defence system against ottoman empire in hungary

8/9/2019 Defence System Against Ottoman Empire in Hungary

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TH E

O T TO M A N

EMPIRE

A N D

ITS HERITAGE

Politics; Society

and

conomy

E D I T E D BY

S U R A I Y A

F A R O Q H I A N D H A L I L I N A L C I K

Advisory

Board

Fikret A d a n i r

•

Idris Bostan

•

A x nnon C o h e n

•

C o r n e l l Fleischer

B arbara F lemming

•

A lex ander de Groot

•

Klaus Kreiser

Hans Georg Majer

•

Irene M e l i k o f f

•

A hm et Ya§ar Ocak

A bdel j e l i l

T e m i m i • Gilles Veinstein • E l i zabeth Zachar iadou

V O L U M E

20

O T T O M A N S , HUNGARIANS,

A N D HABSBURGS

IN C EN T RA L EUROPE

The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest

EDITED BY

G É Z A

D Á V I D

A N D P Á L F O D O R

BRILL

L E I D E N

• B O S T O N • K Ö L N

2000


2/36


3/36

This book is printed on acid-f rcc paper.

Library

of

Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the military confines

in the era of Ottoman conquest / edited by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor.

p. cm. — (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage, ISSN 1380-6076 ;

v.

20)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9004119078 (alk. paper)

1. Europe, Central—History—To 1500. 2. Europe, Central—History—16th

century. 3. Europe, Central —His tory —1 7th century. 4. Europe, Central—

H i stor y , Mi l i t a ry . I .

Fodor,

Pál. I I.

Dávid, Géza.

II I. Scries.

D A W

1038 .0 88 2000

943—dc21 00-034284

CIP

D ie Deutsche

Bibliothek

-

CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the m il itary

confines i n the era of Ottoman conquest / ed. by Gcza Dav i d and Pal Fodor

- Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2000

(The Ottoman Empire and its heritage ; Vol. 20)

ISBN 90-04-11907-8

ISSN

1380-6076

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P RI NTE D

IN

T HE N E T H E R L A N D S

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS V I I

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE V I I I

PREF CE

(PÁL FODOR) I X

INTRODUCTION (GÉZA DÁVID and PÁL FODOR) XI

PART ONE: THE H U N G A RI A N- HA BSBURG FRONTIER

GÉZA

PÁLFFY

The Orig ins and Dev elop ment of the Border

Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in

H u n g a r y (Up to the Early Eighteenth Centu ry) 3

A N D R Á S K U B I N Y I The Battle of Szávaszen tdemeter- Nagy olasz i

(1523).

Ottoman Ad vance and Hungarian Defence

on

the Eve of Mo hács 71

J Ó Z S E F

K E L E N I K The

Mil i tary

Revolutio n in Hun gary 117

PART TW O: THE O T T O M A N FRONTIER

KLÁRA HEGYI The Ot to m an N e t w o r k o f

Fortresses

in Hu ngar y ... 163

GÁBOR

ÁGOSTON Th e Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System m

Hung ary

in the Sixteenth and

Seventeenth

Cen

turies 195

PÁL

FODOR Mak ing

a Living on the Frontiers: Volunteers in

the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman

A r m y

229

GÉZA DÁVID A n Otto man Military Career on the Hungarian

Borders: Kasim Voyvoda, Bey, and Pasha 265

SELECTED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

INDEX 315


4/36

LIST OF MA PS

1.

The

castles

of the Croatian and Wendi sh-Bajcsavar c onf ines in

1582 65

2. The

castles

of the Bajcsavar, Kanizsa, and Gy o r co nfine s in 1582 67

3. The

castles

of the

M i n i n g

Town's and Upper

H u n g a r i a n

confines

in 1582 69

4. Southern H u n g a r y at the end of the f i fteenth century 82

5. The battle of Szavasz entd emete r, 1523 106

6. Otto man fortresses i n H u n g a r y 173


5/36

E

O R I G IN S A N D D E V E L O P M E N T OF THE BORD ER DEFENC E

SYSTEM A G A I N S T

TH E

O T T O M A N EMPIRE

I N

H U N G A R Y

UP TO THE EA R L Y E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y )

GÉZA PÁLFFY

"The system o f fortresses is the onl y means by

w h i c h

Your Majes ty

w i l l

be able

to

c onta in

th e

p o w e r a nd

the

adv ance

of the

e n e m y ,

and

be h ind

w hi ch

Your countr ies and peop les

w i l l

be

secure."

1

T his

is

h o w H a b s b u r g

military

l eaders summarized

their

o p i n i o n a b o u t the s ig ni f i cance of the

Hungarian border defence system protect ing

the imp erial ci ty of

V ienna,

the Austrian hered i tary lands , an d the G e r m a n E m p i r e i n 1577. It

w o u l d

be d if f icult to f ind a better expression to de f ine the r o le of the defence

system established

by the

late s ixteenth century

on the f ront i er

z o n e

o f

Hungary

and its

s outhern annexed prov inces (S lav onia

an d

Croatia)

against the Ot t o man E mpire . Ev en t h o u g h the

Hungar ian

defence system

constituted onl y a section of the l ong an d

varied

f ront i er z o n e

w hi ch

stretched f rom Northern A fr i ca

vi a the

Med i terranean is lands , Italy,

and

Hungary

to the Pol ish-Lithuanian and Russian territories an d protec ted

Europe

against the

O t t o m a n

attacks, it is ev id ent that the decis iv e ev ents

of

the

c entury

l ong

O t t o m a n - H a b s b u r g c o n f r o nt at i o n o c c u r r e d

o n the

territory of M e d i e v a l H u n g a r y .

2

On the basis o f recent archival research

and

the achievements o f A ustr i an , Southern Slav, an d

Hungar ian

historiography, this study attempts

to p r o v i d e an

o u t l ine

of the

system

and

its

dev e lopment , concentrat ing

on the

s ixteenth

an d

seventeenth

centuries . To w ard s the end o f the tw en t i e th c entury it is e v e n m o r e t imely

as, w hi l e s ev eral monog raphs hav e been

p ub l i she d

i n

d i f ferent

w o r l d

languages about

the

defence systems

on the

C roat ian

an d

S lav onian

1

Pál

Szegő, Végváraink szervezete a török betelepedésétől a tizenötéves háború kezdetéig

(1541-1593)

[The

Organization

of the

Hungarian Border Fortresses from

the

Establishment

of the Ottoman Rule to the O utbreak of the Fifteen Years' War], Budapest, 1911, 52.

2

Cf. Pál

Fodor, " Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary,

1520-1541," Acta Orientálta

Academiae Scientiarum

Hungancae

45:2-3 (1991) 271-345.


6/36

4

GÉZA PÁLFFY

terri tories,

3

no w e l l documented study has been wr i t t e n about the system

of the H u n g a r i a n defence districts and border fortresses w h i c h played a

m u c h more i m portant role than the above mentioned areas in the whole

s tructure .

4

Earlier investigations have onl y discussed the Croatian-Slavonian

part , that is a special section of the defence system established in the

sixteenth century to resist the Ottoman advance,

w h i c h

was less decisive

f r o m the

p o i n t

of

v i e w

of the whole area, and have treated it s i m pl y as

th e antecedent of the military frontier Militdrgrenze) org anize d at the

b e g i n n i n g

of the eighteenth century.

5

But the development of the defence

3

The most important works in chronological order: Fr[antisek] Vanicek , Specialgeschichte

der Militärgrenze.

I- IV . Wi en, 1875. Jakob Arnstadt,

Die k. k. Militdrgrenze

1522-1881

(mit

einer

Gesamtbibliographie).

(Inaugural-D iss.) Würzb urg, 1969. Gunther

Erich

Rothenberg,

The Austrian

Militari/

Barder in Croatia,

1522-1747.

(Ill inois Studi es in the Social Sciences , 48.) Urbana,

1960, and

idem, The Milttan Border in Croatia 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution.

Chicago, 1966, and the two volumes

together

in German: Gunther Ejrich] Rothenberg, Die

österreichische Militdrgrenze in Kroatien 1522 bis 18S1.

Wien-München, 1970.

Die k. k. Militär

grenze. Beitrage zu ihrer Geschickte.

(Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Mus eums in Wien,

6.) Wien, 1973. Die österreichische Militärgrenze. Geschichte und Auswirkungen. Ed. by Gerhard

Emst . (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 8.) Regensburg, 1982. Vojna Kra

jina. Povijesni pregled-histonografija-rasprave. Ed. by Dragurin Pavlicevic. Zagreb, 1984. Cf

also Winfried Schulze, Landcsdefension und Staatsbildung. Studien zum Kriegswesen des inner

österreichischen Temtorialstaates (1564-1619). (Veröf fentlichungen der Kommissi on für neuere

Geschichte Österreichs, 60.) Wien-Köln-Graz, 1973.

Karl

Käser, Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die

Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft m der kroatisch-slawonischen Militärgrenze (1535-

1S81).

(Habilitationsschrift) Graz, 1985, and the most

recent

work by Jean Nouzille

(Histoire

de frontières. L Autriche et l Empire ottoman.

Préface par Jean Bérenger. Paris, 1991) w hich is,

however, a

dull

summary of earlier results.

4

So far Kurt Wess ely has been the only one to realize

that

for an understanding of the

whole defence system against the Ottoman Empire it is indispensable to know the history

of the Hungarian border defence zones as

wel l :

Kurt Wessel y, The Develop ment of the

Hungar ian Military Frontier

Until

the Middle of the Eighteenth Century,

Austrian History

Yearbook 9-10 (1973- 1974) 55-110, and idem, Di e Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576,"

in

Die russische Gesandschaft am Regensburger Reichstag 1576. Mit Beiträgen von Ekkehard

Völkl und Kurt Wessely. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 3.) Regens

burg, 1976,

31-55.

Cf. also István Sinkovics, Obrana madarskog pogranienog teritorija od

Turaka u XVI i

X V I I

stoljecu, in Vopna Krajina,

163-174.

The most important H ungari an

monographs: Szegő, op. cit., and Imre Szántó, A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fém/kora Magyar

országon

1541-1593

[The Organization and Golden Age of the Border Defence System in

Hungar y] .

Budapes t, 1980.

5

In Aus trian, German, Croatian—and sometimes even Hungari an—wo rks, the Croa

tian-Slavonian defence zones are called military frontiers (Militärgrenze) already from the

middle of the sixteenth century, which is, in my opinion, a capital mistake. The units of

the defence system of the sixteenthth and seventeenth centuries, the respective

areas

of the

T H E

H U N G A R I A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R

D E F E N C E

SY ST E M S

5

line against the Ottomans'

1

can onl y be understood m the knowledge of

the who le—H ung arian and Croatian-Slavo nian—bo rder defence system

and this is true for the history of its subsequ ent peri od s, too . Below this

system w i l l be examined as a w h o l e , v i e w e d f r o m the administrative

centres, that is f r o m Buda

until

1526, then t em porar i l y f r o m Pozsony and

Vienna, and f r o m 1556 up to the

abo l i t i o n

of the military frontier in the

nineteenth century, f r o m the

Imperial City

and—for an intermediary

p

e r

i o d f r o m Graz (1578-1705) respectively. This is the onl y aspect w h i c h

can p r o v i d e us w i t h a more coherent and complete picture about the

strategy of defence of the medieval H ung ar i an K i n g d o m and that of the

Habsburg military leadership, and about how the system was controlled.

THE

PERIODIZATION

O F

THE HISTORY

O F

THE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN

HUNGARY AGAINST THE OTTOMANS

The new approach makes it necessary to establish a new penodization for

the

history of Croatian and Slavonian territories w h i c h defines the most

important

shifts based o n the qualitativ e

changes w i t h i n

the whole system.

The former penodization advanced in 1960 by Fedor Moacanin, and

only

partly

corrected by those wo r k ing on the problem later on, can

hardly

be

used for the Hungarian territories in the narrow sense co nsti tuting the major

and

more decisive part of the defence system.

7

The Croatian author

d iv id e d

the nearly 500-year-old histo ry of the Croatian-Slavonian defence region

into

the fo l lowing two major and some m i n o r periods:

1. p e r io d : From the beginning to 1593, the outbreak of the so-called

'Fifteen Years' War' or ' L ong War'. W i t h i n this, he differentiated three

subperiods:

border fortresses (Grenzgebiet. Grenze, Grenzfestungen) were qualitatively different from the

mil

itary frontiers organized in the early eighteenth century. Another remarkable mistake of

Austrian historiography is to call the Croatian -S lavo nian border territories A ustri an Mi li tarv

Frontiers (österreichische Militärgrenze, see

notes

3 and 25), as in the sixteen th-sev enteenth

centuries it was not

these that

were called Au strian border f ortress zone (österreichische

Grenze),

but the border castles subordinated to Györ. Therefore it is

more accurate

to use

the term 'the Habsburg defence system against the Ottoman Empi re' in the sixteenth- seven

teenth centuries for the imperial-royal border defence system in Hungary. Cf. Kurt Wessely,

"Reply

to Rothenberg's Comments,

Austrian History Yearbook

9-10

(1973-1974)

119.

f

It

is to be noted

that

scholarly works have so far identi fie d the border defence syst em

against the Ottomans with the chain of fortresses, but this

latter

was, besides the mobile

field troops

and soldi ery kept by the counties, etc., onlv one, though decis ive element in

it.

7

Fedor Moacanin, Periodizacija histonje Vojne Krajine (XV -X IX

St .) , "

Historijski zbornik

13

(1960) 111-117.


7/36

6

GÉZA PÁLFFY

1.1. From the outset to 1522, w he n Ferd inand I , Ar ch du ke of Au stria,

sent

an army at his ow n expense to help the

defence

o f the A ustr i an

terri tories threatened by the Ottomans.

1.2. From 1522 to 1578, w hen the adm inistra tion of the Croatian and

Sl av oni an border

fortresses

w as subord i nated to the new l y es tabl ished

Inner A u str i an War C o unc i l

(Innerösterreichischer Hofkriegsrat,

G raz ) ,

sep

arating

them

f r o m

the H ung ar i an

defence

districts .

1.3. Fro m 1578 to 1593.

2. pe rio d: From 1593 to 1881, the el im inatio n of the system o f military

frontiers. W i t h i n th i s per i od M oacani n de f i ned f i v e sm al l er sections, out

o f w h i c h tw o shoul d be m ent i oned i n connect i on w i t h the era d iscussed

in

this paper.

2.1.

From 1593 to 1683, the beg innin g of the so-cal led reco nqu ering

T u r k i s h w a r

(1683-1699).

This w ar made i t po ssible to establ ish the

n e t w o r k

o f b o r d e r

fortresses

an d

military

f ront i er a l ong the Sava, Tisza,

D anube , and M aros .

2.2. Fro m 1683 to 1755, the first re form o f the

m i l i ta r y

frontiers

cons i dered i m po rtant by M oacani n .

8

Tho ug h the authors of mo nog raphs prep ared after 1960 corrected

M oacani n ' s per i od i z at i on i n

some

po i nts/ the ir approach to the bo rder

defence

system shows no real

change

at all. This

state

of affairs can be

ascribed to the fact that, due to language problems and a lack of archival

research,

they knew practical ly nothing about the Hungarian border

defence

system an d therefore neglected it. So the perio diz atio n to be presented

here

is the

first

attempt to define new periods

f r o m

the point of v iew of the whole

defence system in Hungary against the Ottoman Empire, and also appl icable

to the history of the Croatian-Slavonian region. In my o pin ion the f o l l o w ing

three major and several minor periods can be di fferentiated:

Th e

first

one lasted

f r o m

the beginning to 1526, the termination of

t h e m e d i e v a l H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . D u r i n g this era, the southern

defence

n e t w o r k

stretching f r o m the Ad riatic Sea to Transylvan ia was an org ani

cal ly coherent

defence

l i ne o f the H ung ar i an K i ng do m .

Th e

second

pe riod began in 1526 (the year o f the battle at M ohác s)

and cont i nued

t i l l

th e

peace

treaty of Karlovi tz in 1699, w h i c h closed the

epoch o f the reconqu er i ng T urk i sh w ars

(1683-1699)

and O ttom an rul e i n

H ung ary . A f ter the

peace

ha d

been

conc l uded i t ag ai n became possible

8

Further periods: 2.3.

1755-1807,

2.4.

1807-1848,

finally 2.5.

1848-1881.

9

See the works cited in note 2.

T H E

H U N G

A RI

A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R

D E F E N C E S Y S T E M S

7

to create

a qual i tat i v e l y new

defence

system cal led the

'm i l i ta r y

f ront i er '

(Mditdrgrenze).

In

th e

d e f in i t i o n

of the subperiods of the

th ird

phase (1699-1881),

historians are more or

less

of the same o p i ni o n , so i t is

w o r t h

accepting

the per i od i z at i o n o f M oac ani n and R othenberg .

In th e f o l l o w i n g I w o u l d l i k e to sum m ari z e the dev e l op m ent o f the

border

defence

system up to the organization of the

military

frontiers in

the early eighteenth century.

B y

sho w i ng br i e f l y the subper i od s I

wi l l

make an attempt to analyze the most important

sections

o f the cont i nual l y

changing n etw or k and to evaluate i ts land mark s given the constraints of

time

an d

space.

A t the

same

t ime I

w o u l d

l ike to justi fy the signi fi cant

changes

I have ap pl ie d in the perio diz ation used so far.

1

T H E

D E F E N C E

S Y S T E M

O F T H E

M E D I E V A L

H U N G A R I A N

K I N G D O M

( F R O M

T H E

O U T S E T

T O T H E

B A T T L E

O F M O H A C S I N 1526)

1

1. The origins of the defence

system

against the Ottomans

(late fourteenth century-mid-M70s)

In

the 1360s, th e military and po l i t i ca l l eadership o f the H u ng ar i an

K i n g d o m d id not recogn ize the danger i t faced w i t h the

appearance

o f

the O ttom an troops i n E urope . A l t h o u g h the

conquests

of the g r o w i n g

military state were far away f r o m the borders of the subsidiary provinces

of King L o u i s A n j o u I

(1342-1382),

the consp i cuo us po l i t i ca l and military

expansion of the Ottomans was a clear signal that they w o u l d hard l y

stop on the south-eastern Balkans after gaining the upper hand in the

struggle among the Southern Slav rulers as their auxi l iary troops. Though

L oui s I at tem pted— ev en i f i n a som ew hat unpre pared m anne r— to

contain the conquerors by establ ishing the Bulgarian banate o f

V i d i n

betw een 1365 and 1369 and by placing Hu ng arian soldiers in the

castles

there, the strikes by the Ottomans in the

1370s

an d

1380s

d i rec t l y

threatened the southe rn frontiers of Hun ga ry. The si tuatio n was mad e

worse by the fact that, towards the end of his rule, K i n g L oui s d i d not

pay too m uch at tent i on to the re i nforcem ent o f the southern border

fortresses

a l ong the L ow er D anube , and the confused

years

after his death

further

accentuated the problems of southern

defence.

10

1 0

O n the history of the organization of the defence system

before

1526, cf. Ferenc Szakály,

"Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare Before the Battle of Mohács

(1365-1526),"

Acta


8/36

8

GÉZA PÁLFFY

A fter S ig i smund o f Luxe m bur g , t he Hung ar ian K ing (1387-1437)

later H o l y Ro man Emp e r o r

(1410-1437),

experienced the imme diate threat

by the Ottomans on the batt lef ie ld of N i c o p o l (1396) and his western

neighbours d id so by means of the constant attacks," there remai ned

only o ne p o ss ib i l i t y t o d e f e nd Hungar y . I t became imperat ive that thev

lay the fou nd ation of a bo rder defence system capable of com peting

effectively w i t h the enemy at the frontiers in the

l o n g

ru n. Bearing this

purpose in m i n d , Sigismund ordered that the border fortresses along the

L o w e r

Danube sho u ld be g ive n

into

roy al hands, they should be

reinforced,

and that new castles sho u ld be bu i l t between Szörény and

Nándorfehérvár ( for example Szentlászló) . In

ad d i t i o n ,

he started to place

the mobile troops of the southern counties, of the banates exist ing since

the time of the rulers of the Árpád House, and the soldiers serving in

the border fortresses under central control. In the diet of 1397, held in

Temesvár ,

w h i c h

was of crucial importance concerning the defence of the

southern borders, he

tried

to enforce his intention o f

qua l i f y ing

the

Hungarian

military organizat ion for defence purposes by

means

of

several military l a w s .

12

The reforms led to the establishment of the so-called

militia portalis

by wh ic h

the ruler intended to create a l i gh t cavalry of considerable

numbe r

wh ic h

could be deployed on the front iers. In order to increase

the number of sold iers on the borde rs, Serbian refugees w ere mo re and

Orientálta Academiae Scientiaruni Hungancac 33 (1979)

65-111.

Idem, "The Hungarian-Croatian

Border Defense System and Its Collapse," in

From Hunyadi to Rákóczi. War and Society m

late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary. (W ar and Society in Eastern Central Europ e, 3.)

Ed.

by János M. Bak-Béla K. Király. Brooklyn, 1982,

141-158.

Cf. also Leopold Kupelwieser ,

Die Kampfe Ungarns mil den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht b ei Mo hács,

3526.

W i e n ,

1899

2

.

(I used

these

works in presenting all

three

subpenods, so I am not going to

refer

to them separately

below.)

11

For the earliest

attacks

against Hung ary, cf. Bódog M illeker,

A törököknek első betörései

Dél-Magyarországba Zsigmond és Albert királyok idejében és Keve és Krassó vármegyék megszűnése.

1393-1439

(The First Attacks by the Ottomans Against H ung ary in the Time of Kin gs

Sigismund and Albert, and the End of Coun ties Keve and Krass óf T emes vár, 1914. O n the

attacks against Transylvania, cf. Gustav Gundisch, Z»r Überlieferung der Turkenemfallc in

Siebenbürgen.

Kolo zsvár, 1947. O n the first raids in Au strian territories, see Han s Pirchegg er,

" D ie

ersten Türkeneinfálle

(1396,

1415,

1418)," Zeüschnft des Histo nschen Veremes fur

Steierrrmrk

18

(1922) 63-73.

See also the

latest

summary of the Southern Slav literature bv

Vasko Simoniti,

Vojaskn organtzaaja na Slovenskem v 16. sto letju.

Ljub ljan a, 1991, 5- 23.

12 Elemér Mályusz,

Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn 1387-1437.

Budapest, 1990,

136-166

13

It

meant that

well-to-do noblemen had to field one mounted

archer

for every 20, later,

after 1435, for every 33 peasants. A ndrás Boros y, " Th e Militia Portalts in Hu ngary Before

1526,"

in

From Hunyadi to Rákóczi, 63-80.

T H E

H U N G A R I A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R D E F E N C E S Y S T E M S

9

mo r e f r e que nt ly

h i r e d

as l i gh t hussars, b o a t m e n [naszádos) on the Danu be

or more increasingly, thou gh temp orari ly, as peasant soldiers

(vopiiks,

Soidatenbauer) i n return for certain exemptions. The incomes of the

country

d id not render i t possible to m aintain a regular army

p a id

b y

the king protect ing the front iers, apart f r o m the bandérium of the ruler.

In paral le l to the enlargement of the defensive military forces, the

org ani z at i on o f border defence was made more coherent . The military

forces of the counties of the Temesköz were subordinated—though onl y

tem porar i l y , for some major act ions—to the

h igh

sheri f f o f county Temes

(comes

Temesiensis),

w ho , at the

same

t ime, was appointed captain of the

garrison so ld iers, besides he ad ing h is o w n

bandérium.

A s imi lar process

started in the neighbouring

banate

o f Mac só ,

l y i n g

we st o f t he Te me skö z .

14

T h r o u g h p ersonal neg ot iat ion, Sigism und , und er the terms of the treaty

of Tata in 1426, acquired f r o m Djordje Brankovic the castle o f N án

dorfehérvár (Belgrade) , w h i c h was essential for the strengthening of the

defence. Ten years later he attached the

castle

to the banate o f Macsó, and

as a result a defence zone similar to the one in Temesköz came

into

be ing ,

since the ban o f Macsó disposed of the m i l i ta r y forces of the neig hbo urin g

counties of Baranya, Bod rog, Bács, Szerem, and Valkó . The two

ban

o n

the Croat ian-Slavo nian terr itor ies had sim ilar military

authori ty ,

w hat is

mo r e , t he f avo ur ab le na t ur a l e nd o w me n t s we r e f ur t he r e nhanc e d by

re i nforc i ng the fords on the Sava w i t h wo o d e n f o r t s . At t he

same

t ime,

in

the Temesköz, a chain of about twenty fortresses handled by the k ing

secured the defence of the border.

Th e f o r m a t i o n o f the defence n etw or k und er relatively calm

c o nd i t i o ns

w as fac i l i tated by the fact that the Otto ma n state u n d e r w e n t

one of the most cr it ical periods of i ts history d u r i n g the so-called

interregnum betw een 1402 and 1413. The Hu ng arian military leadership ,

however , d id not make use of the

o p p o r t u n i t y

to chase out the Ottomans.

Still, due to the

activ i ty

of the

comes Temesiensis,

P ip ó o f Ozo r a

(F i l ippo

S c o lar i) , w ho im p le m e nt e d t he

military

reforms of Sigismund and the

Thallóczi brothers (Matkó and Frankó) , and o w i n g to the campaigns and

1 4

A t the turn of the

1430s

Sigismund put the Teutonic Order in

charge

of the

bannte

of

Szörény defending the

entrance

at the Lower Dan ube. But his hopes in connection with

this plan soon failed. Erich Joachim, " König S igm und un d der Deutsche Ritterorden in

Ungarn

1429-1432.

Mitteilungen aus dem Staatsarchiv Königsberg,"

Mit teilungen des I nstituts

für Öst erreichische Geschichtsfo rschung

33

(1912) 87-119,

and recently Jenő Glück, " A n émet

lovagrend a XV . század i Bánságban [The Teutonic Order in the Fifteenth-Cen tury Banate],"

Zounuk. A Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levéltár Évkönyve

8

(1993) 33-44


9/36

10

GÉZA PÁLFFY

org ani z at i onal act ivity

of János

H u n y a d i

in the 1440-1450s, the medieval

H u n g a r i a n

K i n g d o m managed to

b u i l d

up a system on the southern

terri tories of the country, w h i c h was

still

not coherent enough but

adequate for permanent defence.

1.2. The furination of a

coherent

defence system: the military reforms of

Matthias Corvinus and their aftermath 147ÖS-152V

T h o u g h the foundations of the border defence system were

laid during

S ig i smund ' s reign,

the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1440 indicated that those

buf fer

states

in the Balkans w h i c h had previously served to protect

H ung ary

w o u l d

soon be r u ine d by the Ottoman advance. In the l o ng run , neither the

so-called w in te r campaign

(1443-1444)

by János H u n y a d i , nor his success in

Nándorfehérvár in 1456, nor even the Bosnian actions by Matthias Corvinus

in

1463-1464 coul d stop the process by w h i c h the

H ung ar i an

military force

was once and for all d r ive n back to the frontiers of the country by the 1460s,

except for the north-western Bosnian fortresses around

Jajca.

The nearly f i f ty years' 'peace-time' starting in the mid-1460s, wh ic h

was characterized by the

clashes

of the r a id ing troops of the contending

parties,

offered an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y for the

H u n g a r i a n

King to unify

an d r e f o r m the defence system co nstructed by his predecessors, that is

to make preparations for permanent defence. The

shi ft

in the foreign

pol i cy of Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490) f r o m the South-East to the West

m i g h t have served the same purposes.

15

Presumably, he intended to create

an Eastern-Central-European great power w i t h material resources to be

able to finance the reorganized defence line and to co mpe te succe ssfully

w i t h the Ottoman Empire that had changed into a European great power

w i t h the capture of Constantinople in 1453.

The reorganization of the defence system was accomplished in the

m i d d l e of the 1470s. The aims of the innovations were to create a more

coherent defence system,

w h i c h

coul d

be controlled

f r o m

the centre and was

no t d iv id e d in to many political, military administrative centres, furthermore

to establish an army that coul d be m obi l i z ed faster and in a more unif ied

w ay to protect the borders. In the southern regions from the Adriatic to the

Eastern-Carpathians, Matthias Corvinus united and integrated under the

c o m m a n d

of three military o fficials the two basic elements of the defence

system: on the one hand, the military forces and the netw ork of the border

1 3

G y u l a

Rázsó, Hu nyad i Mátyás török politikája [The Ottoman Policy of Matthias

C or vinus] , " Hadtörténelmi Közlemények

22

(1975)

305-348.

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D ER D E F E N C E SY ST E M S

11

fortresses, and on the other, the bandena, county and noble troops, that is

the military of the areas nei ghb ou ring the frontiers. This was the mo st

decisive and most significant part of his reforms.

A s a first step, in 1476 Matthias

united

the offices of the ban of Croatia-

Dalmatia and Slavorua. His

intention

was to subordinate the commanders of

border fortresses, as we l l as the mobile troops of the counties, barons and

nobles of the area, under the unif ied control of the Croatian-Slavonian ban

(banus Croatuie et Slavoniae) f r o m the sea to the Low er Danube. Thoug h he had

already attempted to unify the tw o offices as early as in the mid-1460s, his

endeavours were frustrated for a decade by the pursuits for independence of

the ban of Macsó, Miklós Újlaki, who was appointed King of Bosnia in 1471. '

After

the occupation of Szabács in 1476 and the death of Újlaki in 1477,

nothing

could prevent him from implementing his

p lan.

A t the same time, he organized

the region of the Lower Danube

into

a

unif ied

border defence system, similar

to the Croatian-Slavonian terntones. To this end he created the office of the

captain-general of the Low er Parts supremus capitenus paiiium regra Hungaruie

inferiorum),

w h i c h

was, w i th a few exceptions,

17

assumed by the

high

sheriffs

of

county Temes. From that time on,

besides

their

bandena

of considerable

numbers,

the captain-generals disposed of the

military

forces of

both

the border

fortresses and the ne i g hbour i ng co unties. A t the same

time,

as h igh sheriffs of

county Temes, they were also respo nsible fo r the

civil administration

of the

area.

Whi l e

the Croatian-Slavonian ban was personally m charge of the military

and

civil administration

of Dalmatia, Old Croatia,

lh

and the Slavonian counties

l

András

Kubinyi,

Di e Fragen des bosnischen König tums von N. Újlaki,

Studui Slavica

Acadermae Scientmrum Hungancae 8

(1958) 373-384

1 7

The captaincy-general of Pál Tomori

(1523-1526),

the Archbishop of Kalocsa, who had

his residence i n Péterv árad and died i n the

battle

of Mohács, has to be ranked among these.

'8 It is appropriate to

note

here

that

Croatia and Slavoni a as admi nis trative and territorial

notions had different meanings during the middle

ages

and in the sixteenth- eighteen th

centuries. Th e medieval ' Ol d' Croatia was situated south-west of the river Sava, and its

territory extended between the Kapel la Mountain and the Adriati c Sea, bordering on

Slavonia

in the north-east Sl avoni a proper was located between the Drav a vall ey and the

Kapela Mountain, extending as far as the river Vrbas in the

east.

The Ottoman advance

created

a completely new situation by the second half of the sixteenth century. By

that

time

the southern parts of Ol d Croatia were lost, its populati on sought refuge i n the north, and

for this reason in the sixteenth- seventeenth centuries the name Croatia des ignated the

areas

stretching f rom the Ad riatic to the Sava, then, in the eigtheenth century, to the Drava, which

was formerly named Slavonia, then Upper Slavonia. For Slavonia proper shrank to the

territory between D rava, Sava, and Cs ázm a by the

1570s.

In the second half of the ei ghteenth

century, however, it included the counties Pozsega, Valkó, and Szerem (the so-called Lower

Slavonia), and from

that

time on, Slavonia meant exclusively

that

territory.


10/36

12

GÉZA PÁLFFY

of Zágráb, Várasd, Kőrös, Verőce, Dubica, Szana, and Orbász, due to the

r e f o r ms

of Matth ias, the captain-ge neral of the Low er Parts had the same

responsibi l i t ies over the six counties of Temesköz (Keve, Krassó, Temes,

Torontál , A r a d , and C sanád) , ov er the neigh bo uring six counties of

B o d r o g ,

Bács, Csongrád, Békés, Zaránd, and Bihar, and over the counties

o f Pozsega, Valkó, and Szerem between the Drava and Sava, that is all

the military and adm inistrat ive du t ies over the terr itor ies cal led the Lower

Parts.'

9

Th e third great u n i t o f the defence l ine was led by the Voivode

o f Tr ansy lvan ia (vajvoda

Transilv aniae/Transilv aniensis)

w i t h the same

autho r i ty .

20

A s a result o f the refo rms of Matthias Corv inus , the

bases

of the

defence system against the Ottoman Empire laid d o w n by Sigismund of

L u x e m b u r g

we r e t r ansf o r me d and c hange d

into

a coherent system. At

the end of the f i f teenth century the Hu nga rian

K i n g d o m

was sur r o und e d

b y a vert ical ly and horiz on tal ly d iv id e d , un i f i e d n etw ork of defence. In

d e p t h it consisted of tw o parallel lines of bord er fortresses. The so uthern

l ine stretched f r o m Szörény via Orsova, Szentlászló , Nándo rfehérvár , Z i -

m o n y ,

Szabács, Szrebernik, Jajca, an d Kn i n up to Skardona and Kiissza,

the second, northern l ine f r o m Lúgos, Karánsebes, and Temesvár via

Pétervárad, the minor castles o f the Szerémség and Dubica,

Kr up a ,

and

Bihács to Zengg on the Dalmatian coast. Th e same system was d ivided

into three sections v ertical ly together w i th the Transy lv anian territories:

the Croat ian-Slavonian part w i t h Bihács as its headquarters, the

area

east

of i t ranging to Wallachia w i t h the centre of Tem esv ár called Lo w er Parts

an d the Transylv anian bord er area. A ll three parts had the

function

of

serv i ng and sup po rt ing the bo rder fortresses, in w h i c h there w ere several

t ho usand

Sou thern Slav and Hu nga rian garrison soldiers, bo atmen, and

'« For the history of the captaincy -gen eral of the Lowe r Parts, see recently L ászl ó Fenyv esi,

" A

temesközi-szörénységi végvárvidék funkcióváltozásai

(1365-1718)

[The Changes in

Function of the Border Fortress A rea of the Teme sköz and Sz örény ség] ," in Végvárak és

régiók a

XVI-XVII.

században.

(Studia Agriensia, 14.) Eger, 1993, 238-246.

2 0

The only debatable element of the reform is why Nándorfehérvár did not

become

the

seat

of the newly nom inated captain-general of the Lower Parts. A ll this might be in

connection with the devaluated office of the ban of Macsó held by Lőrinc, the son of Miklós

Újlaki. Thou gh it might have seemed wiser to send the captain-general of the Lowe r

Parts

to Nándorfehérvár, the events afterwards justified the decision by Matthias Corvinus as the

office with the seat in Temesvár survived the fall of Nándorfe hérvár in 1521, and continued

to function until 1556 with different

centres

as

will

be discussed later on. Cf. the different

opinion by Ferenc Szakály,

A mohácsi csata

[The Battle of M ohá csi (Sorsdö ntő történelmi

napok, 2.) Budapest,

1977,

55-56.

T H E

H U N G A R I A N - H A B S B L ' R G B O R D E R

D E F E N C E

SY ST E M S

13

peasant soldiers

p a id

by the k i n g .

2

' So in case o f danger , the captain-

generals of the bord er territories, as the leaders of the m ore secure

interior

counties, d isposed of a signif icant number of

banderia,

c o unt y and no b le

troops,

and unanim ou sly con trol led bo th the bord er fortresses and the

mobi le f ie ld troops. Their concrete tasks we r e d e t e r mine d by t he

ruler ,

w n 0

— w i t h o u t hav in g an ind e p e nd e nt bo d y

c o n t r o l l ing

the military

affairs—arrived

at decisions on the defence of the cou ntry af ter con sul

tation

w i t h t he Ro ya l Co unc i l (consilium regis/regni) resid ing in Buda.

3.3.

The fall of the defence

system

of the

medieval

Hungarian Kingdom

(1521-1526)

Before the

loss

o f Nándorfehérvár , the key fortress of the Danube

line,

in 1521,

22

the system o f bo rder defence di d not

seem

to

d i f f e r

m u c h

f r o m

the netw ork that came into being af ter the reform s of Matthias Co rvin us.

While one element of the defence, however , the chain of fortresses

still

existed, though in a bad state of repair, the other

ma in

c o mp o ne nt , t he

mobi le troop s of the neighb ou ring and inne r parts of the co untry became

practically unusable . So in the disastrous economic , soc ial , and polit ical

conditions

o f H ung ary in the Jagel lon-era (1490-1526), the defence system

became

mut i la te d

already before the fall o f Nándorfehérvár . The loss o f

the most important castle then launched a process that culminated in

total

collapse. Given the lack of a f ie ld a r my t hat c o u ld be mo ve d and

control led qu i c k ly

and c o he r e nt ly , N ánd o r f e hé r vár c o u ld

o n l y

have been

replaced by a castle o f similar size and signif icance along the Danube. A

stronghold

o f such strength, however , was to be

f o und o n ly

several

hundred ki lometers further north, in the centre of the country, in Buda.

The fall o f Nándorfehérvár resulted in a huge breach in the defence

line and brought about the loss of several neig hbo urin g fortresses:

Z i m o n y

and Szabács were captured in the same year , Orsova,

Kn i n ,

and Skardona

one year later, Szörény, the other b u l w a r k o f t he Lo w e r Danube ,

fell

in to

Ottoman hands in 1524. The p e r d i t i o n of the

castles

entailed the loss o f

21

Cf. András K ubi nyi 's article in the present vo lum e

2 2

Ferenc Szakály has dealt with the reasons and circumstances of the loss of the key

fortress in several studies, which obtains very useful points of reference Ferenc Szakály,

"N ándorfehérvár, 1521: The Beginning of the End of the M ediev al Hu ngarian K in gdo m, "

•n

Hungarian-Ott oman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of

Suleyman

the

Magnificent.

Ed.

by Gé za Dávi d and Pál Fodor Budapes t, 1994,

47-76.

Idem, A mohácsi csata,

56-58,

and

'áem, "N ánd orf ehér vár

1521-es

ostromához. Egy királyi adománylevél köztörténeti tanulsá

gai [On the Siege of Nán dorfeh érvár in 1521. T he Histo rical Lesson to Be D rawn From a

Royal

Deed of

Gift ] , "

Hadtörténelmi Kö zlemények 25

(1978) 484-499.


11/36

14

GÉZA PÁLFFY

those vi l lages wh ose inhab itants had prev io usly served as peasant

soldiers fo r a pay of some m onths and for d i f fere nt exemp tions. So

Süleym an the Magn if icen t , the new su ltan (1520-1566), ext inguished the

southern

line of the frontier fortresses—except for Jajca and Ki i ssza— w it h

in

a period of some years. These

castles

served as stepping-stones for him

to d o a w a y w i t h the last remnants of the second line as

w e l l ,

except for

some Croatian fortresses, in the decades after the battle of Mohács in

1526.

W i t h the collapse o f the southern chain of fortresses, the Hu ng aria n

mil i ta r y leadership lost the zone that was to have defended the whole

k i n g d o m .

The second, northern l ine in the

interior

o f the country was not

facilitated b y the natural surro und ings to such an extent as the previo us

one that was situated almost ent irely along mountains and r ivers. There

was a threat that if the gaps could not be f i l led very fast, Pétervárad,

w h i c h

was chosen to subst itute Nándorfehérvár , could not be reinforced,

an d

no mo b i l e t r o o p s we r e

f i e ld e d ,

t he who le

interior

p la in area of the

c o u n t r y w o u l d so o n fall. A l t h o u g h so me measures w ere taken by the

palatínus István Báthorv an d the captain- gen eral of the Lo w er Parts Pál

T o m o r i

a ime d a t b r i n g i n g the fortresses of the second l ine into a

d e f e ns ib l e c o n d i t i o n and a t r e in f o r c ing t he m w i t h p a id i n f a n t r y m e n

an d

bandena,

these

failed one after the other, due to the modest incomes

of the country. As a result , the ent ire southern defence system inevitably

collap sed i n 1526, w he n the last uni ts of the mo bil e f ie ld troops and the

major border fortresses perished. The death of Louis II (1516-1526) at the

same t ime brought about the

fall

o f t he me d ie va l Hungar ian

K i n g d o m .

Before the col lapse of the mediev al bo rder defence sy stem, a change

t o o k p lace whose ef fects could not be

felt

in the 1520s, b u t w h i c h p r o v e d

v ery imp o r t ant in the l o ng run. Already in the early 1500s, K ings

V l ad i s l av

II (1490-1516) and Lo uis II and the Croat ian barons and nobles

turned

t o Emp e r o r

M a x i m i l i a n

1 (1493-1519) for help to

j o intly

avert the

danger threatening the

Austrian

provinces as w e l l . Bu t d u r i n g the rule

o f M a x i m i l i a n 1, the external military support assist ing the

ban

of Croatia

r e maine d

o n l y

a p lan . H ow ev er , af ter the

fall

of the first chain of

fortresses, A rch du ke Ferdinand I, assessing the danger threatening the

Aus t r ian p r o v inc e s go ve r ne d by h i m — m a i n ly Car n io la (Krain), Carinthia

(Kamten),

and Styria

(Steiermark)

—resigned him self to a sign ifican t step.

D u r i n g the

siege

o f Nándorfehérvár in 1521 he summoned his estates for

a special mee t ing and , at the request of his bro ther- in - law , Louis II , he

T H E H L' N C A Rl

A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R

D E F E N C E

SY ST E M S

15

p r o p o se d t o send se ve ra l t ho usand Ge r m an in f ant r ym e n t o sup p o r t

H u n g a r y .

On the

basis

of the documents at our disposal, it can be stated

that abo ut 2,000 infan trym en set of f for Hu ng ary, and this was the first

time w he n there was an actual attemp t by the Aus t r ian p r o vmc e s t o assist

in

the defence of the Hungarian

K i n g d o m . -

3

From 1522 to the defeat at

Mo hac s mo r e and mo r e f r e que nt ly d i d field troops arr ive f r o m the

nei g hbour i ng

Aus t r ian

provinces to the area co ntrol led by the Cro at ian

ban,

but they were not p laced

into

the border fortresses as constant

garrisons yet .

34

Tho ugh t he r e gu lar

Aus t r ian mi l i ta r y

aid seemingly

strengthened the defence in this section of the border, in fact it dissolved

the unif ied leadership of the military force that had been commanded by

the

ban

up to this

t ime.

The captain-generals

(Obnstcr Feldhauptmann der

nwderoblermchischen Landc) of the troo ps sent by the

Aus t r ian

estates we r e

appoi nted by the latter and were not subordinated to the

ban,

though the

consequences of this

d ua l i t y

d id not manifest themselves in these years,

but only

after the fall o f t he Hungar ian

K i n g d o m

i n 1526. A s the mo st

decisive element of the defence system, the chain of fortresses still

remained

under the control o f the ban at that time.

23

Lajos Thallóczy-A ntal H odinka, Magijarország melléktartomány ainak oklevéltára

(Codex

Diplomáticas Partium Regno Hungurtae

Adnexarum).

Vo l . 1 A horvát véghelyek oklevéltára.

1490-1527

[A rchives of the Croatian Border Fortresses

1490-1527).

(Monu menta H unganae

Histórica I. Diplomataria, XXXI.) Budapest. 1903,

34-38:

Nos . XXXV and

LXU-LXXII1:

Nos.

1-10 Th e year 1521 whi ch

I

propose to start a new period, is both appropriate for marki ng

the collapse of the first chain of fortresses and for referring to the

date

when Ferdinand,

Archdu ke of Austria began to support the defence system of the medieval Hungarian

Kin gdom w ith his financial and military power. That is why the year 1522 in Rothenberg's

monograph

(The Austrian M ilitary

Border) is worth modi fyin g to 1521.

; j

In connection w ith this, see Gunthe r E. Rothenberg, " The Ori gins of the Aus trian

Mil

itary Frontier in Croatia and the Alleged Treaty of 22 December

1522," Slavonic and East

European Review

38 (1960) 493-498. Cf. also Winfried Schulze, " Di e österreichische M ilitar-

grenze," Militärgeschichtliche Mitt eilungen 9

(1971) 191-192

Though Rothenberg proved in

his study published in 1960 that the alleged treaty of December 22, 1522 betwee n Lo uis II

and Ferdinand, A rchduke of A ustria is merely the result of a mistake by Frantisek V anicek

(F. Vanicek,

op.

of., 5-6) wh o misinte rpreted the talks at the Impe rial Diet

(Reichstag)

of

Regensburg in

1522-1523,

he (Rothen berg) was not the first to realiz e this. Lajos Thall óczy ,

in his introdu ction to the above quoted collection of documents had already

corrected

the

mistake (L. Thalloczy-A. Hodinka, op. at., Nos .

LV1II-LX

and

LVLII:

n. 1). Ro thenb erg's

merit is

that

he again drew attention to the problem, as Thallóczy's results were often

ignored even by Hungarian scholars. Pal Szegó, op. at., 13 and 32. Cf. recently G erha rd

Rill. Fürst und Hof in Österreich von den habsburgischen Teüungsverträgen bis zur Schlacht vo n

Moliács

(7523/22

bis

3526).

Bd. 1. Außenpolitik und Diplomatie. (Forschungen zur Europäischen

und Vergleichenden Rechtsgeschichte, 7.) W ien- Köln -W eimar, 1993,

42-43:

n. 17.


12/36

16

GÉZA PÁLFFY

2. THE DEFENCE SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMANS IN THE SIXTEENTH

AN D SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

The defeat at Mohäcs opened up a new era in the history of Hungary

The co un try lost not only its ruler, but almo st the wh ol e of its southern

defence

system, i nc l ud i ng both the network of border

fortresses

and the

ne ighbo ur ing

parts supp ort in g them

w i t h

their f ie ld troop s. A ll this

resulted i n the establ ishment o f Ottom an rule in Hung ary , the coronations

of John Szapolyai I

(1526-1540)

and Ferdinand I

(1526-1564)

as kings of

H u n g a r y , and the d i v i s i on of the country into three parts. Though the

sovereign ty and ind ependence of the country di d not ent irely d isappear

in the

f o l l o w i n g

centuries, its terri tory became the batt leground of two

great powers, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire. In 1526, however ,

the quest ion was whether Hungary w o u l d be able to organize a new

defence

system or whether i t w o u l d

share

the fate of w hat had

been

its

vassal states in the Balkans. A nd if the cou ntry was to

succeed,

in which

part

of i t , in what frame w ork , and under who se leadership w o u l d the

ne w

defence

system come into being.

2.1.a.

One and a half decades of confusion: the period of the commanders-

in-chief of the

royal

army

paid

by Ferdinand I of Habsburg

The fifteen

years

after 1526 remind us of the events at the turn o f middle

of the fifteenth century. Only the performers of the Christian party had

changed: no w the Aus tr ian prov inces were in the

same

situation as the

me d ie va l

H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m h a d

been

earlier. The question was the

same:

w o u l d

they manage to stop the enemy in f ront of the borders, on

the terr itor ies of Hu ng ary und er the authority of Ferdinand 1, crowned

the king of this country, or, as the Croatian-Slavonian

ban

Tamäs Nädasdy

expressed

it in his letter to Ferdinand in the summer of 1539: "If Your

H o l y Majestv

does

not support this country

w i t h

your other provinces it

w i l l

certainly happen that, due to the

loss

of this country, the other

p r o v inc e s o f Yo ur H o l y Majesty w i l l be lost ."

25

But the extent of the

danger was not adequately assessed in Vienna at the end of the

1520s.

To put it more accurately: even if they recognized the Ottoman threat,

they d id not have the po w er to act against it effectiv ely. For the

35 "Nisi Vestra Sacratissima Maiestas alicunde ex aliis regnis suis huic

regno

provident,

actum erit de eo, et ex amissione huius regni

amittentur

alia etiam

regna

V estrae Sacra-

tissimae Maiestatis." Wien, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereinafter ÖStA], Haus-, Hof- und

Staatsarchiv

[hereinafter

H H S t A ] , Ungarische Akten (Hungarica)

[hereinafter

Hunganca),

Allgemeine Akten

[hereinafter

A A ] , Fase. 39. Konv. F. 1539. Juni-Juli fols. 36-37.

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

17

rganization of a new defence system—as h ad been implemented on the

southern front iers of H ung ary in Matthias Corv inus' - t ime—there was a

need for a longer period of

peace,

for the appro priate econom ic and

financial

backgro und and po l it ical sup po rt , for a d ip lom acy that was

aware of the Ottoman's customs and methods, for an appropriate ap

paratus to organize and control the system, and last but not

least

for a

thorough

know ledg e of local Hu ng arian c ircumstances. N one of

these

conditions were met at that time.

The conf l ict between the tw o rulers of Hu ngary bro ught about c ivil w ar

conditions in the country and its annexed provinces (Slavonia and Croatia).

To save his territories, John I was forced to coop erate w i t h the Ottomans,

while

they advanced capturing more and more

fortresses

in the

Szeremseg

and

Croatia.

26

But

these

southern territories of Hungary

seemed

far away

enough

from

Vienna, not to mention the

palace

of emperor Charles V

^51 9-1556) in Toledo, for w h o m the Hun gari an theatre of w ar was

overshadowed by the Mediterranean and Italian provinces

also

threatened

by

the Ottomans.

A l thoug h

i t was obvious to those

k n o w i n g

the

geographical situation of Hungary that if the castles of Buda and the plain

areas

cou ld not stop the Ottom ans, they w o u l d get several hundred

kilometers nearer the centre of the Austnan provinces. In vain d id the

siege

of Vienna in 1529

cause

a shock, the Habsburg military leadership w as

unable to perform the

tasks

of

defence

against the Ottomans.

27

T h o u g h

among those Aust nan c o mmand e r s who kne w little about the conditions in

Hungary

there were

some

w ho realized the

severe consequences

o f d e lay ,

28

26

Gabor Barta, " A Forgotten

Theatre

of War 1526-1528 (Historical Events Preceding

the Ottoman-Hungarian Alliance of 1528)," in Hungarian-O ttoman

Military and

Diplomatic

Relations.

93-130.

2 7

Christine Turetschek, Die Türkenpolitik Ferdinands I. von 1529 bis 1532. (Dissertationen

der Universität Wi en, 10.) Wien , 1968.

2S

After the royal troops led by Hans Katzianer captured the castle of Szepesvär, the

residence

of the family Szapolyai, Ulrich Leysser chief field

armoury

officer (Obrist-Feldzeug-

meister) suggested to his ruler on M arch 28, 1528, that the artillery arsenal here and in other

places should be

transported

to the southern

border fortresses

and the ruined cannon should

be

cast

again with the

same

purpose: "Euer Kuni gliche M ajestät etc.

hetten

solh Geschucz,

klain vnd groß behaltenn, vnd die ortflegkhen

gegen

dem Turgkhenn damit versechenn ...

hetten

Euer Kunigliche Majestät etc. new geschuez giessen vnnd die Turgkhisch Gräniczen

damit versechen lassenn." ÖStA Kriegsarchiv [hereinafter KA ] Alte Feldakten [hereinafter A F A ]

'528/3/16 c. It is not a coincidence that it was Leysser who made these proposals as he had

already taken part in the

recruitment

of the auxiliary troops

commanded

to Croatia from 1522

so he was

among

those who rightly

assessed

the real

degTee

of the

Ottoman

threat (see L.

Thaüdczy-A. Hodinka, op. at..

145-147:

No. XCI and

148-149:

No. XCOI).


13/36

18

GÉZA PÁLF-FY

Fe r d inand ' s polit ical , economic , and mi l i t a r y resources a l l o we d t w

th i ng s

in this

p e r i o d .

On the one hand, w i t h h is troop s sent to Hun gary

he grad ually broke the po w er of his r iva l king, and on the other hand'

w i t h the help of the most endangered pro vinc es of Carniola, Carinthia '

an d Styria, he started to reorg anize u nd er his ow n co ntrol the Croatian

b o r d e r

defence system coordinated by the ban.

2v

The t w o

processes

too k place in a similar f rame w ork and were

accom panied by sim ilar prob lems. In order to strengthen his pow er both

in

Hu ng ary and in Croat ia and Slavonia, Ferdin and sent considerable

numb e r s o f f o r e ign ( ma in ly Ge r man) t r o o p s .

These

were supplemented

by the p a id so ld iers of the Hun gari an and C roat ian nobles suppo rt ing

the Habsb urgs, and by the units of the counties and insurgent f ielded

u n d e r the law s of he cou ntry. The coo perat ion o f the German and

H u n g a r i a n

troop s was not unc lou ded . The quest ion of control caused

serious conf l icts

f r o m

the moment the

first

l.nmisknecht set foot on

Hungar ian s o i l ,

as the comm ande r- in-ch ief o f the troo ps serving in

H u n g a r y

or Croat ia

(Obnster

Feldhauptmann

der

mederosterreichischen Lande

in Ungarn/n Kroatwn) at the cost o f t he ' Lo we r Aus t r ian estates' (at that

time still c o m p o s e d o f L o w e r

Austria,

Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria)

tried

to extend his

authority

b oth ov er the Hu ng arian and Croatian

contingents. But according to the so-called palatínus' artic les of 1485, the

d e p u t y c o m m a n d i n g

these

troops in the absence of the k ing was the

palatínus regni Hungáriáé.

3

The situat ion was further complicated by the

fact that this office had not been f i l led since 1530 and the governor

(locumtenens

regni Hungarme), the leader of the go verno rship

{locumtenentta

regia), c reated to replace the palatínus, d id h i s best to keep control over

t he Hu ngar ian t ro o p s .

31

There was a similar conflict between the Croatian

^ T hou gh in the summer of 1528 M artin Fleugaus, the armoury officer of Ferdinand in

Carniola (Zeugwart in Kram), mustered the border fortresses (Szeged, Temesvár, Csanád,

and Lip pa) in Tem esk öz wi th the aim of checki ng how they co uld be strengthened to serve

the purpose of defence against the Ottomans, they could not prevent them from getting

into the hands of John I. ÖStA K A A FA

1528/7/6.

See also ÖStA HHStA Hunganca AA.

Fasc. 8. Konv . 1. 1528. Jan.-Juni fols

175-176.

3« Magyar torvénytár. (Corpus juris Hungária) 1000-1526. évi törvényczikkek (Articles of

1000-1526).

Explained and referenced by Dezső Márkus. Budapest, 1899,

398-399:

article No 4.

3 1

István R.

Kiss,

A

magyar

hely tartót anács l. Ferdinánd korában és

1549-1551.

évi

leveles

könyve

(The Hungarian Locumtenentia unde r Ferdinan d I and its Letter Book from 1549 to 1551).

Budapest, 1908, and G yőző Emb er, " A helytartói hivatal történetéhez a XV I. században [To

the History of the

Locumtenentia

in the Sixteenth Century]," in Emlékkönyv Szentpétery

Imre

születésének

hatvanadik

évfordulójának ünnepére. Budapest, 1938,

142-156.

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A B S B U R G

BO RD E R

D E F E N C E SY ST E M S

19

m

and the

Austrian

c o mmand e r - in - c h i e f . We c an assume that the parties

'"ere perfectly aware of the

h igh

stakes in the struggle for the sphere of

thority

Th e

p o i n t

w as that the w inn er co uld take charge o f the

Hungarian

and Croat ian

mi l i t a r y

af fairs and simultaneously the control

f the border defence system. So in the next fifteen years the Habsburg

litary leadership mad e an attemp t at w hat Sigismu nd of Lux em bu rg

"n d his

successors

could not achieve. They tried to ensure their power

b campaigns led outside the

Aus t r ian

provinces and by

taking

control

of

the mil itary affairs and border defence in such areas they sought to

stop the Ottoman advance. For this purpose the economic and mil itary

pow er

of the

Austrian

p rov inces suf f iced even i f Charles V was reluctant

to

g i

v e

supp ort . For Hun ga ry to preserve i ts sovereign ty and

territory

to

some extent, it seemed that i t had to pay an enormous price in return.

The Hungarian m i l i ta r y - p o l i t i c a l o f f iceholders and the estates

f o r me r ly

controlling

the country and its defence had to renounce their posit ions

in

leading the mil itary. There was

har d ly

any reassuring w ay o ut of the

dead end.

Up

to the peace of Várad in 1538 made w i th John Szapolyai, the

foreign

troops led to Hungary by the

Austrian

c o mmand e r s - in - c h i e f

secured—if not quite sat isfactor i ly—the territory o n w h i c h the new

defence system could be organized later on. A l t h o u g h Kassa, the key to

Upper H ung ary remained in the hands of John 1, and then passed to his

son, John Sigism und betw een 1536 and 1552, an adequate co un terp oi nt

was created by

s u p p l y i n g

the castle of Sáros w i th a signif icant Habsburg

garrison.

The fortresses pro tect ing Vienna (Komárom , Esztergo m, Tnta,

and

Győr) were

s imi la r ly p r o v id e d

w i t h so ld iers of various nat ional ity

(i.e.

Germans and Spaniards)

p a id

b y k ing Fe r d inand .

These mil itary

decisions, how eve r, lacked any

k ind

of strategy aimed at the f o r mat io n

of

a coherent defence sy stem. Practically , they we re decision s m ade in

an emergency situation.

Between 1526 and 1541, the mil itary af fairs of Hungary and the

annexed areas were almost exclusiv ely control led by the above me ntioned

Austrian

c o mmand e r s - in - c h i e f o f Fe r d inand .

A f t e r

the battle of Mohács

the only e f f ic ient army was const ituted by the German troops and by the

cavalry units p a id also f r o m abro ad but led by Hu ng arian and Southern

Slav captains (Bálint Török, Lajos Pekry, and Pál Bakics). As the payment

of

these troops was covered by the ruler f r o m hi s

Aus t r ian

provinces, his

right to command them could not be debated. So in these confused t imes


14/36

20

GÉZA PÁLFFY

the 'task' of the governors (locumtenens

regni Hungáriáé)

in Pozsony w as

only to consult the comm anders- in-chief no t wel l -v ersed in the Hu ng arian

conditions and to quarrel about the spheres of author i ty . The real military

assistants o f t he c o mmand e r - in - c h i e f we r e t he f i e ld m a r s h a l s (Feld-

marschall) com manded to help him and the w ar counci l lo rs (verordnete

Knegsrdte)

e ither staying beside h im or in Vi enn a— inc lud ing a war

secretary (Knegssckretdr):'' So in this pe rio d a new military ad m in i st r a ti ve

organization came

into

being, wh ic h , tho ug h subject to changes in its

personnel, showed some signs of stability and became o f great s ignif i

cance

as the precedent of the A u l i c War Co unc i l

(W iener Hofknegsrat).

In Croatia the changes in the military ad min i st r a t i o n and bo r d e r

defence were similar and even faster than in H un ga ry . John I, after the

death

of his captain-general and

ban*

Kristóf Frangep án in Septembe r

1527, had less power to support his fo l lowers there. After the resignation

in

1528 of

Ferenc

Batthyány, the Croatian-Slavonian ban w h o h a d s u p

ported Ferdinand, the vacancy of the office offered an excellent oppor

tunity to curtail the sphere of

authori ty

of the

ban,

and the locumtenens

in Pozsony had hardly any w o r d in the direct ion of these r e mo t e terri

tories. At the

same

time, the Ottomans—as in the next one and a half

centuries—regarded this territory as a seco ndary theatre of w ar besides

the

main

Hungarian front in its narrow

sense.

In spite of this fact, the

Austrian

provinces were mostly threatened in these areas in this per i od ,

and therefore the estates o f Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria soon manag ed

to transfer control of this section of the defence system of the medieval

Hungarian

K i ng dom

to Archd uke Ferdinand and reo rganize i t for their

o w n

protection.

34

Thus the Habsburg military adm inistrat ion started to f o r m the first

unit of the new defence system against the Ottomans in the Croatian

border area. It has already been me ntion ed as a preced ent th at after 1521

field

troops

paid

by the

Austrian

estates

regularly marched to Croat ia,

» On the war councillo rs, see the Hungarica collection of OS tA HH StA (A A . Fase 2 -Fase.

70. passen) from the period 1526-1550

"Cnstoforus de Frangepanibus rcgnorum Dalm aciae, Croaciae et Sclav oni ae banus

ac capitaneus regius generalis" (Vehke. Augus t 27, 1527) OS tA H HS tA Hun garica A A Fasc.

7. Kon v. 3. 1527. fol. 38. Cf . Gábor Barta,

La route qui mène à Istanbul 1526-1528.

(Studia

Histórica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 195.) Bud apest, 1994, 12-13 and 86.

» On the help given by the Styrian

estates:

Günther Burkert, Ferdinand

I. und die

stemschen

Stande Dargestellt

anhand

der

stemschen

Lmdlagc

1526-1541. (Inaugural-Di ss.) G raz, 1976,

57-173.

T H E H U N G A R 1 A N - H A B S B U R G

BO RD E R D E F E N CE

SY ST E M S

21

b ut i t d id not entai l—and it could not

w i t h i n

t he me d ie va l Hu ng ar ian

K i n g d o m — t h e

transformation of the defence system. H ow eve r , Ferdinand

m his capacity as King o f Hungary and Croat ia, sent troops

paid

by his

Aus t r ian

estates to the

castles

of Zengg and Kiissza in 1527 and to Bihács

after the resignation of

Ferenc

Batthyány in

1528.

35

In ad d i t i o n to

taking

charge of the major border fortresses, more and more field troops also

arr i v ed in the Sava region to stop the Ottoman raids, and their

commanders- in-chief (Miklós Jurisics, Hans Katzianer) began to organize

the border fortresses under

roy al

ad min i st r a t i o n into a coherent system.

A s a first step, in 1538 they set up the post of the captain- gen eral w ho se

respons i b i l i ty

encomp assed the region called the Ol d Croat ian con f ines

(alte

krabatische/kroatische

Grenze) in later sources. In the last day s of

A p r i l ,

w h e n the

ban

Péter Keglevich, defending Bihács again, renounced his

c o n t r o l over the

castles

he had been in charge of , Ferdinand appointed

Er asm vo n

T h u r n

the captain-genera of Zeng g, Bihács, Ripacs, and

Otocsác , and the minor fortresses belonging to them, that is o f the Old

C roat i an c o n f ine s .

36

W i t h the appointment of Thur n the construct ion of

the western sect ion of the Croat ian borde r defence system ex tending f r o m

the Una to the

Ad r ia t i c

Sea actually started, and the

w o r k

was c o nt inue d

by

the commanders- in-chief in Croat ia and Slavonia (Obnstcr Feldhaupt-

mann

windischer und

krabatischer/kroatischer

Lande)

ap po inted af ter 1540,

f irst ly b y H a n s U n g n a d .

3

' In accordance w i t h the practice f o l l o w e d in the

case o f the com mand ers- in-chief in Hu ng ary they were also assisted by

35

L . Thal l c k zy -A . Hod ink a ,

op. at.,

671: N o

D X X IV ,

672-674:

N o.

D X X V I

and

677-686:

Nos . DX XXU -D XXX V and LV11.

3 6

"Pro conservandis partium istarum ad confinia Tu rcharum iacentium locis ... in

Capitaneum assumpsimus et constituimus il l ique Castrorum et Op pido rum nostrorum

Bihigij et Repatz, Civitatisque

nostrae

Segmensi s et Ottoschutz cum omni bus eorund em

attinentiis curam administrationemque demandavim us" , and "i n supremum Capitaneum

univ ersorum regni nostri Croatiae locorum fi nimo rum simul et gentium ib idem nostrorum,

nec non Civitatis

nostrae

Segnensis et Attatschvz ac

praeterea

et opp ido rum n ostrorum

Bihigij

et Repath assumpsimus ct constituimus." Ö StA H HS tA Hungarica A A . Fasc. 35

K onv .

1. 1538. A pr. fols.

94-95.

Cf .

ibid.,

fols

86-87,

89, 93 and

96-99.

1 7

Budapest, Mag yar Országos Levéltár [hereinafter MO L] E 144, M agyar kincstári levél

tárak, M agyar Kam ara Archívu ma [hereinafter

M K A j

Történelmi emlékek. Belügy box 1

fols.

63-64.

January 12, 1540. Wi thout place The Bestallung of Ferdinand I for Han s Un gnad

"O berister Veldhawb tman vnnserer Funff Niderosterrcichischen, Wi ndischen v nd Crabati-

schen Lannde". Cf. Bernd Zimm ermann, "Landeshauptmann Hans Ungnad von Sonnegg

(1493-1564).

Ein Beitrag zu seiner Biographie," in

Siedlung, Macht und W irtschaft. Festschrift

Fritz Posch zum 70. Geburtstag.

(Veröffen tlichungen des Steiermärkischen Landesarchi vs, 12.)

Ed . by Gerhard Pferschy. G raz, 1981, 210.


15/36

22 GÉZ A PÁLFFY

w ar

c o u nc i l l o r s d e l e ga te d by ne ighb o ur ing p r o v inc e s .

3

" In parallel to this

the settlement of and

o f f e r ing

o f pr ivi leges to the Vlachs

(Valaclu)

and

U sko ks

(Uscoci)

started in the Cro atian-Slav on ian

areas,

whose certain

g r o u p s

later on p laye d an imp ortan t role in the defence of bo rder

fortresses and then f r o m the eighteenth century in thé m i l i ta r y f ront iers.*

In the period last ing f r o m the battle of Mohács to the

fall

of Buda

the

f o r m a t i o n

o f a new d efence system was init iated by the Habsburg

military leadership

o n l y

in the Croat ian border area be t we e n Ze ngg and

Bihács. Ferdinand I took the necessary steps

o n ly

in the territories mostly

threatened by the Ottomans and even i f he recognized the real nature of

this danger (namely that Vienna was also menaced) he was unable to

create a coherent defence system to avoid i t . W i t h his troops regularly

sent to Croat ia-Slavonia and Hungary each year, he

o n ly

spontaneously

retorted

hi s r iva l king John I; at the

same t ime ,

he c o mmiss i o ne d

commanders- in-chief to take charge of the

military

af fairs and border

d e f e nce in Hu nga r y . A nd t ho ug h he d id no t

seek

to organize a new

defence system in these far away

areas

o f H ung ary, that is he was not

energet ical ly i n v o l v e d against the Ottomans, w i t h these steps he

still

ensured those regions where later on the new chain of fortresses could

be b u i l t up as the basis for the org anizat ion of the new defence system.

H e

could also benef it f r o m the ser ious m istakes com mitted by the Ottom an

military leadership; in 1529 and 1532, Süleyman I w i t h d r e w his troops

to the l ine of the Low er Danube and Drav a and d id not retain those

fortresses

w h i c h

af terward s faced him as the bu lw arks of the new defence

n e t w o r k a n d c o u l d

o n l y

be regained at the expense o f

severe

losses.

2.1.b. The first attempts to organize a new defence system (1541-1556)

Th e fall of Buda in 1541 and of the fortresses of Siklós, Pécs, Székesfehér

vár , Tata, Nóg rád, H atvan , then of Esztergom on the Danube, and the

loss

o f Valpó and

A ty ina

in Slavonia

d u r i n g

the

1543-1544

c amp a ign

justif ied

those few w ho were of the

o p i n i o n

already in the

1530s

that

these fortresses w o u l d have to be reinforced and a new defence system

c o v e r i n g

the who le country organiz ed. The repeated advance o f the

Ottom ans created a com pletely new situat ion. W hile up to this p o i n t the

creat ion of the new sys tem —w ith the except ion of the mo st endang ered

3« Schulze, Landesdefension,

60-61.

3^

Kaser, op. at.,

60-79.

Catherine Wen dy Bracewell, The Uskoks of Sen/. Piracy, Banditry,

and Holy War in the

Sixteenth-Century

Adriatic. Ithaca-London, 1992.

T H E

H U N G A R 1 A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R

D E F E N C E

SY ST E M S

23

Croatian

areas—could be postponed, now there was no further possibi l i ty

f

delay due to the threat to Styria, Lo w er

Aus t r ia (Niederösterreich),

and

Vienna.

Imm ediate action was needed in the Slavonian parts, in Hu ng ary ,

and particularly

in the foreground of Vienna,

w h i c h

the Ottomans had

already menaced by marching to the

Aus t r ian

f ront iers. The pattern and

the metho ds w ere given : bo rder defence regions had to be form ed that

were similar to those w h i c h used to protect the southern borders of the

m edi ev al H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m ; the basis had already been establ ished in

the Croat ian border zone. This was no

easy

t a sk— no t

o n ly

for f inancial

or military reasons. Whi l e t he military leaders of the

estates

o f Carniola,

Carinthia, and Styria in the Croatian territories already had a certain

k n o w l e d g e of the place and some practice in the

basics

o f ho w t o create

a defence

l ine,

defence system against ottoman empire in hungary

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