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IMPACT OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT ON KENYA’S SECURITY

(1990 – 2013)

JOAN WAMAHIGA

R140\23088\2013

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF

AN ORDINARY DIPLOMA IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

(IDIS),UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

SEPTEMBER, 2014

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of a

diploma to any other university

……………………… …….. …………………………………

Joan Wamahiga Date

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the

university supervisor

…………………………. ……………………………

Mr. Martin Nguru Date

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank God for being with me throughout the entire period of writing this

project.

I also wish to thank my supervisor Mr. Martin Nguru for being there during the formative

stage of formulation of the topic and commencing the study. I thank my classmates and

friends for their words of encouragement and exchange of ideas which provided useful

insights at various stages of the study.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my mother Lucy Ndirangu for being a source of inspiration in

my life and for the great support and encouragement to me throughout my life that I can

achieve anything that I desire and for her being there for me during the research period. I

thank her.

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ABSTRACT

There is growing evidence that the protracted Somali conflict has escalated into security

threats to her neighbours within the Horn of Africa region. Among the many affected

neighbours of the Somali nation, Kenya is a textbook example. To this effect therefore,

this project argues that the Somali conflict has had negative impacts on the state of

security in Kenya as well as having a “domino effect” on other sectors of the Kenyan

economy.

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ACRONYMS

ATPU Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit

CBP Customs and Border Control

CJTF-HOA- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

DoD Department of Defense

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IGAD Inter-governmental Authority of Development

KDF Kenyan Defense Forces

KRA Kenya Revenue Authority

MSSIS Maritime Security and Safety Information System

NFD Northern Frontier District

NGO Non-Governmental Organizational

UNEP United Nation Environmental Programme

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USC United Somali Congress

WCO World Customs Organization

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.................................................................................................................ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT..................................................................................................iii

DEDICATION....................................................................................................................iv

ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................v

ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY...............................................1

1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................1

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem...............................................................................2

1.3 Objectives of the Study..................................................................................................3

1.4 Justification of the Study...............................................................................................3

1.4.1 Policy Justification...................................................................................................3

1.4.2 Academic Justification.............................................................................................4

1.5 Literature Review..........................................................................................................4

1.5.1 Origin of the Somalia Conflict................................................................................4

1.5.2 Kenya’s Poor State of Security due to the Somali Crisis........................................8

1.5.3 Conclusion.............................................................................................................10

1.6 Theoretical Framework................................................................................................10

1.7 Study Hypothesis.........................................................................................................11

1.8 Research Methodology................................................................................................11

1.9 Scope and Limitations of Study...................................................................................11

1.10 Chapter Outline..........................................................................................................12

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND OF THE STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA

AND THE CORRESPONDING RISE OF INSECURITY IN KENYA.....................13

2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................13

2.2 Background to the State Collapse in Somalia in The 1990s........................................13

2.3 Somalia – Ethiopia conflict.........................................................................................14

2.4 Collapse of government in Somalia.............................................................................15

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2.5 The Somali Intractable Conflict and the Corresponding Security Threats to Kenya. .17

2.6 The state of piracy in the East African Coast..............................................................18

2.7 Islamic insurgency in Somalia.....................................................................................21

CHAPTER THREE: KENYA’S SECURITY EFFORTS TO CURB INSECURITY

EMANATING FROM STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA.......................................24

3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................24

3.2 Terrorism.....................................................................................................................24

3.2.1 International Cooperation as a Counter-Terrorism Measure.................................28

3.2.2 Anti – Terrorism Legislations and Policy Actions in Kenya.................................33

3.3 Military Interventions by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF)......................................34

3.3 Counter – Piracy Efforts in Kenya...............................................................................34

3.4 Effectiveness of Kenya’s Security Measures against the Security Threats Arising

from Somali State Collapse...............................................................................................35

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF DATA..................................................................39

4.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................39

4.2 Data Analysis...............................................................................................................39

4.2.1 Has The Somalia State Collapse Led To Threats To Security In Kenya?.............39

4.2.1 Kenya’s response to the various security threats that have been posed by the

Somali state collapse and the subsequent protracted civil war..............................42

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.45

5.1 Summary......................................................................................................................45

5.2 Recommendations........................................................................................................45

5.3 Conclusions..................................................................................................................46

REFERENCES................................................................................................................48

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The Republic of Kenya and its citizens have witnessed great impacts of the conflict in

Somalia on its security since its inception in the late 1980s due to the resistance of Somali

armed forces to the dictatorial rule of the then leader Siad Barre and his regime. After the

armed forces finally managed to overthrow Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, the civil war in

Somalia officially begun.

The civil war which has been going on for over two decades has negatively impacted on

the Somalis as well as the Horn of Africa region adversely affecting neighboring states

that are in close proximity with Kenya itself such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. This

has seen great attention and concern from the regional and international bodies and states

on the ongoing crisis.

The Republic of Somalia was founded in 1960 from a territory contained in the colony of

Italian Somaliland and the British protectorate, Somaliland. In 1969, after 9 years of

democratic government, a Somali military officer by the name Siad Barre seized

government in Somalia through a military coup and declared it a socialist state. Somalia

was initially a client state of the Soviet Union but President Siad Barre flipped allegiance

to the United States after Somalia invaded the contested Ethiopian region of Ogaden in

1977.1 The United States gave aid to Somalia despite President Siad Barre’s poor human

rights record and this also saw clan divisions within Somalia deepen under his corrupt

rule.

Clans opposed to President Barre’s rule went ahead to form armed forces which had a

similar agenda of resisting his regime. Finally, in January 1991, armed forces by the

name of United Somali Congress (USC) ousted Siad Barre from the capital Mogadishu.

After removing Barre from power, the warlord-led clan armed forces then descended

upon each other, causing intense inter-clan battles. These battles escalated into a

1 Center for American Progress, Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting p.7

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nationwide war which saw the state of Somalia collapse into a civil war which has lasted

until now.

External responses to the conflict came late as wars in other parts of the globe for

example, the Gulf War commanded more attention from international bodies. Help

however finally came in the year1992 when a UN diplomatic engagement begun and a

ceasefire was negotiated in Mogadishu between the two major fighting factions. The

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was also formed and brought into

Somalia but it was however unable to quell the violence and address the famine being

faced by the citizens.

As this research is meant to focus on the impact that the ongoing Somali conflict has had

and is still having on Kenya, the research shall concentrate more specifically on the

negative impacts on the Kenya’s state security. This is due to the fact that the conflict’s

negative impacts on the state of security in Kenya, has also had a “domino effect” on

other sectors of the Kenyan economy.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Over the past two decades, Somalia has been through a constant and seemingly unending

civil war. This has seen failure of governments despite numerous attempts to set up

functioning governments charged with the responsibility to oversee quelling of the

violence and unrest and a return of peace and tranquility in the nation. This constant in-

fighting amongst the different Somali armed forces has brought with it a collapse of the

previously peaceful state. It has also seen an overflow of both internally and externally

displaced innocent Somali citizens who are constantly fleeing their homes and country at

large due to the ongoing war.

The failed state of Somalia has been a world focus, both regionally and internationally.

This focus has largely been due to the civil war and it has seen international organizations

like the United Nations take the matter into their own hands by making several attempts

to bring back peace in the nation through actions. It has done this by coming up with

peace-keeping missions like the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) and

sending in peace-keeping troops into the warring country all in an attempt to stop the

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violence and bring back peace to the nation, but with an undesired level of success as

Somalia is still engaging in war to this date. Due to the influx of refugees fleeing from

Somalia into the neighbouring countries in search of their own personal security, Kenya

has acted as one of the hosts to these refugees and this has brought with it drastic impacts

and changes to its state of security as a nation with the impacts being felt from all the

corners of the country. With this harsh reality in view, this study is being carried out with

the intention to find out what the impacts of the war in Somalia are on the status of

Kenya’s security since the year 1990.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is;

To ascertain the degree to which the protracted Somali civil war has

negatively impacted on Kenya’s security.

The specific objectives of this study are;

i. To establish the methods which Kenya has employed to address the security crisis

caused by the Somali conflict

ii. To determine the effects of Kenya’s response to the Somali conflict on its own

state security and that of Somalia

iii. To explore the implications of the influx of Somali refugees on Kenya’s security

1.4 Justification of the Study

1.4.1 Policy Justification

Kenya’s social, economic and political growth and well-being today and also in future

needs stability of security which is the government’s constitutional responsibility to

provide it and also ensure its continuity. The government has in the past and current times

been grappling with the deteriorating state of its internal security as a result of external

insecurity mainly brought about by the ongoing conflict in Somalia. However, the

measures being employed so far to tackle this insecurity menace have proved to be

disappointing and at times inefficient. Achieving a lasting solution and end to this issue

of insecurity is an essential yet uphill task for Kenya’s government, but it could be

rendered meaningless within a very short period of time if the past security mishaps

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continue to happen. In light of this, the study is meant to evaluate on the negative impacts

of the Somali conflict on Kenya’s security and its citizens as well. From the research

findings, this study will aid the government of Kenya in evaluating its policies and

approaches on tackling with the insecurity issue. This will then help it to see where there

are weaknesses in its formulations and implementation and therefore make the necessary

adjustments in order to curb this insecurity issue that it is facing.

1.4.2 Academic Justification

This research will also be an addition to the already existing literature works on the state

of Kenya’s security brought about by impacts of the Somali conflict. The findings can

then be utilized by future researchers and academicians as they carry out their own

literary works.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Origin of the Somalia Conflict

The Somali speaking peoples of the Horn of Africa have always regarded themselves as

one people and have therefore never excused the colonial powers for the balkanization of

the Somali nation into separate entities a phenomenon that led one British author, Salman

Rushdie2, opining that, “to be Somali is to be a people united by one language and

divided by maps.” It is this analogy of the Somali nation that has been the cause of one of

the most protracted conflicts in modern history especially since the collapse of

communism in 1989 that was signified by the fall of the Berlin Wall, a period dogged by

the constant threat of a no holds barred nuclear Armageddon that hang like the proverbial

swords of Damocles upon the earth.

History has it that since 1960 when the Republic of Somalia was founded, it only

experienced the functionalities of a democracy for nine years before it was taken over by

President Siad Barre through a military coup in 1969. After taking over power and

declaring Somalia to be a socialist state, President Siad Barre’s regime saw an increase in

clan divisions and animosity against his rule. This eventually saw the clans uniting to 2 Salman Rushdie was referring to the colonization of East Africa by European powers splitting the Somali people and creating enormous havoc in the process. See Rushdie, S. (1991, July 6). Somalis are not Ethiopians. Washington Post , p. 17

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form armed forces with the aim of removing him from power. In the year 1991, the

armed forces going by the name United Somali Congress (USC) finally succeeded in

removing Siad Barre from power and after doing this, they took control of the capital

Mogadishu.3

The Ogaden war can be arguably said to have erupted in 1976, widespread violence

erupted in the Ogaden as Barre financed Somali guerrillas to attack Ethiopians. The

Somali government officially declared war on Ethiopia in 1977. Somalia sent thousands

of soldiers into the Ogaden and quickly captured large amounts of Ethiopian territory.

Somali forces struck so quickly that by mid-September 1977, Ethiopia conceded that

ninety percent of the Ogaden was in Somali hands. Somali weaponry primarily consisted

of Pre-1977 Soviet donations, including over two hundred and fifty medium-armour

tanks and more than three hundred armoured personal carriers.4

Somali troops attacked the major outpost of Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden at the city of

Harer, but failed to dislodge the troops from the city. The Ethiopian army regrouped, and

with the help of eleven thousand Cuban troops and Soviet aircraft and artillery,

counterattacked, driving Somali forces from many of Ogaden’s major towns and cities.

Somali forces were seriously weakened by this counterattack. In March, 1978, Somalia

recalled the national army from the Ogaden. It had lost nearly eight thousand soldiers,

three-fourths of its armoured units, and more than half of the Somali Air Force.5

Coupled by the 1987-1991 Somaliland Liberation War, the aftermath of the Ogaden War

was the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991. The Ogaden war has been

interpreted by some as the single most important turning point for the Siad Barre regime.

At the outset, the conflict caused a flood of mainly ethnic Somali refugees. By 1979 there

were officially one million three hundred thousand refugees in the country. More than a

half of these refugees were settled in the northern part of Somalia, where one in four of

the population was a refugee, a situation that precipitated a refugee crisis.6

3 Center for American Progress, Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting p.7 4Rediker, E. (2003).The Ogaden: A Microcosm of Global Conflict. Pittsburg.5 Ibid6Ahmed, I., & Green, R. (1999). The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local - Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction. Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 1 , 113-127

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This in part is due to the fact that the arrival of forced migrants intensified pressure on

limited physical resources and services, further aggravating tensions between local

inhabitants and refugees. Resentment intensified as the Issaqs were reduced to second-

class citizens in their own territory. The government’s policy of recruiting refugees into

the army also spurred on tensions. More generally the failed war wholly eroded the

credibility of the army and police, the asserted guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism.7

Other scholars have however criticized the aforementioned causes as well as analytical

approach to the state collapse in Somalia describing it as historical and not particularly

relevant to current problems, as it assumes that the social structure of the Somali society

remained intact following its integration into the world economy.8

Instead, these new breed of scholars argue that the state collapse in Somalia was as a

result of serious economic mismanagement has also played a key role and has been one

of the instrumental causes of state collapse. Since abandoning the experiment of

Scientific Socialism in 1980, the government lacked a coherent development strategy. Its

macroeconomic policy was described as erratic, inconsistent, and often moved from one

set of objectives to another, thereby confusing the domestic market. In 1990 the external

debt was US$ 1.9 billion, which was equivalent to three hundred and sixty per cent of the

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) excluding ‘frozen debt’ to some Eastern Europe

countries.9

The scholars also point out that the public sector crisis originated from massive

expenditure on defense and security services. The regime was also highly successful in

obtaining military support. Somalia was one of the most heavily militarized states in

Africa and one of the top recipients of US and Soviet military aid during the Cold War.

Moreover, more than eighty per cent of refugee aid, which in 1986 together with other

non-military aid accounted for twenty five per cent of the country’s Gross National

Product (GNP), was diverted to the army.10

7 Ibid8 Ibid9 Ibid10Ibid Op. Cit.

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The net effect of this was anarchy and lawlessness as well as competition over resources

especially the port of Kismayu after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The warlords, for

example, fought to control Mogadishu, Kismayu or Baidoa to access resources. Foreign

companies also fuelled the perennial conflict as they explore natural gas in disputed areas

between regions, administrations and clans. The conflict over resources is epitomized by

the conflict between the Hawiye and Darood over the control of Juba and Shabelle river

valleys. As Joseph Kioi Mbugua (2013) argues, economically, Somalia performs poorly

due to effects of the long war and resource exploitation has not only exacerbated the

conflict but also made it protracted.11

However, inter-clan wars led by clan warlords begun and eventually erupted into a full-

blown countrywide civil war which saw millions of Somali citizens who were caught up

in the conflict being killed while others were turned into refugees and fled into both

neighboring and far off countries to get away from the war. The warlords have ever since

been fighting to control Mogadishu, Kismayu or Baidoa to access resources. Foreign







To this date, the conflict is yet to be resolved over two decades on. The coming up of a

solution to this crisis is a crucial part of seeing stability in the Horn of Africa region so as

to give hope and to ensure growth for the future generations of Somalia.

1.5.2 Kenya’s Poor State of Security due to the Somali Crisis

Since the civil war in Somalia officially begun in 1991, Kenya has seen its state of

security deteriorate. This has largely been contributed due to the influx of incoming

refugees fleeing from the war-torn nation of Somalia and the great polarity of Kenya’s

11Mbugua, J. (2013). Drivers of Insecurity in Somalia: Mapping Contours of Violence. Nairobi: International Peace Support Training Centre.12 Ibid

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borders which has seen even non- registered refugees gain access into the country. Over

the years, terrorism has become a global phenomenon and Kenya has not been spared

having experienced major attacks dating as far back as 1998. The Northern and North-

Eastern regions of Kenya are most notorious for poor security due to the high number of

Somali refugees who settled mostly in these areas and some of whom have gained

citizenship status and therefore being referred to as Kenyan Somalis. Unrest in these two

regions of Kenya has largely been due to inter-clan conflicts from the Kenyan Somalis

who have settled in these areas which has caused many deaths to the people caught up in

the fighting. Apart from inter-clan fighting in the Northern and North Eastern regions,

Kenya has also witnessed and unfortunately been a victim of major terrorist attacks

within its borders and the perpetrators being terrorists from the group Al-Shabaab whose

capital base is inside Somalia and one of their aims being launching these attacks on

Kenya is intended to destabilize the country.13

Based on documented findings and revelations, a major factor that has triggered the poor

state of Kenya’s security is lack of preparedness of its security organs to counter terrorist

attacks which the terrorist group Al-Shabaab has largely maximized on. This terrorist

group also takes responsibility for terrorist attacks that occur on Kenyan territory

claiming that their reason is due to the fact that Kenya has its troops inside Somali

territory. Kenya however vows not to withdraw its troops from the troubled country and

this has seen heightened tensions between the two countries and also between the Kenyan

citizens and the Kenyan Somalis who came to settle into the country having initially been

refugees from the war-torn nation.

In specific terms, the state collapse in Somalia and the resultant anarchy created non-

securitized spaces of terrorists. Majority of these terrorists were veterans returning from

Mujahedeen expedition in the then Soviet occupied Afghanistan resulting in the Soviet-

Afghan War of 1979-1988 which led to the soviet withdrawal from Afghan. The

Mujahedeen, inspired by victory in Afghanistan, the Soviet-Afghan War veterans turned

their eyes towards the West largely seen as acquiescing in the Palestinian question. These

Mujahedeen turned terrorists found safe haven in lawless Somalia.

13 Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20 p.113

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The net effect was a spill-over of terrorist activities from Somalia into Kenya starting

with attacks on Western interests in the country. Kenya, for example, has been the

battlefield of tragic terrorist attacks on western interests twice since the year 1998; once

in 1998 when the US Embassy in down town Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, was attacked

(killing 212 people and wounding over 4000) and a second time in 2002 when an Israeli-

owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala at the Kenyan Coast was bombed (killing 13) as well

as an attempted shooting down of an Israeli jetliner taking off from the Moi International

Airport.14

In addition, there has been an increase in piracy ever since the collapse of the state in

Somalia. As Wetangula (2013) argues, prior to 1990, piracy was not a major issue off the

coast of Somalia, but like most coastal nations there were irregular incidences of armed

robbery against small fishing or leisure craft that fell prey to an armed group, or ships

that foundered off the coast.15

Wetangula further argues that a more structured form of piracy began in the mid 1990’s

when some armed groups, claiming they were authorized coast guards charged with

protecting Somalia’s fishing resources, attacked vessels they claimed were fishing

illegally in their territorial waters and held them for ransom. This slowly expanded after

2000 to any vessel that sailed within or close to, Somali territorial waters. Both vessels

and crews would be held hostage and ransom demanded. Somali piracy has imposed

significant global costs, particularly on nearby economies.16

1.5.3 Conclusion

From the above review of literature of the Somali state collapse as well as the attendant

causes of the state collapse as propounded and expounded upon by various scholars,

analysts, conflict and security practitioners as well as other notable authorities both

within and without the domain of international relations, the study finds that the Somali

14 Laing, A. (2013, September 21). Nairobi Assault: Kenyan Terrorist Attacks Since 1980. The Telegraph.15Wetangula, J. (2013). The Effect of Somali Piracy on Kenya's Maritime Sector. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.16 Ibid

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state collapse has adversely impacted on her neighbours in the Horn of Africa region in

general. In particular, it has adversely impacted negatively on Kenya’s security.

This study is however intended to delve deeper into this, and focus mainly on the

negative impacts that the war and instability in Somalia is having on Kenya’s security

and how this is having a spiraling effect on other key sectors of Kenya’s economy after

putting into consideration that the nation’s stability on its key sectors rely heavily on its

level and state of security.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study will be based on the liberalism theory which is also found to be one of the

main schools of the international relations theory. The core issues that the liberalism

theory seeks to address are the problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in

international relations and the methods that can be put into place to achieve this.17State

preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues that they

face, which therefore means that state preferences is a fundamental cause of state

behavior in world politics.18 Liberals look into conflicting state preferences that are

derived from hostile nationalist or political ideologies, disputes over appropriable

economic resources or exploitation of unrepresented political constituencies. For

liberalists, social pressures lead one or more “aggressor” state to possess “revisionist”

preferences that are so extreme, or risk-acceptant that other states are willing to submit.

This is a necessary condition for war.19This theory will be applied in this study to show

that Kenya’s counter-terrorism efforts towards the Somali security threat as well as

counter-piracy operations are a necessary condition as its state preference is to see that

the peace and stability of its neighbor country is achieved as this is crucial and essential

for its own. Liberalism theory also goes further to demonstrate the role of international

law in governing the behavior of states towards each other. It also shows how the values

and actions of individual states have impacts on other states’ behavior.

17 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005 p.5618 S. Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, Princeton University Press, 2000 p.5619 J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully, Indianapolis Hackett Publishers, 1983 p.102

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1.7 Study Hypothesis

i. The Somali conflict has negatively impacted Kenya’s security.

ii. The Somali conflict has not negatively impacted Kenya’s security.

1.8 Research Methodology

This study will be written using secondary data which will be derived from first-hand

information written by other field researchers. It shall make use of reports written by

relevant government authorities, inter-governmental organizations and also non-

governmental organizations. The literature review is from published books obtained from

the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library in the University of Nairobi, local and international

media interviews, publications and articles. The research will also use authentic internet

sources and journals from previous scholars and authors. The study will use all relevant

documents available from classmates, lecturers, the supervisor and also from previously

covered course content. The data collected has been analyzed for the final product of this

research project.

1.9 Scope and Limitations of Study

The study will mainly focus on the negative impacts that the Somali conflict has had on

Kenya’s security. It will work within a timeline of twenty three years that is from the year

1990 to 2013 looking at what has transpired within those years, both on the case of

Somali’s conflict and also the negative impacts this has had on Kenya’s security.

Limitations of this study major mainly on the availability of security information as some

of the published government documents on this issue are labelled as “classified” and are

therefore not available and accessible to citizens who are not within Kenya’s security

force. Time is also a limitation as the scope of study does not go beyond the year 2013

yet this is still an ongoing issue that the Kenyan government and its citizens are grappling

with to this day and hence there is still ongoing impacts being experienced which would

be relevant for study and also to be documented.

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1.10 Chapter Outline

This research paper is arranged into five chapters. Chapter one contains the introduction

of the topic of study, the statement of the research problem, objectives of the research,

justification of the research, literature review, theoretical framework, the study

hypotheses, the methodology of the study, the scope and limitations of the study.

Secondly, chapter two focuses on the background of the state collapse in Somalia as well

as the threats of insecurity posed by the state collapse, attempts to dissect the background

of the state collapse in Somalia as well as the corresponding rise of insecurity in Kenya as

a result of the adverse effects of insecurity that have resulted in the over twenty years that

the intractable conflict in the Somali nation has been ongoing and of which form the

scope of this study.

Chapter three seeks to examine the data collected in chapter two, as well as how Kenya

has responded to the insecurity posed by the protracted civil war orchestrated and

perpetrated in the battlefields of the sick man of the Horn of Africa region; Somalia.

Chapter four analyzes the data collected in chapter three and offers a detailed analysis in

light of the study’s hypothesis as well as theoretical frameworks. The final chapter,

chapter five, contains the summary, recommendations and conclusions of the study.

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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND OF THE STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA AND THE

CORRESPONDING RISE OF INSECURITY IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to dissect the background of the state collapse in Somalia as well as

the corresponding rise of insecurity in Kenya as a result of the adverse effects of

insecurity that have resulted in the over twenty years that the intractable conflict in the

Somali nation has been ongoing and of which form the scope of this study. The chapter

first dissects and analyzes the events preceding the Somali state collapse as well as the

causes of the state collapse as propounded and expounded upon by various scholars,

analysts, conflict and security practitioners as well as other notable authorities both

within and without the domain of international relations.

2.2 Background to the State Collapse in Somalia in The 1990s

According to Walter Oyugi (2002), historically, the Somali speaking peoples of the Horn

of Africa have always regarded themselves as one people and have therefore never

excused the colonial powers for the balkanization of the Somali nation into separate

entities. It is this phenomenon that led to one British author, Salman Rushdie, opining

that, “to be Somali is to be a people united by one language and divided by maps”

(Rushdie, 1991). This balkanization factor became a source of friction and tension

between the new Republic of Somalia (that was created in 1960 after the amalgamation

of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) and her neighbours Kenya and

Ethiopia which had large populations of Somali in the Northern Frontier District (NFD)

and the Ogaden regions respectively.20

As a matter of fact, conflict based on irredentist tendencies i.e., whereby the largely

Somali populated North Eastern part of Kenya, sought to secede and rejoin the greater

Somalia had emerged on the eve of independence with the Somali of Northern Kenya

20Oyugi, W. (2002).Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon. Nairobi: United Nations Public Administration Network

13

demanding independence for their district, the Northern Frontier District, as a prelude to

unification with the Republic of Somalia, the latter having become independent in 1960.

This conflict, which assumed a political character in its formative years, developed into

open warfare between the Somali community and the newly independent republic of

Kenya in what would become famously known as the Shifta War.21

2.3 Somalia – Ethiopia conflict

Long after the standoff between the two states Somali and Kenya had been resolved than

another one erupted between the Somali state and Ethiopia over the Ogaden and Haud

regions of Ethiopia which are predominantly populated by ethnic Somalis still hoping to

one day live the greater Somali dream. Then Somali president Siad Barre’s idea of

Somali pan- nationalism eventually led to a major war over the Ogaden region with

Ethiopia in what is arguably known as the Ogaden or Ethio-Somali War, intense Cold

War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, and finally the collapse of

Somalia. The Ogaden war not only helped to destroy Somalia, but had brutal

repercussions in neighbouring countries as well. The Ogaden war can be arguably said to

have erupted in 1976, widespread violence erupted in the Ogaden as Barre financed

Somali guerrillas to attack Ethiopians. The Somali government officially declared war on

Ethiopia in 1977.22

Somalia sent thousands of soldiers into the Ogaden and quickly captured large amounts

of Ethiopian territory. Somali forces struck so quickly that by mid-September 1977,

Ethiopia conceded that ninety percent of the Ogaden was in Somali hands. Somali

weaponry primarily consisted of Pre-1977 Soviet donations, including over two hundred

and fifty medium-armour tanks and more than three hundred armoured personal carriers.

Somali troops attacked the major outpost of Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden at the city of

Harer, but failed to dislodge the troops from the city. The Ethiopian army regrouped, and

with the help of eleven thousand Cuban troops and Soviet aircraft and artillery, counter-

attacked, driving Somali forces from many of Ogaden’s major towns and cities. Somali

21Ibid Op. Cit.22Rediker, E. (2003). The Ogaden: A Microcosm of Global Conflict. Pittsburg

14

forces were seriously weakened by this counterattack. In March, 1978, Somalia recalled

the national army from the Ogaden. It had lost nearly eight thousand soldiers, three-

fourths of its armoured units, and more than half of the Somali Air Force.23

2.4 Collapse of government in Somalia

Coupled by the 1987-1991 Somaliland Liberation War, the aftermath of the Ogaden War

was the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991. The Ogaden war has been

interpreted by some as the single most important turning point for the Siad Barre regime.

At the outset, the conflict caused a flood of mainly ethnic Somali refugees. By 1979 there

were officially one million three hundred thousand refugees in the country. More than a

half of these refugees were settled in the northern part of Somalia, where one in four of

the population was refugees, a situation that precipitated a refugee crisis. This in part is

due to the fact that the arrival of forced migrants intensified pressure on limited physical

resources and services, further aggravating tensions between local inhabitants and

refugees. Resentment intensified as the Issaqs were reduced to second-class citizens in

their own territory. The government’s policy of recruiting refugees into the army also

spurred on tensions. More generally the failed war wholly eroded the credibility of the

army and police, the asserted guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism.24

Other scholars have however criticized the aforementioned causes as well as analytical

approach to the state collapse in Somalia describing it as historical and not particularly

relevant to current problems, as it assumes that the social structure of the Somali society

remained intact following its integration into the world economy. Instead, these new

breed of scholars argue that the state collapse in Somalia was as a result of serious

economic mismanagement has also played a key role and has been one of the

instrumental causes of state collapse. Since abandoning the experiment of Scientific

Socialism in 1980, the government lacked a coherent development strategy. Its

macroeconomic policy was described as erratic, inconsistent, and often moved from one

23Ibid Op. Cit.24Ahmed, I., & Green, R. (1999). The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local - Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction. Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 1, 113-127.

15

set of objectives to another, thereby confusing the domestic market. In 1990 the external

debt was US$ 1.9 billion, which was equivalent to three hundred and sixty per cent of the

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) excluding ‘frozen debt’ to some Eastern Europe

countries. The scholars also point out that the public sector crisis originated from massive

expenditure on defense and security services. The regime was also highly successful in

obtaining military support. Somalia was one of the most heavily militarized states in

Africa and one of the top recipients of US and Soviet military aid during the Cold War.

Moreover, more than eighty per cent of refugee aid, which in 1986 together with other

non-military aid accounted for twenty five per cent of the country’s Gross National

Product (GNP), was diverted to the army.25

The net effect of this was anarchy and lawlessness as well as competition over resources









The fall of the Somali economy, which collapsed even before the fall of the Siad Barre

government in 1991 translated into the loss of livelihoods to millions of people, neglect

of infrastructure and breakdown of social services. There have been severe threats to food

security ever since with the most recent famine taking place in 2011. Additionally, there

has not been any large scale and long term investment in infrastructure and human

development to revitalize the Somali economy. Inequality in group development among

regions and clans has also exacerbated the conflict. More so, due to ecological

25Ibid Op. Cit.26Mbugua, J. (2013). Drivers of Insecurity in Somalia: Mapping Contours of Violence. Nairobi: International Peace Support Training Centre.

16

degradation among other factors, there has been a decline in access to water and pasture

during dry seasons in places such as Somalia.27

2.5 The Somali Intractable Conflict and the Corresponding Security Threats to

Kenya

As has been in the analogy of the state collapse in Somalia expounded upon above, the

net effect of this was anarchy and lawlessness as well as competition over resources









Furthermore, as we have seen, the fall of the Somali economy, which collapsed even

before the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, translated into the loss of

livelihoods to millions of people, neglect of infrastructure and breakdown of social

services. There have been severe threats to food security ever since with the most recent

famine taking place in 2011. Additionally, there has not been any large scale and long

term investment in infrastructure and human development to revitalize the Somali

economy. Inequality in group development among regions and clans has also exacerbated

the conflict. More so, due to ecological degradation among other factors, there has been a

decline in access to water and pasture during dry seasons in places such as Somalia.29

Against this background, the youth in Somalia were (and have been hindered ever since)

hindered from effective participation in peace building and development due to illiteracy,

lack of economic opportunities, unemployment, breakdown of family and social ties and

27Ibid Op. Cit.28 Ibid29Ibid

17

other cultural inhibitions. For example, statistics in Somalia have shown that over seventy

per cent of the youth in Somalia are under the age of thirty. The average unemployment

rate for people aged 15 - 64 is a whooping fifty four per cent while the unemployment

rate of youth aged 15 - 29 is sixty seven per cent which in effect is one of the highest in

the world.30These youths who are gullible out of material necessity have been exploited

and used both in terrorism as well as in piracy cases since the dawn of the 1990s. In the

case of the latter, youths have increasingly been recruited into piracy activities in the

Horn of Africa posing maritime threats as well as economic threats to neighbouring

countries such as those in east and central Africa, Kenya included. With the longest

coastline in Africa and its status as a “failure among failed states,” Somalia is now the

source of sixty two per cent of all pirate attacks worldwide. The Gulf of Aden north of

Somalia is a corridor of the Suez Canal route that links the Mediterranean Sea with the

Arabian Sea. Pirate gangs have their pick among twenty thousand ships that transit the

Gulf of Aden annually, including those carrying more than ten per cent of the world’s oil

supply.31

2.6 The state of piracy in the East African Coast

The origins of piracy in the Somali high seas have been traced to the 1990s specifically in

1991 as foreign trawlers began illegally overfishing Somali waters and local fishermen

organized to protect their livelihood. The first incidents of Somali piracy were sporadic

hijackings or quasi-legal extortion of foreign vessels for fees to fish off the Somali

coast.32. Incidences of Somali piracy rose gradually from 1991 to 2005, when it took off,

and surged again in the years 2008 and 2009. Since then, pirates have pushed out from

the Gulf of Aden deep into the Indian Ocean. In the year 2010 for example, the

International Maritime Bureau attributed forty nine hijackings, sixteen boardings and one

30United Nations Development Programme. (2012). Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development. Nairobi: United Nations Development Programme31Singh, C., & Bedi, A. (2012). ‘War on Piracy’: the Conflation of Somali Piracy with Terrorism in Discourse, Tactic and Law. Hague: Institute of Social Studies32 See Bahadur, J. (2011). Deadly Waters: Inside the Hidden World of Somalia’s Pirates. London: Profile. See also Hansen, S. (2009). Piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies. Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research

18

hundred and fifty one attempted boardings to Somali pirates. One thousand and sixteen

seafarers were held hostage for ransom. The vast majority of these hostages were released

unharmed after ship owners delivered payment, but fourteen were reported killed.

Ransom payments to pirates in 2010 totaled US$112.79 million.33

In 2011, hijackings fell to twenty eight and hostages fell to four hundred and seventy, but

boardings rose to twenty, attempted boardings rose to 189 and crew fatalities rose to

thirty two. Despite fewer hijackings, gross pirate revenue also increased in the year 2011

to an estimated US$160 million. The average ransom payment for a vessel and her crew

today is US$5 million and rising. The highest ransom paid in 2011 was US$13.5 million

for the Greek oil tanker Irene. It is eighty per cent more expensive for ship owners to

avoid the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope than it is to take the risk

and pay ransom if necessary. To buffer the additional risk, they take out high-premium

insurance, streaming profits to marine insurers.34

Lauren Ploch et al. argues (2011) that, the increase in pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa

is directly linked to continuing insecurity and the absence of the rule of law in war-torn

Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government there provides freedom of

action for pirates and remains the single greatest challenge to regional security. The lack

of law enforcement capacity creates a haven where pirates hold hostages during ransom

negotiations that can last for months. Furthermore, the absence of Somali coastal security

authorities has allowed illegal international fishing and maritime dumping to go

unchecked, which in turn has undermined coastal communities’ economic prospects,

providing economic or political motivation to some pirates. The apparent motive of most

pirate groups, however, is profit, and piracy has proven to be lucrative.35

The vice has also been attributed to the social upheavals, human hardship, environmental

degradation and the entrepreneurial spirit of the Somali. Piracy is flourishing in Somalia

as it is a quick way for all involved to earn a large amount of money way beyond any

33Singh, C., & Bedi, A. (2012). ‘War on Piracy’: the Conflation of Somali Piracy with Terrorism in Discourse, Tactic and Law. Hague: Institute of Social Studies34 Ibid35Ploch, L., Blanchard, C., O'Rourke, R., Mason, R., & King, R. (2011).Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service

19

other means of income generation. In addition to that, poverty, environmental hardship,

pitifully low incomes as well as reduction of pastoralist resources have been cited as

causative agents of increase in piracy off the Horn of Africa’s coastline.36

As Wetangula (2013) argues, the advent of piracy is impacting directly Kenya’s

economy. Part of the national budget has to be redirected on sea patrols and to matters of

defense and security as the country tries to tackle the impacts of piracy. Piracy has

affected the tourism sector in Kenya as small yachts; small chartered vessels cannot be

able to sail for fear of being captured. The net effect has been a huge effect on

employment and foreign exchange earnings from the tourist industry as some countries

such as the United States of America and Europe which have been issuing travel advisory

to their citizens planning to visit Kenya’s coastal cities and islands such as Lamu which

are considered prone to pirate attacks. Against this background, the country has been

forced to invest in new equipment’s like patrol boats, radars, computers, cameras and

evidence gathering equipment as well as enhance her defense spending thus starving

much needed cash which would have otherwise been earmarked for development.37

Somali piracy, owing to the proximity of Somalia to Kenya, greatly reduced maritime

security in Kenya owing to the fact that there was increased exploitation of maritime

spaces as well as their attendant militarization by the pirates and their subsequent use as

extractive spaces. In addition, Somali maritime piracy increased Kenya’s maritime

transport cost thus posing an economic reason for a number of reasons. First, in 2008

ship-owners had to re-route their ships to avoid dangerous waters which leads to a high

cost that has to be passed to the final consumers in the country of destination. However,

this translates into higher costs of goods on reaching the country of destination. Secondly,

based on the claim of insurers and insurance companies loaded their premiums on

maritime freights thus leading to high operational costs. Thirdly, some shipping lines

totally avoided transporting to piracy prone areas thus making goods very expensive. The

36 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). Counter-Piracy Programme; Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.37Wetangula, J. (2013). The Effect of Somali Piracy on Kenya's Maritime Sector. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.

20

study also established that Somali piracy affected import /export trade in Kenya to a very

great extent.38

2.7 Islamic insurgency in Somalia

The Islamist insurgency in Somalia has also been attributed to a spillover effect on

security in the northeast of neighbouring Kenya, affecting livelihoods and the delivery of

services, say residents and officials. Among the crimes reported in the North Eastern

region of Kenya for example include killings, car jackings and abductions including, in

2009, of aid workers and, in 2008, of two Catholic nuns. Insecurity in the borderlands has

led thousands of livestock herders to abandon their traditional grazing land, say locals.

Furthermore, dozens of community programmes have been disrupted, notably those

dealing with reproductive health, sanitation, food security and education, according to

NGOs working in the region.39

IRIN citing humanitarian workers mostly from UN agencies report that there is a direct

effect of insecurity in Somalia for the humanitarian operations in North East Kenya. One

of these effects is that Somali rebels enter Kenyan territory. Messages and threats have

been received by humanitarians about their own security from some of the Somali groups

as a result of these incursions and indigenous banditry and armed cattle rustling. The UN

classifies the region as a phase-three security zone which means no United Nations

movement can be done without armed escorts. A senior UN source working with security

concurred that insecurity in Somalia has worsened the situation in northeast Kenya. There

is no government on the other side. Nobody knows how many weapons go back and forth

across the border and that is always a concern.40

The state collapse in Somalia and the resultant anarchy created non-securitized spaces of

terrorists. Majority of these terrorists were veterans returning from Mujahedeen

expedition in the then Soviet occupied Afghanistan resulting in the Soviet-Afghan War of 38Wetangula, J. (2013). The Effect of Somali Piracy on Kenya's Maritime Sector. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.39IRIN Africa. (2010, September 17). Kenya - Somalia: Insecurity Without Borders. Retrieved June 18, 2014, from IRIN Africa: http://www.irinnews.org/report/90505/kenya-somalia-insecurity-without-borders40 Ibid

21

1979-1988 which led to the soviet withdrawal from Afghan. The Mujahedeen, inspired

by victory in Afghanistan, the Soviet-Afghan War veterans turned their eyes towards the

West largely seen as acquiescing in the Palestinian question. These Mujahedeen turned

terrorists found safe haven in lawless Somalia.

The net effect was a spill-over of terrorist activities from Somalia into Kenya starting

with attacks on Western interests in the country. Kenya, for example, has been the

battlefield of tragic terrorist attacks on western interests twice since the year 1998; once

in 1998 when the US Embassy in down town Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, was attacked

(killing 212 people and wounding over 4000) and a second time in 2002 when an Israeli-

owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala at the Kenyan Coast was bombed (killing 13) as well

as an attempted shooting down of an Israeli jetliner taking off from the Moi International

Airport.41

Since Kenyan troops entered Southern Somalia to flush out Al Shabaab terrorists in a

military operation dubbed ‘Operation Linda Nchi’, there have been a number of small-

scale grenade and bomb attacks on churches, bars, bus stations, military sites and

shopping centres around Nairobi and Mombasa. The attacks started on October 24, 2011,

when a grenade was hurled into a Nairobi bar, killing one person and injuring more than

twenty. The same day, another grenade was hurled from a moving vehicle into the city's

Country Bus Terminal, killing five people. A second attack on the bus station on March

2012 left six people dead and over 60 injured.42

In June 2012, a popular bar in Mombasa was hit by a grenade attack, leaving one person

dead and several injured. The following month, there was another grenade attack on a bar

in Mombasa where patrons had gathered to watch a football match between England and

Italy. Three people were killed. In July 2012, masked gunmen stormed two churches in

Garissa, south of the Somali border, killing seventeen people including two policemen

whose guns they took. There were several grenade and bomb attacks that claimed lives in

the predominantly Somali Eastleigh area of Nairobi in the second half of 2012; one on a

bus and several either in or close to mosques.43On Saturday Sept. 21, 2013, Al Shabaab

41 Laing, A. (2013, September 21). Nairobi Assault: Kenyan Terrorist Attacks Since 1980. The Telegraph42 Ibid43 Laing, A. (2013, September 21). Nairobi Assault: Kenyan Terrorist Attacks Since 1980. The Telegraph

22

gunmen, in Al Shabaab’s only recorded hostage-barricade attack, stormed Westgate Mall

in the upmarket centre of Westlands, Nairobi. The attack resulted in hundreds of

casualties, including over sixty deaths in an attack that shook the world and focused

attention on terrorism in the country.44

44 Miller, E. (2013). Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

23

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA’S SECURITY EFFORTS TO CURB INSECURITY EMANATING FROM

STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA

3.1 Introduction

From refugee crises, to terrorism and to piracy in the high seas, maladies which have

affected Kenya’s internal security as well as sabotaged her economy with the adverse

effects the latter two vices have had on tourism, the country’s second greatest income

earner, and trade as well as her pivotal role in being the gateway to the more than two

hundred million east and central African population as well as being one of the key

gateways to the four hundred million strong COMESA market, Kenya can arguably be

said to have adversely suffered from Somalia’s state collapse.

The country has however employed a number of measures so as to try to arrest the rising

state of insecurity in Kenya. It is against this background that this chapter seeks to

investigate the measures in which the country has undertaken to securitize her from the

insecurities necessitated by state collapse in Somalia. The chapter also seeks to assess the

effectiveness as well as the efficiency of these methods that Kenya has employed.

3.2 Terrorism

Kenya was faced by acts of terrorism on August 7 1998, when a massive bomb exploded

outside the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 213 people, among them twelve

Americans-and injuring over 4,000. Responsibility was quickly traced to al Qaeda. Four

years later, Al Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel

near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet

taking off from Mombasa's Moi International Airport.45 The attacks along many others

that have followed since the that were orchestrated by arguably one of the greatest terror

groups in the world, it became apparent that Kenya’s fetish attractiveness to terrorist

operatives was due to the fact that the combination of geographic, regional, historical,

political, economic and socio-cultural factors were an allure to terrorist organizations in 45Lyman, P., & Morrison, J. (2004).The Terrorist Threat in Africa.Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, 75-86.

24

the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula as well as those operating in the Arab

Maghreb.46

The direct causes of terrorist attacks in Kenya were identified to be; first, its close ties

with Israel and western countries, especially the US, secondly, its vibrant coastal beach

tourism industry that threatens local Islamic culture and, and thirdly, the perception that

the country‘s predominantly Christian population is an obstacle to the Islamization of

Eastern Africa as part of the terrorists’ global agenda of establishing a global Islamic

caliphate.47

To counter terror, Kenya has employed a number of measures. First, the government

employed some of its very viable instruments of fighting terror namely; diplomacy,

military counter – terror operations, intelligence information etc. Diplomacy is the

instrument of power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation.

Diplomatic exchanges promote counter-terrorism cooperation with friendly nations that

serve each other’s mutual interests. Transnational terrorism has no boundaries and

requires governments to reach out to their neighbors and allies to forge a multilateral

approach in the fight against the threat. Diplomacy supports the other instruments of

national power in numerous ways. For example, extradition treaties help in the

application of criminal law by facilitating the transfer of fugitive terrorist suspects.

Intelligence sharing among nations potentially discourages terrorists from operating in

those countries and facilitates the monitoring of groups operating in the region. After the

1998 US Embassy bombing, the Kenyan government fully cooperated with the US

government in intelligence sharing and in giving US investigators access to investigate

the incident. The government also helped apprehend and hand over the suspects to US

investigators to stand trial in the United States.48

Apart from the United States, the Kenyan government approached the Israeli government

to obtain its assistance in rescue operations. This was followed by the dispatch of rescue

46Otiso, K. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery. Kenya Studies Review Vol. 1, No. 1, 107-132.47 Ibid48Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

25

teams and intelligence agencies to help track those responsible for the attacks. In the East

African region, Kenya took center stage internationally because of what was perceived as

the terrorists’ change in operations to focus on soft targets in countries where the

phenomenon of terrorism had not yet been experienced. The Kenyan government allowed

the United States to use Kenya for logistical support as it investigated the terrorist

incident, which resulted from the perceived notion that Kenya was a victim of terrorism

because of US interests in the country, and that the United States had to play a major role

in investigating the attacks.49

However, the Kenyan government did not apply much effort to incorporating the

countries in the Horn of Africa region in a unified regional counterterrorism strategy

because of the belief that Kenya was a victim rather than a source of international

terrorism. This denial was tied to the inability to acknowledge the wider context that led

to the growth of terrorism--the erosion of the structure of governance, notably weak

intelligence capabilities and law enforcement.50

Furthermore, the government also tried to co-opt the Muslim population into the fight

against terror. This was so because the government was afraid to alienate Kenya’s

Muslims who often complained of perceived marginalization. It was feared this group

would bear the brunt of any counterterrorism efforts, since most of the terrorist suspects

were from the Muslim community. The government was in a precarious position from the

fears that there could be political risks if it engaged in a full-scale counterterrorism

campaign Effective counterterrorism measures could potentially have destabilized the

country. Despite evidence of the presence of terrorist cells and the involvement of

Kenyans in terrorist activities, the hostility toward the government’s counterterrorism

measures and diplomatic cooperation with the United States still exists especially when

they bore the brunt of counterterrorism measures largely by the Bush administration’s

overt and indiscriminative anti-terror operations such as the banning of Muslim NGOs

49Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College50 See Khadiagala, G. (2004). Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism. Retrieved June 3, 2014, from United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 113, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr113.html. See also Hared, A. (2005). Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

26

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr113.html

upon which the Muslim communities depended on Islamic organizations for social

welfare (medical, food relief, and Islamic education) and socioeconomic support to

marginalized communities, which the Kenyan government is either incapable of or

unwilling to give.51

After the 1998 terrorists attack, the military, as an instrument of power, was not

effectively used to combat terrorism, partly because of the notion that terrorists activities

were minimal at the time, that the initial incident was more of a criminal act than a

terrorist act, and that it was an isolated incident. The reality that terrorists were using the

porous land borders and coastline to enter the country had not dawned on the

government. Also, the role of maintaining law and order had traditionally rested with the

police in Kenya. Unlike today, the military had no training to combat terrorism. These

factors might have caused the government not to employ the military for counterterrorism

efforts after the 1998 bombing. Nevertheless, the military increased surveillance along

the Kenya-Somalia border.52

Military intelligence also joined other intelligence communities in the country to assess

the threat. An information campaign is critical to any counterterrorism strategy. When

well employed, it can counter perceived marginalization among some communities by

educating the populace about the government’s plans to address the problem. After 1998,

the government was in a state of denial and did not conduct a full-fledged information

campaign to educate the public on the need to cooperate and expose terrorists within their

midst. Terrorists do not operate in a vacuum; they are part and parcel of the community.

A well-employed and effective information campaign could have helped mold the

public’s attitude and to expose foreigners. One can argue that there was a limited

information campaign; however, this was limited to urban areas. In rural areas, especially

in coastal and northeastern regions where many communities have no access to print or

51 See Barkan, J., & Cooke, J. (2001). U.S. Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of September 11: Can Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S.Foreign Policy Goals? Retrieved July 3, 2014, from Africa Center for Strategic Studies: www.csis.org/Africa/ANotes/ANotes0112.pdf. See also Hared, A. (2005). Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College52Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

27

http://www.csis.org/Africa/ANotes/ANotes0112.pdf

electronic media and where terrorists, disguising themselves as Islamic preachers,

businessmen, and teachers, can blend easily into the community, an effective information

campaign would have helped expose them. The lack of resources and the perception that

the country was a victim, rather than a source of terrorism, can also be attributed to the

failure to launch an effective information campaign.53

3.2.1 International Cooperation as a Counter-Terrorism Measure

These terrorist attacks alongside others prompted the government of Kenya to be left with

no other alternative other than to fight terror if she was to be in a position to secure her

from further aggressive activities emanating from terrorist groups and their operatives.

The first step was at the international arena where she rooted for cooperation with the

West who arguably had superior counter-terrorism weaponry, able and well trained

counter-terrorism manpower as well as superior intelligence collection machineries that

easily dwarfed the ones in use in Nairobi. Following the attacks for example, the then US

President Bill Clinton ordered for a targeted air strike of a pharmaceutical plant which

was believed to produce arms in Khartoum, the capital city of neighbouring Sudan, which

remains on the US list of state sponsors of terror and which, for a time in the 1990s, was

official host to Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.54

In addition, the succeeding US government also immensely helped Kenya’s anti-

terrorism operations especially through increased funding as well as capacity building.

The Bush administration, furthermore, designated the greater Horn of Africa a front-line

region in its global war against terrorism and has been working alongside Kenya’s

government to dismantle Al Qaeda’s infrastructure in the region alongside those of

affiliated terrorist groups.55

To combat terrorism in the Horn of Africa, the United States, at the turn of the third

millennium created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which 53Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College54Lind, J., & Howell, J. (2010).Counter-terrorism and the Politics of Aid: Civil Society Responses in Kenya. Development and Change Vol. 41 (2) , 335–35355Lyman, P., & Morrison, J. (2004).The Terrorist Threat in Africa. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 , 75-86

28

involved one thousand and eighteen hundred US soldiers and which was to be backed by

US Central Command. Based in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA'S mission was principally to deter,

pre-empt, and disable terrorist threats emanating principally from Somalia, Kenya, and

Yemen, assisted by a multinational naval interdiction force. In June 2003, President Bush

announced a one hundred million dollar package of counter-terrorism measures that was

set to be spent in the Horn of Africa region for over fifteen months. Half of these funds

was to support coastal and border security programs administered by the US Department

of Defense, ten million dollars was to be spent on the Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit

(ATPU), and fourteen million dollars to support Muslim education.56

The Western support especially from the United States was necessitated by the fact that

after September 11, 2001, the Horn of Africa region courted attention from global

terrorist groups as a possible new haven for Al Qaeda operatives driven from Afghanistan

during Operation Enduring Freedom. Somalia did not, as feared, become the replacement

operational base for Afghanistan, but it did serve as the base for the 2002 attacks in

Mombasa. The terrorist organization, Al Qaeda has a long standing, indigenous

infrastructure in the coastal region of Kenya as well as the environs of Nairobi and the

proven ability to transit in and out of Kenya via Somalia. Furthermore, the ease with

which Al Qaeda operatives operate in Kenya are suspected to be due to its proximity to

Somalia as well as having similar ease of access to Zanzibar, coastal Tanzania, and the

Comoros Islands.57

One of the winners of the western financial and logistical support was the police with the

formation of the Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) as a specialized unit formed to

help fight terrorism and as part of the Kenyan security agencies’ reform process of

making them relevant in fighting the new wars such as fourth generation warfare in

which terrorism forms a pertinent part. The unit was predominantly drawn from the

Ranger Strike Force and has been behind a number of security operations on the Kenya-

Somalia border to prevent terrorist infiltration by al Qaeda terror group as well as Al

Shabaab militias from war-torn Somalia. In a report prepared by the United States State

56 Ibid57 Ibid

29

Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Counter-terrorism, the mandate for the unit

covered operations against infiltrators and armed groups, including terrorists.58

Within the Kenyan military, there were wide sweeping reforms, the first ever since the

radical Tonje Reforms, aimed at equipping the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) to fight

terrorism include the acquisition of additional F5 fighter aircrafts to be used in maritime

and counter terrorism surveillance. However, then Kenya’s Department of Defense

(DoD) spokesman Bogita Ongeri denied that there was such a unit, saying all military

anti-terrorism activities were being coordinated by the National Counter-Terrorism

Centre. Emergent information also revealed that the Kenya Navy had also received

training and equipment from the United States for maritime intervention operations in the

country’s territorial waters. The Maritime Police Unit and other government agencies

such as the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), also received equipment and training for

coastal security from the United States State Department’s Anti-terrorism Assistance

Programme and the United States military’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of

Africa.59

In addition, the United States jointly with the Kenyan government established a Maritime

Centre of Excellence whose mission was primarily to provide operational level training

that builds maritime safety and security capacity in order to promote a stable and secure

Africa part of measures being put in place by the government to step-up efforts to deal

with threats posed by terrorism as well as in helping Nairobi in addressing regional

maritime issues such as piracy, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and environmental issues.

The centre was also tasked with capacity building among security agencies as well as in

helping to fulfill its commitment through collaborative efforts and shared interests of U.S.

and African nations to develop new ideas, increase cooperation and build partnerships to

establish regional stability.60

58All Africa. (2009, August 6). Kenya: New Anti-Terrorism Unit Formed. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from The Republic of Kenya: republicofkenya.org/2009/08/kenya_new_anti-terrorism_unit_formed/ 59 Ibid. Op. Cit.60 See Waters, L. (2009, July 13). CJTF-HOA, Kenyan Government Hold First Maritime Center of Excellence Ceremony. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from United States Africa Command: http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/6753/cjtf-hoa-kenyan-government-hold-first-maritime-cen. See also All Africa. (2009, August 6). Kenya: New Anti-Terrorism Unit Formed. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from The Republic of Kenya: republicofkenya.org/2009/08/kenya_new_anti-terrorism_unit_formed/

30

http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/6753/cjtf-hoa-kenyan-government-hold-first-maritime-cen

Other anti-terrorism initiatives taken in conjunction with Kenya’s international allies

especially in the West included installation of a Maritime Security and Safety

Information System (MSSIS) in key positions on the Kenyan coast, with the assistance of

the United States military. In addition, the American Department of Homeland Security’s

Customs and Border Control (CBP) office is also assisting Kenya Revenue Authority’s

Customs Department in meeting the World Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of

Standards to Secure Global Trade and addressing Export Border Control Issues. The

United States Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Control has also

been providing multi-agency training to Kenyan security personnel through workshops,

seminars, and courses covering airport, seaport, land border, and export control issues

and provided inspection equipment to customs and other agencies in Kenya engaged in

port and border security issues. The United States Department of Homeland Security’s

Customs and Border Control has also been assisting the Kenya Revenue Authority

(KRA) in improving and expanding its Canine Enforcement Programme. In May 2008

for example, government officials from different security agencies in Kenya travelled to

the US for training in airport, seaport and border security operations.61

The United States support of Kenya in initiating counter-terrorism measures also came at

a price. As part of the then United States president George Walker Bush’s attempt to

streamline his agenda of fighting terrorism globally, the “you are either with us or

against us” doctrine came into vogue. With this, the United States alongside Britain

were imposing anti-terrorism legislations that usually had little or no concern with human

rights.

The roots of this draconian requirement lay in the wake of the brazen attacks carried out

by al Qaeda in the American hinterland on 11 th September 2001. In order to combat the

threat of terrorism, it was argued, democratic citizens would have to accept legislation

placing constraints on their individual freedoms. In addition, the fight against terrorism

could not be won by national governments alone; it required countries around the world

to embrace similar measures. On 28th September 2001, a few days after September 11, the

largely united states dominated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted

61All Africa. (2009, August 6). Kenya: New Anti-Terrorism Unit Formed. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from The Republic of Kenya: republicofkenya.org/2009/08/kenya_new_anti-terrorism_unit_formed/

31

Resolution 1373 calling on member states to become party to all relevant international

conventions on terrorism and to enact the necessary domestic legislation to enforce these

agreements. Less than a month later the United States Congress passed the Uniting and

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001. Largely out of the United States

employment of “carrot and stick” methods to force anti-terror legislations in other

countries in the third world, by 2007, at least thirty three countries in Africa, Asia and

Latin America had either passed or introduced specific anti-terrorism legislation in their

parliaments.62

In 2003, Kenya’s newly elected government under Mwai Kibaki introduced in parliament

the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, setting off a firestorm of controversy. The anti-

terrorism bill generated fervent criticism among members of parliament, human rights

advocates, lawyers and religious leaders. Muslim populations felt especially targeted by

the proposed legislation. Widespread opposition forced the government to withdraw the

bill late in the year 2003. After two years of consultation with lawyers and civil society

organizations, a revised anti-terrorism bill was introduced in April 2006. Although the

new draft was widely acknowledged to be much more improved and safeguarding basic

human rights, several prominent members of parliament blocked its passage. Their

reason, quite simply, was that the bill was promoted by the United States.63 Such fears,

can better be seen as captured in a Filipino editorial stating that “treating the world like a

schoolyard where it reigns supreme, the United States made up the rules for those who

want to be on its good side - like the passage of laws outlawing terrorism, if possible

patterned after the United States’ own repressive Anti-Terrorism Law”.64

62 Whitaker, B. (2007). Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Third World.Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 5 , 1017 – 103263 Ibid64Sigam, P. (2002, September 4). Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the Philippines: A Plot of Its Own. Cyber Dyaryo

32

3.2.2 Anti – Terrorism Legislations and Policy Actions in Kenya

As previously aforementioned, on 28th September 2001, a few days after September 11,

the largely united states dominated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted

Resolution 1373 calling on the United Nations’ member states to become party to all

relevant international conventions on terrorism and to enact the necessary domestic

legislation to enforce these agreements. The UNSC was deriving its mandate from Article

41 of the Charter of the United Nations which provided that the Security Council may

determine the measures not involving the use of armed force that may be employed to

give effect to its decisions, and call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply

such measures. The first attempt on anti-terror legislation were the largely Western

sponsored Suppression of Terrorism Bill which was introduced by the Kibaki

government to Parliament in 2003 but was unsuccessful as a result of the outcry from the

civil society, the opposition as well as from the Muslim community.

However, in 2013 a comprehensive legislation, The Prevention of Terrorism Act (No. 30

of 2012) dubbed The Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of the United Nations

Security Council Resolutions on Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations, was successfully

passed into law in 2013. Under the new legislative framework, those convicted for

assisting in the commission of terrorists’ acts or found in possession of property intended

for the commission of terrorist acts could be jailed for up to twenty years. Furthermore,

the legislation also provides stiff penalties for membership to terrorist groups, and

recruiting, training and directing of terrorist groups and persons. In addition, the Act also

amends two extradition laws, making it legal to send terror suspects abroad for trial. The

illegal rendition of suspects has been a major bone of contention with human rights

activists in the past.65

The Association of Muslim Organizations in Kenya had however expressed reservations

with a number of sections and had requested several amendments to the Prevention of

Terrorism Bill 2012 before it was signed into law.66 Kenya also domesticated all

65The Standard. (2012, October 14). Kibaki Signs Historic Anti- Terrorism Bill. The Standard66Sabahi. (2012, June 29). Muslim Leaders Demand Changes to Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Bill. Retrieved June 25, 2014, from Sabahi: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/06/29/newsbrief-04

33

http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/06/29/newsbrief-04

http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/06/29/newsbrief-04

international statutes she was party to by domesticating and incorporating them in the

constitution as is evidence in her constitutions Article 2 which states that “Any treaty or

convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya”.67

3.3 Military Interventions by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF)

In 2011, the Kenyan government sent its troops in a military incursion into Somalia as an

effort to flush out al Shabaab militants as well as al Qaeda operatives who were in the

terrorist haven of lawless Somalia and who were controlling illicit trade in the Somali

port of Kismayu. The decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in

Somalia’s Juba Valley to wage war on Al-Shabaab has been touted as the biggest security

gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has

never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. The military incursion, codenamed “Operation

Linda Nchi” (Operation Protect the Country), was given the go-ahead with what has

shown itself to be inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation. The incursion

culminated in the flushing of the Al Shabaab from their economic hub, Kismayu.

3.3 Counter – Piracy Efforts in Kenya

Kenya has taken various counter-piracy measures to protect her trade interests as the

gateway to East and Central Africa. Alongside, the United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC), Kenya has been able to put in place mechanisms on fighting piracy

that has been disrupting her commerce. This has involved working in four key areas

namely; law enforcement, prosecution, courts and prisons. In terms of law enforcement,

UNODC has for example furnished Kenya with guidelines to help ensure that evidence

packages meet the legal obligations of regional legal systems realizes that once pirates

have guided by the fact that under international regulations, certain procedures must be

followed to ensure a fair trial for example the correct handling of evidence. In addition,

UNODC has provided police stations in Kenya with vehicles and other equipment to

facilitate their investigations as well as ensuring the transfer of weapons seized from

67Government of Kenya. (2010). The Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting.

34

pirates to Nairobi for ballistic examination. Furthermore, funds have been provided for

the training of police in Kenya, as well as the installation of information technology

systems and exhibit rooms.68

In addition, the United Nations agency has also supported capacity building and

development within Kenya’s security agencies. In one of its counter piracy publications

for example, the UNODC details training courses that it has run for Kenyan detectives.

An example is that of UNODC Police Advisor Scott Girling, who has acted as a mentor

for Kenyan investigative officers to ensure that they are able to investigate piracy

offences effectively and make sure that they receive the necessary level of support. This

includes Regional Learning Exchanges as well as the provision of the necessary

equipment.69

3.4 Effectiveness of Kenya’s Security Measures against the Security Threats Arising

from Somali State Collapse

It is true that Al Shabaab has been weakened. However, it remains a formidable

adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize

its asymmetric advantage. One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than

fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanized

infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population

and distribute weapons. This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006

Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its

combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of south-western

Somalia, and they were decimated by ground and air fire.70

68 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). Counter-Piracy Programme; Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects.United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. See also, Kraska, J. (2011). Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy and Diplomacy at Sea. California: Praeger.69UONDC. (2011). Counter Piracy Programme: Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects - Issue 7. Vienna: UONDC70 International Crisis Group. (2012). The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia. Crisis Group Africa.

35

Indeed, Al Shabaab, Al Ittihad, Al Islami and Al Qaeda have both managed to infiltrate

cross-border refugee traffic and some Somali refugee camps in Kenya‘s North Eastern

Province and have made their way into Somali dominated neighborhoods in Nairobi and

Mombasa. From these convenient hideouts, these terror groups have been able to map

their targets and mount terror attacks. Major strides have however been made in curbing

piracy but largely out of concerted efforts by the international community in curbing the

vice in the high seas of not only the expansive gulf of Aden but also the open sea where

piracy has been on the rise.71

However, Kenya’s counter-terror strategy has been bungled by a few maladies which can

largely attribute to the failure of counter-terrorism operations in Kenya. An area that has

led to the ineffective counter-terror strategy is the inefficiency of the agencies involved.

Intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies are important in an effective

counterterrorism strategy. The key to winning the battle against terrorism is winning the

intelligence battle. Intelligence enables early detection of terrorists in time for law-

enforcement officers or the military to act. However, for it to be of any value, intelligence

must be supported by effective law enforcement in conducting apprehensions and

disruptions of terrorist cells. Before 1998, there was a failure on the part of intelligence

and law-enforcement agencies to detect domestic and foreign terrorists freely operating

within the country. The ease with which these terrorists were entering and leaving the

country before the attacks raises questions about the ability and efficiency of intelligence

activities and law enforcement at the time. For example, effective intelligence and law

enforcement should have detected the terrorists when they were assembling the bomb in

the truck at the busy river-road streets in Nairobi, an area often filled with police. While

intelligence agencies and police failed to prevent the attack or dismantle Al Qaeda cells

in the initial stages, there are other agencies that contributed to the failures.72

The fight against terrorism is not a police battle alone; it also involves the Immigration

Department. Most of the terrorist suspects were foreigners. Some of the foreigners living

71 See Otiso, K. (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery. Kenya Studies Review Vol. 1, No. 1, 107-132. See also Wetangula, J. (2013). The Effect of Somali Piracy on Kenya's Maritime Sector. Nairobi: University of Nairobi72Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

36

in Kenya had fake documents, including Kenyan national identity cards and passports.

Because of institutional corruption during the former regime, a person could easily obtain

Kenyan national identity cards, passports, birth certificates, or other documents through

Kenya’s black market. Terrorists have been exploiting such loopholes to enter the

country disguised as immigrants, tourists, or businessmen. Because of the Immigration

Department’s laxity, a large percentage of Pakistani and other immigrants reside in

Kenya. Some of these foreigners are engaged in microeconomic activities. Another area

the terrorists exploited was the lack of security awareness at the country’s entry points.

The ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake

passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later

arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the

Immigration Department.73

Additionally, corruption within the Kenyan security agencies has also been put to blame

over terrorism. Corruption within the Kenyan police force in the 1990s for example was

rampant that you could virtually bring anything into the country as long as you greased a

security officer’s hand. Furthermore, the failure of effective law enforcement also

contributed to the problem. The police force has for a long time been so ill-equipped that

it cannot respond to emergencies because of a basic lack of transportation and

communication resources. Despite the shortcomings noted, after the 1998 terrorist attack,

law-enforcement officials arrested several terrorist suspects a few days after the attacks.

These suspects were handed over to the US government to stand trial. While it can be

argued that the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) helped in the arrests, the Kenyan

government continued to track the terrorists and their supporters in the country after the

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) concluded its preliminary investigations. In

November 2001 for example, the Kenyan government arrested more than twenty people

in Lamu who were suspected of having links with Al Qaeda along the Kenyan coast.74

73 Ibid74 See Hared, A. (2005). Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. See also Khadiagala, G. (2004). Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism.Retrieved June 3, 2014, from United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 113, Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr113.html

37

Furthermore, although intelligence and law-enforcement agencies continued to track

terrorist suspects and their supporters in the country, it is evident there was a missing

link, either an effective approach was not applied or initial successes were the result of

external pressure. The lack of effective intelligence and law enforcement contributed to

the failure to deter the 2002 terrorist attacks. Although transnational terrorism had started

to establish roots in Kenya, the government made no progress in implementing

appropriate domestic legislation on terrorism-related issues. Counterterrorism legislation

is an important instrument of an effective counterterrorism strategy, and any government

confronted with the threat of terrorism should enact such legislation. The enactment of

such laws expresses the government’s political will to combat the threat.75

75Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

38

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to analyze the data in the study as well as offering a detailed analysis

in light of the study’s hypotheses as well as theoretical framework. The chapter basically

seeks to analyze data collected in chapter three on insecurity as well as how Kenya has

responded to the insecurity posed by the protracted civil war orchestrated and perpetrated

in the battlefields of the “sick man” of the horn of Africa region; Somalia. The analysis of

the data is critical in the study as it offers a solid foundation for the study’s chapter five.

4.2 Data Analysis

4.2.1 Has The Somalia State Collapse Led To Threats To Security In Kenya?

From the various literature reviews, it is obvious that the state collapse in Somalia that

was signaled by the fall of the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre has evidently led to a

threatening state of insecurity in Kenya. This was evident seven years after the collapse

of Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime in the year 1998 when on the fateful day of August 7, a

massive bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 213 people,

among them twelve Americans-and injuring over 4,000. Responsibility was quickly

traced to Al Qaeda but intelligence as well as forensic evidence showed that the plot was

planned and executed by terror cells from Somalia. Four years later, Al Qaeda operatives

struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and

simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's Moi

International Airport. This attack too was meticulously planned and executed by terrorists

planning from their hideouts in the anarchical state of Somalia.

In addition, we have been able to deduce that the anarchy in Somalia offering an alluring

aura to terrorists who were being flushed out from their Afghanistan enclaves by superior

American military’s firepower, ammunition and technology. They were thus able to get a

safe haven in Somalia where they could be able to meticulously plan and execute terror

attacks in Kenya on both western interests as has been evident from the United States

Nairobi Embassy 1998 bombing to the 2002, Paradise Hotel, Kikambala attacks at the

39

Kenyan coast, which was Israeli-owned as well as 21st September,2013 Westgate

Shopping Mall gun attack being frequented by Israeli tourists and at the to the mall that is

located in up market Westlands area of Nairobi which was frequented by expatriates and

owned by an Israeli investor.

Non-Western interests have also not been spared as we have seen from the numerous

attacks that have been orchestrated in open air markets, churches, public transport

vehicles as well as villages and government installations such as police stations,

administration posts among others. In the sea front, we have seen how the strategic sea

space in the vast Gulf of Aden stretching all the way to the Kenyan coast has been turned

into a militias’ space of extraction through piracy activities by Somali sea militias

effectively taking the Kenyan economy hostage and hollowing it slowly and asphyxiating

it effectively bringing it to its knees over the long haul.

From the analysis, we can also see how Somali youths who were reduced to a dejected

suffering lot and were gullible out of material necessity have been exploited and used

both in terrorism as well as in piracy cases since the dawn of the 1990s. In the case of the

latter, youths have increasingly been recruited into piracy activities in the Horn of Africa

posing maritime threats as well as economic threats to neighbouring countries such as

those in east and central Africa, Kenya included.

With the longest coastline in Africa and its status as a “failure among failed states,”

Somalia is now the source of sixty two per cent of all pirate attacks worldwide.

Incidences of Somali piracy rose gradually from 1991 to 2005, when it took off, and

surged again in the years 2008 and 2009. Since then, pirates have pushed out from the

Gulf of Aden deep into the Indian Ocean. In the year 2010 for example, the International

Maritime Bureau attributed forty nine hijackings, sixteen boardings and one hundred and

fifty one attempted boardings to Somali pirates. One thousand and sixteen seafarers were

held hostage for ransom with the vast majority of these hostages though being released

unharmed after ship owners delivered payment, fourteen were reportedly killed by the

Somali pirates. Ransom payments to pirates in 2010 totaling US$112.79 million.

All these security breaches from the analysis have been the net effect of the Somali state

collapse which bred anarchy and lawlessness as well as competition over resources

40

especially the port of Kismayu after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. We have seen how the

anarchy precipitated into a civil war where the clan warlords for example, fought over the

control of key positions that were likely to be strategic in minting revenue to them as well

as ensuring their access to the virgin and unexploited resources in Somalia such as cities

and towns like Mogadishu, Kismayu and Baidoa.

We have also deduced how foreign companies also fuelled the perennial conflict as they

explored and prospected for natural gas in disputed areas between regions,

administrations and clans. The conflict over resources is epitomized by the conflict

between the Hawiye and Darood over the control of Juba and Shabelle river valleys. We

have seen how scholars such as Joseph Kioi Mbugua (2013) have argued that

economically, Somalia performs poorly due to effects of the long war and resource

exploitation has not only exacerbated the conflict but also made it protracted.

Furthermore, we’ve seen how the fall of the Somali economy, which collapsed even

before the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991 translated into the loss of livelihoods

to millions of people, neglect of infrastructure and breakdown of social services. There

have been severe threats to food security ever since with the most recent famine taking

place in 2011. All these were bound to have a spill-over effect in neighbouring states or

those with close proximity to the failed state and Kenya owing to its vast and porous

border with Somalia as well as having a huge chuck of Somali population among her

citizenry was bound to suffer. The very fact that Kenya which was considered as a haven

of peace was a natural refugee option to Somalis fleeing from the protracted civil war and

anarchy in their country increased the security threats more. This is largely due to the fact

that terrorists from Somalia can be able to masquerade as Somalis from Kenya or as

refugees and commit atrocities and mingle with the population. All this confirms the

study’s hypothesis; that the Somali state collapse has posed adverse threats to Kenya’s

security.

41

4.2.1 Kenya’s response to the various security threats that have been posed by the

Somali state collapse and the subsequent protracted civil war

From the analysis of data in chapter three, we can see that Kenya as a country has been

instituting a number of measures to deal with various security threats that have been

posed by the collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent protracted civil war.

However, as we have seen from the various terror attacks that have been following one

another in quick succession, each subsequent attack being deadlier and grievous than the

other, the counter terror operations have been ineffective. This is because of a number of

factors which have served as force multipliers in effectuating terror attacks. Kenya’s

counter-terror strategy has been bungled by a few maladies which can largely attribute to

the failure of counter-terrorism operations in Kenya. An area that has led to the

ineffective counter-terror strategy is the inefficiency of the agencies involved.

Intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies are important in an effective counter-

terrorism strategy.

The key to winning the battle against terrorism is winning the intelligence battle.

Intelligence enables early detection of terrorists in time for law-enforcement officers or

the military to act. However, for it to be of any value, intelligence must be supported by

effective law enforcement in conducting apprehensions and disruptions of terrorist cells.

Before 1998, there was a failure on the part of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies

to detect domestic and foreign terrorists freely operating within the country. The ease

with which these terrorists were entering and leaving the country before the attacks raises

questions about the ability and efficiency of intelligence activities and law enforcement at

the time. For example, effective intelligence and law enforcement should have detected

the terrorists when they were assembling the bomb in the truck at the busy river-road

streets in Nairobi, an area often filled with police. While intelligence agencies and police

failed to prevent the attack or dismantle Al Qaeda cells in the initial stages, there are

other agencies that contributed to the failures.76

The fight against terrorism is not a police battle alone; it also involves the Immigration

Department. Most of the terrorist suspects were foreigners. Some of the foreigners living

76Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

42

in Kenya had fake documents, including Kenyan national identity cards and passports.

Because of institutional corruption during the former regime, a person could easily obtain

Kenyan national identity cards, passports, birth certificates, or other documents through

Kenya’s black market. Terrorists have been exploiting such loopholes to enter the

country disguised as immigrants, tourists, or businessmen. Because of the Immigration

Department’s laxity, a large percentage of Pakistani and other immigrants reside in

Kenya. Some of these foreigners are engaged in microeconomic activities. Another area

the terrorists exploited was the lack of security awareness at the country’s entry points.

The ease with which Mohammed Saddig, a terrorist who was traveling on a fake

passport, left Nairobi via the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 6 August 1998 (later

arrested at Karachi airport in Pakistan), is evidence of inefficiency on the part of the

Immigration Department.77

Additionally, corruption within the Kenyan security agencies has also been put to blame

over terrorism. Corruption within the Kenyan police force in the 1990s for example was

rampant that you could virtually bring anything into the country as long as you greased a

security officer’s hand. Furthermore, the failure of effective law enforcement also

contributed to the problem. The police force has for a long time been so ill-equipped that

it cannot respond to emergencies because of a basic lack of transportation and

communication resources.78

Furthermore, although intelligence and law-enforcement agencies continued to track

terrorist suspects and their supporters in the country, it is evident there was a missing

link, either an effective approach was not applied or initial successes were the result of

external pressure.

In addition, the lack of effective intelligence and law enforcement contributed to the

failure to deter the 2002 terrorist attacks. Although transnational terrorism had started to

establish roots in Kenya, the government made no progress in implementing appropriate

domestic legislation on terrorism-related issues. Counterterrorism legislation is an

important instrument of an effective counterterrorism strategy, and any government

77Ibid Op. Cit.78 Ibid

43

confronted with the threat of terrorism should enact such legislation. The enactment of

such laws expresses the government’s political will to combat the threat.79

However, the piracy operations can largely be seen to be a success with the lowering of

pirate attacks ever since the Kenyan government and her allies started a sustained

counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden.

79Hared, A. (2005).Combating Trans-National Terrorism in Kenya. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

44

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

From the study it is evident that the collapse of Somalia as a state, and the subsequent

civil war and anarchical state that ensued accompanied by all maladies that dwarfed the

Hobbesian thesis on the state of nature, has led to adverse effects on the state of security

in Kenya with a “domino effect” on other sectors of this neighbor republic to the failed

state that is Somalia. It is also evident that the piracy activities orchestrated in the high

seas as well as the terror attacks that have been orchestrated in Kenya are largely

attributable to the state collapse in Kenya. It is of utmost importance that there is a review

of the various mechanisms so that we can have a multi-pronged approach to dealing with

the various threats posed by the state collapse in Somalia.

5.2 Recommendations

This study proposes to institute some recommendations that will be of import to the

government, the security agencies, intelligence operatives as well as other researchers in

the domain of international security in particular and international relations in general in

the hope of combating the various vices that are ravaging the Kenyan state and hollowing

her and bringing to their knees key sectors of the Kenyan economy such as the tourism

sector.

First, the government must be proactive in its overall counterterrorism strategy. This

effort largely departs from the reactive stance that the government of Kenya and her

security agencies has been employing. The main logic in this stance is so as to reduce the

risks of future terrorist attacks and as a strategy to the effect that terrorists the world over

have been known to lie in wait and strike when least expected. To this effect, this study

recommends that the government continue to employ more effectively the traditional and

nontraditional instruments of power such as diplomacy, military, economic, law

enforcement, intelligence, and legislation to combat terror threats.

Secondly, in order to improve the country’s efficiency in law enforcement as well as in

enhancing intelligence gathering, the country’s security agencies should be specially

45

trained in counterterrorism techniques, policing best practices and public relations in

order to inculcate a high degree of professionalism when dealing with the public. This

will go a long way in enhancing the public’s confidence in the police and forge a more

effective partnership to fight terrorism and other crimes in the country. In addition, a

structured police force that is embedded in the citizenry will greatly help the public

cooperate in providing intelligence. The government should also provide adequate

resourcing in terms of vehicles and communication to the police and the intelligence

communities to improve their efficiency. The country should also build forensic science

laboratories to facilitate the effective and efficient processing of evidence.

The fingerprint database at the Department of Immigration and Registration of Persons

should also be interlinked with the criminal investigation department to facilitate quick

tracking of suspects. Though Kenya might not have the resources to adequately train and

equip the police and the intelligence community and to establish a forensic laboratory, it

can always exploit the financial muscle of her international allies to help. The

government should also tackle corruption within the security agencies as well as at the

Department of Immigration and Registration of Persons so as to reduce this force

multiplier of terrorism.

Additionally, this study also calls for increased police – civilian cooperation as well as a

citizen security directed security and the socialization of the populace into an effective

security grouping. This is because such cooperation as well as the civic security

competence component is critical for any attempt at building up intelligence extraction

from society. It is also critical to enhancing citizen resistance to terrorists and criminals.

Finally, this study also recommends that there is a need for a regional approach,

synchronized activities among countries and institutions as well as intelligence sharing.

Additionally, the de-politicization and de-ethnicization of the country’s security sector is

also long overdue. There is also need for Kenya to lobby diplomatically for peace efforts

in Somalia.

46

5.3 Conclusions

This study observes that the security threats emanating from state collapse in Somalia

from the twenty year period of 1993 and 2003 are ravaging the Kenyan state and

hollowing her and bringing to their knees key sectors of the Kenyan economy. The state

of insecurity has also been threatening to destabilize the state and lead to its eventual

disintegration. However, if the recommendations given above are followed and a

program of action along their lines is effectuated, we can turn the tide on our favour as a

country.

47

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