delegate structures and strategic unionism- analysis of factors in union resilience.pdf

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Journal of Industrial

http://jir.sagepub.com/content/40/4/663The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/002218569804000409

1998 40: 663JIR

Michael Alexander, Roy Green and Andrew WilsonUnion Resilience

Delegate Structures and Strategic Unionism: Analysis of Factors in

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DELEGATE STRUCTURESAND STRATEGIC

UNIONISM:ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IN

UNION RESILIENCE

MICHAELALEXANDER, ROY GREENANDANDREWWILSON*

* The authors affiliations are with theDepartment

of IndustrialRelations, University

of

Sydney,with the Employment Studies Centre, University of Newcastle, and with the Business School,University of Southbank, London, respectively. We are grateful for comments from Bruce

Chapman, Peter Gahan, Keith Hancock, Barbara Pocock, Louise Tarrant and Mark Wooden. The

paper has also benefited from theadvice of two anonymous referees of theJIR.

Thisarticle examines the pattern of union membership decline inAustralia usingthe 1995Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data set (AWIRS

95), including the panel ofsurviving workplaces drawn from the 1990 survey. Itconfirms recent studies that suggest that the decline is more or less comprehensive, but

points to some diversity in the longitudinal findings. In particular, the article tracks thegrowth of delegate structures in the previous five years in unionised workplaces,employee attitudes to unions, and the much slower rate of derline associated with activeunionism, While it has been argued, not least by Joe Isaac (1958), that workplaceorganisation tended to atrophy under compulsory arbitration, there is no automatic

process by which it will correspondingly flourish under more decentralised bargainingarrangements. TheAWIRS 95 findings suggest that the future of unions will bedetermined by a range of factors, which include their ability to build and co-ordinate

delegate networks and hence the role of the state in providing legislative support forworkplace organisation and fair wages. We argue that this, not a return to centralisedwage restraint, sbould be

the focus of strategicunionism.

The decline in union density has been the subject ofconsiderable discussion inthe past decade. However, the reasons for this decline, and the prospects of

reversing it, remain controversial. InAustralia, the future role of unionism and

corresponding public policy will depend to a large extent on whether uniondecline is seen as a terminal condition or, alternatively, as a transitional processof adjustment to new patterns of work, technology and global competition.One way of addressing the issue, which draws on ivorkplace and employeeattitude data from the 1990 and 1995Australian

AlorkplaceIndustrial Rela-

tions Surveys, is to examine the evidence not only of union decline but also ofunion resilience and the factors that give rise to it. In this article, we make aninitial attempt to do so by identifying and evaluating the significance of factorsrelating to the structure of trade union organisation at the workplace.On the face of it, the evidence of decline is unambiguous.According to the

International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1997), unionisation rates, measured

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by the number of union members as a proportion ofwage and salary earners,fell in the period 1985-95 by more than 20 per cent in thirty-five of the sixty-sixcountries where comparable data were available. In 1995, only fourteen of theninety-two countries in the total sample had a unionisation rate ofmore than50 per cent ofthe workforce, compared to another forty-eight countries with aunionisation rate of less than 20 per cent. The International Labour Organisa-tion attributed this decline not only to structural changc in industry and thelabour market, but also to globalisation. It was argued that the deregulation offinancial markets has limited the scope for expansionary economic policies,leaving unions and their allies without a viable macroeconomics program;capital mobility has destabilised the sheltered structure of wages that nationalindustrial relations systems produced; and low-wage competition from devel-oping countries has eliminated many low-skill, labour-intensive jobs in theunionised sectors of the industrial economies (ILO, 1997). Nevertheless, the

organisationsreport left open the

questionof whether it is

globalisationas such

or an inadequate strategic response that has circumscribed union growth.InAustralia, union density fell from a peak of51 per cent in 1976 to 35 per

cent in 1996, and, as a result of amalgamations, more than three-quarters ofunion members are now concentrated in twelve large unions with an averagemembership of 166 000 each (Pocock 1997). This decline is steeper than inmost other countries, despite the favourable political climate provided by theLabor governmentsAccord with theAustralian Council of Trade Unions inthe period 1983-96. There is a debate, of course, as to how favourable theenvironment

provedto be in the end for

unions,with some

claimingthat

wagerestraint hastened decline (Kenyon & Lewis 1992, 1996), and others respond-ing that decline would have been even sharper without theAccord arrange-ments (Peetz 1997a). However, this debate misses the point that theAccordproduced contradictory effects, with evidence for botb positions. Decidingwhether on balance theAccord was good or bad from the standpoint ofunion interests is relevant only if the implied need for a simple political valuejudgment is accepted. The present article avoids that dilemma by pursuing adifferent approach to the problem of union decline-one that shifts the analyti-

cal focus to union delegate structures as a determinant ofunion organisation atthe workplace. In particular, the approach suggests that any futureAccord-stylearrangement between unions and government must be based not on a return to

centralised wage fixing, which tends to suppress such structures, but on decen-tralised bargaining within a supportive policy setting provided by the state.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS, UNION EFFECTIVENESSAND THE POLICY

ENVIRON~1IENT

It is sometimes suggested that compositional change in industry accounts for a

significant proportion of union density decline (Peetz 1990), but the results ofattempts to quantify this effect are by no means clear or straightforward.Accord-ing to a recent review of the evidence, structural factors probably account forsome of the reduction in density,but not nearly as much as proponents wouldhave us believe (Griffin & Svensen 1996: 512). Indeed, forAustralia the results

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are a puzzle (Western 1996). Two sets of research findings shed some light onthis puzzle. The first, from the United States, suggests that unions organisa-tional strategies and structures, the policies they pursue, and the tactics they usedo make a substantial difference (Fiorito, Jarley & Delaney 1995: 633). Thesecond, which follows from an analysis of the impact of British industrial rela-tions legislation in the 1980s (Freeman & Pelletier 1990; Disney 1990), as well asfrom the experience of incomes policy and shift to plant- and company-levelbargaining in the 1970s, maintains that the policy environment also affects uniondensity. The significance of these findings is that changes in the level of unionorganisation as a proportion of the workforce ultimately reflect changes in theprope1lSity of workers to join unions.A decline in union density due to the growthof relatively less organised industries simply reinforces the need to extend unionorganisation in those sectors, and operates within definite limits. However, a

change in the propensity to join unions reflects a more fundamental shift in thebalance of powerwhose limits are less determinate. For this reason, it is a cause of

greater concern to unions themselves, which have regrouped around the conceptof strategic unionism (ACTU 1987 and 1995), as well as to theAustralian LaborParty in its efforts to construct a new relationship with the union movement(Green 1996, Hampson 1996).

In contrast, theories of articulated union organisation and centralised wagedetermination, which claim that the latter is conducive to high union density,raise more questions than they answer. Few would disagree that a unionmovement that is strongly organised at national and workplace levels will beable to influence conditions at both and thus achieve better outcomes than

unions strongly represented at only one (Evatt Foundation 1995).At thenational level, unions will want an economic policy designed to reduce unem-

ployment and a legal and political climate that facilitates and legitimates unionmembership. The central thrust of this paper, however, is that the ~or~p/f7rclevel is where the union takes on a real and immediate existence in the everydayexperience of workers. InAustralia, the arbitration system encouraged theformation of strong state and federal unions, together with a correspondinglypowerful official bureaucracy, while stultifying the development of workplace

organisation.Whether or not this

produced dependencyon arbitration is

open to debate (Howard 1977, Gahan 1996), but it is clear the encouragementof the closed shop and preference clauses in awards were ineffective substitutes(Cameron 1993).As Isaac observed in the 1950s, just as a muscle atrophiesfrom want of use, so compulsory arbitration...inhibits the development of

organisation and skills necessary for the growth of collective bargaining (Isaac1958: 506).

WORKPLACEAND EhIPLOYEE SURVEY DATA

Our analysis makesuse

ofdata from the 1990 and 1995Australian WorkplaceIndustrial Relations Survey(AWIRS 90 andAWIRS 95) to test the hypothesisthat union delegate presence and activity have a positive effect on both em-

ployee satisfaction with unions and the level ofunion density. It also allows usto address the alternative hypothesis, which is not that union delegate presenceby Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from
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is conducive to more stable membership levels, but that declines in uniondensity impact negatively on the likelihood of a union delegate presence(Drago & Wooden 1998: 55).AWIRS 90 andAWIRS 95 together comprise themost comprehensive database ofAustralian industrial relations (Callus,Morehead, Cully & Buchanan 1991, Morehead, Steele,Alexander, Stephen 8~Duffin 1997). In both surveys, a series of structured questionnaires wereadministered to managers, union delegates and (in 1995) employees at a repre-sentative sample of workplaces with twenty or more employees across allindustries, except agriculture, forestry and fishing and defence., The surveysused face-to-face workplace interviews to obtain information about theworkplaces market, employment and industrial relations characteristics.

Of the 2001workpIaces with twenty or more employees that participated inAWIRS 95, 1896 also agreed to distribute a self-completion questionnaire to arandom sample ofemployees.At least one employee return was received fromI828 workplaces, and a total of 19 155 employee questionnaires (64 per cent ofthe 30 005 distributed) were usable.An identifier on the questionnaire linkedthe information provided by the employee with that provided by managers anddelegates, permitting an integrated approach to employee and workplace deter-minants of attitudes to unions. The population estimates fromAWIRS arebroadly comparable with theAustralian Bureau of Statistics IJekly EarningsandEmployees survey, although the proportion of unionised employees is some-what higher and casual employees lower (Alexander & Peetz, 1997). In addi-tion, a panel was derived from a sample of the workplaces that were also partofAUURS 90, thus

providingdata for the same workplace at two different

points in time. These panel data are used to consider the determinants ofchanges to union density at the workplace level.After screening all 2004workplaces from the 1990 sample, a representative sample of those that hadsurvived was selected and a total of 703 workplaces were interviewed. Thiswas reduced to 698 after further checks revealed that five ofthese had not been

intervieived as part of AWIRS 90.1 In this analysis, a further seven workplaceswere removed from the panel sample because of concerns that the 1995 data

might not refer to the same part of the workplace as was interviewed in 1990.3

1.A smaller, telephone intewiew was also conducted with managers at workplaces with betweenfive and nineteen employees, but these data are not utilised here.

2. The panel sample is not representative of all workplaces with twentyor more employees in 1990,but rather of those that survived until 1995. Morehead et al. (1997, pp. 48-51) found differencesbetween dead and surviving* workplaces, with surviving workplaces more likely to be larger, a

single-site organisation, at least two years old and with better than average performance. Whilethere was no difference between survival rates in union and non-union workplaces, the average levelofunion density at surviving unionised workplaces was slightly lower than at unionised workplacesthat had died (70 per cent compared with 77 per cent). This finding suggests any analysis of changesin union density between 1990 and 1995 is unlikely to be strongly biased by the exclusion ofworkplaces that ceased to operate beforeAWIRS 95 was conducted.

3. In constructing the data set, theAWIRS team provided a number of Hag* variables indicatingwhere defining the workplace at both points in time was problematic.Two ofthese variables indicatewhere only a sub-section of the 1990 workplace may have been interviewed in 1995, or where a larger



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IMPACT OF WORKPLACE UNION ORGANIZATION

WTOrkplace-level data fromAWIRS generally reinforce the evidence of declin-

ing union density inAustralia. The data indicate that union density fell from 64

per cent in 1990 to 51 per cent in 1995 at workplaces with twenty or moreemployees, while at workplaces with at least one union member the decline wasfrom 71 to 59 per cent. Moreover, the decline in density was evident across allsectors, with density in some industries falling by as much as a third from their1990 levels. Yet delegate structures at the workplace have maintained a pres-ence. Despite the proportion of workplaces with at least one union memberdeclining from 80 per cent in 1990 to 74 per cent in 1995, the proportion ofworkplaces with union delegates was little changed between the two surveyperiods: 52 per cent in 1995 compared with 53 per cent in 1990. Consequently,the incidence of delegates at unionised workplaces increased from 66 per centin 1990 to 70 per cent in 1995. White this resilience ofworkplace organisationis an important finding in its own right, it is equally clear that the unionmovement can take little comfort from it if delegates are failing to stem unionmembership decline.

In our analysis of the relationship between workplace union structures andthe ability of unions to recruit and retain members, we first consider howdifferent structures affect the way employees feel about unions that havemembers at their workplace. While a range of factors influence the propensityof workers to join unions, a key determinant will be attitudes to union activityin the day-to-day work environment. The employee survey component of

AWIRS 95 provides a range of attitudinal questions with which to test the ideathat workplaceunion organisation is an important factor in employee percep-tions of the relevance of unions to their interests and concerns. Following onfrom this, we assess the impact ofworkplace structures on density levels usingtheAWIRS panel data. Like the cross-sectional data, the panel sample reflectsa net decline in union density at most workplaces. However, Morehead et al.(1997, pp. 141-3) found that

the rate at which employees left unions over the five years prior to the 199> survey may havebeen affected by the presence of a delega...workplaces that maintained a delegate presencebetween 1990 and 1995 had, on

average,

a lower decline in union

densitythan those where

delegate presence ceased or never existed at all.

This suggests that delegatesmay have been influential in stemming the decline.Further, workplaces that acquired a delegate presence between 1990 and 1995had, on average, an increase in union density (p. 142).

Union organisatio1l and employeeattitudes

White the presence of a delegate is indicative ofsome form of union organisa-tion at the

workplace,it is still a crude measure of the union role.As a result,

geographic site than the 1990 workplace may have been interviewed in 1995. For some studies, this

may not be a concern. However, in the context of measuring changes in union density, it was felt tobe prudent to remove them from the analysis to avoid the possibility of measurement error.

Including these seven workplaces in the analysis made little difference to the results.by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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Table 1 The effects of workplrlce iiiiioii st17lctllres aud density on attitildes to ullio7is

(percentage of employees agreeing witb statements about unions at the workplace)

*

Statmrentr.

1. Unions here do a good job in improvng members pay and conditions.2. Unions here take notice of members problems and complaints.3. Unions here give members a say in how the union operates.4. Unions here do a good job representing members when dealing with management.5. Alanagement and unions at this workplace do their best to get on with each other.6.

Overall,I am satisfied with the service unions here

provideto members.

Nose: Percentage differences of4 per cent or more are significant at the 1 per cent level.

Population: Employees from workplaces with twenty or more employees who were currentlymembers of a union or had been members of a union at their current workplace.Sorrrce: iklkIRS 95 employ ee survey and main survey.

table 2, the changes in average workplace union density between the surveyperiods are compared for each of the categories of union structure over time.The largest declines in density occurred at workplaces where each ofthe three

typesof

delegatestructure was

missingin both 1990 and 1995. This

suggeststhat other factors associated with decline in density had their greatest impact inthe absence of union resistance. The table also shows that the smallest declines

were experienced by those workplaces where the union structure was notpresent in 1990, but had been introduced by 1995. Finally, at workplaces whereby Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from
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delegate activism ceased to operate between 1990 and 1995, the decline inunion density, although substantial, was still less than at workplaces where noactivism had ever existed, suggesting that some residual activism may havetempered the decline.

For closed shops, the largest declines in membership were in workplaceswhere the structure was discontinued between the two survey periods, with

smaller but still significant declines in workplaces where they never existed. Thismay be due to cessation ofa closed-shop arrangement, which allows employeeswho would not otherwise exit to exit more easily, resulting in a larger fall inmembership than where the arrangements were not present. Consistent with thedelegate activism results, the introduction of closed-shop arrangements at aworkplace, or their maintenance over the period, was associated with a smallerdensity decline than where the arrangements ceased or never existed. In sum-mary, then, table 2 provides strong evidence that the presence of workplace unionstructures, even where they were not maintained throughout the survey periods,may have helped to retard the decline in union density.

MODELLING THE IAIPACT OFWORKPLACE UNCTION STRUCTURES

Given the evidence of a strong relationship between workplace union struc-tures and employee attitudes towards unionism, as well as the known relation-

ship between attitudes and the likelihood of exit from a union, we can nowproceed to assess the significance of union organisation in determining theextent to which union density is maintained at workplaces over time. We usemultivariate analysis to test the proposition that union structures influenceboth employee satisfaction with unions and the ability ofunions to maintain orexpand membership.

Employee satisfaction with unions is modelled using the last and mostgeneral of the union attitude statements from the employee survey: Overall, Iam satisfied with the service unions here provide to members.6A logisticregression is used to model the equation:

where

Pi = the probability of the event occurring (i.e. agreeing with the statement)X~ = explanatory variables except those for union organisationZ = union organisation variable(s)

5. Drago andWooden (1998) reject our interpretation in favour ofone depicting reverse causation.

They assert that declines in union density impact negatively on the likelihood ofa union delegatepresence (p. 55) and that it is therefore union density decline that causes delegate presence to belower.The basis for this assertion is the further claim that a reduction inunion members will reduce

both the supply of available delegates and the demand for delegate services (p. 55). While theyconcede that causality could run in either direction, they subsequently rule this out. However,Drago and Wooden have misinterpreted this part of the table. Workplaces where a delegate was

present in 1989/90 are, in fact, represented by the second and the fourth rows ofthe table. That is,where a delegate presence existed in 1990 but not 1995 (row 2, table 2) and where delegate presenceexisted in 1990 and 1995 (row 4). The average decline in union density for these two rows is indeedby Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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Table 2 1%I&plure union density in 1990 and 1995, by union organisation

*

Significant at 5 per cent level**

Significant at 1 per cent level

SOIlrce:AL~IRS 95 panel surr-ey andA~NIIRS 90 main surveyPopIllntiol1: Surviving workplaces that were unionised in 1990.

below the overall average (11.6 per cent compared with 12.5 per cent). To show that delegatepresence is arresting the decline in union density is only necessary for the second, third and fourthrows of table 2 to show lower falls that the first row, which is in fact the case.

6. Preliminary analysis revealed that each ofthe six union attitudinal questions had the same set ofcore determinants.Analysis in a related but as yet unpublished piece of research by one of theauthors indicates that this most general of the attitudinal statements is the most strongly related towhether employees cease to be members of their union at their current workplace.by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from
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The ratio (p/(1--p)) is the odds ratio of agreeing with the statement comparedto neither agreeing nor disagreeing or disagreeing, while In (p/(I-p)) is thelogit (or the natural log ofthe odds ratio).

In a manner similar to Beaumont and Harris (1995), who used the 1984-90panel data from the British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey to examine

the decline in British union density, and Drago and Wooden (1998) andWooden (forthcoming),who also use the 1990-95AWIRS panel data to look atthis issue, we can model the change in union density atAustralian workplacesbetween 1990 and 1995 as follows:

where

Duds - change in workplace union density between 1990 and 1995

~X~= the

changesin determinants of the level of union

densityAs. = changes in union organisation variable(s)UD90~ = union density at the workplace in 1990

However, since UD90 is likely to be determined by

where

X90 = determinants ofthe level of union density in 1990

Z90i = union organisation variable(s) in 1990

UD90 in equation (2) is likely to be correlated with X90 and Z90, thus violatingone ofthe assumptions ofOrdinary Least Squares (OLS) regression.Althoughwe may lose a degree of explanatory power by doing so, we can overcome thisproblem by substituting (3) into (2), which yields:

We can then estimate equation (2) using OLS.In estimating equation (2), variables have been parameterised in one of

three ways.As is conventional, continuous variables (such as the percentage of

employees at the workplace who were casual) were entered by using their 1990level and the change in that level between 1995 and 1990. For dummy vari-ables, however, such a parameterisation is harder to interpret. Since we want toexamine the relationship between the change in union density and union

organisation variables as shown in table 2, we have modelled these and other

dummyvariables to reflect the

changein the state of the characteristic over

7. In fact, we use weighted least squares, since we wish to make inferences about the populationrather than just the sample and therefore need to take into account the stratified sample design usedinAWIRS. by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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time. Such an approach provides us with four categories of workplaces: (a)those where the characteristicwas absent in both 1990 and 1995, (b) those thathad the characteristic in 1990 but had lost it by 1995, (c) those that hadacquired the characteristic between 1990 and 1995 and (d) those that had thecharacteristic in both 1990 and 1995. The characteristic is then modelled byincluding the last three dummy variables in the regression, while omitting the

first category (the absence of the characteristic in both periods) to act as areference group.The third group of variables were simply added to the model as they were,

either because they were invariant over time (such as industry), or because theywere collected in 1995 and involved some notion oflooking back toward 1990(such as whether the workplace had experienced any industrial action in the twoyears prior to the 1995 survey.

Satisfaction witJJ unions

Apart from some industry dummies, table 3 indicates the variables that werefound to be significant in explaining the overall satisfactionwith union services.The impact is measured byhow much the probability ofan employee agreeingwith the attitude statement changes as we move from the lowest to the highestvalue for each variable. 9A full description of each variable, along with summarystatistics, is presented in appendix tableA1.

Significantly, the model suggests that satisfaction with unions is influencedbyhow employees view management at the workplace and how they feel abouttheir

joband

workplaceenvironment. Positive attitudes to these issues are

associated with increased satisfaction. Where employees agreed that manage-ment at the workplace does its best to get on with employees, or agreed thatmanagement at this workplace can be trusted to tell things the way they are,there was a significant and substantially positive impact on the probability thatemployees would be satisfied with the services of unions.At the same timeswhile employees who were dissatisfied with the way management treated themand others at the workplace were also more likely to have a positive attitudetowards unions, so were employees who agreed that they got paid fairly andwere satisfied with conditions of

work, training provisionand their

jobover-

alL It should be noted that when coded for the opposite response to some ofthese attitudinal variables (i.e. disagree rather than agree), many providednegative feedback for unions. These results suggest that dissatisfaction with

8. The variables used to model equations (1) and (2) are taken from prior research. Specifically, forunion satisfaction, seeAlexander and Peetz (1997), Griffin and Svensen (1996, 1998) and Peetz

(1997); and for union density see Wooden and Balchin (1993), Harris (1993), Peetz (1998) and

Drago and Wooden (1998).

9. This approach is chosen in preference to modelling a one unit change in the variable, since it isthe effectover the full range of the variable that is relevant. Fordummy variables, the effect ofa oneunit change or over the full range of the variable amounts to the same thing.10. The data on unionisation and job satisfaction also have important implications for exit-voice

theory in theAustralian context (Freeman & Medoff 1984).by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from
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management may increase the standing of the union in the eyes of the em-ployee, but that unions will take some of the blame when employee dissatisfac-tion is centred around aspects of their job.

By far the most significant and influential variable was the employeespreference for being a union member. Where employees agreed that, given afree choice, they would rather be in a union, the probability of being satisfiedwith union services was more than 27 percentage points higher, compared withother employees. Yet those employees who had left the union while at theircurrent workplace were 7.5 percentage points less likely to be satisfied,The attitude of management to unions at the wor1.]Jlace was also significant,

and was gauged by the response to two statements. The first required manage-ment to indicate whether unions representing employees at the workplace kepttheir word, and the second required employees to respond whether to get onat the workplace, it was not a good idea to be in the union. Where workplacemanagers agreed or strongly agreed with the first statement, and where em-ployees disagreed with the second statement, satisfaction with the services ofunions was increased by about the same a~nount-3.7 percentage points in thefirst case and 2.5 percentage points in the second. This is not necessarilyinconsistent with the additional finding that industrial action also elicits apositive attitude to unions, since unions are expected by their members to co-operate at the workplace as far as possible but not beyond the point where theinterests ofemployees are seen to conflict with those of management.

Considering the demographic variables in the model, employees aged 24-35swho were managers were less

likelyto be satisfied with unions overall than

those who were either older or younger than themselves, or were from differ-ent occupations. This is consistent with previous research indicating teat olderworkers have a greater tendency to be union members and that managers arethe least unionised group. Interestingly, though, the attitude of tradespersons isvery similar to managers and is not statistically different from them. There wasno overall gender difference to union satisfaction. Having very young depend-ent children, however, was found to be positively related to union satisfactionfor both men and women, although women with primary school childrentended to have a more

negativeattitude. In

addition,the more overtime an

employee normally worked, the more negative their attitude to unions. Therewas no difference between men and women on this issue.

Table 3 also shows that attitudes to unions at a workplace are established inthe first few years that the employee is employed there. Over the first four yearsof an employees tenure there is a small increase in the probability of indicatingsatisfaction with unions of about 3 percentage points. However, subsequently,length of tenure only increases the probability of being satisfied by a muchsmaller amount, such that a further forty-one years of service only increases it

by justover

1 percentage point. Holding everything else constant, public sectoremployees were significantly less likely to be satisfied with their union thanthose in the private sector.

Turning now to the union organisation variables, the regression indicatesthat higher levels of workplace union density were associated with higher



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satisfaction with unions up to union density levels of40 per cent. Higher levelsof density beyond this point had no further impact on the probability ofrespondents being satisfied with unions.At the same time, the presence of aunion delegate was associated with higher satisfaction of 6.2 percentage points,although delegate bargaining, active unions and the presence of a closed shopwere found not to be significant.&dquo;The result for delegate bargaining and active unions is quite surprising,

since both these variables are defined only for workplaces where a delegate isfound and most of the effect seems to be captured by delegate presence. Whenwe calculate the linear combination of both delegate bargaining and activeunions with delegate presence, we find that the coefficients are highly signifi-cant. The probability that employees are satisfied with unions is 6.6 per cent

higher in workplaces where delegates bargain with management and 8.2 percent higher where unions are active. The significance of these results is evengreater at workplaces with both delegate bargaining find active unions, in whichcase the probability of employee satisfaction with unions is increased by 8.6percentage points.

Clmrrrges ill iiiiioii dellsityThe last section has clearly shown that workplace delegate structures andactivity are a major factor in the shaping of employee attitudes to unions. In thissection, we show that these same variables matter in a separate but related

explanation of changes in union density. Table 4 lists the variables found to be

significantin

explainingthe

changein the level of union

densityat the

workplacebetween 1990 and 1995.A description and summary statistics ofthe variables intable 4 can be found in appendix tableA2. Workplaces from larger firms (asdefined in 1990) experienced a larger decline in union density than those fromsmaller firms. This is accounted for by the higher average 1990 density levels atthe workplaces of larger firms than at those from smaller firms, providing morescope for density to fall and less for it to rise.&dquo;

Workplaces that were single-site organisations in both 1990 and 1995experienced an average decline in union density of 16.6 percentage pointsrelative to

workplacesthat were

partof a

larger organisationin both

years (theomitted category). Those that were single but became part ofa larger organisa-tion (presumably by being taken over or perhaps expanding their operations toseveral sites) also experienced substantial falls in union density of 30 per cent,while the density in workplaces that became single-site organisations betweenthe two periods was little changed. Workplaces that were primarily exportoriented in 1990, whether they remained so or not in 199~, experienced large

11. When the union organisation variables were added to the model individually, the active unionvariable was

significantat the 1 per cent level and the

delegate bargainingvariable was

significantat

the 10 per cent level.

12. When the 1990 level of union density is included in the specification, the coefficients on thefirm size variables are only 45 to 75 per cent of their values in table 4 and are much more uniform,instead of tending to rise with fimi size. The coefficient on the 1990 level of union density isnegative as expected and highly significant, although this specification fails the RESET test.

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Table 3 Influences on being satisfied overall witb the service providedby unions at the workplace



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#

Significantat 10

percent level

*

Significant at 5 per cent level**

Significant at 1 per cent le~~el.

Note: The regressions include fifteen industry dummy variables not shown in the table. The

regression uses weighted data.

Source:ABVIRS 95 panel survey andAL~IRS 90 main survey.by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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falls in density. Those that became primarily export oriented between thesurvey periods were little different from those that were never primarily exportoriented.

The largest and most significant coefficient was for workplaces part of whichhad closed between 1990 and 1995. While the potential for such action to havea heavy impact on union numbers is obvious, not too much should be made ofthis result, since it affects only two workplaces in the sample. Effectively it isalmost acting as an individual dummy variable on each of these two observa-tions. Removing them from the sample makes no substantive difference to theregression results. On a similar issue but affecting many more workplaces,there was an average decline in union density of 9.7 percentage points wheremanagers indicated that the main activity of the workplace had changed since1989.A change in the main activity would be indicative of significant restruc-turing of the workplace or organisation and appears to have had a largedetrimental effect on union numbers.

There was also a strong relationship between changes in union density andthe age profile of the workplace. WorkpJaces where at least 25 per cent of theworkforce was under twenty-one years of age in 1990 (whether they main-tained this level of youth employment in 1995 or not) had significantly lessdecline (or greater increase) in union density than workplaces where thepercentage of youth employment remained lower than this over the period(24.6 percentage points higher where the level was maintained and 14.6 per-centage points higher where it was not). For workplaces where 25 per cent ormore of the workforce was

agedover

fiftyin

1990,the

relationshipwas similar

but in the opposite direction-23.9 percentage points lower where this levelwas maintained and 16 percentage points lower where it was not, compared to

workplaces that had lower levels in both periods.We know from studies of individual union membership that demand is

lowest among the young and higher in older workers. The results in table 4 areconsistent with these findings, since a workplace with a large proportion ofolder employees would tend to have a high level ofunion density, but over timewould therefore have a greater opportunity to fall further. The opposite is true

of workplaces witha

high proportion of young people.After controlling for theage profile of the worlPlace, table 4 indicates that workplaces with a highproportion of long-term employees in 1995 (25 per cent have been there forlonger than ten years) maintained higher density levels than those who werebelow this level in both years. This was the case whether the workplace hadalways had these levels (7.9 percentage points), or whether they moved to this

position over the period between the surveys (6.3 percentage points).. In cases of all or most employees at a workplace working twelve-hour shifts,

density levels were 16.6 percentage points higher where the shifts were an

ongoing feature compared to workplaces where no such shifts had been worked.Interestingly, density was 12.9 percentage points lower where twelve-hourshifts had been introduced between the survey periods. Both the level of casual

employees at the workplace and the change in that level during the period wereinversely related to changing levels of union density, as would be expected from



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prior research. Curiously, though, the 1990 level and change in the level ofpart-time employeeswas positively related to changing levels ofunion density.

Our earlier finding that management attitudes influence employee satisfac-tion with unions does not seem to be as readily reflected in union densitychanges between the survey periods. We found no association with manage-ments view on whether unions keep their word or whether they are seen as

effectively representing the views of their members (and are consequently notincluded in the final specification). Nor was there any association with thestatement that management prefer to deal directly with employees individu-ally, not through trade unions. However, where managers believed that theaward system had worked well in the past for their workplace, union densitywas 8.0 percentage points higher.

Turning to the union organisation variables, workplaces that obtained orretained a delegate presence between 1990 and 1995, or that commenceddelegate bargaining between 1990 and 1995, experienced a significantly smallerdecline (or larger increase) in union density than did workplaces that lackedboth types of union organisation in both years (10.2, 24.4 and 8.5 percentagepoints, respectively).As well, workplaces where a closed shop was removed hada significantly larger decline in union density (8.7 percentage points) comparedto other workplaces. Industrial action in the two years prior to the survey andactive unions appear not to have influenced changes in the level of uniondensity.

However, since delegate bargaining and active unions are only definedwhere

delegatesare

present,the real

impactof these

categoriescan

onlybe

gauged by combining their coefficients with those for delegate presence andtesting the significance of the new coefficient. These results are shown at thebottom of table 4, and they indicate strong significant effects for both delegatebargaining and active unions. Workplaces that acquired a delegate and com-menced bargaining with management over workplace issues between the twoperiods experienced a lower decline (or greater increase) in density of 32.9percentage points compared with workplaces that did not have a delegate ineither period. Where the introduction of the delegate was combined with

union activism, the differencewas

27.7 percentage points, and where the unionboth commenced bargaining and became active through its delegate structure,the difference was 36.2 percentage points.

Compared with workplaces that never had delegates, those where delegateswere present in both periods had a slightly better outcome in terms of main-

taining density levels if they were also characterised by bargaining (12.2 per-centage points), active unions (11.0 percentage points) or both (13.1 percentagepoints), than if they just had delegates (10.2 percentage points). Workplaceswhere delegates were operating between the nvo survey periods, but where

unions ceased to be active, experienced about the same change in density asthosewhere unions became active. Woreover, these declines were 13.4 and 13.6

percentage points lower, respectively, than workplaces without delegates.Where delegates remained but bargaining with management ceased, the differ-ence in the change in density (again relative to workplaces that never had a



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Table 4 Influences on the chonges in workplace uniOl1 density, 1990-95



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# Significant at 10 per cent level * Significant at per cent level ** Significant at 1 per cent lev-el

1~otes: The regression include fifteen industry dummy variables not shon-n in the table. The

regression is based on weighteddata.

Sonrce:AWIRS 95 panel survey andABVIRS 90 main survey.

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delegate) was 10.1 percentage points; however, where bargaining commencedit was 18.7 percentage points higher.

In summary, then, where unions have delegates at the workplace, the mosteffective strategy for maintaining density levels is to preserve and extend thedelegate structure, to encourage delegates to be active at the workplace and toengage in bargaining with management, if they do not already. In workplaceswhere unions have members but no delegates, the evidence points to substan-tial improvements in density levels over time if a delegate presence can beestablished, with the prospect of further gains if delegates pursue an activistrole in workplace representation and bargaining.

CONCLUSION

There are a number of specific conclusions that may be drawn from thisanalysis which have far-reaching implications for the future strategy of tradeunions inAustralia. The first is that, according to our interpretation of the

AWIRS data, employee satisfaction with unions is strongly influenced bydelegate presence, and in particular by the presence of active unionism. Thedistinction often made between an organising model of unionism and aservices model dissolves in this analysis, since perceived success in providingservices is to a large extent itself dependent on effective workplace organisation(Bronfenbrenner 1994). Other factors contributing to satisfaction include notonly the obvious one of preference for being a union member but also the morecomplex and dynamic relationship between co-operation with managementand

autonomy

in areas of

potentialconflict. The second conclusion is that

delegate presence at the workplace has played a major part in retarding therecent decline in union density. This is again reinforced if the presence is notsimply passive but reflected in delegate involvement in workplace negotiationsand, among other things, an accommodating attitude on the part ofemployers.While these factors are clearly related, the evidence suggests that union organi-sation and bargaining capacity, rather than management style, are decisiveelements in maintaining (and extending) the union membership base. Thealternative view that delegate structures merely reflect changes in union densityreceives no

supportfrom the

data, which,on the

contrary, providesolid

empirical support for the strategic shift by theAustralian Council of TradeUnions to rebuilding workplace organisation.

While success will depend on the efforts of unions themselves, it is also the

product ofthe interaction of the union and its environment (Fiorito, Jarley &

Delancy 199~, p. 615). We also argue that these findings challenge the conven-tional view that strategic unionism requires a return to centralised wage re-straint agreements with governments and employers associations (Soskice1990). The effectiveness of such agreements, whatever the economic rationale,

is based ultimately on a diminished role for union delegates at the workplace. Ifthey have any role at all in this environment, it is simply to hold the line againstwage pressures that threaten the centrally agreed pay norms.As such, anincomes policy which relies mainly on [delegate] leadership is fragile, becauseto the extent that it reduces living standards, violates wage expectations, or



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generates anomalies, it underlines such leadership (Wllman 1982: 143). If,however, as our analysis indicates, the reinvigoration of trade unionism in

Australia requires instead the further development and co-ordination of

workplace delegate structures, a political and legislative environment thatfacilitates rather than restricts the development of these structures will becrucial (Green & Wilson 1997). Some progress has already been made in

identifying the broad features of such an environment, which may reinforce theshift to workplace industrial relations through support for the extension ofcollective bargaining on the one hand and a reconstructed award framework onthe other (Beazley 1998). However, the major influence on any relationshipberiveen the trade union movement and a future Labor government will be the

extent to which unions themselves have recognised the value of strengtheningworkplace organisation and given it substance both strategically and in the day-to-day task ofrepresenting the interests of their members.

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Beazley K. (1998), 10 Step Rescue Plan, Statement by the Leader of the Opposition, 1 July.Bronfenbrenner K. (1994), Winning against the odds: Successful union strategies for winning

NLRB certification elections, Working Paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.Callus R., MoreheadA., Cully M. and Buchanan J. (1991), Industrial Relations at Work: The

Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey,AGPS,Canberra.Cameron C. (1993) ALP and the unionspast, present and future, Labottr History 64, 119-28.

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influences, Industrialand Labor Relations Review 48, 613-35.Freeman R. and Medoff J. (1984), What Do Unions Do? Basic Books, New York.Freeman R. and Pelletier J. (1990), The impact of industrial relations legislation on British union

density, British Journal of Industrial Relations 28, 141-64.Gahan P. (1996), Did arbitration make for dependent unionism? Evidence from historical casestudies,Journal of Industrial Relations 38(4), 648-98.

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Griffin G. and Svensen S. (1996), The decline ofAustralian union densityA survey of theliterature,Journal of Industrial Relations 38(4), 505-47.

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Harris R. (1993), Variations in union presence and density inAustralia: Evidence fromAWIRS,1989, Journal of Industrial Relations 35(4),571-84.

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membershipand theAccord,Australian

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Discussion Paper no. 358, Centre for Economic Policy Research,Australian National Univer-sity, Canberra.

Peetz D. (1997b), Why join?

Whystay? Instrumentality, beliefs, satisfaction and individual

decisions on union membershi , Discussion Paperno. 356, Centre for Economic Policy

Research,Australian National University, Canberra.Peetz D. (1998), Unions in a Contrary World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Pocock B. and Wright P.(1997), Trade unionism in1996, Journal of Industrial Relations 39(1), 120-

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Soskice D. (1990), Wage determination: The changing role of institutions in advanced industrial-ised countries, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6, 36-61.

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APPENDIX .

TableA1 l7eftnitions rtnd Sl/7/llJlmy statistics for variables used ill alialysis ofoverall satisfactioii with iiiiioiis (6477 observations)



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685DELEGATE STRUCTURESAND STRATEGIC UNIONISM



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686 THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS



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TableA2 Definitions and SlJ11/71JflJY statistics for variables used in aiialysis ofchmlges in wo~~Eplace ztjliQn density 1990-95 (475 observations)



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delegate structures and strategic unionism- analysis of factors in union resilience.pdf

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