democratic control and bureaucratic responsiveness: the police and domestic violence

Democratic Control and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: The Police and Domestic ViolenceAuthor(s): Carole Kennedy Chaney and Grace Hall SaltzsteinSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 745-768Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991728 .

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Democratic Control and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: The Police and Domestic Violence* Carole Kennedy Chaney, San Diego State University Grace Hall Saltzstein, University of California, Riverside

Theory: A principal-agent model is used to assess if police department practices regarding the handling of domestic violence calls are responsive to direct orders which mandate arrest of abusers. We also examine the competing and complementary effects of bureaucratic discretion on responsiveness to direct orders. Hypotheses: State and city laws mandating the arrest of perpetrators of domestic violence will positively influence municipal police departments' reported reliance on arrest as the usual disposition of domestic violence calls. It is expected, however, that city laws, with their more proximate locus of influence, will have a greater impact on police response than will state laws. Methods: Probit and ordered probit analysis of data collected from 1989 regarding the usual police response to domestic violence in three scenarios. Data were collected through mailed survey of a national sample of municipal police departments; national and state-level crime reports; directories of various service organizations; and census data. Results: Direct orders in the form of state and local laws requiring arrest of the perpetrators of domestic violence appear to be effective controls over police practice, but there is also evidence of bureaucratic discretion coexisting with political control. Further, both political control and bureaucratic discretion in this arena prove to be highly context- dependent.

Questions regarding bureaucracy's place in democratic political systems and prospects for asserting and maintaining political control over bureaucracy in such systems have been staples of public administration theory and research virtually since the establishment of the field. During the 1980s, however, such questions not only reemerged as central concerns within the field of public administration but also garnered entirely new scholarly interest within the discipline of political science as a whole. Pub- lic administration scholars demonstrated renewed concern for the classical topic of bureaucratic control/responsiveness (e.g., Gormley 1989; Gruber 1987) at the same time that scholars throughout the discipline began to

*Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Sci- ence Association and the Western Political Science Association. All data and documentation neces- sary to replicate this analysis can be obtained from the authors. Data analysis presented in this article was conducted using SST.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 3, July 1998, Pp. 745-768 ( 1998 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System



746 Carole Kennedy Chaney and Grace Hall Saltzstein

recognize and use principal-agent models developed in the fields of eco- nomics, management, and sociology (Levinthal 1988; Zucker 1987) as potentially-powerful new tools for assessing political control/bureaucratic responsiveness in the relations between political superiors and bureaucratic subordinates within government.

However, though recent analysis of this classical issue has produced re- visionist views of a number of traditional "tools" of control over the bureaucracy and has told us a great deal more than we knew before about whether political control/responsiveness can or does occur, recent empirical research as a whole has examined only a fairly limited array of mechanisms of control; indicators of responsiveness; types of agents, agencies, and organizations; levels of government; or rival explanations (see Moe 1987; Perrow 1986; Ringquist 1995; Wood and Waterman 1994 for critiques). As a consequence, contemporary critics' complaints often echo those of earlier periods. Just as Salamon and Wamsley argued in 1975 that the question is not whether responsiveness occurs, but what form it takes, and to whom and under what circumstances it occurs, critics today complain that we know relatively little about the "determinants" (Wood and Waterman 1991) or "causal mechanisms" of control/responsiveness (Wood and Waterman 1994, 28), about the effectiveness of a variety of tools of control, or about whether .. . the exercise of bureaucratic discretion coexists with the exercise of political control" (Ringquist 1995).

Alternative Tools, Issues, and Settings This study addresses several of these omissions through analysis of the

effects of a previously-maligned, little-studied, but increasingly common control mechanism on the pattern of organizational practices in a controversial policy arena and in a complex local government setting wherein the organization and its members historically exercise considerable discretion and have autonomy from political control. Specifically, we ask whether a direct order in the form of legislation mandating a particular police reaction to domestic violence calls is associated with the desired pattern of organizational practice in such situations.

Scholars, administrative overseers, and practitioners alike have long be- moaned the difficulties of controlling the bureaucracy by simply telling it what to do. Inherent in this pessimistic viewpoint is the realization of a wide variety of practical and political limitations to the use of direct orders (see Meier 1993 for a thorough overview). Nonetheless, direct orders have re- mained a part of the arsenal of controls over bureaucracy; many substantively significant policy issues lend themselves to explicit policy directives; and the courts, legislatures, and general public have joined chief executives in recent years in resorting to explicit directives (in the form of court orders,



POLICE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 747

legislation, executive orders, or voter initiatives or referenda) to constrain bureaucratic discretion in a variety of controversial arenas. Thus, we might well ask: Contrary to what earlier administrative analyses would suggest, can we find evidence of linkages between specific directives and bureaucratic behaviors in substantively-significant policy arenas?

One such effort to control bureaucracy through direct orders arose during the 1970s and 1980s as cities and states around the country sought to al- ter local police departments' handling of domestic violence complaints through the enactment of legislation requiring arrest of the aggressor in all domestic violence situations handled by the police. We argue that the complex, singular nature of local government police organizations in conjunc- tion with externally-imposed policy directives that in many cases challenge departmental values and traditions make this a "hard test" case of democratic control and responsiveness. Thus, such a test adds to recent research on bureaucratic agents and their various principals by extending analysis to a bureaucratically- and politically-complex local government organization that is home to large numbers of "street-level" bureaucrats and is responsible for substantively significant policy outcomes.

Domestic Violence and the Police As awareness of the scope and severity of the problem of adult domestic

violence against women grew during the 1970s and early 1980s,1 attempts to address the problem moved beyond the provision of social services to focus on the role of criminal justice agencies in general and police departments in particular (Frisch 1992). Slightly more than half of all domestic violence incidents revealed in victimization surveys today are reported to the police; the police agency is the most likely, and sometimes the only, social institution to come into contact (often repeatedly2) with both the victims and the perpetrators of domestic violence (Buzawa and Buzawa 1990; Dutton 1988). Police departments thus are critical in shaping overall domestic violence policy:

'The U.S. Surgeon General has identified battering as "the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States"; 20% of women using emergency medical services "do so because of battering" (MacManus and VanHightower 1989). Though the term generally applies to "all forms of violent behavior between people who live together" (California Attorney General's Public Rights Division 1990, 121), the National Crime Survey shows seven out of every ten incidents of domestic violence in the nation to have been directed against women by a spouse, ex-spouse, boyfriend, or ex- boyfriend (U.S. Department of Justice 1986, 3). Thirty percent of female murder victims each year are killed by husbands or boyfriends (U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports 1990); overall reports of domestic abuse short of murder have risen significantly since 1980. In addition, the violence suffered by women tends to be recurrent in nature (U.S. Department of Justice 1986).

2Examining police records of domestic assaults and domestic homicides in Kansas City, Mis- souri, researchers found in half of all cases that police had been at the address of the incident five or more times in the two years preceding the incident (Police Foundation 1977).




police disposition of individual calls has been shown to be crucial in deter- mining victims' access to relevant social service support and criminal justice assistance, while the overall pattern of departmental reaction to domestic violence complaints can inhibit future violence and encourage future victims to seek assistance (U.S. Department of Justice 1986).

When encountering domestic violence incidents, officers must decide whether an individual incident constitutes a felony offense of rape, aggravated assault (assault with a weapon), or robbery, or a misdemeanor in a case of "simple" assault. Data from 1978 to 1982 showed that about one- third of all incidents of domestic violence against women were classified as felony crimes while the remaining two-thirds were classified as misdemeanor simple assaults (U.S. Department of Justice 1986).3 Under most circumstances, officers have recourse to a fairly standard array of responses that range from officer-provided mediation, warnings, and/or referral to counseling, shelters, or other social services; ordering the offender away from the premises; or arresting the offender (Berk, Fenstermaker, and New- ton 1988). Yet, regardless of the circumstances, most studies show that the police "virtually never arrested the abuser" (Zorza 1992,48): arrest rates for domestic violence offenses hover in the single digits or low teens while victim surveys show much higher rates of incidence (see Buzawa 1988 or Buel 1988 for summaries), and arrest is uncommon even in those cases (which constitute the majority of all cases) in which the victim requests arrest of the batterer (Bowker 1983).

Indeed, police departments have been criticized for being "largely indif- ferent to domestic violence" (Zorza 1992). Departments historically gave domestic violence a low-priority status, dismissing such incidents as merely order-maintenance problems or "social work" rather than legitimate police work. Offlcers and new recruits often were socialized to think of domestic violence as less than a "real" crime; departments during the 1970s and early 1980s often taught officers "that domestic violence was a private matter, ill- suited to public intervention" (Zorza 1992, 47). As a consequence, one survey of research concludes that (Zorza 1992, 47-8), "(U)ntil recently, police frequently ignored domestic violence calls" and, even when officers were dispatched, they "rarely did anything about domestic violence."

Early efforts to reshape police practices focused on attempts to enable the police to arrest in a larger number of cases and under a wider array of circumstances, particularly in misdemeanor offenses committed outside the

3Yet the same data show victim injury to be at least as common in domestic violence incidents classified as misdemeanors as among those classified as felonies. Further, "in terms of actual bodily injury, as many as half of all incidents of domestic violence that police would classify as misdemeanors are as serious as or more serious than 90% of all the violent crimes that police would classify as felonies" (U.S. Department of Justice 1986, 3).




presence of officers (MacManus and VanHightower 1989). When such reforms failed to produce the desired results, lawmakers in Oregon in 1977 and Maine in 1980 finally sought to eliminate entirely departmental and officer discretion in the treatment and disposition of domestic violence calls through passage of legislation mandating police arrest of domestic violence offenders. Exerting direct control over police practices in this fashion spread to other states and to cities during the 1980s, with adoptions of mandatory arrest laws accelerating in response to the publicity surrounding both the 1981-82 Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment's conclusions regarding the deterrent effects of arrest (Sherman and Berk 1984a, 1984b)4 and a 1985 jury award of $2.6 million to a female victim of domestic violence on the basis of police negligence in failing to protect the woman and her son from an abusive husband (Thurman v. Connecticut, 595 F. Supp. 1521 [Dist.Conn.1984]). Hence, mandatory arrest as standard police practice in domestic violence situations attained and held a uniquely privileged position in the policy arena throughout the 1980s as these factors led several states and a number of cities to implement mandatory arrest laws during this period.

Nonetheless, a considerable amount of research attests to extensive autonomy on the part of municipal police departments at both the organizational level and at the level of individual officers (Brown 1981; Muir 1977; Skolnick 1966; Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Wilson 1968). Departments have been able to thwart policies they disagree with by giving higher priority and scarce resources to other crime-control efforts; by failing to disseminate or enforce relevant laws and guidelines (Buzawa 1982, 1988; Milner 1970; Wasby 1976); or by omitting or downplaying such guidelines in training and supervising uniformed personnel (Buzawa 1982); the "street-level" nature of police work means that policy opposition among patrol officers may also thwart implementation. Given the previously-documented reluctance of departments and individual patrol officers to arrest domestic violence offenders, could we expect to find any meaningful correspondence between mandatory arrest laws and department handling of domestic violence calls in the late 1980s?

Sample and Dependent Variables To address this question, this study examines reported police disposition

of domestic violence situations in a national sample of municipal police departments and explores alternative police practices and associated influences, including arrest laws, on those practices. The sample selected to

4However, the research and assumptions which fueled this movement have come under intense scrutiny since that era. See, for example, Sherman (1991, 1992a); Hirschel and Hutchison, III (1992;) or Berk (1992).




explore these questions represents the universe of U.S. municipal police departments employing at least 100 full-time personnel in cities with a black population of at least 5% of the total as of 1980 (N = 201).5 Research and Planning Departments of the sample police departments were surveyed in late 1989 regarding the department's usual response to the three most common domestic violence situations. One hundred and sixty-three departments (or 80.7% of the total) answered questions regarding departmental practice in domestic violence situations. Complete data ultimately were available for 147 of these police departments, providing a final sample representing 72.1 % of the universe of departments.

Research and Planning Departments of larger police departments are the institutional repositories of departmental records and statistics: they are responsible for compiling, reporting, and maintaining most official crime records and statistics, and for conducting research and analyses of these ma- terials. As a consequence, they are the most likely to know the usual or most likely disposition of calls in various categories; they also provide much of the institutional memory regarding department policies and practices. Direc- tors of these units were asked to have the questionnaires compiled by a department member most familiar with the particular policies in question. Respondents were asked to consider separately the three most common situations encountered by officers responding to domestic disturbance calls involving spouses, ex-spouses, or boyfriend and girlfriend in 1989: those in which 1) violence occurred in the officer's presence; 2) violence had oc- cuffed prior to the officer's arrival; and 3) violence was threatened but had not occurred. For each scenario, respondents were asked to identify patrol officers' most likely or usual method of disposing of calls from the alternatives of arresting the offender; ordering the offender away from the premises; attempting to mediate; referring the parties to outside social agencies; or no usual disposition. Given our concern with the efficacy of mandatory arrest laws, reported dispositions of each of the three scenarios were dichotomized, for this analysis, on the basis of arrest (coded as 1) versus all other reported dispositions (coded as 0); in addition, the dichotomized values for each department were summed across all three posited scenarios to produce a summary variable (ranging from 0 to 3) of department reliance on arrest to dispose of domestic violence situations in general.

Table 1 reports the frequency scores for departments reporting arrest versus all alternatives as the usual response to the three posited incident scenarios along with the summary scores reflecting reliance on arrest alone

5The range was selected so as to include departments large enough to provide a full range of police services and to have established routines; the black population floor was imposed to ensure a minimum level of diversity among departmental clientele.




Table 1. Reported Reliance on Arrest as Usual Response to Various Domestic Violence Scenarios, Sample Police Departments

Frequency

I. Domestic Violence: A. Occurred in officer's presence

1. Depts. reporting arrest as usual response 143 (98.6)a

2. Depts. reporting responses other than arrestb 2 (1.4)

B. Occurred prior to officer's arrival 1. Depts. reporting arrest as usual response 117

(80.7) 2. Depts. reporting responses other than arrest 28

(19.3) C. Threatened Only

1. Depts. reporting arrest as usual response 40 (27.6)

2. Depts. reporting responses other than arrest 105 (72.4)

II. Summary Score, depts. reporting reliance on arrest as usual response in: A. None of the above scenarios 2

(1.4) B. One of the above scenarios 26

(17.9) C. Two of the above scenarios 77

(53.1) D. All three of the above scenarios 40

(27.6) N= 145

aPercentage of sample. bResponses include ordering offender from the premises, attempting to mediate, referring parties to outside agencies or no usual response.

across all three scenarios. As is evident, by 1989, virtually all departments (98.6%) report arrest as the usual response in cases involving violence which occurs in the presence of the officers. Where violent incidents had occurred prior to officers' arrival, a smaller though still substantial number of departments (80.7% of the total) in 1989 report reliance on arrest as the usual response. As would be expected (Berk, Fenstermaker, and Newton 1988; Berk and Loseke 1981; Worden and Pollitz 1984), the greatest variation in police practice and the lowest level of reported reliance on arrest is evident in the case of violence which has been only threatened at the time of officers' arrival. A little under 30% of the total report arrest as the usual disposition in such circumstances; though not reported here, nearly as many




(28% of the total) reported no usual disposition and 39% of the total reported reliance on mediation and/or referral as the usual disposition of cases under these circumstances.

As the summary scores indicate, forty departments (or nearly 28% of the total) report reliance on arrest as their usual response in all three violence scenarios mentioned; a little over half of the respondents report reliance on arrest as the usual response to two of the three scenarios; while nearly 18% report reliance on arrest in only one of the three situations. Though not shown here, there is a precise cumulative ordering to the responses: departments that report reliance on arrest in situations in which violence has been threatened only invariably report reliance on arrest in both of the remaining situations; departments which report reliance on arrest as the usual response when violence has occurred prior to the officers' arrival always report reliance on arrest as the usual response when violence occurs in the presence of officers' and all of those departments reporting arrest as the usual response to only one situation were responding affirmatively to the scenario involving violence occurring in the presence of officers (not surprisingly, the two departments that do not usually arrest under these circumstances do not usually arrest in any of the other situations either).

Validation Issues Actual police records often are subject to considerable skepticism; our

analysis injects yet another level of concern by using self-reports of whatever norms operate in a given department. While previous research (see especially Berk, Fenstermaker, and Newton 1988; Berk and Loseke 1981; Worden and Pollitz 1984) provides a solid basis for accepting the veracity of actual records regarding the disposition of domestic violence calls (by dem- onstrating a convincing correspondence between actual police records, field observation, and victim interviews), self-reports of what constitutes normal (or usual) police practice across cases raise other validity issues. In particular, a major concern is that respondents might simply report what they think departmental practice is supposed to be-in such an event, any apparent correspondence between (self-reported) practice and the presence of mandatory arrest laws might mean only that respondents are aware of the law and have tailored their reports to match what the law says department practice should be. Though an argument can be made regarding the potential significance of departmental awareness of the law in its own right and as a precondition for efforts to comply with its requirements (Buzawa 1982,1988), this is no sub- stitute for some attempt to validate these self-reports as indicators of actual departmental practice.

Ideally, of course, we would hope to examine the questions raised here with data reflecting the disposition of actual incidents and the actual share of




domestic violence incidents which result in arrest in each of a large number of jurisdictions. However, data regarding actual incidents are available almost solely in the form of observation of specific domestic violence incidents following adoption of legislation in a single jurisdiction (e.g., Birn- baum 1990), while data reflecting the total share of incidents resulting in arrest simply are unavailable now or for earlier time periods for any jurisdiction. Though single-case studies have been absolutely crucial in demonstrat- ing the need for revision and refinement in the law, they are not designed to and cannot shed light on normal police practices across a large number of jurisdictions and cannot illuminate the relative influences of alternative controls, community characteristics, or bureaucratic discretion on routine police disposition of various domestic violence situations.

Obtaining valid comparative data regarding the share of total incidents which result in arrest is even more problematic since most arrest statistics are not compiled for domestic violence as a separate category: individual incidents are lumped together with all nondomestic violence arrests under felony classifications of rape, aggravated assault, or robbery, or as misdemeanor simple assaults. Further, since data are not available regarding the total number of incidents per jurisdiction in any given time frame, it is not possible to calculate the number of arrests per incident reported in any case. Though national victimization surveys (U.S. Department of Justice, annual) do identify victim-offender relationships (at least for spouses and ex-spouses) by offense categories, along with victims' reports of police response, these data cannot be disaggregated to communities and matched to individual police department's practices or characteristics.

The best, and virtually the only, domestic violence incident data available by agency for multiple jurisdictions is collected by the small number of states which adopted mandatory statewide data reporting requirements as part of their domestic violence policy reforms (MacManus and VanHigh- tower 1989). As of 1988, four states had mandated such data collection; however, three of the four (Maine, Montana, and Massachusetts) either are not represented or are too sparsely represented in our sample to be of use for validation purposes. On the other hand, the existence of data on arrest for violations of state spousal abuse laws in California6 in 1989 does provide an opportunity to validate the self-reports of our study respondents against

6Under state laws dating to the mid-1980s, California police departments must collect and report to the state both the total number of domestic-violence related calls for assistance they receive each month and the total number of arrests they make under the state's criminal code for spousal abuse. Due to vagaries in both law and reporting practices, the two sets of data cannot be matched to one another, and the data on calls for assistance is not a reliable measure of adult male-female part- ner domestic violence (Interview with Research Analyst, Statistical Analysis Center, Division of Law Enforcement, Califomrnia Department of Justice, 1995).




actual arrest data. Such an analysis with a California subpopulation carries added weight, as the sixteen California departments responding to our 1989 survey comprise a little over 1 1% of the total respondent population (the largest state subpopulation in the study).

Our validation exercise rests on the assumption that spousal abuse arrest rates should be higher in jurisdictions in which police departments arrest the offender in most or all domestic violence incidents encountered than in jurisdictions in which departments normally rely on other means of disposition. Therefore, if self-reports of reliance on arrest are valid, we would expect to find a significant, positive relationship between self-reports of reliance on arrest as the usual means of disposing of domestic violence calls and actual arrests for spousal abuse after controlling for factors associated with jurisdictional differences in the actual incidence of domestic violence. Partial correlation analysis of the California subsample does demonstrate this predicted relationship: a positive, significant correlation (r = .51; significance = .03, one-tailed) between departments' self-reports of reliance on arrest in domestic violence situations in which violence has been threatened only7 and actual 1989 spousal abuse arrests per 100,000 population is evident, after controlling for poverty levels and housing density8 in each of these California jurisdictions. The results thus support the validity of the California departments' self-reports of normal practice as indicators of actual practice. Further, as there is no reason to assume departments in the re- mainder of the sample are any more likely to misstate their departmental practices than are their California counterparts, the results support our operationalization of the dependent variables for the entire sample as well.

Independent Variables A substantial body of research has shown a wide variety of factors to in-

fluence police exercise of discretion and, by extension, to affect the possibil- ity of controlling that discretion. We are, of course, especially interested in

7All or nearly all of the California cities reported reliance on arrest as the usual means of disposing of calls involving violence which either occurs in the officers' presence or occurred prior to the arrival of police. With about 20% of departments reporting reliance on arrest as the usual means of disposing of cases involving the threat of violence, only the threat scenario provides enough variation for analysis.

8Researchers to date have had little success in isolating any consistent community-level demographic correlates of adult domestic violence (see Sedlak 1988; Stark and Flitcraft 1988 for re- views). A variety of research suggests, however, that subpopulations that are poorly-housed and/or are under economic stress may be both at greater risk of domestic violence than the general population, and more likely to draw the attention and intervention of the police in those circumstances (Burgess and Draper 1989; Margolin, Sibner, and Gleberman 1988; Stark and Flitcraft 1988). Hence, the second-order partial correlation coefficient in this case indicates the significant association between self-reports of reliance on arrest and actual arrests when the influences of poverty levels and housing density are removed from both measures.




any links between direct orders taking the form of mandatory arrest legislation and reported police practices. To that end, we have counted as mandatory arrest jurisdictions only those jurisdictions which had in place in 1989 mandatory arrest legislation of some kind pertaining to misdemeanor or felony domestic violence offenses (this excludes cities and states with mandatory arrest laws applying only to violation of restraining orders). Some of these are state laws, some are municipal statutes (see Appendix). We use two separate dummy variables: the first indicates the presence of a state law; the second, the presence of a city law. Though the two variables do not provide mutually-exclusive categories, theory and research support consideration of each type of law separately (and the number of cases of overlap between the two are relatively small in any event).

We anticipate differential impacts on reported police practices as a consequence of the differential levels of knowledge and commitment associated with the presence of state laws versus city laws. We would expect state laws to have less influence on reported police practices than city laws. Agitation for such laws at the state level may succeed when there is only limited support for such laws within a particular jurisdiction; any usual aversion on the part of departments to arrest in these settings may be reinforced by the per- ceived lack of community pressure to enforce the state law. Furthermore, it is more difficult to enforce controls over discretionary behavior at a distance- the normal implementation gap is likely to be even greater when the impetus for change comes from another level of government (Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991). Thus, we expect city laws to be more effective than state ones; further, we expect mandatory arrest laws to be linked with a propensity to arrest. Analysts have found legal constraints to influence police practices in a number of areas in the past (Saltzstein 1989; Wasby 1976), and some case studies of changes in arrest policies in specific departments suggest a positive impact for mandatory arrest laws (Jaffe et al. 1986; and Pagelow 1992, 1993 review this research), even though other studies have been more negative about the influence of law (Buzawa 1982; Ferraro 1989; Lerman 1981).

Whatever connection we might expect between mandatory arrest laws and police disposition of domestic violence cases, we must still account for the potential influence of alternative controllers on either or both law and police practice. Hence, we include in our analysis two sets of actors that might be expected to demonstrate an interest in, and efforts to exert control over, police disposition of domestic violence cases. Previous research (Frisch 1992; MacManus and VanHightower 1989) suggests that among the most obvious alternative sources of influence on police practice in domestic violence cases are nonprofit agencies and organizations providing support to victims of domestic violence (e.g., shelters for battered women, victims' rights advocacy groups, etc.). Such groups have been vocal critics of the police for many years and have been persistent in pursuing formal and informal




channels to bring about changes in police practices (MacManus and Van- Hightower 1989). We include a dummy variable coded as one if any such organizations were present in the jurisdiction of 1989, and as a zero in the absence of such organizations at that time (National Coalition Against Do- mestic Violence 1990).

We also hypothesize that a female mayor could be another potential source of influence on police practice in domestic violence cases. Though research linking female office-holders and policy outputs generally has been very limited to date (Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Hansen 1995; Tamerius 1993), a major tenet underlying much of the research on women and politics has been the assumption that female representation in elective office can make a difference on issues affecting women. Though female mayors have been linked with outputs beneficial to women in earlier periods (Saltzstein 1986), female mayors in the late 1980s typically faced a variety of pressures along with serious resource constraints that would limit their ability to provide programs and services of specific interest to women. At the same time, female candidates, for local offices especially, have had to overcome suspi- cions of being both "soft" on crime and ineffective in standing up to the police (Boles 1995; Winning With Women 1991). By pushing mandatory arrest as an alternative to normal police disposition of domestic violence cases during this time period, female mayors could sound tough on crime and aggres- sive in their oversight of the police while providing a service to women at no financial cost. We thus include a variable indicating the presence of a female mayor in the year preceding our survey of police practice.

While we hope to account for the relative influence of alternative control mechanisms and alternative controllers on police practices in this area, we seek to do so in a manner that tests for evidence of the possible coexist- ence of bureaucratic discretion (Ringquist 1995). To that end, we include as independent variables two different measures of organizational makeup and culture that might be expected to influence police practice in this particular policy arena: departmental reliance on arrest for crimes invoking significant officer discretion, and departmental representation of women among uniformed police ranks.

Analysis has long noted considerable variation in departmental proclivities to arrest offenders (Henderson 1975; Skolnick 1966, 19; Wilson 1968), especially in regard to offense categories that invoke officer discretion. To be sure that any reported tendency to arrest in domestic violence cases is not simply a function of a general organizational propensity to resolve complaints with arrest, we control here for each department's actual ratio per 1,000 population of arrest in four offense categories involving significant officer discretion9 as an indicator of departmental arrest-propensity.

9Taken from U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports, 1988, 12-month reports for reported arrests in drunk, disorderly, vagrancy, and suspicion offense categories.




Alternatively, many analysts and advocates argue (see Oppenlander 1982; Sherman et al. 1992), domestic violence crimes are specifically (and, many argue, uniquely) associated with police discrimination against the victims, with police officer attitudes singled out as barriers to routine reliance on arrest in such cases (Buzawa 1982; Goolkasian 1986; MacManus and VanHightower 1989). Some have charged that the police may be as likely as the general public to "blame the victim" (Schechter 1982) or to subscribe to the view "that men have a right to beat and discipline their wives" (MacManus and VanHightower 1989, 272-3); police also have been found to engage in domestic violence themselves and/or condone it on the part of their colleagues (Clark 1991; Zorza 1992). These attitudes and con- sequences occur, it is argued, "largely because most police officers are men" (Sherman et al. 1992, 140). Hence, victims' advocates in this and other policy arenas10 have called for increased representation of females among uniformed police ranks as a means of introducing more diverse attitudes and greater empathy for crime victims in routine police practice, especially in regard to female victims of rape or domestic violence. Thus, we expect female representation among the ranks of uniformed officers in 1988 to have an effect on reported disposition of domestic violence calls for assistance.

We also expect various characteristics of the community to be associated with different police practices in domestic violence cases through their possible effects on both incidence levels and the nature of police reactions to community characteristics. The police in particular have been linked with highly divergent responses (especially in the provision of service functions) to various subpopulations within a jurisdiction (Brown 1981; Skolnick 1966; Wilson 1968). Various studies have suggested that such characteristics as race,11 social class, and living conditions engender different reactions from the police to domestic violence calls (Black 1971; Buel 1988; Zorza 1992). Indeed, a common model of police discretion is linked with domestic violence arrests of the "unemployed, unmarried, nonchurchgoing rifraff' only while "more respectable" suspects "go free" (Sherman et al. 1992, 142). Though no clear and consistent demographic correlates of the incidence of domestic violence have been identified (Buzawa 1988), any number of studies suggest that more cases are likely to come to the attention of the police from populations that are under economic stress and/or live in crowded or

I?See particularly the literature regarding representative bureaucracy (Meier 1993, 205-10). " Potential racial variations in either (or both) the incidence of or police response to domestic

violence have been a concern of researchers for some time. Significant multicollinearity almost always exists, however, among race and SES variables, and (perhaps as a consequence) findings have been inconclusive at best. Including the percentage of the population which is black in lieu of other highly-intercorrelated demographic variables in our models failed to demonstrate a significant relationship, hence, race is excluded from the analysis reported here.




otherwise difficult housing conditions (Burgess and Draper 1989; Gelles and Straus 1979; Margolin, Sibner, and Gleberman 1988; Stark and Flitcraft 1988). Alternatively, however, some analysts have argued that women who are poor and/or dependent on their male partners are more vulnerable in domestic violence situations and are less likely to find the police to be sympa- thetic to their plight (Zorza 1992).

We include here measures of the percentage of the population living below the poverty level and the number of persons per occupied housing unit as of 1980 as indicators of social and economic conditions in the community that have been associated with increased risk of domestic violence and with a greater likelihood of that violence drawing police attention and formal intervention (Sherman 1992b; Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991). Additionally, we include a measure of relative male/female differentials in social and economic resources (operationalized as the squared differential between male and female employment rates in each community12), with the expectation that higher levels of female economic dependence relative to those of men will be associated with lower levels of reported police reliance on arrest in domestic violence cases.

One final independent variable is included in the form of a dummy variable singling out the South for comparison with all other parts of the country. Though we retain considerable skepticism about regional explanations in general, we feel that any number of factors suggest a possibly significant role for Southern location in police handling of domestic violence offenses in particular. For example, various analysts have noted that police in the South show a propensity to arrest in "order maintenance and victimless crimes" (see Swanson 1979 for summary); indeed, Southern cities in this sample make discretionary arrests at an average rate that is 50% higher than non-Southern cities (12.45/1,000 population versus 8.42/1,000) in the sample.

On one hand, this tendency to rely on arrest to resolve disputes might suggest that Southern cities would report reliance on arrest in domestic violence disputes more frequently than non-Southern cities. On the other hand, the South is associated with a more traditional political and social culture that has been linked with resistance to women's rights legislation in earlier periods (Hansen 1995); indeed, Southern departments in this sample are significantly less likely than non-Southern ones to function under either a state

12The functional form of this variable is dictated by our expectation that larger employment differentials indicate the presence of both larger numbers of women who are economically dependent upon men (and thus potentially more vulnerable to domestic violence) and of community-wide perceptions of male status advantages which might translate into greater police deference to males (and less sympathy for females) involved in domestic violence incidents. Hence, the variable is the squared differential.




or a city mandatory arrest law.13 Domestic disputes traditionally have been viewed as private ones, and traditional norms and values often give considerable deference to male dominance (even physical dominance) of the household. Similarly, domestic violence issues might very well play into any lingering effects of race and class in Southern police practices (Wilson 1968, 13), both of which have been associated with differential treatment of black or poor offenders or victims (Buel 1988; Zorza 1992) in domestic violence cases generally. If cultural biases of this sort are more evident in the South today, Southern location may influence police practice in ways that are not captured by differential arrest ratios or by other significant variations in community or organizational demographics.

Analysis Table 2 provides the analysis of the impact of mandatory arrest laws and

other factors on reported police responses to two of the three separate domestic violence scenarios. These two dichotomous dependent variables, involving violence which occurred prior to officers' arrival or which had been threatened only, are subjected to probit analysis. The dependent variable measuring reported police responses to domestic violence which occurs in the presence of the police is excluded from the analysis of individual incident scenarios due to insufficient variation in response patterns (see Table 1). The polychotomous summary variable was examined through ordered probit (see Dubin and Rivers 1990, 59; Kennedy 1992, 231; McKelvey and Zavoina 1975); those results are not reported here, as they essentially mirror those reported in Table 2 regarding threatened violence.

As is evident in Table 2, the data regarding the two scenarios involving violence which occurred prior to officers' arrival and that in which violence had been threatened only provide us with little or no support for the "anti- rifraff' thesis of police disposition of domestic violence calls-neither increased community poverty nor housing density prove to be significantly related to reported police reliance on arrest in either of these two incident scenarios. Likewise, we find little or no support to suggest that the presence of female mayors or domestic violence organizations, or general departmental proclivities to arrest in discretionary situations, have an impact on propensity to report arrest in these domestic violence situations. In regard to violence which has occurred prior to the arrival of police (Column 1 of Table 2), reported police disposition of such calls is significantly associated with

13South/non-South mean scores regarding the presence of mandatory arrest laws equal .06/ .21 for state laws, .17/.37 for city laws. Only one Southern state had a mandatory arrest law in effect as of 1989; analysts singled it out as having seemingly clear mandatory arrest language that was not being "interpreted as mandating arrest" (National Center of Women and Family Law, Inc. July 1992, 8).




Table 2. Effects of Changes in Explanatory Variables of Probit Model for Dependent Variables in Two Domestic Violence Scenarios (N = 145)

Report Arrest Report Arrest When Violence Occurs When Violence

Independent Variables Prior to Officer's Arrival Threatened Only

MLE Impacta MLE Impact

Constant -.33 -2.11 (2.20)b (2.47)

Mandatory arrest law .72 .0495 .53** .0607 in effect in state (.58) (.34)

Mandatory arrest law .30 .0276 .87*** .1321 in effect in city (.35) (.28)

South -1.12*** -.1639 -.77*** -.1000 (.33) (.33)

Domestic violence organization -.19 -.0165 .32 .0342 in city (.46) (.40)

% Female protective service .04* .0426 .006 .0091 (.03) (.03)

Percent in poverty -.02 -.0239 -.01 -.0146 (.03) (.03)

Persons per housing unit .65 .0256 .61 .0375 (.67) (.78)

Discretionary arrest rate -.002 .0045 .01 .0278 (.015) (.01)

Female mayor -.07 -.0046 -.07 -.0059 (.43) (.41)

Squared difference in adult male -.001 -.0195 -.003* -.0767 vs. female employment (.002) (.002)

Baseline prediction rate 80.69 72.41 Percent correctly predicted 80.00 77.93

*p < .10, one-tailed test; **p < .05, one-tailed test; ***p < .01, one-tailed test.

aThe change in the probability of arrest per 1 Sigma change in Independent Variable. bStandard errors in parentheses.

only geographical location and the level of female representation among uniformed police officers. Southern location is associated with substantially lower levels of reported reliance on arrest (at a significance level well below .0005 in a one-tailed test). Indeed, meaningful variation in reported reliance on arrest in this particular scenario occurs almost entirely within the South;




though not shown here, virtually all non-Southern cities (almost 93%) report arrest as the usual response to violence occurring prior to the arrival of police, compared to a little less than two-thirds of Southern departments.

We also find reported reliance on arrest in this situation to be positively and significantly linked to the level of female representation among uniformed police officers in 1988: the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in the percentage of women on the police force results in a 4.26% increase in the probability that police will report arrest as the usual response when violence has occurred prior to their arrival on the scene. As noted earlier, situations that involve violence that has occurred prior to the officers' arrival inevitably require officers to exercise considerable judgment on a score of questions regarding the nature and severity of any conflict, which party instigated the violence and/or was the primary aggressor, and so on; previous research (cited earlier) has found the judgment of many male police officers to be less than supportive of female victims in such situations. Our finding of a significant link between the level of representation of women among the ranks of uniformed police officers and reported reliance on arrest in such cases thus is in keeping with general arguments in support of representative bureaucracy as well as specific arguments regarding the potential influence of female police officers on the treatment of female victims; at a minimum, it may suggest that departments that are receptive to female employment on the force may also follow practices that are more sensitive to female victims. However, the failure of our model to improve upon the baseline prediction rate necessitates a restrained assessment of the predictive value of even significant relationships.

The model proves more useful in accounting for reported reliance on arrest in domestic violence situations involving only threatened violence (Col- umn 2 of Table 2) and for reported reliance on arrest in all three situations (the summary measure; results not shown). Reported disposition of these incident calls is most strongly and significantly associated with Southern location, with male/female employment differentials, and with the presence of city and state arrest laws. Departments in communities exhibiting greater differentials between male and female employment rates (i.e., greater female economic dependence relative to men) are less likely to report reliance on arrest. Likewise, though Southern/non-Southern differences are not as pro- nounced as regards violence which occurred prior to the arrival of police, departments in the South are also much less likely to report reliance on arrest in cases involving threatened violence (significance equal .005, one- tailed). On the other hand, departments operating under state and/or city mandatory arrest laws are much more likely to report reliance on arrest when violence has been threatened only than are departments not operating under such laws.




Thus, in the sample as a whole, we find evidence of a positive association between female police representation and reliance on arrest when violence occurred prior to officers' arrival; strong effects due to Southern location in nearly all scenarios; and strong positive associations between mandatory arrest laws coupled with a negative association between female economic dependence in the community and reported departmental reliance on arrest in cases involving threatened violence and across all three scenarios.

As noted previously, non-Southern respondents nearly unanimously report reliance on arrest as the usual response both when violence is committed in the presence of officers as well as when it was committed prior to officers' arrival; nearly 40% report reliance on arrest when violence has been threatened only (the result being a mean score of 2.3 on the summary variable for the non-Southern subsample). In comparison, a fraction more than 65% of Southern departments report reliance on arrest when violence occurred prior to the arrival of officers while barely 13% report arrest in cases involving threatened violence (for a mean score of 1.76 on the summary variable). Even after controlling for factors associated with Southern distinc- tiveness (i.e., significantly higher discretionary arrest rates, higher poverty, and higher housing density), Southern departments prove to be significantly less likely than non-Southern ones to report arrest as their usual response to all domestic violence situations other than those which occur in the presence of police officers.

Yet, after accounting for the strong effects of Southern location and all other factors, we find mandatory arrest laws to have a significant effect on reported police response to domestic violence calls, most notably in regard to situations involving violence which has been threatened only. As noted previously, there was no clear consensus as of 1989 regarding appropriate practice in cases in which violence is threatened but has not occurred at the time of the officers' arrival, and only a handful of jurisdictions included threatened violence in their domestic violence statutes. Of the three domestic violence scenarios, threatened violence finds the smallest number of departments reporting arrest as their usual response, and results in the greatest variability across departments in reported responses. Yet, even though most mandatory arrest laws do not address threats of violence, we find strong relationships between the presence of city and state mandatory arrest laws and reported reliance on arrest in such situations. Thus, it appears that arrest laws predominately addressing other violence scenarios may serve a cue-giving function regarding response in a less-settled area. Further, the impacts vary as expected with the locus of arrest legislation: though both city and state laws are significant, city laws have a greater impact on the probability that a department reports reliance on arrest than state laws (predicted probabilities equal 13% vs. 6%, respectively).




Conclusions Several major conclusions emerge from this analysis. The first is that

political principals apparently can influence the behavior of bureaucratic agents through issuance of direct orders, even in a difficult-to-control setting dependent upon the actions of street-level bureaucrats. Specifically, the presence of direct orders in the form of state or local mandatory arrest laws proves to be strongly linked to reported police reliance on arrest both in domestic violence calls involving threatened violence and in domestic violence cases overall. Second, the analysis does provide evidence of bureaucratic discretion coexisting with the exercise of political control in this arena. For example, increased female representation among police officers is linked with increased reliance on arrest when violence has occurred prior to the arrival of the police, while possible police deference to male status advantages is linked to decreased reliance on arrest when violence has been threatened only. Additionally, the analysis suggests that the exercise of both political control and bureaucratic discretion as well as the interrelations between the two may be highly context-dependent. In the case of domestic violence, location matters: Southern communities generally are much less likely than their non-Southern counterparts to pass mandatory arrest laws, to interpret existing state law as requiring arrest, or to be served by police departments which report arrest as their usual disposition of domestic violence incidents.

Our results thus have related scholarly and policy implications. In extending recent empirical tests of political control/bureaucratic response and principal-agent relationships to a bureaucratically- and politically-complex arena, we find evidence of political control, of bureaucratic discretion coexisting with that control, and of variable context-specific effects as well. This does suggest that examination of a broader array of control mechanisms in a wider variety of settings might add to scholarship in this area. Likewise, our analysis lends support to those who seek to employ direct orders as a means of changing policy when the prevailing practices of bureaucratic agents are decidedly at odds with the strongly-felt preferences of aroused political principals. In both arenas, however, our results also suggest the complex nature of the relationship between political control and bureaucratic response: bureaucratic discretion and context-specific factors may enhance or impede the effects of even apparently unambiguous direct orders. In sum, our results suggest that the interactive nature of bureaucratic control/response requires considerable fine tuning, both in identifying and testing relevant relationships and in crafting more effective controls.

Manuscript submitted 24 February 1997. Final manuscript received 15 July 1997.




APPENDIX

Sample Police Departments Operating under Municipal Mandatory Arrest Laws, 1986

Berkeley, CA Lexington, KY San Diego, CA Buffalo, NY Long Beach, CA San Francisco, CA Colorado Springs, CO Los Angeles, CA South Bend, IN Columbus, OH Milwaukee, WI* Springfield, IL Dallas, TX Minneapolis, MN Stamford, CT* Dayton, OH Newport News, VA Tacoma, WA* Denver, CO New York, NY Tampa, FL Flint, MI Oakland, CA Toledo, OH Fort Worth, TX Orlando, FL Tulsa, OK Fresno, CA Philadelphia, PA Waterbury, CT* Gary, IN Portland, OR* Washington, DC Hartford, CT* Richmond, VA Jersey City, NJ* Riverside, CA Knoxville, TN Sacramento, CA Las Vegas, NV* St. Louis, MO

*State mandatory arrest laws also apply

Source: Ellen G. Cohn and Lawrence W. Sherman. 1987. "Police Policy on Domestic Violence, 1986: A National Survey." Washington, DC: Crime Control Institute.

Sample Police Departments Operating under State Mandatory Arrest Laws, 1989

Atlantic City, NJ New Orleans, LA Baton Rouge, LA Norwalk, CT Davenport, IA Plainfield, NJ Des Moines, IA Portland, OR* Hartford, CT* Providence, RI Jersey City, NJ* Racine, WI Lafayette, LA Shreveport, LA Las Vegas, NV* Stamford, CT* Milwaukee, WI* Tacoma, WA* New Brunswick, NJ Waterbury, CT* New Haven, CT

*Municipal mandatory arrest laws also present

Sources: National Center on Women and Family Law. 1992. Item No. 67. "Mandatory Arrest." New York; MacManus and VanHightower. 1989. "Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies." Public Administration Review, 49(3), 269-78; Buzawa and Buzawa. 1990. Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response. Sage Publications.




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democratic control and bureaucratic responsiveness: the police and domestic violence

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