defense intelligence agency 35 - federation of american scientists

D E F E N S E I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

A B R I E F H I S T O R Y

CommittedTo ExcellenceIn DefenseOf The Nation

35Y E A R S

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THE DIA SEALSYMBOLISM

The in i t ia l le t ters o f Defense In te l l igence

Agency (DIA) a lso compr ise the Greek word

"d ia" which means d iv ided in to two par ts . In

th is ins tance, the f laming torch and i ts go ld

color represent knowledge, i .e . , in te l l igence,

" l ight ing" the way of the "known" l ight b lue-

green wor ld against the darkness or unknown

symbol ized by the dark b lue background —

"the area of t ru th" s t i l l sought by the wor ld-

wide miss ion of the Agency. The two red

atomic e l l ipses symbol ize the sc ient i f ic and

technical aspects of in te l l igence today and of

the fu ture. The 13 s tars and the wreath are

adopted f rom the Department of Defense seal

and are used to ident i fy the Agency as a

Depar tment o f Defense organizat ion.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became operational on1 October 1961 as the Nation's primary producer of foreign militaryintelligence. It filled a critically important need for a centralintelligence manager for the Department of Defense (DoD) tosupport the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military forces, as well as otherpolicymakers.

During the period following World War II until the Agency'sestablishment, the three Military Departments separately collected,produced, and disseminated intelligence for their individual use.The system proved duplicative, costly, and ineffective as eachService provided their estimates to the Secretary of Defense, theUnified and Specified (U&S) Commands, or other governmentalagencies.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 sought to correct theseshortcomings by assigning responsibility for U&S Commandintelligence support to the J-2 of the JCS. However, DoDintelligence responsibilities remained unclear, coordination poor,and products lacked dependability and national focus. PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower, therefore, appointed the Joint Study Groupin 1960 to determine better ways of effectively organizing theNation's military intelligence activities.

Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, Secretaryof Defense Robert S. McNamara in February 1961 advised the JCS

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Introduction

35A B R I E F H I S T O R Y

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Berlin headlined the news when the announcement of DIA's formation was made on 2 August 1961.2 3

D E F E N S E I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y A B R I E F H I S T O R Y

of his decision to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency and taskedthem with developing a concept plan that would extensively integratethe military intelligence efforts of all DoD elements. The JCScompleted this assignment by July, and published DoD Directive5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency" on 1 August, effective1 October 1961.

According to the plan for the new agency, DIA reported to theSecretary of Defense through the JCS. It was a union—not aconfederation of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence

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The Requirement for a DIA

"...a better mechanism...for coordinating the serviceintelligence agencies...should be established ..."

"...[the Secretary of Defense] must be, per se, the coordinatorof intelligence...within the military establishment."

The 1st Hoover Commission, 1948

"Great strides toward a more closely integrated [intelligence]community would result from improved intelligencecoordination within the DoD."

The Joint Study Group, 1960

"It appears the most effective means to accomplish therecommendations of the Joint Study Group would be theestablishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency which mayinclude the existing National Security Agency, [and] theintelligence and counter intelligence functions now handledby the military departments..."

Robert S. McNamara, 1961


activities, and it did not add administrative layering within the Defenseintelligence community. The Agency's mission was the continuoustask of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating,producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD. Otherobjectives included more efficiently allocating scarce intelligenceresources, more effectively managing all DoD intelligence activities,and eliminating redundancies in facilities, organizations, and tasks.

During the summer of 1961, as Cold War tensions flared over theBerlin Wall, Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, soonto become DIA's first director, planned and organized this new agency.It began operations with 25 employees in borrowed office space on 1October 1961.

Following DIA's establishment, the Services transferred intelligencefunctions and resources to it on a time-phased basis to avoid rapidlydegrading the overall effectiveness of Defense intelligence. Theprincipal objectives in establishing DIA were to obtain unity of effortamong all DoD components in developing military intelligence, andto strengthen DoD's overall capacity for collecting, producing, anddisseminating intelligence information.

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THE 1960'sA year after its formation, the Agency faced its first major intelligencetest during the superpower confrontation that developed after Sovietmissiles were discovered in Cuba. Yet, even in the midst of this crisis,Agency organizational efforts continued. In late 1962, DIA establishedthe Defense Intelligence School, and on 1 January 1963, it activated anew Production Center. Several Service elements were merged toform this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" buildingsat Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Centeron 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientificand Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumedthe staff support functions of the J-2, Joint Staff, on 1 July 1963.Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for theDefense Attache System — the last function the Services initiallytransferred to DIA.

"B" building at Arlington Hall Station.

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During these early years of DIA's existence, Agency attempts toestablish itself as DoD's central military intelligence organizationmet with continuing Service opposition. At the same time, theVietnam War severely tested the fledgling Agency's ability toproduce accurate, timely intelligence. In particular, the warincreased Defense intelligence's involvement in efforts to accountfor American Service members missing or captured in SoutheastAsia.

DIA analysts focused during the 1960's on China's detonation of anatomic bomb and the launching of its cultural revolution; increasingunrest among African nations; and, fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus,and Kashmir. In the late 1960's, crises that tested Defense

Creating DIA bolstered DoD's efforts to improvethe military intelligence system by merging many of itsfunctions under a single authority. The Agency wasestablished to:

Unify the intelligence efforts of the DoD and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

Strengthen DoD-wide collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Provide more efficient management and use of resources.

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Impetus for DIA


intelligence's responsiveness included the Tet offensive in Vietnam;the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; continuing troubles inAfrica, particularly Nigeria; North Korea's seizure of the PUEBLO;and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

John Hughes' televised briefing on Soviet missiles in Cuba.

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THE 1970'sThe early 1970's were transitional years for DIA as the Agency shiftedits focus from consolidating internal and external management roles toestablishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. Thisproved difficult at first since sweeping manpower decrements between1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31 percent andprecipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring. The attache system also underwent major revisions.

Challenges facing DIA at this time included the rise of Ostpolitik inGermany, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in theMideast, and growing arms control concerns. Riots in Gdansk, Poland;civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria; and the U.S. incursion into Cambodiafrom South Vietnam also drew intelligence interest. Other crises duringthis period included Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda, unrest in Pakistan,the formation of Bangladesh, and continued fighting in Southeast Asia.

On 3 November 1970, DoD created a position for an Assistant Secretaryof Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) "to supervise Defense intelligenceprograms . . . and to provide the principal point for management andpolicy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA,and other intelligence officials outside the DoD." Also in November,President Nixon reorganized the national Intelligence Community anddesignated DIA's Director as program manager for the General DefenseIntelligence Program. Of significance, the Agency established aDirectorate for Estimates in November 1970.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970's as itsproducts were increasingly perceived throughout the government asvaluable to decisionmaking. Meanwhile, the specially-convenedWilliamsburg Conference in 1972 looked closely at the effects of DIAresource reductions. Among the recommendations of conferenceparticipants were to place increased emphasis on technology in the

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Aerial photo of bomb damage to a Hanoi airfield.

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Agency and to upgrade the National Military Intelligence Center(NMIC). The General Counsel function was added that year as well.

Agency analysts in 1972 concentrated on Lebanon, President Nixon'svisit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime inChile, and the prisoners of war (POW's) being held in Southeast Asia.Subsequent challenges involved detente; the development of arms controlagreements; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; globalenergy concerns; coups in Ethiopia and Portugal; and independencemovements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

In 1974, DIA established a J-2 Support Office to better satisfy JCS'sintelligence needs. In October of that year, DIA began a comprehensiveoverhaul of its production functions, organization, and management.Positions for Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's) were established inDecember. The DIO's were given the responsibility of acting as the DIADirector's senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters.

Intense Congressional review during 1975 and 1976 created turbulencein the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and RockefellerCommission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimatelyled to an Executive Order that modified many of the functions theCommunity performed. Within DIA, the leadership adopted the"delegated production" concept to offset heavy production requirements,and a report from the Intelligence Management Study Group led to areorganization of all DIA production activities.

With American involvement in Vietnam ending by 1975, Defenseintelligence faced massive resource decrements. During this period,DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligenceproducts. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to consumersin OSD, the JCS, and the Unified & Specified Commands, and alsomodernized the National Military Intelligence Center. Faced with similarresource challenges, DoD also sought to centralize its activities. The

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ASD/I was designated Director of Defense Intelligence, a DefenseIntelligence Board was established, and the President set up aNational Foreign Intelligence Board.

In 1977, a charter revision further clarified DIA's relationship withthe JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Secretaryassigned staff supervisory responsibility over DIA in the resourcearea to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,Communications, and Intelligence, while giving the AssistantSecretary of Defense for International Security Affairs supervisoryresponsibility regarding policy matters. For a period during 1976and 1977, DIA discontinued the positions of Deputy Director andChief of Staff. Analytical efforts within the Agency at the timecentered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, aircraft hijackings, theIsraeli raid on Entebbe Airport, unrest in South Africa, andcontinuing Middle East tensions.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036,which restructured the Intelligence Community and better outlinedDIA's national and departmental responsibilities, the Agency wasreorganized around five major directorates: production, operations,resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. Despite these and otherCommunity-wide efforts to improve intelligence support, the lossof resources during the 1970's limited the Community's ability tocollect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributedto intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategicareas.

In fact, intelligence requirements were expanding while resourceswere decreasing. By the late 1970's, Agency analysts wereextremely busy focusing on Lebanon, China, South Africa,terrorism, and Southeast Asian POW issues. Special DIA taskforces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of

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Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking ofU.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979. Otherevents of serious concern during this period were the Vietnamesetakeover in Phnom Penh; the China-Vietnam border war; the overthrowof Amin in Uganda; the North-South Yemen dispute; troubles inPakistan; border clashes between Libya and Egypt; the Sandinistatakeover in Nicaragua; and, the Soviet movement of combat troops toCuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II.

Port of Corinto, Nicaragua.

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THE 1980'sDIA came of age in the 1980's by focusing heavily on the intelligenceneeds of field commanders and national-level decision makers. Atthe start of the decade, the Agency provided valuable intelligencesupport to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force duringOperation BRIGHT STAR. This was done against a backdrop ofCongressional support for DoD budget increases to enhance"readiness, sustainability, and modernization." Agency analysts,meanwhile, were also closely monitoring events in Rhodesia(Zimbabwe), the Iran-Iraq War, and the civil war in El Salvador.

DIA's publication in 1981 of the first in a series of white papers onthe strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled, "SovietMilitary Power," met with wide acclaim. (Ten such booklets werepublished subsequently over the next decade.) In April of 1981, theAgency broke ground for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center(DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. World crisescontinued to flare and included: the downing of two Libyan SU-22'sby American F-14's over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid todestroy an Iranian nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian airraids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

As the decade continued, DIA concentrated on enhancing its supportto tactical and theater commanders, improving its capabilities to meetmajor wartime intelligence requirements, and strengthening DoD'sindications and warning system. DIA established a position for afunctional manager for intelligence processing in 1982. Two yearslater, the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) wasestablished as an interagency analytical organization focused onCentral American insurgency. DIA also created a standardintelligence communications architecture to improve DoD's abilityto disseminate national-level intelligence to tactical commandersduring contingency situations.

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CH-53 helicopter landing in front of the Defense Intelligence AnalysisCenter at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

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"LET US NEVER FORGETTHAT GOOD INTELLIGENCE

SAVES AMERICAN LIVES ANDPROTECTS OUR FREEDOM"

President Ronald Reagan, 1981


The concept of intelligence as a "force multiplier in crises" becamea predominant theme as DIA assembled an all-source integrateddata base to enable the U&S Commands to better assess the threatas it existed in the field. As a followup, the Agency established aResearch Crisis Support Center at the DIAC to provide acentralized, operationally secure, all-source, crisis managementcenter to support the NMIC and the U&S Commands.

As events deteriorated in Nicaragua, DIA analysts providedextensive support to the U.S. Southern Command. Other analysisat this time was focused on the war over the Falkland Islands andIsrael's invasion of Lebanon. When 6,000 U.S. troops invadedGrenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, a special DIAtask force responded to numerous taskings for briefings, papers,and intelligence information. DIA also distributed a wide varietyof intelligence summaries to assist field commanders during theoperation.

Closer to home, many of DIA's major functional elements werefinally consolidated under one roof when the Agency dedicated theDIAC at Bolling AFB on 23 May 1984. Other DIA analyticalefforts during the mid-1980's centered on the attack on the Marinebarracks in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan,the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil warin Chad, and unrest in the Philippines.

Indeed, the significantly large number of hijackings, bombings,kidnappings, murders, and other acts of terrorism led to 1985 beingcharacterized as the "Year of the Terrorist." Secretary of DefenseCasper Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency's first JointMeritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence supportover the previous year during a series of crises—the hijacking ofTWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO, unrest inthe Philippines, and counterterrorist operations against Libya.

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It was during this period that DIA developed its OperationalIntelligence Crisis Center (OICC) in the DIAC as the primary vehiclefor orchestrating analytic support during volatile situations. Inaddition, to relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, the Agency movedseveral elements into a leased office building at 3100 ClarendonAvenue in Arlington, Virginia.

Also during this timeframe, the Agency concentrated on the rapidlyshifting national security environment, characterized by key issuessuch as changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics,warfighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict.DoD moved decisively to improve its automated data bases and applyadditional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal armsshipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring alsoincreased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

Within the Agency, the National Military Intelligence Center wasupgraded, renovated, and collocated with the National MilitaryCommand Center—a move that permitted the fusion of operationsand intelligence during crises at the national level. Designated a"combat support agency" under the Goldwater-Nichols DefenseReorganization Act of 1986, DIA moved quickly to increasecooperation with the U&S Commands and to begin developing abody of joint intelligence doctrine.

Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified asthe Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Gulf. DIA provided significantintelligence support to Operation EARNEST WILL while closelymonitoring incidents such as the Iraqi missile attack on the USSSTARK, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attackson Kuwaiti oil tankers. The "Toyota War" between Libya and Chadand the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA's heavy production workload,as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia,Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

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Subsequently, DIA oversaw a successful Defense intelligence effortin support of U.S. operations in Panama which demonstrated thebenefits of increased cooperation between DIA and operational forceplanners. The Agency also provided threat data on "hot spots"throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing theimpact of changes in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesserdegree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decisionmakers withintelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan;events surrounding the shootdown of several Libyan jets; the civilwar in Liberia; the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; and, the Tienanmen Square incidentin China. Weapons acquisition issues, counternarcotics, andcounterterrorism, likewise, remained high priority issues.

President Bush receives briefing from DIA during Operation JUSTCAUSE (Panama).

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THE 1990'sWith the end of the Cold War, Defense intelligence began a period ofreevaluation following the fall of Communism in many of the EastEuropean countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoingeconomic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasizedimproved management of intelligence production DoD-wide asresource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agencyobjectives and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the conceptof functional management to better address U&S Commandintelligence issues. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,Control, Communications, and Intelligence) was given expandedauthority, direction, and control over DIA.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set upan extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailornational-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled toexpel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation DESERT STORMbegan, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligencesupport effort. Most of them were associated with the national-levelJoint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in the Pentagonto integrate the intelligence produced throughout the Community.DIA sent more than 100 employees into the Kuwaiti Theater ofOperations to provide intelligence support, and deployed 11 NationalMilitary Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTS) overseas.

Afteraction reports later confirmed that no combat commander hadever benefited from as full and complete a view of an adversary asU.S. and coalition commanders did prior to and during DESERTSTORM. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples ofintelligence support to operational forces in modern times. For itsachievements during the crisis and conflict, DIA earned a second DoDJoint Meritorious Unit Award. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

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Advancing US tanks during DESERT STORM.

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An Intelligence Success Story

"No combat commander has ever had as full and completea view of his adversary as did our field commander.Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM was a success story."

General Colin Powell, 1991


Staff, General Colin L. Powell, attached the streamer to the DIA flagin a special outdoor ceremony at the DIAC on 26 June 1991.

DIA improved crisis management and support to the decision makerand warfighter based on experience gained during the Gulf War. TheAgency created the National Military Joint Intelligence Center(NMJIC), replacing the NMIC and retaining many of the positiveattributes of the wartime national-level JIC. DIA also significantlyexpanded its support to the Joint Staff. The Gulf War experienceprompted the Agency to improve on its NMIST concept by addingCIA and NSA members to the DIA element and redesignating themNational Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). The Military IntelligenceBoard, chaired by the DIA Director, continued its important role afterthe War coordinating national intelligence support.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), and theMissile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the

President Clinton being briefed on Haiti.

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Army for over 30 and 50 years respectively, became elements of DIAin January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidateintelligence production and make it more efficient.

The most fundamental reexamination of U.S. national security policysince the 1940s—precipitated by the end of the Cold War—compelleda widespread review of DIA's role as the Intelligence Communityconfronted the twin challenges of a new era of regional conflict andsimultaneous reductions in U.S. Defense spending.

With intelligence requirements escalating sharply, DIA undertook oneof the most profound reorganizations in its history in 1993. Thisrestructuring essentially rebuilt the Agency from the bottomup. In the process, DIA enhanced flexibility, improved cooperationwith the Service intelligence organizations, severely reduced

National Intelligence Support Team in Bosnia.

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management overhead, and returned to the basics by focusing on thecommon intelligence functional areas of collection, production, andinfrastructure.

As DIA moved toward institutionalizing the process underlying thereorganization, it became clear that the restructuring had already broughtabout an unprecedented level of integration among DIA, the MilitaryServices, and the Combatant Commands. This served the Communitywell as it surged to provide intelligence support to U.S. and UnitedNations forces involved in places such as Somalia, the formerYugoslavia, and Haiti. In 1994, DIA received an unprecedented thirdJoint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during thesecrises, as well as support to operations in Iraq and Korea.

The newly formed Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service(DHS) achieved its initial operating capability on 1 October 1995.DHS consolidated the HUMINT activities of all the Services under theumbrella of DIA. This new organization reflected the driving need toconsolidate and focus our downsized resources to maximize theeffectiveness of reduced assets. DIA was also designated as theIntelligence Community's executive agent for Measurement andSignature Intelligence (MASINT).

Today, DIA continues to build on its proud traditions and stands as theNation's preeminent military intelligence organization. Mostimportantly, the Agency's many professionals around the globe remain,as in the words of its motto, "Committed to Excellence in Defense ofthe Nation."

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The Patriot's Memorial at the DIAC, dedicated to the men and women whohave paid the ultimate price in service to their Country and the DefenseIntelligence Agency.

"I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

Captain Nathan Hale, 1776

Directors of theDefense Intelligence Agency

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J o s e p h F. C a r r o l l , U S A F O c t 1 9 6 1 - S e p 1 9 6 9

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l D o n a l d V. B e n n e t t , U S A S e p 1 9 6 9 - A u g 1 9 7 2

V i c e A d m i r a l V i n c e n t P. d e P o i x , U S N A u g 1 9 7 2 - S e p 1 9 7 4

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l D a n i e l O . G r a h a m , U S A S e p 1 9 7 4 - D e c 1 9 7 5

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l E u g e n e F. T i g h e , J r . , U S A F ( A c t i n g ) J a n 1 9 7 6 - M a y 1 9 7 6

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l S a m u e l V. W i l s o n , U S A ` M a y 1 9 7 6 - A u g 1 9 7 7

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l E u g e n e F. T i g h e , J r . , U S A F A u g 1 9 7 7 - A u g 1 9 8 1

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J a m e s A . W i l l i a m s , U S A S e p 1 9 8 1 - S e p 1 9 8 5

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l L e o n a r d H . P e r r o o t s , U S A F O c t 1 9 8 5 - D e c 1 9 8 8

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l H a r r y E . S o y s t e r , U S A D e c 1 9 8 8 - S e p 1 9 9 1

D e n n i s M . N a g y ( A c t i n g ) S e p 1 9 9 1 - N o v 1 9 9 1

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J a m e s R . C l a p p e r , J r . , U S A F N o v 1 9 9 1 - A u g 1 9 9 5

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l K e n n e t h A . M i n i h a n , U S A F A u g 1 9 9 5 - F e b 1 9 9 6

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l P a t r i c k M . H u g h e s , U S A F e b 1 9 9 6 - P r e s e n t


DIA History OfficeWashington, DC, 1996

defense intelligence agency 35 - federation of american scientists

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