Deliberati.e Democracyas Critical TheoryChristian P. PostbollDLIRA7IVFRDDMDeliberativeFreedomThis page intentionally left blank.DeliberativeFreedomDeliberativeDemocracyasCritical TheoryChristianF.RostbllStateUniversityofNew YorkPressPublishedbyStateUniversityofNew YorkPress, Albany2008StateUniversityofNew YorkAllrightsreservedPrintedintheUnitedStatesof AmericaNopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwith-outwrittenpermission.Nopartofthisbookmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemor transmittedinanyformorbyanymeansincludingelectronic,electrostatic,magnetic tape,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwisewithoutthepriorpermissionin writingofthepublisher.Forinformation,contactStateUniversityofNew YorkPress, Albany,NYwww.sunypress.eduProductionbyEileenMeehanMarketingbyMichaelCampochiaroLibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataRostbll,ChristianF.Deliberativefreedom:deliberativedemocracyascriticaltheory/ChristianF. Rostboll.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN978-0-7914-7459-4(hardcover:alk.paper)1.Democracy.2.Liberty.I.Title. JC423.R61762008321.8dc22200703663810987654321ForKathrin,Leo,andSiriThis page intentionally left blank.ContentsAcknowledgmentsixIntroduction1Why DimensionsofFreedom?9OverviewoftheBook14Chapter1.Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedom19Beyondthe Aggregationand TransformationDichotomy19TheNegativeFreedom TraditionandDemocracy31Conclusion43Chapter2.RepublicanFreedomandDiscursiveStatus45 DominationwithoutInterference46RepublicanFreedomandDemocracy51DeliberativeDemocracybeyondRepublicanism68 Conclusion75Chapter3.PreferencesandPaternalism79 NonautonomouslyFormedPreferences81Paternalism95CollectiveSelf-LegislationandFreedomasStatus102Conclusion106Chapter4.Freedomas Accommodation: TheLimitsofRawlsianDeliberativeDemocracy109The AccommodationofReasonableDoctrinesandNegativeFreedom111PublicReasonandReasonableness116PoliticalandMoral Autonomy130Conclusion132viii ContentsChapter5.FreedomasEmancipation:DeliberativeDemocracyasCritical Theory133 TheCritiqueofIdeologyandInternal Autonomy135DeliberationandPoliticization141SocialCritics, TriggeringSelf-Reection,andPublic Autonomy145Conclusion151Chapter6.DemocraticEthosandProceduralIndependence153TheInterdependenceoftheEthicalandtheMoral154DeliberationandPrivacy158DemocraticEthos161ThinkingforOneself166Conclusion174Chapter7.Freedom,Reason,andParticipation175TheEpistemicDimensionofDeliberativeDemocracy176Reason,Freedom,andRadicalDemocracy184Participation,Freedom,andNeutrality199Conclusion207Chapter8.Conclusion: Towarda TheoryofDeliberativeFreedom209FourConceptionsofFreedomReinterpreted209AMultidimensional TheoryofDeliberationandFreedom218OntheNeedforInstitutionalReformandEconomicRedistribution226Notes233Bibliography285Index305ix ContentsAcknowledgmentsIbeganthisbookasagraduatestudentatColumbiaUniversityandI wouldliketobeginbyexpressingmygratitudetomyteachersthere. IoweaspecialdebttoJeanCohen,whohasbeenacontinuedsource ofinspiration,encouragement,andcriticalcomments.Ialsofeelex-tremelyfortunatetohavehadJonElsterasareader.Hisanalyticclarity andastutecommentshavehelpedmeavoidmanyinvalidarguments.I amimmenselygratefultothembothfortheirinvaluableadvice.Other teachersatColumbiawhohaveinspiredmebytheirteachingand/or commentedonmyworkandwhomIwishtothankareRobertAm-dur,BrianBarry,BernardBerofsky,DavidJohnston,PhilipPettit,Jeremy Waldron,andNadiaUrbinati.Many friends have commented on my work over the seven years or soIhaveworkedonthisproject.IwouldliketothankPabloGilabert, ToreVincentsOlsen,ReidarMaliks,AndreasKalyvas,DanielCordes, Hans-MartinJaeger,andScottMorison.Aspecialthankyougoesto ChrisZurn,whodidmuchmorethanwhatonecouldexpectfroma reviewerandwhogavemealottothinkabout.IthankLauraInman andKatherinePettusfordiligentcopyediting,andTheresaScavenius forherhelpincomposingtheindex. AtSUNYPress,IthankMichael RinellaandEileenMeehan.IalsowouldliketothankmystudentsatColumbiaand Wesleyan duringtheperiod20012004.At Wesleyan,Iwasfortunatetobeable toteachtwocoursesdirectlyrelatedtomyresearch,oneondeliberative democracy and one on freedom. At Columbia, teaching contemporary civi-lizationhelpedmesituatemythinkinginthetraditionofgreatbooks.Ihavepresentedanumberofpapersthatinsomeformoranother foundtheirwayintothisbookatdifferentconferencesandseminars, ix including the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association inBostonin2002andinPhiladelphiain2003;the11th AnnualCritical TheoryRoundtable,StonyBrookUniversity,2003;the61st AnnualNa-tionalConferenceoftheMidwestPoliticalScience Association,Chicago, 2003;theColloquiumonPhilosophyandtheSocialSciences,hostedbythe InstituteofPhilosophy,AcademyofSciencesoftheCzechRepublic, incooperationwithCharlesUniversity,Prague,in2001and2003;and the Thirty-fourth AnnualMeetingoftheNortheasternPoliticalScience Association,Providence,2002.Iwouldliketothanktheparticipantsin theseevents,inparticular,SusanBickford,ElizabethH.Ellis,Cathrine Holst, ArtoLaitinen,MichaelLipscomb,andBrentD.Lollis.IdedicatethisbooktomywonderfulwifeKathrinandtoour childrenLeoandSiri.IthankSagePublicationsforpermissiontoreprintandreworkpartsof thefollowingarticles:PreferencesandPaternalism:OnFreedomandDeliberative Democracy.PoliticalTheory33:3(June2005):37096.(Sage Publications,2005)EmancipationorAccommodation?Habermasianvs.Rawlsian DeliberativeDemocracy.Philosophy&SocialCriticism34.(Sage PublicationsandDavidRasmussen,2008)x AcknowledgmentsIntroduction[E]very democracy, they say, has liberty for its aim.Aristotle, Politics 1317a40Democracyandfreedomareclearlyrelatedinthepopular imagination.Politicalactorsoftenusethemsynonymouslypromoting democracy is seen as identical to promoting freedom. Thisistruebothofgovernmentsandamongprotestmovements.1 When theUnitedStates,undertheBushadministration,initiatedOperation IraqiFreedominMarch2003,itwastakenforgrantedthatbringing freedomtoIraqmeantbringingdemocracytoIraq.2 Assessingtheprog-ressoftheoperationinhis2004StateoftheUnion Address,George W. Bushsaid, AsdemocracytakesholdinIraq . . . theIraqipeoplewilllive in freedom.3 When Chinese students demonstrated against the authoritar-ianCommunistregimeon TiananmenSquareinBeijinginMay1989, theycalledtheirstatueresemblingtheStatueofLibertytheGoddess ofDemocracy.Fortheprotesterstherewouldbenomeaningindistin-guishing between ghting for freedom and ghting for democracy; it was oneandthesamestruggle.4Inthehistoryof Westernpoliticalthoughta connectionbetweendemocracyandfreedomalsohasbeendrawnsince itsbeginningsinPlatoand Aristotle.5However,evenifitisagreedthat everydemocracyhaslibertyforitsaim,as Aristotleclaimed,weareno wiser,sinceboth democracyand freedomhavebeenunderstoodin verydifferentways,bothintheoryandinpractice.Whatexactlyisit about democracy that makes citizens free? Which conception offreedom 12 DeliberativeFreedomdoesdemocracypromote? Andwhichmodelofdemocracymakesciti-zensmostfree?Remarkably,thesequestionshavenotbeenaddressedin thediscussionsofdeliberativedemocracy,themostprominenttheoryof democracytoday.6Inmost,ifnotall,modelsofdemocracywend,explicitlyorim-plicitly,bothatheoryofwhatfreedommeans,aconceptionoffreedom, andsometheoryregardingwhyandhowdemocracyisneededforthe sakeofthisfreedom. Thusamodelofdemocracyencompassesbotha conceptionoffreedomandatheoryabouttherelationshipbetween democracyandfreedom. Thisbookisabouttheconceptionoffreedom presupposedbydeliberativedemocracyandabouttheconnectionbe-tweendemocracyandfreedominthismodelofdemocracy.Deliberative democracyreferstotheidealofincreasingcitizenparticipationinpublic deliberationandmakingcollectivedecisionmakingresponsivetopublic deliberationratherthantoeconomicandsocialpower.Eventhough thismodelofdemocracyhasbeentheobjectofextensivedebateover thelasttwodecades,noonehassystematicallyaddressedtheissueof whichconceptionoffreedomitiscommittedto.Itisthereforeunclear whatmakesitadistinctmodelofdemocracyintermsoffreedom.Does deliberativedemocracypromisetomakepeoplemorefreeorfreeina differentandbettersensethanothermodelsofdemocracy?Onlywhen wehaveansweredthisquestionwillwebeabletojudgewhetheritis anidealworthstrivingfor.7Bybringingtogetherwritingsondeliberativedemocracyandon conceptionsoffreedom,thisbookseekstoclarifythepossibleconnec-tionsbetweendemocracyandfreedomandthemeaningofeachnotion. Itisastartingpointformyargumentnotonlythateverydemocracy haslibertyforitsaimbutthatwefruitfullycandifferentiatedifferent modelsofdemocracyintermsofwhichconceptionoffreedomtheyare committedto.Differentmodelsofdemocracyelitist,pluralist,partici-patory,protective,andsoon8canofcoursebedistinguishedinterms ofotherdifferencesthantheirviewoffreedom,butthelatterconcept givesusaparticularlyvaluablewayofdistinguishingthem.Itisnotthe aimofthisbooktoshowthisforallthedifferentmodelsofdemocracy thatwemaythinkofbutrathertoshowthattheuniquenessandthe attractivenessofthedeliberativemodelofdemocracycanbebetteras-sessedbyexplicatingtheconceptionoffreedomitpresupposes. Actually thereisnosingle,clearlydenedmodelofdeliberativedemocracybut manydifferentversions,soIalsowilldevelopanddemarcatemyversion 3 Introductionofthemodelfromtheothers,whichIdoviaadiscussionofdifferent conceptionsoffreedomaswell.The main argument advanced in this book is that deliberative democracy presupposes a complex and multidimensional conception of freedom. The theory as wellasthepracticeofdemocraticdeliberationisdialecticallyinterrelated withmultipledimensionsoffreedom. Themultidimensionalconception offreedomisthetheoreticalfoundationandnormativejusticationof deliberativedemocracy.Moreover,thedifferentdimensionsoffreedom arewhatmakeactualdeliberationpossible;theformerarethecondition ofthelatter.Butitworkstheotherwaytoo;democraticdeliberationis needed in order to understand, justify, and realize the different dimensions of freedom. The relationship between deliberative democracy and the dif-ferentdimensionsoffreedom,thus,isdialecticalandcoconstitutive.Itis arelationshipofmutualjusticationandreciprocalreinforcement.Amongtheauthorsendorsingdeliberativedemocracywendnor-mativecommitmentstoawiderrangeofdimensionsoffreedomthan wedoamongproponentsofothermodelsofdemocracy.Fromliving inadeliberativedemocracycitizensshouldexpecttoexperienceafuller freedomthantheywouldundertheothermodels.Itisthisnormative commitmenttomultipledimensionsoffreedomthatdemarcatesdelib-erativedemocracyasadistinctmodelofdemocracy.Asthetheoryhas advancedupuntilnow,however,eventhoughwedondexamplesof commitmentstoseveraldifferentdimensionsoffreedom,theyarenot allmadeexplicit,nordoesanyoneauthorrefertothemall,andno attempthasbeenmadetointegratethem.Whatthisbooksattempts, therefore,istodevelopatheoryoffreedomanddemocracythatclaries thedifferentdimensionsoffreedomthatdeliberativedemocracyshould becommittedtoandtoshowhow,ifatall,theycanbeintegrated,and where they cannot be integrated to make manifest the tensions that have tobenegotiated.Icallthismultidimensionalandcomplexconception offreedomdeliberativefreedom.The theory of deliberative freedom developed in the following chap-ters seeks to incorporate four conceptions of freedom that have emerged in the history of democratic theory and practice. In doing so the relation-shipsbetweendemocracyandfreedomandthemeaningofthefreedom aimed at in earlier models of democracy are not merely incorporated, they are reinterpreted. The contention is not only that deliberative democracy asatheoryshouldbenormativelycommittedtomultipledimensionsof freedombutalsothatthepracticeofpublicdeliberationentails,expresses, 4 DeliberativeFreedomanddevelopsthedifferentdimensionsoffreedom.9 Asatheory,delibera-tivedemocracyisinmyformulationaregulativeidealthatintermsof dimensionsoffreedomsuggestswhatweshouldaspiretoandinlight ofwhichwecanseethedecienciesofpresentconditionsandinstitu-tions.10Butitisonlyintheactualpracticeofpublicdeliberation,which attemptstomirrortheideal,thatwefullydevelopandunderstandthe differentdimensionsoffreedom.Deliberativedemocraticpracticesdo notmerelyaimatprotectingexistingfreedomsbutalsoatinterpreting andjustifyingthefreedomthatshouldbeprotected.Inaddition,they aimatdoingsoinawaythatitselfisnotcoercivebutthatrespectsthe freedomofeachandeveryonenotmerelyinanegativemannerbutalso positivelyasparticipantsinacommonenterprise.Sowhatarethe dimensionsoffreedomtowhichIamreferring? Two dimensions are familiar, namely, public autonomy and negative free-dom, or the freedom of the ancients and that of the moderns.11 Delibera-tivedemocratshaveattemptedtoreconcilethesetwodimensions,12but eveniftheseattemptsarejudgedsuccessful,anotherchallengeremains. Athirddimensionoffreedomisneglectedbytheconcernforreconcil-ingpublicautonomyandnegativefreedomandinthecloselyrelated discussion of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism.13 Thisdimensionconcernsfree(noncoercedandnonmanipulated)forma-tionofpoliticalopinions,whatIshallcall internalautonomy.Internal autonomyhasplayedacrucialroleinthedevelopmentofthetheory ofdeliberativedemocracy.Ithasbeenakeyargumentinthisdevelop-mentthattheformationofpreferencesandopinionsisendogenousto socialconditionsandpoliticalinstitutions.Itismainlyforthisreason thatweshouldgobeyondseeingthedemocraticprocessmerelyasone of aggregating preferences. This dimension of freedom gets very different formulationsinthe IdeologiekritikofFrankfurtSchoolcriticaltheory andintheoriesofadaptivepreferenceformation.Bothlinesofinquiry haveinuencedthedevelopmentofthetheoryofdeliberativedemoc-racy,andthedimensionoffreedomtheyemphasizemustbeincluded inanyanalysisofit.Whenthefacetofinternalautonomyisrevealed andrestored,thefullpotentialofdeliberativedemocracy,asatheoryof emancipationbecomesclear.Theideaofthe libertyoftheancients,asitismostoftenused, obscuresadistinctionbetweentwodifferentdimensionsoffreedom. The libertyoftheancientsoftenisseenasreferringtoaRousseauistideaof popular sovereignty or public autonomy. But Rousseaus notion of freedom 5 Introductionaspublicautonomyisamodernone,asitiscloselyconnectedtothe modernideaofsovereignty.Adifferentunderstandingoffreedomone thatisindependentofthemodernideaofsovereigntyistheideaof freedomasstatus. Thefreedominterestatissuehereisnotmakingthe lawstowhichoneissubjectbuttoenjoyacertainstatusamongothers andwithinapoliticalstructure.Freedomasstatusisassociatedwiththe republican tradition in political theory but gets very different formulations in,forexample,Hannah ArendtsparticipatoryversionandPhilipPettits more recent and democratically minimalist version. For Arendt, freedom as statusisaformoffreedomaspraxis,anditisconcernedwithexperiencing a form of activity that is without constraints.14 Pettits status conception of free-domismorepassiveandmoreconcernedwithsecuritythanwithpraxis. I shall later develop a deliberative democratic interpretation of freedom as status. Thestatusdimensionoffreedomhasnotbeengivenasprominent aplaceamongdeliberativedemocratsastheotherthree,butIshallargue thatitisindispensablebothintermsofcheckingtheotherdimensions andbecauseitispresupposedbythem.Inshort,itisrequiredbecause theprocessesinwhichwelearnwhatourpoliticalopinionsare(internal autonomy),inwhichwedeterminewhatindividualfreedomsweshould giveeachother,andinwhichwegiveourselveslawsmustthemselvesbe anexpressionoffreedomoratleastnotviolatefreedom.Thuswearriveatfourmaindimensionsoffreedom.Inaddition to(1)publicautonomyorcollectiveself-rule,and(2)negativefreedom orfreedomasnoninterference,wehave(3)autonomousopinionfor-mationorinternalautonomyand(4)freedomasstatus.Noneofthese dimensions of freedom is exclusive to deliberative democratic theory, but Ishallarguethatthelatterhasauniqueabilitytoincorporateallfour dimensions, and that the theory as well as the practice of deliberation can supplynewandvaluableinterpretationsofthem. Thefourdimensions offreedomcometogetherintheoverallconceptionoffreedomthatI calldeliberativefreedom.Itisnotonlydeliberativedemocracythatisdialecticallyrelatedto deliberativefreedom,butthefourdimensionsoffreedomthattogether form the conception of deliberative freedom are closely related among each otheraswell. Theyaresointwodifferentways.First,theyareneededto balanceeachother. Toomuchconcernforonedimensionoffreedomcan undermine the prospects for freedom along another axis. A classic example of this is when public autonomy is used to limit negative freedom: demo-cratically formed majorities can interfere in citizens private sphere. Another 6 DeliberativeFreedomexampleiswhentheconcerntopromotetheexperienceoffreedomin politicalparticipation(freedomaspraxis)threatensthenegativefreedom todecideonesownconceptionofthegood;thishappenswhenpeople are forced to participate even if they would prefer not to. A third example iswhentheaimoftransformationintoautonomouspersonsturnsinto paternalismandathreattoprivacy.Conversely,aone-sidedconcernfor negativefreedomcanbeusedagainstbothpublicandinternalautonomy: ifwethinkthatfreedomisonlyaboutbeingleftalone,thendemocratic politics cannot be seen as contributing to freedom, nor can learning from othersanddevelopingourinternalautonomyinintersubjectivepractices ofdeliberation.Iarguethatthesimultaneousconcernforandsystematic inclusion of several dimensions of freedom, rst, make clearer the norma-tivebasisandimportanceofthesetensions;second,theygiveusaunique wayofanalyzingthem;and,third,theyopenupavenuesofsometimes overcomingthemandatothertimesnegotiatingtheappropriatebalance betweenthedifferentfreedomintereststhattheyexpress.Interestingly, even if the different dimensions of freedom sometimes competeandareintensionwitheachother,theyalsopresupposeeach other.Nodimensionoffreedomiscompleteinitself.Freedomcan-notbeprotectedbeforeithasbeendened,interpreted,andjustied, hence,negativefreedomcannotstandalonebutpresupposesthemore social freedoms involved in the deliberative process. The laws that set the boundaries of our negative freedom must be given by ourselves, otherwise thelimitsofcoercionaredeterminedcoercively,whichiscontradictory, thusnegativefreedompresupposespublicautonomy. Andtheprocessof determiningthemeaningandboundariesoffreedommustitselfbean expressionofourfreedom;otherwise,thewayinwhichweaimatfree-domwoulditselfbeanegationoffreedom,whichalsoiscontradictory. Thuspublicautonomypresupposesfreedomaspraxisandstatus.Finally, theacceptanceofthelawsdeningandconditioningourfreedommust notbecoercedbutmustbeproductsoffreeprocessesofopinionand willformation:publicautonomypresupposesinternalautonomy.Deliberativefreedom,asIhavesaid,incorporatesfourdimensions offreedom. Thesefourdimensionsaredeliberativedemocraticreinter-pretationsofconceptionsoffreedomthatwecanndinthehistoryof politicalthought,namely,popularsovereignty,negativefreedom,personal autonomy,andfreedomaspraxis.Ialsoclaimedthatmostmodelsofde-mocracy not only encompass a conception of freedom but also a theory of howdemocracyrelatestothatconceptionoffreedom.Inearliermodels, 7 Introductiondemocracyhasbeenseenasconnectedtothefourtraditionalconceptions offreedominthefollowingway:1.Democracyaspopularsovereignty: Theonlywayinwhichwecan befreeinsocietyistobeauthorsofthelawstowhichweare subject.Democracyaimsatconvertinganinevitabledependence intofreedom(Rousseau).152.Democracy as instrumental to negative freedom: Democracy is required in order to protect a form of freedom that in itself is prepolitical or outside political activity. Democracy aims at protecting an already understoodanddemarcatedfreedom(theliberalview).163.Democracyasinstrumentaltopersonalautonomy:Participationin democraticpoliticscreatescitizenswithautonomouscharacters. Democracy aims to transform individuals into autonomous persons (Rousseau,Mill).174.Democracyasintrinsictofreedomaspraxis:Participationindemo-craticpoliticsisaformoffreedom.Democracyaimsatcreating anewexperienceofbeingfree(onerepublicanview).18In the rst of these democracy is seen as conceptually or denition-allyconnectedtofreedom;thedenitionofdemocracyisthedenition ofpopularsovereignty,whichis(aformof)freedom.Butdemocracy alsoisseenashavingthecausaleffectofturningaformofslaveryinto freedom.Therelationshipbetweendemocracyandfreedominboth(2)and(3)ispurelyinstrumental,andin(4)itisintrinsic. Theideathat democracyisinstrumentaltofreedommeansthattheenjoymentofthat freedomisaconsequenceofdemocracy.Forfreedomtobeintrinsicto democracyitmustbepartofdemocracy.Ishallinthisbookshowhow theserelationshipsandconceptionsarereinterpretedinandbydelibera-tivedemocratictheoryandpractice.Theneedforaclaricationofthenormativecommitmenttoa wider and more complex theory of freedom is especially urgent if we see deliberativedemocracyasacriticaltheory,asIargueweshould.Critical theoryisbothintrinsicallylinkedtoamultidimensionalconceptionof freedombecauseofitsconcernwithemancipationfromallformsof oppressionandcommittedtoclarifyingthestandardsinlightofwhich socialcriticismismade.19Asacriticaltheoryofcontemporarysociety, deliberativedemocracyshouldcontributetoanalyzingwhichaspectsof 8 DeliberativeFreedomcontemporarysocietylimitourprospectsforenjoyingthemultipledi-mensionsoffreedom,whichitpresupposes.Butitalsoshouldinvestigate whetheritispossibletofreeourselvesfromcertainformsofoppression withoutcreatingnewones. Thusitisnotonlydeliberativedemocracy thatneedscriticaltheory,itisalsotheotherwayaround. Theconcern of critical theory with, for example, ideological delusion very easily turns into paternalism if emancipation from ideological domination is not inte-grated with respect for (some understanding of) negative freedom, public autonomy, and discursive status. But democratic theory also needs critical theory and ideology critique to remind us that there is more to freedom thanconstitutionalrights.Inadditiontothelibertiesoftheancientsand themoderns,thereisadimensionoffreedomthatwasnottheorized untilafterConstant:thefreedomfromideologicaldomination.Otherproponentsofdeliberativedemocracyhaverecentlynoted andlamentedtheuncriticaldirectionthetheoryhastakenandurgeda returntocriticaltheory.20Butnonehasdiscussedhowtheircomplaint relatestotheunderstandingoffreedomemphasizedindifferentversions ofdeliberativedemocracy,andnonehasnotedtheconnectiontothe neglectofinternalautonomyinthelatertheoreticaldevelopments.21Itisnotonlytheaimofthisbooktodemarcatemyversionof deliberativedemocracyfromothermodelsofdemocracybydiscussing which dimensions of freedom they aim at but also to differentiate between differentversionsofdeliberativedemocracyfromthesameperspective.I address the differences between various versions of deliberative democracy developedhithertoandarguethatnoneofthemhasdevelopedasuf-cientlymultidimensionalandcoherenttheoryoffreedom. Theone-or two-dimensionality of earlier versions of deliberative democracy leads either toaneglectoftheorizingtheotherdimensionsor,moreseriously,to suggestions that promote one or two dimensions at the cost of the others. Myaimistoremedythisdecitandtodevelopatheoryofdeliberative democracythatintegratesthedifferentdimensionsoffreedom.Therearetwodominantversionsofdeliberativedemocracy:aver-sionwithrootsinHabermasiancriticaltheoryandaversionbasedon Rawlsianpoliticalliberalism.ThemaincontrastbetweenHabermasian criticaltheoryandRawlsianpoliticalliberalism,Iargue,istheirdifferent understandingsoffreedom.Criticaltheoryisbasedonabeliefbothin theimportanceoflearningprocessesforfreedomandinaconcernfor emancipationfromideologicaldomination.Politicalliberalismreduces theconceptoffreedomtoamoremodestconcernforaccommodation 9 Introductionofpeoplewithdifferentworldviewsorcomprehensivedoctrines.This importantdifferencehasbeenignoredbecauseoflackofself-reection regardingwhichdimensionsoffreedomthetwotraditionsbuildon. TheversionofdeliberativedemocracythatIproposeseekstoretrieve thecriticalthrustofHabermassearlierwritings.Itdoesso,however,in awaythatisnotblindtotheimportanceofthedimensionoffreedom stressed by political liberalism. It is exactly for this reason that deliberative democracymustbeseenascommittedtoanumberofdifferentdimen-sionsoffreedom.TheversionofdeliberativedemocracythatIargue for,then,shouldbedistinguishedbothfromHabermasianandRawlsian versionsandfromtheconvergencebetweenthetwo.Why DimensionsofFreedom? Why speak of dimensions of freedom and not the more common con-ceptions of freedom?22 In fact, I will be concerned with both dimensions and conceptions of freedom. Some disputes over how best to understand freedomrefertodifferentdimensionsoffreedom,whileothersarebased on different conceptions of freedom. It is important to distinguish between thesedifferentdiscussions.Inadditiontodimensionsandconceptionsof freedom, there also are various concepts of freedom. In this work I will be concerned with only one concept of freedom (political freedom), while Iwilldiscussseveraldimensionsandconceptionsoffreedom.Nowwhat arethedifferencesbetweenconcepts,conceptions,anddimensions? The mostinstructivewaytoapproachthisquestionistoconsiderthethesis of essentiallycontestedconcepts. Theideaof dimensionsoffreedom isnotarejectionoftheessentialcontestabilitythesisbutcomplements andrenesitinimportantways.ConceptandConceptionTheconceptreferstotheoverallideaorthecoremeaningofaterm; conceptionsarerivalwaysofunderstanding,applying,and/orspecifying theconcept.23JohnRawls,forexample,seeshis justiceasfairnessand utilitarianismasrivalconceptionsofthesameoverallconceptofjustice.24 The distinction (but not the terminology) lies at the heart of W. B. Gallies originalformulationofthenotionof essentiallycontestedconcepts.Es-sentially contested concepts are characterized by having a general use (the 10 DeliberativeFreedomconcept)and anumberofmutuallycontestingandcontesteduses(the conceptions) of the former.25 If there were no general use or core meaning towhichthecontestantsallreferred,thenitwouldnotbeacommonor single contest. Moreover, without a common uncontested concept, we would havevagueness,ambiguity,orconfusionandnotessentialcontestability.26The concept under discussion in this book is not freedom as such but politicalfreedom.Ifwewereconcernedwithfreedomassuchwe would need to include a discussion of free will, which I do not do. I see thedistinctionbetweenpoliticalfreedomandfreewillnotasamatter ofinterpersonalorsocialrelationsversusintrapersonalorpsychological ones.27Rather,discussionsofpoliticalfreedomareconcernedwithwhat couldbedifferent,whatcouldbeaffectedbycollectivehumanaction andpoliticalinstitutions. ThedimensionofpoliticalfreedomthatIcall internalautonomyisinasenseintrapersonal,butitispoliticalinsofar asitdependsonsocioeconomicandpolitical-institutionalconditions. Philosophicaldiscussionsoffreewill,incontrast,concernwhatisand whatcannotbeotherwise.Thisalsomeansthatthereisaninevitable normativeandpracticaldimensiontoissuesofpoliticalfreedomthatis absentfromthefreewilldebate.Ourunderstandingofpoliticalfreedom has consequences for how to act. Admittedly, the distinction between free will and political freedom is not complete; rather, conceptions of freedom areprimarilyofonekindortheother.ConceptionsItisnotpartofthisbooktoevaluatetheintricatediscussionsaboutthe validity of the thesis that some political concepts are essentially contested. Ishallacceptthegeneralidea(asoutlinedbelow),butmymainaimis toarguethattherecanexistadifferenttypeofrelationshipbetweendiffer-entformulationsof freedomthantheonesuggestedbythenotionof essentialcontestability. Thisdifferenttypeofrelationshipwendamong thevarious dimensionsoffreedom.Inordertoseethedistinctiveness ofthetypeofrelationshipthatexistsbetweenthemultipledimensions offreedomthatIarguethatdeliberativedemocracyshouldincorporate, wemustrstunderstandtherelationshipthatoftenisbelievedtoexist betweendifferent conceptionsoffreedom.Icharacterizethisrelation-shipbyhighlightingveaspectsthatareusually(ifnotalways)accepted bytheproponentsoftheessentialcontestabilitythesis.First,differentconceptionsareputforthasrivalsthatarecompeting about giving the best formulation of a concept. Thus in Gallies words, To 11 Introductionuseanessentiallycontestedconceptistouseitagainstotheruses . . . [it] means to use it both aggressively and defensively.28 Or, as Jeremy Waldron putsitinarecentarticle, Eachconceptionisputforwardasanattempt tooutdoothersincapturinganelusivesense,thatweallshare,asense thatsomewhereinthemidstofthiscontestationthereisanimportant idealthatsocialandpoliticalsystemsshouldaspireto.29Second, a conception arises out of and operates within a particular moral and political perspective.30 Thus the contest between different con-ceptions does not only concern disagreement over that particular concept butisindicativeofamoreprofounddisputeoverhowtounderstanda wholerangeofothernormativeandtheoreticalconcepts.Itisacontest regardingentireconceptualframeworksorworld-views.Inshort,it isan ideologicaldispute.31 Third,thethesisofessentialcontestabilityentailsthatonemusttake sides.Gallieusestheillustrationofcompetingsportteams,whereeach teamhasitssupporters. Thesupportersnotonlywantacknowledgment oftheirteamaschampionsbutjustasimportantlyacceptanceofitas expressingthepropercriteriaofchampionship.32Thuseachperson musttakesidesnotonlyintermsofwhoshouldwinbutalsoregarding whichcriteriaforwinningshouldbeaccepted.Fourth, the contestation between competing conceptions is unsolvable andendless.33Noconceptionwilleverachievesuccessinitsattemptto outdotherest.34Itisbecausethecontest inevitablyisendlessthatitis an essential contest and not merely a contingent one. Conceptual contests areendlessandhenceessentialwhentherearenologicallycoercive reasonsforpreferringoneconceptiontoanother.35Fifth,contestednessispartoftheverymeaningofanessentially contested concept. More precisely, a concept is essentially contested when its users understand that it is contested, that is, when they understand that othersinevitablywillhavedifferentandcompetingconceptionsofthe sameconcept.Galliesideais(in Waldronswords)thatsomeonewho does not realize that democracy, for example, or art are sites of contestation reallydoesntunderstandtheconceptheisinvoking.36DimensionsWhen I speak of dimensions of freedom it is, as mentioned, in order to emphasizethatthesedimensionsstandinadifferenttypeofrelationshipto eachotherthandoconceptionsoffreedom. Toseewhatthismeansmore specically,letuscomparetheideaofdimensionsoffreedomwiththe 12 DeliberativeFreedomideaofconceptionsoffreedom,relatingtheformertotheveaspects ofconceptionsexplainedintheprevioussection.First,thedifferentdimensionsoffreedomarenotrivalsbutstand inacomplementaryrelationshiptoeachother.EarlierIdescribedhowthe multipledimensionsoffreedombothbalanceandpresupposeeachother. Formulating and advocating a specic dimension of freedom do not necessarily entailanattemptatoutdoingotherdimensionsthoughitcan,contin-gently,entailsuchanattempt.Idonotseenegativefreedomandpublic autonomy, for example, as different and competing conceptions whose aim necessarilyistooutdoeachotherthatsomepartisansadvanceasifthe latter was the case is accidental. To be sure, there can be conicts between claimsofpublicautonomyandclaimsofnegativefreedom,buttheyare notnecessarilyconictsoverthetruemeaningofpoliticalfreedom,but ratheroverwhichdimensionoffreedomshouldbegivenmostweight. Thustherecandenitelybecontestsbetweenthevariousdimensionsof freedom,buttheyarenotessentialconceptualcontests.Second,dimensionsoffreedomdonotnecessarilybelongtodiffer-entandcompetingmoralandtheoreticalperspectives. Tobesure,some ideologiesarecommittedtoonlyonedimensionoffreedom,butthisis neitheraconceptualnoranormativenecessity.Thereareothermoral andtheoreticalperspectivescommittedtomorethanonedimensionof freedom;considerRousseauorKant,forexample,bothofwhomare committedtonegativefreedom,publicautonomy,andidealsofpersonal andmoralautonomy.Third, when discussing dimensions of freedom there is no requirement that one take sides for one specic dimension. Rather, it is my conten-tion in this work that deliberative democratic theory makes it possible to adhere to various dimensions of freedom simultaneously. There is nothing contradictoryinademocratictheoryincorporatingandacitizenbeing attractedtoandenjoying,say,bothliberalandrepublicandimensionsof freedom. Asatheorist,therefore,Ialsodonottakesides,forexample,for freedomasstatusagainstnegativefreedom.Myaimistoshowthatthe adherentsofdifferent understandingsoffreedomshouldnotseeeach otherascompetitorsbutasdevelopingdifferentaspectsofacommon aspiration,namely,maximallyfreecitizens.Or,toputitdifferently,some formulationsof freedomcanbeputforwardeitherasconceptionsor asdimensions;Iaimtoshowthevalueofthelatteralternative. Fourth, since there is no necessary competition between the different dimensionsinthewaythereisbetweenrivalconceptions,weobviously 13 Introductioncannotspeakofresolvingacontestinthesenseofndingawinner. Thereis,however,adifferentformofcompetitionbetweenthevarious dimensionsoffreedom. Thisisnotoneofgivingthebestdenitionor theoryofthesameconceptbutratherofhowmuchweighteachdi-mensionshouldbegiven.PreviouslyImentionedwell-knownbalancing acts.Basedonexperiencenotconceptualanalysisthisbalancingwill never nd a resolution. The relationship between the different dimensions isnot,however,onlyamatterofbalancingtheminpractice. Therealso mightbedenitionaldisputesinvolvingdifferentdimensionsoffreedom. For example, as I show in Chapter 1, some liberals want to dene public autonomyasaformofnegativefreedomandthuscollapsewhatItake tobetwodifferentdimensionsoffreedom. Thisadmittedlymuddiesthe waters.Butliberalsalsowanttobalanceindividualrightsandpolitical rights, negative freedom and public autonomy. So I maintain the value of distinguishingbetweendisputesovercompetingconceptionsoffreedom anddisputesoverhowtobalancedifferentdimensionsoffreedom.Fifth,themeaningofadimensionoffreedomdoesnotlieinits competitionwithotherdimensions,asfollowslogicallyfromwhathas alreadybeensaid.However,Ishallarguethatwecannotgainafullun-derstanding of any dimension of freedom without in some way engaging theotherdimensions. Theargumentforthisiscomplicatedandwillbe giveninduecourse,butearlierIgavesomeindicationsoftheideain thediscussionofhowthedifferentdimensionsoffreedompresuppose eachother. What I have said might lead to the impression that I take sides with theadversariesoftheessentialcontestabilitythesis,sonotethatmymain aimistodistinguishdiscussionsregardingdimensionsoffreedomfrom discussions of conceptions of freedom. The reason for doing this is not to defend some of the important targets of the thesis of essential contestability. Myaimisnottoremovedenitionalissuesfromthecontestedeldof politicstosometheoreticalneutrallevel.37However,Imaintainthatthe differentdimensionsoffreedomstandinadifferenttypeofrelationship toeachotherthandoconceptionsoffreedom. Thisleadstomysecond disclaimer:IamnotclaimingthatthewayinwhichIformulatethedif-ferentdimensionsoffreedomisnalandunchallengeable. Thatwould goagainstsomeofthebasicassumptionsofdeliberativedemocracyas Iseeit:fallibilism,thatnoonehasprivilegedaccesstotruth,andthat justicationalsoofdenitionsmusthappendiscursively,tonameafew thatwillbeexplainedlater. 14 DeliberativeFreedomTo summarize, different understandings of freedom can be under-stood either as conceptions of freedom or dimensions of freedom. I do not rejecttheideathattherearecompetingconceptionsoffreedom,butthe idea of dimensions of freedom is an important addition to this. Conceptions offreedomrelatetomydimensionsoffreedomasfollows: Therecanbe differentandcompetingtheoriesofhowbesttounderstandeachofthe four dimensions of freedom. The characterizations of the four dimensions of freedom that I give in this book are rivals to other conceptions of the samedimensions.Inadeliberativedemocracytheexactmeaningofthe different dimensions will and should be determined by citizens themselves. Fortunately,thepoliticaltheoristalsoisacitizenandcancontributeto publicdeliberation.Deliberativefreedomistheoverallconceptionof freedomadvancedinthisbook,anditincludesmultipledimensionsof freedom;ofcourse,therewillbecompetitorstothisconception,which mightincludeanynumberofdimensionsoffreedom.OverviewoftheBookDeliberativedemocracyoftenisseenasamodelofdemocracybased onthetransformation,ratherthanthemereaggregation,ofpreferences. Chapter1presentsseveralargumentsagainstdemarcatingdeliberative democracyinthiswayandsuggests,rather,thatdeliberativedemocracy involves a distinctive theory of freedom. This theory of freedom can most clearlybedemarcatedbycontrastingittoatraditioninthehistoryof politicalthoughtthatseestheaimofdemocracyasbeinglimitedtothe aim of protecting negative freedom. A one-dimensional focus on negative freedomdoesnotexcludethetransformationofpreferencesbutrather theideathatdemocracyshouldaimataspecictypeofpreferencefor-mation.Deliberativedemocracyisnotaimedattransformingpreferences asopposedtomerelyaggregatingthem,butatsecuringthetransforma-tionofpreferencesinafreemannerasopposedtounderconditionsand processesthatdistortthefreeexchangeofreasonsandinformation. The focus on multiple dimensions of freedom also makes it clear that negative freedomrequiresapositivecounterpartbothinordertogivemeaning andjusticationtothenegativefreedomweaimtoprotectandinorder todosoinanoncoercivemanner.The republican tradition offers the main historical alternative to the liberal understanding of freedom and democracy and the relation between 15 Introductionthoseideas.Somethinkershaveassociatedtherepublicantraditionwith deliberativedemocracy.Chapter2discussesPhilipPettitscomprehensive andambitiouscontemporaryattempttoreconstructarepublicantheory offreedomanddemocracy.EventhoughPettitsrepublicanismhassome clear advantages over the liberal theory discussed in Chapter 1, it does not supplyuswiththemultidimensionaltheoryoffreedomthatdeliberative democracy presupposes. In particular, it fails on two levels. First, it miscon-strueshowdemocraticprocessesofpoliticalopinionandwillformation playanimportantepistemicroleforfreedom.Notonlyisinsufcient roomgivenforthedimensionoflearningandinternalautonomy,italso isignoredthatfreedomasnondominationforitsowndenitionand justication is parasitic upon the epistemic dimension of public autonomy. Second,inrejectingmoreparticipatoryversionsofrepublicanism,Pettit disregardstheimportanceoftheintrinsicpropertiesofthedemocratic process for freedom. He overlooks that the process employed to determine themeaningandboundsoffreedommightitselfconstituteaviolation offreedomifitdoesnothavetherightproperties.Boththeliberalandrepublicantraditionsfocusontheexternal dimensionsoffreedomorfreedomofaction.Fromtheperspectiveof deliberative freedom, we see that this is insufcient. Deliberative democracy isamodelofdemocracythatalsomustbeandhasbeenconcerned withthefreeformationofthepoliticalopinionsthatformthebasisof democraticdecisionmaking.Chapter3discussesoneapproachtothe notion of free preference formation, an approach beginning with the idea ofadaptivepreferenceformation.(Chapter5discussesanother,basedon the critique of ideology.) In analyzing and discussing Jon Elsters and Cass Sunsteinsimportantcontributionstothisapproachfromtheperspective ofdeliberativefreedom,itbecomesclearthattheideaofautonomous preference formation must be checked by other dimensions of freedom, in particular to avoid turning into paternalism. While deliberative democracy mustrejecttheideathatpeoplecanneverbewrongabouttheirown interests,oriftheyare,anyandallwaysofdealingwiththeissuewould beaviolationoftheir(negative)freedom,weshouldnotfallintothe opposite camp of paternalistically imposing independent standards of what isgoodforpeople.Ifweseedeliberativedemocracyasalsobeingcom-mittedtotwootherdimensionsoffreedom,freedomasdiscursivestatus andfreedomasbeingaparticipantinself-legislation,thenitispossible toavoidtheparadoxicalsituationwhereinattemptingtomakepeople moreautonomouswesimultaneouslyviolatetheirfreedom.Itisargued 16 DeliberativeFreedomthatpublicdeliberationproperlyunderstoodentailsacommitmenttoall thesethreedimensionsoffreedom.Ialsosuggestthatthedeliberative democrat as a critical theorist can initiate processes of self-reection about adaptivepreferenceswithoutpaternalisticallysubstitutingherorhisown judgmentforthoseofothers.Butthelatterpointisnotfullyelaborated onuntilChapter5.Whereas Chapters 13 begin from conceptions of freedom and relate themtodemocracy,Chapters4and5beginwiththeoriesofdemocracy, deliberation,andpublicreasonandconsiderwhichconceptionsoffree-domtheyimply.Chapters4and5aredevoted,respectively,toRawlsian andHabermasianmodelsofdeliberativedemocracy.Bymakingasharp distinctionbetweenthesetwotraditions,IgoagainstwhatIseeasan unfortunate tendency to convergence between Rawlsian political liberalism andHabermasiancriticaltheory. Tosomeextentmyownprojectcanbe seenaspartofthisallianceinsofarasIattempttoshowthatdeliberative democracy can be committed to both the dimensions of freedom empha-sizedbytheRawlsiansandthoseunderlyingtheHabermasianversions ofdeliberativedemocracy.Buttheunionhasbeenanunbalancedone, movingmoreinthedirectionoftheRawlsianpolestressingfreedom asaccommodation(aconceptionofnegativefreedom)andawayfrom Habermassrootsincriticaltheoryfocusingonfreedomasemancipa-tion. Thismeansthatthedimensionoffreedomstressedbytheearlier Habermasandothercriticaltheoristsisneglected. Whenconceptionsof freedomarediscussedasdividingthetwotraditions,thefocusisexclu-sivelyontheweightgiventonegativefreedomandpublicautonomy, respectively. Thisdiscussionleavesoutthenotionofinternalautonomy orfreeformationofpoliticalopinions,whichinformstheideology critiqueofearliercriticaltheory. Theresultisaconvergencearoundan understandingoffreedomwithlesscriticalpotential. Rawlsiandeliberativedemocracyismoreconcernedwithaccom-modationofcitizenswithdifferentcomprehensivedoctrinesthanwith public deliberation as a process that aims at emancipation through learning andenlightenment.Chapter4showshowRawlssideaofpublicreason entailsaprotectionofcitizensfromhavingtheirfundamentalideasdis-cussed and hence excludes seeing public deliberation as a learning process. Iarguethatthiscanbeconnectedtoalackofnormativecommitment to freedom as internal autonomy. I agree with the proponents of political liberalism, that autonomy should not be promoted as constituting the good life;toimposeauniformconceptionofthegoodviolatesanimportant 17 Introductiondimensionoffreedom.Butweneedtodistinguishbetweenautonomy asconstitutingthegoodlifeandautonomyasthesourceofourmoral andpoliticalobligations.Idonotthinkthatdeliberativedemocracycan escape,orshouldtrytoescape,fromacommitmenttothelatterview.Thenotionofinternalautonomyhasbeendeemphasizedinlater writingsondeliberativedemocracy,alsobyHabermas(ians).Inorderto clarifyandrehabilitatethisdimensionoffreedomIshowinChapter5 howitinformsthetheoryofideology,astheearlierHabermasandother critical theorists formulated it. Connecting deliberative democracy to ideol-ogy critique changes the main aim of deliberation from one of overcoming fundamentalmoraldisagreementtooneofpoliticizingself-imposedforms ofcoercionandchallenginginstancesofunreectiveacquiescence. While I think internal autonomy is a crucial dimension of freedom, I also argue that it must be checked by other dimensions. Chapter 6 reveals thatacommitmenttointernalautonomyiscompatiblewiththeprotec-tionofimportantnegativefreedoms. Therststephereistoshowthat internal autonomy is not based on an untenable perfectionism but should be limited in its application to the formation of political opinions or rela-tionsofjustication.Second,Icountertheargumentthattransformative dialogue is a threat to privacy. The deliberative perspective, however, must rejecttheideathatanyformofdependenceorinterferenceiswrong andviolatesfreedom.Thedeliberativeconceptionoffreedomrequires thatwebeabletodistinguishbetweenformsofdependencethatlimit freedomandformsofdependencethatareneutraltoorevenenhance freedom.Deliberationitselfimpliesdependenceor,better,interdepen-dence;weneedeachothertolearnandtogaininternalautonomyand toexercisepublicautonomy.Butdeliberationalsorequiresthefreedom tosayno.Ithereforeintroducetheideaofproceduralindependence,a notionthatallowsfortherequireddistinctionsbetweendifferentforms ofdependenceandindependence.Chapter7analyzestherelationshipbetweenfreedom,reason,and political participation. The main aim is to clarify the relationship between the intersubjective epistemology that informs my view of public delibera-tion, on the one hand, and deliberative freedom as a procedural epistemic conception of freedom, on the other hand. The chapter responds to two opposingobjectionstodeliberativedemocracy,bothofwhichconcern participation and elitism. On the one hand, the focus on reason and ratio-nalityhasbeenchargedwithleadingtoanelitistpoliticswhereonlythe participation of the wisest is needed. I counter this objection by showing 18 DeliberativeFreedomthat the epistemic aims of deliberative democracy actually depend on the participationofeveryone.InmakingthisargumentIshowthatdelibera-tivefreedomisaformofwhatIcallproceduralepistemicfreedom. Whatcharacterizesthisfreedomisboththatitstressesindividuallearn-ingovercollectivelygettingitrightandthatwhatmakesusfreeisnot beingrightbut,rather,formingouropinionsandgivinglawsfollowing procedures with epistemic value. The response to the rst objection gives risetothesecond,namely,thatdeliberativedemocracyiselitistexactly becauseitrequiresthateveryoneparticipate(andthattheydosoina certainway),whilemanypeoplewouldprefernottoparticipate(orto dosoinsomeotherwaythanthroughpublicdeliberation). Thesecond objectionthusholdsthatdeliberativedemocracyisnotneutralbetween conceptionsofthegoodbutiscommittedtoparticipationasagood. Ishowthatthisisamisunderstanding,whileIacceptthatdeliberative democracy,ofcourse,isnotneutralwithregardtoitsownnormative content. Thelatterdoesmeanthatparticipationindeliberationmustbe seenasa(moral)obligationinadeliberativedemocracycommittedto multiple dimensions of freedom. This obligation, however, has nothing to do with a commitment to a certain view of the good but with a certain viewoftherightandofpracticalreason.Thenalchapter,Chapter8,summarizesandelaboratesonthefour dimensions of freedom that comprise deliberative freedom. It also briey sug-gestssomeinstitutionalimplicationsoftheideaofdeliberativefreedom.CHAPTERONEDeliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomDespitethelargequantityofwritingsondeliberativedemocracy overthelasttwodecades,itisnotclearwhatexactlydistin-guishesdeliberativedemocracyasamodelofdemocracyfrom othermodelsintermsoffreedom. Thischapterisanattempttoclarify thisissue.Intherstsection,Ibeginbymakingsomequalicationsto the most common way of demarcating deliberative democracy, namely, the idea of seeing it as a matter of transforming rather than merely aggregat-ingpreferences. Thesecondsectionarguesthatdeliberativedemocracy canbecontrastedtoaspecictraditioninpoliticaltheorythatreduces freedomtononinterferencewithprivateinterestsandseesdemocracyas merelyinstrumentaltosecuringthisfreedom.Freedomshouldnotbe seenmerelyastheendofdemocracy,assomethingtowhichdemoc-racyisonlyameans,butaswhatdemocracyis.Democracyisaform ofexercisingfreedom,aswellasawayofunderstandingandprotecting freedom.Itismycontentionthatdeliberativedemocracycanbeseenas atheoryoffreedom,andthatthiscandemarcateitasauniquemodel ofdemocracy.Beyondthe Aggregationand TransformationDichotomyItistemptingandtheattempthasoftenbeenmadetosetupasharp dichotomybetweendeliberativedemocracyandaggregativedemocracy.1 But, for several reasons, this is an unfortunate dichotomy, especially when the contrast is drawn as one between transforming preferences versus ag-gregating preferences.2 This way of demarcating the theory of deliberative democracyhasledtomanymisunderstandingsofwhatthedeliberative 1920 DeliberativeFreedomprojectisaboutandalsoofwhatandwhoitstargetsare. Theideathat deliberative democracy can be understood as being essentially about trans-formingratherthanaggregatingpreferencesgoesagainsttheconception ofdeliberativefreedomdevelopedinthisbook. Theexclusivefocuson transformation is too outcome oriented and risks sacricing dimensions of freedomintrinsictothedeliberativeprocess. Thusitdoesnotdojustice tothemultidimensionalunderstandingoffreedomtowhichdeliberative democracy,inmyview,shouldbecommitted.Isuggestsixreasonstogobeyondthesharpdichotomybetween transformationandaggregation.Indiscussingthese,Ihopetocoun-terwhilelearningfromsomeobjectionstodeliberativedemocracy andsimultaneouslymakeapreliminaryclaricationofwhatIthink deliberativedemocracyisandwhatitisnot.1.First, the point of the theory of deliberative democracy, as I see it, is not that we need more proper deliberation in order that prefer-encescanbechanged.Becauseofthestressontheendogenous changeofpreferencesbydeliberativedemocrats,itissometimes thoughtthattheargumentisthatinotherformsofdemocracy preferences are not changed and we need deliberative democracy inorderthatpreferencescanbetransformed.Butthat,Ithink, isamisunderstanding.Preferencesaremalleableandsubjectto changeinanymodelofdemocracy,indeed,underanyform ofgovernment.Itisonthebasisofthisinsightthatwemust developatheoryofhowpreferenceandopinionformationcan happeninanondistortedandfreemanner. Thatispartofwhat thetheoryofdeliberativedemocracyshouldattempttodo.Somecriticismsofdeliberativedemocracyseemtorelyona failure to recognize this point. Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes, for example, both think that deliberative democracy is especially susceptibletomanipulationofpreferences.Butthereasonthey think so is that deliberative democracy according to their denition is a theory of democracy, which posits the change of preferences astheaimofthepoliticalprocess.3Bothcriticsgoontoaccuse deliberativedemocratsfornothavingconsideredthedangerof manipulationinpubliccommunication. Thelatterclaimisno lessthanabsurd.4Oneofthemainproponentsofdeliberative democracy,JrgenHabermas,hassincetheearly1960sbeen concernedexactlytopointtothedangersofmanipulationin 21 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomcommunication.5Sincethisissooftenoverlookedandsince ithasmovedtothebackgroundofevenHabermassownlater writingsIargueforrevivingsomeoftheearlierconcernsof criticaltheory(seeespeciallyChapter5).Thecriticismofbeingparticularlysusceptibletotheprob-lemofmanipulationifdirectedatdeliberativedemocracyasa theoryisthereforeunfair. Asatheory,oneofthemainconcerns of deliberative democracy has been to distinguish between forms ofpubliccommunicationthataremanipulativeandundermine freedomandautonomyandformsofcommunicationthatare undistortedandhenceenhancefreedomandautonomy.Butthe criticism also could be directed at deliberative democracy as practice. The objection would then be that promoting deliberation would open up for more manipulation. But this objection also would miss thepointofthedeliberativeproject,oratleastoftheprojectas Iconceiveit. Whatdeliberativedemocracyshouldbecallingfor isnotmorecommunicationinsomeuncriticalfashion.6Rather, thecallshouldexactlybeformoredeliberation. Andtocallfor moredeliberationistocallforlessdistortedcommunication. Deliberationshouldnotbedenedas theendogenouschange ofpreferencesresultingfromcommunication,asStokesdoes,7 sincethisdenitionexcludesthepossibilityofdifferentiating differentformsofcommunicationandhenceoverlooksthevery pointofthedeliberativemodel.Rather,deliberationshouldbe seen as a process of mutual reason giving and reason seeking that gives people the opportunity to form their opinions on the basis ofinsightsgainedintersubjectively.Thecallformoredelibera-tion,however,isnot(oratleastnotmainly)amoralizingcall toindividualstocommunicateinaspecicway;itis,rather,a matter of calling attention to the socioeconomic and institutional featuresofcontemporarysocietythatinhibitproperdeliberation. Deliberativedemocracyshould,amongotherthings,beacritical theorythataddressestheaspectsofcontemporarysociety,which limitdeliberationandwhichaffectortransformpreferencesin anonautonomousmanner.8Itshouldnotmerelybeconsidered acallforthetransformationofpreferencesbutratherofgoing fromonemodeoftransformingpreferencestoanother.Thisargumentsuggeststhatitisunhelpfultocharacterize deliberationasamatterofchangingpreferencesasopposedto 22 DeliberativeFreedomjust aggregating them. Preferences are always being transformed in thepoliticalprocessandinsocietyingeneral. Whatisimportant ishowandunderwhatconditionstheyarechanged.Deliberative democratsquarrelwithothermodelsofdemocracydoesnot mainlyconcerntheconstructednessofpreferencebutwhatwe shoulddoaboutthisfact. Afterall,JosephSchumpeterwhoif anyonemustbeplacedintheoppositecampthandeliberative democratsagreeswithandemphasizestheideaofendogenous preference formation.9 The point on which deliberative democrats differfromaminimalistdemocratsuchasSchumpeterisnotthe malleability of preferences but what to do about it. According to Schumpeter, the will of the people is constructed from above, by political elites. The conclusion he draws from this is, roughly, that sincethepeoplehavenowillindependentlyoftheelites,then popularsovereigntyisimpossible,andweshouldlettheelites rule.Deliberativedemocratsdisagreewiththisso-calledrealist anduncriticalconclusion.Itmightbetruethatthepopular will today is fabricated from above, but that does not have to be thecase;itisnotanatural,unalterablefactaboutallpolitics.It makesadifferenceunderwhatconditionsandinwhatprocesses citizensformtheiropinionsandwill,anddeliberativedemocrats areorshouldbeconcernedtoshowhowopinionandwill formation can happen as freely and autonomously as possible. Also, itisimportanttoseethatdeliberativedemocratsarenotcom-mittedtoaviewofdemocraticlegitimacythatrequiresthatthe opinionsthatareexpressedinpoliticaldecisionsnotbeaffected bypoliticalinstitutions.10Rather,thepointistogiveanaccount ofwhichinstitutionsandconditionsareandarenotconducive tofreeopinionandwillformation.Itisanuntenableviewof freedom and popular sovereignty that sees them as requiring that each citizen is entirely independent from other human beings and politicalinstitutions.11From the perspective of deliberative democracy, the problem with,forexample,minimalistandliberalmodelsofdemocracy is not that they see preferences as given in ontological or meth-odologicalterms,butratherthatthemodelsofdemocracythat theyproposeareonesthattreatpreferencesasgiven.Someof these models of democracy agree that preferences are constructed but do not want to do anything about it. As I argue in the next 23 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomsection, this connects these models of democracy to the negative freedomtraditioninthehistoryofpoliticalthought.2.Asecondreasontogobeyondthesharptransformationandag-gregationdichotomyisthatthetransformationofpreferencesin deliberation is often taken to be a matter of moving from disagree-menttoagreement,anditisthoughtthatifthereisagreement, thenthereisnoreasonforconcern.Ifthiswerethedeliberative democraticview,thenitwouldberighttocriticizeit.12And deliberativedemocratsdo,atleastfromacursoryreading,giveus reason to believe that the aim of deliberation is always to go from disagreementtoagreement. AclearexampleofthisisGutmann andThompson,forwhomdeliberationismeanttodealwith moral disagreements.13 But also Habermass emphasis on reaching agreementorunderstanding(Verstndigung)andJoshuaCohens emphasisonconsensuscouldleadustobelievethatdeliberation always is aimed at turning disagreements into agreements, and that the existence of agreement is the same as the absence of anything tobeconcernedabout. Yetsuchaconclusionistheproductof confusion.Itisaconsequenceofthefailuretodistinguish,rst, betweenempiricallyexistingconsensusandrationallymotivated consensus,and,second,betweenconsensusasregulativeidealfor deliberationandconsensusasgoodinitself.Itisonethingto saythatdeliberationshouldhaveconsensusasitsregulativeideal, butitisquiteanothertosaythatanyexistingconsensusisgood. Clearly,deliberativedemocratsshouldbecommittedonlytothe rstofthesetwopositions.Moreover,thekeyissuefromthe perspective of deliberative democracy, as I understand it, is neither thataconsensusexistsnorwhatthecontentoftheagreementis buthowtheagreementwasreached.Undercertainconditions,Ishallargue,deliberationshould aim not at creating consensus but at breaking an existing consensus, at least as the initial step. Critics of deliberative democracy think thisideadoesnotsitwellwiththeaimofreachingconsensus.14 WhileIagreethatproponentsofdeliberativedemocracyhave paidtoolittleattentiontothevalueofbreakingupanexisting consensus,15 I think this conclusion builds on a misunderstanding of what is involved in the aim of reaching agreement. Sometimes deliberation with the aim of reaching agreement can actually lead 24 DeliberativeFreedomto undermining an existing consensus. Or, more precisely, the aim ofreachingaconsensusbasedonthebestavailableinformation andreasons,thatis,arationallymotivatedconsensus,mightre-quirethatanexisting,empiricalconsensusrstbechallenged.TheobjectionIwishtocounteristhattheaimofreach-ingunderstandingindeliberationmakesitimpotentinfaceof illegitimateformsofconsensus.Forexample,fromaMarxist perspectiveitmightbearguedthattheinterestsofworkersand capitalistsareirreconcilable,andthereforethatanyexistingcon-sensusmustbeafalseoranideologicalconsensusand,hence, theaimofpoliticalstrugglecannotbetogofromdisagreement toagreementbutrathertomaketheconictapparentandto ghtitout.16Or,totakeamorefashionableexample,themul-ticulturalcharacterofcontemporarysocietymightmakeevery consensusseemtobeanexpressionofthemajoritycultureand henceoppressiveandexclusionary.Bothoftheseexamplesraise importantconcerns,butIshallargue,rst,thattheseconcerns areactuallyparasiticuponanideaofreachingagreementanddo notconstitutecounterexamples;and,second,iftheconictof interestsisnotseenasonethatcomesaboutintheactualpro-cessesofdeliberation,thenthetheoristswhospeakaboutthem mustoperatewithapaternalisticviewofobjectiveinterestsor objectiveidentities.Whenagivenconsensusisregardedasillegitimate,asa falseconsensus,bypoliticaltheorists,itisoftenbecauseitis seenasonethatrepresentstheinterests,identity,orvaluesofa particulargroupasthegeneralinterest,thecommonidentity,or thesharedvalues. ThisishowMarxistsviewbourgeoisideology undercapitalism.Similarly,multiculturalistslament theuniver-salizationofadominantgroupsexperienceandculture,andits establishmentasthenorm.17 And,accordingtosomefeminists, the great problem in contemporary society is the idea embedded in law, that to be human . . . means to be a man.18 In these cases wehaveanempiricalconsensusifthedominantpointofview isgenerallyaccepted,butforitalsotobearationallymotivated consensusitwouldhavetobeaproductofafree,openprocess of deliberation. The criticisms made by Marxists, multiculturalists, and feminists amount to saying to (or about) the dominant group thatwhatitpresentsasuniversal(orgeneralorcommon)isnot 25 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomreally so: it is not shared by everyone. But this is exactly what the logic of nondistorted and free communication does, as Habermas has shown.19 In communication aimed at reaching understanding, participants ask whether what is presented as true or right really isso;orascriticaltheorists,weaimtoshowwhenthecondi-tionsnecessaryforsuchdeliberationaremissing.Deliberation takesplacewhenlistenersaskforthereasonsbehindtheclaims raisedbyspeakers(whentheydonotunderstandthemornd themobjectionable),andwhenspeakersredeemthisrequestin a way that is meant to convince the listeners (as opposed to just manipulating them). By inherently being concerned with reasons orgrounds,deliberationmakesvisibleorpublictheunderlying assumptionsculturalmeanings,normativeprinciples,factual assumptions,andsoonofoursharedcultureandmakesthem theobjectofreection,consideration,andevaluation. Thevery coreofdeliberativedemocracythusisaconcernwiththepos-sibilityofcriticizingideologies,biases,conventions,andthelike. Questioning the validity of an utterance is to break the consensus, eveniftheaimisalwaystorestoreitlater.Theproblemwithdoingawaywiththeaimofreaching understanding is that it becomes difcult to explain how people (inourexamplestraditionallyoppressedgroupssuchasworkers, minorities,orwomen)realizethattheydonotshareinterests withtheoppressorsorindeedwhatitmeansnottoagree.In, for example, Iris Young,20 it is surprising to nd reproachful ac-cusationsof biassetalongsideassertionsoftheimpossibilityof impartiality.Ifwedispensewithanynotionofimpartiality,how canwecondemn,orevenidentifybias?21 Thereisconfusion herebetweentheideologicaluseofidealssuchasimpartiality andagreementandtheidealitself.Itisonethingtocriticize the hypostatizing[of]thedominantviewofprivilegedgroups intoauniversalposition22;itisquiteanothertorejecttheidea offollowinganimpartialprocedureinordertonduniversal agreement.Indeed,onecannotmakethecriticismifonerejects theideaofimpartiality. Theideaofimpartialityguidesdelibera-tion, but what in a given case is the impartial outcome can only beknownastheresultofanactualprocessofdeliberation.It isonlybyquestioningwiththeaimofunderstandingwhatthe interestsandthereasonsbehindthehegemonicculturearethat 26 DeliberativeFreedomonecanseeoneselfasbeinginconictwithit.Onecannot beginwiththedisagreement.Byengagingindeliberationwith someone,ImightlearnthatIdidnotagreewithhimanyway, that we do not share interests, for example. I could not come to thisinsightifmyaimwastodisagree,unlessweassumesome prepoliticalinsightintowhatmyinterestsandthoseofothers are and how they relate. Disagreement is parasitic upon the idea ofagreement.What someone like Przeworski overlooks when he argues for putting theconsensualistviewofpoliticswhereitbelongsin theMuseumofEighteenth-centurythoughtandobservethat all societies are ridden with . . . conicts23 is that the participants intheseconictsareanimatedbythedesiretobeunderstood. Theyappealtojusticeorsomeothervaluethattheybelieveall canshare.Conictmightbetheorderoftheday,butitgrows outoftheaimofreachingunderstanding,anditistheinherent normativepotentialsinthisaimthatshouldbeexploited.Mysecondreasonfordefendingtheregulativeidealof reachingunderstandingagainstthefocusonconictisthe dangerofpaternalism.Animportantadvantageofdeliberation aimedatreachingunderstandingisthatitconnotesaprocess inwhichthepersonherselfcomestoanawarenessofwhether ornotshecanacceptsomethingasbeinginherinterest. Those theoristswhopresentinterestsoridentitiesasgivenaretaking apaternalisticobserversperspective.Onecriticofdeliberative democracydrawstheconclusionthat oftenwhatisneededis not widespread deliberation but rm action from above to protect thevulnerable.24Andanothercriticnotes,Iamnotentirely againstdeliberation.ButIamagainstitfornow:Ithinkitis prematureasastandardfor AmericanDemocrats,whoarecon-fronted with more immediate problems.25 But here it is assumed thatthey,astheorists,knowwhatisright,andthatstateaction doesnotneedtobediscursivelyjustied.Or,itisassumedthat rstalltheconditionsforperfectdeliberationmustbeinplace andthenonecanbeginimplementingthepractice. Thedelib-erativeperspective,onthecontrary,isaparticipantperspective, byitsnatureanonhierarchicalperspective.Itisasparticipants insocietalprocessesofdeliberationthatcitizenslearnwhether ornottheyshareexistingvalues. Wemightneedrmactionto 27 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomprotect the vulnerable, but such action must go hand in hand with discursivejusticationifitisnottoturnintopaternalism. The claims of the oppressed are sometimes presented as self-evidently justandright.Buteveniftheghtagainstoppressionisjust, therewillneverbeagreementonwhatitrequiresinconcrete casesorevenregardingwhatconstitutesoppression. And,more importantly, the deliberative commitment to fallibilismthe idea thatanyclaimtotruthorrightnesscouldbewrongandshould beopentocontestationhastobeextendedtotheclaimsof theoppressed. Therearenopredeliberativetruthsaboutwhatit isrighttodo,andeventheresultsofdeliberationshouldalways beopentocritiqueandrevision.(Thisisacentralepistemic pointinthisbook,andIdevelopitfurtherinlaterchapters.) Those who argue against the merits of deliberation and in favor ofmoreforcefulandantagonisticmeansofpoliticsseemtome alltoocondentthattheyhavetherightontheirside.263.Itmaycreateconfusiontospeakofdeliberationasaimedat changing preferences. Preferences have unfortunate individualistic connotations that seem more valid for understanding market be-havior than political action; it is a too-simplistic notion to capture what deliberation is aimed at. Deliberation is not necessarily aimed atchangingprivatepreferences.Inmanyinstancesitisaimedat setting up rules within which people can act with the preferences theyalreadyhave.Deliberationisaimedatreachingagreements concerningwhichrulesorlawsarelegitimate,notatchanging privatepreferences.Icanbeconvincedoftherightnessoflaws establishingfreedomofreligionwithoutchangingmyreligious preferences.27Imightevenprefertoliveinasocietyinwhich all share my religion and still accept freedom of religion, because IrealizethatIcangivenoconvincingreasonsforwhypeople whodonotsharemyreligiousviewsshouldbeforcedtolive insuchasociety.Or,totakeaverydifferentexample,Icanbe convincedofalawsecuringpluralisminthemediaevenifI prefer to watch only one TV station. The private person chooses whatsheprefers,butthecitizenmustalsobeconcernedwith whatisavailabletoothers.28Preferencesmaysometimeschange,becausepeoplerealize thattheirpreferenceswerebasedoninsufcientinformationor 28 DeliberativeFreedombadreasoning,butthisisnotthemainaimofdeliberation. The deliberativeprocessisnotaimedatconvergenceofpreferences butatcomingtoanagreementoncertainprinciples,despite differencesinpersonalpreferences.29Inotherterms,deliberation isprimarilyaimedatreachingagreementsaboutwhatitisright todo,notonwhatweliketodo. Thispointisimportantfrom theperspectiveofatheorycommittedtomultipledimensionsof freedom, because the idea of changing preferences very easily turns intopaternalismordisrespectforthefreedomtochooseones own conception of the good. To be sure, a dimension of freedom that deliberative democracy should be committed to does concern thefreeformationofpoliticalopinions,orwhatIlatershallrefer toas internalautonomy.Butthisdimensionoffreedomisnot concernedwithourprivatepreferences.30Ratherthanchangingpreferences,theaimofdeliberation should be gaining insights and forming opinions and judgments. Wemightgaininsightsandformjudgmentsonmanydifferent levels,aboutothersandaboutourselves(aboutneeds,interests, and desires), about the world (facts and causal relationships), and about possible arguments (normative as well as theoretical). These insightsandjudgmentsmayaffectusindifferentways;they mightaffectourfundamentalvalues,ourbeliefs,orourderived preferences,wherethelatterareproductsofthersttwo.31I shallgointomoredetailontheseissuesinChapter7,buthere Iwanttopointtothefactthatchangingpreferencesmayrefer tomanydifferentideas.Forexample,thefactthatafterapro-cessofdeliberationInolongersupporttheproposalIsetout supportingneednotmeanthatIhavechangedmyfundamental preferenceforit(hereinthesenseofdesiringorvaluingit);it mightbeaconsequenceofndingnogoodreasonwhyothers shouldalsosupportit.Ihavelearnedthatitisunreasonableto ask for my desire to be satised, which does not necessarily lead toachangeofthepreferenceforhavingitsatised. Tobemore precise,itisunreasonableformetoaskforapoliticaldecision thatwillleadtothesatisfactionofmydesire,becauseIhave learnedindeliberationthatitimposesheavyburdensonoth-ers,isunfeasible,orwhatever. Whatshouldbestressedhereis thattherearemanyinstancesinwhichtheaimofdeliberation isnottochangeourfundamentalpreferencesbuttocometo 29 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomabetterunderstandingoftheperspectivesofothers,factsabout theworld,andconsequencesofdifferentpolicyproposals.4.A fourth problem with seeing deliberation in contrast to aggrega-tion is that it might give the impression that there is no concern forthesatisfactionofneeds,interests,ordesires.Onedimension ofdeliberativefreedomconcernstheabilitytohaveonesneeds anddesiresfullled.Deliberationshouldnotbeseenasaway oftransformingpeopleintonoumenalselveswithoutneeds,in-terests,anddesires.Oneofthemainadvantagesofdeliberative democracyoverKantianethicsisexactlythatitgivesusaway ofcombiningaconcernforuniversalizationwithourparticular anddifferentinterests,needs,anddesires. Thereasonweneed intersubjective dialogue and not internal monologue is exactly that wearedifferentandhavedifferentinterests,needs,anddesires, andweneedtoknowwhatthesearetocometodecisionsthat areintheequalinterestofall. Thisiscrucialforthetheoryof freedomthatIamdeveloping.InKant,asiswellknown,there isaproblemofcombiningthefreedomofthenoumenalself withtheheteronomyoftheempiricalself.Because deliberationhappens between real people and does not rely on the dichotomy betweentheintelligibleworldandtheworldofsense,itdoes notrunintothisKantianproblem.32Inrelationtointerests,italsoiscommontothinkthat aggregationmustbeofegoisticinterestsanddeliberationmust be about transforming narrow self-interest into an altruistic con-cern for the common good.33 But this dichotomy overlooks the possibilitythattheeffectsofdeliberationmaypointindifferent directions, and also that aggregation can be of altruistic preferences. Indeed, one aim of deliberation should be for citizens to become more aware of and concerned with the satisfaction of their own interests. AsJaneMansbridgehasargued, Greaterawarenessof self-interestisabsolutelyrequiredforgooddeliberationwhena hegemonic denition of the common good makes less powerful members either unaware of their own interests or convinced that they ought to suppress those interests for the common good even whenothersarenotdoingtheirjustshare.34Itispossiblefor someonetobetooaltruisticortolackunderstandingofwhatis inherowninterest.Deliberationideallyhelpsoneclarifyones 30 DeliberativeFreedominterests,knowinghowtheycanbemet,andascertainingto whatextentitisjustforonetohavethemsatised.Injusticeis not always the consequence of people being partial to themselves butalsocanbearesultofbeingsoagainstthemselves.Ishould cautionherethatIamnotspeakingofobjectiveinterests,which otherscanknowbetterthantheconcernedpersonherself.I amclaimingthatpeoplecanbe(1)mistakenaboutwhattheir interestsare,(2)lackknowledgeofhowtofullltheirinterests, and/or(3)betoolittleconcernedabouttheirintereststhanisgoodforjustice.AndIamclaimingthatdeliberation(un-dertherightconditions)mayhelpthesedeciencies,notasaprocesswherethetruthisimposedonsomebyothersbutasaprocesswherewelearnfromeachother.5.Thecontrastbetweenaggregationandtransformationcanlead totheideathatwecansetupthetwoinasimplemanneras alternativewaysofsolvingaproblem.Italsomightbethought herethattransformingopinionsworksonthesametimeframe asdoesaggregation.Butifweconstruedeliberationasamatter ofgaininginsightsorasalearningprocess,thenthismeansthat deliberationcannotbeseenasasimplealternativethatcansub-stitute for aggregation. One of the aims of deliberative democracy istobroadenthefocusofdemocratictheoryfromthepolitical processnarrowlyconstruedtoaconcernforallthefactorsthat playintotheformationofpoliticalopinions.Thisalsomeans thatdeliberationshouldnotonlybeevaluatedonthebasisof itslocalbutalsoonthebasisofitsglobaleffects. Thuswhen IanShapiro,forexample,notesthatdeliberationmightleadto hardeningofopinionsandincreasingconict,heistoofocused on its local effects.35 In a deliberative democracy citizens are both participants in and observers of different sites of deliberation. One cannot merely study one site or occasion of deliberation in order tojudgeitseffects. Whatmattersaretheoverallandlong-term effectsoflivinginasocietywithwidespreadopportunitiesfor participatinginprocessesofpublicdeliberationinformalaswell asinformalinstitutions.Deliberationshouldbeseenandevalu-atedasasociety-widelearningprocess.Deliberativedemocracy isforthisreasonatheoryconcernedwithmuchmorethanthe decision-makingprocessinformalinstitutions.31 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomTobesure,circumscribedinstancesofdeliberationaimedat making decisions, for example, in legislative bodies, are essential for democracy. But it is crucial to see that these instances are embedded in a larger context of deliberative practices. A legislator might not change his mind or be willing to learn when confronted with her opponentontheoorofCongressorParliament,butthisdoes notpreventherfromlearningfromherbroaderparticipationin andobservanceofpublicdeliberationincivilsociety.6.Finally,deliberativedemocracycannotdowithoutaggregation. Noproponentofdeliberativedemocracybelievesthatwecan doawaywithmechanismsofaggregationincomplexmodern societies.Becauseofcontingentconstraints,especiallythetime constrainttodecide,deliberationcanneverbeanymorethana supplement to aggregation.36 However, it is important to see that aggregationdoesnotconstituteadenitiveendtothepolitical process. Aggregationorvotingmightbenecessarytocometoa decision, but this does not mean that deliberation about the issue has come to an end. Everyone should remain free to criticize any decisionmadeandtoattempttochangeit.Deliberationshould notbeapartonlyoftheprocessbeforeaggregation(turning unreectivepreferencesintoreasonedjudgments)butalsoafter aggregation(probingwhetherformerdecisionsarevalid).TheNegativeFreedom TraditionandDemocracyRatherthandifferentiatingdeliberativedemocracyfromaggregativede-mocracyasamatteroftransformationversusaggregation,Icontrastthe formertoatraditionthatischaracterizedbyaspecicconceptionof freedom.Isuggestthatdeliberativedemocracyshouldbeseenincon-trasttoatraditionofmodelsofdemocracythatreducesfreedomtoa matterofnoninterferencewithprivateinterestsanddesires. Thistradi-tionisonethatfocusesonprivateinterestsandpleasuresandhenceis concerned either with the protection and/or the satisfaction of these. On theprotectiveside,politicalfreedoms(therightstospeak,assembly,and vote)areseenmerelyasameanstotheprotectionofprivateinterests (inparticular,therighttoprivateproperty).Onthesatisfactionside, thedemocraticprocessisindeedseenasoneofaggregation.However, 32 DeliberativeFreedom aggregationisnotemphasizedbecausepreferencesareseenasgivenbut ratherbecauseofthenegativeconceptionoffreedom. Whetherornot preferencesaregivenorconstructedisreallyoutsidetheconcernofthis modelofdemocracy;indeed,itisoff-limits.Preferenceformationispart ofthesphereofnegativeliberty,asitisconstruedbythistradition.Deliberativedemocracyshouldnotbeseenincontrasttothistra-ditionbecausethelatterisconcernedwithinterestsandpreferencesbut ratherbecauseitviewstheseinanuncriticalmanner.Duetoitsone-dimensional commitment to negative freedom, this tradition sees interests andpreferencesasmerelyaprivateandsubjectivematter.Ittreatspeople asiftheyhaveclearideasaboutwhattheirinterestsandpreferencesare andasiftheycannotbemistakenabouttheirinterestsandpreferences.37 Andpopularsovereigntyisreducedeithertoamatterofbeingableto protecttheseinterestsorasamatterofhavingtheopportunitytohave onespreferencescountedintheaggregativeprocess. Thereisnoroom forfreedomeitherassomethingintrinsictopoliticalparticipationoras amatterofcollectiveself-legislation.Incontrasttothistradition,Isee democracyasaformofexercisingandexperiencingfreedom.Delibera-tivedemocracy,Ithink,shouldbeformulatedintermsofatheoryof freedom. This theory does not reduce freedom to one dimension but sees deliberative democracy as committed to and expressing multiple dimensions offreedom.Itdoesnotdenytheimportanceofsomedegreeofnegative freedom, but it sees this as only part of what deliberative freedom requires andasdependentonotherdimensionsoffreedomforbeinginterpreted andjustiedaswellasforbeingimplementedinawaythatitselfdoes notunderminetheconcernforoverallfreedom.Thenegativefreedomtraditionbeginswith ThomasHobbesand includesmostnotablyJeremyBentham,JamesMill,IsaiahBerlin,F.A. Hayek,JosephSchumpeter, AnthonyDowns,and WilliamRiker.Clearly therearegreatdifferencesbetweenthesewriters,butIbelievethatthey shareanuncritical(oradefeatist)attitudetopeoplesexistinginterests andpreferencesandstillseethemasthecenterofwhatpoliticsisabout. Iarguethatthisisatraditionthathasresultedinacombinationofan understandingofdemocracyasaprocedureforprotectingandaggregat-ingself-interestedorprivatepreferencesandaconceptionofnegative freedomorfreedomasnoninterferencewithprivateinterestsasunderstood insomesensesubjectivelyandprepolitically.Moreover,itisatraditionthat neglectstotheorizehowtodeterminethemeaningandboundariesof 33 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomnegativefreedominanoncoercivemanner. Asatheorythatfocuseson noncoercion,thislatteromissionmakesitincompleteandunstable.Itmightcomeasasurprisingclaimthatthistraditioncombines freedomanddemocracy,sinceitisatraditionthatexplicitlyrejectsthe ideathatthereshouldbeany necessaryconnexionbetweenindividual liberty and democratic rule.38 But my claim is not that the combination ofnegativefreedomandaggregativedemocracyisconceptualorneces-sary.Norisitmyclaimthateverybodyinthetraditionsharestheidea thatnegativefreedomconnectstoaggregativedemocracy.Rather,the contentionisthatthetraditionhistoricallyhasresultedinaviewofafree anddemocraticsocietyasonethatcombinesaggregativedemocracyand negativefreedom. Thecombinationofnegativefreedomandaggregative democracy, however, is not entirely fortuitous. Aggregative democracy and negativefreedomhavethesameaim:theprotectionofprivateinterests orpreferences.Inaggregativedemocracyvotingisseenastheassertion ofprivateinterestswiththeaimoftheself-protectionofself-interested individualsagainstthestate.39 Negativefreedomis,correspondingly,seen asfreedomfrominterferencewithprivateinterestsassubjectivelycon-ceived.Adistinctionbetweenprotectingandpromotingself-interestis obscuredhere. Thetraditionunderdiscussiontendstotaketheideaofa privatesphereasagivenandhencetoregardnegativefreedomandthe voteaswaysofprotectingwhatwealreadyrightfullyhave.Assuch,it obscuresthataspecicunderstandingofhowtheprivatesphereshould beunderstoodanddemarcatedispromoted.NotethatIamnotmakingaconceptualpointaboutaggregative democracyandnegativefreedombuttryingtoidentifyhowtheyhave beenconceivedinaspecic,inuentialtraditioninpoliticaltheory.40 Thistraditiondeservesourinterestnotmerelybecauseofitsinuence inacademia.Moreimportantly,someofthekeyfeaturesofthistradition haveastrongholdonthepublicmindinexistingdemocracies.Partof theresistancetoamoredeliberativedemocracycomesfromanideology basedonatoo-narrowfocusontheideathattheonlyfreedominterest wehaveistobefreefrominterferencewithourprivategoals.Fromthis perspectiveevenbeginningtodiscusstheideathatpeopledonotalways knowandvotewhatisbestforthemisseenasathreattofreedomand democracy.Showingthatthisisanunfounded(oratleastexaggerated) concern is an important aim of this books focus on multiple dimensions offreedomandtheideaoftheirmutualdependence.34 DeliberativeFreedomBecausethereisanobvioussimilaritybetweenwhatIsayhereand awell-knownargumentthatgoesbacktoC.B.Macphersonandhas beenelaboratedonbyDavidHeld,letmedifferentiatemypointfrom theirs.MacphersonandHeldalsonotetheconnectionbetweennegative freedomandwhattheycallprotectivedemocracy,buttheirfocusis onhowthisrelatestotheemergenceandprotectionofthemarketand capitalism.41Frommyperspective,theconnectiontocapitalism,evenif important,isnotthefocus. Thefocusofthepresentbookisratherthe factthatthistraditionblocksthepossibilityofseeingpublicdeliberation as a precondition and exercise of freedom. When freedom is seen as nega-tiveanddemocracyasprotective,thenanyideaofpublic,intersubjective learningandjusticationisseenatbestasunnecessaryandatworstas athreattoindividualfreedom.Mytheoryofdeliberativefreedomdoesnotrejecteverythingthat comesoutofthistraditionofself-interestliberalism. Themechanismsof aggregationstillplayaroleindeliberativedemocracy.Andtheideaof negativefreedomiscertainlynotrejectedtoutcourt,thoughweshall seethattheconceptofnegativefreedomismorecomplicatedthanitis presented in this tradition. What deliberative democrats must reject is the idea that overall freedom can be understood in terms of negative freedom and the protection of self-interest. I argue that deliberative freedom cannot bepatternedonnegativeliberty,asitisunderstoodinthetraditionof self-interestliberalism.Publicautonomy,moreover,cannotbeunderstood ashavingthesamemeaning,structure,andpurposeasnegativefreedom. Mostimportantly,negativefreedomisparasiticuponanintersubjective exerciseofpublicautonomy,bothfordeterminingtheformersmeaning, signicance,andboundariesandinordertodosononcoercively.Inwhatfollows,Idiscussthenegativeconceptionoffreedom, showhowsomeoftheelementsofnegativelibertyconnecttoaggrega-tivedemocracy,andmakeacriticismofthemfromtheperspectiveof deliberativefreedom.TheNegativeConceptionofFreedomNegativefreedominitsHobbesian-Berlinianformulationmayappeara verysimpleidea.Itisamechanisticnotionaccordingtowhichfreedom means the absence of external obstruction to or interference with motion oractivity.42Negativefreedominitssimplisticformulationisseenasa 35 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedommatterofprotectingan areawithinwhichamancanactunobstructed byothers.43Itisinterestingtonote,however,thatbothHobbesand Berlinquicklymovebeyondthesimplisticformulationoftheconcept ofnegativefreedom. Theybothmovetowardsomethingthatrelatesto the satisfaction of given, individual, and private desires. Thus Hobbes says thatafreemanisdenedbynotbeing hinderedtodowhathehasa willto;afreeman ndsnostop,indoingwhathehasthewill,de-sire,orinclinationtodo.44 AndBerlinsaysthatapersonlacksnegative libertyifpreventedfromattainingagoal.45Coerciontheantithesis ofnegativelibertyforBerlinisthatwhichfrustrates mywishes46or frustrateshumandesires.47It should be clear that there is a difference between being obstructed inonesmovementsandbeingpreventedfromattainingonesgoalsor indoingwhatonehasadesiretodo. Wemightseethelattercategory ofobstructionsasasubsetoftheformer.Notallourmovementsare aimedatattainingsomegoal,andnotallouractsareexpressionsofour desires.Someofouractsarerandomorunwilled,andobstructionsto theseactswouldnotcountasahindrancetowhatwehavethewill ordesiretodo.48IfIamabouttodriveofftheroadinthemountains andampreventedfromdoingsobytherailing,thenmymovementis obstructed,butIamnotpreventedfromdoingsomethingIwanttodo, assumingIamnotonasuicidalmission.Theseremarksopenupawiderangeofissuestobeansweredby proponents of negative liberty, all of which I cannot go into. The point to emphasize here is that the Hobbes-Berlin conception of negative freedom iscloselyrelatedtothesatisfactionofdesiresandtotheprotectionof privateinterests. Thisviewrepresentsaspecicunderstandingofnegative freedom;itisoneconceptionofanoverallconceptofnegativeliberty.49 Thegeneralformulaofnegativefreedomasnoninterferencerequires thatweanswerthequestionof obstructiontowhat? Theabsenceof interference with what aspect of myself constitutes freedom?50 In Hobbes andBerlin(andBentham),theanswertothisquestionis privatedesires andinterests. ThisviewoffreedomholdsthatIamfreewhennoone obstructsmeinsatisfyingmydesiresorinterfereswithmyinterests. Thereisaclear,positivedimensiontothisview.HobbesandBerlingive ananswertowhatitisweshouldbefreetodo,namely,toactonour desires.51ItisnotamereaccidentthatBerlinandHobbesmovebeyond thesimplistic,mechanisticdenitionofnegativefreedom. Thatconcep-tionoffreedomisabsolutelyuninterestinginapoliticalcontextwhen 36 DeliberativeFreedomitisnotrelatedtosomeideaofwhatitisweshouldbefreetodo,and somepositiveideaofwhatitistobeafreehumanagent.Freedom,alsoinitsnegativedimension,isanessentiallymoralno-tion.RonaldDworkinarguesthataconceptionoflibertyfailsthetest if [i]tdeclaresaviolationwhenaviolationisnowrong,anditthere-foredoesnotshowuswhatthespecialimportanceoflibertyis.A conceptionoflibertyisaninterpretivetheorythataimstoshowwhyit isbadwhenlibertyisdenied,andaconceptionoflibertyistherefore unsuccessfulwhenitforcesustodescribesomeeventasaninvasion oflibertywhennothingbadhashappened.52Mypointissimilar,but Dworkins formulation is not sufciently precise. While we, in formulating aconceptionoffreedom,willbeguidedbynormsofwhatwebelieve itwouldbebadtodenypeople,thisdoesnotmeanthatthedenition offreedomonwhichwesettlewillbesoperfectthataninfringement offreedomsounderstoodwillalwaysbewrong.Freedomisinevitably anincompletemoralnotion.53 Wewilltendtodenefreedominaway thatmakesitusuallywrongtolimitfreedom,butwemustacceptthat incertaincircumstancesinfringementscanbejustied.Furthermore,if weseefreedomasinvolvingmoredimensions,itissometimesjustied tolimitonedimensionforthesakeofanotheriftheoverallfreedomof eachistherebyaugmented.It should be emphasized that I am making both a conceptual and a historical argument. The conceptual argument is that the idea of freedom astheabsenceofobstructionorfreedomasnoninterferenceisparasitic upon an idea of obstructions to what? or a specication of interference withwhom?orwithwhat?andbywhom?orbywhat?The historicalargumentisthatthereisanimportanttraditioninthehistory ofpoliticalthoughtthathasdenedthe withwhat?asprivateinterests and desires. The answer to interference with whom? is the self-regarding privatepersonwhoisconcernedwithfulllinghisprivatedesires,not thepoliticalpersonorthecitizenwhoalsoisconcernedwithhowhis privatedesiresaffectothersandwithcomingtoanunderstandingwith them. Andtheanswerto bywhom?isthestate,nototherprivateac-tors. ThehistoricalpointisperhapsmostclearlyexpressedbyBenjamin Constantinhisdescriptionofthelibertyofthemoderns: Theaimof themodernsistheenjoymentofsecurityinprivatepleasures;andtheycall libertytheguaranteesaccordedbyinstitutionstothesepleasures.54My criticism is mainly of the contingent answer given by the liberal self-interest tradition.Itisclearthattheanswerwegivetothequestionof obstruc-37 Deliberation, Aggregation,andNegativeFreedomtiontowhat?hasgreatpoliticalimplications. Thepointtostressatthis junctureistheinadequacyofnegativefreedomasabasisforaconcep-tionofoverallfreedominsofarasitseesfreedomasthefreedomofthe private person, of le bourgeois and not of le citoyen. When freedom is reducedtoitsnegativedimension,asitisinthetraditionunderscrutiny, itisimpossibletospeakofthefreedomofthecitizenasaparticipantin the political process, because freedom is tied to private pleasures. According tothisnegativeconceptionoffreedom,freedomisexternaltopolitics;it isseen asbeginningwherepoliticsends,especiallyinvariousformsof private life.55 [L]iberalism, as Hannah Arendt puts it, has done its share tobanishthenotionoflibertyfromthepoliticalrealm.56The conceptual point also is important. It is so because the tradition Ihavetriedtoidentifyspeaksasifitfollowsnaturallyfromtheconcept ofnegativefreedom,thatitisafreedomagainstinterferencebythestate withtheinterestsanddesirespersonsidentifyforthemselveswhenthey seethemselvesasprivatepersonsconcernedonlywithfurtheringtheir own good. But this answer is a contingent one and in no way natural or neutral.Itcanthereforenotbetreatedasprepoliticalandwithoutneed ofdemocraticjustication.Therearetwomainreasonsnegativefreedomcannotstandalone butrathershouldberegardedasadimensionoffreedomthatisparasitic onotherdimensionsoffreedom.57First,therearenoneutralorobvious answerstothefollowingquestions:(1) Whoshouldbeprotectedagainst interference?Onlymaturehumanbeingsoralsochildren,oranimals? (2)Whatconstitutesinterference?Arguments,manipulation,threats,or onlyovertviolence?(3) Whatandwhocanexerciseinterference? The state, private persons, the market, ideology? Any idea of negative freedom dependsonapositivespecicationandjusticationofitsmeaningand boundaries. Second, because negative freedom and its meaning cannot be seenasagiven,itisparasiticuponcollectiveformsofjusticationand decisionmaking.58Inorderforthisdecision-makingprocessitselfnotto becoerciveandviolatethefreedomitattemptstodene,itmustitself beaprocesswhoseintrinsicpropertiesareexpressionsoffreedom.Mypurposethusisnotacrusadeagainstnegativefreedomassuch because it makes the citizen the servant of egoistic man, as Marxs was.59 It is important not to mistake the liberal ideology of the negative freedom ofbourgeoismanwiththeideaofindividualrightsassuch,asClaude LefortconvincinglyarguesMarxdid.60Butthisdoesnotmeanthatwe shouldnotbecriticaloftheliberalideology,whichisstillwithus,and 38 DeliberativeFreedomwhich too often determines how individual freedoms function in society. Mypointisnotthatweshouldgiveupontheprotectionofnegative freedom per se, but rather that it is not an uncontroversial question what thatmeansandthatitthereforemustbesubjecttodeliberativescrutiny anddemocraticlegitimation.Inthenegativefreedomtraditionitisassumedthatbydening certainlimitstothescopeofpoliticaldecisionsortoprotectacertain areafrompoliticalinterference,peopleareequallyfreetoleadtheirlives as they like. This strategy leads to the depoliticization of certain spheres of life. In these spheres people are free to make private choices. The impor-tance of this type of freedom should certainly not be underestimated. The problememergeswhenitisthoughtthatwecandeneprepoliticallyor onceandforallwhichspheresorwhichpracticesshouldbeprivatized. From a social-theoretical perspective, it is evident that historical demarca-tionsoftheprivatespherehavehadatendencytoprotecttheindividual freedomofthepowerfulattheexpenseoftheoppressed. Thisisclear intheprotectionofthepatriarchalfamilyandthecapitalisteconomyas partofthesacredprivatesphere. Womenandworkershavefoundthat theirpathtoemancipationwasandistochallengeearlierdenitionsof whatisprivateandprotectedbynegativefreedom.61Bothincasesof womensemancipationandinthecaseofworkersrightsandsocialjus-tice,proponentsofnegativefreedom(privatepropertyandprivacy)will ndthatnegativefreedom,astheyunderstandit,isviolated.Butwhatis happening in these struggles is in fact that oppressed groups are claiming thattheydonotenjoyequalfreedom. Tobesure,theprotectionofthe privatespheredoesnotalwaysprotectthepowerfulandprivileged,asis evidentfrom,forexample,theprivacyprotectionthatRoev. Wade(the 1973 Supreme Court decision that protects the right to abortion) affords womenintheUnitedStates. Thisisjusttoillustratethatboundariesof negativefreedom,inordertoaffordequalfreedom,mustbesubjectto continueddiscursivejustication.Thusitisaspecicconceptionofnegativefreedom,a