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UNRISD UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Democracy, Social Spending and Poverty
Marcus André Melo
prepared for the UNRISD project on
UNRISD Flagship Report: Combating Poverty and Inequality
June 2008 ▪ Geneva
UNRISD was established in 1963 as an autonomous space within the UN system for the conduct of policy-relevant, cutting-edge research on social development that is pertinent to the work of the United Nations Secretariat; regional commissions and specialized agencies; and national institutions. Our mission is to generate knowledge and articulate policy alternatives on contemporary development issues, thereby contributing to the broader goals of the UN system of reducing poverty and inequality, advancing well-being and rights, and creating more democratic and just societies.
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Overview
In this paper I discuss the impact of two recent broad processes that has changed
profoundly welfare provision in the developing world in the last three decades, namely,
democratization and globalization. I provide a review of the existing literatures on the
effects of both democratization and globalization on social spending, poverty levels, and
social welfare, more generally. In this review, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
current contributions and highlight the similarities and divergences in the findings of this
rapidly expanding area of research. Issues relative to data availability and reliability are
also briefly reviewed. The focus in this analytical exercise in on the quantitative analysis
available in large N studies, which adopt a cross-national perspective. The paper also
provides an updated discussion of global trends in democratization, social spending and
poverty, by further exploring recently available data.
The various scholarly attempts at exploring this theme have tried to disentangle
the effects of democratization and democracy and to isolate the influence of other global
trends and factors. Most authors find evidence against the link established in received
wisdom for OECD countries that globalization is expected to affect positively social
spending. In this group of countries, trade openness has been found to be positively
associated with welfare provision because greater exposure to international markets
increases vulnerability to economic fluctuations, leading to higher pressures by actors
such trade unions and labor-based political parties for compensatory mechanisms. On the
contrary, the studies on developing countries show that trade openness is related to a
downward trend on social spending due to the: a) effects of competitive pressures on
expenditure cuts, fiscal balance and the corresponding “the race to the bottom” among
states; and b) of the changes in labour markets (due to a decline in formal employment
and in the manufacturing sector) and weakening of institutions associated with labour
interests, in particular, trade unions and political parties.
Most studies concur that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on
aggregate social spending. In the Latin American case growing levels of trade integration
had a substantial negative effect on aggregate social expenditures, with the effect being
driven entirely by the social security category. In addition, there is significant evidence
that education and health are relatively immune from such pressures and in some regions
3
expenditures in these areas have expanded. While these effects are found to be global
trends, the impact of globalization is not uniform across the developing world. Rather,
there is robust evidence that different regions have divergent patterns which result from
their distinct institutional legacies from the pre-globalization period (particularly in the
social security system), their different fiscal vulnerabilities of countries and their growth
rates.
Some recent studies dispute these findings and argue that that trade openness does
not constrain government outlays for social programs, and that democracy has a strong
positive association with social spending, particularly on items that bolster human capital
formation. Nevertheless, the disagreement is rooted in different methodologies for
measuring openness, and more significantly, the regional coverage in this specific strand
of the literature is limited to Latin America, and cannot be generalized.
The effects of globalization on welfare spending are no less controversial than the
effects of democratization on social policies. Political economy models predict that
democracies will favour redistribution and social spending because democracy brings
more people with below-average incomes to the polls, and they collectively press the
government to redistribute income downwards. This literature also predicts that the
effects of democracy is not uniform across the social sectors and that programs with large
constituencies – in areas such as primary education or primary health care – are expected
to expand under democracy because this would bring government’s policy closer to the
median voter’s preference. By contrast, programs which small and concentrated
constituencies, such as special pensions, which caters for the interest of groups such as
civil servants and formal sector employees, will experience spending cuts.
There is robust econometric evidence from various studies that as countries turn
into democracies they will increase their welfare spending. Holding trade openness
constant, these studies show that democracy expands social spending in education and
health, while keeping social security outlays unaffected or in some cases smaller. Also,
repressive authoritarian regimes retrench spending on health and education, but not on
social security. Contrary to OECD countries, however, partisanship has no explanatory
power in this relationship. There is research support for the effect of regime in specific
4
regions. In Africa, the need to obtain an electoral majority prompted governments to
prioritize primary schools over universities within the education budget. In turn, in East
Asia, a country that experiences a permanent move to democratic rule sees its average
share of social security spending to GDP increase significantly. In Latin America, the
evidence of an influence of regime on spending is less clear cut and the findings on the
causality are inconclusive. However, there is also considerable support for a positive
relationship.
There is also evidence that not only do democracies spend more in social welfare,
they also associated with better welfare outcomes. Democracies are argued to do a better
job than non-democracies of improving the welfare of the poor and promoting growth.
However, this increased spending may not result in more favorable results for the poor
because they may favor disproportionably middle income groups and specific clienteles.
This explains research findings that, when flaws resulting from the fact that most cross-
national studies omit from their samples nondemocratic states with good social records
are corrected, non-democracies outperforms democracies in key social indicators such as
mortality rates.
A number of relatively robust conclusions come to the fore in the review. The first
is that although democracies spend more than non-democracies, the available
econometric evidence suggests that they do not perform better in terms of actual
outcomes. Second, when disaggregated, current large N research suggests that democracy
is associated with higher spending and better education and health care. The
contradictory findings in the literature on Latin America may actually result from issues
of disaggregation and methodology. In two econometric tests, I found mixed evidence for
the role of democracy on social safety nets and on health and education spending. While
the effect of democracy on social safety nets was established, its influence on health and
education was not, a result that may have arisen because of missing data for the most
recent period. Finally, it is increasingly clear that there is strong interregional variation in
terms of the behaviour of the main variables of interest. Therefore, one can hardly speak
of one model of welfare state in the developing world.
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Introduction
The strong wave of democratization that has swept most regions of the world has
attracted a lot of scholarly attention to the evaluation of the causal links between
democracy, social spending and poverty. In a similar vein, the process of globalization of
trade and financial markets has prompted many studies aimed at investigating the impact,
if any, of enhanced capital mobility and increased trade openness on the welfare of the
poor and middle sectors in the developing world. While these literatures have
accumulated, there is a pressing need to evaluate their findings and assessing the state of
the art in this area. This paper is designed as a contribution to help filling this gap. The
paper provides a review of the quantitative literature on democracy, social spending and
poverty, assessing the contributions made to our knowledge of these relationships. This
review evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of current contributions and highlights the
similarities and divergences in the findings of this rapidly expanding area of research.
Issues relative to data availability and reliability are also briefly reviewed.
The review is focused and circumscribed to the large N studies, which adopt a
cross-national perspective. These studies are grouped, for expository purposes, into two
large categories: those that focus on the impact of globalization on social spending and
those that scrutinize the influence of democratic transitions and consolidation on welfare
regimes. In addition to this review, the paper provides an updated discussion of global
trends in democratization, social spending and poverty, by examining recently available
data. The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I review a selection of
contributions to the quantitative literature on welfare in developing countries. This
section is subdivided into two sub sections on globalization and democratization. The
third section focuses on issues of data availability and reliability whereas the fourth
section discusses some global trends and explores some further issues drawing on the
available data. The final section concludes.
6
Literature review of quantitative analyses on democracy, social spending and
poverty
What is the effect of globalization and democratization on social spending and
poverty in the developing world? 1The various scholarly attempts at exploring this theme
have tried to disentangle the two factors and to isolate the influence of other global trends
and factors, such as the noticeable improvements in social indicators, which reflect
exogenous factors unrelated to either of these.2 Indeed globalization and democratization
have gone hand in hand over the last two decades in distinct parts of the globe and they
are intertwined. Careful attention has to be paid to hold constant globalization indicators
– including trade openness or restrictions on capital accounts – while examining the
effects of democracy on the outcomes of interest. Conversely, democracy – measured by
whatever indicators that are widely used, from Freedom House to Polity IV scores,
among others – have to be isolated from the effects of financial liberalization and
importance of trade in GDP. 3
Globalization and social spending
Globalization is expected to affect positively social spending because trade
openness has been found to have played that role in the OECD countries in the formative
years of the welfare state. Several contributors have argued that historically the welfare
state was primarily a response to the pressures of losers of international-market
competition.4 Greater exposure to international markets is associated to greater
1 See among others Deacon (2000), Cornia et al (2004), and Kauffman and Haggard
(forthcoming). 2 Irrespective of the effects of globalization and democratization on welfare effort,
changes in medical technology have led to improvements in health care indicators. Technological
change has also meant cheaper medicines and vaccines. These factors have to be taken into
account in evaluations of the welfare effects of trade integration or democracy. 3 Other research strategies involve controlling for the heterogeneity of countries and for
country specific factors. 4 30% of the variance in social spending is explained by trade integration in bivariate
partial correlation for the period 1973-2003 (Segura-Urbiego 2007, 93).
7
vulnerability to economic fluctuations, leading to higher pressures by actors such trade
unions and labor-based political parties for compensatory mechanisms. Economic
insecurity then prompted social actors to engage in social bargaining, which usually were
associated to corporatist mechanisms of macro-concertation involving employers’ peak
associations and labor associations. This was the pattern found in the so called corporatist
countries, which were small and more integrated in the world markets. 5
Recent scholarship has challenged this approach putting forward that the sources
of vulnerability are primarily located in national markets and are associated with
technological change.6 Moreover, in OECD countries the association between openness
and welfare spending has been reversed in recent years. In fact, since 1997 openness and
welfare spending have behaved in opposite directions: when openness increases welfare
plummets and vice versa (Segura-Urbiego 2007, 91). Wibbels (2006) provides an
argument that domestic and external forces combine: while it is true that tradables,
unions, and the like in the developing world have less power or interests divergent to
those in the OECD—interests that militate against social spending, developed and
developing nations have distinct patterns of integration into global markets. This author
argues that while income shocks associated with international markets play an
insignificant role in the OECD, they are profound in developing nations. In the developed
world, governments can respond to those shocks by borrowing on capital markets and
spending counter-cyclically on social programs. No such opportunity exists for most
governments in the developing countries, most of which have limited access to capital
markets during crisis, bigger incentives to balance budgets, and as a result cut social
spending at exactly the times it is most needed. Wibbels (2006) concludes that “while
internationally-inspired volatility and income shocks seem not to threaten the
underpinnings of the welfare state in rich nations, it undercuts the capacity of
governments in the developing world to smooth consumption (and particularly
consumption by the poor) across the business cycle”.
5 The relevant contributions to the this large literature is Cameron (1978), Katzenstein
(1978) and Garret (2000). 6 This argument can be found in Iversen and Cusack (2000) and Adserá and Boix (2002).
8
For our present purposes the issue of analytical interest is the applicability of this
argument to developing countries.A number of studies on the Latin America welfare
states have argued that trade openness is not related to welfare state expansion. Quite the
opposite: welfare state expansion is associated with import-substitution industrialization.
Huber has advanced this argument showing how the extension of social security coverage
and health care provision was part and parcel of the process of inward-looking
developmentalist states. The Latin America hard evidence suggests a sustained inverse
correlation between the two over the last decades. While there is little controversy on this
issue7, much of the current debate on the effect of globalization on welfare spending
focuses on the effects of competitive pressures on expenditure cuts, fiscal balance and the
corresponding “the race to the bottom” among states.
A number of contributions have actually tested the impact of globalization on
welfare effort or expenditures in developing countries (Kauffman and Haggard
forthcoming; Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005); Kauffmann and Segura-Ubiergo 2001;
Segura Ubiergo 2007; Rudra 2002). Two rival arguments have been tested about its
impact on welfare. The first is a variant of the “race to the bottom thesis” and posits that
because globalization increases exposure to international competition it will induce
governments to roll back social expenditures. This argument is usually couched in terms
of the “efficiency gains” produced by globalization. Interests associated with industry and
foreign trade pressure governments to reduce budget deficits and this would inevitably,
the argument goes, lead to expenditure cuts in social programs..
An extension of this argument is that governments will also be constrained to
lower taxation, with a view to enhancing the country’s international competitiveness,
levels thereby reducing the availability of funds for social spending. This is so because
social programs are funded by payroll taxes, income taxes and employers’ contributions
all of which increases labour costs. The key factors operating here are, firstly, the role of
business groups and economic policy-makers in competitiveness-enhancing policies.
Secondly, the enhanced capital mobility associated with globalization, which punishes
governments that deviate from orthodox monetary and financial policies and provide
7 See the review and evidence in Segura-Urbiego (2007, 93-95).
9
incentives for government policy makers to pursue fiscal policies that are consistent with
business interests.
The alternative explanation is the view discussed above that globalization
produces social dislocations, which lead to compensation initiatives in the form of more
social welfare programmes. Kauffman and Segura-Ubierdo (2001 and Segura-Urbiego
(2007) find robust support for the first hypothesis, namely that trade affects welfare. They
demonstrate that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social
spending in the Latin American case. Their findings suggest that growing levels of trade
integration had a substantial negative effect on aggregate social expenditures, with the
effect being driven entirely by the social security category. Moreover, they find that this
effect is greater in the group of welfare states than for the group of non-welfare states,
which historically had much higher trade openness in the past. Overall integration into
global markets affected social spending only to the extent that markets perceived the
fiscal deficit to be unsustainable.
Segura-Urbiego (2007) argues that in addition to pressures for rolling back public
expenditures, there is another mechanism through which globalization affects welfare
provision. Trade liberalization produced the decline of the sectors that expanded during
the period of import substitution industrialization, and which were the main
constituencies for the creation of social security and other programs. These sectors were
concentrated in manufacturing and other sectors targeted at the internal markets which
were shielded from competition of international markets. Employment generation shifted
from these sectors to service sector and the informal economy,8 and as a consequence real
wages fell. As a result, the link between employment and social security entitlements
weakened and trade union’s influence on policy-making declined. Segura-Urbiego (2007)
did not find any evidence of reduction in educational or health spending but found
significant retrenchment in pensions expenditures and social assistance.
Kauffman and Haggard (forthcoming) confirm Kaufman and Segura-Urbiego
2001) argument that trade openness affects social spending. In this study, trade openness
8 In Africa, 90% of new employment was in the informal sector during the 1980s and
1990s. In Latin America, the figure was 80%. Cf APSA (2008)
10
has a negative impact on social security spending in Latin America. Trade openness is
associated with a decline in aggregate expenditure and education spending in Eastern
Europe but an increase in East Asia. These results suggest strongly that the effects of
trade are far from uniform across regions. The model coefficients for revenue change in
East Asia show that, as in Latin America, social spending is sensitive to short-term
changes in revenue. However, the authors highlight that this positive relationship
occurred in the context of strong growth and a steady improvement in economic and
fiscal conditions throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, unlike the extremely
volatile context faced throughout Latin America. It should also be underlined that unlike
Latin America, spending on social security, the most important area of welfare expansion
in the Asian democracies, was unaffected by changes in revenue.
Rudra and Haggard (2005) found that political regimes are an important
intervening variable. Using unbalanced panel data on 57 developing nations, and
considering social security and health and education spending, the authors examine
whether democratic and authoritarian regimes exhibit similar or different social spending
priorities in the context of increasing economic openness. The study shows that social
spending in "hard" authoritarian regimes is more sensitive to the pressures of
globalization than in democratic or intermediate regimes. Rudra (2002) disputes the
applicability of the argument that those strong labor movements, such as those in
European social democracies, can discourage governments from reducing welfare
spending during globalization. She argues that in the developing world, low-skilled labor
is highly abundant, and should be expected to benefit from globalization according to
neoclassical economics. Yet persistent collective-action problems accompanying
globalization undermine labor's political clout in the developing world. Using a data for a
sample of 53 less developed countries for 1972-1995, the author finds that collective-
action problems of labor in countries with large pools of low-skilled and surplus workers
tend to offset labor's potential political gains from globalization.
Recent work on the topic has however challenged these findings and goes beyond
the “efficiency versus compensation” debate. Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) provide
a much more nuanced picture of the relationship among democratization, spending and
globalization. Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) use two measures to account for the
11
effect of globalization. In addition to the traditional indicators of trade openness ((imports
+ exports/DGP), they include a measure of capital mobility (restrictions on capital
account) used in IMF statistics. By disaggregating the analysis and using alternative
specifications of trade openness and capital mobility,9 the authors find that trade
openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures, that
financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs, and that
democracy has a strong positive association with social spending, particularly on items
that bolster human capital formation. They argue that trade openness leads to increases in
aggregate social spending, a large part of the effect results from spending in education.
Rather than being compensatory, spending in education may be a form of improving
efficiency by providing the economy with more productive workers. They conclude then
that compensation and efficiency are not mutually exclusive.
Democratization, social spending and welfare outcomes
The effects of globalization on welfare spending are no less controversial than the
effects of democratization on social policies. Although intuitively appealing, the notion
that democracy is intrinsically associated with income redistribution and pro-poor
policies is difficult to reconcile with the fact that authoritarian regimes, particularly the
so-called socialist regimes, have a much superior capacity to guarantee health care and
education. In Latin America, the show case is Cuba, which boasts infant mortality rates
lower than the United States. Some authoritarian regimes such as Vargas two terms of
office and the military regime (1964-1984) indeed expanded social security coverage and
extended social services to the rural poor (Malloy 1979). This historical record in OECD
countries is also controversial, as the debate on the emergence of social insurance in
Bismarkian Germany suggests.
There is a exciting new generation of quantitative studies of the consequences of
democracy that has focused on its impact on social spending and social welfare more
9 They show that different measures of trade openness produce opposite results. The
findings in previous works using exchange rate conversions are reversed if purchasing power
parity is used.
12
generally. Researchers have built new indicators to explore systematically the effects of
the various dimensions of democratization. These indicators measure a number of
relevant dimensions, including civil liberties, political rights, competition, constraints on
the executive, regime types and subtypes, party legitimacy, legislative effectiveness,
competition in the nomination process for executive and legislative posts, and freedom of
speech. Box 1 provides information on existing indexes. These various dimensions are
categorized in terms of Dahls’s well known typology of dimensions of democratization:
contestability and inclusiveness.10 Box 2 (located at the end of this section), in turn,
provides systematic information on existing scholarly contributions.
BOX 1. Indexes of democracy Contestability Freedom House’s indice of Civil Liberties Freedom House’s indice of Political Rights Vanhanen’s Index of Competition Gurr’s Executive Constraints Gurr’s Competitiveness of Political Participation Cheibub and Gandhi’s Type of Regime Polity`s Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment Banks` Party Legitimacy Banks` Legislative Effectiveness CIRI`s Freedom of Assembly and Association CIRI`s Freedom of Speech CIRI`s Political Participation Banks` Competitive Nomination Process Inclusiveness Bollen et all`s Adult Suffrage Banks` Legislative Selection CIRI`s Women’s Political Rights Banks` Effective Executive Selection Vanhanen`s Index of Participation Polity`s Openness of Executive Recruitment
Author’s own elaboration
In this new wave of research there is robust evidence that democracies fund
public services at a higher level than non-democracies in the developing world (Huber,
10 For a discussion of these variables and their relation to Dahl’s typology see Coppedge,
Maldonado and Alvarez (2008)
13
Mostrilo and Stephens 2008; Kaufman and Haggard, forthcoming;Ross 2004; Avelino,
Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001;
McGuire 2006; Stasavage 2005).11 Another strand of the literature claim that not only do
democracies spend more in social welfare, they also associated with better welfare
outcomes. Democracies are argued to do a better job than non-democracies of improving
the welfare of the poor and promoting growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake and
Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Stasavage 2005). These claims are consistent with
political economy models, which suggest that democracies produce more public goods,
and more income redistribution, than non-democracies (Keefer et al; Ross 2004;
Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
The microfoundations for the expected association between democracy and
redistribution are typically anchored in the median voter theorem. Under universal
suffrage, the median voter will earn the median income. However, when income is
unequally distributed, the median income is less than the mean income. Redistribution is
expected to follow democratization because the mean income in pre-democratization
societies is universally higher than the income of the median voter. Since the decisive
voter earns a below-average income, he or she favors a higher tax rate and public policies
geared towards redistribution. In sum, democracy brings more people with below-average
incomes to the polls, and they collectively press the government to redistribute income
downwards. Democracy also depends on larger winning coalitions than autocracies and
this sets in motion a process whereby public goods tends to be favored to private goods
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).
The empirical discussions have focused on two interrelated set of issues. The first
is the actual impact of democracy on actual welfare outcomes. In this line, Sen (1999),
have showed that famines do not take place in democracies. Others like have looked at
11 See also Avelino 1997 and Avelino 2000. This view has gained strong empirical
support in recent scholarship in virtue of recent advances in the econometric approach in this area
of research. Other scholars including Sen (1999) have explored the microfoundations for the link
emphasizing that democracy produces better information about the welfare of the poor and this
information is used to punish rulers that do not respond to famines or poverty more generally
14
sectoral outcomes in Health care, infant mortality etc. For example, Lake and Baum
(2001) find that a move from complete autocracy to complete democracy should produce
a drop in infant mortality of five deaths per thousand. In a follow-up piece Baum and
Lake (2003) show that precisely because basic services like education and health lead to
accumulation of human capital, democracy has also an important indirect effect on
growth.
The second issue that has attracted a lot of scholarly attention is the impact of
democracy on social spending (as opposed to welfare outcomes). Avelino, Brown and
Hunter (2005) estimate the effect of democracy on social spending in Latin America at
0.5% of GDP. In other words, as countries turn into democracies they will increase their
welfare spending by 5%.12 This literature is more controversial because as many
contributors have argued, spending may not be a good proxy of welfare effort, it may
reflect clientelistic personnel expenditures or redistribution to middle income groups
rather than on the poorer segments of society. The main difficulties in these strand of
literatures has also do with issues pertaining to the complex web of causalities involved,
in addition to problems of endogeneity and reverse causation. In fact, democracy have
indirect ways of affecting welfare outcomes and spending and, more significantly, these
outcomes also affect democratization. Expansion of educational services and health care
as well as poverty reduction further influences and reinforces democracy. 13
In developing countries, democratization was expected to affect welfare and
poverty reduction not only because of the broader effects of electoral markets but mostly
because in these countries the forces pushing for reforms and political liberalization were
associated with universalistic policies and anti-poverty programs. Thus from Latin
America to Africa, the opposition forces under authoritarianism – from trade unions to
NGOs and leftist parties, and from religious institutions to social movements - adopted
these banners. By empowering new and old actors that started to mobilize support for
12 This figure is derived from the fact that the average social spending in Latin America is
roughly 10%. 13 The technical challenge involved in these studies is finding instrumental variables that
could be used in two stage least square estimation to control for endogeneity.
15
their demands in the various decision-making arenas that were reinvigorated, democracy
was supposed to generate redistribution. Empowered social actors – subnational political
actors, civil society groups and legislators – were to become the vectors of
transformation.
Because the constituencies which are associated with social expenditures’
clientele vary in terms of size and organizational capabilities, the effects of democracy
may not be uniform across the social sectors. Thus programs with large constituencies –
in areas such as primary education or primary health care – are expected to expand under
democracy because this would bring government’s policy closer to the median voter’s
preference. By contrast, programs which small and concentrated constituencies, such as
special pensions, which caters for the interest of civil servants and formal sector
employees, will experience spending cuts.
The strongest piece of evidence regarding the effect of democratization on social
spending is provided by Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005). The study fits a panel data
model consisting of 19 Latin American countries for the period 1980-1999. The authors
find that holding trade openness constant, democracy14 expands social spending in
education and health, while keeping social security outlays unaffected. This is expected
according to the authors because popular pressures under democracy lead governments to
cater for the interests of the majorities, thereby causing the increase in health and
educational expenditures. Social security expenditures did not decline because the power
of vested interests remained powerful and managed to block measures to reduce their
privileges.
Stasavage (2005) provide compelling evidence for the ways the introduction of
democracy has affected government priorities and has shifted existing pro-urban biases in
educational provision in Africa. He argues that democratization made governments more
responsive to the needs of the rural poor that forms the majority of citizens in almost all
14 Democracy is measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is classified as
democratic in Alvarez et al (1996)well known study.
16
African countries.15 He tests this hypothesis with a panel of 44 countries for the period
1980-96. Using sophisticated techniques for dealing with problems of missing data, he
finds that the move to multiparty elections leads, on average, to an increase in overall
educational spending of 1.1% of GDP. More importantly, he finds evidence that the need
to obtain an electoral majority prompted African governments to prioritize primary
schools over universities within the education budget.
Huber, Mostrillo and Stephens (2008) examine the determinants of social
expenditure in an unbalanced pooled time-series analysis for 18 Latin American countries
for the period 1970 to 2000. They explore the role of a number of variables including
regime (democracy versus nondemocracy) partisanship, state structure, economic, and
demographic variables. The authors find that democracy matters in the long run both for
social security and welfare and for health and education spending, and—in stark contrast
to OECD countries—partisanship does not matter. They disaggregate the analysis for
type of social expenditures and discover that highly repressive authoritarian regimes
retrench spending on health and education, but not on social security.
Kauffman and Haggard (forthcoming) provides the most up todate analysis of the
effects of democratization on social spending. The value added of their research is that
they disaggregate the results per program and more importantly for region of the world.
They argue that democracy has different effects across the three regions in their study
East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. In fact, they show that different regions
15 Against the received wisdom on the limited spread of democracy in Africa, Lindberg
(2006) argued that repetitive elections in Africa’s third wave of democratization tended to be self-
reinforcing leading to successively more democratic elections. The author demonstrate
persuasively the role of elections as a causal variable in democratization. This has also had, as he
shows, positive impacts on gender representation; on opposition parties’ learning and adaptation
to electoral politics; as well as enhancing and deepening de facto civil liberties in society. Using
several indicators of party system stability, Lindberg classifies Africa’s 21 electoral democracies
as fluid (eight countries), de-stabilized (two countries), or stable party systems (11 countries), and
that eight out of 11 stable systems are one-party dominant. See also Lindberg (2004) and Bratton
and Van de Walle (1997).
17
exhibit contrasting patterns which result from their distinct institutional legacies from the
pre-globalization period (particularly in the social security system), their different fiscal
vulnerabilities of countries and their economic dynamism. In East Asia, they find that a
country that experiences a permanent change to democracy also experiences a permanent
change in average social spending. A country that experiences a permanent move to
democratic rule, the average share of social security spending to GDP increases by about
23 percent (despite the fact that this share is very small).
Kauffman and Haggard (forthcoming) also claim that democratization has a
positive short-term effect on spending in education and health although they return to the
trend average. The move to democracy also affected spending in post-socialist countries.
Moreover, the results show significant short-term effects of regime change on spending
in health and strong and positive effects on long-term average shares of general
expenditures and social security, which increase by 13 and 58 percent respectively.
Surprisingly, their analysis conclude that in Latin America, democracy generally
has no impact on social spending – a pattern that the authors explain in terms of the
political and economic constraints on social policy. The only significant impact found
was a long-term negative relation between polity and social security spending. The study
also confirmed a pro-cyclical pattern of spending. The strongest effect is on overall
expenditures, but they note significant fiscal constraint in health and social security as
well.
Although there is large literature on the effects of newly empowered actors under
democracy on social-policymaking, the results should be evaluated with caution. This is
so because democracy created the possibility that inequalities of wealth and access to
political forces could be used to advance the interests of specific clienteles. In Latin
America the historical association between democracy and welfare is weak. Although the
countries with the greater number of uninterrupted years as democracy are also in the
group of best performers in terms of welfare indicators, many authoritarian governments
promoted social welfare as part of the strategy to create some level of legitimation. Costa
Rica and Uruguay are in the former group, while Brazil and Argentina would clearly be
located in the latter group.
18
In a study of 14 Latin American countries, Kauffman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001)
found no evidence of a link between democracy and social welfare effort in the recent
decades. They found that neither popularly based governments nor democracies
consistently spend more or less than conservative governments or autocratic regimes.
But this exercise uses data for the period 1973-1997. 16 The findings by Avelino et al,
reviewed above contradict these findings though.
Melo (2008) also found no evidence that the residuals from regressing social
spending percapita on GDP percapita are associated with the uninterrupted number of
years under democratic rule. This runs counter Figueira’s findings in a roughly similar
exercise. This author, however, has used a different time span in a bivariate correlation –
the uninterrupted number of years under democratic rule between 1950 and 1970. As for
GDP and the share of social spending the data refers to a single year, 2000. Much more
research is needed to establish causation. Case studies have shown that for a number of
countries democracy is indeed the engine of welfare state expansion. Costa Rica is a case
in point., as discussed in Segura-Ubiergo (2007) and Figueira (2005).
Several alternative arguments can be made for explaining the lack of association
between democracy and social spending. It may be that authoritarianism from 1930s to
1960s – the heyday of developmentalism - is associated with more welfare spending but
no so after this period. A more important point in this respect is that to take social
spending as a proxy of welfare effort is not without risks. Social expenditures serve
different functions purposes across developing countries – in some countries they are pro-
market while in others they are compensatory (Rudra 2007). In some countries,
expenditures in pensions cater for the demand of special clienteles and therefore they are
not associated with democracy – although as the Brazilian case suggests, certain
privileged categories have higher mobilization capacity under democratic rule (Melo
2007).
The positive correlation between increased social spending and democracy in
recent years as found in many studies (Avelino, Hunter and Brown 2005) does not
16 See also Avelino (1997) among others on the same topic.
19
necessarily means that the increased expenditures actually reach the poor. In fact it is not
obvious that they produce better social outcomes, such as longer, healthier lives. If
democracy produces better outcomes for low-income families, then countries that transit
from autocratic to democratic rule should see improvements in their infant and child
mortality rates. In fact, the record suggests the opposite. Ross (2004) points out that in all
44 states that made a single, unambiguous transition to democracy between 1970 and
1999, the infant mortality rates collectively fell by 7.4% during the first five years after
their transitions, while they fell by 10.7% during the five years before their transitions.17
In this study uses a dataset of roughly 160 countries, Ross (2004) found no support for
the notion that democracy performs better than authoritarian regimes in terms of welfare
outcomes. The author has used sophisticated techniques for solving the problem of
underrepresentation of high performance authoritarian regimes in the samples used in
existing studies, along other technical problems involved measurement and estimation.
These reduced samples would not be a problem if the missing states were randomly
distributed by regime type, income, and other characteristics, but they are not:
undemocratic countries are much more likely to be missing than democratic ones.
What account for the different findings in the literature?. Ross (2004) argues that
past studies of democracy and the poor have been flawed by a peculiar form of selection
bias: most cross-national studies omit from their samples nondemocratic states with good
economic and social records, which creates the false impression that democracies have
outperformed nondemocracies. Most also fail to control for country-specific fixed effects
and global trends. 18 Once these flaws are corrected, democracy has little or no effect on
infant and child mortality.
17 Infant mortality is also a sensitive measure of many other conditions including access
to clean water and sanitation, indoor air quality, female education and literacy, prenatal and
neonatal health services, caloric intake, disease, and of course, income—that are hard to measure
among the very poor 18 Fixed effects models in time series cross sectional data allow researchers to control for
country specific factors, which in other estimation techniques can lead to serious “problems of
omitted variables”. In turn, global trends, for example in terms of overall improvements in social
indicators, can also lead to wrong conclusions about their relationship to democratization.
20
Ross (2004) should be regarded as the most conclusive available research on the
topic. How can – if they can at all - the prima facie conflicting quantitative evidence
reviewed above be reconciled? These studies differ in a number of ways (see table 1).
First, geographical coverage. Many studies are circumscribed to a specific region –
Africa (Stasavage), Latin America, Kauffman and Ubiergo-Segura, Huber et al, Avelino
et al, Brown, Hunter and Brown), while Ross covers the whole world.19 Second, a few
studies are sector –specific whereas others cover social spending as a whole. Findings in
the area of health or education may not be consistent across all sectors. Third, some
studies focuses on welfare outcomes while others investigate patterns of spending.
Fourth, there are important differences in terms of model specification and issues of
measurement.
Bearing these differences in mind, a number of relatively robust conclusions come
to the fore. The first is that although democracies spend more than nondemocracies they
do not perform better in terms of actual outcomes. This conclusion is supported by
contrasting Ross (2004) and Avelino et al (2005) and Kauffman and Haggard
(forthcoming). Second, when disaggregated by sector, the evidence suggests that
democracy is associated with better education and health care. The contradictory findings
between Kauffman, Segura-Urbiego, on the one hand, and Avelino et al (2005) may
actually result from issues of disaggregation and methodology. Last but not least, it is
increasingly clear that there is strong interregional variation in terms of the behaviour of
the main variables of interest. Therefore, one can hardly speak of one model of welfare
state in the developing world (Kauffman and Haggard forthcoming; Rudra 2007).
In addition to these quantitative investigations, it should be noted that recent case
studies have provided additional evidence for improved conditions for the poor under
democracy. In the last two decades the more established democracies in the Latin
American region have indeed expanded social spending, reflecting growing social and
political demands. As a consequence there have come to the fore political responses in
19 Haggard and Kauffman (forthcoming) also covers the whole world but present their
findings in disaggregated by region.
21
the form of governmental programmes and social expenditures as well as in the form of
new legislation expanding entitlements and coverage.
Brazil under Cardoso and Lula is consistently cited as a showcase for the effects
of democracy. In this country there appears to have been created a unique virtuous cycle
linking universalistic social programs which are strongly rooted in electoral competition.
In other words there has been a virtuous cycle. The increasingly universalistic character
social policy under Presidents Cardoso and Lula is indeed a product of the creation of an
electoral market to which presidents respond to the demands of the rural poor.20 In the
past, before the introduction of the cash transfer programs, the credit for social programs
was mostly claimed by local political elites at the sub-national level. Historically,
education, health and most notably social assistance have always been at the center of
patronage games and clientelistic networks, typically involving local elites. A paradoxical
development is that the social transfer programs in Brazil operate in a fairly transparent
way, with minimum clientelistic mediation.
Recent literature on the political economy of clientelism argues that public good
reforms require political competitors with an incentive to appeal to broad segments of the
citizenry (Keefer 2006). Politicians who can make credible promises only to a few –
clientelistic politicians, for example – do not have these incentives. In countries such as
Brazil, the lack of programmatic parties which could credible claim to deliver public
goods is indeed an obstacle to universalism. Thus, presidents have had a strong incentive
for poverty reduction because they have become accountable for social policy for the first
time. Because the constituency of Presidents is the whole country, they develop a strong
interest in universal programs which are not geographically targeted or focused on
narrow groups of the population. 21
20 See Melo (2008), Melo (1997a; 1997b), Hunter and Powers (2007) and Zucco (2008).
For a similar dynamics in Mexico, see Diaz Cayeros et al 2006 and Coady (2003). 21 The evidence for the electoral appeal of the social programs is virtually ubiquitous
when one look at the 2006 Presidential race. This sets in motion a dynamics that ultimately
fosters a particular type of universalism. The programmes with the highest redistributive impact
of the country have over the last decade generated a politically efficacious constituency. This
22
BOX 2
Literature review
Authors Sample and Time
Period
Findings
Social spending and policy models
Habibi 1994 67 countries, 1984 Political rights (Gastil index) in prior period (12 years) positively influences
budget shares for social spending
Lindert 1994 21 countries, 1880-
1930 (mostly
European)
No effect of democracy on social spending
Brown and Hunter 1999 17 Latin American
countries, 1980-1992
Democratic governments show more rapid increases in social spending in the face
of economic constraints than authoritarian regimes, but differences diminish with
level of income
Lott 1999 99 countries, 1985-
1992 (cross-section for
1990 on health)
“Totalitarian” countries have higher education expenditures but lower health
spending
Przeworski et. al. 2000 141 countries, 1950-
1990
Democracies have higher health spending
Kaufman and Segura
2001
14 Latin American
countries, 1973-1997
Democracy has a positive effect on health and education spending, but negative
effect on social security spending
Baqir 2002 100 countries, 1985-
1998
Democracy is positively associated with the within-country variation in social
sector spending, but not with cross-sectional variation
Bueno de Mesquita et.
al. 2003
Global sample, 1960-
1999
Coalition size is positively associated with education and health spending
political logic is also a product of the extension of the franchise to the illiterates in the mid-1980s.
Indeed the clientele of bolsa família is at the time of writing 11 million families – affecting
probably some 18 million voters. The clientele for the rural pensions is 8 million beneficiaries,
representing a constituency of some 12 million voters. These developments can be unequivocally
be traced to the consolidation of a political market for redistributive programmes. For its
redistributive impact Ferreira (2006) and Lindert (2007).
23
Mulligan, Gil and Sala-
I-Martin 2004
102 to 110 countries,
1980-1990 (cross-
section)
Average democracy scores (1960-1990) have no influence on education spending,
pensions, or non-pension social spending
Nooruddin and
Simmons 2005
137 countries, 1980-
1997
Trade openness is associated with more education spending in democracies than in
authoritarian regimes; no such effects with respect to health care
Rudra and Haggard
2005
59 developing
countries, 1975-1997
Democracies and authoritarian governments respond differently to economic
openness, particularly trade. Authoritarian governments are more likely to cut
education, health and social security spending and to see adverse trends in primary
enrollments infant mortality
Huber, Mustillo and
Stephens 2008
22 Latin American
countries, 1970-2000
Duration of democracy is significant with respect to health and education spending,
but conditional on the strength of left parties. Democracy has no effect on social
security spending.
Rudra 2002 53 LDCs, 1972-1995 Globalization affects negatively social spending
Dion 2004 49 middle-income
countries, 1980-1999
Democracies have higher levels of social security, health and education spending,
but differences among democratic institutions (particularly the number of veto
points) are also significant
Avelino, Brown and
Hunter 2005
19 Latin American
countries, 1980-1999
Democracy is positively associated with aggregate social spending, but through
education spending only; democracy has no significant effect on social security or
health spending
Brooks 2005 59 countries, 1980-
1999
Democracy interacted with party fragmentation lowers probability of pension
privatization
Stasavage 2005 44 African countries,
1980-1996
Democratization leads to greater spending on primary education.
Nooruddin and
Simmons 2006
137 countries, 1980-
1997
Democracy is associated with higher education shares of budget in the absence of
IMF programs, but lower health and education shares in the presence of such
programs
Wibbels 2006 Globalization associated with downward pressures in social spending in
developing countries
Kaufman and Haggard,
forthcoming
1980-2005, 21
countries in East Ásia,
Ásia and Eastern
Europe
Democracy depresses social security and increase expenditures in health and
education. Results conditional on the impact of financial and fiscal constraints
Outcome models
24
Moon and Dixon 1985 116 countries, 1970-75
(cross section)
Democracy positively associated with PQLI
Williamson 1987 80 developing
countries, 1970
Democracy has no effect on PQLI
Shin 1989 109 counties Democracy positively associated with PQLI
Young 1990 103 countries, 1985 Democracy positively associated with life expectancy
London and Williams
1990
Global sample, 99-110
countries and
subsamples of
developing and
“peripheral” countries,
1970
Democracy positively associated with PQLI and Net Social Progress Index in
global, developing and “peripheral” subsamples
Weede 1993 Global sample (72-97
countries), 1987
Democracy has a modest positive effect on Human Development Index but not on
life expectancy
Wickrama and Mulford
1996
Global sample (82
countries, oil-exporters
excluded), 1988 and
1990
Democracy has a positive effect on life expectancy, infant mortality, primary
education, and Human Development Index
Boone 1996 96 developing
countries, excluding
OPEC, 1971-75, 1976-
80, 1981-85, 1986-90.
Liberal democracies have lower enfant mortality than emerging democracies,
socialist or authoritarian regimes.
Brown 1999 94 developing
countries, 1960-1987
Democracy has a positive effect on primary school enrollments, although
diminishing with level of development
Frey and al-Roumi
1999
87 developing
countries, 1970, 1980,
1990
Democracy has positive effect on PQLI in 1970 and 1990, but not in 1980
Zweifel and Navia 2000 138 countries, 1950-
1990
Democracies have lower enfant mortality than dictatorships
Bueno de Mesquita et.
al. 2003
Global sample, 1960-
1999
Coalition size is positively associated with a variety of outcome measures:
cumulative years of schooling, literacy, and nine health measures including infant
mortality, immunization and access to water.
25
Lake and Baum 2001 37 to 110 countries,
1970, 1975, 1985,
1987, 1990, 1992
depending on model
In cross section tests, democracy has consistently positive effects on 17 indicators
of education and basic health; sole exception is immunization. Democracy and
transitions to democracy significant in pooled time series on secondary
enrollments, access to water, DPT and measles immunization, and infant mortality
Gauri and Khalegian
2002
175 countries, 1980-
1997
Democracy associated with higher levels of immunization in poorer developing
countries, but lower levels of immunization in middle-income countries
Gerring and Thacker
2005
188 countries, 1995 Long-term experience with democracy is associated with lower infant mortality
Lake and Baum 2003 Global (128 countries),
1967-1997
Democracy positively associated with female life expectancy in poor countries and
female secondary education in middle-income countries
McGuire 2002a 92 developing
countries, 1990; 47
developing countries,
1995
Democracy (both long and short-run) has no effect on multiple measures of basic
health care provision and under-5 mortality.
Ross 2004 156-169 countries,
1970-2000
Democracy does not have positive effects on infant mortality using imputed data
that corrects for systematic under-representation of high-performing authoritarian
regimes in existing data sets
Ghobarah, Huth and
Russett 2004
179 countries, 2000 Democracy is positively correlated with World Health Organization’s Health
Adjusted Life Expectancy
Franco, Alvarez –
Dardet and Ruiz 2004
140-162 countries,
1998
Freer countries (Freedom House measure) have higher life expectancy and lower
enfant and maternal mortality.
Shandra et. al. 2004 59 developing
countries, 1997
Democracy moderates adverse effects of various measures of globalization
(“dependency”)
Notes. PQLI refers to the Physical Quality of Life Index; HDI refers to Human Development
Index. Unless otherwise indicated, studies with a single year reflect a cross-section design while
those showing a date-range are panels.
Source: Kauffman and Haggard, (forthcoming, p. ) and own elaboration
Strengths and limitations of data used
In contrast to the existing literatures on developed welfare states, the literature on
social spending and welfare provision is relatively scarce. Whereas the political economy
of the welfare state is a theme that is part and parcel of accounts of the development of
26
national economies and polities of OECD countries in the XXth century, no
corresponding body of research exists for developing countries. Although the relative
weight of social expenditures in GDP justify these contrasts, it should be noted that the
share of social spending in GDP countries in many developing countries is higher than in
many OECD countries. Therefore the centrality of social spending only account for part
of the explanation.
In fact, an array of factors explains this pattern. First, in the poorest regions of the
world such as Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia data are not available for significant periods of
time, or can only be found at a high level of aggregation. This has precluded that even
researchers in multilateral institutions and OECD universities from doing research on
social welfare expenditures in poor countries. There have been improvements in the last
decade but the situation is still very unsatisfactory. Second, in addition to missing data,
existing data suffer from reliability problems. They can be either grossly inaccurate or,
more importantly for the analysis of social expenditures, may not be a good proxy of
service provision. Indeed they may reflect patronage spending on personnel rather actual
welfare effort. Thirdly, with the exception of a number of countries in Latin America,
along with India and South Africa, developing countries have typically weak research
institutions and universities which collect data or carry out independent evaluations of
social policy.
Advanced econometric techniques have been used to overcome some of the
limitations of the data. These include, for example, multiple imputation estimates where
non-observed data are imputed using advanced programs such as AMELIA (King et al
2001 and Honaker et al 2003). 22 An additional problem that creates additional technical
problems in for assessing the determinants of welfare outcomes is that we should expect
countries to produce fewer data when they are authoritarian. This implies that cross-
22 Multiple imputation involves imputing m values for each missing cell in your data
matrix and creating m "completed" data sets. (Across these completed data sets, the observed
values are the same, but the missing values are filled in with different imputations that reflect our
uncertainty about the missing data.) After imputation, Amelia will then save the m data sets.
Researchers then apply whatever statistical method they would have used if there had been no
missing values to each of the m data sets, and use a simple procedure to combine the results
27
national datasets tend to exclude authoritarian states. This may lead to the false inferences
(Ross 2004).
An additional problem that affects comparative research on the developing world
is that some regional organizations that specializes in data collection at a more
disaggregated level - such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) –
use criteria for collecting the data that are not shared by other regional organizations. As
a consequence, cross-regional research cannot be carry out at a lower level of
disagregation. In addition, there are rich and detailed datasets for a large number of
developing countries that are country-specific, uses nationally defined categories and tha
therefore cannot be aggregated into regional data. These problems are even more salient
with institutional and political data, which are essential for the study of the links between
democracy and social spending.
Global trends in Democratization, Social Spending and Poverty
A cursory look at current global trends in democracy and social welfare around
the world would suggest a relatively encouraging picture. Democracy is spreading
throughout the globe and the absolute number of poor people is declining. Indeed, at the
beginning of the third wave of democratization, in 1974, there were only 41 democracies
among the existing 150 states. In 2007, 130 of the current 193 states are democracies.23
These figures reflect broader changes state- society relations in the last quarter century
and have impacted public policy. Currently, there is a clear association between
democracy and citizens’ well-being. Exceptions to this rule are found in the Middle East
and in transition countries of the former Soviet republics. When we turn the focus to
poverty trends, the picture seems no less encouraging. The total number of people living
in absolute poverty declined by 501 million from 1,470 million in 1980 to 969 million in
2004.
However, when we disaggregate the data by region and country the picture that
emerges is rather disturbing. Without the 627 million drop in East Asia (China alone had
a 506 million decline), the number of people living in poverty in the rest of the
23 See Freedom House and Diamond (2003)
28
developing world increased by 581 million. In sub-Saharan Africa the number of people
in absolute poverty almost doubled from 164 million to 313 million. The largest
proportional increases occurred in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the former soviet
republics, the number of people living in absolute poverty grew by more than five times
from 3.1 million to 17 million. People living in poverty in Latin America and the
Caribbean grew by 40 percent from 35.6 million to 49.8 million.24 These figures suggest
that poverty is a crucial issue in the world and that the politics of poverty programs will
remain high in the public agenda of both international and domestic policy-makers for a
long time to come.
There are equally alarming news about the rise of inequality. There have been
both increases in within and between countries inequality (Bourguignon and Morrison
(2002). With the star of the globalization process, there has been a marked polarization of
income distribution in the world. Economic growth during the 1990s has benefited the
wealthy disproportionately and has concentrated in a few top performing developing
countries. In 1980, the richest 1% of the world population earned 216 times the poorest
1%. By 2000, this enormous gap had skyrocketed to 415 times the earnings of the poorest
1% (APSA 2008). Inequality between the United States—the world’s wealthiest
country—and the world’s poorest country in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) per
capita calculated in purchasing power parity dollars has risen from an already large
38.5:1 in 1960 to more than 64:1 in 2005. The global distribution of household wealth is
even more unequal. In 2000, its Gini coefficient was 0.892 - much higher than Brazil’s or
South Africa’s figure (currently at approximately 0.56). There have also been growing
inequalities within the developing world. Within this group, the income gap between its
best and worse performers has widened, and is currently larger than that between these
countries and the United States. 25.
24 Various sources cited in APSA (2008) The Persistent Problem: Inequality, Difference,
and the Challenge of Development Report of the Task Force on Difference, Inequality, and
Developing Societies. 25 In terms of 2005, Brazil’s per capita Gross National Income, (measured by purchasing
power parity dollars, or PPP) is more than 12 times greater than that of Malawi—the world’s
poorest country—but it is only five times less than that of the United States. China’s per capita
29
The issue of increasing inequalities has come to dominate the political agenda in
the XXI century in marked contrast with the situation in the 1980s and 1990s when
absolute poverty was the main focus of debates in policy and political circles, as well as
NGOs and social movements. Indeed the new politics of poverty is increasingly
intertwined with issues of inequality. However, a new generation of research is yet to
produce large N studies exploring these links. 26
In the remainder of this section I provide further quantitative evidence of trends
and relationships in democracy, poverty and social spending. First, I use the dataset
produced by the Bertelsman Stiftung to explore the relationships between democracy and
social welfare in a number of regions. I also illustrate this relationship with data from the
IMF Government Finance Statistics and a combined score of Freedom House and Polity
data. Second, I test a few of the hypotheses discussed earlier in the paper with new data
from the Harvard Africa Dataset. Finally, I use the ECLAC dataset for a new discussion
of the Latin American case.
Figure 1 suggests that welfare spending correlates with indicators of social
spending. The data is from a times series cross sectional data on social spending in social
security and welfare for 150 countries from roughly 1970 to 2004. Indeed the scatterplot
shows a bivariate relationship and therefore capture the influence of ommited variables
such as income levels, urbanization rates and age structure. When these are introduced
this relationship still holds. For the figures 2,3,and 4, I use data for the Bertelsman
Stiftung. The countries are selected in the Bertelsman dataset according to the following
criteria: they have yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy and market economy,
have populations of more than two million, and are recognized as sovereign states. The
data cover the so-called developing countries plus a few southern European ones along
with countries from the former soviet republics. Figures 2 and 3 show that in Latin
America, Sub-Saharan Africa the Middle East, democracies exhibit better social welfare
than nondemocracies. Welfare is defined in this dataset in terms of a measure of social
safety nets (SSN). The latter is operationalized as an aggregate measure of 10 scores
income is more than 10 times greater than Malawi’s but only 6.4 times less than the United States
(op cit). 26 See Milanovic (2005), Nel (2006), World Bank (2006), De Ferranti et al (2004),
30
combined to reflect the extent to which social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty
and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability. In turn, the variable
democracy is operationalized as existence of free elections as defined in Freedom House
methodology.
In Figure 2, the Arab countries are displayed in blue. These countries are outliers
and exhibit higher welfare than expected given the extant political conditions, namely
lack of free multiparty elections. Oil wealth and level of economic development explains
greatly the pattern observed. In Latin America the outlier is Cuba – its position is much
above the regression line and close to the zero score in the Free Elections scale. Figure 4
show the results for the Asian countries. We can see a clear clustering of countries around
the regression line, with the former communist countries (China, Turkmenistan,
Uszbezekistan, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus)
These scatterplots only show a bivariate relationship between the two variables.
However, the association between democracy and welfare is robust to the introduction of
further controls, the most important of which is GDP per capita. Table 1 provides the
results for a simple regression of GDP per capita and existence of free elections on the
existence of social safety nets. The data is a cross section of 119 countries for 2006. The
coefficient for free elections is positive and statistically significant at 1%. It reflects the
state of affairs contemporaneously. Because currently there are only a few authoritarian
socialist countries, the association between authoritarianism and good welfare outcomes
can not be fully established controlling for the nature of the economic regime.
31
Figure 1
The relationship between social security and welfare spending (% of GDP)
and democracy
SyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyria
Romania
MyanmarEthiopia (-1992)
Romania
Ethiopia (-1992)Ethiopia (-1992)Myanmar
Romania
Ethiopia (-1992)MyanmarEthiopia (-1992)MyanmarMyanmarMyanmar
RomaniaRomania
HaitiBahrainSyriaChadBahrain
Syria
HaitiHaitiChadBahrainChad
SyriaSyria
Syria
SyriaHaitiBahrainEthiopia (-1992)MyanmarEthiopia (-1992)Ethiopia (-1992)BurundiMyanmarMyanmarMyanmarMyanmarEthiopia (-1992)TogoBenin
MaliEthiopia (-1992)BeninMali
Bulgaria
Myanmar
Bulgaria
BurundiMyanmarEthiopia (-1992)MyanmarMyanmarIranIran
Guinea-Bissau
RomaniaRomania
MyanmarGuinea-BissauCameroonEthiopia (-1992)Cameroon
Romania
Ethiopia (-1992)MyanmarBahrain
SyriaSyria
BahrainBahrainChad
Panama
MaliEthiopia (-1992)Niger
Panama
Ethiopia (-1992)BeninTogo
IndonesiaIndonesiaBurundiMaliNigerNigerMaliNiger
BurundiBurkina FasoBurkina FasoBurkina Faso
Panama
Panama
NigerTogoMaliChad
TogoMauritaniaBurundiMaliMaliMaliMali
RwandaBurundiBurkina FasoMali
Kuwait
BahrainIranBahrain
KuwaitKuwait
IranIranIranBurundiBurundiBahrainBahrainCameroonCameroonCameroon
Uruguay
CameroonCameroonCameroonCameroonCameroonCameroonCameroonCameroon
Uruguay
CameroonMyanmar
IranIranIran
MyanmarMyanmarMyanmar
Iran
Syria
Nepal
Kuwait
Tunisia
Tunisia
Ethiopia (-1992)
Tunisia
LesothoZambiaSyriaZambiaNepalEthiopia (-1992)
TunisiaTunisia
TunisiaTunisia
Zambia
Syria
Korea, SouthNepal
TunisiaZambia
Tunisia
NepalNepalNepal
Argentina
Nepal
Argentina
MaliBurkina FasoThailand
Uruguay
TanzaniaTanzaniaRwandaLesotho
Greece
TanzaniaTanzaniaTanzaniaTanzaniaTanzaniaRwandaRwandaRwandaThailandRwanda
Belarus
TanzaniaCentral African Republic
Belarus
Chile
Pakistan (1972-)Pakistan (1972-)
Yugoslavia
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
Liberia
Chile
MauritaniaRwandaTanzaniaRwanda
YugoslaviaYugoslaviaBelarus
Yugoslavia
Myanmar
Greece
TanzaniaIndonesiaTanzaniaTanzaniaTanzania
TogoIndonesia
Togo
Belarus
Chile
Chile
Chile
BahrainKuwaitBahrainBahrainBahrainKuwaitBahrainBahrain
Bahrain
Kuwait
KuwaitBahrainBahrain
Iran
BahrainBahrainKuwaitBahrainCameroonParaguay
Haiti
Panama
Korea, SouthParaguayParaguay
Tunisia
Korea, South
Paraguay
Korea, SouthMyanmar
Egypt
IranIran
EgyptEgypt
Myanmar
Czechoslovakia
EgyptMyanmarEgyptZambiaZambiaZambia
Morocco
ZambiaZambiaZambiaZambiaZambiaZambia
MoroccoMoroccoZambiaMoroccoZambiaLesotho
ChileChileRomania
YugoslaviaMorocco
Chile
Burkina FasoLesothoBurkina Faso
Spain
Panama
Burkina FasoPakistan (1972-)Pakistan (1972-)
Chile
Hungary
Burkina Faso
HungaryHungary
LesothoYugoslavia
Spain
YugoslaviaBahrainKorea, SouthKorea, SouthKorea, South
Paraguay
BhutanBhutan
Panama
ParaguayParaguayParaguayParaguayNicaraguaParaguayParaguayParaguayParaguayNicaraguaMoroccoBhutan
Tunisia
Uruguay
Uruguay
Tunisia
Nicaragua
Uruguay
ParaguayTunisiaTunisia
Bhutan
ParaguayIranIran
LiberiaZimbabwe
Chile
IranIranIran
Chile
IranIranIran
Liberia
Chile
Liberia
Chile
Zimbabwe
Chile
Egypt
NepalZambiaCameroon
Iran
Morocco
CameroonLesothoLesotho
Kuwait
Morocco
Uruguay
Liberia
KuwaitKuwait
Kuwait
KuwaitKuwait
GuyanaGuyana
Pakistan (1972-)Lesotho
Guyana
HungaryHungary
Lesotho
Spain
Lesotho
Guyana
Kuwait
MoroccoLiberiaLesotho
Morocco
Egypt
Korea, South
Tunisia
Korea, SouthYugoslaviaYugoslaviaYugoslavia
Tunisia
YugoslaviaBurkina FasoYugoslaviaBurundiYugoslaviaYugoslavia
MoroccoMoroccoMoroccoKorea, SouthHaiti
MoroccoKorea, South
NicaraguaNicaraguaNicaraguaMoroccoMoroccoMorocco
Egypt
LiberiaSenegalZimbabweLiberia
Egypt
Panama
Liberia
EgyptEgypt
ZimbabweZimbabweZimbabwe
Egypt
Liberia
Panama
Liberia
Zimbabwe
LiberiaMadagascarLiberia
Burundi
Kazakhstan
CameroonCameroonCameroon
Guyana
Kazakhstan
Hungary
Guyana
Uruguay
LesothoLesothoLesotho
Kuwait
Lesotho
Uruguay
Uruguay
YugoslaviaKorea, SouthIndonesia
TunisiaTunisia
BurundiBurundi
TunisiaTunisia
BurundiMoroccoKuwait
Morocco
TunisiaTunisia
Morocco
Tunisia
Kuwait
KuwaitTunisiaKuwaitTunisiaKuwaitTunisia
Morocco
PanamaPanamaEgypt
EgyptEgypt
Madagascar
TajikistanEgypt
Liberia
EgyptEgypt
Burundi
PanamaEgypt
NepalLesothoThailandGuatemala
Panama
Tunisia
YugoslaviaKorea, SouthKorea, South
Spain
Kuwait
MoroccoMoroccoNicaragua
Kuwait
MexicoMexico
Egypt
Panama
Egypt
MadagascarSingaporeSingaporeSingapore
Iran
SingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingapore
Iran
Ethiopia (-1992)Ethiopia (-1992)
Tunisia
CroatiaCroatia
Madagascar
Argentina
ThailandHonduras
MexicoPanamaMexicoMexico
SingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeSingaporeThailandSingaporeSingaporeSingapore
Singapore
Hungary
IranIran
IranNicaraguaEthiopia (-1992)
Nicaragua
Belarus
GuatemalaCroatia
MexicoMexicoMexico
Croatia
Mexico
Croatia
Madagascar
Portugal
Honduras
Chile
HondurasHondurasHondurasHondurasHondurasHondurasZimbabweZimbabweBurkina Faso
Brazil
SenegalSingaporeSingaporeSingapore
Mexico
Uruguay
GuatemalaGuatemala
Mexico
Guatemala
MexicoGuatemalaCroatia
MexicoMexicoMexico
Dominican RepublicSouth AfricaSenegalZimbabweSenegalZimbabweSouth Africa
Brazil
Burkina Faso
ZimbabweZimbabwe
Panama
NepalNepalNepalNepal
Mexico
GuyanaMexicoMexicoGuyana
Romania
Dominican Republic
Brazil
Dominican RepublicDominican RepublicThailand
Brazil
ZimbabweSenegalKorea, South
Spain
Malaysia
Romania
MexicoMexicoMexicoDominican RepublicMadagascarThailandMalaysiaMalaysiaMalaysiaZimbabweMalaysiaMalaysiaMalaysiaMalaysiaGuyana
Portugal
Thailand
Sri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri Lanka
Sri Lanka
ThailandParaguayThailandThailandThailandThailandParaguayZimbabweMalaysiaMalaysia
Mexico
Malaysia
MexicoNicaragua
Guyana
Nicaragua
GuyanaGuyana
TurkeyPakistan (1972-)Turkey
Romania
Sri Lanka
Romania
Turkey
ThailandParaguayTurkey
Belarus
ThailandMalaysia
Hungary
Russian Federation
Malaysia
Zimbabwe
MalaysiaMalaysia
Russian Federation
MalaysiaMalaysiaMalaysia
Mexico
GuatemalaThailandTurkeyPakistan (1972-)
Sri Lanka
Dominican Republic
Sri Lanka
Dominican Republic
Sri Lanka
NepalNepal
Romania
Sri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri LankaSri Lanka
Romania
Belarus
ColombiaColombiaColombiaColombiaMalaysiaGuatemala
Greece
Sri LankaMexico
NepalNepal
Nicaragua
Pakistan (1972-)ThailandThailandThailandTurkeyPakistan (1972-)
Colombia
Belarus
GambiaThailandMalaysiaMadagascarMalaysiaThailand
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Dominican Republic
Estonia
Panama
Chile
Brazil
Colombia
Bulgaria
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Cyprus
Cyprus
Burkina Faso
Spain
Paraguay
Turkey
Argentina
Slovakia
Turkey
Paraguay
Slovakia
ThailandThailandColombia
Sri Lanka
Estonia
Korea, South
Sri Lanka
Korea, SouthDominican Republic
Sri Lanka
Dominican RepublicKorea, SouthKorea, SouthDominican RepublicDominican RepublicDominican Republic
EstoniaEstonia
Korea, SouthDominican Republic
PanamaSri Lanka
Brazil
PanamaArgentina
Dominican Republic
PanamaCyprus
Cyprus
CyprusCyprusEl Salvador
Cyprus
Brazil
Argentina
El Salvador
ArgentinaArgentinaArgentinaArgentina
Argentina
ThailandTurkey
Mauritius
Bolivia
ThailandMadagascarTurkeyMadagascarColombiaTurkeyMadagascarColombiaMadagascarColombia
Mauritius
Turkey
Mauritius
Dominican RepublicDominican RepublicDominican RepublicDominican RepublicKorea, SouthKorea, SouthKorea, SouthKorea, SouthDominican RepublicDominican RepublicKorea, SouthDominican Republic
EstoniaBulgaria
Chile
Bulgaria
Dominican Republic
Sri Lanka
BulgariaLatvia
Colombia
Sri LankaSri Lanka
Bulgaria
ColombiaColombia
BrazilBrazil
Gambia
Colombia
Brazil
Brazil
Romania
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
CyprusCyprusArgentina
BrazilBrazilArgentinaBoliviaBolivia
Israel
BoliviaBoliviaIsraelBolivia
PanamaMongolia
BoliviaBolivia
Mongolia
Bolivia
Panama
Bolivia
Mongolia
Israel
Spain
Mauritius
Mauritius
IsraelPanama
Mauritius
ThailandThailand
Israel
Mongolia
PanamaMauritiusPanama
Bolivia
EstoniaEstonia
Chile
Dominican Republic
Estonia
Estonia
Dominican Republic
Bulgaria
Trinidad and TobagoGambia
Bulgaria
GambiaTrinidad and Tobago
Romania
Gambia
Trinidad and TobagoTrinidad and Tobago
Greece
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Trinidad and Tobago
Greece
Argentina
Argentina
Chile
Bulgaria
Gambia
Latvia
Greece
GambiaGambia
Sri Lanka
Greece
ChileChileChileChileChileChileChile
Latvia
Greece
GambiaGambia
Brazil
Czechoslovakia
Chile
Mongolia
Jamaica
MongoliaMongoliaArgentina
IsraelIsrael
Bolivia
Spain
Venezuela
IsraelIsrael
Venezuela
Spain
BoliviaBolivia
UruguayUruguay
Israel
UruguayUruguayIsraelIsraelIsraelIsraelIsraelIsraelPortugal
Mauritius
PortugalIsrael
IsraelIsraelIsrael
Portugal
Mauritius
Venezuela
IsraelIsraelIsraelIsrael
Israel
Venezuela
Israel
Slovakia
LatviaFranceFrance
Greece
FranceFrance
Argentina
France
LatviaLatvia
Greece
Argentina
France
Argentina
Trinidad and Tobago
France
France
France
Finland
Greece
Uruguay
Uruguay
JapanFinland
Finland
Mauritius
FinlandItaly
Greece
Finland
Jamaica
Hungary
Mauritius
FinlandFinlandFinlandFinlandFinlandFinland
GreeceMauritiusMauritius
Uruguay
Mauritius
Finland
Mauritius
FinlandGreece
Italy
HungaryHungary
Greece
Mauritius
MauritiusGreece
Mauritius
Finland
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
France
France
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
France
Venezuela
France
Venezuela
France
Venezuela
Spain
France
Venezuela
PolandPolandPolandPolandFrance
Portugal
VenezuelaVenezuelaVenezuelaVenezuela
France
France
Mauritius
Ireland
Japan
Mauritius
Italy
Spain
GermanyCzech Republic
United Kingdom
Japan
Germany
Portugal
Mauritius
Italy
United Kingdom
PortugalCzech Republic
Slovenia
Mauritius
United Kingdom
United KingdomSwedenGermany, West
Cyprus
Slovenia
Spain
Cyprus
Germany, West
Slovenia
Spain
Czech RepublicCzech Republic
Spain
Ireland
Czech Republic
Spain
Spain
Portugal
Italy
CyprusGreeceCyprus
United Kingdom
Germany
Israel
Slovenia
Costa Rica
Hungary
Slovenia
MauritiusMauritius
United Kingdom
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Uruguay
Uruguay
Greece
Spain
CyprusCosta Rica
Portugal
Italy
Germany, West
Portugal
United Kingdom
Jamaica
Hungary
Hungary
Mauritius
Finland
Costa Rica
Hungary
United Kingdom
CyprusCosta Rica
Uruguay
Germany, West
United Kingdom
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Uruguay
Italy
Czech Republic
Germany, WestGermany, WestGermany, WestGermany, West
Spain
Germany, WestSpainSpainHungary
Finland
Mauritius
Uruguay
Italy
Uruguay
United KingdomHungaryGermany, WestGermany, West
Uruguay
Uruguay
Slovenia
Portugal
Trinidad and Tobago
United StatesUnited States
Australia
Finland
Australia
Denmark
Sweden
AustraliaSwitzerlandAustraliaUnited StatesSwitzerland
Switzerland
Australia
Finland
Norway
Netherlands
Switzerland
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Australia
Sweden
Sweden
Italy
Sweden
Australia
NorwayDenmark
Sweden
Costa Rica
Australia
Netherlands
FinlandSweden
Sweden
United Kingdom
Canada
Australia
Sweden
Sweden
Australia
Costa Rica
Belgium
Sweden
Australia
Denmark
Costa Rica
Italy
SwedenSweden
SwitzerlandSwitzerland
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Australia
AustriaAustria
AustriaAustriaAustria
Norway
AustriaAustria
United States
Belgium
United States
CanadaUnited Kingdom
SwedenAustria
Netherlands
Austria
Switzerland
Austria
Cyprus
Austria
AustriaAustriaBelgium
Australia
Costa Rica
Canada
Cyprus
Sweden
Switzerland
Norway
Denmark
Switzerland
United StatesCyprus
Switzerland
Australia
Norway
Switzerland
AustraliaCosta Rica
SwitzerlandNorway
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Australia
NetherlandsNetherlandsFinland
Costa Rica
DenmarkNetherlands
Costa Rica
United States
United Kingdom
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Sweden
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Costa Rica
Netherlands
Canada
Belgium
NetherlandsNetherlands
United States
Sweden
Australia
United States
Germany, West
CanadaCanadaCanadaCanadaCanadaCanada
CanadaCanada
Netherlands
Canada
Denmark
Canada
CanadaFinland
Denmark
Austria
Belgium
United States
Germany, West
Ireland
Costa RicaUnited States
Spain
United Kingdom
Sweden
Switzerland
Austria
Belgium
Norway
Australia
United States
Austria
Norway
United States
Norway
Canada
Denmark
Sweden
Italy
NorwayNorway
Sweden
Norway
Ireland
Netherlands
United StatesUnited States
Switzerland
NorwayNorway
Canada
United Kingdom
Costa RicaCosta Rica
Sweden
Costa Rica
Finland
Costa RicaCosta RicaCosta Rica
Austria
Austria
Australia
Denmark
Canada
Norway
United States
Germany, West
CyprusCyprusCyprusCyprusUnited Kingdom
United States
Spain
United States
Australia
Canada
United States
United States
Belgium
Norway
Cyprus
Denmark
Netherlands
DenmarkDenmarkDenmark
Denmark
Denmark
Switzerland
DenmarkDenmarkDenmarkDenmark
Australia
DenmarkDenmark
Netherlands
Austria
Australia
Canada
Sweden
United KingdomUnited Kingdom
Sweden
Australia
Ireland
United Kingdom
Australia
Norway
Denmark
IrelandIrelandIrelandIreland
Norway
Ireland
NorwayGermany, West
Belgium
United States
NetherlandsFinland
Austria
Ireland
Canada
United States
Spain
Cyprus
BelgiumDenmark
Austria
Ireland
AustraliaCanada
Belgium
IrelandCanada
Norway
Spain
United States
Belgium
Cyprus
Italy
United Kingdom
Australia
Costa RicaCosta Rica
Sweden
FinlandBelgium
United States
Belgium
Sweden
United States
Ireland
Denmark
United KingdomIreland
Belgium
Norway
United Kingdom
Denmark
Finland
Belgium
Costa RicaCosta Rica
NetherlandsBelgium
Italy
Sweden
Finland
United Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
Austria
Switzerland
NorwayDenmark
Netherlands
Norway
Costa Rica
Germany, West
Germany, West
United States
05
1015
2025
Gov
ernm
ent e
xpen
ditu
re o
n so
cial
sec
urity
and
wel
fare
(%
of G
DP
)
0 2 4 6 8 10Democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
Author’s own elaboration
Data Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics and Freedom House and Polity
Scores (average score from these two sources)
32
Figure 2
Figure 3
Author’s own elaboration
Algeria
Angola
Bahrain
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo, DR
Côte d'Ivoire
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ghana
G Guinea
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kenya
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
i SLeone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Syria
T Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia Turkey
Uganda
Arab
Emirates
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
0
2
4
6
8
0
2 4
6
8
10
Free elections
Democracy and welfare in Africa and Middle East
Egypt
Wel
fare
reg
ime
Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican RepublicEcuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
JamaicaMexico
Nicaragua
P Panama
P Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
10
Free elections
Democracy and Welfare in Latin America
Wel
fare
reg
ime
33
Figure 4
Author’s own elaboration
Notes for Figures ,2,3 and 4
Note.Welfare regime is measured by a scale for social safety nets. The latter is an aggregate measure of 10 scores combined to reflect the extent to which social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability. Source: Bertelsman Transformation 2008, Center for Applied Policy Research/ Bertelsmann Stiftung 27. The data for free elections comes from Freedom House.
27. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2006 Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007.
Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Cambodia
China
Georgia
India
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Malaysia
Moldova
Mongolia
Myanmar
Nepal
North Korea
Papua New Guinea
P hilippines
Russia
Singapore
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6 8
10
free elections
Democracy and welfare in Asia
Wel
fare
reg
ime
34
Table 1.
OLS estimation of the determinants of welfare regimes (social safety nets)
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model B Std. Error t Sig.
Constant 8.112
.363
22.329
.000
Percapita GDP .576
.035
-16.471
.000
Free elections .114
.029
3.876
.000
a. Dependent Variable: Social safety nets
Adjusted R2 = 0.77 N = 119 countries * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
Notes. Social safety nets is an aggregate measure of 10 scores combined to reflect the extent to which social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability. Source: Bertelsman Transformation 2008, Center for Applied Policy Research/ Bertelsmann Stiftung 28. The data for Free elections comes from Freedom House.
28. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2006 Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007.
35
Table 2
The determinants of social spending in Africa
Dependent variable = health expenditures
Dependent variable = educational expenditures
variables Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 5.8927*** (.7307)
24.2487*** (2.7148)
GDPPPP .0085*** (.000)
.0034* (.0039)
Trade openness -.0203 (.0193)
-.1882** (.0736)
Nontax revenue -.0320* (.0167)
-.1489** (.0974)
R2 = 0.09 R2 = 0.24 N= 46 countries, robust standard errors in parentheses Fixed effects model * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
Data source: Harvard University’s Africa Research Center, author’s own
elaboration. Dataset covers period 1960-2000, with significant gaps, especially for the
last 15 years.
Although the bivariate correlations suggest an association between democracy
and social welfare outcomes, the analysis of a panel of 46 Africa countries do not suggest
a causal relationship between social spending (health and education expenditures) and
democracy. The variables of interest are trade openness and free elections. I introduced as
controls real GDP per capita and nontax revenue. 29 The literature predicts a negative
impact of nontax revenue in social expenditures. The assumption is that nontax revenue
discourages rulers to produce public goods and, unlike tax revenue which creates a bond
between tax payers and elected politicians, is not accountability –enhancing. None of the
13 variables used to measure democracy proved to be statistically significant in a fixed
29 See the essay in Brautigan, Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) and Ross (1999).
36
effects model for the determinants of health and educational spending.30 Trade openness
was found to be negatively associated with educational and health expenditures, although
it was only statistically significant for explaining education at 5%. GDP per capita was
used as a control, and as expected, social spending is positively correlated to country
income.
Consistent with the claims in the literature, nontax revenue have a robust
downward impact on social expenditures. The variable’s coefficient is negative for both
education and health expenditures and statistically significant at 5% and 10%,
respectively. The finding that democracy does not affect spending in this exercise may be
due to the fact that there is significant missing data for the last decade when the new
wave of African democratization was at its apex (Bratton and Van de Walle (1997).
Therefore the lack of association between democratization and social spending should not
be considered conclusive.
Conclusions
While there are still disagreement in the literature findings, we can conclude that
there is robust evidence that globalization, irrespective of the indicators used, has a
consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending. In the Latin American case,
growing levels of trade integration has had a substantial negative effect on aggregate
social expenditures, with the effect being concentrated markedly in social security
expenditures. In addition, there is significant evidence that education and health are
relatively immune from such pressures and in some regions some authors argue that
expenditures in these areas have expanded. While these effects are found to be global
trends, the impact of trade liberalization varies across regions in the developing world. In
fact, there is hard evidence that different regions exhibit contrasting patterns which result
30 Most of these variables are listed in Box 1: Autocracy Score, Authority , Democratic
Index (Barro transformation), Democracy Score, Multiparty elections, Monocratism measure,
Single party elections, Executive Constraints , Executive Recruitment Competition, Executive
Recruitment Openness, Executive Recruitment Regulation , Civil Liberties (transformed by
Barro), Competitiveness of Participation, Regulation of Participation
37
from their distinct institutional legacies from the pre-globalization period (particularly in
the social security system), their different fiscal vulnerabilities of countries and their
economic dynamism. It is increasingly clear that there is strong interregional variation in
terms of the behaviour of the main variables of interest. Therefore, one can hardly speak
of one model of welfare state in the developing.
Some recent studies dispute these findings and argue that that trade openness does
not constrain government outlays for social programs, and that democracy has a strong
positive association with social spending, particularly on items that bolster human capital
formation. Nevertheless, the disagreement is rooted in different methodologies for
measuring openness, and more significantly, the regional coverage in this strand of the
literature is limited to Latin America.
The effects of globalization on welfare spending are no less controversial than the
effects of democratization on social policies. Political economy models predict that
democracies will favour redistribution and social spending because democracy brings
more people with below-average incomes to the polls, and they collectively press the
government to redistribute income downwards. This literature also predicts that the
effects of democracy is not uniform across the social sectors and that programs with large
constituencies – in areas such as primary education or primary health care – are expected
to expand under democracy because this would bring government’s policy closer to the
median voter’s preference. By contrast, programs which small and concentrated
constituencies, such as special pensions, which caters for the interest of civil servants and
formal sector employees, will experience spending cuts.
There is robust econometric evidence from various studies that as countries turn
into democracies they will increase their welfare spending. Holding trade openness
constant, these studies show that democracy expands social spending in education and
health, while keeping social security outlays unaffected. Also, repressive authoritarian
regimes retrench spending on health and education, but not on social security. Contrary to
OECD countries, however, partisanship has no explanatory power in this relationship.
There is research support for the effect of regime in specific regions. The need to obtain
an electoral majority prompted African governments to prioritize primary schools over
38
universities within the education budget. In the two statistical exercises presented in
section 3, I found mixed evidence for the role of democracy on social safety nets and on
health and education spending. While the first correlation – democracy on social safety
nets – was confirmed, the latter was not. The fact that the data covers only the initial
years of the democratization in SubSaharan countries process may explain this
divergence and the results should be taken with caution. In turn, in East Asia, a country
that experiences a permanent move to democratic rule, the average share of social
security spending to GDP increases significantly. In Latin America, the evidence of an
influence of regime on spending is less clear cut and the findings on the causality are
inconclusive. However, there is also considerable support for a positive relationship.
There is also evidence that not only do democracies spend more in social welfare,
they also associated with better welfare outcomes. Democracies are argued to do a better
job than non-democracies of improving the welfare of the poor and promoting growth.
However, this increased spending may not result in more favorable results for the poor
because they may favor disproportionably middle income groups and specific clienteles.
This explains the some research findings that, when flaws resulting from the fact that
most cross-national studies omit from their samples nondemocratic states with good
social records are corrected, non-democracies outperforms democracies in key social
indicators such as mortality rates.
39
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