dela cruz v capco

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Dela Cruz v. Capco Facts: Petitioner’s mother, Teodora, acquired ownership over a piece of land. It was duly registered under her name (TCT) no. 31873. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the said property. The subject property was later on conveyed to Spouses Dela Cruz. Spouses Dela Cruz demanded Spouses Capco to vacate the property, but refused to do so. Baranggay Conciliation failed to resolve the controvery. Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Spouses Capco. Spouses Capco asserted that the complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to show that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property. Be that as it may, the spouses Capco asserted that they have all the rights to occupy the subject property since respondent Rufino Capco (Rufino) is an heir of its true owner. In fact, they established their balutan business and built their house thereon as early as 1947. MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Dela Cruz. RTC affirmed the decision of MeTC. CA ruled in favor of Spouses Dela Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are the rightful possessor of the subject property. Held: The spouses Dela Cruz are able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the rightful possessors of the property.

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Dela Cruz v. Capco

Facts: Petitioners mother, Teodora, acquired ownership over a piece of land. It was duly registered under her name (TCT) no. 31873. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capcos occupation of the said property. The subject property was later on conveyed to Spouses Dela Cruz. Spouses Dela Cruz demanded Spouses Capco to vacate the property, but refused to do so. Baranggay Conciliation failed to resolve the controvery. Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Spouses Capco. Spouses Capco asserted that the complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. Neither is a title attached thereto to show that the spouses Dela Cruz are the owners of the disputed property. Be that as it may, the spouses Capco asserted that they have all the rights to occupy the subject property since respondent Rufino Capco (Rufino) is an heir of its true owner. In fact, they established their balutan business and built their house thereon as early as 1947. MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Dela Cruz. RTC affirmed the decision of MeTC. CA ruled in favor of Spouses Dela Cruz.ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners are the rightful possessor of the subject property.

Held:

The spouses Dela Cruz are able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the rightful possessors of the property."The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure."45But "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property."46Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that "[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property."47The spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they are the owners of the lot. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a land registration case and was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by (1) a copy of the Decision in the said land registration case; (2) the title of the land issued to Teodora (TCT No. 31873), and, (3) the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora wherein the latters heirs agreed to convey the said property to Amelia.The spouses Capco, on the other hand, aside from their bare allegation that respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing to support their claim. While they submitted receipts evidencing their payments of the realty taxes of their house and the camarin standing in the subject property, the same only militates against their claim since the latest receipts indicate Teodora as the owner of the land. Moreover, the spouses Capcos attempt to attack the title of Teodora is futile. "It has repeatedly been emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable."48All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion, as affirmed by the RTC, that the spouses Dela Cruz are better entitled to the material possession of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right to the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of ownership.

Suarez v Emboy, Jr.

Facts:

Respondent spouses Felix and Marilou Emboy inherited a 222 sq.m. lot, Lot No. 1907-A-2 covered by TCT No. T-174880, from their mother, Claudia. The lot was originally part of a bigger property, Lot No. 1907-A, which was partitioned into 5 different lots for Claudia and her siblings as inheritance from their parents Carlos Padilla and Asuncion Pacres. In 2004, the respondents were asked by their cousins, the heirs of Vicente (Claudia's brother) to vacate the subject lot and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5 which was a landlocked portion without a right of way. The respondents refused, insisting that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. Shortly thereafter, the respondents received a demand letter from counsel of the petitioner, requiring them to vacate the said lot on the information that petitioner had already purchased the said lot from the respondent's relatives on Feb. 12, 2004. Respondents refused and went on to file a complaint for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heir's respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A after examining the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovering possible anomalies like forged signatures and alterations in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to the same lot. The petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents on Dec. 8, 2004 before the MTCC alleging that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. The MTCC upheld respondent's claims in its 2006 decision and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expence all the improvements they had built thereon. The RTC affirmed the MTCC ruling. Through a petition for review filed before the CA, respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades while petitioner was buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot's title. The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to petitioner, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for petitioner's claim that the respondents' possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners. Respondents also discovered a duly notarized document showing that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesoa, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A when he used the same as a collateral in obtaining a loan from PNB. The loan was paid for by Carlos and Asuncion. Based on this discoveries, the Heirs of Vicente did not have the rights over the subject lot to convey to petitioner. Respondents also averred that petitioner's complaint lacked a cause of action because the certification to file an action was issued in the name of James Tan Suarez (petitioner's brother), who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Also, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after the execution of the deed of sale (April 1, 2004), which served as petitioner's primary basis for her claim to the property. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.Issues

1. Whether or not Carmencita's comlaint againts the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.2. Whether or not the pendency of the respondents' petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita's ejectment suit.

Held:

1. Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion,sansfactual substantiation, that (a) the respondents initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lots possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

2. As an exception to the general rule, the respondents petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate Carmencitas suit for unlawful detainer. Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencitas complaint be granted, the respondents house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.