuch operation as being subordinate to OVERLORD). Heeresgruppe G deployed tendivisions,includingtwopanzerdivisions,on6June,andnotuntilmid-Junewasapanzerdivision moved north; and no others were moved until mid-July. German forces weretherefore successfully diverted from the critical theatre.34 With the winding up ofVENDETTA,Wilson,nowSupremeAlliedCommanderMediterraneanTheatre,wasabletoreporton26Junethat:

No[enemy]divisionsmovedfromtheMediterraneantheatretonorth-westEuropeduringthepreparationperiod of OVERLORD. . . . So far as is known to date, only one division has moved from theMediterranean theatre towards theOVERLORD area; and none arrived in time to influence the battleduringthe‘critical’perioddefinedbySHAEF.35

One other deception planwasmade to keep reserves away from northern France,althoughitwasconspicuouslyunsuccessful.OperationIRONSIDEwasdesignedtothreatenthewesternFrenchcoast.ThecoverstorywasthatalargelyAmericanexpeditionaryforcewasconcentratinginwesternUKportsandaimedtocaptureBordeaux,whichwouldthenreceiveforcesdirectfromtheUSA.Thedeceptionstaffshadlittleconfidenceinthistaleandwithfewphysicalresourcestodevotetoittheonlymeanstodisseminateitwerethedoubleagents,whosecontrollerswerereluctanttoriskpreciouscredibility.Somereportsweresentbutthereisnoevidenceoftheirbeingaccepted.36

OPERATIONALDECEPTION:FORTITUDESOUTHThatHitler’sattentionwasfocusedonnorth-westFrancehadbeenobvioussincehisissueofDirectiveNo.51on3November1943,describingthattheatreashistoppriorityforthecoming year.37While demonstrating the probable futility of attempts at grand strategicdeception, it highlighted the importance of the Pas de Calais in Hitler’s thoughts,particularly in relation to the V-weapons, whose emplacement was then beginning andwhoselimitedrangedemandedcloseproximitytoGreatBritain.Thiswouldalsoproveofvitalsignificancetothedeceiverswhenthebattlecametobefought.NotonlydidthePas

deCalaispresenttheAllieswiththeshortestrouteacrosstheChannel,butitwouldalsoprovidethequickestwayintotheindustrialheartlandoftheRuhrandofGermanyitself,afactwellknownto theGermans. Itwasalso logical for theGermans toassumethat theBritishandAmericanswouldwanttoneutralizetheV-weaponsitesbeforetheycoulddoseriousdamagetoLondonandtheChannelports,especiallygiventhepropagandaabouttheirvaluethatGoebbelswasproducing.

InJanuary1944Rommel,whohadbeendispatchedtoinspectthewesterndefences,proposedtoHitlerthatradicalchangesbemadetovonRundstedt’santi-invasionplansandwasgrantedhisrequestofcommandofHeeresgruppeB,coveringthecriticalsectorfromthe Zuider Zee to the Loire. Nominally subordinate to von Rundstedt, Rommel heldradically different views fromhis superior on the problem of defending 1,700miles ofcoastline. This reordering of the High Command in the west produced furthercomplications. All armoured forces now came under the control of General derPanzertruppenBaronGeyrvonSchweppenburg, incommandofPanzergruppeWest.Hewished to keep these forces concentrated and was backed up in this belief by theInspector-GeneralofPanzerTroops,GeneraloberstHeinzGuderian.Rommel’sexperienceof growing Allied air power convinced him that if they succeeded in effecting alodgement,theAllieswouldbesimplytoostrongtoevict.Hewantedtoestablishstrongtacticalreservesclosetothebeachesanddefeattheinvasionthere.MostaccountsportraythedivisionasbeingbetweenvonRundstedtandRommel,butitwasprincipallybetweenRommelandvonSchweppenburgsupportedbyGuderian,withvonRundstedtasarbiter.Eventually,Hitlerproducedacompromisethatsatisfiednobody,orderingthatfourpanzerdivisionsbekeptasanOKWreserve.38

Meanwhile, vonRundstedt,who in commonwithmost of theGermanArmywasunable fully to comprehend the air and naval dimension of the invasion, assumed thatsimilarairandnavalweaknessestothosethathadcompelledhisowncross-Channelplanof1940totaketheshortestroutewouldapplyequallytotheAllies,abelief thatfurtherhighlightedthePasdeCalais.Asaresultoftheill-fatedDiepperaidof19August1942,Germancommandersatalllevelshaddrawnthewrongconclusions.TheDieppeoperationconfirmedtheirbeliefthataninvasionwouldtargetamajorport.RommelatfirstbelievedtheAllieswould land at themouth of the Somme and try and takeLeHavre from therear.39However,despitebeingrepulsedwithheavylosses,thelargelyCanadianforcehadgiven the Allies ‘the priceless secret of victory’.40 One of the most important lessonslearnedwas the impossibility of quickly capturing a port intact.The ingenious solutionwasprovidedbytheMulberryharbours,consistingofenormousfloatingconcretecaissonsto be joined together on the far side of the Channel,* and Pipeline Under the Ocean(PLUTO) for supplying the vast quantities of fuel that would be needed for the fullymotorized forces. At the same time, by negating the need to capture a major portimmediately,theseinnovationswouldalsogreatlyassistdeceptionplanning.41

Thus von Rundstedt, like Hitler, concentrated his focus on the Pas de Calais.Consequently, the labourers of the Todt Organization built 132 heavy concrete gunemplacements between Dunkirk and Boulogne, compared with 47 in Normandy.Goebbels’ministryclaimed:‘WehavefortifiedthecoastofEuropefromtheNorthCapeto theMediterranean and installed the deadliestweapons that the twentieth century can

produce.’ Gilles Perrault, historian of the FrenchResistance, noted that ‘if theAtlanticwall anywhere resembled the ferocious image popularized by Goebbels, it was in thesegmentwhere vonRundstedt expected theAllies.’Rommel agreed, and toldGuderianrepeatedlythattheinvasionwouldoccurnorthoftheSomme.42Withcharacteristicvigour,hehadoverfourmillionminesandthousandsofobstacles,manybooby-trapped(knownas ‘Rommel’s asparagus’) placed along the foreshore. Being a camouflage enthusiasthimself,healsoaddednumerousdummiesanddecoyswhichdrewconsiderableattentionfromAlliedairmen.

Commanding the land component of the invasion force was Montgomery. Hisintelligencesourcesestimateda totalof sixtyGermandivisions inFrance, including tenpanzer and twelve mobile infantry divisions.* The Allies had a total of thirty-sevendivisionsavailable in thelandingandfollow-onforces.Apartfromtheimmediate threatposedby the fivedivisions insitu at the landing sites, therewere fourpanzerdivisionscloseenoughtoaffectoperationsinthearea.Montgomery’sprojectedbuild-upmeasuredagainst that of the Germans in attempting to contain and repel the Allies led to theconclusionthatafterforty-eighthourstherewouldbeapproximatelytwelvedivisionsoneitherside,bywhichtimetheGermanswouldrealizetheseriousnessofthethreat.43

The actual assault, while in itself extremely hazardous, would not thus ultimatelydecidetheissue; instead, theracetobuildupforcesinthelodgementareawouldbethecritical factor, and in this the Germans had the advantages of numbers and landcommunications. Deception would play a crucial role in producing a ratio of forcesnecessaryforAlliedvictoryinthebattleofthebuild-upandpermittingabreak-out.ThecoverplanofFORTITUDESOUTHwassimple.TheAlliedmainassaultwouldbelaunchedagainst the Pas de Calais six weeks after the landings in Normandy, which werethemselvesnomorethanadiversiontodrawoffreserves.Theaimwasthusnothingshortof pinning thenineteendivisionsofFifteenthArmy in thePasdeCalais. Its success inmisleadingevery levelof theGermanCommandas to theprecise targetandstrengthofthethreatwasoneofthecentraltriumphsofthedeceptionstaffsoftheentirewar.44

Theuseofairpowerwascriticaltothedeceptionplan.Controloftheskiesnotonlyprovided security for thepreparationsbut formed an integral part of them.Now the airplanwas framed so that for every tonofbombsdroppedoncoastal batteries andeveryreconnaissancemissionflownoverNormandy,twowouldoccurinthePasdeCalais.Theregion north and east of the Seine received ninety-five per cent of the anti-railwaybombing effort.45 This was a vital aspect of the operational plan, since Eisenhowerinsisted that he could not outstrip the German build-up without paralysing railcommunications.46 Fortunately, it also coincidedwith the deception plan. Eisenhower’steam of railway experts produced a target list that attacked repair shops and junctionsbetweentheSeineandtheMeuse,butthelinesservingNormandyweremainlyextensionsof those supplying the Pas de Calais, which therefore still appeared the target. ThecampaignopenedinMarchandwashugelysuccessfulinbothobjects.Barelyforty-eighthours before D-Day, in his weekly report to von Rundstedt, Rommel stated that‘concentrated air attacks on the coastal defences betweenDunkirk andDieppe [i.e., thePasdeCalais]strengthenprospectsofalarge-scalelandinginthatarea’.47

The main deceptive elements were less easily formalized. The proposal of a

diversionaryoperationwas ruledout on thegrounds that only agenuine landingwouldbeingtheLuftwaffetobattle.TherewereonlyenoughlandingcraftavailabletolandonedivisioninthePasdeCalaisandsopunyalandingwouldquiteobviouslybeadiversion,withdisastrousconsequencesforthegenuineassault.Giventhatthiswouldlandbetweenthe Seine and the Cotentin peninsula, these forces would be assembled in the areastretching from Portsmouth westwards as far as Plymouth. The preparations could nothope to be concealed permanently and were already apparent to FHW. Instead, it wasplanned to produce equal concentrations in south-east England, which would beintensifiedoncetheactuallandingshadtakenplace.Whenthedemandsthiswouldplaceon scarce resources became apparent, it was further decided, given almost total Alliedcontroloftheairandofthetriedandtrustedsystemofdoubleagents,torelymainlyonthe latter and on radio simulation, since by now these were what the Germans almostexclusively relied upon. Nevertheless, visual simulation would be needed as back-up,notablyoflandingcraftintheKentportsandThamesestuary,becausetherecouldbenoguaranteethataerialreconnaissancewouldnotgetthroughandtheplancouldnotaffordagapinthecorroborativeevidencethatmightimperiltheentireoperation.48

The knowledge the Allies possessed of German intelligence capabilities andperceptionsnowprovedinvaluable.VonRoenneatFHWwasknowntobeashrewdandexperienced staff officer from a Prussian Junker family, whose understanding of theAllies’truecapabilitiesandintentionswasoftenremarkablyaccurate.Hewasoneofthefirst to see the Norway threat as a deception and never took the threat to the Balkansseriously.ButhewasdismayedtofindtheHighCommandputfarmorefaithinHitler’sintuitionthaningenuineintelligence.Wellawarethatamajorinvasionwasimminent,hewas alarmed at the way theWest was used as littlemore than a rest and recuperationtheatreforshatteredformationspulledoutofthelineintheEast,andwasdeterminedtomakethethreatclearforhissuperiors.

ReportsfromtheGermanradio-directionfindingservice,theY-Dienst,showedthatwhiletrafficintheMediterraneanwasdecreasing,intheUnitedKingdomitwassteadilyincreasing.Certainindicatorformationswerecarefullymonitored,includingtheUS82ndAirborneDivision.AlthoughitappearedtobestillinItaly,carefulanalysisoftherhythmsandpatternsofitsoperatorsshowedchangesthatsuggestedadeception,andthisseemedto be confirmed when new patterns in England fitted the ‘signature’ of the division.Confirmationcameinasignalinterceptedinclear;aroutinemessageconcerningawelfarematterbutreferringtothe82ndcommandpostatBanbury.

NowtherivalrybetweenthevariousGermanintelligenceagencieshandedtheLCSanewace.VonRoennediscoveredthatKaltenbrunner’sSDwasscalingdownhisestimatesofAlliedstrength,oftenbyasmuchasfiftypercent,inordertotellHitlerwhathewantedtohearandcoveritsownlackofinformationandinefficiency.OneofvonRoenne’sstaffsuggested deliberately overestimating in order to strike a ‘balance’. Von Roenne waseither initiallyhorrifiedby this suggestionor, as an intimateofvariousmembersof theJulybombplot,waskeenforanAlliedlandingtocounter-balancetheSovietthreat.Eitherway, he realized he need only accept information at face value without seekingcorroboration,andaconsistentpicturewouldemerge.Thisnaturallyplayeddirectlyintothe hands of the deceivers, but hardly had vonRoenne begun issuing his overestimateswhenforreasonsofhisownKaltenbrunnerstoppedscalinghisdown!FromMay1944the

fictitiousorderofbattlecomprisingsomeninetydivisions(whereinrealitytherewerejustthirty-seven) became set in stone.49 Evenwhen von Roenne began to havemisgivingsaboutthissituation,itwasdifficulttoseewhattodoaboutit.

Meanwhile, Montgomery’s Chief-of-Staff, Francis de Guingand, had raised theimportance of the post-assault phase, saying: ‘I feel we must, from D-Day onwards,endeavourtopersuade[theenemy]thatourmainattackisgoingtodeveloplaterinthePasde Calais area, and it is to be hoped that NEPTUNE will draw away reserves from thatarea.’50 As the Germans would be bound to wonder why the Allies held back suchpowerful forces, theycouldbefurtherdivertedafter the initial landingsfromthecrucialareaof operations.Thiswouldmakeuseof the entirely notionalFirstUSArmyGroup(FUSAG),whichhadcome intobeing inOctober1943andwouldnowcomeunder thecommandof the larger-than-lifePatton.The latterwasunder a cloud after a numberofscandalsinvolvingthepress,butthesituationprovidedtheAlliedHighCommandwithameans to utilize Patton’s public talents before hewas due to take command of theUSThirdArmylaterinthecampaign.CharacterizedbyLadislasFaragoas‘thetall,taut,tenseAmericangeneralofvague fameandgrowingnotoriety, the swashbuckling tankwizardthe tabloids in the States already called “Old Blood andGuts’”, Pattonwas the seniorAllied commander most respected by the German generals (if not by Hitler, whocontemptuouslyreferred tohimas the‘cowboygeneral’). In theireyeshewasanaturalchoice to command themain effort of the Allies and therefore an ideal choice for thedeceivers. This aspect of the plan was code-named QUICKSILVER and divided into sixparts.*

Althoughdeeplydisappointednottobetakingpartintheinvasionplanitself,Pattonrealized the importance of his role and embraced it with gusto under the direction ofLieutenant-ColonelsJohnJervis-ReidandRogerHesketh.GermanreportsbegantorefertoArmeegruppePatton,andhis laterabsence fromNormandyhelped reinforce the ideathatthelandingswerediversionary.GenuineformationswereincludedinFUSAG,tobereplaced by notional ones upon their transfer to France, including many elements ofFourthArmyfromScotland.TheprincipalcomponentswereUSThirdArmy,CanadianFirstArmyanddozensofUSdivisionsstillintraininginAmerica.Accordingtothecoverplan,twelvedivisionsweretotakepartinthe‘Calaislandings’withthirty-eightwaitingtofollow up, all covered by US Ninth Army Air Force. The careful blend of real andimaginary formations thus served a threefoldpurpose: cloaking thebuild-up, disguisingthedestinationandstrengtheningthecredibilityofthecoverplan.51WhenPattonfinallywentoverseas,hewasreplacedbyLieutenant-GeneralLeslieMcNair,andthedeceptionwaseventuallymaintainedfarlongerthanoriginallyintended.

AswithFourthArmy,acarefullypreparedprogrammeofradio trafficcommencedon 24 April to simulate the busy network of an army group in preparation for majoroperations. A special Royal Signals unit, 5thWireless Group, introduced a number oforiginal features. All traffic was recorded in advance and equipment was devised thatmade it possible for one transmitter to simulate six, so that the complete traffic of adivisionalheadquartersanditsbrigadescouldbebroadcastbyasingleradiotruck.Unlike5thWirelessGroup,theUS3103rdSignalsServiceBattalionusednormalequipment,andthe traffic passed directly between operators without the intervention of recording

apparatus,withthetrucksmovingthroughthecountryjustastheformationswhichtheyrepresentedwouldhavedone.Byomittinglinksbelowthedivisionalleveltheywereabletorepresentnofewerthanthreearmycorpsandninedivisionsaswellastheheadquartersofanarmygroupandanarmy.52HavingarrivedinFebruary,the3103rdspenttheirtimecarefully analysing formation and unit signals patterns in order to reproduce themaccurately. Security was of paramount importance and a directive to signals personnelstated:

Youare takingpart inanoperation…designedtodeceivetheenemy,andithasadirectbearingonthesuccess of our operations as a whole. Youmust realize that the enemy is probably listening to everymessage you pass on the air and iswell aware that there is a possibility that he is being bluffed. It istherefore vitally important that your security is perfect; one careless mistake may disclose the wholeplan.53

OnesuchmessagebecameaSHAEFclassic:‘5th[Bn]Queen’sRoyalRegimentreportanumberofcivilianwomen,presumablyunauthorized, in thebaggage train.Whatarewegoingtodowiththem–takethemtoCalais?’54

The radio deception was once again backed up with appropriate visual displays,although the almost total commandof the skiesmeant thatwholesale layout of dummycamps and depots was deemed both unnecessary and impractical. Twenty-First ArmyGroupneveragreedtotheextensiveprogrammeofphysicaldeceptionoriginallyproposedbySHAEF.Theenemywouldmonitortheshippinginportsratherthanthecampsaroundthemasanindicationofwheretheattackingforceswouldcomefromandofthescaleoftheattack.Theenemyhadmadeno inlandaerial recceandeven ifhedid,owing to thecharacteroftheBritishlandscapewithitswoods,townsandvillages,hewouldbeunlikelytodiscovermuchifcamouflagedisciplinewasstrictlyenforced,ashewouldexpectittobe.Thesecostlymeasureswoulddolittlegoodandmightdomuchharm,and21stArmyGroup requested that SHAEF cancel any instructions that the latter had issued inconnectionwith camouflage,meaning the abolition of ‘discreet display’ in Eastern andSouth-EasternCommandsandthepracticeofnormalcamouflagedisciplineinallareas.55

Displayswereinsteadrestrictedtoshipping.FakevesselsresemblingLandingCraftTanks (LCTs)were known as ‘big-bobs’, other inflatable dummy craft as ‘wet-bobs’ (areference in the ‘oldboy’world to thoseatEtonwho rowed for theirhouseor school).Some were moored in the creeks and inlets between Great Yarmouth and the Thamesestuary, but the larger proportion of them were concentrated around Kent and easternSussex.*Attentiontodetailensuredauthenticityfromtheair,evendowntooilspillsandsuitablelightingatnighttosuggestloadingoperations.Mostspectacularly,thedesignersofSheppertonFilmStudioswereenlistedtobuildagiant‘oilstoragefacility’anddockingareanearDover,designedbyBasilSpence.Thisstretchedseveralmilesandwascompletewith storage tanks, pipelines, jetties, terminal control points and anti-aircraft defences.BoththeKingandMontgomerypaidvisits,whichwereprominentlycoveredinthepress.AnRAFphoto-recceplaneoverflewthecomplex,andmodificationsweremadefromtheresulting prints. Thereafter the defensive screenwas gradually relaxed, although stronganti-aircraft defences kept those German aircraft that did come across at high altitude,fromwhich itwasdifficult topickoutany remaining flaws.When theGermans firedafewlong-rangeshellsfromCapGris-Nez, thecamouflagecrewsevenproducedsuitablyrealisticdamageusingsodiumflaresandsmokegenerators.56

Securitywasasvital tovisualdeceptionsas toradio transmissions.JimRowewasworkingontherailwaybetweenReadingandGuildfordwhenherealizedthattheloadhisenginewaspullingwasextremelystrange.Hesaidtohismate:‘HereBill,thesetanksaremade of wood.’ However, to German reconnaissance planes, ‘theywere tanks – therewasn’tnoargumentaboutit.Theywerewonderfulfakes,rightdowntothegunsonthemand thedarkgreencamouflage.’Wellawareof thewartimedoctrine that ‘CarelessTalkCostsLives’,JimandBillkeptquietabouttheirunusualload.57

Securityprovedsomethingofaheadachefortheplanners,however,sincetherewerea considerable number of interests to accommodate, many of them conflicting. TheForeign Office wanted to retain normal diplomatic channels while the deception staffswishedtoensure,andifpossibleincrease,theplausibilityoftheirschemes.TheproposalthatallcommunicationsfromBritainbecutat thelastpossiblemomentwasrejectedbyBevan on the basis that such an action would alert the Germans at the most criticalmoment. He would rather risk leaks, which would in any case be low-level andcontradictory and which he felt confident the LCS could smother, if such acommunicationsbancouldbeimposedearlyenoughtocoverbothFORTITUDESOUTHandNEPTUNE.Thiswouldmean lettingcertaincivilianauthorities inonsomeaspectsof theplan to enable their co-operation so that civil measures of security, civil defence andevacuationcouldbeinstituted.However,oncethedecisionhadbeentakentorelyonradiodeception and ‘specialmeans’ (thedouble agents), thesemeasuresweredeemed largelyunnecessary.

At the beginning of February Churchill insisted that security measures should go‘high,wideandhandsome’.Allserviceleave,traveltoIrelandandtheairmailservicetoLisbonwere suspended and the coasts declared prohibited to a depth of tenmiles.Thesuspension of the Lisbonmail was a serious inconvenience to the Twenty Committee,since their principal double agent,GARBO, could no longer send long, rambling letters.Onceimposed,itwasimportantthatthesemeasuresshouldremainforthelongestpossibleduration, which was vehemently opposed by the Foreign Office. The Chiefs of Staffagreed to relax it on D+2 (in practice, D+7) but this in turn presented the deceptionplannerswith the thornyconundrumofexplainingwhyseveresecuritywas imposedforthelandingsinNormandybutrelaxedbeforethesupposedlyimminentassaultonthePasdeCalais.Aclever scamwasdevisedwherebyGARBO, ‘informed’byhiscontact in theMinistryofInformation,‘learned’thatalthoughthemilitaryhadwishedtocontinuewiththeban, itwouldhavemeant tellingneutraldiplomatsabout thePasdeCalais landingsand that this was deemed a greater security risk. However, this too was renderedunnecessarywhenEisenhowerinsistedthatthediplomaticbanremaininforceuntilD+25,andsecurityforFORTITUDESOUTHremainedintacttotheveryend.58

Manyother seemingly trivialelementscontributed theirpart to theoverallpicture.Naval craftwere busy off EastAnglia and in theChannel and electronicwarfare unitsjammedNaziradar,butforalltheeffortsofthedeceiversworkingtocreatethevisualandelectronicimageofFUSAGthemostimportantsourceofinformationasfarasbothsideswereconcernedwere thedoubleagents.Of these, themost significantwasundoubtedlyGARBO.TheyoungSpaniardhadinitiallybeenrejectedwhenheapproachedtheBritish,soheenlisted inGermanserviceunder thecode-nameCATObeforeofferinghimself to theBritish once more as a ready-made double agent. He in turn operated a network of

fourteenagents(including‘Welshnationalists’,many totallyfictitious) inplacessuchasBrighton,DoverandHarwich.BetweenJanuary1944andD-Dayheaveragedoverfourtransmissionsaday.BeginningwithanunsuccessfulattempttosowseedsofdoubtastothearrivalatalloftheAllies,GARBOalongwithBRUTUS,TRICYCLE,TREASUREandTATEmaintained a steady stream of information that regularly found its way into Germanintelligence summaries.As the bigday approached, so the arrangements for the doubleagentsbecameincreasinglytightlyorchestrated.InformationaboutthebogusstructureofFUSAG was mixed with information about Montgomery’s genuine 21st Army Group,which when these formations were recognized in Normandy would strengthen thecredibilityofthefakereports.

AtthebeginningofMayGARBOreportedthepresenceofUS6thArmoredDivisionin Ipswich. Unbeknown to the deceivers, German aerial recce had observed the strongbuild-up in the south-west, and von Roenne was worrying about this apparent shift.GARBO’smessage,togetherwithanumberofothers,helpedrestoreGermanfaithintheiroriginal estimate.On12MayvonRoenne issueda report suggesting thebulkof forceswere in the south-west andonlydiversionaryoperationswere expected from the south-east, exactly the opposite of what the deceivers wanted. After further messages fromvarious agents and increased air activity off the south-east coast (actually intended topreventtheLuftwaffefromcheckingonthepresenceof thefictitiousunits)vonRoennechangedhismind.Amap,subsequentlycapturedinItalyanddated15May1944,showedthe completeness with which the Germans accepted the imaginary order of battle,particularlyasaresultofthereportsofGARBOandBRUTUS.59

While it proved enormously successful, the double-agent systemwas fraughtwithterriblerisks.Oneopportunityarose,however,toshowthebuild-upinthe‘south-east’tosomeone entirely trustworthy to the Germans. Throughout the war prisoners wererepatriated under the auspices of the Swedish Red Cross in cases of serious illness.GeneralderPanzertruppenHansCramer,holderof theKnight’sCrossof theIronCrosswithoakleavesandone-timecommanderoftheDeutchesAfrikakorps,wasbeingheldinacampinsouthWaleswhenhebecameacandidateforrepatriation.ImmediatelytheLCStookcontrol,arrangingforhistransportbyroadtoLondon.Itwas‘letslip’thathisroutewasthroughsouthernandsouth-easternEnglandwheninfactitwentthroughtheareasofmaximum concentration in the south-west. The removal of all signposts years earlierassisted the illusion. After dinner with Patton, who was introduced as Commander-in-Chief of FUSAG, and who discreetly mentioned Calais, Cramer was dispatched toGermany by means of the Swedish shipGripsholm and arrived on 23May in Berlin,where he duly reported that south-east England was awashwith troops and equipmentbound for the Pas de Calais.60 His reports were received with some dismay in Berlin,whereGöringaccusedhimofadoptingadefeatistattitude,butafterafewdaysleavehewas posted to von Schweppenburg’s staff in Paris.61 The seeds of misinformation hadbeenplantedandwateredandwerefinallybeginningtogerminate,butthegreenshootsofdeception were incredibly fragile, and needed all the protection that security and luckcouldgivethem.

Aseriesofgreat scaresnowalarmed theStaffs,beginningwith thediscoveryofaparcelinChicago’sCentralPostOfficecontainingpreciseanddetailedinstructionsforthe

invasion. Then itwas feared that, during theGermanE-boat raid onExerciseTIGER inLymeBay,oneofanumberofmissingofficers,fullybriefedontheinvasionplan,mighthave been captured. A thorough and detailed search of the waters around the baywasconducteduntileachbodyhadbeenaccountedfor.Furthermore,reportsfromtheFrenchResistance told of the arrival fromHungary of the crack Panzer Lehr Division and itsdeploymentatChartresandLeMans,barely100milesfromthebeaches,which12thSSPanzer Division Hitlerjügend also menaced from Lisieux. The move of 21st PanzerDivisionfromRennestoCaen,andtheadditionof6thParachuteRegimentand91stLightDivision to the critical sector at the base of the Cotentin peninsula were especiallyalarming:itappearedthattheGermansweresomehowawareofAlliedplans.

ThroughoutthespringargumentshadragedwithintheGermanHighCommandastopreciselywhereandwhatformthelandingswouldtake.VonRundstedtwasnotaloneinbeing convinced that any invasion would come across the Straits of Dover; in thisconvictionHitlerforthemostpartagreed,buttheincreasedstrengthinNormandycameasaresultnotofintelligenceontheGermans’partbutofintuitionbyHitler.Hisminddidnotoperatealongthelinesofthetrainedstaffofficersaroundhim,andanavalreporton26April suggested that the pattern of Allied air attacks and minesweeping operationsindicatedanattackbetweenBoulogneandCherbourg.Whateverhisinfluences,on2MayHitler proclaimed to his staff that the Allied schwerpunkt would be in Normandy. Hereasoned that diversionary attacks were likely to try and draw off von Rundstedt’sreserves, and that the Allies would need a big port situated in such a way as to bedefensible froma short line–conditionsmetbyCherbourgand theCotentinpeninsula.FortunatelyfortheAllies,accordingtoWarlimont,‘hebelievedfurthermore,previoustoand for a long time after the invasion, that a second landing would take place on theChannelcoast.’62Thus thebasic tenetunderpinningall thedeceivershopes in factheldfirm in the minds of the German High Command. Hitler had issued orders forstrengtheningthelinesbetweentheSeineandtheLoire,butbyinsistingthatallofFrancebeheld,herestrictedhissubordinates’freedomofaction.VonRundstedt,hisgazefixedfirmlyonthePasdeCalais,carriedouttheseinstructionsreluctantly.

If the Germans thought they knew the place of the invasion, they also tried tosecond-guess the Allied commanders as to its timing. Believing that the assault troopswouldnotwishtocrosshundredsofyardsofexposedbeach,theyassumedhightideasalogicalprerequisite,combinedwithdawnandreasonableweather.Analertwasheldon18May, duringwhich all leavewas cancelled and tension rose. TheKriegsmarine expertsconsulted their tide tables, then proclaimed that no real danger now existed until mid-August.Leave,trainingandexercisessuchastheoneplannedforseniorofficersinearlyJune could all be resumed.TheAllieswere indeed readyand the real datehadbynowbeen set, but theywould land at dawn on a spring low tide in order to findRommel’sobstaclesexposedratherthanhavethemripopenthehullsoflandingcraft.Arisingmoonand long summernightswouldgivemaximumassistance in thebuild-up to support theinitial waves of parachutists and help to provide naval gunfire support.63 Only thenotoriouslyfickleearlyJuneweathercouldinterruptproceedingsandinthisariskhadtobetaken.

OriginallyplannedforMay,theoperationwasfinallyscheduledfor5Junebutwaspostponed for a further twenty-four hours owing to a severe storm. When the

meteorologists indicated that despite its apparent worsening there would in fact be anarrowgap sufficient to launchNEPTUNE, Eisenhower spoke the famous phrase, ‘Okay,let’s go’. Without the benefit of weather data from the far west, the GermanmeteorologicalservicehadfailedtospotthebreakandhaddeclaredconditionswouldbetoobadforlandingoperationsthroughoutthefirstweekofJune.Asaresult,manyseniorofficers, includingRommel, took the opportunity to take leave.Warlimont noted in hisdiary thatnobody inOKWhad the slightest suspicion that ‘thedecisivemoment of thewarwasupon them’.64Early indications thatsomethingwasafootwere ignoredbyvonRundstedt’sheadquarters,butRommel’ssenta ‘MostUrgent’ signal to stand-toat2300hourson5June.However, thiswassent toFifteenthArmybetweentheScheldtandtheOrne;SeventhArmy,guardingtheactualinvasionbeaches,receivednowarningatall.

Once the vast resources assigned to it were unleashed it would be impossible toconcealtheinvasionforlong,buttheaimofthedeceiverswastoensurethattheGermanswould see it through a veil of illusions, created by every trick the double agents, radiotransmitters,ships,aircraftandscientistscoulddeliver.Fromthemoment thewhirlwindstruckthecoast,theeffectsofdeceptionwerefelteverywherebythebewildereddefendersontheground.

TACTICALDECEPTION:THELANDINGS

Nowawholenewphasehadbegunduringwhich theprocessof threatening thePasdeCalaiswould bemaintained, butwhere tactical deceptionwould assist in creating localdiversionstoensurethatGermancommanders’knowledgeoftheactualassaultwouldbeobscured by false, confusing and contradictory information. TheGermans had profitedfrom theexperienceof theBattleofBritainand takengreat care toestablishachainofradar stations along the entire west coast of Europe from Kirkenes in Norway to theSpanishborder.Therewerestationsfordetectingaircraftandothersfordetectingshippingand theoretically this linecouldnotbebreached.Certainly theGermanswereconfidenttheycouldnotbesurprised.BetweenCherbourgandBoulognewasaseriesoflong-rangestationsthatformedthenucleusofLuftwaffefightercontrolandsignalsintelligence,eachofwhichwasheavilyattackedbytheRAFintheweekleadinguptotheinvasion.Duringthenightof5/6Juneotherswerealsoattacked,butasufficientnumbernorthoftheSeinewasleftunharmedtopickupfakeconvoys.

Theseraidsweremuchmoreeffectivethanwashopedfor,butasback-upmorethan200 naval vessels were equipped with powerful radar-jamming equipment. However,jammingasectorofcoastwouldbeaclearindicatorofthedirectionofattackanditwasimpossibletojamtheentirecoastline,whichwouldinanycaseputalldefencesonalert.ItwasnecessarytogivetheGermanssomeinformation,butithadtobefalseinformation.Aforce of heavy bombers fittedwith powerfulMANDREL jammers was sent to block theearlywarningradarseastoftheSeinebeyondtheBelgianborder.Twogapswouldbeleft,apparently by error or atmospheric conditions, and deception fed through them. ThewesterngapwasnearLeHavre,totheeastofthelandingzone.HereaKriegsmarinelong-rangeSEETAKTsetwascapableofpickingupshippingintheChannel.No.617SquadronRAF–thefamed‘Dambusters’–wastaskedtoflyOperationTAXABLE,aprecisionpatternmore complicated than anything previously attempted. Taking account of the exactcharacteristicsof theSEETAKT, theywouldpaint on its screens a picture of hundredsof

ships,whichwere simply unavailable in reality. To do this,WINDOW would have to bedroppedinexactlytherightdensityandshape,aprocessthatinvolvedturningrepeatedlyto port, flying a set distance and turning again, with one flight eight miles behind theother,advancingthescreensothatitappearedtobemovingtowardsthecoastatasteadyeightknots.Thecrewshadtoberelievedeverytwohours,whichintroducedtheadditionaldifficultyoftakingoverinjusttherightposition,andtherewasaseriousriskofcollisioninthemoonlesssky.

The ruseworked and brought the expected response: radar-equipped aircraftweresenttoinvestigate.ThesecondphaseofTAXABLEwasdesignedtoaccountforthis.SomenavallaunchesweredetachedfromthefleetandcontinueduptheChannelpastLeHavre,sailingwithintheframecreatedbytheWINDOWandtowingbehindthemballoonscalledFILBERTS fittedwith radar reflectors.Others carriedMOONSHINE, and audio effectswereadded so that the picture was created of a large fleet actually moving away fromNormandy.TheGermansturnednavalcraft,patrolaircraftandshorebatteriesonTAXABLEbutnoneonNEPTUNE.At thesame timeNo.218SquadronwasflyingasimilarmissionclosetothePasdeCalaisinOperationGLIMMER,whichalsodrewsomelimitedresponse.

Meanwhile,theextremelyvulnerabletransportplanescarryingthefirstwaveoftheassault, the airborne divisions, were approaching the coast and it was imperative thatGerman night fighters be kept well away or disaster would ensue. Some twenty-fourLancastersandfiveFlyingFortressesfrom100GroupRAFflewamissionthatsimulatedavastbombingraidalongtheSomme,droppingvastquantitiesofWINDOWastheywentandat thesame time interferingwithground-controlandfightercommunications.65TheGerman radar screen was therefore not only neutralized, but acted as a conduit fordeceptionandhelpedpreserve theelementof surprise, so that theGermans receivednowarningoftheairarmadabringingthethreeairbornedivisions.TheLuftwaffe,practicallydeafandblind,insteadspentthecrucialhoursbetween0100and0400hourssearchingforanon-existentstreamofbombersapparentlyoperatingoverAmiens.

During this time reports were coming in from all over Normandy and FifteenthArmy’sareaofparachute landings. InOperationTITANICaseriesofdropswasmadebysmall groups of the Special Air Service accompanied by dummy parachutists calledPARAGONS.66 The first drop came a fewminutes aftermidnight nearMarigny, betweenCoutancesandStLô,andtheothersweremadeinabroadsweeprightaroundthelandingareafromalmostthewestcoastofCotentintojusteastofLeHavre.Thedummiesweredesigned to firebattle simulatorson landing, to reproduce the soundof small-arms fire,mortarsandgrenades;pintailbombsfiredparachuteflaresandVereylightsandthefourfour-manpartiesoperatedgramophoneswith recordsof soldiers’voicesandmorebattlesounds.Evencanistersofchemicalstoreproducethesmellsofcombatwereused.Theaimofthesedropswastodelayenemyreservesfromreachingtherealdropzones(DZs)andtocausemaximumconfusionintherearareas.Thescatterednatureofthegenuinedrops,inwhichmanymenmissedtheirdesignatedDZs(especiallyAmericansaroundthebaseofCotentin), inadvertentlyadded to theeffectandbegan todissipate local reserves,whichweredispatchedhitherandyon.SoonvonRundstedt’soperationsmapwasarashofredspreading far beyond the actual area of battle, making the schwerpunkt impossible toidentify and the flanks a blur. In this respect TITANIC was very successful, and oneimportant German regimental group found itself fruitlessly sweeping woods at Isigny

throughtheearlyhoursofthemorning,wellawayfromthereallandingstotheirnorth.67

Defending OMAHA beach was the 352nd Infantry Division, commanded byGeneralleutnantHelmutKraiss.Thehalf-mileofbroadflatbeachatlowtidewasedgedbyabankofshinglethreetofourfeethigh,behindwhichlayamarshystripandthenasteepridgebetweensixtyandeightyfeethigh.Fromtheseheights,whichwerenoteffectivelyneutralizedbytheinitialbombardment,Kraiss’stwoforwardregimentsgavethebeachitsnickname ‘bloody Omaha’. However, apart from pinning the Americans on the beach,Kraisswasinnopositiontothrowthemoffitbecausehehadnoeffectivecounter-attackforce. His division provided the corps reserve, Kampfgruppe Meyer, comprising threebattalions.From0305hours itdeployedwestward towards IsignyandCarentan toopentheroadsandsearchforparachutists,eastoftheUS101stAirborneDivision’sactualDZ.One committed, it was practically impossible to recall and, although one battalionwasdirected to counter-attack towards Colleville-sur-Mer at 0735 hours, radiocommunicationswereprovingdifficult andorderlieshad tobedispatchedbybicycle toroundupthedetachments.Having littlemotor transport,nothinghadcomeof thisorderfourhourslater.TherestoftheKampfgruppewasinnobetterstatetointervenewhenthatdecisionwas finallymade, and by late afternoon it had been broken up and effectivelydestroyedfromtheair.BythistimethecrisisonOMAHAwasresolvedandtheAmericanswereabletopushmorethanamileinland.TITANICthusnotonlydistractedtheGermansfrom the airborne DZs but played a vital part in enabling success at OMAHA, withoutwhich an extremely dangerous gap could have been opened between the British andAmericanzones.

NORMANDYANDBEYOND

FollowingtheleadingBritishtroopsashorecameColonelDavidStrangeways’‘R’Forceto provide tactical deception measures in subsequent operations. These began withOperationACCUMULATOR,on12June.Tacticaldeceptionhadplayedanenormouspartinthe success of the landings themselves but the crucial factor in deciding the successfuloutcomeofOVERLORDwouldbethebattleofthebuild-up,whichnowreacheditsclimax.FORTITUDESOUTH continued, principally through the double agents.GARBO was able toimprovehiscredibilitybysendingamessagegivingthedetailsofNEPTUNEjusttoolatetobeofanyuse.Noonewaslisteningatthetime,solaterheberatedhiscontrolforbeingunavailableatthecrucialmoment.Henowproceededtosendprolificreportsandspentanumberofnotionallysleeplessnights.Montgomery’sracetowinthebattleofthebuild-upwas now in full swing. As early as 0400 hours on the morning of the invasion vonRundstedt’s Chief-of-Staff, Günther Blumentritt, asked OKW for the release of thearmouredreserves.Jodl,speakingforHitler,refused,sayingsignificantlythatthelandingswerenomore thana feint and that another landingwould comeeastof theSeine.Thisargumentcontinuedallday.Hitlerhadgonetobedwithasleepingdraughtandamazinglyhewasnotinformedoftheseabornelandingsuntilmid-morning.HishopesofthrowingtheinvasionstraightbackintotheseaevaporatedandhesentorderstoFifteenthArmytosendreinforcementstoNormandy.

NofewerthanfiveinfantrydivisionsweresettomovetotheSeinebridges,andtwopanzerdivisions,including1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteAdolfHitlerinBelgium,were to move to the bridgehead. On the night of 8 June GARBO sent the following

message:After personal consultationon8 June inLondonwithmyagents, JONNY[sic],DICKandDERRICKwhosereports Isent todayIamof theopinion, inviewof thestrong troopconcentrations inSEandEEngland,thattheseoperationsareadiversionarymanœuvredesignedtodrawoffenemyreservesinorderto make an attack at another place. In view of the continued air attacks on the concentration areamentioned,whichisstrategicallyfavourableforthis,itmayveryprobablytakeplaceinthePasdeCalaisarea, particularly since in such an attack the proximity of air bases will facilitate the operation byprovidingcontinuedstrongairsupport.

Thiswaspassedat2200hourson9JunetoOberstFriedrich-AdolfKrumacher,theOKWChief of Intelligence, who added that it ‘confirms the view already held by us that afurther attack is expected in another place (Belgium?)’ and the message was seen byHitler.68

Once the Germans had identified elements of 21st Army Group in Normandy,confirmingGARBO’Searlier information,hiscredibilitywassuch thathis informationonFUSAGwas accepted completely.A stroke of luck, in the form of amessage from anuncontrolledagentinStockholm,JOSEPHINE,referringtorumoursinLondonofanattackonthePasdeCalais,wasenoughtogeneratethefollowingmessagefromvonRundstedton0730hoursthenextmorning:‘Asaconsequenceofcertaininformation,OBWesthasdeclareda“stateofalarmII”fortheFifteenthArmyinBelgiumandNorthFrance.(ForNetherlands command too, if Heeresgruppe B thinks fit). The move of 1st SS PanzerDivisionwillthereforebehalted.’TheAllieswereabletowatchGermanreinforcementsmove towards the battle area, halt, then turn around andmove away again. FORTITUDESOUTH wasmaintained for far longer than originally intended, and only slowly did theGermansreleaseformationsfromFifteenthArmyintothebattleragingtothewest.FourthArmywasnotionallybroughtsouthtosupportFORTITUDESOUTHasFORTITUDENORThwaswoundup.On18JulyvonRundstedt’sheadquarterssentamessage,interceptedandreadat Bletchley, stating that ‘there are no grounds for changing our appreciation of theintentionsof theArmyGroupassembledinsouth-eastEngland’.Onlybytheendof themonthweretheGermansseriouslydubiousaboutthelikelihoodofafurtherassaultonthePas de Calais, and this was overwhelmingly because they believed the Allies simplywanted to reinforce the success they had achieved in Normandy and not through anysuspicion that FUSAG did not exist. On 3 August its commander, Patton, opened hisgenuineoffensivetobreakoutinthewestofthebridgeheadheraldingvictoryintheBattleof Normandy. As his superior, General Omar Bradley, commander of US First ArmyduringNEPTUNEandnowcommandingUS12thArmyGroup,wroteinhismemoirs:

While the enemy’s Seventh Army, overworked and under strength, struggled to pin us down in thebeachhead… theGermanHighCommand declined to reinforce itwith troops from the Pas deCalais.There,forsevendecisiveweeks,theFifteenthArmywaitedforaninvasionthatnevercame,convincedbeyondallreasonabledoubtthatPattonwouldleadthemainAlliedassaultacrossthenarrowneckoftheChannel. Thus… the enemy immobilized nineteen divisions and played into our hands in the biggestsinglehoaxofthewar.69

Eisenhower wrote in his SHAEF report that ‘the German Fifteenth Army, ifcommittedtobattleinJuneorJuly,mighthavedefeatedusbysheerweightofnumbers’.70Instead,theirremovalfromthebattlepermittedtheAlliestobuildupsufficientforcestobreakout,leadingtothetotaldestructionofSeventhArmyandtheheadlongpursuitoftheGermans to the borders of theReich.Although ‘R’ Force continued to practise tactical

deceptionuntil thecrossingof theRhineinMarchthefollowingyear, theeraofAnglo-AmericandeceptionintheSecondWorldWarhadlargelycometoanend.Justtwoshortweeks after the landing in Normandy, however, the Germans would be the victims ofanothermassivedeceptionoperationthatwouldleadtotheirbiggestsingledefeatof thewar,farmoredestructivethanthatofStalingrad:OperationBAGRATION.

10

Maskirovka‘ . . . the Soviet armed forces learned to preserve in deep secretiveness the intentions to executedisinformationonalargescaleandtodeceivetheenemy.’

MarshalG.K.Zkukov

OPERATION BAGRATION WAS launched just over two weeks after D-Day, on the thirdanniversaryoftheGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnion,22June1944.BytheclosesometwomonthslaterGermanyhadsuffereditsmostcrushingdefeatofthewar–thecompletedestruction ofArmyGroupCentre, involving the loss of some 350,000men – and theSoviets had advancedmenacingly close to the borders of the Reich. Amajor factor inSoviet success was their use of maskirovka to achieve surprise. The Soviet MilitaryEncyclopaediadefinesmaskirovkathus:

Themeansof securingcombatoperations and thedaily activitiesof forces; a complexityofmeasures,directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various militaryobjectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the commander…maskirovkacontributestotheachievementofsurprisefortheactionsofforces,thepreservationofcombatreadinessandtheincreasedsurvivabilityofobjectives.1

It permeates down to the lowest tactical level and includes all measures, active andpassive, designed to deceive the enemy. Although the word is sometimes translated as‘camouflage’,thisbeliesitsmuchbroadermeaningwhichincludes:concealment(skrytie),imitation using decoys and dummies (imitasiia), manœuvres intended to deceive(demonstratinvnyemanevry)anddisinformation(dezinformatsiia).2

AlthoughaproductoftheSovietera,maskirovkahasalonghistory;itsrootscanbetraced to the Imperial Russian Army, and several Soviet authors traced it to DmitryDonskoy’splacingaportionofhisforces inanadjacentforestat theBattleofKulikovaField in 1380. Seeing a smaller force than they anticipated, the Tartars attacked,whereupontheywereoverpoweredbytheconcealedtroops.3DuringthetimeoftheTsarsandtheBolshevikstheimportanceofdeceptionwaswidelyacceptedwithinpoliticsbut,sincebothdeceptionandsurprisewereregardedprincipallyastoolsoftheoffensiveandRussiahadbeenonthestrategicdefensivesincethetimeofNapoleon,thestrategyinboth1812and1914was toallowthevastnessof theMotherland toswallowan invader.Thedevelopment ofmilitary art in the youngSovietUnionwas largely evolutionary, but asearlyasthemid-1920stheSovietsconcludedthatthe‘basicmethodfortheachievementofsurpriseisoperationaldeception’.4Theyreliedgreatlyonexperience,whichobviouslytheGreat PatrioticWar provided in abundance butwhichwas apparent as early as theBattle ofKhalkin-Gol against the Japanese inAugust 1939.The Soviets underZhukovdrove the Japanese back to Nomohan, largely thanks to their experience of cover andconcealmentofoffensivepreparations.Zhukovlaterdescribedhow

these[deception]measuresaimedatcreatinganimpressionthatweweremakingnopreparationsforanoffensiveoperation.WewantedtoproduceanimpressionontheJapanesethatweweremerelybuildingupourdefencesandnothingelse.5

AlthoughtheRedArmy’sFieldRegulationsof1936and1939statedclearlytheneedfor

alltypesofdeceptioninordertoachievesurprise,therewasalargediscrepancybetweentheoryandpractice. In1941both thepolitical andmilitaryhierarchiesbelieved that theFirst World War pattern would pertain and that there would a time-lag between thedeclarationofwarandthecommencementofoperations.6ThusthedevastatingeffectsthatGermansurpriseachievedin1941servedtofocusSovietmindsonboththeimportanceofsurpriseandthepossibilitiesofferedbydeception,eventhoughinitialchaosandtechnicalincompetenceeffectivelyscuppereddeceptionintheearlymonthsofthewar.

Thefirstoperationalinstructionconcerningmaskirovkawasissuedon26June1941,just fourdays after the invasion, andconcernedconcealmentofobjectives from the air.DuringtheearlywaryearstheRedArmyhadtolearnpainfullytheartofmodernwarfare,ofwhichmaskirovkawasbutoneaspect.Itwashamperedinthisbypoorradiodiscipline,althoughitlearnedcamouflagetechniquesandcouldmaskthemovementoflargeforcesifradiousecouldbeavoided.SuchsuccessastheSovietsdidenjoyinthefirstyearofthewarwasprobablydueasmuchtothechaoticnatureofthefightingandtherapidityoftheGerman advance as to improvements inSoviet securitymeasures.7Thus the firstmajorSovietattemptatmaskirovka–tocoverpreparationsforthecounter-offensiveinfrontofMoscow inDecember1941– succeedednot somuchbecauseof itsdeceptive effect asbecause of good security, radio and light discipline, and night movement to help theconcealmentofregroupingforces;moreover,theGermanscompletelyunderestimatedtheregenerative powers of theSoviets.On 18November theChief of Staff of theGermanArmy,GeneraloberstFranzHalder,wrote:

[GeneralfeldmarschallFedor]vonBocksharesmydeepconvictionthattheenemy,justasmuchaswedo,isthrowinginthelastounceofstrengthandthatvictorywillgotothesidethatsticksitoutlonger.Theenemy,too,hasnothingleftintherearandhispredicamentprobablyisevenworsethanours.8

The deployment of Zhukov’sWestern Front (army group) of 1st Shock, 10th and12thArmies tookplace in thestrictestsecrecy inamanner thatwouldbecomestandardpractice for the future. Strict light and camouflage discipline was observed and allmovementcarriedoutatnightunderabsoluteradiosilence.Particularattentionwaspaidtodisguisingsupplydepotsand therailandroadcommunicationsalong thedeploymentroutes. The Germans, who were preoccupied with their own problems and tendedthroughoutthewartodismissSovietabilities,werelargelyunconcerned.However,Haldernoted on29November that ‘on the front ofFourthArmy… there is some talk that theenemy is preparing to attack’.9 ButHalder otherwise displayed optimism, as didArmyGroupCentre:nowhereon theirmapsdid the1stShock,10thor12thArmies appear.10Evenonewholeday after theoffensive startedon5December,OKHhad still failed toidentifythreeofthetenarmiesintheMoscowsector.WithinaweekGermanforceswerestruggling to withdraw in good order from the Moscow region, an indication of whatmightbeachievedwithmaskirovka.

STALINGRADIntheearlyperiodoftheGreatPatrioticWarmostdeceptionoperationstooktheformofimitatsiia, as for examplebefore an attackby theWesternFront across theLamaRiverwestofMoscowinFebruary1942.InordertolureawayGermanbombersfromtherealconcentration area, the 20th Army built a concentration of hundreds of dummy tanks,

vehicles,artilleryandtroopsonitsrightflank,withsimulatedfiringandbroadcastsofthesoundoftankmotorstoaddrealism.Thisreportedlydiverted1,083enemyflights.DuringthespringtheGermanspreparedforamajorstrategicoffensiveaimedattheeconomicallyvaluableCaucasusandsupportedbyadeception,OperationKREML(‘Kremlin’),designedtoconvincetheSovietsthatthetrueaimremainedMoscow.AtthesametimetheSoviets,with their gaze already transfixed by events in front of the capital, planned a strategicdefensive with limited operational offensives. Following one such at Kharkov, Stalinordered a retreat in the south when the German drive towards Stalingrad began, acombination thatwas tohave fatal consequences for theGermans. It alsoprecipitatedaleadershipcrisiswhentheretreatthreatenedtobecomearout,andasaresultZhukovwasnamedDeputy SupremeCommander and tookde facto control of operations. The firstresultofthisappointmentwasOperationURANUS,whichaimedattyingdowntheGermanSixth andFourthPanzerArmies untilNovemberwithout allowing them to settle into adefensiveposture;acounter-strokewouldthenbeunleashed.Itwasimperativeboththatthe Germans should not capture Stalingrad and that they should remain completelyignorantofSovietintentions.Themaskirovkaplanwouldneedtobeofanunprecedentedsophistication.11

As in late 1941, so during summer and autumn 1942 the Stavka (Soviet HighCommand) carefully created reserve armies and also formednew armoured formations.Theseweremechanizedcorpsandtankarmieswherepreviouslytheyhadonlydeployedarmourinbrigade-sizegroupings.AstheStavkaexaminedtheexperiencesofthefirstyearandahalfofwar,theynotedthatfalseobjectiveshadbeencreatedunsystematicallyandunrealistically, and had produced no discernible reaction from the enemy. Poorcamouflage in rear areas and of roads and the lack of participation by chief engineerofficers in formulating operational plans had resulted in poor camouflage security. Adirective was issued to rectify these matters, which also specifically demanded greaterefforts at disinformation, a directive that became the focal point for the Stalingradoperation.12

Fromthesestudiesrecommendationsweremadeformaskingoffensivepreparations,includingthoroughcamouflageandconcealment,ensuringallreconnaissanceandcombatsecurity should be carried out by units previously in contact with the enemy, andmovementbynight.Theyhadnotedthatatleastoneriflecompany,threetanks,threeanti-aircraftmachine-guns and three anti-aircraft gunswere normally required to simulate aregimental (brigade) concentration. During the organizing of an offensive everycommanderwasexpectedtoprepareathoroughmaskirovkaplan.Itwasappreciatedthateveniftheintentcouldnotbehidden,thentherewasgreatbenefitfromhidingthetiming.Butradioprocedurewasstillnotofahighenoughstandardtopermiteffectiveuseoffalsetraffic, and improvedmaskirovka discipline within armour, artillery and infantry unitscouldnotcounteractGermanairrecce.TheproblemwouldhavetoawaitthedefeatoftheLuftwaffe.13Meanwhile,OperationURANUSwouldbea testofSoviet ability across thespectrumoftheartofwar,notleastofmaskirovka.

InAugusttheSovietslaunchedOperationMARSinfrontofMoscow.Itachievedonlylimitedgainsbutdrew twelveGermandivisions intoArmyGroupCentre.SomeSovietsourcesrefertoMARSasadeception,possiblymodelledontheexampleprovidedbythe

GermanswithKREML,whichhadprovedhighlysuccessfulinpersuadingtheSovietsthattheGermanmaineffortwouldbetowardsMoscow.14ButMARSwasarealoperationandratheradisastrousone,although itcertainlyhad theeffectofdrawingattention towardsMoscow. An intelligence summary from Fremde Heeres Ost (FHO, the EasternIntelligence Branch of OKH) on 29 August concluded that the Soviets would haveconsiderable offensive potential in both Army Group Centre and Army Group ‘B’ssectors,butthat‘theRussianswouldbemoreeagertoremovethethreattoMoscow’andtheysubsequentlyforecastaSovietoffensivethere.Mostsignificantly,itassumedSovietinabilitytomakemorethanonemajoroffensive.15

TheStalingradFront conducted offensive operations between29September and 4October to secure thebridgeheadsover theRiverDonanddistractGerman forces fromdefensive actions in Stalingrad itself.As a securitymeasure to preserve the concept ofoperations,Zhukovkept that concept to himself and a few trusted aides and imposed astrictlimitonthetimeallottedforplanningtothefrontsandarmiesduetomaketheactualassault. Thiswasmade possible by theRedArmy’s now improved sequential planningability.Thisgreatly reduced time frameworkmeant that the frontcommanderswerenotpermittedtoimplementtheirownplansbeforethefirstweekinNovember.To‘disinform’theGermans,thefrontswereorderedtogoontothedefensivefrom15October,sothatallvisible effort along the frontlinewas put into building defences.All the villageswithintwenty-fivekilometreswereevacuatedandringedwith trenches togiveenemyair reccesomethingtosee.Concealingthedirectionandscopeofthemaineffortwasgoingtobethehardestaspectandhereitwasnecessarytogivewaytopracticallimitations.Theneedtobring in a third front headquarters –South-western – to control themain effort,wasdelayed until 29October and generally the build-upwasmadewith formations smallerthanarmysize(withtheexceptionof5thTankArmy,whichwouldformthespearhead).Allmovementwas conducted at night in strict radio silence and the reserves held 200kilometresupstreamofStalingradontheVolga.16

The South-Western Front now proceeded to bring 5th TankArmy and 21stArmyinto bridgeheads south of the Don, north of Stalingrad. For this they built twenty-twobridges (including five false ones), concealing the approaches with vertical covers andcamouflagingthecrossings.Oneparticularlyclevertechniquewastobuildthesurfaceofabridgejustbelowwaterlevelorconcealedbeneathice.17Truckswouldgetwettyresbut,astheattackdateof19Novemberdrewcloser,Germanaircraftbombedthefalsebridgesandlefttherealonesintact.Extensivesmokescreenswereusedtocoverthemovementof26th Tank Corps into the bridgehead and the engineers constructed simulatedconcentrations of artillery and tanks to divert German artillery and air recce. TheDonFrontconductedsimilartasksasitscommander,General-MajorKonstantinRokossovskiy,recalled:

muchwasdoneinordertodeceivetheenemy.Wetriedtoconvincehimthatwewereabouttoattackinthe areabetween the rivers and conductedmoreoperationshere. In the remaining sectors of the front,intensifiedoperationsfortheerectionoffoxholes,fortificationsetc.,weresimulated.Anymovementoftroops in those regions, from where they were to operate, was carried out only at night, with theobservanceofallcamouflagemeasures.18

The total night movements involved 160,000 men, 10,000 horses, 430 tanks, 14,000vehiclesand7,000tonsofammunition,andweremostlyundetectedbytheGermans.

Sovietnewspaperscontinuedthefamiliarsloganneshagunazad(‘notastepback!’)andtalkedofoffensiveplanselsewhere.19Finally,Zhukovhadtonegotiatetwoaspectsofcurrent Soviet doctrine that might alert the enemy to his peril. The first was razvedkaboyem (‘battle reconnaissance’),whichwas then regarded as indispensable to offensiveoperations to feeloutobjectives,defencesand thenatureof the terrain; itwasnormallyconducted in strength but Zhukov restricted it to battalion-sized groups throughout theStalingradarea.Second,heensuredtheRedArmy’sChiefofArtillery,NikolaiVoronov,was close at hand to guarantee the secrecy of the artillery deployment and to limit theartillerypreparationtoanhourandahalf.20

As a result, while the Germans were aware of offensive preparations they wereunaware of themagnitude of what was building against them, a factor exacerbated byoptimismandover-confidence.DuringOctober,OberstReinhardGehlen,ChiefofFHO,forecast an attack in theMoscow area, althoughHitler regarded the potential danger toArmyGroup ‘B’as serious.Air reccehad revealed someof thebridgesacross theDonbut, significantly, he did not see the danger as particularly imminent. Reinforcementsordered from France would not arrive before December, and in the first week ofNovember Hitler went on leave for two weeks to Berchtesgaden.21 On 29 OctoberRomanianThirdArmyreportedtoArmyGroup‘B’onthemarkedincreasesincrossingsoftheDonintheSovietrearandoncontinuousattacksalongthefrontline(areferencetorazvedka boyem) as well as reports from deserters.22 This prompted GeneralleutnantFreidrichPauluscommandingGermanSixthArmytoreportthat‘amajorenemyattack,itwasconsidered,couldbeexpectedinthenextfewdays’.23However,GeneraloberstKurtZeitzler(whohadreplacedHalderasChiefoftheGeneralStaffinSeptember)statedthat

theRussiansnolongerhaveanyreservesworthmentioningandarenotcapableoflaunchingalarge-scaleoffensive. In forming any appreciation of enemy intentions, this basic fact must be taken intoconsideration.24

OnceagaintheGermanshadfatallyunderestimatedtheregenerativecapabilitiesoftheSoviets.At0730hourson19Novembertheordertoopenfirewasgivento3,500gunsandmortarsmassedintheSermafimovichbridgehead.AsRomanianThirdArmyreportedseveral ‘weak’ attacks and a stronger one at around 0900 hours, German Sixth Armycontinued to assault Stalingrad throughout the day. At 2200 hours a teletype messagearrivedatSixthArmyheadquarters:

ThedevelopmentofthesituationatRomanianThirdArmycompelsradicalmeasurestosecureforcestoprotectthedeepflankofSixthArmy.AlloffensiveoperationsinStalingradaretobehaltedatonce.25

Itwastoolate.TheGermanssufferedacrushingdefeatthatmarkedaturning-pointinthewar,althoughtheymanagedtoretainthestrategicinitiativeuntilthefollowingsummer.

TheSoviets,on theotherhand,hadgainedvaluableexperience in their firstcrudeexperimentwithstrategicdeception,havingmadestrenuouseffortstosimulateoffensiveintent elsewhere along the front. German concerns with Moscow and the fighting inStalingrad itselfdistracted themfromthevulnerabilityof theflanksofArmyGroup‘B’and demonstrated the value of those efforts. At the operational and tactical level therewardswereevengreater,producingparalysingsurprise.Theability toobscuremattersoftiming,detailandscalewouldprovidethebasisforfuturemaskirovka.26

ADOPTINGTHESTRATEGICOFFENSIVE

During the course of 1943 the Soviets’ ability to deceive strategically matured with acomprehensiveandsuccessfulmaskirovkaplanfortheKurskdefensive-counter-offensiveoperations. A series of diversionary attacks along theMius and northern Donets riversconcealed the intent to attack along the axis Belgorod–Khar’kov–Poltava and drewGermanreservesawayfromthechosensector.Once they reached theRiverDnepr theyfeintedalongitsentirelengthwhileregroupingsecretlytothenorth,andestablishedsuchabridgeheadthattheGermanswereoverwhelmed.Hereontheopensteppewherenaturalcoverwassparse,colossalamountsofsmokewereused toscreen thewholesectionsofthe front, most notably by General-Lieutenant P. Batov’s 65th Army during the Dneprcrossing operations. Soviet strategic maskirovka in 1943 involved only limitedregroupmentandconcentrationofStavkareserves.ThemostsignificantexamplewasthedeploymentanduseoftheSteppeFrontatKurskandbetweenfrontsontheadvancetotheDnepr.27

InlateSeptember1943theStavkacameupwithaplantodestroytheGermanforcesbetweenVitebskandGomelinthecentralsectoroftheEasternFront.Withinthisplanthetaskof theKalininFrontwas topenetrate theGermandefencesandseize the importantcity of Nevel, which controlled lateral communications between two German ArmyGroups.GeneraloftheArmyAndreiYeremenkochosetoattackon6October.HemadehismaineffortfromhisrightflanktowardsNevelwiththe3rdand4thShockArmies,andin order to divert attention from this he ordered diversionary attackswestward towardsVitebskby39thand43rdArmiesonhisleftflanktocommenceon2October.Forhisplanto succeed it was essential that 3rd Shock Army was able to concentrate secretly andrapidlytolaunchasuddenattack.

The commander of 3rd Shock Army, General-Lieutenant K. N. Galitsky, in turnplannedtoattackwithtworifledivisionsonafour-kilometrefrontsupportedontheirleftflankbytwodivisionsfrom4thShockArmy.HewouldthenexploittoNevelwithathirdrifledivision supportedbya tankbrigade, retaininga fourth rifledivisionand two riflebrigadesinreserve.Fortherestofhishundred-kilometrefrontagehedeployedtwounder-strengthrifledivisionsandariflebrigadeandorganizedtwofortifiedregions;theseinturnwouldformoneortwobattaliongroupsforlocalattackstodivertattentionfromthemaineffort.ThisaimedtocapitalizeontheswampyandheavilywoodedgroundtotheeastofNevel,bothtomaskthepreparationsandtohinderGermancounter-measures.Galitsky’splan was approved by Front headquarters on 27 August under the strictest possiblesecurity.OnlyGalitskyandhischiefofstaff,thensubsequentlyhischiefsofservicesandoperationsandtwoassistants,helpedtoformulatetheplan,preparingalimitednumberofdocumentsbyhand.

Regrouping began on 3 October, closely supervised by Army staff officers alongpreviously prepared routes through the forests and physically covered in key sectors topreventGermanairreccespottingthebuild-up.Allmovementwasstrictlytimetabledandcarriedoutinradiosilence.Atthesametime39thArmycarriedoutsimilarmovementsinthe south in more open fashion to lend credibility to the diversionary attacks towardsVitebsk. The regrouping was completed by 5 October and commanders madereconnaissances of the approach routes to their start lines, which were physically

concealedby the engineers.After darkon5October the first echelonunitsmoved intotheir forming-up points, just 300 metres from the German front line. The assaultcommencedat1000hours,whereuponGalitskycommittedhissecondechelondivisiononthe flank where greatest progress was being made. The attack achieved suchoverwhelming surprise that,with the support of the tank brigade, a penetration of overtwentykilometreswasmadetocaptureNevelby1530hours,testimonytotheeffectsofbothactiveandpassivemaskirovka.28

Shortlyafterwards,3rdGuardsTankArmycompletedwhatwaspossibly themostprofitableuseof imitatsiiaduring thewar.Theypulledoutof theBukrinbridgeheadontheRiverDneprsouthofKievandmovedintotheLyutezhbridgeheadtothenorthofthecity in order to launch a surprise attack that enabled the liberation of the city by 6November–intime,asStalinhadordered,forthecelebrationsoftheOctoberRevolutionthefollowingday.Inthemaskirovkaoperation,commandradiostationsoftheformationsinvolved remained in place and the tanks and vehicles moving out of position werereplacedwithdummies.Whenthemovementtimetableslipped,fogcoverwasenhancedwith smoke,whichwas also used to protect the bridge.Within the Bukrin bridgehead,radio and artillery firing patterns continued as usual and rumours were promoted of arenewedoffensivetothesouth.Falseroadtrafficwasmaintainedthroughoutdaylightandmock-uphutsanddugoutswerebuiltintherearareas.29

Other operations in 1943were less successful (somepossibly deliberately).AlongtheMiusRiverinJulyandalongthenorthernDonetsRiverinJulyandAugustpoorradiosecurityundercuttheeffectivenessofthemaskirovka.InbothofthesecasestheGermanswere able tomove reserves to the threatened sector andhalt theSoviet offensiveswithminor losses.These reserves, however,were drawn frommore important sectors of thefront.Throughoutthewinterof1943–4theSovietslaunchedaseriesofoffensivesstartinginUkraine, continuing in the north to relieve Leningrad and culminating oncemore inUkraineinMarch1944,withadrivethatclearedtheCrimeaandapproachedthepre-warbordersofPolandandRomania.Alloftheseoperationsinvolvedmaskirovkawithvaryingdegrees of success. Again, while it was impossible to conceal offensive intentions,maskingoftimingandmaineffortsoftenbroughtconsiderablegains.

Over theyearsmaskirovka had developed from largely passive efforts tomaintainsecurity into more concerted and co-ordinated schemes that required specific staffagencies within major headquarters. At the same time the lessons learned were beingincorporatedintonewregulations;the1944FieldRegulationsopenedwithaeulogytothebenefits of surprise before outlining specific measures for achieving deception andstressingtheimportanceofdeceptioninachievingsurprise.Itstated:

Maskirovka is a mandatory form of combat support for each action and operation. The objectives ofmaskirovka are to secure concealment to themanœuvre and concentrationof troops for thepurposeofdeliveringasurpriseattack;tomisleadtheenemyrelativetoourforces,weapons,actionsandintentions;andthusforcehimtomakeanincorrectdecision.

Itspecified:concealingrealobjectsfromtheenemy,changingtheexternalappearanceofobjects, spreading false rumours, noise discipline and artificial noises, and radiodiscipline, false radio nets and radio deception, and it stressed the principles of‘naturalness,diversityandcontinuousness’.30AManualonOperationalMaskirovkawas

published later that year to give front and army-level planners basic guidance onformulating their plans and set the framework for the development of operationalmaskirovkaintothestrategicvariety.

OPERATIONBAGRATION

Themaskirovka plan forOperationBAGRATIONwas the largestandmostcomprehensivethattheSovietseverattemptedandtheresulting400-kilometreadvanceatestimonytoitssuccess.Duringthespringof1944bothsidespreparedfortheSovietoffensiveexpectedonce themudhaddried.Oncemore theproblem for theGermanswasdecidingexactlywheretheblowwouldfall.TherecentSovietadvancethroughUkrainesuggestedthatthemain effort would be towards the Balkans, promising political gains and coveringfavourablegroundwhichwouldgive several possibilities for furtherdevelopments.TheGermans were particularly sensitive to the possible loss of the Romanian oilfields andwerewellawareofbothRomania’sandHungary’swaveringcommitmenttotheAxis.ButseveralotherpossibilitieswereopentotheSoviets,includingthedirectroutetoBerlinbyway of Belorussia. This was deemed by the Germans to be a more difficult option,however,withpoorroadsandthePripetmarshestotraverse.AnalternativewouldbeanattackfromUkrainetowardstheBalticwhichcouldthenisolateArmyGroupCentrefromtherear.FurtherattackswerealsoexpectedintheBalticregion,butherethenatureoftheterrainwouldundoubtedlyfavour thedefenderand itwasconsideredastrategically lesssignificantproblem.

Inchoosing theBelorussianoption, theStavkasought toexploit thepossibility fordeceptionofferedbytheothers;suchachoicewouldalsoexploitHitler’swishfulthinking,sinceanoffensiveoutofnorthernUkrainepresentedthebesthopeforaGermancounter-stroke. Its subsequent success was in no small measure due to German fears andmisconceptions, uponwhich theSoviets played handsomely.AsZhukov remarks in hisMemoirs, ‘intelligence reports showed that theGermanHighCommand expected us tomakethefirstblowofthesummercampaigninUkraine,notBelorussia.’31Bycarefullyregrouping their forces and time-phasing all offensivemovements, theStavka created astrategicmaskirovkaplan thatwouldcontribute toconvincingbothHitlerandOKHthattheSovietsummeroffensiveof1944wouldemanatefromnorthernUkraine.Infact, theoffensive aimed at destroying three German army groups on the central and southernportions of the Eastern Front in five successive, distinct operations beginning with adiversionary attack north of Leningrad. It would then feign threats in northern andsouthern Ukraine, threatening to continue the successes achieved in the winter whilemakingamassiveredeploymentandreorganizationforablowinBelorussia(BAGRATION),to be swiftly followed by attacks launched successfully from northern and southernUkraine.

Once again security was paramount. Only three people other than Zhukov wereaware of the whole plan.32 The first task for the Stavka was the reorganization of thefrontstoconformtooffensiverequirements.TheBelorussianFrontwasrenamedthe1stBelorussian Front and theWestern Frontwas divided into the 2nd and 3rdBelorussianFronts; these threewouldco-operatewith the1stBalticFront in thecriticalBelorussianoperation. Formations such as 5th Guards Tank Army would need to be moved fromUkraine to Belorussia and 2nd Guards and 51st Armies from Crimea, but all of these

moveswouldneed tobeconcealed.Meanwhile,anorderwassent to thecommanderofthe3rdUkrainianFronttoencourageHitler’sbeliefinthethreatfromnorthernUkraine:

Youarechargedwithconductingoperationalmaskirovkameasuresfor thepurposeofmisinformingtheenemy. It is necessary to show a concentration of eight–nine rifle divisions, reinforcedwith tanks andartillery, beyond the right flank of the front… The false region of concentration should be animated,showing the movement and disposition of separate groups of men, vehicles, tanks and guns, and theequippingof theregion;anti-aircraftgunsshouldbeplacedat the locationsof tankandartillerymock-ups.33

Thiswasdulycarriedoutwithdummyequipmentand false radionetsandgenerousaircoverthatneverthelessallowedoccasionalenemyflightstorecordthe‘build-up’.

PlanningforBAGRATIONwascompleteby14MayandapprovedbytheStavkaon20May. The task was by no means simple, with about one million Soviet troops facing850,000Germans–notparticularly favourableodds.Tocreate the requiredoddswouldneed the redeployment of five combined arms armies, two tank and one air army, 1stPolishArmy,andfivetank,twomechanizedandfourcavalrycorps(somehalfamillionmen plus all the associated impedimenta). Each front prepared a maskirovka plan inaccordancewith theoverallStavkaplan.Ateach level thiswashandledby theabsoluteminimumnumberofpeople,withpaperworkrestrictedruthlessly.Thenewspaperstalkedof defensive arrangements and the political commissars gave suitable instruction to thetroops. Along the front line all activities were maintained in their usual routine. Falseminefields were created and defensive positions improved.The commander of the 1stBelorussianFront,Rokossovskiy(nowGeneraloftheArmy),recalledthemeasurestakeninhiscommand:

Allheadquarterswere required tomaintain constant air andgroundcontrolover the effectivenesswithwhichallactivitiesatthefrontwereconcealedfromtheenemy.Hewastoseeonlywhatwewantedhimtosee.Troopsdeployedandregroupedunderthecoverofnight,whileinthedaytimetrainloadsofdummytanksandgunstravelledfromthefronttotherear.Inmanyplaceswebuiltfakecrossingsandroads.Gunswereconcentratedonsecondarylines,fromwhichtheylaunchedartilleryattacksandwerethenremovedtotherear:dummiesbeingleftthereonthefiringpositions.34

Aparticularproblemwasrazvedkaboyem. Itcouldnotbeavoided,soitwasplannedtooverloadtheenemywiththelargestrazvedkaboyemofthewar,alonga600-milefrontageincluding the2ndand3rdBalticFrontsnorthof theBAGRATION area and1stUkrainianFronttothesouth.35

The resulting operation proved to be the greatest German defeat of the war, andyieldedgreaterlossesintwoweeksthaneventhetwomonthsfollowingthesurroundingofStalingrad.ThesuddenvacuumcreatedinthecentreofthelineforcedtheGermanstoshift forces from both north and south just as the Red Army was planning to launchoffensive operations in these areas, but how much it can be attributed to successfuldeceptioncanonlybemeasuredagainstGermanintelligencereports.On3May,thedaytheSovietsissuedtheirdirectiveondeception,FHOissueditsforecastforthesummer.Itenvisaged two possible Soviet offensives: one from south of thePripetmarshes cuttingnorth behindArmyGroupCentre to theBaltic, and the other drivingwest through theBalkans. The latter was considered the more likely. Even when some signs of Sovietbuild-up were detected in June, these were dismissed as ‘apparently a deception’ andincreasedattackindicatorsafter16Junecausednoexcitementandonlyroutineinterest.36

In part this was a product of rapidly deteriorating German reconnaissancecapabilities. It is also probable that among the information they did receive about theSovietforcesoppositeArmyGroupNorthUkraine,asdistinctfromthoseinfrontofArmyGroupCentre,agreatdealwasfromthelargenumbersofUkrainiannationalistpartisansoperating in that area, which would further serve to confirm their wishful thinking.37Added to Soviet deception was ‘an almost hypnotic self-induced delusion: the mainoffensivewouldcomeagainstArmyGroupNorthUkrainebecause thatwaswhere theywere ready to meet it’.38 This is hardly surprising given what had gone before, but itcannot detract from the conclusion that the ‘system of operational deceptive measuresproveditsworth.Historyhasshownthattheenemywasprofoundlymisledconcerningourrealintentions.’39

These offensives serve to demonstrate a different approach, particularly at thestrategic level, from that of theWestern Allies, a product no doubt of the differencesbetweenthecontinentalandmaritimecontexts.BeforeURANUS,maskirovkaamounted tosecrecy and concealmentwith simulation displays.AlthoughMARSwas conceived as agenuineoffensive, itseffect–possiblyunintentional–was to reinforceamisconceptionand create an ambiguity that improved the effect of URANUS. The maskirovka forBAGRATIONtookthisfurther.TheaimwasnottocreatefictionalformationsintheWesternmanner,buttopresentanessentiallytruepictureinatotallydistortedfashion.Thismeantthateven if theGermanshadunmaskedpartorallof thedeception, theywouldstillbefacedwith two possibilities. Put rather simply,while theAnglo-Americans created oneforcewithwhichtheymightstrikeinanyoneofanumberofplaces,theSoviettechniqueinvolved two or more forces but one strike.40 Following their enormous success inBelorussia therewere subsequent operations elsewhere, but on the Polish sector of thefronttherenowensuedapausethatsawoneofthemorebizarredeceptionsofthewar.

OperationSCHERHORNwasthecreationofanotionalgroupof2,500GermantroopsledbyOberstleutnantHeinrichScherhornwhichtheSovietsusedtoidentifytransmittersand investigate the German command and intelligence system. The German HighCommand received amessage from an alleged network inMoscow saying Scherhorn’smenweretrappedbehindSovietlinesattheBeresinoRiver.FromthenuntilScherhorn’slastmessageon4April1945theGermansexpendedconsiderableeffortinmen,material,andpreciousaircraftinavainattempttorescuehimandhismen,includingsendingtwoSSgroups that never returned.At onepointOttoSkorzenywas alerted to create a taskforce for themissionbutby then itwasMarchand too late.HitlerpromotedScherhornandallthemenwerementionedindispatches,butScherhornwassendingmessagesunderduress, and his detachment had in fact ceased to exist during theBAGRATION offensive,whenScherhornandsome200survivorshadsurrendered.41

THEDRIVEONBERLIN

When the Soviet offensivewas renewed in early 1945, unsurprisingly itwas under thecoverofacomprehensivemaskirovkaplan.Thedrivehadtocomeoutofthebridgeheadsalready establishedover theRiverVistula,which limited thepossibilities for deception.The 1stUkrainian Frontwould attack out of the Sandomierz bridgehead, followed twodayslaterbyZhukov,nowcommandingthe1stBelorussianFront,fromthoseatPulavy

andMagnushev.Bothfrontsrequiredsubstantialreinforcements,andthefirstaimof theStavka’smaskirovka plan sought to conceal this effort; the second aim was to divertGerman attention towards secondary sectors, particularly on the region south of theVistula. Employing the security methods so assiduously learned over three and a halfyearsofwar,Zhukovcreatedasimulatedforceconcentrationontheleftof1stBelorussianFrontwith 1,000 dummy tanks, self-propelled guns and vehicleswhile defensiveworkcontinuedintheattacksectors.Alloffensiveengineerworkwascarriedoutatnightandseniorofficersmaderegularinspectionsfromtheair.

In1stUkrainianFront’s sector theneed foreffectivemaskirovkawasevengreaterand a simulated build-upwasmade on the far left of the bridgehead. Soviet engineersconstructed thirteen1-kilometrebridges across theRiverVistula. In8thGuardsArmy’ssector therewere three. Two of these entered forests on the far bank andwere used toconvey traffic into the bridgeheadwhile the third,which terminated in an open region,carried the return traffic. Sixtieth Army organized a command group to implement itsmaskirovkaplan.Headedby thedeputychiefofoperations, itcomprisedrepresentativesfrom each branch of service (infantry, armour, artillery, signals, engineers and services)and controlled forces assigned from front assets to perform maskirovka tasks. Theseincluded an engineer brigade plus two battalions and a separatemaskirovka company.SixtiethArmyitselfprovidedanengineerbattalionandthreeinfantrybattalionstogetherwith artillery batteries to simulate adjustment fire, officer billeting parties, 200 dummytanks and officer reconnaissance parties from the defending regiments in the front line.Thesewouldmakeostentatious recces of forward areaswhile the billeting partieswentaroundwarning the localpopulationof the influxofnewunits.When4thGuardsTankCorps moved through the region, it was replaced with over 600 dummy tanks whilespecial detachments animated the areawith vehiclemovements and camp fires.Rovingguns simulated artillery adjustment fire and soon afterwards 550 dummy guns werebrought in.Germanartillerycontinued to fire at thesepositions longafter the realgunshadbeenmovedtotheassaultsector.

Since German observation posts could see somewhere between five and eightkilometresbehind theSoviet front line, thevast reserves that theStavkaallocatedwerehidden in the small forests scattered throughout the bridgehead by vertical vegetationscreensbuiltbytheengineers,whichextendedoutintotheopenareas.Nolessthan240kilometres of thesemasks and 180 kilometres of cross-country roadswere built in andaround the forests. All of this was backed up by intensive rear-area security measurespursued with increasing effectiveness by the NKVD, which greatly undermined theGerman intelligence effort. But even with these measures, the Soviets knew that theGermansexpectedanattack.Theythereforedeterminedtotrynewassaulttechniques.Theassault would begin with a platoon from each lead battalion supported by a couple oftanks, a self-propelledgunand severaldummy tanks,whichwould stagedemonstrationattacksalong the front thirtyminutesbeforeH-Hour inorder todraw theGermans intotheir defensive positions before the artillery preparation. FifthGuardsArmy alsomadeextensive use of smoke to cover its demonstrations. Similarly, both fronts changed thepatternoftheirartillerypreparations,staggeringthemwithvariousforwardmovements.42

TheGermanscertainlyexpectedanattackfromlateOctoberonwards,butremaineduncertainastoexactlywhenandwhereitwouldoccur.Theirintelligencesummarieswere

infact fairlyaccurateregarding these,butwerehopelesslywideof themarkconcerningthe scale of the assault.Theymissed the deployment of no fewer than six armies fromStavka reserve, so that inall threebridgeheads theGermans thought they facedoddsofabout3:1wheninfacttheywerebetween5:1and7:1,andevenbetween8:1and16:1onconcentration.IfitseemsmoreafailureforGermanintelligenceratherthanasuccessforSovietmaskirovka,thenitshouldbenotedthatby26January,whentheGermanfrontwasvirtuallynon-existentinPoland,Germanintelligencecorrectlylocatedeveryfirst-echelonSovietarmyandmostcorpsanddivisions.AsDavidGlantzputsit,‘theSovietsmaskedwhattheywishedtomask.’43

If theBattle forBerlin seemsanti-climactic comparedwithwhathadgonebefore,theSovietswerealsowellawareofwhathadhappenedinsimilarcircumstancesin1760.Theyestimated that theGermansstillhad field forcesofamillionmenand, forall thatthey were a shadow of the once proud and mighty Wehrmacht, they could still offercredible resistance. The honour of leading the assault fell to Zkukov’s 1st BelorussianFrontfromtheKüstrinbridgeheadontheRiverOder.Zhukov’smaskirovkaplansoughttodistract German attention from the central Küstrin bridgehead position by simulatingattack preparations north at Guben and south at Stettin while portraying a defensivepostureatKüstrin.Atthisstageofthewar,however,maskirovkahadlimitedapplicationsince the front had narrowed to a few hundred kilometres. Also significant was theproduction of a huge smokescreen, no less than 310 kilometres long; 92 kilometres toconcealgenuinepreparationsand218merelytoconfuse.44

WiththedefeatofGermany,theSovietswerefinallypreparedtotakeahandagainstJapan,sinceStalinsensedthattherecouldberichpoliticalpickingsasthewarintheFarEastalsodrewtoaclose.Thescaleof theundertakingwasvast: theoperational theatrewas1,000kilometresby600kilometres;bothsideshadaround700,000mendeployedinManchuria and the Soviet far east respectively, a figure that the Sovietswould have toraise to double by transporting as many men again along the 9,000 kilometres of theTrans-Siberian railway together with all their arms, equipment and supplies. Assumingthat these forces could be assembled secretly, the terrain to be covered in the proposedadvancemeantthattheJapanesewouldhavetobedeceivedastotheactualroutes.Addedtothis,thecampaignwouldhavetoachieveitsgoalsinthirtydays.

Tobeginwith,themonthchosenfortheattackwasAugust,whichinManchuriaisthemonthofrains.Thesecouldbeexpectedseriouslytoimpedemovementandso,evenastheSovietbuild-upbecameapparent, theJapaneseestimated1946astheearliestdateforaSovietattack.45 It seemed that surprisewouldalsodepend toa largeextenton theformoftheattack,whichneededtopre-emptJapanesedefencesorparalysethecommandandcontrolstructure,usingunusualcombattechniques.46Themainblow,deliveredbytheTrans-Baikal Front, was therefore delivered across difficult country regarded by theJapaneseHighCommandasimpassableforlargenumbersoftroops.AtthesametimetheJapanese did expect an attack towards Hailar and it was deemed important not todisappointthem,lesttheyshouldredeploythelargenumbersoftroopsdefendingit.The36th Army was therefore detailed to do this, although it mostly comprised low-gradeinfantry.47Thesuccessachievedwas indeedspectacularand,as thefirstopportunity fortheSovietstoapplymaskirovkaattheoutsetofawar,wouldproveanimportantextension

ofitstheoryandmakethecampaignaspecialsubjectforfuturestudy.

DEVELOPMENTOFADOCTRINE

The Soviets learned several very important lessons during theGreat PatrioticWar. Thefirstwasthatitisvirtuallyimpossibletoconcealone’sintenttoattack,evenattheoutsetofhostilities.However,maskingthescale,timinganddirectioncanbeatleastaseffectiveasconcealingtheintent:anexpectantenemytendstohaveamoreactiveimaginationandwill be more receptive to false indicators, especially if his intelligence service isinefficient.OneweaknessofSovietdeceptionplanning,though,wasitsinabilitytoknowhow successful its own measures were, along with a tendency to follow predictablepatterns, especially in theearlywaryears.TheSoviets identifiedconcealmentof forcesand operational concepts as the principal purpose ofmaskirovka, citing the followingmeasures as being fundamental to achieving surprise: secrecy of force deployments;demonstrative actions to deceive the enemy regarding one’s actions; simulations toconfuse the enemy regarding intent and location of real forces; and disinformation bytechnicalmeans,falseordersorrumour.48

Sovietwartimeexperiencesalsoproved theessential interrelationbetween tactical,operationalandstrategicdeceptionmeasures.Althoughonecouldmaketacticaldeceptionwithoutplanningoperationalandstrategicmeasures,itwasimpossibletodotheopposite.Successfulstrategicdeceptiondependedentirelyontheeffectivenessofmeasuresatlowerlevels. Most important was the ability secretly and efficiently to redeploy numerousarmies and corps,which depended on the ability to hide individual tanks and vehicles.Sloppy camouflage or radio procedure could jeopardize the whole process, as couldoverenthusiastic razvedka boyem or artillery registration. It took numerous failures torevealatalentformaskirovka,butbythemiddleof1943thattalentwasevident.Sinceitrelied on the most extensive application of their methods and techniques, strategicdeceptiontooktheSovietslongesttomaster.49

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s strategic and operational planning wasovershadowed by nuclear weapons, although surprise and deception remained keyelements. In1976,however,General-LieutenantM.M.Kir’yan,aseniormemberof theVoroshilov General Staff Academy, wrote that ‘surprise is one of the most importantprinciplesofthemilitaryart’,andhislistofmethodstoachieveitbeganwith‘deceivingtheenemyconcerningone’sownintentions’.Hefurtherelaboratedonamongotherthings,secrecy,camouflageandnightmovement.50

Regardless of its form, the environmental or organizational aspects affecting it,maskirovka is governed by four major principles: activity, plausibility, variety andcontinuity.51 The first of these principles (activnost) states that offensive action isnecessarytodegradetheenemy’sobservationcapability:hisabilitytolocateandidentifytroop concentrations and key weapon systems, particularly indicator systems, by theconcerted use of electronic warfare, dummies and good camouflage and concealment.Plausibilityandpersuasiveness(ubeditel’nyiandpravdopodobnyi)areessential,but theirsuccessdependsontimeliness(svoevremennost).InthelargeforcesavailabletotheUSSRtherewas no need to create entirely false armies, since therewere plenty of real ones.Nowadays,farsmallerforcesaredeployed,althoughthesameprinciplesapply.Iraqused

aSoviet-baseddoctrineduring theGulfWar in1991and,despitedeployingoverhalfamillionmen,made effective use of decoysmade of wood, cardboard, paper, cloth andfibreglass, including realistic models of tanks bought from an Italian company.52Maskirovkamustbevaried(raznoobraznye),andthisrequiresforethoughtandoriginalityifitisnottobecomestaleandpredictable.Itisthisembeddingofmaskirovkaintheveryfabricofeveryotheractivity,thislevelofawarenessandtrainingthroughoutthestructure,thatperhapsmostclearlydifferentiatesmaskirovka fromWesternconceptsofdeception.Finally,continuity(nepreryvnost)mustbemaintainedbothtemporallyandthroughoutalllevelsofcommand;atacticaldeceptionerrormayrevealanoperationalorevenstrategicdeception.

At the tactical level maskirovka includes the following categories: optical/light,thermal,sound, radioandradar.Optical/lightmaskirovka covers thosemeasures,mainlypassive,designedtodenyenemyopticalreconnaissancesystems,includingphotography.This covers everything from nets, camouflage clothing and special paints to the use ofsmall lights likeminers’ lamps,wornon theheadandpointingdownwards so that lightcanbeappliedonlywhereneeded.Butitalsoincludesdisplaysofdummyequipmentthataredesignedtobeseen,asthermalmaskirovkaincludesbothconcealingheatsourcesandcreating false ones.Equally, radarmaskirovka involvesmethods of reducing signatures,fromtopographicanalysisinordertolocateradardeadgroundwhichcannotbescanned,totheapplicationofstealthtechnologyandthewidespreaduseofreflectorstocreatefalseradar images. These reflectors (corner, pyramid, spherical or dipole) can also formeffectiveradarjammers.Suspendedalongaroadorthroughoutanareainpairs,theycanmaskactivity;placedbesidesawoodendummytheycangiveitaradarsignature,andtheycanbeusedtocreatefalsebridgesandevento‘alter’thelandscape.Duringthemid-1970severySovietmotor-riflebattalionwasissuedwiththirtycornerreflectors.53

FromthisitwouldappearthatmaskirovkapermeatedveryaspectofSovietmilitarylife (and by extension, that of modern Russia and other former Soviet states). Indeed,Soviet soldierswere ‘compelled by regulations to employ some formofmaskirovka’.54With the threat posed byweapons ofmass destruction, thiswas regarded as absolutelyessential,asmuchtoensure thesurvivabilityofSoviet forcesas togainsurprise. Itwasvaluedprimarilyforitsabilitytodisruptanddelaytheenemy’sdecision-makingcycleandhis ability efficiently to target Soviet concentrations and build-ups.55 Similarly, it isdesignedimplicitlytoraisesuchdilemmasintheopponent’smindastowhethertofireonwhatmaymerely be decoys or to accept the risk of amassing of forces close to handwhichmay later threaten to swamp thedefences.56Nevertheless,WesternanalystswerehardpressedwhenwatchingSovietmanœuvrestodetectthewidespreadimplementationofmaskirovka.Whetherthiswasproofofitseffectiveness,orbecausethe‘real’thingwasbeingheldbackforoperations,orbecausethepracticewasfarlessadvancedthanhistory,doctrineandassertionsuggestedisnotclear.57

POST-WARINTERVENTIONSOneSovietwriternotedthat

amoreimportantconditionforachievingvictorythanoverallsuperiorityinweaponsandmanpoweristheability to use concealment in preparing one’s main forces for a major strike and use the element of

surpriseinlaunchinganattackagainstimportantenemytargets.58

Amajorthemeinpost-warSovietthoughtwasthedeterminationneveragaintobetakenbysurprise.Inthe1960sand1970sSovietmilitarywritersbegantostressthekeyroleofsurprise as one of the important principles ofmilitary art.A plethora of articles on thesubjectculminatedinamajorworkbyGeneralS.P.Ivanov,TheInitialPeriodoftheWar,whichderivedlessonsfromtheeventsof1940–41andAugust1945.Thisneedtopossessthecapabilityforlaunchingsurpriseattacks,andtodefendagainstthem,becameacentraltheme.59 TheSoviets never distinguished between the tactical, operational and strategiclevelsofdeception,andinsteademphasizedvariationofthemeansofdeception.Amongotherrecognizedmethodsforachievingsurpriseweretheuseofexercisesandmanœuvresas cover for the deployment of forces, a method used in the invasions of bothCzechoslovakia andAfghanistan.Thiswas facilitatedby the centralizationofdeceptionplanning in Department D of the KGB’s First Main Directorate in 1959, in order tomanagehigh-qualitydeceptionoperationsworldwide.60

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated these operations superbly.Contingency planning began several months beforehand, when it was discussed at thehighestlevels.AlthoughtheSovietPolitburowasreluctanttoordermilitaryintervention,Leonid Brezhnev later admitted that sometime in May they began to contemplate theoptionas a last resort andbeganamilitarybuild-up,partlyaspreparationandpartly tobringpressureonthereformiststokeepeventsundercontrol.Militaryexercisesalsogavecoverforthenecessarylogisticpreparationsandrehearsals.BylateJuneSovietdivisionshadmoved from their peacetime garrison locations in Poland andEastGermany to theCzechoslovakborders.ThefirstSovietdeploymentontoCzechoslovakterritoryoccurredin June and July under cover of ‘staff military exercises’, following an understandingmadebetweenAlexeiKosyginoftheUSSRandCzechoslovakia’sAlexanderDubček,theleaderofthe‘Praguespring’.Forcesfromnon-CzechoslovakWarsawPactcountrieswerenotoriginally to takepart in theseexercises,and thefirstunits todosoarrived inearlyJuneduringameetingoftheCzechoslovakCommunistParty’sCentralCommittee.Theybroughtwiththemheavyequipment,includingarmourandEWassets.Theyfirstenteredair bases capable of handling the Soviet’s heavy lift capability. Not only wereCzechoslovakofficersnotinformedofthisdevelopment,buttheywereexcludedfromthepost-exerciseanalysis,abreachoftheMayagreementaboutwhichDubčekcomplained.Itlater transpired that theWarsaw Pact command had introduced 16,000 troops into thecountry between 20 and 30 June. A troop withdrawal announced on 1 July was thendelayed until negotiations took place later that month and in early August at Cierna-Bratislava.

These month-long manœuvres formed an unusual deception. They were not onlyunsealed but widely advertised, and thus served not only as preparation for possibleintervention but also to create political pressure. Militarily, they were designed todesensitizetheCzechoslovaksandWesternleadersandanalysts.Whenitbecameknownon 23 July that the Soviet Politburo was to enter negotiations with the Czechoslovakleadership, theSovietmedia announced theholdingof the largest logistic exercise everheldbytheSovietgroundforcesundertheCommander-in-ChiefRearServices,GeneralS.Mariakin.During this exercise, code-namedNEMEN, thousandsof reservistswere called

up and civilian transport was requisitioned. The exercise started all over the westernUSSRand as the negotiations progressedwas extended intoPoland andEastGermany.Immediately before the Cierna conference, major fleet exercises were conductedthroughouttheBaltic,andalloftheseexercisescontinuedduringtheconferences.WhenNEMENformallyendedon10August,avastairdefenceexercisebeganthefollowingday,along with a communications exercise in western Ukraine, Poland and East Germany.From16AugustHungarywas included,andthefollowingdaythedecision to intervenewasmade.

All this time the KGB was trying to provide ‘proof’ of counter-revolutionarybehaviourtojustifymilitaryintervention,suchascachesofsecretweapons‘discovered’neartheWestGermanborderandfakedocumentstoincriminatetheCIA.Czechoslovakstocksof fuel andammunitionhadbeen skilfully reducedby removal toEastGermanyand theUSSRunder the pretext of the exercises, and the Soviets arranged for amajorexercise of the Czechoslovak Army to take place from 21 August – a day after theinterventionwasduetostart–inordertodiverttheattentionoftheCzechoslovakmilitary.Tight security measures were imposed, including radio silence and use of electronicwarfare assets, to ensure theWest knew as little as possible about what was about tohappen.CertainlyDubčekhimselfknownothinguntil itwas too late.Hugeforcesweredeployed,estimatedatbetweenaquarterandhalfamillionmen,butdespitetheprolongedlogistical exercises the operationwasdogged at several points by shortages of fuel andfood and water.61 The Soviets had, however, learned from subjecting the HungarianRevolutionof1956,whentheysufferedsome720deadandmissingand1,540wounded:inCzechoslovakiatheylostonlyninety-sixmenkilled.62

TheinvasionsofbothCzechoslovakiaandAfghanistanincludedtheestablishmentofamilitaryandKGBelementtoassist in theproductionofacoveranddeceptionplantodivertattentionawayfromitandallowthemquickly toseize theessential facilitiesandkeyleadersandofficials.InAfghanistanpreparationsfortheSovietinvasionofDecember1979alsobeganmonthsearlier.InAprilGeneraloftheArmyAleksiyYepishev,headofthe Main Political Directorate, led a delegation to assess the situation (as he hadpreviouslydoneinCzechoslovakia).InAugustGeneraloftheArmyIvanPavlovski(whocommandedtheCzechoslovakinvasion),nowCommander-in-ChiefoftheSovietGroundForces, led some sixty officers on a weeks-long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan.63With the country in the throes of civil war following the replacement of the king byAfghanCommunists,anexerciseheldinAugustinvolvedtransporting10,000troopsfromtheUSSRtoSouthYemenandEthiopiaandbackagain,inafleetofAntonov-22aircraft.In September they took the first steps towards influencing the military situation inAfghanistan during the visit to Moscow of President Nur Mohammed Taraki, and ameetingwasarrangedwithBabrakKarmal,whoinduecoursewouldadoptthepositionofpresident following the invasion. The Soviets were involved in intrigues aimed ateliminating Taraki’s rival the vice-president Hafizullah Amin. These backfired and theresultwasTaraki’sdeathandtheascendanceofAmintopower.Forcedtoacceptthecoup,theypretendedtocourtAminandappeartohavedecidedtointerveneonamassivescaleonly as late as November, when they sent the First Deputy Minister of the Interior,General-Lieutenant Viktor Paputin, to Kabul, ostensibly to advise Amin on police andsecuritymattersbutinrealitytorallythesupportersofTarakiandKarmal.

Changes to deployments along the Afghan and Iranian borders during this periodwere apparent to US analysts, who this time were not particularly surprised by theinvasionwhen it came.Preliminarymovesbeganon8 and9Decemberwith the lift ofairborne units to take control of Bagram airport to reinforce a unit sent originally inSeptember.Their initial taskwas tosecure themainroadbetweenKabuland theSovietborderwhileotherunitsmovedconcurrently to takecontrolofKabulmunicipalairport.The actual invasion was deliberately timed for 24–26 December, when most Westernofficialswould be onChristmas holiday.64On the groundSoviet advisors succeeded indisarmingtwoAfghandivisionsbypersuadingtheircommandersthattheyneededtotakeover their ammunition and anti-tankweapons for inventory and their tank batteries forwintering,andthatsomeoftheirtanksneededtohaveadefectmodified.Thenbetween24and 26 December some 10,000 men of the 105th Guards Airborne Division landed atKabulwhiletwomotor-rifledivisionscrossedtheborderfromthenorthandadvancedtotakecontrolofkeypositions in thecentreof thecountry, leavingcontrolof thebordersuntil later.Intotal,some80–100,000menweredeployed,andthelogisticproblemsthathamperedtheinvasionofCzechoslovakiawereavoided.65However,simplytakingcontrolof the country’s main installations and infrastructure was not sufficient to calm thepopulation and control the country.Although the invasion itselfwas accomplishedwithfewproblems,thatwasonlythebeginning.

The invasionwas feltbymany in theWest tobe theSoviets’ ‘Vietnam’,andwithsomejustice.SoviettacticsinAfghanistanwereveryclumsytobeginwith,andthepoortrainingofmanyof theunits involvedmeant therewas seemingly little employment ofmaskirovka. Aswith theAmericans inVietnam, the emphasis was on firepower, usingarmourandlarge-scaletroopdeploymentstodestroycompletelyMujahadeenvillagesandtheirassociatedagriculture.Later,withtheintroductionofSpetznaz(specialforces), thischangedtowardsobservingarmssupplycaravansfromtheairandinterceptingthem.SoMujahadeen commanded by Abdul Haq took to setting up dummy caravans andassembling a counter-force. Having waited to see where the Spetznatz teams weredeployed,theywouldambushtheambushers.NotmanyoftheMujahadeengroupswerecapableofsuchoperations,butonlyafter1986didtheyadoptmoresubtletactics.66

In theautumnof1987,during the largestSovietoperationof thewar,MAGISTRAL,the40thArmylaunchedtodrivetoclearthemainroutetoKhostdistrict,whichhadbeeneffectivelycutoffby theMujahadeen.Thekeypositionwas theSatukandavpass, thirtykilometres east ofGardez, andpractically theonlyway through themountains betweenGardez and Khost. On 28 November, following unsuccessful negotiations with theguerrillas, General Boris Gromov decided to determine the enemy’s weapon systems(especiallyairdefence)withafakeparachutedropusingtwentydummyparachutists.Thisprovedhighlysuccessfulandtheguerrillasrevealedtheirpositionsforartilleryobserverstorecord.Theywerethenattackedfromtheairandwithafour-hourartilleryprogramme.Althoughthedeceptionwasveryeffective, theartilleryprogramme(whichfarexceededSovietnorms)wasnot,andthepasswasclearedonlyafterheavyfighting.67

Successinguerrillawarishardtodefineandbodycountiscertainlyapoorcriterion.The Soviets appear repeatedly to have been engaging rearguards and the slow oruninformed guerrillas.Night patrols and ambusheswere singular plannedmissions, not

routine events. The Soviet concept of line-of-communication security appears to havebeen to establish a series of fortified positions, man them and then sit back and wait,without aggressive patrolling or reconnaissance. Similarly, they seem to have used airpower primarily for offensive action and not reconnaissance, with little effort to shiftforces,occupytemporarysites,ortakeactionstodeceiveor‘wrong-foot’theenemy.Bythe time the Soviets finally left Afghanistan in 1989 their casualties amounted to over15,000deadandastaggering439,000woundedandsick.Sovietcommandmightperhapshavebeenmoreeffectiveifithadreadabookwrittenattheendofthenineteenthcentury,SirCharlesCallwell’sSmallWars.

11

DeceptioninCounter-RevolutionaryandIrregularWarfare

‘Itisstrangethatthecommandersofregularforcesshouldsooftensucceedinsmallwarsindrawingtheenemyintoactionbysubterfugeandstratagem.’

C.E.Callwell

SINCEATLEASTas longagoas165BC,whenJudahusedthemagainst theSeleucids,hit-and-run tactics havebeenpractisedby tribesmen, peasants in uprising and even regularsoldiersinsituationswheretheyweresooutnumberedthatconventionaltacticsthreatenedthem with being overwhelmed. The anti-revolutionary uprising of the Chouans in theVendéeandBrittanyinthe1790sandtheguerrillacampaignsagainsttheFrenchinSpainbetween1808and1814andintheTyrolin1809wereperhapsthefirstexamplesoffull-blown hit-and-run campaigns, and all served to demonstrate the savagery andindiscriminatenatureofsuchwarfare.Butsincethelastcenturyaconfusingarrayofterms–guerrillawars, ‘brush-fire’wars, smallwars, low-intensitywars,counter-revolutionaryandinternalsecurityoperations–hasgrownuptodescribewarsbetweenregulararmies,usuallybelongingtoaEuropeanstate,andtechnologicallyunsophisticatedenemiessuchasAfricanpeoplesorNorthAmericanIndians;butthesamelabelshavealsobeenappliedto thepartisanand resistanceoperationsof theSecondWorldWarand, especially sincethen,tothosecampaignsfoughtbyvariousnationalliberationmovements.

Generally,deception, like the fighting itself, takesplaceat the small-scale, tacticalend of the spectrum. Imperatives of security during the SecondWorldWarmeant thatresistanceorganizationscouldplaynoknowingpartinthelarge-scaledeceptionschemessuchasBARCLAYandBODYGUARD, although theycouldplayan indirect role.While theAllies were clearing North Africa and planning for the invasion of Sicily, among theerroneous troop movements that the Germans made was the dispatch of 1st PanzerDivision from France to Greece, where it provided targets (and trouble) for the Greekresistance.1ResistanceactivitywasencouragedbytheAlliesduringMayandJune1943andwas so effective that theGermans sent twomore divisions toGreece, including anarmoureddivision.AfterthishadreachedtheSalonika–Athensline,theAsopusviaduct–the only practical route available for withdrawal – was blown up, closing it for fourmonths.2Anotherwaythatresisterscouldcontributewasbylayingboobytraps inareasenemy troopswere likely topass.SOE’s camouflage section amused itself indesigningexploding cowpats and other deceptive but deadly forms of schoolboy humour.Intelligencereportsfromresisterswerealsovaluabletodeceptionstaffstryingtoestimatetheeffectivenessoftheirotheroperations.Usedcarefully,thepressurethesesmallgroupscould bring to bear on the enemy at well-chosen moments became an importantoperationaltool.3

THEFETTERMANMASSACRE

Inmanyrespectstheprinciplesoftacticaldeceptionoutlinedaboveapplyalsotoirregular

andguerrillawarfare.However,therearetworecurringfeaturesofsuchwarfareworthyofnote:theuseofambushandtheuseoflurestodrawtheenemyintothem.Regularforceswilloftentrytolureguerrillasintoanambushbyfeigningweakness;andtheguerrillaorirregularwilloftentrytolureenemytroopsbyofferingatemptingtargetforattack,andmakingupforweaknessinnumbersandarmsbychoosinghispointofambushcarefullytogeneratelocalsuperiority.FollowingtheAmericanCivilWartheAmericangovernmentwaskeentoexpandintothenewlandsofthewest.Inevitably,thisbroughtthesettlerssentthere into conflict with the plains Indians, whose nomadic lifestyle could not beaccommodated in this new arrangement. The arrival of 700 men from 2nd Bn, 18thInfantry,atFortLaramiewithorders togarrisonFortRenoonthePowderRiver,andtoestablish two further fortsalong theBozeman trailwhich randirectly through theirbesthunting grounds, was a provocation the Oglala Sioux could not ignore and they dulypreparedforwar.ThedisasterthatbefellUSforceswasonethatmighthavebeenforeseeninthecircumstances.Thedistancesbetweentheproposedfortswouldbeahundredmiles,sixty-sevenmilesandninety-onemiles,toogreattobeabletoprovidemutualsupportorprotecttraffic,especiallywhenmannedonlywithinfantry.Nevertheless,thiswaswhattheUScommander,ColonelHenryB.Carrington,setouttodo.AfterreachingFortRenoon28June1866,hecontinuedtothesiteofFortPhilKearnyandcommencedconstruction,beforecontinuingon3AugusttowardsthesiteofFortC.F.Smith.Histroopswerethusalreadyspreadtoowidelytoprotecttravellers,apointhemadeinalettertohissuperiorwhilealsorequestingacavalrydetachment.

Eventually,sixtymenof2ndCavalrytogetherwithaforty-fivereinforcementsfrom18th Infantry were sent to Kearny, including Captain William Fetterman, who soonbecame the ringleader of a disloyal clique that regarded Carrington as nomore than apoliticalappointee.AmongthefewnotinvolvedintheseintrigueswasthegrizzledseniorscoutJimBridger. ‘Yourmenwhofoughtdownsoutharecrazy,’hewarnedCarrington,‘theydon’tknowanythingabout fighting Indians.’Fewdid;but theywere learningandBridger had already established a drill, if attacked, for putting the vulnerable trainscarryingwoodforthefortsintoalaageruntilsupportarrived.WhenFettermanproposedasweep with a hundred men through the various Sioux encampments along the TongueRivertothenorth,Carringtontoldhimtogoawayandcomebackwithamorepracticalproposal.However,CarringtonagreedthatmoreactivemeasureswerenecessaryandsentFettermanwiththirtycavalrynotmerelytorelievethewoodtrainwhenitwasattacked,but to pursue the Indians along their usual retirement route to Peno Creek, whereCarringtonwouldtryandcutthemoffwithanotherthirty-fivemen.Unfortunatelywhenthishappened,assoonasthehundredorsoIndiansrealizedtheywerebeingpursuedbyonly a third of their number, they turned and counter-attacked. Carrington’s party alsofounditselfintroubleandwasluckytoescapewithonlytwodeadandfivewounded.

TheIndiansontheotherhandweredelightedtofindthattheirenemieswerewillingtoventuresofarfromthefort.At1000hourson21Decemberthewoodtrainsetoutoncemore, and anhour later the lookout reported itwasunder attack.The reliefwas ledbyFetterman with strict instructions not to pursue beyond Lodge Trail Ridge. Fetterman,commandingeightymen(thenumberthathehadonceboastedwasallherequiredtoridethroughtheSiouxnation),headedstraightalongtheBozemantrailandwasseentoclimbtheslopesofLodgeTrailRidgeinskirmishorder,engaginggroupsofIndiansastheywent

beyond thecrest. Itwasaroundnoon.Carringtonsenta relief forceandataround1245hoursreceivedamessage:‘ThevalleyontheothersideoftheridgeisfilledwithIndianswhoarethreateningme.Thefiringhasstopped.NosignofFetterman’scommand…’

When Fetterman’s defeated force was found, the sight was truly appalling. Thebodiesweremutilatedsoviciouslythatthereportwassuppressedfortwentyyears.Onlyonesoldier,buglerAdolphMetzger,whohadusedhisinstrumentasaweaponuntilitwasbatteredshapeless,escapedsuchtreatment;abuffalorobewaslaidoverhimasatributetohis bravery. Although the exact details are unknown, it seems that a promising youngwarrior called Crazy Horse was prominent in the attack, which involved up to 2,000braves,skilfullyusingdecoypartiestoattackthewoodtrainanddemonstratenorthofthefort.OnceFettermanwas seen taking the route towardsLodgeTrailRidge, the Indianssimply led him on, taunting and riding across his front, until the soldiers reached theambushsite.4

INTELLIGENCEIn 1896 Sir Charles Callwell published his manual for British Imperial soldiers, SmallWars,inwhichhenotedthat

theenemyhasnoorganizedintelligencedepartment,noregularcorpsofspies,andyetheknowsperfectlywellwhatisgoingon….Thisarisesfromthesocialsysteminsuchtheatresofwarandfromthemannerinwhichtheinhabitantslive.Newsspreadsinamostmysteriousfashion.5

Itwasprobably lessmysterious thanCallwell thought,buthehadhitonasalientpoint:intelligenceisofenormoussignificanceinirregularandguerrillawarfare.

Sincethesecurityforceslivewithinthepopulation, theyinevitablybecomepartofthe infrastructure. Many individuals – contractors, delivery drivers, local governmentemployees–haveaccesstothem,toinformationaboutthemandtheiroperations.Manyofthese people may be hostile and even agents of the guerrillas. The barracks and otherbuildingsusedbysecurityforcesarelikelytobeeasilyobservedandmonitored,providingguerrillaswith informationonall theroutinesofboth lifeandoperations that takeplacethere.Surveillanceofthesecurityforcesbyguerrillasisthereforeafairlystraightforwardmatter.

The reverse is most definitely not the case, especially if elements of the securityforces are in any way alien to the community under their control.6 These forces areimmediately set apart by their uniforms, but are fighting against forcesmuch harder toidentify and locate. The ‘unconventional’ nature of such warfare means that detailedintelligence is of even greater significance. The destruction of the insurgents’infrastructureratherthantheirarmedforcesisthekeytovictory.Moreover,militaryforcesareoftenexpectedtooperatewithinthelaw,whichrestrictstheinstanceswhentheycanuse force. The legal emphasis is therefore on capturing guerrillas and trying them,especially in contexts such as Northern Ireland. In these circumstances deception is asusefulasanaidtogatheringintelligenceasitisforactuallycombatingtheguerrillasinthefield.

Callwellnotedthatspreadingfictitiousinformationonproposedoperationswaseasyandsuretoreachthetarget.Hewentontosaythat,althoughtroopsinsmallwarsfound

theiropponentsskilled in theuseofambushesandmastersof theartofdeception,suchopponents were significantly less adept at avoiding such pratfalls than at setting them.Thus,wheresuchtrapswerelaidbyregulars,theyusuallysucceeded.7Modernguerrillas,itshouldbenoted,however,tendtobemoresophisticated.

SMALLWARS

From the beginning of their campaigns in India, Africa and elsewhere, the Britishemployedintimidationanddeceptionaslegitimateweapons.Ifthisseemstheantithesisofthe‘publicschool’ethos,thenitshouldberememberedthattheempirewasbuiltlargelyby adventurers and free spirits who were often out of place at home, andmost of theempirehadbeenwon longbefore thepriggishnessof laterVictorian societyestablisheditself.Inanycase,theyjustifiedtheiruseofsuchtacticsbyseeingitasaresponsetothetraitsoftheindigenouscommunities.Theyperceivedcunninganddeceit,forexample,asthe salient characteristics of the Indian princes, and were quick to appropriate thosecharacteristicsfortheirownpurposes,bothpoliticallyandmilitarily.Callwellnoted:

Itisstrangethatcommandersofregularforcessooftensucceedinsmallwarsindrawingtheenemyintoactionbysubterfugeandstratagem.Irregularwarriorsindividuallypossessthecunningwhichtheirmodeof life engenders.Their chieftains are subtle and astute.All orientals have inborn love of trickery anddeception…historyaffordsnumerousexamplesofsuchantagonistsbeingluredoutofstrongpositionsorenticed into unfavourable situations, by bodies of trained soldiers handled skilfully – somuch is thisindeedthecasethatthesubjectmeritsaspecialchapter.8

Small Wars is full of examples of how to deceive and trick an enemy, and nobodysuggesteditwas‘poorform’.

Callwellparticularlynotedtheabilityofdisciplinedtroopstocreateanexaggeratedimpressionofthesizeofabodyoftroops,especiallyinattack.Baden-Powell’scaptureofWedza’s stronghold towards the end of theMatabele operations in 1896 is an excellentexample. The stronghold consisted of several kraals perched almost on the crest of amountain some three miles long, which was joined to a ridge by a neck. While thedefendersnumberedseveralhundred,theBritishforceamountedtoonly120;theoriginalplanhadbeenforanothercolumntoco-operateintheattackbutitwasunabletodoso.Baden-Powell commenced operations by sending twenty-fivemountedmen to the neckwithorderstoactasthoughtheyweretentimesasstrong.Thegunswouldbombardthecrestwhiletherestoftheforce,comprisingsomehussars,demonstratedagainsttheouterend of the mountain and against the back of it. After some desultory skirmishing themountedinfantrypushedtheirwayuptothepointdesignated,leavingtheirhorsesbelowwithsevenhorse-holders.Buttheenemybegantoassembleinforceandseriouslythreatenthehillparty.

Baden-Powell, perceiving their somewhat critical position, sent orders to the gunsandhussarstomakeadiversion.Butthesehadbeendelayedontheroadandwerenotyettohand,sohetookthesevenhorse-holders,movedroundthebackof themountainandorderedmagazinefire,soastogivetheideathattherewasaconsiderableattackingforceonthisside.Therusewascompletelysuccessful.Therebelswhohadbeenpressingovertowards theneckhastily spread themselvesallover themountain,and thearrivalof therestof thetroopsat this juncturecompletedtheillusion,reinforcedwhenthegunscameintoactiontothefront.Thehussarsmovedaroundthemountainanddispersedtorepresent

asstrongaforceaspossibletoimpresstheenemy.Itwasdecidedthatnoassaultshouldbedeliveredthatday;insteadthedeceptionwasmaintainedthroughoutthenight.Fireswerelitatintervalsaroundmuchofthemountainandfedbyrovingpatrols.Themenhadorderstodischargetheirriflesfromtimetotimeatdifferentpoints,andeverythingwasdonetomakeWedzaandhisfollowersbelievethatawholearmywasarrayedagainstthem.Thenextdaythekraalswerecapturedwithease,aftermostoftheenemyhadslippedoffintothedarkness.9

CHINAANDMAOTSE-TUNG

ModernconceptsofrevolutionarywarprobablyowemoretoMaoTse-tungthananyoneelse. He understood that ‘because guerrilla warfare derives from the masses and issupported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from theirsympathiesandco-operation.’10Atthesametimeassustainingthemilitarystruggle,thisprovidedthebasisforthepoliticaldevelopmenthesoughttoengineer,namelyrevolution.Similarly,mostmodernguerrillacampaignsarelikelytobeinspiredbybroaderpoliticalornationalistobjectivesthanthoseofanineteeth-centurylocalchieftainorrulertryingtopreservehisindependence.DeceptionhasbeenacentralthemeinChineseliteraturesinceatleastthetimeofSunTzu,anddeceptiveskillhasbeenhighlyprizedbytheChineseasaleadershipquality.MuchofMao’smilitarywritingappearstobebasedonthesetraditions,putting stress onknowledgeof oneself andone’s enemy, usingdeception to control thedynamic of a situation, to reduce costs and control risks, and the use of deception as ameans of helping the opponent to defeat himself. Mao talks of ‘luring the enemy in’,‘feintingtotheeast’and‘counter-encirclement’.

From its earliest days the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted thestandardguerrillatacticofattackinganenemyoutpostinordertoambushthereliefforce.The PLA called this tactic ch’ien niu (‘pulling a stupid cow’) and employed it on anincreasinglygrandscale.ItsmosteffectivepractitionerwaspossiblyLiuPo-Ch’eng,whocommandedtheCentralChinaFieldArmy.Liuusedthetactictogoodeffectin1946and1947torelievepressureontheEastChinaFieldArmyinsouthernShantungandnorthernKiangsu,effectivelydivertingNationalistpowerintonorthernHonan.InNovember1946Liu’s diversionary offensive against the southern Hopei cities of Shangkuan andLaoanchendreweightNationalistdivisionsinpursuit,whichwereattackedinambushandencirclement operations. The Nationalists sustained losses equivalent to a completedivision and their weapons were added to the Communist inventory. The tactic wascontinuedintothespringof1947withthesurroundingofseveralcitiesalongtheP’ing-Han (Peiping–Wuhan) railway north of Cheng-chou in Honan, and destruction of theNationalistreliefcolumnspiecemeal.

InMay, Liu was ordered to cross the Yellow River and attack south towards theYangtze.AsthemainNationalistforceswereoccupiedinManchuria,thiswouldhavetheeffectoftransformingthewarbythreateningthecommunicationstothenorthandnorth-west.Liu’scrossingoperationwascoveredbydiversionaryoperationsinwesternHonanandShantungtotiedownNationalistforcestotheeastandwestofthecrossingsites,andaddtotheambiguityofCommunistplans.Shortlybeforetheactualcrossingon30June,afeintwaslaunchedagainstnorthernHonaninthewestandthecrossingmadeagainstlightopposition.Itwas,accordingtoLiu,theclassicalstratagemof‘makingabignoiseinthe

west inorder toattack in theeast’.Liuwenton touseanothervariationof ‘pulling thecow’on14JulywhenhesurroundedthreeNationalistdivisionseastofK’aifeng,leavinganopeningthroughwhichtheytriedtoescapeandambushingthemthere.Indeed,theuseof diversion and ambushwas sowidespread throughout thePLAby1948 that it seemsremarkablehoweasilyNationalistcommandersweredrawnawayfromdecisivepositionsintofatalactions.11

PSEUDO-OPERATIONS

Maowasnottheonlypersontoappreciatethat‘thedifferencebetweenorthodoxwarsandwarsbasedon subversion [is] that the instigatorsof thecampaign relyon thepeople tooverthrowthegovernment’.12 Inanumberof instancessince theSecondWorldWar theBritishhavehadthechancetolearnallaboutthisstyleofwarfare.Asignificantfactorineach case has been the existence of a long-standing political commitment; indeed, theprimacy of civil and police authority in such campaignswasmade as early as 1934 inImperialPolicing,byMajor-GeneralSirCharlesW.Gwynn.13However,whiletherewasanapparentconsensusabouthowtoconductcounter-guerrillaoperationsfromanoverallcommandandcontrolperspective,actualorganizationandtacticsvariedwidely.

The League of Nations mandate for the administration of Palestine proved apoisonedchalice in1945,whenmanyof the Jewishdefencegroupsbegan toattack theBritish. Numerous Zionist liberation groups sprang up, many of them strengthened byexperience gained with the Special Night Squads formed during the 1930s by OrdeWingate.ThisextraordinaryBritishofficerearnedtheDSOforhisexploitsinthisperiod,havingmadeextensiveuseofdeceptionanddisguise.14TheJewishcampaigntoestablishthestateofIsraelbeganon31October1945andcontinuedforthreeyears.BeforeIsraelcame into being at midnight on 14 May 1948, 223 British servicemen had died. TheBritishmade littleuseofdeception in this campaign,but the Jewishguerrillas cameupwith a particularly effective and clever mask aimed at both the British and the Arabs.Whenevertheymountedalarge-scaleattackagainsttheArabstheyworeBritishuniformsand used British equipment and vehicles, either from stocks issued to them during theSecondWorldWar(aJewishbrigadefoughtalongsidetheBritishinItaly)orelsestoleninraidsorcaptured fromBritish servicemen.Although theArabsknew theBritishhadnoreasontoattackthem,theyweretrickedintoattackingBritishconvoys,thinkingtheywereJews in disguise.As late asFebruary 1948 a raid on aBritishArmy campnearLatrunlaunchedinBritishuniformsandvehiclesresultedinatleastfivedeathsandthecaptureoflargequantitiesofarmsandammunition.15

It was in Palestine that the British first made use of pseudo-operations, in whichregularforcesdisguisethemselvesasirregularseithertoattackanddestroythemor(moreusually) togather information inorder todirectother forces.Pseudo-operationsarebestusedasameansofgathering long-termandbackground information,which isnormallyverydifficulttoacquireinaguerrillacampaignbutessentialforattackingtheguerrillas’infrastructure.(Tacticalconsiderations–thatis,decisionsaboutwhenandwheretoattackguerrillaforces–areadifferentmatter.16)SomeoftheJewishgroupsopposingtheBritishin Palestine (such as the SternGang)were very small and allwere very tight-knit andhighly organized to the point of impenetrability. Intelligence was very scarce and the

police,unableeffectivelytocombattheuprising,werealsoresentfulofseniorpostsbeinggiven to military personnel. Colonel Bernard Fergusson, appointed Commander of thePoliceMobileForce,decidedtopursuespecialoperationsandemployedformerSASandSOEpeopleforthepurpose.However,theinabilitytospeakHebrewseverelylimitedtheirability to penetrate Jewish groups and poor security further reduced their effectiveness.Twomonths of largely fruitless operations did, however, point towards lessons for thefuture. In order to succeed, such operations require attention to the minutest detail,especially racial similarity and language proficiency. Pseudo-operations are extremelydifficult to implement in clannish communities or tribal areas and they are alsoparticularlyvulnerable tocompromise inurbanareas. Ideally,allsuchoperationsshouldinvolvepolice,serviceandintelligenceorganizations.17

MalayawasoneofthefirstterritoriesoverrunbytheJapanesein1941,aneventthathelped to shatter themyth ofEuropean superiority.During the Japanese occupation theMalayanPeople’sAnti-JapaneseArmy(MPAJA)providedthecoreofresistance,althoughits 10,000memberswere largely drawn from the significant Chinese population of thecountry.ThearmywasledbyCh’inPeng,generalsecretaryoftheMalayanCommunistParty (MCP), which fully intended to take control of the country in the wake of theJapanese departure. Speedy reoccupation by the British, however, thwarted their plans.ManyChinese formerMPAJA guerrillas, formed into ten regiments across the country,returnedtothejungle,takingwiththemtheweaponsandsuppliestheyhadcapturedfromtheJapanese.TheyenjoyedwidespreadsupportfromtheChinesepopulationifnotfromtheMalaymajority.TheMCPconsistedofamilitarywing(theMalayanRacesLiberationArmy,known to theBritishasCommunist terrorists,orCTs)andacivilwing (theMinYuen). It was initially estimated that only some 2,300 from a total of 12,500 MCPmemberswereactivelyinvolvedinmilitaryactions,atotalwhichpeakedat7,292in1951andhaddroppedto564by1960.18

In 1948, after the British had withdrawn from India, Pakistan and Burma, orderswent out to begin a campaign to force the British to leaveMalaya and to establish aCommunistregime.Itwasashadowywarfromtheverybeginning,onlyeverreferredtoby the British as an ‘emergency’. The Chinese insurgents had to try to persuade theMalaysandtheirownpopulationthattheyweregoingtowinandthattheordinarypeoplehadmuch to gain by supporting them.TheBritish had to persuade theMalays that theopposite was true and flush out the guerrillas from the jungle. This was immenselydifficult since in looking for the enemy they advertised their ownpresence.The enemyhad the advantageof experience and the concealment that the jungle afforded, andwasabletocarryoutaseriesofroadambushes.Tobeginwith,Britishcommandwasfracturedandthepolice–whoweresupposedlytheprimaryanti-guerrillaforce–lackednumbers,especially of Chinese speakers. At the same time, the military intelligence chain wasweak, with information lacking proper dissemination.19 However, once the Director ofOperations,Lieutenant-GeneralSirHaroldBriggs, introduced theplan thatsubsequentlybore his name in April 1950, fortified villages and psychological operations provedremarkablyeffectiveandeventuallygrounddowntheinsurgents.InOctober1951GeneralSirGeraldTemplerbecameHighCommissionerandalsosucceededBriggsasDirectorofOperations. He further streamlined the command and control functions (so that itultimatelytookfouryearstocreateanefficientstructure).20

GHQFarEastLandForcesadvisedtheWarOfficethat‘thereisscopefordeception,not only in the tactical sense in Malaya itself but also in the wider theatre field’.21Tactically, one of the most effective deceptions was created by the ability ofMalayanScouts(forerunnersof22ndSASRegiment)tooperateforuptotwoweeksinthejungle,laying ambushes and taking the fight to the insurgents.When resupplywas required, itwould be by stealth through porters, while very obvious air drops would be made tosuggest that operations were focused elsewhere.22 Pseudo-operations began with anexpandedSpecialBranch, but the first use of specific pseudo-operations camewith theformation of Q-Force Pahang in early 1952 under aMalaya Police lieutenant, RichardBentham‘Yorky’Dixon.

Dixon pressed for some time to be allowed to use surrendered enemy personnel(SEPs) to form a unit that would impersonate CT units for the purpose of gatheringinformation.Attheendoftheyearhehadformedtwoplatoons,buthewaskilledinactionon20December.Commandpassed toLieutenantNoelDudgeonand thescheme,whichbynowhadproveditsworth,wasexpandedtootherpartsofthecountrybeforecomingintoofficialexistenceinMay1953astheSpecialOperationalVolunteerForce(SOVF).23However, the effectiveness of the force was limited by the tightness of the Chinesecommunity and by the end of 1953 other policies were proving more successful inisolatingtheguerrillasfromtheirsupportandsupplysources.By1955,althoughthewarwas not yet over, the guerrilla infrastructure had been greatly weakened and pseudo-operationsprovedoflessvalue.

Wherepseudo-operationswereprobablymost successfulwasduring theMauMauRebellion inKenya,which tookplaceat thesame timeas theMalayanEmergency.Thecentral issuewas land rights in the ‘WhiteHighlands’, settled byEuropean farmers onland claimed by theKikuyu people.The issuewas raised byKikuyu nationalist partiesformed during the SecondWorldWar and by JomoKenyatta’s Kenyan African Union(KAU),buttherewasconsiderableAfricandistrustoftheKikuyuandtherebellionneverspreadtothewiderpopulation.24

Following a series ofmurders, a state of emergencywas declared on 21October1952.GeneralSirGeorgeErskinewasappointedCommander-in-ChiefEastAfricainMay1953and,besidesinstitutingaseriesofoperationsalongthelinesofthosebeingcarriedoutinMalaya,soughtoverallcommandofbothmilitaryandciviladministrationsuchasTempler enjoyed there.ButErskine harboured a deepmistrust of thewhite settlers andtherewasmuchmutual antipathy.His operational prioritieswere to secure the reservesandmake them safe, clear the insurgents out ofNairobi and pursue the ‘gangs’ (as theguerrilla groupswere known) into the forests. This had basically been achieved by themiddleof1954.Thereafter itwasacaseofconcentratingandbreakingupordestroyingthenowisolatedgangsintheAberdareandMountKenyareservesandforestareas.Therewere bynow some4,500 rebels in gangs ranging from just four to fivemen to severalhundred,usuallyrelyingonindividual leadershipandlackingcentralcontrol. Itwasthisisolationthatmadethemparticularlysusceptibletopseudo-operations.

Preciselywhowas responsible for initiating these is open to debate but, althoughtacticaldeceptionwasprobablytriedearlier,thecreditseemsduemainlytoFrankKitson,thenacaptainintheRifleBrigade,whoarrivedinKenyainAugust1953withnoprevious

experience of Africa or intelligence work. To improve military intelligence, Erskineappointedarmyofficers toSpecialBranchasDistrictMilitary IntelligenceOfficers,andthese in turn controlled non-commissioned officers appointed as Field IntelligenceAssistants(laterFieldIntelligenceOfficers,orFIOs).HegavepermissiontoKitson,whowasDMIO forKiambu district, to turn ex-gangsters into pseudo-gangsters afterKitsondiscoveredthatoneofhiscaptiveswasremarkablywillingtoreturnandactasaninformeronhisformercomrades.25AswiththeSOVFinMalaya,formergangmembersmadethebestcounter-gangmembers, although thisdidnotpreventKitson’senthusiasticassistantEricHolyoakfromjoining in.OnoneoccasionHolyoakand the turnedgangsterJames,whowascertainlynotshortofconfidenceinhisplayacting,gotmixedupwitharealgang.James’quickthinkingsavedtheday.JamestoldthegangthathewaspartofabodyguardforanAsianwhowasoneofthemostseniorofallMauMauleadersandthenintroducedHolyoak.‘HowonearthdidyoupassyourselfoffasaMauMauleaderfortenminutes?’KitsonlateraskedHolyoakincredulously.‘Afterall,eveniftheyswallowedthestoryofyourbeinganAsian,therearen’tmanyofthemaroundsixfoottallwithfairhairandblueeyes.’‘Idon’tsupposetheynoticedthat’,repliedHolyoak,‘becauseitwasdarkandIwaswearing a hat.’26 Holyoak later joined other gangs with a blacked-up face and passedhimselfoffasanAfrican,averyriskybusinessthatrequiredcompletefaithintheothermembersofthegroup,onwhomhewouldhavetorelytodothetalking.

InMay 1954 Kitson was faced with official hostility to his methods and it tookinterventionfromErskinetosetuptheSpecialMethodsTrainingCentreinJunetoexpandthescheme.Tobesuccessful,thecounter-gangshadtoresembletherealonesexactly,sothatlaterKitsonevenallowedwivesandgirlfriendstoaccompanygangmembers,astherealgangsdid.Kitson’semphasiswasverymuchondevelopingbackgroundinformationabout the infrastructure, while others, notably the police, used the same methods toeliminate the gangs themselves. The Kenya Regiment (formed exclusively from whitesettlers)alsoranpseudo-operations,whichKitsonfeltrantheriskofcompromise,buttheyproved highly successful and the two forces cooperated to a degree. By 1955 pseudo-operations were very well established, with offensive operations taking increasingpriority.27Theremaininggangswerenaturallysowarythatonlyextremelysophisticatedcounter-gangs could succeed and Erskine’s successor, Lieutenant-General Sir GeraldLathbury, relied principally on Superintendent Ian Henderson of Special Branch (aKenyanwhospokefluentKikuyu)inhiseffortstosubduethelastpocketsofresistanceintheAberdares.TheArmywithdrewfromoperationsinmid-November1956,leavingthepoliceincharge,andtheEmergencyofficiallyendedinJanuary1960.

Innoothercampaignhavepseudo-operationsprovedsosuccessful,largelybecausecommunications had broken down within the Mau Mau organization. It was the righttactic at the right time, incorporated by Erskine into the overall strategy.28 During theRhodesian War of Independence, which began in 1966, the government also madewidespreaduseofpseudo-operations.TheSelousScoutswereformedspecificallyforthistask, which they carried out between 1973 and 1976. Thereafter, a breakdown in theintelligence process led to their employment principally on external raids, a significantchangeofrole.29

DuringtheCyprusEmergency(1959–64)andinAden(1964–7)pseudo-operations

were attempted with little success. In both cases the guerrillas were tightly knit andclannish, which made penetration very difficult.30 In Aden the SAS used Fijians andothersofsimilarappearancedisguisedaslocalArabsin‘keenimeeni’operations(thenamecomesfromaSwahilitermdescribingtheunnoticeablewindingofasnakeinlonggrass,aeuphemism for undercover work).31 Some infantry units also adopted such tactics: therecce platoon of 3rd Bn, Royal Anglian Regiment, formed a ten-man group that wasresponsible for capturing fourteen guerrillas including the second-in-command of theFront for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen.32 However, in overall terms theseoperationsachievedlittle,becauseofthelackofturnedArabsandArabicspeakersandthegovernment’sdecisiontowithdrawregardlessofthecircumstances.33

VIETNAM

Moderntechniquessuchaselectronicwarfarehaveaparttoplayinguerrillacampaigns.The innocent-sounding Bureau d’Etudes et de Liaisons (BEL) monitored radiotransmissionsoftherebelsduringthelatterstagesoftheAlgerianWarofIndependence.In1959thesuccessortoHouariBoumedienne,inchargeofWilaya5(districtofOranie),was identifiedasacolonel calledLotfi, andhisprecise route fromMorocco tohisnewheadquartersinwesternAlgeriawasplottedbytheFrench.Hispartywasthenambushedand destroyed, but before this could be reported to theArmée de LibérationNationale(ALN) command in Morocco a false ‘Colonel Lotfi’ was reporting over the capturedtransmitter.Forseveralmonthshecalledrepeatedlyforreinforcements,armsandmoney,allofwhichwereambushedand takenby theFrench; theoperationalso soweddistrustbetweenthefightersoftheinteriorandtheircommandersontheoutside.34

Many French soldierswho served inAlgeria had previous experience of guerrillawarfare fromVietnam, which the French abandoned following the disastrous Battle ofDien Bien Phu in 1954. When the US Army found itself embroiled in Vietnam soonafterwards, its reaction to the threat of revolutionary warfare relied largely ontechnological superiority.Still fresh in itsmemorywas the legacyofKorea,whereUNtroops spent almost two and a half years entrenched on hilltop positions in all-rounddefence, relying on superior firepower to deal with mass assaults. This was in itself aproduct of the SecondWorldWar: Americanminor tactical skills were poor comparedwiththoseoftheGermans,andinboththeEuropeanandPacifictheatrestheAmericansusedoverwhelmingmaterialpowertocrushoppositionandreducecasualties.GiventhattheUSArmyexpanded in fouryears fromlittlemore than120,000men toaround12½million, lavishlyequippedandsuppliedwithevery itemthenation’scolossalproductioncapacitycouldprovide,thiswashardlysurprising.However,therewasalreadyatendencytodisparagestealth,subterfugeandsubtlety.

Vietnam was not America’s first involvement with guerrilla campaigns. In thePhilippines(1901),Haiti(1915–34)andagaininthePhilippinesduringtheHukRebellion(1946–55) US forces were involved directly or in an advisory role. During the HukRebellionAmericaprovidedmilitaryadvicewhichhelpedtheFilipinosconductahighlysuccessfulcounter-insurgencycampaign.35Thecampaignwasamodelexamplefromthemilitarypointofviewbut, theUSmilitaryfailedtodrawonit inVietnam,eventhoughtheirinvolvementtherebeganalmostdirectlyaftertheendofHuk.36

In Vietnam a plethora of military, governmental and private bureaucracies andagenciesworkedwithlittleornoco-ordinationorco-operation.UnlikeinthePhilippines,where local forceswereorganizedandtrained tofightagainstguerrillas, inVietnamtheUSmilitary sought to impose a conventional structure on theArmyof theRepublic ofVietnam(ARVN).37ThiswasbecausethethreatwasperceivedasbeingsimilartothatinKorea of an invasion by conventional forces from the north across the De-MilitarizedZone (DMZ). Furthermore, although the war developed along unconventional lines,Americanparticipationwaswhollydominated,accordingtoAndrewKrepinevich,bythe‘ArmyConcept’ofwar,whichtotallylacked

emphasis on light infantry formations, not heavy divisions; on firepower restraints, not widespreadapplication;ontheresolutionofpoliticalandsocialproblemswithinthenationtargetedbyinsurgents,notclosingwithanddestroyingfieldforces.38

WhenSpecialForcesandotheradvisersbecame involved theyweremore realisticabouthowtoapproachguerrillawarfare.In1962theSpecialWarfareDivisionpublishedtheCounter-InsurgencyOperationsHandbook,whichincludedpseudo-operationsamongits tactical methods. However, these were to operate as ‘hunter–killer’ groups to ‘huntdownanddestroyelementsoflocalguerrillaterroristarmedbands’ratherthanlong-terminformationgathering.39Besides, the tacticsandstructureproposedwereneveracceptedbytheArmyasawholesince itdidnotcoincidewith the‘ArmyConcept’. Instead, theArmy reliedoncordonandsearch typeoperationsand theapplicationofoverwhelmingfirepower.

TheUSMarineCorpswaslesshideboundandhadalonghistoryofunconventionaloperations.However,afterthedeploymentofUSgroundforcesin1965theMarines’areaof responsibility was I Corps adjacent to the DMZ, where they were most likely toencounter North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in comparatively conventionalcircumstances. Nevertheless, they did institute a number of ‘Greek’ projects (DELTA,OMEGAandSIGMA)involvinglong-rangereconnaissancepatrolstotheborderswithLaos,Cambodia andNorthVietnam.Theseused ‘Roadrunner’ teamsdressedandequipped toresembleVietcongtofollowthetrailsandgatherinformation.40However,theperiodwhentheHoChiMinhTrailwasworking at optimum efficiency in 1970 coincidedwith thescalingdownofUSinvolvement,andProjectDELTAwaswoundupon31July.41Besides,effortsbytheMarinestousemoresubtleandappropriatetacticsinpursuitofpacificationranfoulof thecommanderofUSforcesinVietnam,GeneralWilliamC.Westmoreland,who ordered them to take a more aggressive stance.42 The Marines tried to keep thepacification strategy going and this led to the development of the Combined ActionsPlatoonconceptandtheKitCarsonScouts,whooftendressedasVietcongandprecededMarinepatrols.However, suchdeceptionswereonlyeverused tacticallyandonadhocbasis.43

InVietnamtheBeachJumpersweremoreinvolvedwithPsyopsthanwithdeception.Theircommander,Lieutenant-CommanderCharlesR.Witherspoon,laterrecalledthat

battlefieldcommanderswerereluctanttouseorcondonedeceptionofamorebizarrenatureiftheycouldnotseeanimmediateadvantageofsuchanaction.Deceptivetacticssuchassimulatingorhidinglarge-scale forcemovements were proposed but then rejected because of the extreme physical difficulty ofimplementationunderexistingcircumstances,e.g.harshterrain.

Athighercommandlevelseffortstoformulatebroaddeceptionstrategywerehamperedbythelackofaunifiedcommandstructureandpoliticalfactors; thesewereexacerbatedbytheconstantrotationofpersonnel,whichcontributedtoageneral lackof theknowledgeandco-ordinationnecessaryforsophisticateddeceptions.44

TherotationofpersonnelprovedtobeaserioushandicaptotheperformanceofUSforces in Vietnam. Writing with hindsight, one American officer commented that hiscountrydidnotacquire tenyearsexperiencebut ‘oneyear’sexperience ten times’.45Atthe same time a further pernicious influence was increasingly apparent. From thebeginningofthegreatexpansionoftheUSArmy,thesupportarmsandtechnicalservicestookthebestrecruits,andtheinfantrywasregardedaslittlemorethanarepositoryforthedross.Fewwanted to join the infantry,especially the typeof recruitwhowouldmakeagoodjuniorleader–theessentialrequirementinunconventionalwarfare.Withaninfantryforcelackingthemotivation, trainingor initiativefor theclose-quarterworkinvolvedinfightinganelusiveenemy,andwithaHighCommandwhosefaithinfirepowerhadthusfarbeenrepaid,theconceptof‘firebases’wasestablished.Theenemywouldbecrushedwithanoverwhelmingweightofmetal,highexplosiveandpetroleumjelly.TheB-52(astrategic bomber), the DC-3 Dakota armed with Gatling guns and the ubiquitoushelicoptergunshipalltookleadingroles.Deception,alreadyaforgottenart,wasviewedasunderhandandun-American.Americans,‘raisedinaculturewhichseeksdirectsolutionstoproblemsandwhichhungersafterrectilinearformsinwork,inplayandinbattles,’sawdeceptionasjustanother‘commie’trick.46Anotableexceptionwas4thBn,39thInfantry,whichin1969employeda‘specialactionforce’oftwelve‘Vietnamese-sized’Americansand sixVietnamese scouts (whowere all formerVietcong)wearing black pyjamas andequippedwithAK-47sandothercapturedequipment,forcovertanddeceptionoperations.Butthiswasveryunusual.47Thus,althoughsomeUSforcesusedminortacticaldeceptionto a modest degree, Military Assistance Command Vietnam failed to develop or co-ordinateit.TheVietnamese,bycontrast,usedittodevastatingeffect,bothtacticallyandattheoperationallevel.

Afavourite tacticwas toambushasmallSouthVietnameseorUSunit inorder tolure larger relief forces into a bigger ambush.A typical example came on 21 February1966. TheVietcong ambushed a district chief on a road north of Plan Thiet. The 88thRegionalForceBattalionrushedtothesceneandwasalsoambushed.ThreebattalionsoftheregularSouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN)weresenttodealwiththeincidentandthistimechosetoapproachfromadifferentdirection.Theywereabletocatch602ndVietcongBattalionpreparingamassiveambushandforcethemtowithdraw.Althoughgovernmentforces eventually did learn to deal with this threat, they seldom took the initiativethemselves.48

Therehasbeenmuchdiscussionaboutdeceptionwithinthesoul-searchingthathasaccompaniedAmerican involvement inVietnam,and inparticularabout theCommunistuseof it on thepolitical front.AmajorweaknessofAmericanpolicywas its failure torecognizethesynthesisofallefforts,includingpoliticalones,bytheirenemy.Althoughinguerrillawarfarethemilitarycannotbeseparatedfromthepolitical,theAmericanmilitarytried to do precisely this, most importantly in the field of intelligence.49 Both sidesrecognizedthedoubtsthatlurkedunderthesurfaceofAmericanpublicopinionandsaw

themas constituting theWest’sAchillesheel.Between1965and1967 theCommunistssucceededinportrayingtheNationalLiberationFrontasan independentand indigenoussouthern political entity with a policy of its own, fighting for the cause of freedom,independenceandjustice,andthiscoincidedwiththeindependentjudgementsofthoseinthe West who blamed the war on President Diem and knew the shortcomings of hisregime. The combined effectwas erosion of domestic and international support for thepolicyoftheUSinVietnam,becausethelegitimacyofthepolicywasdoubtful.50

TheincreasingUSinvolvementcouldhardlyhavebeenexpectedtogenerateanylessinterest than it did, certainly considering the increasing American casualties sufferedduring 1967. However, the influx of men and material had severely weakened theCommunists and during the summer of that year there was considerable debate in theNorthastohowtoproceed.Thedebatewaseventuallywonbythehawks,ledbyGeneralVoNguyenGiap,whoproposedaspectacularall-outoffensivethroughoutSouthVietnamusingeveryavailableVietcongandNVAasset,whichhehopedwouldprovokethelonged-for general uprising of the South’s oppressedmasses. This presented a nasty dilemma:how to issue an order for such an assault and yet preserve the security necessary toachievesurprise,withoutwhichsuchanoffensivewasdoomed.Thedeceptionplan thatresultedcleverlytookintoaccountwhattheUSAexpectedandindeedactuallywantedtohappen, combinedwith amixture of contradictory signals reinforcing knownAmericanprejudicesinablendofwhattheNorthtermedpassiveandactivemeasures.

Supplyingthecadresinthecitieswouldtaketime.WeaponshadtobebroughtdowntheHoChiMinhTrailandsmuggledintothecitiesbyagents,oftenwomenandchildren,usingmanydifferent ruses: concealedunder loadsofproduce, forexample,or inbogusfuneralprocessions.Passivemeasuresinthediplomaticandpoliticalsphereweredesignedtosuggestmovestowardsasettlementduring1968.InOctober1967itwasmadeknownthattheVietcongwouldobserveawholeweekofceasefireduringtheTetFestival,whichbegan on 31 January. The decision to attack at Tet was a controversial one but Giapreasoneditwouldprovideperfectcover,andbesidestherewasaprecedent:similarattackshadbeenmadeagainsttheChinesein1789.51Althoughitwasalongtruce,giventhatoneof some sort had been observed every year for twenty years, it was expected andwelcomed by theAllies. Significantly,US analysts regarded it as a sign ofCommunistweakness andan indication thatvictorywasnear: theyexpected (andhoped) to see theNorthputtingout feelers forpeace.WhenaVietcongagentwascapturedby theARVNandsaidthathehadbeensent toopenachannelfornegotiationswiththeAmericanstodiscussmatterssuchasprisonersofwar,USauthoritiestriedtoforcesomeofhisdemandsonearlyreleaseofVietcongprisonersonareluctantSouthVietnamesegovernment.Thisplayedon theneo-colonialist fault line that theNorthperceivedas aweaknessbetweentheirenemiesandalsoservedtoraiseAmericanhopes.Thestrategywasfurtherreinforcedby theNorth’s foreignministerofferingsubstantivepeace talks if theAmericansceasedbombingthem.

AtthesametimeGiaptookactivemilitarymeasures.HeplannedtodrawAmericanattentionawayfromthegeneraluprisingbyofferingtwoalternatives,bothneartheborderand therefore a long way from the true targets in the heavily populated areas aroundlogisticsbases.AnattackwaslaunchedatDakToon4November1967thatlasteduntiltheendofthemonth,andanotherwasplannedtobeginagainstthebaseatKheSanhten

daysbeforethemainoffensive.52Nevertheless,therewereampleindicationsofwhatwasimpending if only thesewerenoted. Inevitably reports reached the earsofUSofficials,and a press release was even issued on 5 January 1968 regarding some captureddocumentswhichstatedclearly that thePeople’sArmywas to ‘useverystrongmilitaryattacksinco-ordinationwiththeuprisingsofthelocalpopulationtotakeoverthetownsandcities’.Unfortunately,fewifanybelievedthethreatwasgenuine.Onereporterpickedup a copy of the press release andwrote a single comment beside the translated attackorder:‘Moonshine’.53Andhewasfarfrombeingtheonlysceptic.Americanofficerswerecertain (and were ultimately proved correct) that the Communists were incapable ofseizing andholding themajor cities.Alas, capabilities do not necessarily coincidewithintentions, and the very boldness of the planmade it seem incredible. Besides, if suchreports were true it would seriously upset the routine and climate of comfort andconveniencethathadexistedhitherto.Inaddition,thefactthattheplanmadeamockeryofall the reportsof impendingsuccessmeant that itwasdismissedbystronglyentrenchedinterests,notablypoliticalones,ontheAmericanside.Infact,theUSintelligencesystemwassofracturedandbesetwithinfightingthattheCommunistshardlyneededadeceptionplan.AssomeembitteredUSintelligenceofficersputit:

TheNVAwouldhavedonebetternottohavetriedtoattacktheUSMilitaryHeadquartersinSaigononthe night of Tet; success would only have ended the existing confusion within the ranks of the USCommandinVietnam.54

TheattackonKheSanhwashighly significant as adiversion from the impendingoffensive.Anattackofsomesortwasexpected,probablyagainstanisolatedgarrisonandaiming for a decisive victory along the lines of Dien Bien Phu; all the indications,therefore,werethattheattackonKheSanhwasthebigone.ItpromptedWestmorelandtoissueawarningthat‘attemptswouldbemadeelsewhereinSouthVietnamtodivertanddisperseUSstrengthawayfromtherealattack…atKheSanh.’Yettherecontinuedtobeample indicators that something farmore ambitiouswas afoot.When the Tet ceasefirecame into force on 29 January, it was compromised by a number of cadres attackingprematurely, which might have severely threatened its chances of success. Some localmeasures were taken that helped to blunt the effect of the attack when it came, butgenerally warnings were issued too late or were not fully heeded. When it came, theoffensiveachieveddevastatingsurprise.55

OverhalfamillionAmericantroopsweremorethansufficienttoseeitoffbutgiventhatboththeAmericanmilitaryandgovernmenthadbeenassuringthepublicthatthewarwasallbutwoninlate1967,thepublicreactiontoTet,particularlytothesmallincursionby fewer than twenty Vietcong guerrillas into the American embassy in Saigon, couldhardlybeblamedonCommunistpropaganda.ThatTetwasaresoundingmilitarydefeatfor the Communists could in no way make up for the US military’s loss of preciouscredibilitywiththeAmericanpublic.ItmaynothavebeenquitewhatGiapandtheNorthVietnameseintended,buttheresultwasthestrategicdefeatoftheworld’smostpowerfulnation.

NORTHERNIRELANDInNorthern Irelandmanydeceptionshavebeenpractisedbyboth terroristsandsecurityforces.AlthoughthetroublesstartedinAugust1969,itwasnotuntil5February1971that

thefirstBritishsoldierwaskilled.Thefollowingmonththreeoff-dutysoldiers,includingtwobrothers(JohnandJosephMcCaig,agedseventeenandeighteen)weredrinkinginabar inBelfastwhen theymet three IRAmen, including PaddyMcAdorey, a prominentmember of the organization. One of the IRA men had served in the British Army soconversationwaseasy,andaftergoingtoanotherpubitwassuggestedthat theygotoapartytofindsomegirls.Crammedintocars,thegroupheadedwestthroughthecityupthehilltowardsLigoniel.Atadesertedstretchoftheroadtheystoppedandthethreesoldiersclimbedouttorelievethemselves.Astheydidso,theywereshotinthebackofthehead.Thebrotherswere foundslumpedovereachotherand their friendDouglasMcCaugheywasstillclutchinghisbeerglass.Itwasthebeginningofarapidspiralintofull-blownandmercilessviolence.WidespreadrevulsionatthenatureofthekillingsledtheIRAtoissueadenialbutitwasnotlongbeforetheytriedthetacticagain.InMarch1973fourNCOswerepersuadedbysomegirlstogotoa‘party’intheAntrimRoad,wherethreewereshotdeadandthefourthseriouslywounded.56

From the beginning it was difficult for the security forces to gain accurateinformationfromthe tight-knitandhighly localizedRepublicancommunities,especiallyastherewasmutualdistrustbetweentheArmyandtheRoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC).In December 1970 Frank Kitson, now a brigadier, was commanding 39th Brigade inBelfast.The followingspring, inconjunctionwith theCommanderLandForces,Major-General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, he set up the Mobile Reaction Force (MRF).Although its role has subsequently been sensationalized, the purpose of this unit waslimitedtosurveillanceandinformationgathering,usuallybytwo-orthree-manteamsinsuitablybattered carswhoobservedpotential bomb targets andphotographed suspected‘players’,asIRAmenwereknown.57

After Kitson’s departure in April 1972 the MRF became associated with moreunorthodoxdeceptions.WhenGeneralSirFrankKingtookovercommandoftheBritishArmyinNorthernIreland,hedecidedtoconcentrateonBelfast.Hebelievedinprovidingthesoldiersonthegroundwithdetailedintelligenceaboutthedailylivesandhabitsoftheplayersandunderstoodtheneedtoconcentrateongatheringinformation,howevertrivial,abouttheirroutinesandactivities.Muchofthesurveillancecontinuedtobecarriedonbyplainclothessoldiersincars,butotheroperationsinvolvedestablishingobservationpostsin attics, running phoney businesses (including a massage parlour)and sending womensoldiers around as door-to-door cosmetics saleswomen. One of the most ambitiousoperations was the Four Square Laundry. This allowed soldiers not only to observeCatholicareascloselybutalsotocollectdirtyclothesandlookfortracesoffirearmsandexplosives, as well as following the movements of IRA members. Many of theseoperationshadbeencompromisedbyOctober1972,but itwas thecourtproceedings inFebruaryandJune1973resultingfromashootingincidenton22June1972thatblewtheMRF’s cover. The force was subsequently transformed into the 14th IntelligenceCompany,however,andprovedveryeffective.58

Meanwhile the Army information service set about deliberately disrupting IRAmorale and trying to break up its internal cohesion by releasing false information. Itfrequentlyannounced,forexample,thatanarresthadbeenmadeonthebasisofatip-offfrom an informer when this was not the case. Such announcements led to a spate of

punishmentshootingsastheProvosdealtouttheirroughjustice.TheintroductionoftrialwithoutjuryandareductionoftheburdenofproofmeantthatIRAmemberswereunderincreasingthreatofimprisonment.BetweenApril1973andApril1974,1,292peoplewerechargedwithterroristoffences.59Ahard-hittingreportbyAmnestyInternationalin1978describedhoweasyitwasforthesecurityforcestoobtainconvictionsbyextractingfalseconfessions. In this atmosphere there was enormous pressure to turn informer, eventhoughdiscoverymeantalmostcertainbrutaldeathatthehandsoftheterrorists.

In May 1974 two such young men, Vincent Heatherington (aged eighteen) andMyles Vincent McGrogan (nineteen) were arrested separately along with three otheryouthsinconnectionwiththemurderoftwopolicemen.Theotherswerereleasedwithoutcharge but Heatherington andMcGrogan were sent on remand to Crumlin RoadGaol,where theywere offered the choice of being held in the IRAwing or the non-politicalwing.Theychose theIRAwing,but theIRAcommanderwassuspiciousand theywereinterrogated.HeatheringtonsoonadmittedthathehadbeentoldtoentertheIRAwingoftheprisonbyBritishplainclothessoldiersafterbeingthreatenedwithbeinglinkedtothemurderofthepolicemen.Soonafter,thetwoyouthsweremovedfromCrumlinandweretried, andacquitted,of charges relating to themurdersof thepolicemen.Although theydisappearedoncemore,theyweretrackeddownbytheIRAandshot.

The incident led to a witch-hunt among IRA prisoners, involving interrogationmethods such as pianowire and electric current,which forced some to admit to beingturncoatswhen theywere not. The resultwas a killing spree that lasted for a year andclaimed a number of prominent Belfast Republicans. Only much later did the IRAdiscover that Heatherington had not broken under pressure, but had released‘programmed’informationdesignedtotearthemapartfromwithin.OneRepublicanlateradmitted:

ItwasverymuchinthemouldoftheMRFoperations,onlybetterplannedanditmustbesaid,brilliantlyexecuted. It created paranoia in the ranks and the IRA found it difficult to admit thatBritishMilitaryIntelligencewassogood.Italmostdestroyedus.60

12

TheFutureofDeception‘Wemustbereadytoemploytrickery,deceit…withholdingandconcealingthetruth.’

V.I.Lenin

‘IconsideritessentialthattheUSforcesshouldcontinuetotakethosestepsnecessarytokeepalivetheartsof…coveranddeception.’

DwightD.Eisenhower

MEDIAOPERATIONS

SUCCESSFULMEDIAOPERATIONS,likePsyops,dealintruth,andwouldseemtohavelittleincommon with deception. Nevertheless, information management is an increasinglycomplex business and public information officers, detailed to liaise with and assist thepress,performaveryimportantstafffunction.Freedomofthepressisfundamentallyfartooimportantevertojustifyimposingmilitarycontrols,andNATOforceshavelearnedtoimplement media policies accordingly. While they aim to be as helpful as reasonablypossible, their operationsmust naturally be co-ordinatedwith the rest of the staff sincetheycannotaffordtogiveawayvitalinformationaboutforthcomingoperations,whetherrealordeceptive.

It is also important to distinguish between Psyops, which deal with forces,populations or groups byworking beyond the establishedmedia, andmedia operations,whichdealwiththeplethoraofprintandbroadcastjournaliststhatattendanyconflict.Inthe age of global communications, media operations – dealings with independenttelevisionandnewsorganizations–areincreasinglyregardedbyWesternarmedforcesasvital. The media played a crucial part in the American defeat in Vietnam, where theCommunistsappeartohaveappreciateditsimportanceveryearlyonandexploiteditveryeffectively;ithasevenbeenallegedthatthemediaactuallylostthewarforAmerica.Suchsimplisticexaggerationisnothelpful,however.Thepresscannotbeblamedforclaimsbythegovernment andmilitaryduring1967 that thewarwasallbutwon, and it thereforecannotreasonablybeblamedfor thesubsequentsurpriseandshockthatTetproducedintheAmericanpopulation.

Nevertheless, there is a tendency towards ‘spin’ that sometimes appears to comefrompoliticalmotivationsratherthanstrictlymilitaryones.In1999NATObombedatrainthatwascrossingabridgeatGurduliceinSerbia.Thebridgewastherealtargetanditwasa tragic episode, yet the film thatNATO showed of the incidentwas not quitewhat itseemed.Itshowedthetraincomingrapidlyintoviewandintothebombsight,tooquicklyfor the pilot to abort; but for an electric commuter train it seemed to bemoving ratherquickly. In fact, the film had been speeded up but the reporters took it at face value.1However, such a story does NATO far more harm than might have arisen from theadmission of a mistake. The British government, worried by adverse reaction to thebombing,haddispatcheditsownchiefspindoctor,AlastairCampbell,toadviseNATOonmediaoperations. Itcouldbe that thiswasanexampleofhishandiwork,butwhether itemanatedfromamilitaryspokesmanoracivilian,theresultwasthatNATO’scredibility

was affected. The increasing intrusion of politics intomilitary affairs is something thatseniormilitarycommandersmustconsider.

Thisisanewdevelopment.AsrecentlyattheFalklandsConflict,althoughtelevisioncamerasaccompaniedtheTaskForce,theMinistryofDefencewasabletoexertastrongelement of control on everything the media did, because the islands were so isolated.When deception was employed, it was only as an afterthought, and according to oneparticipantitwaslargely‘schoolboystuff’.2TheArgentinesmadedummycratersoutofearth and stones to give the impression that attempts by the RAF to put Port Stanleyairfieldoutofactionweremore successful than theywere. In fact, theArgentineswereabletousetheairfieldbydayandnightuntilthetimeoftheirsurrender.3Justnineyearslater,however,averydifferentwarwasfoughtinthefullglareofaglobalmedianowintherealmofinstantsatellitetelevisionbroadcasts.Thepubliccouldwatchtheanti-aircrafttracerarcingacrosstheBaghdadskylineasithappened.TheCoalitionshowedfootageofprecisionattacksonpinpoint targets,andfully in thefaceof thecamerasanoperationaldeceptiononascalenotseenfornearlyfiftyyearswascreated.

THEGULFWAR,1991After their invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 the Iraqis deployed their forces so thatthosedefendingKuwaitwouldalsoformtheforwarddefenceofIraq.Thekeypositionswere Kuwait City and Basra; the Iraqis assumed no attack could bemade through thedesert interior, since the major roads were near to the coast and because the interiorpossessedsomeverydifficultterrain,includingrockyandsandyareasalmostimpassabletovehicles.They thereforeconcentrated theirdefences in three lines:on thecoast road,thedirectroutebetweenSaudiArabiancitiesandKuwait;onthebendintheborderwithKuwait;andalongtheroadparalleltotheIraqipipelinetoSaudiArabia,westoftheWadiAlBatin,whichformedthemostdirectroutetoBasrafromtheSaudiArmybaseatKingKhalidMilitaryCity.TherecentwarwithIranhadledtheIraqistobelievethatairpowerwaslargelyineffectiveinsupportofgroundoperationsandwasimportantonlyasa‘forceinbeing’,heldasastrategiccounterweight to threaten theenemy,andofnovalueonceaircraftwerelostinaction.Theysawthemostimportantfactorasmassivegroundforces,particularlyifplacedindensefortificationswithstrongartillerysupportforthebreakingup of enemy attacks. They therefore tried to replicate the defensive network that hadprovedeffectiveagainsttheIranianinfantryduringtheIran–IraqWar.

This overlooked the real differences in capability possessed by theCoalition. TheIraqiHighCommandbelievedtheCoalitionwould take thedirect route towardsKuwaitCityandBasra,sothedefencewaslayeredalongtheSaudiborderandthecoastwithaninfantry‘crust’andarmouredunits in reserve,while increasinglybetter formationsweredeployedfurthernorth,culminatingintheRepublicanGuard.Massivefirepowercouldbebroughttobearandtherewasathickobstaclebelt(thistacticwasbasedlargelyonSovietdoctrine) running from the coast to the Wadi Al Batin. From the start the IraqicommandershadassumedthattherewouldbeanamphibiouslandingfromtheGulfintoKuwait.Byaprocessofeliminationtheyconcludedthatthiswouldmostlikelycometothenorth-eastofKuwaitCity,whenceitwouldbepossibletogetaccesstothenorth–southhighway toBasraand tocut the IraqiArmy inhalf.4Even thedefenceof thecity itselfpresumedthatthemainattackwouldcomefromthesea.Buildingsfacingtheshorewere

evacuatedandturnedintofightingpositionsandthetrenchlineextendedthroughout thecityalongthebeach.Intotal,fourarmoureddivisionsandseveninfantrydivisionswerealignedtocoverthisthreatfromthesea.5

Against an enemy geared to fast-movingwarfare and enjoying air supremacy, theIraqi forceswere alwaysgoing to find it hard to control thedirectionand tempoof thebattle.TheseproblemswerecompoundedbytheIraqiplan,whichwasheavilyweightedto the east, leaving the west vulnerable. There was no proper intelligence operation toassesstheCoalition’slikelystrategy–thesurveillanceaircraftusedinthewarwithIranwere too vulnerable – only somemonitoring of commercial broadcasts and occasionalpatrols,andthisrenderedtheIraqisaneasytargetfordeception.MostIraqisoldiershadlittleideaofwheretheirownforceswere,nevermindthoseoftheenemy.6Commandingthe Coalition during the subsequent Operation DESERT STORM, General H. NormanSchwarzkopf, convinced that newspaper and television reports had become Iraq’s bestsourceof intelligence, imposedstrictsecuritymeasuresonhisownside.Later,whenanissue ofNewsweek appeared to show his flanking plan in precise detail, Schwarzkopfcalled the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to complain.‘Don’toverreact’,advisedPowell,‘thatmagazinehasbeenonthenew-standsforaweek.Othermagazinesarefullofmapsshowingotherbattleplans.They’realljustspeculating.’Schwarzkopf was relieved to see that Powell was right and there was no subsequentchangeinIraqidispositions.7

TheCoalitionmeanwhilehadconsiderableintelligenceaboutIraqidispositions,andas theairandPsyopscampaignsprogressed,so the largenumbersofdefectorsprovidedfurtherevidenceofbothIraqiplanningandtheconditionoftheirtroops.Quiteapartfromthe leaflets urging defection, the accuracy of the bombing and the ability to destroyhardwareprovidedapowerfulpsychologicalweapon.OverChristmas,SchwarzkopfandhisstaffwatchedvideotapesoftheKenBurnsfilmTheCivilWar,whichservedtobringhometothemthemagnitudeofthetaskahead.ItrenewedSchwarzkopf’sdeterminationtodoeverythingpossible tominimize the lossof life.8Hecalledhissubsequentdeceptionplan the ‘HailMary Play’, and it involved going around the Iraqi defences rather thanthroughthem.

TheUSMarineCorpswoulddemonstrateas if tomakea landingalong thecoast,whileXVIIIandVIICorpswould redeploy fromnear thecoast topositionswell to thewest, fromwhichtheywouldsweeparoundthebackof theIraqidefenceline.Positionswould be held for as long as possible before making this manœuvre, and dummyheadquarterswouldremaintocreateelectronicsignaturesintheoldlocations.Atthesametime,inpressbriefings,massedassaultsandbreachingtacticsweredescribed,andasubtlespin imparted that implied a direct attack combined with amphibious operations insupport.Meanwhile,Psyopsmaterialsbeingused included leafletsshowingUSMarinessurfing onto the beaches with helicopter and naval support, highlighting the realcapabilitieswithoutcomprisinggenuineintentions.

On16January1991allCoalitiongroundforceswerearrayedeastofalinerunningthrough Hafr Al Batin to the Saudi–Iraqi–Kuwaiti tri-border junction, squeezing themcloselytogether.ThefirsttaskoftheaircampaignwastoneutralizetheIraqiairforceanddeny it the ability to see what the Coalition was doing. Covered by massive air and

artilleryattacks,USMCformationsswappedplaceswithSaudiandKuwaitiforcesintheeast andVIICorpsmoved to the end of the SaddamLine,whileXVIII Corpsmade amassivemovewestwards,coveringanaveragedistanceof360miles.Toensureitwasnotdetected, it was held south of the Tapline Road and, since it was feared that nomadicBedouinmightcompromisethesecurityofthismanœuvre,Saudiunitsweresentinfirsttoclearasmanyfromtheareaaspossible.

TheVIICorpsmovedanaverageof140milestoitsleft,leavingaconspicuousgapbetween it andXVIIICorps inorder to suggest that thiswas theendof the line.Manyelementswereheldbackuntilshortlybeforethegroundinvasionopened.Anammunitiondump covering forty square miles was created, but the setting up of two other largelogisticbaseswasdeferreduntilIraqiairreccehadbeenneutralized.TheXVIIICorpsleftahundred-mandeceptioncell ineasternSaudiArabia touseinflatabledecoysandradiomeasures.9ThelargearmouredVIICorpswaiteduntil16Februarytocommenceitsmoveandalsoleftbehindadeceptioncell,whichcreatedacompletedecoymilitarybasesouthof Wadi Al Batin with mock missiles, fuel dumps, radio traffic, Hawk missile radarsignals,andvehiclesusingmulti-spectraldecoystomakeitharderfortheIraqistoseethatallofVIICorpswasmovingwestwards.10

Between 17 January and 17February theCoalitionmoved over 100,000men and1,200 tanks as well as thousands of other vehicles, an enormous logistical effort.Schwarzkopfwanted sufficient food, ammunition, spares and other supplies to last thisforceforsixtydays,whichrequiredtheconstructionofthreevastdepotsandatorrentoftraffic(one truckpassinganygivenpointalongthe two-laneTaplineRoadeveryfifteenseconds). This could only be achieved with total control of the air, although the aircampaign’s focus remained Kuwait and the area to the immediate west (which furthersustained the deception plan). Similarly, skirmishingwasmaintained along theKuwaitiborderandjustwestofKuwaitcounter-reconnaissanceraidswerecarriedoutbyelementsof the US 1st Cavalry and 1st Infantry Divisions after 9 February. Further deceptiverelocationsoccurredafterthispointwhen1stUSMCDivision,whichhadpreviouslybeendeployedoppositetheAlWafraoilfields,movedrapidlytoapositionoppositethebendintheKuwaiti border and 2ndUSMCDivision,which had been stationed east of the 1st,movedtonewpositionsfurtherwest.

The1st(UK)ArmouredDivisionwasregardedasakeysignatureformation,whoseposition would give the Iraqis a clear indication of the direction of the main effort.Seventh Armoured Brigade and later 4th Armoured Brigade were originally undercommandoftheMarineExpeditionaryForce(MEF)USMC,andwasalsotomovewestalong the Tapline Road. The Iraqi Army had fourteen electronic warfare battalions, ofwhichninewerebelieveddeployedintheKuwaittheatre.ThereforetheFleetElectronicWarfareSupportGroup(FEWSG,theRoyalNavy’scommunicationssecuritymonitoringteam), recorded radio transmissions from Sherpa vans, and when the division movedwestwards, a group call RHINO Force comprising half a dozenmatelots and transmitterequipmentborrowed from theBritishForcesBroadcastingService (BFBS), remained inplace to rebroadcast the exercise traffic that had been generated. At the same time theresubordination of 1st (UK) Armoured Division from theMarines to VII Corps on 26Januarywasnotmadepublic,andatelevisionreportshowed26thFieldRegiment,RoyalArtillery, trainingona rangeby the sea,without stating that the regimenthadonly just

arrivedandwouldbemovingtojointherestofthedivisionalmostimmediately.

TheamphibiousdeceptionhadbegunasearlyasAugust1990,when2,500Marinessailed for the Mediterranean on the amphibious assault ship USS Inchon. Meanwhile,elements fromDiegoGarcia,Guam and theAtlanticwere directed towards the PersianGulf. In mid-August the Pentagon announced the dispatch of a 15,000-man MarineExpeditionary Brigade (MEB) aboard some thirteen ships, and this force henceforthreceived prominent press coverage. By mid-January the total Marine deployment wasaround17,000menfromtwoMEBsandtwoAmphibiousTaskGroups.11On17Januarythe Coalition announced publicly that air attacks would begin to soften up the coastdefences, and on the 25th that the current amphibious exerciseswere the largest ‘sinceKorea’.Onthe28thanattackonIraqiwarshipsinKuwaitiwaterswasmade,ostensiblytoopen an approach for a Marine assault and US Navy sea–air–land teams (SEALs) toconduct mine-clearing operations, while battleships hammered coastal defences. At thesametimerehearsalscontinued:inthelasttendaysinJanuary8,000MarinesexercisedinOman. On 1 February Newsweek magazine carried a feature article on the plannedamphibious assault.By22Februaryup to80,000 Iraqiswere reported asdefending thebeaches.On the25thMarinehelicopters flewaseriesofmissionsalong thecoastwhile13th Marine Expeditionary Brigade feigned an attack. On the first day of the groundoffensive Radio Free Kuwait claimed that Marines had landed on Faylakah Island, adeceptionthatwasmaintainedforsometimeafterwards.12

Once the ground campaign opened, the other deception operations also continued.ThetwoMarinedivisionsattackedat0400hourson24Februaryintheeasternendofthesector, where Coalition planners wanted the Iraqis to think all the assaults would takeplacebeforetheassaultcommencedinthewest,andthissuccessfullybreachedtwolinesofdefence.AlltheCoalitionforcesdemonstratedvigorouslyinthissector;mostnotably,1stCavalryDivisionlaunchedamockattackjustwestofWadiAlBatintofixtheIraqisinthatarea.Meanwhile,XVIIICorpslauncheditselfdeepintothedeserttoestablishforwardstagingareaswith theFrench6thLightArmouredDivisionseizingSalmonairstrip,andUS101stAirborneDivisionblockingHighway8.SosuccessfulwerealltheseoperationsthatVIICorps,originallynotduetocrossitsstartlinesfortwenty-fourhours,wasorderedforward by Schwarzkopf during the afternoon of 24 February. By this stage there waspracticallynothingtheIraqiHighCommandcoulddotoreorientateitselftotherealthreat.Crammed as they were into a 200-mile wedge along the southern border and easterncoastline,theyofferedscantresistancetotheCoalitionforcesmakingthemaineffortouttothewest.

Itwouldbeamistaketosupposethat theubiquityofelectronicmediamadelarge-scale operational deception of this sort difficult for the Coalition. The Iraqis sought toexploitthepresenceofCNNinBaghdadfortheirownpurposes,butthisprovedadouble-edgedsword.TheemphasisoncapabilitieshelpedconcentratethemindsofIraqiplannerson those aspects which Coalition planners wanted them to focus on, such as theamphibious threat,withoutmentioning intentions.Theonlydifferencebetween this andpreviousdeceptionschemesisoneofemphasis:Schwarzkopffedthenews-hungrymediaplentyofinformationthatwasnotfalse,merelyskewedtosuithispurposes.Insodoing,Coalition planners showed real understanding and skilful appreciation of the nature ofmodernmassmedia. By the same token, every utterancemade by President Bush and

otherWesternpolitical leadersemphasizedthelimitationsoftheirmandatefromtheUNas being the liberation of Kuwait, thus making the militarily implausible option ofattackingtheIraqiswheretheywerestrongestappearplausible.

The abundance of information regarding orders of battle in modern professionalarmiesmeantthatwhilethelocationoftheassaultwassuccessfullyhidden,otheraspectswerenotsoeffectivelyobscured.Infact,therewasalmostacatastrophicsecuritybreachwhen a laptop computer containing details of the plan was stolen from a parked carbelonging to an assistant of a very senior British officer in London. Fortunately, thecomputerwashandedinanonymouslytotheMinistryofDefencethreeweekslater,andwhilethereisnoevidencethatanyofthedetailswereleakedtotheIraqis,thatcanonlybeattributedtogoodfortune.13

COUNTERINGANDTEACHINGDECEPTION

Self-delusion on the part of the target is undoubtedly a major factor in successfuldeception.Complacencyandover-confidence,inparticular,canmakeaforcevulnerable.DuringtheGulfWar,forexample,theCoalitionwassurprisedbytheIraqiraidonKhafji,perhaps because of the Iraqis’ otherwise inept conduct. The modern belief in theinfallibilityofSIGINTisanotherexampleofover-confidence,sincethisisthemosteasilyfabricated formof intelligence.Besides, the signalsworld of the twenty-first century isvery different from that of the mid-twentieth. The electronic environment is now sodenselypackedwithtransmissionsthatsophisticatedjudgementisneededtochoosewhichsignalsareactuallyworth recording, evenbeforeanycode-breaking takesplace.By thesametoken, increasingsophisticationofmilitaryequipmentmakesfire-controlradar,forexample, difficult to identify owing to the ability to shiftwavelength andwaveform, acharacteristic developed to guard against electronic counter-measures. In signalsintelligence,meaningismuchmoreelusivethanimagery.14

Thestandardsafeguardagainstdeceptionistocheckhowwellthenewinformationorinterpretationfitswiththeexistingbroadpictureofreality.Intelligence,however,looksatverysmallandexceptionallyimportantpiecesofrealityusingnarrow,specialistsourcesand methods, and this specialization makes the task of checking the image with thebroaderworldallthemoredifficult.Technologycanprovideglimpsesofotherwisedeniedareasbutmaynotproduceusefulinformationwithoutsomebroaderunderstandingoftheenemy’sintentions.Moreover,anynationthatknowsitisbeingobservedinthiswaywillnaturally seek to control and manipulate the information available to the enemy’stechnology.15Simplypossessinghigh-technologyinformation-gatheringsystemsdoesnotguaranteehigh-qualityinformation.

Counter-measures todeceptionarenecessaryandshouldbe treatedasseriouslybymoderncommanders as theirowndeception schemes.Commanders shouldbeundernodoubtthattheywillbedeceptiontargetsthemselves,andthegreatertheirownpredilectionfortrickery,probablythegreatertheirownawarenessofthatlikelihood.Goodintelligencewillleadthemsomewaytowardsuncoveringadeception,andintelligencestaffneedtobeabletodistinguishdeceptivethreatsfromgenuineones.Theymustthereforebescepticalabouteveryitemofinformationthattheyreceive,andmustneveracceptanythingpurelyatfacevalue.Andintelligenceofficersmustresistthetemptationtoproduceconclusions

for which they have only hunches (and in the case of ‘known’ doctrine on the part offorcestrainedbytheformerUSSR,itwouldbeveryfoolishsimplytoascribetothemthebehaviourpatternsdescribedinintelligencemanuals).

In this respect, the current American system of Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield(IPB)isripeforenemydeceptionplanners.Byuseofoverlays,itattemptstosimplifytheintelligenceestimateprocessand,especiallyindefence,itreliesheavilyonastylizedportrayaloftheSovietpatternofoperationalbehaviour.16Itsuseoftemplatesissimply far too prescriptive, particularly where it templates doctrine (a practice withinherentdangersthatarelikelytobeexacerbatedintheabsenceofhardintelligence)andassumeslittleornooperationalflexibilityorimaginationontheopponent’spart,whereasidentification and use against an enemy of his ‘specified algorithms of decision’ areimplicit in the very concept of maskirovka.17 In other words, anyone with anunderstandingofdeception, includingthoseschooledinmaskirovka,willseektoexploitthe limitations of IPB by feeding what its practitioners might expect to see and hear.DuringtheGreatPatrioticWartheSovietsrepeatedlychoseasanaxisterraindismissedbytheGermansasunsuitableforamajoroffensive,muchastheGermansthemselvesdidinchoosingtheArdennesinMay1940and,perhapsmoresignificantly,inDecember1944.InSovieteyesthebestterrainwasthatinwhichtherewerenoanti-tankweapons.18

Askilfulattackerwillthereforetailorhisdeceptiontoconfirmtheviewthedefenderalreadyhasofhimbeforedoingsomethingcompletelydifferent,muchas theEgyptiansdid in 1973. It is therefore imperative for both commanders and staffs to keep anopenmind,particularlytobeawareasfaraspossibleoftheirownpreconceptions,sothatthesearenotexploited.Theonlywaytolearnhowtocounterdeceptionistoteachtoitandtoexercise it, throughpracticeandatall levels.Thismeans introducing realisticdeceptiveelementsintobothsidesduringtrainingexercises,ratherthanmerelydiscussingthemasanafterthoughttoanexerciseinstruction.

Iftheoppositionforceinanexerciseisoperatingtoastrictscheduleprovidedbyanumpire, itwillmakefordullandunrealistic training.Furthermore,asBasilLiddellHartwroteinhisStrategyofIndirectApproach:

the trainingofarmies isprimarilydevoted todevelopingefficiency in thedetailedexecutionof tactics.Theconcentrationontacticaltechniquestendstoobscurethepsychologicalelements.Itfostersacultofsoundness rather than surprise. It breeds commanders who are so intent not to do anything wrong,accordingto‘thebook’thattheyforgetthenecessityofmakingtheenemydosomethingwrong.

This remains true to this day.Tactics are taught in away that seeks to exploit the bestground,butiftheenemyknowswhatthebestgroundisheislikelytoplanaccordingly.Choosingsecond-bestterrain,bycontrast,createsanopportunityforadeceptionthatmayyieldenormousresults:surpriseandconsequentsuccessatquitepossiblymuchlesscost.

Training in deception involves teaching commanders to make the enemy makemistakes,ataskthatrequiresimagination.Somewillnaturallyshowagreatertalentforitthanothers,butthistalentcanonlybeencouragedbyallowingasmuchlateralthinkingaspossible into training schemes,whichall toooftenare structuredand formulaic.WavellranexercisesbasedonthelegendoftheGoldenFleece,onKingSolomon’sMinesandonotherideasgleanedfrombooksandfilms.19Hisaimwastomaketrainingunusualand,asa result, more interesting and more effective.MostWestern soldiers, however, tend to

considerpersonalcamouflageasthelimitoftheirdeceptiveresponsibilities,anddeceptionisusuallypassedoveronexerciseswiththeexcusethatresourcesarescarce.(Surelythisisitselfanexcellentargumentinfavourofpractisingdeceptionateverylevelandateveryopportunity.)AccordingtomodernBritishArmydoctrine,effectivedeceptionrequiresthecommitmentofsignificantresourcestoconvinceanenemy.Onecanonlyassumethatitsauthorshaveneverstudiedtheartofdeception.

Anexampleofthisproblemistheuseofsmoke.Withtheirexperienceofwarfareonthesteppes,itishardlysurprisingthattheSovietsappreciatedthevalueofsmoke.Aswellasbeingusedforconcealment,smokeservedtodrawfirefromGermanpositionsandthusassist in reconnaissance.Soviet thinkingon theuseof smoke changedvery little in thepost-war years. The Yom Kippur War re-emphasized its value and it was alwaysconsidered a low-technology counter-measure to Western high-technology weapons.Whatever other deficiencies may have been noted in the practice of maskirovka onexercises, use of smokewas not among them. Soviet tankswere all designedwith theability to inject a chemical mixture into their exhausts and create their own smokecontinuously. The bestmostWestern tanks canmanage is a few smoke rounds from adischarger.InSovietandWarsawPactexercisessmokewasalwaysusedinabundanceanditwas found that it couldgreatly reducecasualties.Smokecapableofblinding thermal-imagingdevices can be produced and screens of enormous dimensions created by suchequipmentas theTMS-65smokegenerator,whichcanlayascreen3kilometresby500metres in tenminutes; such itemsareavailable topost-Soviet forces in abundance.TheBritish,bycontrast,bought four large-areasmokegenerators for theGulfWar;after thewarthesewereapparentlymadeavailableforcommanderstoplaywithonSalisburyPlainorinCanada,butmostcommanderswillbeblissfullyunawareoftheirexistenceandhavelittleideawhattodowiththemanyway,sincesmoke,likeeveryotheraspectofdeception(apartfromcolouredsmokegrenades),islargelyoverlookedinBritishtraining.

Finally,twofactorsareworthconsidering:thefirstisthebureaucraticimperativethatorganizations trained for a particular task will seek to perform it; the second is thepsychological tendency to think in familiar terms. Both of these suggest that militarydeception is likely to be used only if the doctrine, planning apparatus and means areavailable,orat leastappreciated.Amilitaryorganization lacking thesemeans,orwhoseappreciationof thedoctrineandwhosemeansofdeceptionhaveatrophied,willhave toovercomestronginertiatorestorethem,astheAmericansdidduringandaftertheSecondWorldWar.20

NEWTECHNOLOGYANDINFORMATIONWARFARE

Improvisation and imagination are the stock-in-trade of deception. Even unconvincingdecoymaterialsmaymakeadouble-bluffpossible.ItisnotabsolutelynecessarytogoasfarasscientistsattheUSArmyResearchLaboratoryinMaryland.Theypredicttheabilityto create holographic forces, a concept inspired by the originalStarWars film,when amessagewas delivered by a holographic image.21StarWars also inspired the Imperialtrooper, and continuing developments in miniaturization will, it is predicted, producesimilar soldiers equipped with helmets including head-up displays, global positioning,video and other sensor links direct to headquarters, and wearing protective suits withlightweight body armour, laser-guided weapons and other such gadgetry. But while

modern warfare is undoubtedly seeing an enormous increase in the quantity ofinformation,thereisalsoamarkedreductioninthetimeavailabletointelligencestaffstoanalyse itanddisseminate the resulting intelligence.Moderndeceptionmeasuresshouldtakeadvantageofthetarget’svulnerabilitytoparalysisthroughdatasaturation.ASovietwriternotedthenecessityfor

dummyobjectivestopossessthephysicalpropertiesoftheequipmentbeingsimulated…notonlyhavingthe appropriate form, but also being capable of reflecting any light, heat and electromagnetic energywhichfallsonthem,andalsocreatingheatemissions,amagneticfieldaroundthemselvesetc.Otherwisemodernmeansofreconnaissancewilldifferentiatewithrelativeeasebetweenthetrueandfalsetargets.22

Althoughtheuseofspecialpaints,radarreflectorsandothermeasurestocreatedeceptivedisplaysofvehiclesorotherequipmenthasnotbeenconfinedexclusively to theformerUSSR andWarsawPact, these nations retained thewillingness to use such tactics on acolossalscalethatNATOperhapsneverfullyunderstood.ItisnotunreasonabletoassumethatwhereverRussianequipmentissoldandadvicegiventhesetechniqueswillbeamongthem.

In any case, nomatter how radical a technological innovationmay be, a counter-technology will soon be developed. Infra-red sensors designed to detect heat can becountered by something as simple as treated hessianmaterial, used in conjunctionwithcamouflagenetting.Similarly,sensorscannotdifferentiatebetweenagenuinehotengineandasimulationmadefromacanfilledwithsandandpetrol.Developmentsin‘stealth’technologyaretakingplacetomakeequipmentinvisibletoradar.Conversely,onevehiclecantowastringofreflectorsbehindittosimulatemanyothers.Fromthedeceiver’spointof view, more spectra have to be covered than before, but the means are there, asdemonstratedbyrecentexperience.

Under some circumstances the latest technology can remain vulnerable tosurprisinglyunsophisticateddeceptionstrategies.DuringtheKosovoconflictverysimpledecoys and dummy sites led themost powerful air forces in theworld to overestimategrosslytheeffectivenessoftheircampaignagainstSerbarmourontheground.AndsinceNATOaircraftdeliveredmostoftheirattacksfromover15,000feetinordertoavoidanti-aircraft fire, it is hardly surprising that in spite of repeated claims about accuracy theysometimeshit refugee columns rather thanmilitary convoys.ABritishordnanceofficerreportedfindingtheremainsofonlythirteenSerbtanksdestroyedfromtheair–thesamenumber as theSerbs admitted to during the conflict and eighty-three fewer thanNATOclaimed at the time. NATO pilots were simply fooled into attacking hundreds of otherlocations.23 An internal Pentagon report obtained by Newsweek revealed that only 58strikes were accurate, compared with 744 ‘confirmed’ by NATO at the end of thecampaign. Far from destroying ‘around 120 tanks’, ‘around 220 armoured personnelcarriers (APCs)’ and ‘up to 450 artillery and mortar pieces’, in seventy-eight days ofbombing, the true figures were 14 tanks, 18 APCs and 20 guns and mortars. Anotherunwelcome discovery was just how easily high-altitude surveillance systems had beentricked. Yet the Serbs did not possess state of-the-art camouflage and deceptionequipment.Although their battle positionswere locatable, their hides seldomwere, andmanyofthedecoyswerejustknockedtogetherfromlocalmaterials.‘Tanks’,forexample,weremade fromblack logsonold lorrywheels. (Othercharacteristicscanbesimulatedjustaseasily:apetrolcanwillmakethe‘tank’explodewithanappropriatewhumpand

chickenwirecangive itameasureofprotectionagainstcertainanti-tankmissiles.)Oneimportantbridgewas ‘destroyed’many timesover,protectedbya fakebuilt300metresawayfrompolyethylenesheeting.24AnotherbridgeatKosovoPoljewasconstructedfromlocaltimberandroofingfelt,whichhasthesamethermalsignatureastarmacandwhichprovidedaperfectlyconvincingroadway.

American military professionals have accepted their deficiency in deceptivetechniquesforsomeyears.Thisfailingisperhapsaresultofurbanization,andpossiblyaproduct of having fought the last five major wars and other smaller campaigns withoverwhelmingairsuperiority.25Whilethatsuperiorityisinitselfextremelydesirable,itisnoteverything.Satellitesalsohaveseverelimitations,dependingontheheightoforbit.Inageosynchronousorbitat22,300milesabovetheearth,afairlylargeareaoftheearthcanbeseen,butverylittledetailcanbedistinguished.Atanaltitudeof100miles,ontheotherhand,asatellitecanseeaduckonapond,butwouldcircletheearthinlittlemorethanahour and cover a very limited area. Thousands of such satellites would be needed toguaranteemeaningfulcoverage,involvingexpensethatnocountrycanafford;inanycase,lookingfortanksandmissilesmaybefruitlesssincethesecanalwaysbekeptindoorsorunder cover.26 High technology is not a panacea nor an end in itself; more traditionalhumanintelligencesourcesmayyethaveasignificantroletoplayinthefuture.

Doctrinally,deceptionnowformsoneofthepillarsintheconceptofcommandandcontrolwarfare(C2W),whichaimstoattackanenemy’scommandandcontrolfunctions(and to protect one’s own) through the combined and co-ordinated use of operationalsecurity,physicaldestruction,deception,electronicwarfareandPsyops.Thesetechniquesare part of what is now regarded as ‘information age warfare’, but it is important todistinguishbetweenthisand‘informationwarfare’.C2Wdiffersfrominformationwarfareinthattheformerconcernsonlytheenemy’smilitarycapabilitieswhilethelatterfocusesonany information function, including thecivilian infrastructure (whichalso formedanimportantpartoftheNATOattackonSerbia).27Information-agewarfareincorporatesnewtechnologies into the actual business of directing and implementingmilitaryoperations,whileinformationwarfareviewsinformationinitselfasa‘separaterealm,potentweaponandlucrativetarget’.28

Althoughitforeseestheuseofhigh-technologytechniquessuchas‘logic’bombstoattack the information systems on which everybody increasingly relies, contemporarywarfare also includes conventional attacks on information functions, such as telephoneswitching facilities. The array of potential targets is vast, and the greater a nation’srelianceonhightechnology,thegreateritsvulnerabilitytosuchattacks.Consequently,theuse of deception may have an important part to play in protecting these vulnerablefunctions, by suggesting, for example, that an attack has beenmore successful than isreallythecase.

Direct information warfare affects information without relying on the opponent’sabilitytoperceiveorinterpretthatinformation.Attacksmighttakemanyforms,butthoseof a deceptive nature could involve planting false information in an enemy’s databases(creating a false order of battle, for example). Nevertheless, although such schemesinvolvenewmethods,thetime-honouredprinciplesremainentirelyvalid.Ifafighterwingappearsinthisneworderofbattletheenemywillseekcorroboration,andfalserunways

and decoy aircraft (with all the trimmings) are as necessary as ever. Alternatively, ifdummy bridges prevent the destruction of a real bridge, an information attack mightachievethedesiredeffectbydeceivingtheenemyintothinkingthatatargetedbridgehasbeen destroyed, causing him to reroute transport and divert engineer resources for itsrepair.Thisremainsalargelyhypotheticalandspeculativearea,butitisonlybycarefullyconsideringallsuchmeansthatdefenceswillbedeveloped.

POSTSCRIPTItisnotunreasonabletosaythatthemoreexpensiveandextensivewarsbecome,themorevaluable successful deceptions are likely to become.29Wars continue around the globe,butmany ‘small-scale’conflictsexcite littleornomedia interest in theWest.When theWest does become involved, it increasingly relies on its huge technological advantage.Thisistoitsbenefitonlysolongasitremembersthatwarsarefoughtnotbymachinesbutbymen;andthebestsoldiershaveaseasoningofdevilry.30

However,itisworthsoundingafinalnoteofcaution.Theexactsuccessofanygivendeceptionoperationisoftenverydifficulttomeasure.Therearewidelyvaryingestimatesofthesuccessofthe‘going-map’ruse(inwhichamapthatmarkedpoorterrainas‘goodgoing’wasplantedontheGermansbeforetheBattleofAlamHalfa).AndKlaus-JürgenMüllerarguesthatmanywritershaveoverestimatedtheeffectivenessofAllieddeceptionoperationsduringtheSecondWorldWar,includingBARCLAYandFORTITUDENORTH.31Bythesametoken,asenseofproportionisneeded:deceptionisprobablylessimportantthangoodintelligence,andnowarwaseverwonbyeither,butonlybyhardfighting.

AsShermansaidonanumberofoccasions,‘War ishellandyoucannotrefine it.’Nobodywithanyexperienceofwarwouldseektodisagree,yet,asDudleyClarkewroteintheforewordtohisdraftmemoirs(sadlynevercompletedorpublished),‘thesecretwarwaswaged rather to conserve than todestroy; the stakeswere the livesof the frontlinetroops,andtheorganizationwhichfoughtitwasabletocountitsgainsfromthenumberofcasualtiesitcouldavert.’32Deceptionremainsapowerfultoolforreducingthebloodshedinherent in war, as well as having an enormous influence on its outcome. The art ofdeceptioninwarisfarfromdead.

NotesINTRODUCTION

1. DesignforMilitaryOperations:TheBritishMilitaryDoctrine,pp.4–35.

2. D.Glantz,SovietMilitaryDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar,p.2.

3. A.P.Wavell,TheGoodSoldier,pp.157–8.

4. Polybius,TheRiseoftheRomanEmpire,III,81,p.248.

5. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.14.

6. R.Beaumont,Maskirovka:SovietCamouflage,ConcealmentandDeception,p.21.

7. D.Glantz,p.3.

8. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,p.123.

9. M.Hastings,Overlord,p.75.

CHAPTER1.AHISTORYOFBLUFFINWARFARE

1. Judges,vii,15-23.SeealsoIsaiah,ix,4.

2. SunTzu,TheArtofWar,p.66.

3. Polybius,TheRiseoftheRomanEmpire,III,46,pp.218–19.

4. JuliusCaesar,TheConquestofGaul,VII,35,p.172.

5. M.I.Handel(ed.),StrategicandOperationalDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar,p.2.

6. A.P.Wavell,TheGoodSoldier,p.36.

7. SirC.Oman,AHistoryoftheArtofWarintheMiddleAges,pp.172,201–5.

8. R.Holmes,WarWalks2,p.37.

9. H.Delbrück,HistoryoftheArtofWar,vol.3,TheMiddleAges,p.159.

10. SirC.Oman,p.162.

11. J.Chambers,TheDevil’sHorsemen,pp.79–80.

12. D.Morgan,TheMongols,p.86.

13. R.E.DupuyandT.N.Dupuy,TheCollinsEncyclopaediaofMilitaryHistory,pp.372–3.

14. P.Thorau,TheLionofEgypt:SultanBaybarsandtheNearEastintheThirteenthCentury,pp.204–5.

15. G.A.Williams,OwainGlyndŵr,pp.27–8.

16. J.D.G.Davies,OwenGlynDŵr,pp.45–50.

17. G.Hartcup,Camouflage,p.11.

18. N.Machiavelli,TheArtofWar,p.xxv.

19. H.Delbrück,vol.IV,TheDawnofModernWarfare,p.156.

20. D.Chandler,MarlboroughasMilitaryCommander,pp.126–30.

21. M.Dewar,TheArtofDeceptioninWarfare,p.31.

22. D.McKay,PrinceEugèneofSavoy,p.59;N.Henderson,PrinceEugenofSavoy,p.58.

23. D.Chandler,Marlborough,pp.158–61.

24. Ibid.,pp.287–91.

25. J.Luvaas(ed.),FredericktheGreatontheArtofWar,p.324.

26. C.Duffy,FredericktheGreat:AMilitaryLife,p.327.

27. D.Chandler,AtlasofMilitaryStrategy:TheArt,TheoryandPracticeofWar,1618–1878,p.73.

28. C.Duffy,pp.148–53.

29. A.V.Sellwood,TheSaturdayNightSoldiers,p.143.

30. LondonGazetteExtraordinary(27March1797);AnnualRegister(1797);quotedinE.H.Stuart-Jones,TheLastInvasionofBritain,p.114.

31. Ibid.,p.115.

32. Ibid.,p.111.

33. Ibid.,p.116–19.

34. D.Chandler,TheCampaignsofNapoleon,p.146.Foradetailedexpositionofwhatfollows,thisisthedefinitivereference.

35. D.Chandler,Atlas,p.98.

36. D.Chandler,CampaignsofNapoleon,pp.78–80.

37. M.vanCreveld,SupplyingWar,pp.40–2.

38. D.Chandler,Atlas,p.100–1.

39. A.P.Wavell,p.38.

40. N.Dixon,OnthePsychologyofMilitaryIncompetence,p.326.

41. D.R.Morris,TheWashingoftheSpears,p.53.

42. Ibid.,p.63.

43. G.C.Wardetal.,TheCivilWar, pp.76–80.Anexcellentoverview taken from the filmof the samename, andlavishlyillustrated.

44. Ibid.,p.90.

45. P.Katcher,GreatGamblesoftheCivilWar,p.195.

46. G.C.Wardetal.,p.110.

47. P.Katcher,p.202.

48. W.J.Miller,‘NoAmericanSevastopol’,America’sCivilWar,vol.13,2,p.34.

49. C.V.Woodward,MaryChesnut’sCivilWar,p.401.

50. S.Foote,TheCivilWar:ANarrative,vol.1,pp.381–4.Awonderfulbook,beautifullywritten.

51. G.C.Wardetal.,p.124.

52. Ibid.,p.340.

53. J.A.Wyeth,LifeofGeneralNathanBedfordForrest,pp.108–9.

54. Ibid.,p.218.

55. S.Foote,vol.2,p.185.

56. J.A.Wyeth,pp.492–3.

57. T.Pakenham,TheBoerWar,p.398.

58. R.S.S.Baden-Powell,Lessonsfromthe‘VarsityofLife,p.203.

59. R.S.S.Baden-Powell,evidence,RoyalCommissionontheWarinSouthAfrica,vol.3,p.424.

60. R.S.S.Baden-Powell,Lessonsfromthe‘VarsityofLife,p.202.

61. D.Grinnell-Milne,Mafeking,pp.50–2.

62. R.S.S.Baden-Powell,Lessonsfromthe‘VarsityofLife,p.211.

63. B.Gardner,Mafeking:AVictorianLegend,p.65.

64. R.S.S.Baden-Powell,Lessonsfromthe‘VarsityofLife,p.206.

65. D.Grinnell-Milne,p.58.

66. Ibid.,p.94.

67. A.Horne,ThePriceofGlory,pp.37–40.

CHAPTER2.THEINFORMATIONBATTLE

1. See A. D. Coox, ‘Flawed Perception and its Effect upon Operational Thinking: The Case of the

JapaneseArmy,1937–41’,inM.I.Handel(ed.),IntelligenceandMilitaryOperations.

2. K.vonClausewitz,OnWar,p.162.

3. See Chapter II, ‘Seurat and his Friends’, in J. Rewald, Post Impressionism: From Van Gogh toGauguin,London,SeckerandWarburg,1978.

4. R.K.Betts, ‘Analysis,WarandDecision:WhyIntelligenceFailuresAre Inevitable’,WorldPolitics(31October1978),pp.69–72.

5. SirJ.Ardagh,evidence,RCSAWII,Q5126,quotedinPakenham,p.76.

6. D.Chandler,MarlboroughasMilitaryCommander,p.324.

7. J.Luvaas(ed.),FredericktheGreatontheArtofWar,p.122.

8. J.G.Zimmerman,FragmenteüberFriedrichdenGrossen,vol.1,Leipzig,1790,p.288.

9. C.Duffy,FredericktheGreat:AMilitaryLife,pp.326–7.

10. D.Chandler,TheCampaignsofNapoleon,pp.146–7.

11. S.Foote,TheCivilWar:ANarrative,vol.3,p.144.

12. Frontinus,Stratagems,p.21.

13. S.Foote,vol.2,p.689.

14. C.Roetter,PsychologicalWarfare,pp.136–7.

15. S.Foote,vol.1,p.570.

16. J.Haswell,TheTangledWeb:TheArtofTacticalandStrategicDeception,pp.89–90.

17. M.deArcangelis,ElectronicWarfare,pp.11–12.

18. B.W.Tuchman,TheGunsofAugust:August1914,pp.327,344.

19. ‘AHistoryofElectronicWarfare’,RoyalSchoolofSignalspamphlet.

20. For a full description of these German operations, see H. O. Behrendt, Rommel’s Intelligence in the Desert,London,WilliamKimber,1980.ThechildishnessofBritishradioprocedureiswellillustratedinK.Douglas,AlameintoZemZem,Harmondsworth,Penguin,1969.

21. G.Barkas,TheCamouflageStory,p.43.

22. A.J.Brookes,PhotoReconnaissance,pp.9–10.

23. B.W.Tuchman,pp.270–1.

24. A.J.Brookes,p.13.

25. Ibid.,pp.16–20.

26. C.Babington-Smith,AirSpy,p.113.

27. J.Haswell,p.111.

28. A.J.Brookes,pp.83,89–90.

29. D.Chandler,pp.146–8.

30. G.Barkas,p.50.

31. Polybius,TheRiseoftheRomanEmpire,III,78,p.245.

32. B.Pitt,TheCrucibleofWar,pp.81,85,90.

33. ‘ThePrinciplesandPracticeofCamouflage’,TM623.77(41)Camouflage/1,p.7.

34. T.Newark,Q.NewarkandJ.F.Borsarello,Brassey’sBookofCamouflage,p.11.

35. I.T.Schick(ed.),Battledress:TheUniformsoftheWorld’sGreatArmies,1700tothePresent,pp.145–6.

36. T.Newarketal.,pp.12–14.

37. I.T.Schick,pp.189,210.

38. B.W.Tuchman,pp.55.

39. I.T.Schick,pp.219–20.

40. T.Newark,etal.,pp.15–16.

41. G.Hartcup,Camouflage:AHistoryofConcealmentandDeceptioninWar,pp.77–86.

CHAPTER3.THEPRINCIPLESOFDECEPTION

1. PROAIR20/2497,05.02.1944.

2. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.81–2.

3. PROCAB154/2,‘A’ForceWarDiary,vol.2,p.16.

4. J.Haswell,TheTangledWeb:TheArtofTacticalandStrategicDeception,p.23.

5. PROCAB154/2,p.19.

6. R.Hesketh,Fortitude,pp.360–1.

7. P.Beesley,Room40:BritishNavalIntelligence,1914–18,p.184.

8. J.Haswell,pp.85–8.

9. R.Hesketh,pp.360–1.

10. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,vol.5,StrategicDeception,p.105.

11. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.14.

12. R.Hesketh,pp.360–1.

13. PROCAB154/2,p.22.

14. A.M.Codevilla, ‘Space, Intelligence andDeception’, inB.D.Dailey and P. J. Parker (eds.),Soviet StrategicDeception,p.484.

15. D.Glantz,SovietMilitaryDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar,pp.568-9.

16. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,p.71.

17. B.Whaley,Stratagem,p.229.Whaleyalsodiscussestherelationshipbetweensecurityanddeceptionwithdifferentemphases,pp.225–6.

18. W.Shirer,TheRiseandFalloftheThirdReich,pp.671–2.

19. R.Hesketh,p.355.

20. NAC.H.Bennett,‘GermanAppreciationofOperationSTARKEY‘,COSSAC/41DX/INT,01.09.1943,R331.

21. J.Haswell,p.24.

22. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,p.i.

23. R.Hesketh,p.356.

24. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.49.

25. D.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,‘PropositionsonMilitaryDeception’,inStrategicMilitaryDeception,pp.18–19.

26. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.14.

27. J.C.Masterman,TheDoubleCrossSystem,p.110.

28. D.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,p.20.

29. R.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,pp.237,316.

CHAPTER4.THEMETHODSOFDECEPTION

1. D.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,pp.5–7.

2. A.P.Wavell,TheGoodSoldier,p.157.

3. J.Haswell,TheTangledWeb:TheArtofTacticalandStrategicDeception,pp.30–2.

4. S.Foote,TheCivilWar:ANarrative,vol.2,p.332.

5. Frontinus,Stratagems,pp.75–7.

6. NAAPO#655,RG319,G-3,11.07.1944.

7. S.Foote,vol.2,pp.685–8.

8. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,pp.86–8.

9. PROWO201/2649.

10. J.Luvaas,FredericktheGreatontheArtofWar,pp.122–3.

11. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.27.

12. R.Hesketh,Fortitude,pp.351–3.

13. Ibid.,pp.15,65–71.

14. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.49–50.

15. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.76–8.

16. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.14.

17. R.Hesketh,p.38.

18. Ibid.,p.358.

19. PROFO898/398,29.06.1943.

20. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,p.56.

21. A.CaveBrown,BodyguardofLies,p.118.

22. PROWO201/2023.

23. G.Barkas,TheCamouflageStory,pp.198–200,204–5.

24. M.YoungandR.Stamp,p.70–1.

25. P.Delaforce,Monty’sMarauders,pp.44–6.

26. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.126,128.

27. G.Barkas,pp.210–11.

28. Ibid,pp.200–3.

29. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.135.

30. PROWO201/2024.

31. PROWO201/2023.

32. M.Dewar,TheArtofDeceptioninWarfare,p.10.

33. SundayTimesInsightTeam,TheYomKippurWar,p.61.

34. Ibid.,p.69.

35. J.Amos,‘Deceptionandthe1973MiddleEastWar’, inD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig(eds.),StrategicMilitaryDeception,pp.322–4.

36. Ibid.,pp.324-6:R.K.Betts,SurpriseAttack,p.72.

37. J.AmosinD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,pp.327–8.

38. J.Lucas,Kommando:GermanSpecialForcesofWorldWarTwo,p.45.

39. I.C.B.Dear,ed.,TheOxfordCompaniontotheSecondWorldWar,p.155.

40. M.R.D.Foot,Resistance,p.29.

41. P.Fleming,OperationSealion,pp.63–4.

42. J.Lucas,pp.48–50.

43. Ibid.,pp.129–30.

44. L.Kessler,Kommando:Hitler’sSpecialForcesintheSecondWorldWar,pp.111–16.

45. J.Lucas,pp.131–2.

46. L.Kessler,p.129.

47. A.P.Wavell,ThePalestineCampaigns,pp.100-3.

48. There are a variety of accounts ofMeinertzhagen’s ‘haversack ruse’: seeM. Dewar, The Art of Deception in

Warfare,pp.39–40,andM.I.Handel(ed.),StrategicandOperationalDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar,p.8.SeealsoC.Falls,MilitaryOperationsEgyptandPalestine,part1,London,HMSO,pp.30–31;SirG.Aston,SecretService,NewYork,Cosmopolitan,1930,pp.201–16.

49. A.P.Wavell,p.106–7.

50. M.I.Handel,pp.10–11.

51. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar:StrategicDeception,p.89.

52. E.Montagu,TheManWhoNeverWas,p.13.

53. Ibid.,p.54.

54. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,KriegstagebuchdesOberkommandoderWehrmacht,vol.3,p.1429.

55. M.Howard,p.92.

56. J.Pimlott,Vietnam:TheDecisiveBattles,pp.90–1.

57. J.Morroccoetal.,TheVietnamExperience:ThunderintheAir,pp.144–6.

58. J.Pimlott,p.92.

59. C.Cruickshank,p.88.

60. Livy,TheHistoryofRome,xxii,14.

61. L.Cottrell,EnemyofRome,p.114.

62. J.Peddie,Hannibal’sWar,pp.84–5.

CHAPTER5.TACTICALANDOPERATIONALDECEPTION

1. F.Wilson,RegimentsataGlance,p.53.

2. PROAIR23/5526,17.03.1943.

3. A.Gilbert,Sniper:One-on-One,p.71.

4. H.StG.Saunders,TheRedBeret,p.257.

5. G.Hartcup,Camouflage,p.27.

6. C.Wilmot,TheStruggleforEurope,pp.406–8.

7. P.Delaforce,TheFightingWessexWyverns,p.110.

8. G.Taylor,InfantryColonel,p.66.

9. Ibid.,pp.67–72.

10. H.StG.Saunders,pp.283–4.

11. R.Beaumont,Maskirovka:SovietConcealment,CamouflageandDeception,p.9.

12. J.Lucas,WarontheEasternFront,1941–45:TheGermanSoldierinRussia,pp.53–5,96,181.

13. F.W.vonMellenthin,PanzerBattles:AStudyintheEmploymentofArmorintheSecondWorldWar,p.294.

14. S.H.Newton(ed.),GermanBattleTacticsontheRussianFront,1941–5,p.72.

15. Ibid.,p.77.

16. TM623.77(41).Camouflage/1,pp.12–13.

17. J.Maskelyne,Magic:TopSecret,p.47.

18. S.Reit,Masquerade:TheAmazingCamouflageDeceptionsofWorldWarII,p.179.

19. Ibid.,p.187.

20. G.Hartcup,pp.111–12.

21. A.J.Barker,FortuneFavourstheBrave:TheBattleoftheHook,Korea,1953,pp.77–85.

22. A.Moorehead,Gallipoli,p.263.

23. M.Hickey,Gallipoli,pp.322,327–9.

24. A.Moorehead,p.287.

25. Ibid.,p.288.

26. M.Hickey,pp.329–34.

27. J.Haswell,TheTangledWeb:TheArtofTacticalandStrategicDeception,pp.75–6.

28. TheTimes,14May1974.

29. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.38.

30. D.Wheatley,TheDeceptionPlanners,p.20.

31. R.Lewin,TheChief,p.52.

32. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar.vol.5,StrategicDeception,p.33.

33. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,pp.19–21.

34. D.Mure,pp.95–6.

35. Ibid.,pp.82–3,93–4.

36. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,p.40.

37. CAB154/1‘A’ForceWarDiary,vol.1,p.43.

38. PROWO201/2024.

39. CAB154/1,pp.35,51–2,87.

40. CAB154/2‘A’ForceWarDiary,vol.2,p.19.

41. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.81.

42. M.Howard,p.42.

43. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.120,130.

44. B.Horrocks,AFullLife,p.125.

45. PROWO201/434.

46. B.H.LiddellHart,TheRommelPapers,p.304.

CHAPTER6.STRATEGICDECEPTION

1. R.Patai,TheArabMind,p.311.

2. J.Amos,‘Deceptionandthe1973MiddleEastWar’,inD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig(eds.),StrategicMilitaryDeception,pp.317–18.

3. W.Byford-Jones,TheLightningWar,pp.33–4.

4. J.Amos,p.319.

5. SundayTimesInsightTeam,TheYomKippurWar,pp.399–404.

6. J.Amos,p.320–1.

7. G.Meir,MyLife,p.409.

8. SeeH.Trefousse,PearlHarbor:TheContinuingControversy,chapter2.Arecentexpositionof thistheorycanbefoundinR.B.Stinnett,DayofDeceit:TheTruthaboutFDRandPearlHarbor,NewYork,FreePress,1999.

9. R.K.Betts,SurpriseAttack,p.134.

10. TheObserver(9December1979).

11. J.Hughes-Wilson,MilitaryIntelligenceBlunders,pp.68–9.

12. R.Wohlstetter,PearlHarbor:WarningandDecision,pp.379–80.

13. B.Whaley,CodewordBarbarossa,p.242.

14. Pravda(22June1989),p.3.

15. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,DoubleDeception:Stalin,HitlerandtheInvasionofRussia,pp.16–7.Thisisanexcellentandcomprehensivestudyofthesubject.

16. H.E.Salisbury,The900Days:TheSiegeofLeningrad,pp.57,70.

17. R.H. S. Stolfi, ‘Barbarossa:GermanGrandDeception and theAchievement of Strategic andTactical Surpriseagainst theSovietUnion, 1940–41’, inD.C.Daniel andK.L.Herbig (eds.),StrategicMilitaryDeception,p.201.

18. Ibid.,p.195.

19. P.Fleming,OperationSealion,p.296.

20. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,pp.19–21.

21. R.H.S.Stolfi,p.196.

22. H.Trevor-Roper,Hitler’sWarDirectives,p.57.

23. R.H.S.Stolfi,p.197.

24. NAH.Weberstedt,‘PublicDeceptionRegardingtheRussianCampaign’,MS.P-O44c,p.10;H.vonGreiffenberg,‘DeceptionandCoverPlans’,MS.P-O44a.

25. R.H.Stolfi,pp.199–200.

26. G.Hagglof,SamtidaVittne,1940–45,pp.96–7.

27. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,pp.52–3,56–8.

28. Ibid.,p.59.

29. Ibid.,pp.25–7.

30. R.H.S.Stolfi,p.201–2.

31. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,p.209.

32. SirW.S.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar,vol.3,TheGrandAlliance,p.357.

33. I.Akhmedov,InandOutofStalin’sGRU;ATartar’sEscapefromRedArmyIntelligence,pp.136–7.

34. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,pp.122–7.

35. Ibid.,pp.150–51.

36. J.Hughes-Wilson,pp.53–4.

37. G.HilgerandA.G.Meyer,TheIncompatibleAllies:AMemoir–HistoryofGermanSovietRelations,1918–1941,pp.328–31.

38. H.RTrevor-Roper(ed.),Hitler’sSecretConversations,1941–1944,p.397.

39. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,p.164.

40. D.McLachlan,Room39:NavalIntelligenceinAction,1939–45,p.242.

41. NationalArchives,WashingtonDC,E.F.J.Raus,‘StrategicDeception’,MS.P-O44b,p.5.

42. J.Erickson,Hitler’sWarwithStalin:TheRoadtoStalingrad,pp.88–9.

43. R.H.S.Stolfi,pp.207–8.

44. K.Macksey,Keselring:TheMakingoftheLuftwaffe,p.82.

45. H.Plocher,TheGermanAirForceversusRussia,1941,pp.33–5.

46. Bundesarchiv,Freiburg,Gen.KdoLVHIPzKorps,Kriegstagebuch1,19.02.1933–1.10.1941,p.19,1568/1.

47. R.H.S.Stolfi,p.210–12.

48. E.E.J.Raus,StrategicDeception,p.5.

49. J.BarrosandR.Gregor,pp.178–9.

50. Ibid.,pp.199–200.

51. Ibid.,pp.204–7.

52. D.Volkogonov,Stalin:TriumphandTragedy,pp.407–9.

53. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,vol.5:StrategicDeception,p.22.

54. N.Wild,forewordtoD.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.11.

55. M.Howard,pp.3–10.

56. J.C.Masterman,TheDoubleCrossSystem,p.9.

57. PROCAB121/105,SICfileA/Policy/Deception/1,COS(41)344thmeeting,7October;JAPANESE(41)819,8October.

58. PROAIR203693,21.04.1942.

59. PROCAB154/2‘A’ForceWarDiary,vol.2,p.60.

60. PROCAB121/105WavelltelegramtoPrimeMinister12461/Cof21May1942.

61. D.Wheatley,TheDeceptionPlanners,p.229.

62. Ibid.,p.64.

63. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses,p.16.

64. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.92–3.

65. Ibid.,pp.72–5.

66. PROCAB154/100HistoricalRecordofDeceptionintheWaragainstGermanyandItaly(SirRonaldWingate’sNarrative),vol.1,p.111.

67. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.108–13.

68. M.Howard,pp.57–61.

69. L.F.Ellis,VictoryintheWest,vol.1.,p.10.

70. M.Howard,p.75.

71. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,KriegstagebuchdesOberkommandoderWehrmacht,vol.3,p.1219.

72. Pujolwroteanentertainingaccountofhislifeasadoubleagent:Garbo:ThePersonalStoryoftheMostSuccessfulDouble Agent Ever, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. Certainly he had no doubt of his ownimportance.

73. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,vol.2,p.770.

74. M.Howard,pp.80–1.

75. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,vol.3,p.1037.

76. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.199.

77. NARG331SHAEF/203/DX/Int.

78. PROWO19946479A.

79. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,vol.3,p.1024.

80. LettertoNoelWild(24September1945),quotedinD.Mure,MasterofDeception,pp.234–6.

81. M.Howard,p.84.

82. J.B.Dwyer,SeaborneDeception,p.26.

83. PROCAB154/3‘A’ForceWarDiary,vol.3,pp.69–70.

84. M.Howard,p.92.

85. PROCAB8078,no.16.

86. D.Mure,PractisetoDeceive,pp.102–3.

87. Ibid.,pp.46,53–5.

88. IWMMI14/522/2,KurzeFeindBeurteilungWest(KFW)982of25.07.1943.

89. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.210.

CHAPTER7.NAVALDECEPTION

1. Vegetius,EpitomeofMilitaryScience,IV,37,pp.135–6.

2. A.Wiel,TheNavyofVenice,pp.172–4.

3. SeeD. Thomas,Cochrane: Britannia’s Last Sea–King, and I. Grimble,The Sea Wolf: The Life ofAdmiralCochrane.

4. S.Foote,TheCivilWar:ANarrative,vol.2,p.125.

5. Ibid.,vol.3,pp.380–6.ForafullaccountofthecareeroftheAlabama,seeC.M.RobinsonIII,SharkoftheConfederacy:TheStoryoftheCSSAlabama,London,LeoCooper,1995.

6. SirJ.Corbett,NavalOperations,vol.1,p.177.

7. J.Terraine,WhiteHeat:TheNewWarfare,1914–18,p.253.

8. SeeSirR.Bacon,TheConciseStoryoftheDoverPatrol,London,Hutchinson,1932.

9. G.Hartcup,Camouflage:AHistoryofConcealmentandDeceptioninWar,pp.40–8.

10. Foradetailedandverywell-illustrateddescriptionofcamouflageduringtheSecondWorldWar,includingnavalcamouflage,seeR.M.Stanley,ToFoolaGlassEye,p.53.

11. S.Reit,Masquerade:TheAmazingCamouflageDeceptionsofWorldWarII,pp.195–7.

12. R.M.Stanley,chapter3.

13. J.Terraine,p.262.Seealso:E.KebleChatterton,Q-ShipsandTheirStory,London,SidgwickandJackson,1923.Writtenasitwassosoonafterthewar,itmentionstheshootingofthecrewofU-27inthemosteuphemisticterms,butisinterestingnevertheless.

14. D.Woodward,TheSecretRaiders,pp.138–44.ThisbooksgivesacompleteaccountoftheoperationsofGermandisguisedraiders.SeealsoRogge’sownaccount,TheGermanRaiderAtlantis.

15. D.Pope,TheBattleoftheRiverPlate,pp.4–5.

16. D.Owen,BattleofWits:AHistoryofPsychologyandDeceptioninModernWarfare,p.42.

17. D.Pope,pp.147–52.

18. D.Macintyre,Narvik,p.30.

19. SirW.S.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar,vol.1,TheGatheringStorm,p.579.

20. D.Owen,p.43.

21. ‘NaziConspiracyandAggression’(partoftheNuremburgdocuments)VI,pp.914–15(N.D.C–115).

22. D.Macintyre,p.47.

23. W.Shirer,TheRiseandFalloftheThirdReich,pp.698–9.

24. M.R.D.Foot,Resistance,p.241.

25. D.Owen,pp.43–5.

26. D.VandeVat,TheAtlanticCampaign,pp.250–6.

27. A.Weale,SecretWarfare,pp.1–3.Forafullaccountofthisdaringaction,seeJ.G.Dorrian,StormingStNazaire,London,Pen&Sword,1998.

28. S.Foote,vol.3,pp.716–19.

29. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,pp.223–30.

30. J.C.Masterman,TheDoubleCrossSystem,pp.182–4.

31. For a full account of the USNavy’s deception operations in the Pacific theatre, see K. L. Herbig, ‘AmericanStrategicDeceptioninthePacific’inM.I.Handel(ed.),StrategicandOperationalDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar.

32. W.J.Homes,Double-EdgedSecrets,pp.85–95;T.Tuleja,ClimaxatMidway,pp.51–2.

33. M.FuchidaandM.Okumiya,Midway:TheBattlethatDoomedJapan,pp.129–30.

34. J.B.Dwyer,SeaborneDeception:TheHistoryoftheUSNavyBeachJumpers,pp.3–5.

35. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,p.168.

36. J.B.Dwyer,p.20.

37. NARG218,‘CoverandDeceptionPlans’CSS434/2,06.01.1944.

38. J.B.Dwyer,p.73.

39. J.B.Dwyer,pp.127–30.

CHAPTER8.DECEPTIONINAIROPERATIONS

1. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,p.112.

2. R.M.Stanley,ToFoolaGlassEye,pp.73–8.

3. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.98.

4. R.M.Stanley,pp.78–80.

5. J.Munson(ed.),EchoesoftheGreatWar:TheDiaryofReverendAndrewClark,1914–19,p.153.

6. PROAIR2/2878.

7. PROAIR2/6021.

8. S.Reit,Masquerade:TheAmazingCamouflageDeceptionsofWorldWarII,p.52.

9. PROAIR2/3212.

10. PROAIR8/317.

11. PROAIR41/3AHBDecoysandDeceptions.

12. PROAIR41/46AirHistoricalBranchHistoryofNo.80(Signals)Wing.

13. S.Reit,pp.53–6.

14. H.R.Trevor-Roper,Hitler’sWarDirectives,1939–1945,p.79.

15. S.Reit,p.59.

16. Ibid.,p.61.

17. M.E.DeLonge,ModernAirfieldPlanningandConcealment,NewYork,Pitman,1943,p.135.

18. L.Brettingham,RoyalAirForceBeamBenders;No.80(Signals)Wing,1940–45,p.105.

19. PROAIR2/4759.

20. PROAIR26/580.

21. PROAIR26/583.

22. G.Pawle,TheSecretWar,pp.187–90.

23. S.Reit,p.208.

24. H.K.Smith,LastTrainfromBerlin,p.137.

25. R.M.Stanley,p.176.

26. H.W.Flannery,AssignmenttoBerlin,pp.293–4.

27. R.M.Stanley,p.25.

28. AfullaccountisgiveninR.V.Jones,MostSecretWar,chapter11.

29. L.Brettingham,pp.17–18.

30. PROAIR41/46pp.16–17.

31. Ibid.,p.22.

32. W.Murray,TheLuftwaffe,1933–45:StrategyforDefeat,p.80.

33. D.Owen,BattleofWits:AHistoryofPsychologyandDeceptioninModernWarfare,p.62.

34. M.W.BowmanandT.Cushing,ConfoundingtheReich,p.63.

35. M.Dewar,TheArtofDeceptioninWarfare,pp.151–3.

36. D.Owen,pp.64–5.

37. G.Hartcup,Camouflage:AHistoryofConcealmentandDeceptioninWar,p.74.

38. M.Dewar,p.159.

39. W.Murray,p.214.

40. M.W.BowmanandT.Cushing,p.82.

41. D.Owen,pp.66–8.

42. M.W.BowmanandT.Cushing,pp.150–3.

43. R.M.Stanley,p.71.

44. E.H.Sims,AmericanAces,p.184.

45. W.Murray,p.300.

46. M.Howard,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar:vol.5,StrategicDeception,p.170.

47. R.V.Jones,p.421.

48. M.Howard,pp.182–3.

49. D.Richardson,StealthWarplanes,p.138.

CHAPTER9.OPERATIONBODYGUARD

1. N.Lewis,ChannelFiring,p.99.

2. GeneralordertoUSSeventhArmybeforetheSicilylandings,1943.

3. A.CaveBrown,BodyguardofLies,p.426.

4. M.vanCreveld,SupplyingWar,p.208.

5. A.CaveBrown,p.426.

6. C.Wilmot,TheStruggleforEurope,p.189.

7. B.H.LiddellHart,TheOtherSideoftheHill,p.395.

8. C.Cruickshank,DeceptioninWorldWarII,p.85.

9. PROWO219/308(07.10.1943).

10. PROCAB80/76.

11. PROCAB122/1251.

12. SHAEFOps‘B’document#18209,quotedinA.CaveBrown,p.460.

13. R.Kershaw,D-Day:PiercingtheAtlanticWall,p.20.

14. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,pp.154–5.

15. PROWO199/1378,26.03.1944.

16. R.Hesketh,Fortitude,p.37.

17. PROWO219/2221.

18. A.CaveBrown,p.465.

19. PROWO219/2220.

20. D.Owen,BattleofWits,p.119.

21. C.Cruickshank,p.135.

22. PROFO188/446.

23. IWMMI14/499,KFW1279,28.05.1944.

24. IWMAl1828/1.

25. IWMKFW1276,25.05.1944.

26. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,KriegstagebuchdesOberkommandoderWehrmacht,vol.4,p.298.

27. D.Owen,p.120.

28. IWMMI14/522/-2,KFW978,21.07.1943.

29. PROCAB146/57.

30. H.GreinerandP.Schramm,vol.4,p.81.

31. R.Hesketh,pp.61–2,157–9.

32. IWMAL1828/2,05.05.1944.

33. C.Cruickshank,p.157.

34. M.Howard,p.152.

35. PROCAB154/4,p.96.

36. M.Howard,p.125.

37. H.R.Trevor-Roper,Hitler’sWarDirectives,1939–1945,p.149.

38. B.H.LiddellHart,pp.398–401.

39. C.Wilmot,p.191.

40. EarlMountbattenofBurma,quotedinT.Robinson,Dieppe:TheShameandtheGlory,p.15.

41. W.Murray,TheLuftwaffe,1933–45:StrategyforDefeat,p.135.

42. G.Perrault,TheSecretofD-Day,p.165;H.Guderian,PanzerLeader,p.331.

43. R.Kershaw,p.35.

44. M.Howard,p.119.

45. C.Wilmot,p.200.

46. Ibid.,p.207.

47. G.Perrault,p.220.

48. C.Cruickshank,p.171.

49. D.Owen,pp.124–7;D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.255.

50. R.Hesketh,p.25.

51. S.Reit,Masquerade:TheAmazingCamouflageDeceptionsofWorldWarII,p.38.

52. R.Hesketh,pp.36–7.

53. PROAIR37/882.

54. A.CaveBrown,p.604.

55. R.Hesketh,pp.83–4.

56. S.Reit,pp.35–40.

57. M.YoungandR.Stamp,pp.137–8.

58. M.Howard,pp.123–5.

59. J.C.Masterman,TheDoubleCrossSystem,1939–45,p.156.

60. D.Owen,pp.129–30.

61. J.Haswell,TheIntelligenceandDeceptionoftheD-DayLandings,pp.150–1.

62. B.H.LiddellHart,p.396.

63. D.Owen,p.134.

64. W.Warlimont,InsideHitler’sHeadquarters,p.422.

65. D.Owen,pp.139–45.

66. PROAIR14/725.

67. M.YoungandR.Stamp,pp.78–80.

68. M.Howard,p.188.

69. O.N.Bradley,ASoldier’sStory,p.344.

70. G.Perrault,p.239.

CHAPTER10.MASKIROVKA

1. Y. A. Yefrimov and S. G. Chermashentsev, ‘Maskirovka’, in SovietMilitary Encyclopedia, vol. 5,Moscow,Voyenizdat,1978,pp.175–7.

2. M.Dewar,TheArtofDeceptioninWarfare,p.83.

3. F.Myshak,‘ModernCamouflage’,Teckhnika-Molodeghi(March1968),pp.1–3.

4. P.Mel’nikov,‘OperationalMaskirovka’,inVoyenno-IstoricheskiyZhurnal(April1982),p.18.

5. G.K.Zhukov,TheMemoirsofMarshalZhukov,p.156.

6. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia:SovietDeceptioninWorldWarII’,inD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig(eds.),StrategicMilitaryDeception,p.243.

7. D.Glantz,SovietMilitaryDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar,pp.21–3.

8. F.Halder,Kriegstagebuch,vol.7,Kolhammer,Stuttgart,1962,pp.168–9.

9. Ibid.,p.188.

10. A.Seaton,TheBattleforMoscow,p.198.

11. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,pp.246–8.

12. D.Glantz,pp.107–8.

13. Ibid.,pp.99–103.

14. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.250.

15. E.Ziemke,StalingradtoBerlin:TheGermanDefeatintheEast,p.46.

16. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.248.

17. L.B.Ely,TheRedArmyToday,p.87.

18. K.K.Rokossovskiy,ASoldier’sDuty,p.152.

19. D.Glantz,p.113.

20. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.249.

21. Ibid.,pp.252–3.

22. A.Clark,Barbarossa:TheRussian–GermanConflict,1941–45,p.272.

23. W.Görlitz,PaulusandStalingrad,p.197.

24. Ibid.,p.229.

25. NA‘AOKlaKriegstagebuchNr.14’,19November1942,inSixthArmy,FileNo.33224/2.

26. D.Glantz,pp.118–19.

27. Ibid.,p.561.

28. Ibid.,pp.244–7.

29. Ibid.,pp.267–8.

30. FieldRegulationsof theRedArmy1944, translationby theOfficeof theAssistantChiefofStaffG-2,GSUSA,publishedbyJPRS,1985.

31. G.K.Zhukov,p.525.

32. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.260.

33. S.Shtemenko,TheSovietGeneralStaffatWar,1941–45,pp.300–1.

34. K.K.Rokossovskiy,p.237.

35. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.261.

36. NA‘OKH,GenStdH,FHONr.1794/44,2–3.6.44’,inForeignArmiesEast,FileNo.H3/185.

37. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,p.267.

38. E.Ziemke,StalingradtoBerlin,pp.315-16.

39. S.Shtemenko,p.234.

40. E.Ziemke,‘StalingradandBelorussia’,pp.268–9.

41. J. J.Dziak, ‘SovietDeception:TheOrganizational andOperationalTradition’, inB.D.DaileyandP. J.Parker(eds.), Soviet Strategic Deception, pp. 10–11. See also D. Sevin, ‘Operation Scherhorn’,Military Review(March1966),pp.35–43.

42. D.Glantz,p.475–88.

43. Ibid.,p.498.

44. M.Dewar,pp.88–9.

45. P.H.Vigor,SovietBlitzkriegTheory,p.105.

46. D.Glantz,pp.544–6.

47. P.H.Vigor,pp.108–10.

48. D.Glantz,pp.564,569–70.

49. Ibid.,pp.559–60.

50. P.H.Vigor,pp.149–50.

51. C.L.Smith,SovietMaskirovko,www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/smith.html,pp.10–11.

52. L.FreedmanandE.Karsh,TheGulfConflict,p.367.

53. C.L.Smith,pp.5–8.

54. C.N.Donnelly,‘TheHumanFactorinSovietMilitaryPolicy’,MilitaryReview(March1985),p.21.

55. N.TrulockIII,‘TheRoleofDeceptioninSovietMilitaryPlanning’,inB.D.DaileyandP.J.Parker(eds.),SovietStrategicDeception,p.282.

56. R.Beaumont,Maskirovka:SovietConcealment,CamouflageandDeception,p.31.

57. Ibid.,p.34.

58. A.Postovalov,‘ModellingtheCombatOperationsoftheGroundForces’,VoyennayaMysl,no.3(1969).

59. P.H.Vigor,‘DoubtsandDifficultiesConfrontingaWould-BeSovietAttacker’,RUSIJournal(June1980),pp.32–8.

60. J.Valenta, ‘SovietViewsofDeception’, inD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig (eds.),StrategicMilitaryDeception,pp.339–40.

61. SeeJ.Valenta,SovietInterventioninCzechoslovakia,1968:AnatomyofaDecision.

62. G.F.Krivosheev(ed.),RemovingtheSecretSeal:CasualtyFiguresoftheArmedForcesinWar,CombatActionandMilitaryConflicts,Moscow,Voyenizdat,1993,pp.397–8.

63. L.Grau(ed.),TheBearWentovertheMountain:SovietCombatTacticsinAfghanistan,pp.199–200.

64. P.H.Vigor,SovietBlitzkriegTheory,p.141.

65. J.ValentainD.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,pp.345–7.

66. M.Dewar,p.190.

67. L.Grau,pp.61–4.

CHAPTER11.DECEPTIONINCOUNTER-REVOLUTIONARYANDIRREGULARWARFARE

1. E.Montagu,TheManWhoNeverWas,pp.109–10.

2. M.R.D.Foot,Resistance,p.181.

3. M.YoungandR.Stamp,TrojanHorses:DeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar,p.198.

4. D.Brown,TheFettermanMassacre.

5. C.E.Callwell,SmallWars,p.54.

6. M.Dewar,TheArtofDeceptioninWarfare,pp.181.

7. C.E.Callwell,p.55.

8. Ibid.,p.174.

9. Ibid.,pp.175–6.

10. MaoTse-tung,OnGuerrillaWarfare,p.41.

11. W.W.Whitson,TheChineseHighCommand,pp.173–5.

12. F.Kitson,LowIntensityOperations,p.29.

13. K. Jeffery, ‘Colonial Warfare, 1900–39’, in C. McInnes and G. D. Sheffield (eds.),Warfare in the Twentieth

Century:TheoryandPractice,p.32.

14. SeeC.Sykes,OrdeWingate,London,Collins,1959,pp.141,149–58.

15. M.Dewar,pp.182–3.

16. F.Kitson,p.95.

17. P.Melshen,‘Pseudo-Operations’,pp.23–7,34.Thisexcellentstudyofthesubjectisunfortunatelynotavailableinpublishedform.

18. R.Jackson,TheMalayanEmergency,p.14.

19. PRODEFE11/36,12.05.1950.

20. P.Melshen,pp.43–4.

21. PRODEFE11/42,30.11.1950.

22. D.Owen,BattleofWits,pp.158–64.

23. P.Melshen,pp.59–60.

24. R.BEdgerton,MauMau:AnAfricanCrucible,pp.42–55.SeealsoF.Furendi,TheMauMauWarinPerspective,London,JamesCurry,1989.

25. F.Kitson,GangsandCounter-Gangs,pp.73–4.ThisisapersonalaccountofKitson’sexperiencesinKenya.HelaterwroteLowIntensityOperationsasaresultofadefencescholarshipinwhichpseudo-operationsareplacedwithinhisframeworkforcounter-insurgency(pp.95–102,187–97).SeealsoBunchofFives,asummationofhiscareer.

26. Ibid.,pp.82–4.

27. Ibid.,pp.93–4,102–4,121–2,186–7,209.

28. P.Melshen,pp.108–9.

29. R. Reid Daley, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton, RSA, Galago Publishing, 1982; and P. Stiff, SelousScouts, Alberton, RSA, Galago Publishing, 1984. Both give somewhat self-congratulatory and glorifiedaccounts(ReidDaleywasaformercommandingofficeroftheunit).

30. TheQ-patrolsofCyprusaredescribedinG.Grivas,GuerrillaWarfareandEOKA’sStruggle(trans.A.A.Pallis),London,Longman’s,1964,pp.50–2.

31. T.Geraghty,WhoDaresWins,pp.401–2.

32. M.Barthorp,CratertotheCreggan:AHistoryoftheRoyalAnglianRegiment,1964–74,p.39.

33. P.Melshen,p.149.

34. A.Horne,ASavageWarofPeace,p.390.

35. SeeB.J.Kerkvliet,TheHukRebellion:AStudyofPeasantRevoltinthePhilippines,Berkeley,CA,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1977;andE.Lachica,TheHuk:PhilippineAgrarianSocietyinRevolt,NewYork,Praeger,1971.

36. P.Melshen,p.220.

37. R.H.Spector,AdviceandSupport:UnitedStatesArmyinVietnam,TheEarlyYears,1941–60,pp.221–3,282–6,296–302.

38. A.Krepinevich,TheArmyandVietnam,pp.4–5.

39. Counter-InsurgencyOperations:AHandbook for theSuppressionofCommunistGuerrilla/TerroristOperations,Norfolk,VA,ArmedForcesStaffCollege,01.03.1962,p.34.

40. Apersonal accountof theseoperationscanbe found in J.E.Acre,ProjectOmega:Eyeof theBeast,Hellgate,1999.

41. P.Melshen,pp.265–72.

42. W.C.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports,pp.164–6.SeealsoL.W.Walt,StrangeWar,StrangeStrategy,NewYork,FunkandWagnalls,1970,fortheMarinecommander’sview.

43. P.Melshen,p.298.

44. J.B.Dwyer,SeaborneDeception:TheHistoryofUSNavyBeachJumpers,pp.114–15.

45. J.R.Arnold,TetOffensive,1968,p.21.

46. R.Beaumont,Maskirovka:SovietCamouflage,ConcealmentandDeception,p.42.

47. P.Melshen,p.301.

48. M.Dewar,p.190.

49. W.Colby,LostVictory,p.264.

50. SeeG.Lewy,‘DeceptionandRevolutionaryWarfare’,inD.A.ChartersandM.A.J.Tugwell(eds.),DeceptionOperations:StudiesintheEastWestContext.

51. J.Arnold,p.12.

52. J.Hughes–Wilson,MilitaryIntelligenceBlunders,pp.175–80.

53. D.Oberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar,p.119.

54. J.Hughes-Wilson,p.198.

55. Ibid.,210–15.

56. P.BishopandE.Mallie,TheProvisionalIRA,pp.177–8.

57. P.Melshen,p.183.

58. M.Urban,BigBoysRules:TheSecretStruggleAgainsttheIRA,p.37–49.

59. P.BishopandE.Mallie,pp.239–42.

60. J.Parker,DeathofaHero,pp.75–8.

CHAPTER12.THEFUTUREOFDECEPTION

1. ‘JournalistsMustAlwaysFightSpin’,TheIndependent(17January2000).

2. J.Haswell,TheTangledWeb:TheArtofTacticalandStrategicDeception,p.124.

3. Ibid.,p.111–12.

4. L.FreedmanandE.Karsh,TheGulfConflict,p.386.

5. J.Blackwell,ThunderintheDesert:TheStrategyandTacticsofthePersianGulfWar,pp.156–7.

6. L.FreedmanandE.Karsh,p.387.

7. H.N.Schwarzkopf,ItDoesn’tTakeaHero,pp.381,440.

8. L.FreedmanandE.Karsh,p.395.

9. N.Freidman,DesertVictory:TheWarforKuwait,p.221.

10. D.Steele,‘TanksandMen:DesertStormfromtheHatches’,Army(June1991).

11. LosAngelesTimes (8August, 17August 1990, 1 January 1991);WashingtonPost (8August 1990);NewYorkTimes(25January1991).

12. ‘MarinesAreatSeaandUnhappy’,WashingtonTimes(18January1991);‘TotheShoresofKuwait’,Newsweek(11February1991).

13. ‘StolenComputerContainedGulfDeceptionPlan’,TheTimes(13March1991).

14. A.M.Codevilla, ‘Space, Intelligence andDeception’, in B.D.Dailey and P. J. Parker (eds.),Soviet StrategicDeception,pp.471–3.

15. Ibid.,pp.474–5.

16. N.TrulockIII,‘TheRoleofDeceptioninSovietMilitaryPlanning’,inB.D.DaileyandP.J.Parker(eds.),SovietStrategicDeception,p.289.

17. R.Beaumont,Maskirovka:SovietCamouflage,ConcealmentandDeception,p.30.

18. C.L.Smith,SovietMaskirovko,www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/smith.html,p.10.

19. A.P.Wavell,TheGoodSoldier,pp.121–56.

20. D.C.DanielandK.L.Herbig,‘PropositionsonMilitaryDeception’,inStrategicMilitaryDeception,p.14.

21. ‘ArmyGoestoWarwithPlatoonsofHolograms’,SundayTelegraph(11May1997).

22. V.Shcedrov,‘CamouflagingTroopsduringRegroupingandManœuvre’,VoennayaMysl(June1966).

23. ‘US“LostCountofUraniumShellsFiredinKosovo”‘,TheIndependent(22November1999).

24. ‘NatoHitsWereOnlyaTenthofThoseClaimed,SaysUSAirForce’,TheIndependent(8May2000).

25. R.Beaumont,p.18.

26. A.M.Codevilla,pp.468–9.

27. Ibid.,p.10.

28. CornerstonesofInformationWarfare,www.af.mil/lib/corner.html,p.2.

29. M.R.D.Foot,Resistance,p.28.

30. A.P.Wavell,p.47.

31. K.J.Müller,‘AGermanPerspectiveonAlliedDeceptionOperationsintheSecondWorldWar’,inM.I.Handel(ed.),StrategicandOperationalDeceptionintheSecondWorldWar.

32. D.Mure,MasterofDeception,p.87.

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ENDNOTESCHAPTER1:AHistoryofBluffinWarfare*OneoftheshipsroundedPenAnglasintoFishguardBaytobegreetedbythe9-pounderordnanceofthefort.Thiswas

firingthealarmtosummonthelocalvolunteers,andtheshipwithdrew,unawarethatthefort’seight9-poundergunshadonlythreeroundsofammunitionandsixteencartridgesbetweenthem.Itwasthetownsfolk’sresponsibilityforthe supply but they had never taken the threat of invasion seriously (E. H. Stuart Jones,The Last Invasion ofBritain,pp.72-4).

CHAPTER2:TheInformationBattle*PointCounterPoint,London,Flamingo,1994,p.83.

* Ironically, theFrenchwere similarlydeceived in1914by theGermanhabit of giving reserve formations the samenumeral as their parents. So, for example, an army including the IVCorpswould be grouped togetherwith IVReserveCorps.

CHAPTER4:TheMethodsofDeception*ThetermoriginatedduringtheSpanishCivilWar,whentheNationalistgeneralEmilioMolamadearadiobroadcast

sayingthattheNationalistswereadvancingonMadridwithfourcolumnsandclaimingtohavea‘fifthcolumn’inthecityitself.

CHAPTER5:TacticalandOperationalDeception* The word ‘notional’ was first used in a deception context by Dudley Clarke to indicate something or someone

imaginarytothedeceiverbutfactualtotheenemy.

CHAPTER6:StrategicDeception*ItisalsoworthnotingthattheBalkanscampaignwasnotresponsibleforafatalfour-tosix-weekdelaythatledindue

coursetotheGermaninvasionbecomingboggeddownintheRussianwinter.TheexpansionoftheGermanArmyand the associated demand for stores led OKW to realize that German production capacity was insufficient,renderingchangestothetimetablenecessary(M.vanCreveld,‘TheGermanAttackontheUSSR:TheDestructionofaLegend’,EuropeanStudiesReview,vol.2,no.1(January1972),p.83).

*Between17September1939and26June1940theSovietseitherannexedormilitarilyoccupiedeasternPoland,partsofFinland,thepreviouslyindependentBalticstatesofLithuania,LatviaandEstonia,andtheRomanianprovincesofNorthernBukovinaandBessarabia,atotalofapproximately180,000squaremiles.

*SISbecamepartofthemilitaryintelligencedirectorateontheoutbreakofwarandhasbeenknownasMI6eversince.TheSecurityServicebecameMI5.

*SpecialOperationsExecutive,asecretserviceformedunderthepoliticalcontroloftheMinstryofEconomicWarfaretopromoteresistanceandsubversionwithinoccupiedEurope.

CHAPTER7:NavalDeception*TheFrenchfrigateResistanceforexample,whichwascapturedbytheRoyalNavyfollowingthelandingatFishguard,

wasrenamedHMSFisgardintheserviceofhernewmasters.EvenduringtheSecondWorldWarboththeRoyalNavyandKriegsmarineputcapturedsubmarinesintoservice.

*Their ruthlessnesshasalsobeencreditedwithhelping toprovokeunrestrictedsubmarinewarfarebyforcing theU-boats to attack submerged, and thus helping bring theUSA into thewar. Themost notorious examplewas themurderofthecrewofU-27bythecrewoftheQ-shipBarralong(seeA.ColesSlaughteratSea:TheTruthBehindaNavalWarCrime,London,RobertHale,1986).

CHAPTER9:OperationBodyguard*TheSSReichssicherheitshauptamtorSSHauptamt,theReichsecuritymainoffice,wasapowerfulbureauofHeinrich

Himmler’s SS headquarters set up on 27 September 1939 by Reinhard Heydrich. Left over from the SDwerepersonnel and administrative branches (Amt I andAmt II) and newly created were Amt III (Interior), Amt IV(Gestapo), Amt V (Criminal) and Amt VI (Foreign Intelligence). Bureaucratic, over-compartmentalized andinefficient, it nevertheless servedHeydrichwell in his climb to power until his assassination in 1942.HimmlerpersonallyheadedtheRSHAuntilKaltenbrunnertookitoverinJanuary1943.

*ItwasherethatChurchillmadethefamouscommentthatheadsthechapter(W.S.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar,vol.V,TheHingeofFate,p.338).

*Eachhollowconcretecaissonwas230feetlongby60feetacross,andthereforeimpossibletoconceal.Thestorywasputaboutthattheywereboomdefenceunitsfortheprotectionofharbours(PROWO219/2237).

*Therewereinfactfifty-eight.‘Mostofthemwerelow-gradedivisions,andsomewereskeletons,’accordingtovonRundstedt (quoted in LiddellHart,TheOther Side of theHill, p.382). In total: thirty-threewere static, thirteenmobileinfantrydivisions(i.e.,havingthefullcomplementofdivisionaltransport,muchofwhichwasinanycasehorse-drawn), two Fallschirmjäger (parachute), and six panzer divisions (plus the OKW reserve of fourpanzer/panzergrenadierdivisions;seeH.Meyer,p.32).

*QUICKSILVER I was the fiction that the assault on the Pas de Calais would be launched some weeks after theNormandylanding.QUICKSILVERIIcoveredtheradiodeception,QUICKSILVERIIIthedisplayoflandingcraft,QUICKSILVERIVandVthebombingcampaign,andQUICKSILVERVIthedisplayofsixty-fivefalselightingschemesalongthesouthcoast,includinganexactreplicaoftheportandrailwaylightingofNewhavenatCuckmereHaven.

*By12June255dummycrafthadbeenputondisplaybymenof4thBn,NorthamptonshireRegiment,and10thBn,WorcestershireRegiment,and‘operated’bynavalpersonnelatGreatYarmouth,Lowestoft,intheriversDebenandOrwell,andatDoverandFolkestone(M.Howard,p.127;G.Hartcup,pp.89-90).