DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND SOVEREIGNTY:

SERBIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE BOSNIAN CRISIS,

1906-1909

Violet.. Manojlovic

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1993

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

M A S E R OF ARTS

In the Department of History

O Violeta Manojlovic L 997

SMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

November 1997

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ABSTRACT

The Bosnian Cnsis of 1908 was a crucial turning point in European diplomacy

that produced many of the conditions that contributed to World War 1. Although this

juncture has been examined extensively, the role of the smaller States, Serbia in

particular, has not been studied as ciosely as that of the great powers. This is significant

because Serbia was a major participant. Austria's motives in annexing Bosnia-

Herzegovina cannot be understood without assessing Viema's relations with Serbia.

Consequently, the airn of this thesis is to respond to this shortcoming and analyze Serbian

policy in depth.

The most common and rnisleading assumption made by historians when

discussing the Serbian perspective is that nationdism was the detemiinhg factor of the

govemment's reaction to the annexation. According to this assumption, Serbia opposed

Austria's action because it thwarted its ambition of becoming the "Piedmont of the South . .

Slavs" and of unifying al1 Serbian lands into a Greater Serbia. Though nationalism

infIuenced the responses of many Serbians, it is rny contention that the Serbian

govemment's primary concern was to protect Serbia's political stability and territorial

integrity. The annexation threatened both because it could have provoked a civil conflict

in Serbia or even war with Austria, if that was what Vienna had in mind.

Throughout the crisis Serbian government policy was formulated by its foreign

rninister Milovan Milovanovich. Rather than intransigent rejection of annexation as

demanded by the nationalists, this policy sought compensation in the form of additional

iv

territory and economic concessions for Serbia Aithough the government was unable ta

win concessions fiom the great powers, it did succeed in stabilizing Serbian politics, and

Serbia survived the crisis. As a result, the Serbian government was able to deny

Aehrenthal's claims that Vienna had achieved a total victory, and that Serbia had been

forced back into the role of a client state. In fact, the government considered that Serbia

was in a much stronger position internationally than it had been before the crisis because

of its newly formed friendships with Russia and Great Britain. These fnendships had

been essential to the peacehl resolution of this crisis, but they would prove even more

usefül in Serbia's h t u r e confiicts with the Hapsburg Monarchy.

The conchsions presented in thk thesis are the result of intensive research of

primary and secondary Serbian sources. 1 have used the collection of diplornatic

correspondence of the Serbian Foreign Minisiry as well as the personal memos of the

Serbian Foreign Minister, Milovan Milovanovich. These documents, and the Minutes of

the Serbian National Assembly, are located in the Serbian National Archives (Arhiv

Srbije) and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti).

In addition, Serbian newspapers proved to be another vital source of information; they

were found in the Belgrade City Library and in the Serbian Academy of Arts and

Sciences. And, fmally, 1 utiïized a great nurnber of Serbian monographs and articles to

supplement, and provide a point of cornparison to my findings in the primary sources.

This thesis would have been impossible without the assistance of rnany

individuals fiorn many different locales. From Simon Fraser 1 wouid fbst like to thank

Professor Edward Ingram for encouraging me to enter Graduate School and for his help

in defining my topic. Next 1 would like to acknowledge Professor Richard Debo who

assurned more responsibility on my committee when asked, and who without complaint

took on the task of reading those very long first cirafts of the thesis. Without his

assistance, 1 could not have finished. As well 1 would like to thank Professor Martin

Kitchen for his many assurances, and Mary Anne Pope, the Graduate secretary, for

guiding me through the finai steps of the thesis. From Belgrade 1 would like to thank

Professor Milan St. Protich fiorn the Institute of Balkan Studies for his speciai insights,

and Professor Dragoljub Zivojinovic at the University of Belgrade for improving rny

basic knowledge of Serbian History. But above d l , 1 must express rny appreciation of

Professor Mihaljo Vojvodic who went out of his way to help me find sources, and

personally handled al1 of the details necessary for me to work in the National Archives.

And fînally 1 would like to conclude by thanking al1 of rny fnends and farnily for

their love and patience. In particular, my brothers, my parents, Ljiljana and Manojlo, and

Mike, my fiancé, who has given me the benefit of his constant support and strength for

the last two difficult and seemingly unending years of my work.

vii

Table of Contents

. . Approval ...................... ... ................................................................................... 11

. *. Abstract ................................................................................................................. 111

Dedication ............................................................................................................... v

Introduction. ............... SERBEAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BOSNIAN CRISIS OF 1908. 1

Chapter One INSTABILITY AND CRISIS, SERBIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1903-1908 .................................................................................................. 20

Chapter Two THE CALM BEFORE THE CRISIS: MILOVANOVICH'S MEETINGS WITH

........... IZVOLSKY AND THE MAKING OF SERBIA'S OFFTCIAL POLICY. 41 Milovanovich goes to take his cure ................................................................. 45

Chapter Three THE BOSNIAN CRISIS PART ONE: OCTOBER 6, TO FEBRUARY 24,1909, THE CONSOLIDATION OF DOMESTIC STABILITY ..................................... 58

A Provisionai United Front. Milovanovich's Deal with the Parliament ........... 62

Chapter Four THE BOSNIAN CRISIS PART TWO: FEBRUARY 26 TO MARCH 31, THE

................................ RESOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT 85 The Climax: The Austro-Serbian Conflict cornes to a head ............................ 94

Conclusion FINAL REMARKS ON SERBIA AND THE BOSNIAN CRJSIS ..................... 110

Endnotes ............................................................................................................. 1 18

Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 132

Introduction

Serbian Foreign Policy in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908

The subject of this thesis is Serbia's role in the Bosnian Cnsis of 1908. The Bosnian

Crisis began on October 6, 1908, with Austria-Hungary7s announcement that it intended

formally to annex the two Ottoman provinces of B o s ~ a and Herzegovina, provinces that had

been occupied and adrninistered by the Dual Monarchy since 1878.' With the notable

exception of Germany, international reaction to the Austrian action was negative,

Significantly, the great powers: England, France, Itaiy and Russia, did not dispute Austria's

right to acquire the two provinces, rather they disapproved of the means by which Austria

carried out the annexation. Viema aItered the terms of the Treaty of Berlin unilateraily,

without having first obtained the consent of the other signatories. Yet, however irritated the

great powers were with Aehrenthal's behaviour, it paied in cornparison to the hostility

expressed by Serbia, which was so great that the powers feared that without their meditation

war could have erupted between the two parties.

Serbia's hostility to the annexation was caused by two factors. Firstly, Serbian

nationalists believed that Greater Serbia could not be achieved without Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Jovan Cvijic, a renowned Serbian anthropologist underlined their importance

in the following:

From the forgoing it is p k n that Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the worth of the nation, by their central position in the etbnographical mass of the Serbo-Croat race, by the advantageous mixture of Orthodox and Catholics, hold the key of the Serb Problem. Without them there c m be no Great Serb state.'

3 - While nationdism greatly infiuenced the response of the public to the Austrian act, it was

not the primary determinant of Serbian foreign policy mainly because it was recognized that

Greater Serbia had never been a feasible objective even prior to the annexations. Instead,

official Serbia's hostility was due to a second motive; fear that Austria-Hungary was about

to attack Serbia proper. Belgrade was only too aware of the fact that Austria was funous

about the Serbian goverment's recent success in asserting its independence vis a vis Vienna,

but what was not known was how far would Austria go to bring Serbia back into line. Was

the annexation of Bosnia the prelude to the Austrian invasion of Serbia? In addition, the

govemment was also worried about what repercussions the annexation would have on

Serbia's unstable domestic politics. Public outrage would most likely cause the fa11 of the

Velirnirovich cabinet, but an even greater concem, was that this discontent, if hamessed by

dissatisfied nationalist elements within the military, could quite possibly lead to civil war.

The Serbian govemment was clearly in a very precarious position during the

annexation crisis. Serbia's continued existence and integrity depended upon its leadership

articulating a policy that would successfully contain not only the "red" threats from outside

of Serbia but also the "potential" threats from within Serbia. This already difficult task was

complicated by the fact that the Serbian leadership was divided as how to proceed. The

Foreign Minister, Milovan Milovanovich, argued that Serbian vital interests would be best

served by accepting the fait accompli ', and by focusing its attention on gaining the Sanjak of Novi Pazar as compensation whereas the President of the Serbian Radical Party, Nikola

Pashich, refused to consider recognizing the Dud Monarchy's action and asserted that if

3

Serbia couid not convince the great powers to arrange a conference at which the annexation

would be nuilified, then Serbia had no option but to prepare for war and attempt to liberate

Bosnia on its own." This intra-eiite debate was in one sense meaningless because the Foreign

Minister had the power to determine foreign policy, but in another sense it was significant

because it M e r contributed to Serbia's domestic instability.

Despite considerabie effort made on Milovanovich's part, the diplomatic

environment was not conducive to success. While the great powers were dismayed with

Austria-Hungary's heavy handed diplomacy, no one, includiig Russia, was prepared to use

force to pressure Viema either to gant Serbia territorial compensations or to attend a great

power congres. MiIovanovich had hoped to achieve his aims without it coming to that, but

once St. Petersburg had capitulated, he reaiized that Serbia was diplomatically isolated and

incapable of maintainhg M e r resistance to Austria. Therefore, on March 3 1, 1909, Serbia

recognized tlle annexation, promised Austria to suppress al1 anti-Hapsburg and Pan-Serbian

propagandq and agreed to disband Narodna Odbrana (National Defense) and other Serb

miIitia groups.

Although Milovanovich did not achieve his publicly stated objective of obtaining

territory, his diplomacy was successfui in other areas. It was significant that he obtained

even "limited" great power assistance for Serbia's cause. Due to the influence of pan-

slavism, it was perhaps not so unexpected that Russia supported Serbia's and Montenegro's

demand for compensation, but he aIso improved relations with Britain so much so that Sir

Edward Grey refused to consent to the annexation while the Serbo-Austrian confiict was still

4

unresolved. These newly fonned fkiendships perhaps had not proved that productive with

regards to the present crisis, but the Foreign Minister knew they would in the future. In

addition, Milovanovich's poIicy deserves credit for having guided Serbia through the crisis

without provoking war witti Austria or civil war because there were moments when either of

the two scenarios appeared to be al1 too possible.

In short, although the Bosnian crisis appeared to give Vienna and the DuaI AlIiance a

complete diplomatic victory over the entente powers and Serbia, the srnall state, in fact,

ernerged fiom the crisis in a stronger diplomatic position than before. Its connections with

Britain and in particular with Russia, allowed Serbia not only to ignore its promise to Austria

to disband Narodna Odbrana, but also to open secret taiks with Bulgaria regarding the

possibility of fomiing the second Balkan League.

Serbia and the Bosnian Crisis in Historioaaphv

The Bosnian Crisis marked a crucial turning point in European diplomacy. Briefly,

many of the underIying factors that contributed to the Great War were either directly

produced by the Bosnian Crisis such as Russo-Serbo cooperation, or fixther reinforced such

as Austro-Russian hostility and suspicion of Geman expansionism, and it is due to this fact

that there is proIiferation of texts currently available that discuss and analyze the Bosnian

Crisis, ranging fiom those which were written immediately after 19 18 to the present.

5

The rnost common characteristic of the Literature, and its basic weakness as well is

that it has the tendency to focus on the role of the great powers at the expense of the smaller

States who were also involved in the crisis like Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. Granted.

this does not mean that the literaîure has totally ignored discussing their views, but it

certainiy paid them less attention, and in cornparison it is far less easy to answer the basic

questions of how they behaved either before, during and after the annexation crisis. The

reason why this needs to be addressed is that without doing so our understanding of the total

picture will not be complete, especially with regards to Serbia, who was one of the crucial

actors in the crisis. M e r dl, Austria-Hungary's decision to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina only

makes sense in the context of the dynamic of Austro-Serbian relations. AusÛia's foreign

minister, Aehrenthal, himself acknowledged that one of the main motives for the annexation

of Bosnia was to show the Belgrade Governrnent that its inedentist pretensions would not be

tolerated, and that Viema would not allow Greater Serbia to be created.'

Serbian historiography, as expected, does focus on examining the Serbian role in the

crisis, and therefore is of much more use for this thesis. But it as well has some drawbacks,

and interestingly they are some of the same ones shared by its English language counterparts.

To explain, while there are countiess English language reference works in which the Bosnian

cnsis is summarized in a few pages or in a chapter as part of a discussion of the broader

question of the origins of the Great War, there is only one monograph, Bernadotte Schmitt's,

The Annexation of Bosnia, wrïtten in 1937, solely concemed with the Bosnian Crisis.

Likewise, the Serbian sources tend to analyze the Bosnian Crisis in relation to the Balkan

6

Wars, World War I and in particular to the formation of the fmt Yugoslavia. In fact, there is

not even one monograph in Serbian devoted exclusively to the Bosnian Crisis. The

explanation usually offered for this peculiarity is that Serbian scholars simply were not

interested in thoroughly researching what they perceived to be a Serbian foreign policy

f a i l ~ e . ~ Thus, insofar a s Serbian sources themselves are more detailed than the English

language texts, even they have many gaps and have not answered every question that needs

to be answered.

The classic English Language account of the Bosnian Crisis is Bernadotte

Schmitt's The Annexation of Bosnia. Schmitt's work is principally concerned with

determining how was the annexation crisis ultimately resolved given both the clumsy and

confrontational diplomacy of the two Foreign Ministers responsible for the crisis, Aehrenthal

of Austria and Izvolsky of Russia, and the provocative sabre rattling of Serbia. What he

concludes is that war was averted due to the combination of two factors: 1) the strength of

the Austro-German Dual Alliance and 2) the excellence of British diplomacy. The first

factor, he argues, played a partial role in maintainhg the peace, because the Dual Alliance

by providing Austria with the unconditional support of the most powerful state on the

continent gave Austria the necessary leverage to force Russia and Serbia to abandon their

demands both for the great power conference and for temtorial and economic compensations.

in other words, Russia and Serbia capitulated, and ruied out war with Austria because of the

fear that war with Austria would also mean war with Germany, and hence certain defeat. The

second factor, British diplomacy, was however, even more important in Schmitt's opinion,

7

in containing the crisis as it was directly responsibie for resolving the Austro-Serbian dispute,

which was considered the most dangerous of the disputes in the Bosnian Crisis.

Why British diplornacy was so crucial he explains was that it deterred both Serbia7s

and Austria-Hungary7s govemments from extremism. When Serbia's Foreign Minister,

Milovan Milovanovich, visited London at the beginning of the annexation crisis, Foreign

Secretary Grey warned him that England would withdraw its diplomatic support of Serbia

and leave the srnall state isolated if its govemment pursued a policy that provoked a military

conflict with ust tria-Hungary .' With regards to Austria-Hungary, Grey infomed Austria

that not only would Bntain refuse to recognize the annexation as long as the Austro-Serbian

question remained unsettled, but also that Great Britain wodd withhold its approval of the

fait accompli indefinitely if Austria invaded Serbia8 Although the threat to withhold

recognition was not a very powerful detenent, it did send Austria-Hungary the message that

there wodd be negative consequences to aggression. Moreover, that one gesture

demonstrated that Great Btitain was more involved in the negotiations than even Russia,

Serbia's self proclaimed advisor; afier dl, Russia officiaily recognized the Annexation of

Bosnia on the 22 of March 1909 while the Austro-Serbian question was still open.

The Annexation of Bosnia as is typical of the English Ianguage historiography is great

power centred and depicts the crisis as a stniggIe between the great powers and the two great

power partnerships, the Dual Alliance and the TripIe Entente. While Schmitt considers that

Serbia played a crucial role in the Bosnian crisis, as Austria-Hungary's adversary, his

discussion of the Serbian perspective is otherwise superficial and incomplete. This point can

8

be illustrated by his discussion of Belgrade's officiai policy. In his text, he asserted

repeatedly that the airn of Serbian dipIomacy was to persuade Russia and Britain to force the

Dual Monarchy into conceding temtoriai compensations to them, (preferably territory fiom

the north of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar as it wodd give Serbia and Montenegro a common

fr~ntier.)~ The problem with this assessrnent is that he presurned that there was only one

option considered for official policy. Granted, the Foreign Minister, Milovan Milovanovich

and his circle pushed for compensation, but since compensation required the recognition of

the annexation, the more nationalist factions wiihin the Serbian govemment, parliament and

military, advocated other courses of action, including the demand for Bosnia's autonorny, or

war against Austria-Hungary. This is a significant omission by him because there were well

known occasions during the crisis when it appeared that Milovanovich had abandoned his

original policy and had made concessions to his rivals.I0

A rnuch more detailed account of Serbia's involvement in the Bosnian Crisis is

provided by Albertini's The Orkins of the War of 1914, arguably because he had access to

sources unavailable to Schmitt. In particular, he uses Momcilo Nincic's La Crise Bosniaque,

which was published in 1937, the same year as Schmitt's text." He utilized this text so

elctensively as the source for Serbia's policy in part because it was virtually the only western

text written at the time that had examined the Serbian perspective, but also due to the fact that

Nincic's examination was ccmsidered more thorough and credible than others given his statu

as a prominent Serbian Radical Politician.12 This meant that Nincic was more inclined to be

interested in discussing what was Serbia's roIe in the crisis than other historians, and that he

9

would, as an insider, have the advantage of better understanding the crucial issues and

personalities in Serbian politics. Finally, as Foreign Minister he was assured of far easier

access to Serbian documents than western historians."

The most sigaificant improvement and difference between Albertini's and Schmitt's

works is that Albertini, unlike Schmitt, appreciated the cornplexity of Serbian politics and its

relation to foreign policy. He recognized that the Serbian govemment and parliament, fiom

the onset of the crisis were divided into two rivai camps, led by Milovanovich and Pashich,

each advocating that their own option become the basis of Serbian foreign policy and the

official response to the annexation." He fürther added that although the Milovanovich circle

prevailed and succeeded in having its views adopted as the official policy, the rivalry

between the two groups continued for the duration of the crisis, and Pashich circle did not

stop trying to generate Russian support for its demand that Bosnia must be auto nom ou^.'^

The only area in which Albertini's discussion of Serbia's role in the crisis fails

somewhat short is in detail. While he summarized the major events, he did not explore thern

deeply or omitted some important questions altogether. For instance, Albertini does not

explain how the Miiovanovich faction prevailed especiaily since their rivals had strong public

support. It is important to know how this happened as it is doubt.1 that the pragmatists won

their victory without some conflict. However, this omission does not detract from the overall

q d i t y of Albeaini's work. It would have been impossible for him to discuss every facet of

the Bosnian Crisis when his monograph was concerned with the broader question of the

origins of the great war.

1 O

Schmitt and Albertini's works are arnong the few English language texts that

examined the Bosnian crisis fiom the perspective of al1 of the great p~wers . '~ Usually

historians analyze the Bosnian Crisis fiom the point of view of one particular great power,

and logically these types of works were less important to my research since they devoted

even less attention to Serbia than Schmitt and ~1beaini.l' Nonetheless, one work written by

Barbara Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanalements, should be mentioned as it provides an

excellent overview of Russia's near eastern policy fiom 1804-1914, and describes Russia's

sometimes fiiendly and turbulent relationships with the successor Balkan States, including

Serbia.

Jelavich like Aibertini, saw the Bosnian Crisis as a turning point contributing to the

origins of the war. It is her thesis that Russia's refisal to abandon Serbia during the

evolution and intensification of the July Crisis of 191 4 can ody be understood in reference to

the events which occurred six years earlier during the Bosnian Crisis. She argues that due to

the diplornatic defeat Russia had expenenced in 1909, the autocracy feared that if it did not

support Serbia, and stand up to the Dual Alliance, its status as a Great Power and its very

existence would be in danger of being destroyed.

Serbian literature naturally focuses on Serbia's roie in the c r i~ is . '~ One of the best

summaries of Serbian policy is found in Dimitrije Popovich's, The Stm~rrIe for National

Unification, which was written in 1938.'~ Although Popovich's work, as indicated by the

title, is prirnarily concerned with explainhg the events which led to the formation of the first

Yugoslavia in 1918, it fills in many of the gaps and answers questions with regards to motive

I I

and diplomacy not answered or even considered by EngIish lmguage sources. He argues that

two factors influenced Serbia's negative reaction to the annexation of Bosnia; nationalism

and parochialism. On the one hand, Serbian nationalists among the public, press, military

and parliament were extremeiy disappointed by the officiai loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina as it

meant that the goal oFSerbian unity had become even more unlikely. Milovanovich, during

his visit to Great Britain at the beginning of the crisis, voiced îhis sentiment to Charles

Harding, Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, saying that the Austrians, "with the annexation of

Bosnia have succeeding in destroying d l the hopes of the Serbian Although he

sees nationalism as a powerfid influence, he also beiieves the Serbian government's response

to the annexation was dictated by parochialism.

According to Popovich, before the crisis the Serbian government was acutely

concerned about its geopoliticd position in the Balkans and its related ability to defend itself.

He described the situation thus; "al1 of her neighbours were either unreliable allies" as in the

case of Bulgaria, Rornania and even Montenegro, or "reliable enemies" as were Austria-

Hungary and the Ottoman Empire." Austria's annexation of Bosnia intensified the

government's concems because it was just not known whether the annexation foreshadowed

something much worse like an Austrian invasion of Serbia. As the Serbian government

viewed the Austrian annexation as a threat to its existence, it decided that the prirnary aim of

its foreign poIicy had to be the protection of Serbia proper. Popovich is carefüi to point out

that this did not mean that Serbia was unconcerned about its CO-nationals in Bosnia, (as

Milovanovich's quote illustrates), but instead that the Foreign Minister decided to Save what

12

was still sdvageable, namely Serbia itself. Austrian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 placed it

out of Serbia's reach then; the annexation was just another reminder of that fact.

M e r considering options, Milovanovich decided that Serbian interests would be best

protected by a policy that focused on acquiring territorial and economic compensation fiom

Austria, in exchange for official Serbian approval of the annexation, and on irnproving

relations with the other great powers." Territorial compensation would help guarantee

Serbian security as it wouid limit the number of fronts fiom which Austria couid attack

Serbia. Another benefit to having cornmon fiontier with Montenegro, which would be the

case if Serbia received temtory fiom that region, is that would increase the capacity of both

States to defend themselves, and also foreshadow their future unification. With regards to the

second aspect of his policy, Milovanovich believed that building good relations with other

great powers, most notably Russia and Great Britain, was cmcial because support wouid help

Serbia attain compensations and as well it might deter any potential Austrian aggression.

Interestingly, Milovanovich's policy has sparked a huge debate in Serbian

historiography as to whether it was the morally appropriate response to the anne~ation.'~

Among those historians who defend his choices are Popovich and his contemporary, Ilija

Prizich, who wote Serbia's Foreipn Policv: fiom 1804- 19 14."

Prizich, Iike Popovich, argues that Milovanovich's policy of compensation was the

best option given Serbia's domestic and international statu at the beginning of the crisis. In

his view, it would have been pointless and irresponsible for Serbia to declare war against

Austria-Hungary in an attempt to liberate Bosnia because firstly it was obvious that the

13

Serbian military was incapable winaing and secondly because it would not have the

diplomatic support of any of the great powers if it did so. For Prizich this second point was

not a matter of debate but fact. '5 Throughout the crisis, Milovanovich was tdd both directiy

and indirectly by his great power coIleagues that they accepted that Bosnia was a part of the

Austrian Empire. They did not disapprove of the annexation as much as they did of the

methods employed by Austria-Hungary to carry it out. In addition, these same powers did

not even consider that Serbia was entitled to daim it was affected by the Bosnian question

since it was not one of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. In this environment, if it was

difficult for Milovanovich to even get an audience to Iisten to his concerns about Bosnia, it

was absurd to think he or any one could have compelIed the Powers, and in particular gun-

shy Russia, to go to war against ust tria-~ungary." Thus, Prizich concludes if Milovanovich

had pursued an aggressive policy it most likely would have ended in Serbia being defeated or

rnaybe even occupied by Vienna.

A representative example of the other side of the debate is provided by Dimitrije

Djordjevic's biography of the Serbian Foreign Minister, Milovan Milovanovic, which was

written in 1962." Like the others, Djordjevich acknowledges that the diplomatic

environment was not conducive for a Serbian success, but where he differs is in how he

believes Milovanovich shouId have responded to the situation. In short, he maintains that it

would have been better for Milovanovich to have adopted a more nationalist inspired policy

such as the one advocated by Pashich, and focused on demanding Bosnian autonomy,

because at least that course of action would have preserved his credibility in the parliament

14

and with the public. But instead, his policy of compensation had not only failed to produce

the desired results: Le. Serbia was not rewarded by either economic or territorial

compensations, but he had also compromised Serbia's dignity.

There are two weaknesses two Djordjevic's argument. Firstly, it is not fair to blame

the Foreign Minister for having failed to win compensations for Serbia because that was

beyond his control once Russia had taken back its support, and secondly the option he

identifies that he could have considered as an alternative was just not realistic. By the 1s t

stage of the crisis Milovanovich was threatened by Austria-Hungary that Serbia would be

invaded if its govenunent withheld recognition of the annexation, so how in al1 conscience

couid he have done so? Moreover, the other source of pressure to recognize the annexation

originated fiom the Russian Foreign Minister who wamed him that Serbia would be bIamed

for any war, and wodd be denied Russian support if its governrnent defied Austria-

Hungary's request.

Consequentiy, though he is correct to assert that Milovanovich's policy of

compensation did not owe any thing to pan-Serbian nationalism, it is inappropriate for

Djordjevich to describe that as a flaw. The Foreign Minister's policy of compensation did

not provoke a war that Serbia was incapabIe of fighting, and furthermore, that very policy

m u t be judged as being superior to any approach that might have. If Serbia were to be

annexed by Austria-Hungary as the result of an Ausiria-Serbian war, how would that have

furthered the Serbian nationalkt cause? By his actions it is apparent that Milovanovich knew

that it would not, and it is probable that so did his adversary Pashich. M e r ail, one of the

15

most curious events of the whole crisis is that Pashich, even though he apparently disagreed

with Milovanovich's ofTiciai policy, never used his influence to remove Milovanovich fiom

office during the crisis, which he very easily could have done.

The discussion of how Serbian historians have viewed Milovanovich's policy takes us

directly to another point that should be raised regarding the Serbian sources. Tbough, as

stated earlier, Serbian literature does provide a more informative account of Serbia's role in

the Bosnian crisis, it unfortunately as a rule tends to be overly partisan.

Using the example above, from the beginning Serbian historians make it clear where

their allegiances lie and whether they are supporters of the Milovanovich or Pashich

approach. The limitation of this type of scholarship is that Serbian scholars overly praise

one position, and then condemn the other. The resuit of which is neither position is

scrutinized sufficientIy. One of the best example of this can be found in Popovich's work.

Popovich, throughout his text, fkequently asserts that Milovanovich was "right" and "on the

right track" in terms of the foreign policy he selected for Serbia whereas Pashich was just

"wrong". '' Pashich's policy was wrong, he explains, because it was both too confrontationai, and that it presumed that Russia could be forced to assist Serbia in that war,

even when Izvolsky warned Pashich that this would not happen. The drawback of

Popovich's description is that once he explains why Pashich was "wrong", he fails to

examine his policy in depth.. He does not for instance consider the possibility that Pashich

did not really intend to go to war with Austria, but rather threatened to do so in order to

provide Serbia with some bargaining leverage. Moreover, he does not ask why Pashich did

16

not dismiss Milovanovich if he disagreed with his policy so passionately? The fact that

Pashich did not suggests that perhaps the two men agreed as to how the Serbian govement

needed to respond during the crisis. This idea might have been so disturbing to Popovich that

he could not even contemplate it!

This tendency of Serbian literature is not entirely a weakness. After d l , it guarantees

that the reader will be entertair~ed.'~ As well the other notable benefit of this tendency to be

judgmentai is that it sparks debate, and provides an opportunity to accept, modifj or even

reject these historians' prernises, which is most important for the simple reason that it shows

that there is ample justification for further research on this topic.

A Reconsideration of Serbia and the Bosnian Crisis

The aim of this thesis is to respond to the deficiencies of the existing English

language histonography, and through the extensive use of Serbian primary and secondary

sources, to clarify Serbia's role in the Bosnian crisis. It is my intention that the discussion of

Serbia's perspective not only be more facruai and detailed than that offered by other

historians but 1 also wish to reconsider the following basic questions: Why did the Serbian

government oppose the annexation? How was Serbia's official response to the annexation

formulated? What were the objectives of Serbian foreign policy? Was it successful? What

were the repercussions of the annexation crisis for Serbia?

17

The answers given will place Less emphasis on Serbian nationalism as motivating the

Serbian government to the annexation of Bosnia. Instead, it will be argued that the Serbian

goveniment's actions preceding, during, and following the crisis, were prirnarily determined

by its concem for the protection of the integrity and stability of Serbia proper. In short,

Serbian politicians were first and forernost statesrnen cornrnitted to creating a strong Serbia

and to assuring the continued dominance of their leadership vis à vis other groups competing

for power such as the military and the monarchy. In this light, the annexation of Bosnia was

alarming to the Serbian govenunent because it posed two major threats, to Serbia's vital

interests: the first was invasion by Austria-Hungary, and the second was civil war, triggered

by public outrage over the loss of the Serbian territories.

Consequently, the task that faced the Serbian government during the Bosnian crisis,

and in particuiar the Foreign Minister, was to articulate a strategy that would successfully

contain both threats to Serbia's security. This was complicated because the policy

formuiated on the one hand had to prove to the Serbian public that its government was doing

the most to protest against the Austnan action, which would help preserve dornestic order,

but on the other hand did not supply Austria-Hungary with any cause to invade Serbia.."

In his opinion, the best solution to this problem was the policy of compensation. He

was reasonabIy confident that demandhg compensation for Serbia would not provoke a

rnilitary response fkom Vienna because he had been able to secure Russian diplornatic

support for his poiicy when he met Izvolsky in Carlsbad in September of 1908. Furthemore,

he hoped to appease pubtic opinion by showing how Serbia wouid benefit fiorn territorial and

18

economic compensation. He argued that territory f?om the SanjaW Bosnian border would

irnprove Serbia's capacity to defend itself against Austria, as well as provide Serbia and

Montenegro with a common border, thus giving Serbia better access to a sea port and

international markets.

Although Milovanovich's policy had little support among politicians or the press, he

retained his position as Foreign Minister for the duration of the crisis even when Serbia's

minority governent fell and was replaced in February 1909 by a new coalition. If his rivals,

in particular Nikola Pashich, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, despised his

concessionist diplomacy why did they not remove him fiom ofice? After d l , Pashich was

perfectly able to do so. The reason Pashich did not was that he was just as concerned with

preserving Serbia's stability as was Milovanovich. This view happens to contradict the

standard argument that Pashich and Milovanovich were diarnetrically opposed to one

another. Pashich's actions, or lack of them, illustrate that he m u t have realized that ifhe

forced Milovanovich to either change his approach or resign, not only would it have

encouraged Austria's hawks and increased the likeiihood of war but it dso would have

contributed to domestic unrest.

This paper will also offer a different interpretation of the results of MiIovanovich's

policy. His policy has been usually assessed as having failed because he was forced to

capitulate and recognize the annexation of Bosnia without having obtained any of the

compensations for which he asked. In one sense, however, Milovanovich's policy must be

seen as successful because Serbia survived the crisis and escaped without war. This was no

19

smdl achievement as Serbian security had been endangered by the potential threat of intemal

and extemal confiict. Furthemore, credit needs to be given to Milovanovich for having

estabIished important contacts with Russia primarily and secondly with Britain while he was

attempting to generate support for his policy. Arguably, these contacts not only helped to

deter Austrian aggression, but they also wodd prove invaluable for Serbian foreign policy in

the near future.

In conclusion, this paper presents a new approach to discussing Serbia's involvement

in the Bosnian Crisis. It will be argued that the primary concern of the Serbian government

during the crisis was the protection of Serbia proper. The consequence of this view of

Serbia's priorities, is that the standards for judging the officia1 policy change. Of interest is

not only whether Serbia was compensated, which was the apparent objective of

Milovanovich's policy, but also to determine if the govenunent managed to contain the

threats to Serbia's integrity and independence. As has been previously stated, the second part

was realized even though the fmt was not, which leads me to ask the question whether

compensation was ever the "actual" aim of Milovanovich's dipiomacy during the crisis. In

other words, did he really believe that the Great Powers would compel Austria to agree to

Serbia's demands? The following chapters will be organized in a marner that enables me to

consider this question properly and al1 of the others that have been raised.

20 Chapter One

Instability and Crisis: Serbia's Domestic and Foreign Policy from 1903- 1908

The brutal assassination of the King and Queen of Serbia, Alexander and Draga

Obrenovich, in the middle of the night of June 1 2, 1903, marked a cmcial turning point in

the history of the modem Serbian state. As a resuit of the coup d'etat, Serbia's political

system was transformed in a matter of days from a repressive autocracy into a democratic

constitutionai monarchy. The new king, Petar Karadjordjevich, in the telegram he sent from

Geneva on June 16, 1903, swore "to defend and protect national and individual liberty, the

constitution, the law and the rights of the Serbian people and parliament.""

Although Serbia had become a parliamentary democracy, bitter and debilitating

politicai conflict continued. From the first day of the dernocratic period, the nation's

domestic stability was undermined by ongoing power struggles between the government and

military, between the government and the Court, between the government and parliament,

between the political parties vying for control of the parliament, and even by the power

struggles between factions of individual politicd parties. Similarly, Serbia's foreign policy

and international relations were plagued by crisis after crisis. The country's relations with

the great powers, ranged fiom bad to worse, and those with its Balkan neighbours also left a

great deal to be desired.

ï h e challenge of having to continuously deai with both interna1 and external strife

made it extremely difficult for any Serbian govemment to function nomdly. Moreover, it is

within this context that the govemment had to deal with the problems arising fiom the

2 1 annexation of Bosnia. One of the main reasons why the Serbian governent was so

concerned about the impact the annexation of Bosnia would have on Serbia's stability was

that Serbia had already been shaken by earlier crises. The Bosnim crisis, in other words, did

not create new problems but exacerbated existing ones; Le. the precarious position of the

civilian government and Serbia's relations with Austria. To be sure, this most recent crisis

was more serious than the others, but the fact that it had been preceded reinforced the

govemment's fears.

The Serbian Radical Pariv. Sruska Radikalna Stranka

The Serbian Radical party was not directly involved in the coup d'etat of 1903, but it

was one of the groups that benefited the most fiom the overthrow of the Obrenovich dynasty.

As the most popular political Party within Serbia by far, it has been estimated that by 1903 as

much as 80% of Serbia's population either supported or belonged to the Serbian Radicds, the

transformation of Serbia into a parliamentary democracy meant that the Radicals w d d

dorninate the parliament, and that they would continually form the government and nin

~erbia."

The Radical Party was formally founded in 1880 by Pera Todorovich and Nikola

p as hi ch." From the beginning, it was the vehicle of expression for both Serbia's democmtic

and nationalist movements. Led by young, affluent, western educated, and ambitious Serbian

intellectuals, the party sought to modernize the Serbian state through poIiticd action.3J The

Radicals demanded that Serbia's political system be transformed into a parliarnentay

22

democracy, and that democratic reforms such as universai sufhge and freedom of the press

be guaranteed. Next, the Radicals argued that the airn of Serbia's foreign policy must be to

unite ail of Serbian tenitories in a Greater Serbia- In 1894, Milovan Milovanovich, in a

paper outlined the party's views, "Serbia cannot simply abandon the interests of Serbdom.

From the Serbian standpoint, there is no difference between the Serbian State interests and

the interests of other Serbs. ..Cut off fiom other Serbian lands, Serbia by itself means nothing

and has no reason to exist at di." 35

After the RadicaI Party won the nationai elections that were held on 21 September

1903 in a landslide, (they took 14 1 of the 160 seats), its leadership finaily had the opportunity

it had been waiting for to reaiize al1 aspects of its party progra~n.'~ Perhaps the most

important plank of the piatform had been fiilfilled by the Skupshtina's ratification of the 1888

Constitution on June 17, which ensured universal suffrage and bestowed the parliament with

full legislative a~ tho r i t~ .~ ' However, there were other issues related to dornestic development

such as need to industrialize, and the whole question of foreign policy that had not yet been

addressed. The debate that ensued regarding where and when to deal with these issues would

divide the Radical party into thee separate factions; 1) the Independents, 2) the Court

Radicals and 3) the Pashich Group.

The Independent Radicals, the left wing of the Radical Party, were first organized in

1901, under the Ieadership of Ljuba Zivkovich and Ljuba Stojanovich, (the latter would

become the editor of the faction's newspaper Odiek, The Echo,) to protest the party

leadership's opportunistic acceptance of King Alexander's quasi-democratic constitution.

The Independents were the self appointed conscience of the Radical Party, the "True

23 Radicals", and were comrnitted to realizing al1 of the goals articulated in the original Radical

Party Platform of 188 1 .38 Thus, when the Radicals came to power in 1903 the independents

stressed that the government must focus on foreign policy dong with domestic policy. In

particular, they advocated that the Serbian govenunent immediately sever ties with Austria-

Hungary, and prepare a plan for the creation of Greater Serbia.

At the other end of the spectnun were the Court Radicais. The most prominent

representative of this faction was Milovan Milovanovich, who was the party's most

renowned scholar. Schooled in Paris, he was a lawyer, a professor and author, and had

written both the 1888 constitution and the controversial 190 1 constit~tion.'~ 'O George

Clemenceau said of him sornetime during the aftermath of the Bosnian Cnsis, "1 do not know

of any orher European statesman of his calibre'*' Whether or not Clemenceau's praise was

sincere, it helps to understand the way in which Milovanovich perceived himself; he

proclairned himself to be both a Serbian patriot and a European politician.

Milovanovich's long-term political aim was to elevate Serbia to the standards of

western European States. Creating Greater Serbia was less important than creating a strong

and modem Serbia proper.J' Milovanovich also differed fiom the other Radicais in that he

was wiliing to put aside his personai or ideological preferences and cooperate with any

individual, group or even state, including the Dua! Monarchy, in order to achieve his long

term political objectives. This was why he was prepared to serve in King Alexander's

govemment.J3 However, insofar as Milovanovich was in favour of reform, he was by nature

very cautious, and thought it should be introduced gradually. In his view, overly ambitious

pIans to develop the Serbian economy would only saddle the country with debt, and in

24

contrast to the Independents he was strongly opposed to any action that would alienate

Austria and provoke a conflict for which Serbia was not prepared.

The third faction and rnost influentid faction of the Radical Party was the Pashich

Group. It was led by the Party's president Nikola Pashich, and by his two loyal partners

Stojan Protich and Lazar Pachu. This faction was more prudent than the independents but

more aggressive than the Court Radicals. Pashich intended to implement both aspects of the

Radical Party Program, but gave priority to dornestic policy. It would be foolish to embark

on an expansionkt foreign policy before democracy and the position of the Radicals were

even secure in Serbia. Since it was the largest faction, the Pashich group was usually able to

determine how the government would be nui, but sometimes in questions of foreign policy

they had to yield to Milovanovich whose ability as a diplomat was highly regarded.

Serbia's Domestic Politics: 1903-1908

Very eady into its role as a democratic state, there were indications that Serbia's

domestic situation would continue to be as unstable as it had been during the Obrenovich

regime. And ironicaliy, the first sign of trouble came fiom within the Serbian military, which

had been one of the forces responsible for the June coup d'etat.

At the beginning of August 1903, military officers fiom the ganison in Nish, Serbia's

second largest city, began to organize a protest, under the direction of a young Captain, Milan

Novakovich, who had been in Paris at the time of the coup. While acknowiedging that the

King had governed pooriy, the Novakovich group declared the conspirators had gone too far

25

by betraying their oath of loyalty to the King. They demanded in a petition, signed by 68

offices, that ail those that had participated in the conspiracy be discharged f?om service,

"either they take off their tunics, or we take off ours.'*

The government in Belgrade was understandably alarmed by this development

because it owed its position to the conspirators. Hence Dragutin Dimiûijevich (Apis), one of

the conspirator officers, was eIected to go to Nish to contain the situation before it could turn

into a counter-revolution.jS There he arrested 27 of the officers who had signed the petition.

They were quickly convicted by the Nish court, and received sentences ranging frorn 4

months to 2 years, and Novakovich, as the instigator, was sentenced to the MI two years.

From prison Novakovich continued to protest, but neither the government nor the

King ever officially responded to his criticisms even though many Serbian politicians agreed

with his views. They realized that great powers' concerns about the conspirators possessing

so much influence in Serbian politics wouid have a detrimental impact for Serbia's foreign

relations. Konstantin Durnba, Austria-Hungary's envoy to Belgrade f i o u s l y berated

Pashich when he had heard that certain military officers had convinced King Petar to hold a

Royal Bail for the evening of June 12, 1904, the anniversary of the coup; "this festivity, if it

takes place would be a Party thrown by cannibal'~.'"~ In addition, with regards to domestic

politics, the govemment recognized that its authority, and parliarnentary democracy in Serbia

would be vulnerable as long as the military considered it was entitled to special privileges for

having carried out the coup. Complicating the rnatter was that since the military enjoyed the

King's support, the government had to figure out how to isolate the conspirators and re-

establish control over the military without insulting the monarch in the process. The problern

26 was finally solved in 1906 when 6 of the most notorious of the conspirators agreed to be

retired from the army."

The other hindrance to Serbia's domestic stability was the struggie waged in the

Serbian parliament over the question of who would forrn the government. Superfrcially, this

seemed odd because in the eiection of September 2 1, 1903, the Radical Party won 14 1 of the

160 seats. In normal circumstances this would have provided the Radicals with a mandate to

forrn the government, but it did not in this instance due to the fractures within the party.

Consequently, a better way to break down the September election resuIts is tliis; the

PashichCourt Radical faction won 76 seats whereas their rivals, the Independents, won 65

seats. ï h e Pashich group had more seats but it was not enough to form a majority

government on th& own, and obviously neither could the Independents, so for there to be a

Radical Government at dl, the two factions would have to cooperate.

The Radicals were willing to work out a solution with the Independents, but the

Independent leadership recognized that they could exact a high price for their cooperation

and they did. They eventuaily decided that they would support the main faction of the party

only on the condition that Nikola Pashich, the Radical President, promised not to enter the

g~vernrnent.''~ This was obviously an extreme demand for the Independents to issue, but it

was not unexpected. Though Pashich was extremely popular with the Serbian public at large,

he was despised by the young nationalists in the party who accused him of being an

opportunist who had willfuily betrayed Radical ideology in order to advance his career.

There were of course many other Radicals that were far more pragmatic or "opportunistic"

than Pashich, but this point did not seem to matter to the independents.

27 Pashich. backed in a corner, had no choice but to agree to the Independents' terms, 49

and on October 4, 1903, the rnixed Radical/ Independent government, with Radical Sava

Grujich named as Prime Minister, was fonned." But not surprisingly, this cabinet, like the

many that would follow, was doomed to a short Iife as it had been formed under duress, and

more importantly because no progress had been made regarding the problem of

RadicaUIndependent conflict. In this case, the cabinet became paralyzed in January of 1904

over a disagreement as to how it should respond to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Russia

had forbidden their representatives fiom attending ai1 diplornatic functions in Serbia as a

means to protest the prominent role of the conspirators in domestic poli tic^.^' After much

discussion, it was decided to reshuffie the cabinet, and at this point Nikola Pashich,

presurnably thinking he had sacrificed enough for intra-party relations, entered the

govemment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

Quite understandably, the Independents were furious and were of the opinion that

they were no longer obliged to back the coalition. The Radicals, however, justified their

actions by citing the fact that it resolved the irnrnediate issue it was intending to address.

Shortly thereafter Austria-Hungary and Russia re-established normal relations with Belgrade

because both were confident that this new government would be better equipped to deai with

the conspirator question." Moreover, they wodd not apologize for having helped Pashich

become the Foreign Minister because they felt he was entitled to such a post.

This disagreement soon degenerated into a full blown quarrel, and put ail other issues

like domestic reform on the back burner. Instead, the mission of the Independents was to

oust Pashich fiom power whereas the Radicais were cornmitted to keeping him in office.

28

This power struggle continued for several rnonths, but was fmdly won by the Pashich

Radicals on November 37, when they formed a homogenous Radical govement, with

Pashich as the Prime Minister to replace the Grujich cabinet that had fallen due to a vote of

non-confidence

This was the finai straw for the Independents, and they lefi the Radicais to form their

own separate The schism was of crucial importance because henceforth the

arguments between them became even more fierce, and damaging for Serbia's political

stability

The Independents maintained that since their party had won almost as many seats as

the Radicals, they deserved to be represented in the governrnent. The Radicals, refusing tu

acknowledge that their demands were legitimate, preferred to try to govem without them

even though they lacked the majority in padiament necessary to conduct any kind of

business.

The Independents retaliated to having been fiozen out of power by embarking on a

campaign to cause the fdl of the Pashich govenunent. To this end they emphyed any tactic,

even assuming the c o n m q position to issues they would have otherwise supported. What

this meant of course was that they were wiIling to put aside their politicai beliefs whenever it

was expedient, which was rather ironic because the Lndependents had always bitterty

condemned the Radicals for such behaviour.

From his first day as Prime Minister, the focus of Pashich's government was to

diminish Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia.j6 To do so, Pashich argued, Serbia m u t

cultivate closer relations with other great powers, notabIy Russia, because it wouId dlow

29 Serbia to counter Austria's political interferen~e.~' In addition, regarding domestic policy,

Pashich believed the govemment should sponsor programs designed to modernize and

diversifi Serbia's economy as that would reduce the country's reliance on the Dual

Monarchy's manufactured goods.

Modemizing Serbia's economy was of course going to be extremely expensive, so the

govemment decided to seek a loan for 1 10 million Francs fiom the National Bank of

France." The loan was intended to pay for a wide variety of weapons, (mainiy guns and

cannons), Eom the French firm Schneider-Creusot, and to fund the construction of badly

needed railways within Serbia's inte~ior.'~ This was only the first step however.

The Serbian constitution required the government to obtain parliament's approvd for

such a 10a.n.~' As the Radicals did not have a majority, they would need the support of al1

other parties as well, namely the Independents and Nationalists. Pashich anticipated that the

Independents would use the opportunity to vote against hirn, as would the Natiunalist Party,

the most conservative of the three parties, which favoured the continued purchase of weapons

from the Austrian fïrrn Skoda Given these circumstances, he concluded the only recouse

was for new elections, which would hopefûlly give the Radicals the necessary mandate to

approve the loan.

When a new session of parliament failed three times to elect a Speaker, Pashich, on

22 May asked King Peter for permission to cal1 new ele~tions.~' Unfortunately, Pashich's

garnble backfired because aithough the King agreed that the situation needed to be addressed,

he wanted to put together a replacement government before he called for new etections. 62 He

repeatedly asked the Radicais to consider entering a Coalition Government with the

3 O Independents, but they adamantly refused, stating that they preferred that the elections take

place first. F r u s t e d by their obstînacy, King Petar did the unprecedented, 6-1 and formed a

homogenous Independent government; i.e. comprised ody of Independent politicians, on

May 29, 1905, which had Ljuba Stojanovich as the Prime Mini~ter.~'

Once in power the Independents found it to be just as difficult to introduce their

policies. Like the Radicais, the priority of this cabinet was to secure a loan to finance their

projects. However, rather than deai with the French, the Independent Minister of Finance,

Milan Markovich, negotiated a loan fiom Austria-Hungary, and the Union Bank of Vienna.66

If there had been any doubt that younger Independents become as adapt practitioners of

Realpolitik as the old guard Radicais, it was put to rest by this action, as the former group

had always labeled themselves as committed Austrophobes!

Predictably, when they attempted to secure approval of the loan fiom the parliament,

they failed because the Radicals voted against it. In response Stojanovich stepped down as

Prime Minister on 13 March 1906, and Sava Grujich replaced hùn. It was hoped initially that

the new cabinet wouid be betîer received by the parliament as Grujich had been a RadicaL6'

But this was soon shown not to be the case because not only was the Grujich govemrnent

unable to deal with the loan question, but it aiso was confronted with a diplomatic crisis with

Britain regarding the persistent problem of the conspirators, causing the cabinet to resign in

April 1906.

To break the stalemate national elections were heId on June 24, 1906. Although this

tactic had been attempted without success on two previous occasions, this time it worked.

The Radical Party won a majority of the seats in the Skupshtina; they won 9 1 seats and the

3 1

Independents won 47, which was suficient to empower them to govern without the

cooperation of any other

This election marked a significant tuniing point and brought to a close three years of

debilitating arguing which had crippled al1 attempts to implement reforms in Serbia. As a

result, Serbia's domestic politics became more stable. This did not mean that the strife

between the two parties was elirninated altogether, but rather that it becarne somewhat less

fiequent and disruptive. To illustrate, despite being continuousiy criticized by the opposition,

Pashich's government had a lifespan of over two years, which was longer than any previous

administration since the coup d'etat. And frnally, it is interesting to note that the timing of

this improvement was most fortunate because it happened at the moment when Serbia's

international relations becarne more complicated and turbulent.

Serbia's International Relations fiom 1903- 1908

Although the Radical Party identified the creation of Greater Serbia as a major

foreign policy aim, the party leadership recognized that since greater Serbia would require

the dismantiing of two multinational empires, there was very Little chance that this would

take place in the immediate future.69 Instead, it took as its imrnediate goal the assertion of

political and economic independence fiom Austria-Hungary, which considered Serbia to be

within its sphere of influence. To do this, Serbia would have to improve relations with

Russia and Britain, because that would provide leverage to counter Austrian interference, and

build stronger ties with her immediate neighbours.

32 When Pashich became Foreign Minister in Jmuary 1904, he went to work on both

fronts. The first was not prornising; Russia was preoccupied with the war with Japan, and

Britain was even more distant as the Foreign Secretay, Sir Edward Grey, had severed formal

diphmatic relations to protest the prominence of the conspirators in Serbia's govemment and

military. In the second area, however, Pashich made significant headway. During Febniary

of 1904, he agreed with Montenegro that both states would advocate the Mwzteg Refom

Program for Macedonia, and would hold future talks regarding the possibility of f o h g a

defensive alliance.70 But his real achievement came on f 2 April 1904, when after months of

discussions, Serbia and Bulgaria signed two treaties, one economic and another political.

The economic treaty provided for the reduction and or elhination of tariffs between the two

states, and in the potiticai treaty, they pledged to form a cornmon policy concerning

Macedonia, in that they promised to respect the status quo and the sovereignty of the

Ottoman Empire, and they aIso established a defensive alIiance, agreeing to provide military

assistance if the other were attacked."

In Pashich's opinion, the rnilitary alliance with Bulgaria was especidly valuable

because he feared Vienna would use unrest in Macedonia as a pretext to send additional

military forces to the region. This would leave Serbia surrounded by the Austria-Hungarian

Empire on three sides, and provide a stepping Stone for further expansion towards SaIonika,

and the Straits. He knew that Serbia on its own codd not deter the Dual Monarchy fiom any

of its policies, but a united fiont with Bulgaria just rnight,

The difficulty for the Radical leader was that during the time he negotiated the

alliance with Bulgaria, he was dso in the process of arranging a new econornic treaty wiih

3: Austria, as the existing one was set to expire on March 1, 1906. Fearing that word of the

Serbo-Bulgarian discussions would jeopardize the negotiations, Pashich asked Sofia to keep

the alliance a secret until the new trade treaty was signed." Unfortunately, in December

1905 the BuIgarian government for unknown reasons presented both treaties to its parliament

for ratifi~ation.'~ As feared, Vienna was furious that Serbia had acted against the ternis of the

Convention of 188 1, and demanded that Serbia renounce the treaties with Bulgaria as a

condition of the renewal of the econornic treaty with them. This heavy handed ultimatum

piaced the govemrnent in an extrernely awkward position. On the one hand, the Independent

Stojanovich cabinet, preferred to cut off ail ties with Viema in favour of Russia, but on the

other they understood that Serbia's econorny was dependent on the Austrian market. In 1905

Austria-Hungary accounted for over 90% of ail Serbian exports and 60% of her irnports."

Besides which, Serbia had to contend with the fact that the Duai Monarchy was already

displeased with the Serbian goveniment for having turned to France to secure a loan and to

buy weapons.

In the endi the Stojanovich govement tried to reach a compromise with the Duai

Monarchy. They offered to seek a loan Eom the Union Bank of Vienna, and added that they

rnight consider abandoning the treaties with Bulgaria on the condition that they first obtained

a favourable commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary. But Austria's Foreign Minister,

Goluchowslq, rejected these overtures as i n ~ ~ c i e n t , and on the 22 of January, informed the

Serbian rninister in Viema that the trade taiks were to be halted, and that the Dual

Monarchy's border wouId be closed to al1 Serbian livestock Cpigs and cattle), which was by

far Serbia's most important export, out of concem about communicable disease.'*

34 Recognizing this was a power play, the Serbian govenunent retaliated by closhg its border to

Austrian goods, (mainly sugar and alcohol), and by doing so opened the first stage of the

trade war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, also known as the Pig War.

Significantly, rnost Radical and Independent politicians supported the s m c e of the

Stojanovich government. ïhey viewed Austria's dernands as an f i g e m e n t of Serbia's

sovereignty that must be resisted. On February 2, 1906, Pashich in a speech to the Serbian

parliament declared that the govemment must deQ Austria's dernands simpIy because no

self-respecting governrnent would allow another country to interfere in its domestic politics

to such an extent. He concluded by adding, "rnembers of parliament, rernember that while

Serbia may be weaker and smaller than Austria-Hungary, our dignity and self respect is not

any less than that of the Dual Monarchy's or of any tat te".^^

Perhaps, the only dissenting voice Quring this crisis was that of Milovanovich who

was still posted in Rome." He saw no value in either destroying Serbia's good relationship

with Austria or abandoning an extremely beneficiai cornmerciai convention for one with

Bdgaria, especially since it was doubtful that there wouid be a high volume of trade with a

country that had an agricultural economy like Serbia's. He aiso wamed that it was very ris@

for Serbia to adopt a confrontational policy and antagonize Austria while it was without

allies. M e r dl, the treaty with Bulgaria had never been ratified and Russia was still

recovering fiom its war with Japan and not interested in Baikan politics. So he advised that it

would be wiser for the Serbian government to agree to Austria-Hungary's conditions, sign

the economic treaty, and in return ask Viema to support the Serbian government's efforts to

gain more influence in Macedonia at Bulgaria's expense.

3 5

Though the Serbian government did not respond to Milovanovich, it was pressured by

the Serbian public, unhappy about the soaring prices of industrial goods, to abandon the

customs union with Bulgaria and reopen the border to Austrian products on 23 February

1906, only one month after the trade embargo had begun." This gesture managed to appease

the public for only a bnef while however. The Austrians agreed to re-open the trade talks,

but they refused to lift the ban on Serbian livestock. The Skupshtina, not surprisingly, was

furious that Stojanovich had conceded without having obtained anything in return and

resolved it would no Ionger back the government. Thus, on March 14, he resigned was

repIaced by Sava Grujich.

Two days Iater a verbal accord with the Austrians was reached, whereby both States

agreed to gant each other most favoured nation status. This appeared a promising start, but

then Vienna told the Serbian legation that before Serbia could obtain a commercial treaty, it

would have to agree to purchase d l guns, cannons, and military supplies fiom the Austrian

fïrm Skoda. The Grujich government rejected this demand and resigned. It was replaced on

March 30, by a new cabinet Ied by Nikola Pa~hich.'~

During Pashich's term, the dispute with Austria intensified. In the sumrner of 1906,

in order to demonstrate good faith, Pashich offered to purchase a limited selection of

weapons fiom Skuda, worth 26 million Francs. But Austria-Hungary still insisted that Serbia

buy al1 of its weapons fiom them, and imposed a general tariff rate on al1 Serbian go~ds . '~

Leaming fiom their experience fiom the h t embargo in February, the govemment

detennined that to secure public support it would be necessary to create new markets to

replace the Ioss of Austria's so that the negative impact of the trade war would be lessened.

36

As well, the government decided to resolve the loan and guns question once and for dl . On

November 7, guns and cannons were purchased fiom Schneider-Creusot, and in the following

week another loan was negotiated for 95 million francs from the French National Bank. Both

were approved without much dificulty by the Serbian parliament on December 25, 1906, and

none of this did anything to improve relations with ust tria-Hungary."

In the midst of this turmoil, there was one bright spot in Serbia's foreign aiTain.

M e r three yean of conflict, Serbia's relations with England were finally repaired.

Significantly, the Serbian govenunent had never disputed England's argument that the

conspiraton should be punished. Where they diEered was over procedure. In discussing the

issue with Britain, Milovanovich explained that the Serbian govemment codd not arrest the

officers for regicide when the Serbian parliament had already pardoned their actions; it

would be both unconstitutional and could also provoke popular revolt." The British f d l y

agreed to a compromise, and on June 1 1, 1906, (the third annivesary of the assassinations),

Serbia retired six officers that were identified as the rnost culpable by the British government

for the regicides. In r e m , the British recognized the Serbian govemment." Yet, while

Serbia was extremely pleased about having resolved this dispute, its relevance was limited;

the first occasion that the government would find the improved relations with Britain

beneficial was during the Bosnian Cnsis.

Meanwhile, Serbia's struggles with Austria took a very interesting turn when it

became apparent the efforts made by the Serbian governent to find new clients for its goods

were paying off. Although Austria's market share dropped fiom 90% to 45% in 1906, the

figure for Serbia's exports was very sirnilar to the year before. Ironically, the increase in

3 7

business with Germany (Austria's loyal dly) was largely responsible for Serbia's success in

weathering the trade wu." This was a huge biow for the Austrian Foreign Minister, who

resigned in disgrace on October 24, 1906.a5

His replacement, Alois "Lexa" Aehrenthai was as cornmitted to defending the Dual

Monarchy's economic and geopoIiticai interests in both Serbia and the Balkans, but he was

more creôtive in his approach to plitics. Recent events had s h o w him that the Dual

Monarchy's policy needed revision. He said, "Our policy of making Serbia economicdiy

and politicaily dependent and treating her as a negligible quality has fo~ndered."'~ Since

previous attempts to punish Serbia had backfired, Aehrenthal's approach was to woo the

small state with concessions instead, and in March 1907, he informed Belgrade that he was

prepared to re-open trade talh if Serbia stiU wanted. Shortly thereafter Pashich accepted

Aehrenthai's offer and agreed to meet with him in Vienna on May 12,1907.87 This change

of mind while stabilizing Serbia's foreign relations, re-ignited the party warfare between the

Radicais and the Independents in the parliament. As soon as Pashich announced he was

going to meet with Aehrenthd, the Indepeudent newspaper, Odiek, launched bitter attacks on

his character and accused him of being a "professionai swindler", of "fostering intrigues" and

of having "treasonously conspired against the country".a9 Fortunately, by this stage of his

career, Pashich had become very adept at both ignoring and defending himself agaùist

criticism, and on March 14, 1908, afier severai months of discussions, he concluded a new

economic treaty with Austria-Hungary.

Three days later, on Mach 17, he addressed the Skupshtina in an attempt to j u t i e

his actions:

3 8 gentleman, 1 have always stated that the foreign policy of our politicai

party and the country as a whoIe can be summed up by this one slogan "the Balkans for the Balkan people" which means that no power must be allowed to expand any further in this region.. . But gentleman at the same time the circumstances mitigating and influencing foreign policy are aiways changing. There are times when it is possible to carry out an active foreign policy, but there are dso times when it is not possible to carry out an active foreign policy ... And today 1 can tell you that the mood of the powers in Europe is that peace in the Baikans must be maintained.w

Yet regardless of his assurances to parliament, Pashich had doubts whether Viema

could be m e d . In January 1908, while Serbia and Austria-Hungary were fully immersed in

trade talks, the RadicaI was caught completely off guard by Austria-Hungary's

announcement that it had asked the Ottoman Empire for permission to build a railway

through the Sanjak of Novi Pazar to the port city of Salonika. That move seemed to confirm

the worst Serbian fears about Austro-Hungarian expansionism. Although these fears might

have been groundless, at the least the proposed railway would have provided a M e r lever

with which to pressure Serbia?' Concerns notwithstanding, Pashich, ever the practical

poIitician, did not consider revoking the economic treaty to protest Vienna's actions, but

instead. he appeaied to the Porte for permission to constmct a railroad of its own, linking

Serbia to Rornania and Montenegro. Obviously the reason why he identified this route was

that it would provide Serbia with the ever important access to the Adriatic via the

Montenegrin seaport of Bar. 92

To bis credit, Pashich generated Italian, French and Russian support for his railroad

idea, but it did nothing to heIp him with the confIict with the Independents who remained

adamant that they would not endorse the commercial treaty with Austria. Consequently, on

3 9

March 30, 1908, the Pashich goveniment resigned, and arranged for elections to be held on

the 3 1 of May. 93

Since these elections gave the Radical Party a majority of seats, they chose to form

another government under Pashich. When parliament re-opened however, the Independents

remained determined to block the economic t r e a t ~ . ~ ~ As a result, on June 18,1908, Pashich

and his rninisters resigned en masse once more. By this point, Serbian parliamentary

democracy had degenerated into a full blown tragi-comedy, and the politicians were at a loss

at what to do. Finally afler one month of chaos, the King brokered a truce between the

Radicals and the Independents, enabling him to create a new government on July 20, (Pera

Velimirovich was named as the Prime Minister and Miiovan Milovanovich became the

Foreign Minister.) The Independents promised to join forces with the Radical party to pass

the yearly budget and approve the Austrian economic treaty (which would be in effect until

March 3 1, 1909). The Radicais, in return, agreed to form a coalition govemment with the

Independents, granting them three portfolios within the cabinet.95

Although the new coalition government approved the economic treaty with Austria, it

did not lead to a significant improvement in Austria-Serbian reIations. This was in part due

to the fact that the Serbian public and parliament disliked the terms of the economic treaty

In their opinion, the quota assigned for Serbian livestock was far too low, and should not

have been accepted by the govemment representatives. But more irnportantly, the Serbian

government continued to worry about the lengths to which Austria-Hungary was prepared to

go to re-establish its hegemony over the Balkans, and whether Serbia would be able to

protect itself against these measures.

40 To be sure, the govemment was reasonably satisfied with how it had countered the

Austrian railway project. By June 1908, Serbia arranged the financing for its Adnatic line

and managed to foster doser relations with the Russians in the process, but the question

disturbing the Serbian govemment was whether they wodd be able to do the sarne in the

event that Austria-Hungary decided to employ more drastic tactics, which appeared likel~.'~

Moreover, there was ais0 concem about how or if the revolution in the Ottoman Empire on

July 24, would alter Austrian policy. Milovanovich, in particular, suspected that the events

in the Porte would have negative concesquences for Austro-Serbian relations, although even

he did not yet know to what extent he would be proven correct.

4 1

Chapter Two

The Calm Before the Crisis: Milovanovich's Meetings with Izvolsky and the Making of Serbia's Official Policy

On July 20, 1908, Milovan Milovanovich, gave up his post as Serbia's minister

plenipotentiary to Rome to become Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Radical/

Independent coalition g~vernment.~' He would hold the position of Foreign Minister untiI

his death in 19 12, and in this short period he established the foundations for Serbia's

stunning political successes in the BaLkan Wars and World War One.

Afier the parliament ratified the economic treaty with Austria-Hungary,

Milovanovich's first priority was to assess recent events that had taken place in the Ottoman

~rnpire.~' On July 24, 1908, the Cornmittee of Union of Progress forced the Sultan to re-

instate the constitution of 1876 and proclaim the Ottoman Empire a constitutionai

~nonarchy.~~ In his view, this event would have crucial importance for Austro-Serbian

relations. Ever since Vienna had announced its plans to build the Sanjak Railway, he had

suspicions that the Dual Monarchy rnight be considering to rnake its occupation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina permanent, and also to expand its temtory deeper into the Balkans. He feared

the coup d'etat wouid just strengthen Vienna's resolve because the new regime in Turkey

rnight insist that its sovereignty be restored in full in the two provinces. Consequently,

Milovanovich decided that as soon as parliament closed for its surnmer break he would travel

to Vienna and Carlsbad to meet with Aehrenthal and Izvolslcy, the Foreign Ministers of

Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, for the purpose of obtaining inf~rmation. '~

42

Thaugh the Serbian minister intended to visit both of his colleagues, he expected to

l e m more fiom Izvolsky than Aehrenthal. M e r dl, it would have been quite preposterous

for Vienna to disclose to Serbia the action they were considering to re-assert its authority

over its forrnerly obedient client state, especially since many groups in Austria were

extremely hostile to Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian chef of Staff, General Conrad von

Hotzendorf, for example, had begun to cal1 Serbia "a dangerous nest of vipers".'*' Insofar as

Milovanovich hoped that Izvolsky might have heard whether Austria-Hungary was planning

to annex Bosnia, he had no cIue about the extent to which the Russian minister was entangled

in the whole affair.

Izvolskv and AehrenthaI

At the beginning of 1908, the usually civil relations between Russia and Austria-

Hungary had been disrupted by Vienna's announcement that it intended to build the Sanjak

Railway. 'O' Izvolsky objected because Aehrenthal had acted without consulting St.

Petersburg and thereby violated the convention the two powers had signed in 1 897.Io3

Although his irritation was genuine, Izvolsky seized on the incident to attempt to forge a new

agreement with Austria-Hungary.

For the duration of his appointment as Foreign Minister, Izvolsky's singuIar objective

was to restore Russia's prestige after its humiliating defeat in its war with Japan in 1905.'04

In his opinion, the key to this problern was for Russia to pursue a more active policy in the

43

near east. He endorsed Serbia's Adnatic Railway Project for exactly this reason, but it was

not al1 that he intended to do. He was convinced that only an ambitious, daring and above al1

successfid policy would be able r e t m Russia to its former gIory, and he had determined to

,-tee his policy's success he must involve Austria-Hungary.

Hence, on 2 luiy 1908 Izvolsky sent Aehrenth