Deontological Ethics

From Jane Eyre, the end of Chapter XXVII:(Mr. Rochester is the first speaker)

“And what a distortion in your judgment, what a perversity in your ideas, is proved by yourconduct! Is it better to drive a fellow-creature to despair than to transgress a mere humanlaw, no man being injured by the breach? for you have neither relatives nor acquaintanceswhom you need fear to offend by living with me?”

This was true: and while he spoke my very conscience and reason turned traitors againstme, and charged me with crime in resisting him. They spoke almost as loud as Feeling: andthat clamoured wildly. ”Oh, comply!” it said. ”Think of his misery; think of his dangerlook at his state when left alone; remember his headlong nature; consider the recklessnessfollowing on despair soothe him; save him; love him; tell him you love him and will be his.Who in the world cares for you ? or who will be injured by what you do?”

Still indomitable was the reply “ I care for myself. The more solitary, the more friendless,the more unsustained I am, the more I will respect myself. I will keep the law given by God;sanctioned by man. I will hold to the principles received by me when I was sane, and not madas I am now. Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation: they arefor such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; stringentare they; inviolate they shall be. If at my individual convenience I might break them, whatwould be their worth? They have a worth so I have always believed; and if I cannot believe itnow, it is because I am insane quite insane: with my veins running fire, and my heart beatingfaster than I can count its throbs. Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations, are all Ihave at this hour to stand by: there I plant my foot.”

I did. Mr. Rochester, reading my countenance, saw I had done so.

Deontological Ethics

I Deontological ethics says that being good consists infollowing the right rules/meeting all your obligations.

I Unlike consequentialism, it is highly un-situational. (e.g. ifkilling is wrong, it is always wrong even if killing someonewill save 1 million lives).

I Rules could come from anywhere; for instance, W. D. Rossthought that it was self-evident that we had the followingobligations:

1. Fidelity

2. Reparation

3. Gratitude

4. Justice

5. Harm-Prevention

6. Self-Improvement

7. Non-Malfeasance

I Many people are not satisfied with a mere list of rules, butinstead want a systematic answer to what determines therules.

Deontological Ethics

Kantian ethics rests on two majorclaims:

1. The sole source of moralgoodness is the Will

2. A Good Will is one which actsfrom universalizable reasons

Immanuel Kant(1724-1804)

The Will as the source of goodness

I In looking to what we should actually ascribe the word“good”, Kant first rules out abilities/talents, becausethese can be used for evil.

I He also rules out consequences, because those are notultimately up to us, and goodness should not be based onluck.

I The only thing we always have control over is our will−wecan choose what policies to enact within our own minds.

The Will as the source of goodness

I The fact that the will is the source of goodness is furtherconfirmed by the fact that reason is the thing which ismost distinctively human.

I Reason is very bad at making us happy (just consider howmuch happier most animals are), so our end purposecannot be happiness.

I The only thing reason is good for is allowing us to considerand follow good principles/maxims.

The Categorical Imperative

I Moral claims are imperatives.

I There are two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical andcategorical.

I A hypothetical imperative is conditional. It says “if youwant to get X, then you should do Y”

I A categorical imperative is unconditional. It says “Youshould do Y”

I According to Kant, only one imperative could rise to thelevel of being a categorical imperative; hence it is thecategorical imperative

The Categorical Imperative

I The Categorical Imperative: Act only on maxims that youcan simultaneously will to become a universal law

I This is sometimes put, “don’t make an exception ofyourself.”

I To put it another way, suppose that any time you acted itinstantly became the case that everyone else acted in thesame way (acted on the same reasons). If you could notcoherently still act in that way, or if you would no longerdesire to act in that way, then you should not act on thatreason.

Why think that the Categorical Imperative is true?

Act only on rules that you can simultaneously will to become auniversal law

I If we act, we are acting on a principle

I A principle is something like “one should hurt those whohurt you” or “one should try to make others happy”

I If I think that principle is true, then it would be irrationalfor me to think that others should not act on it. That is, ifI think it is right to act on the principle “take what youcan, give nothing back” then by the very nature of it beinga principle, I also think that others should act on it.

I If I cannot coherently will everyone to act on a principle,then I cannot will myself to act on that principle.Principles are not the sorts of things that can apply to oneindividual.

Why think that the Categorical Imperative is true?

Act only on maxims that you can simultaneously will to becomea universal law

I It is irrational to think that I should act a certain waywhile thinking that society should be held to a differentstandard.

I There are no moral principles we must act on other thanthe principles that we give ourselves. But there arerational requirements on the principles such that moralityis not just whatever we want it to be or think it should be.

“the laws to which [one] is subject are only those ofhis own giving, though at the same time they areuniversal, and that he is only bound to act inconformity with his own will; a will, however, which isdesigned by nature to give universal laws” −Kant

Applying the Categorical Imperative

Act only on maxims that you can simultaneously will to becomea universal law

There are primarily two ways Kant thinks we can fail to followthe categorical imperative.

(1) We can act on a principle which we cannot consistentlyconceive of as a universal law. Here he gives two examples:

I Suppose one has no desire to live. She wants to act on aprinciple that she kill herself because it would be helpful toherself; but the very idea of helping oneself implies notharming oneself, so this is an incoherent desire.

I Suppose a man needs to borrow money which he knows hewill not be able to pay back. If he were to desire thateveryone who needed money borrow it with no intention ofpaying it back, then he is in fact imagining a scenario inwhich no one lends money. He thus cannot consistentlydesire that everyone borrow money without intending to payit back, because this is conceiving an inconsistent scenario.

(2) We can act on a principle which we cannot consistently willto be a universal law. Again, he gives two examples:

I Suppose a woman could further work hard and develop hertalents to benefit society, but instead she desires to be lazyand self-centered. She cannot consistently desire to be lazyinstead of developing herself, because then she would bedesiring to have never developed any talents (which shedoes not desire).

I A man has extra money but doesn’t want to give to theneedy. He cannnot consistently will this, because if he wereto be needy, he would not will this, so he cannot in factdesire that everyone do likewise.

The Other? Categorical ImperativeI Kant actually states the categorical imperative 3 different

ways.I The 3rd is very similar to the first, so we won’t worry

about itI The second, however, is “So act that you use humanity,

whether in your own person or in the person of any other,always at the same time as an end, never merely as ameans”

I The basis for this is that humans are rational creatures,therefore we have aims/desires.

I One should always treat rational creatures as equals, asfellow moral agents with their own desires and purposes

I Kant does not say that we cannot use people as means toan end, but merely that we must also always treat them asends in themselves

I Kant thinks that this second formula is equivalent to thefirst, and goes through his cases again to show that itgives the same results

More examples

How should Kant evaluate the following?

I Abortion

I Partying

I Nuclear bombs

I Divorce

Why follow the Categorical Imperative?

I Deontological ethics says that one should act on principleswhich she wishes to be universalized; that no one shouldmake an exception of themselves.

I The egoist and nihilist specifically want to make specialrules for themselves so that they can get everything theywant for themselves.

I Kant’s response is based on the nature of what he callsautonomy.

Why follow the Categorical Imperative?

I We are autonomous when we are in control of ourselves,exercising our free will.

I Autonomy seems like a desirable thing; if we are notautonomous, we just kinda do things without those thingsactually being guided by our rationality and desires.

I However, Kant argues, we are only autonomous when weare following the categorical imperative.

I Roughly, to make an exception of ourselves is to beirrational.

I If I think that I should cheat others, but others should notcheat me, then I am contradicting myself. I am tellingmyself to do something that I don’t think should be done,which is just to be irrational.

I If I am acting irrationally rather than on principles, then Iam not autonomous.

Why follow the Categorical Imperative?

I To put the point another way, I have to be acting forreasons in order to be acting rationally (or freely).

I Reasons, by their very nature, are things that we think aretrue.

I If I think it is true that I should A, but I think it is falsethat someone else should A, then I think the same thing isboth true and false and am being irrational.

I Where this ultimately leaves us is that Kant can say thatthe egoist and nihilist are irrational and therebynon-autonomous.

I Suppose the egoist responds, “thats ok, I like beingirrational because it makes me happy!” What else canKant say? Has he said enough?

Problems for Deontology

I Once again, one of the ways we evaluate a normative ethicis if we think it generally tells us the right thing to do invarious cases

I Once again, this evidence appears mixed

I One noteworthy feature which may be considered bad orgood is that the categorical imperative does not always saywhat to do. Sometimes there may be one forbiddenaction, but many permissible actions, and Kant does notsay which is the best

I There are other problems, such as Kant’s distinctionbetween acting from duty and acting in accordance withduty, which seems to many to be wrong.

I One remaining difficulty deserves to be especiallyhighlighted: the problem of how broad maxim’s aresupposed to be.

Problems for Deontology

I Whether or not we can or do wish a rule to beuniversalized seems to depend a lot on how specific amaxim is.

I If we consider the case of borrowing money withoutintending to give it back, then if the maxim on which wewere acting were “anyone with my DNA sequence shouldborrow money with no intention to pay it back” then weprobably could coherently imagine and will such a scenario.

I Kant thinks we should not do this, so he needs maxims tobe broader claims, such as “one should borrow moneywithout intending to pay it back”; a maxim of that sortplausibly could not be universalized.

Problems for Deontology

I Whether or not we can or do wish a rule to beuniversalized seems to depend a lot on how specific amaxim is.

I As maxim’s get more general, other moral problems seemto crop up. For instance, “everyone should lie” could notbe coherently willed as a universal law, so instead weshould act on the maxim “everyone should tell the truth.”This seems fine, until we consider scenarios in which theNazi’s are at the door and asking if you are harboring Jewsin your house...

I Despite these problems, Kant accepts the results. To claimthat we have a different moral obligation regarding truthwhen we are harboring Jewish people from Nazis is just tonot understand what it is for a imperative to be“categorical” rather than hypothetical.

Religious Deontological Ethics

I A lot of people have thought that we should get ourethical rules from religious sources (Torrah, Bible, Quran,catechism, etc)

I Quite different from Kant, the rules in these systems donot come from you, but from God (mediated by humanswriting them down)

I It is difficult to evaluate these views as normative ethics,because there is sufficient disagreement between themabout what exactly we should do (and there are a lot ofethical situations that do not appear to be talked about inthese texts)

I Instead, I want to mainly focus on religious deontology asit relates to meta-ethics−why be ethical?

Religious Meta-ethics

I From very early in human history, humans have said thatthey should do good so that they may be blessed by thegod(s).

I According to this way of thinking, the egoist and nihilistare foolish because they do not understand that there is adivine law by which they will be punished, in this life orthe next.

I If the sacred text tells us what God wants, then if we arebeing good to please God, we should do what the sacredtext says.

I However, there is a very famous problem for thisposition−the Euthyphro dilemma.

Religious Meta-ethicsI The Euthyphro dilemma can be stated as a question:

Are things good because God says they are good,or does God say they are good because they aregood?

I If they are good because God says they are good, thenethics seems arbitrary−what if tomorrow God decides thatmurder is good and feeding the poor is bad; do we reallywant to say that it would then be good to kill people andbad to feed the poor?

I If God says they are good because they are good, thenGod is merely recognizing goodness−things are right orwrong independently of God. Perhaps God is very skilledat recognizing good and evil, so sacred texts could still begood for telling us the answers on things, but ethics nomore depends on God than gravity depends on physicists.

I Both options seem bad, so how might the defender of thereligious answer respond?

Horn 1: Ethics are Arbitrary

I Søren Kierkegaard was a Danish philosopher of the early19th century who defended the position that right andwrong depend entirely on what God declares to be rightand wrong.

I His prime example that he used to illustrate this was thebiblical story of Abraham and Isaac.

I Recall that in the story, God asks Abraham to sacrifice hisson Isaac. Just before this occurs, God stops him andexplains that it was ultimately a test of Abraham’sdevotion to God.

Horn 1: Ethics are Arbitrary

I Should Abraham have been willing to follow God’s order tokill his son?

I Did God have the right to command murder? Should areligious person today kill someone if God commandedthem?

I According to Kierkegaard, the only faith worth having is afaith that can ask us to do otherwise irrational things. Ifwe were not willing to receive ridiculous commands, likekilling your son or marching around a wall, then we don’treally have faith. Sure ethics could seem somewhatarbitrary if you could be told murder used to be wrong butnow is right, but on the other hand, if you think God isgood, why not think that all his judgments are good?

Horn 2: God is the Enforcer

I Suppose, on the other hand, that God says things aregood because they are good.

I This means there is an ethical standard independent ofGod to which God himself is subject.

I If this is the case, in what way can we still say that God isrelevant to ethics (particularly relevant to the egoist andnihilist)?

I One thing that could be said is that God might tell uswhat is right and wrong in sacred texts. While this isrelevant, it is not relevant to the egoist and nihilist otherthan informing them that they are factually wrong in theirbeliefs.

Horn 2: God is the Enforcer

I What is more relevant is if God acts as a divine lawenforcer. Many religions believe in some sort of karmicsystem where God(s) punish evil and reward good, in thislife or the next.

I If this is the case, the rational egoist should do good andavoid evil out of self-interest; if she continues to do evil,she is just really bad at trying to achieve her aims ofhappiness.

I Does this actually motivate people? Should it?

I Do we see these punishment and rewards in this life?

I Should we like a God that acts like this?

I Is God then a grown-up version of Santa Claus?

Splitting the Horns: God’s character

I Some philosophers have tried to find a third option bysaying that morality depends on God (so it is not a higherstandard), but it is not arbitrary or changing because itdepends on his unchanging character (not his will).

I Good is whatever is like the character of God, and bad iswhatever is unlike the character of God.

I Assuming God’s character is not changing or arbitrary,ethics will not be changing or arbitrary.

Splitting the Horns: God’s characterI Suppose this is a legitimate 3rd option, so what? If saying

“action A is good,” means the same thing as “action A isin line with God’s character,” why does this matter to theegoist or nihilst?

I For one thing, they are now both factually wrong. Thenihilist is wrong because there is in fact a good and a bad;the egoist is most likely wrong because it is unlikely thatwhat is in one’s selfish interest is always in line with God’scharacter (consider the fact that sometimes lying will be inone’s self-interest, and sometimes telling the truth will bein one’s self-interest).

I One might claim, as some utilitarians claim, that it isanalytically true that “one ought to seek the good,” andthis theory is merely spelling out what being good consistsin.

I This system can still say that God is a lawenforcer−rewarding those who do good and punishingthose who do evil.

Evaluating Religious Deontological Ethics

This still leaves open a lot of questions:

I How could we know what the character of God is like?

I Which of the many religious traditions (if any) gives us theright normative ethics?

I What if God’s character seems really bad to us (such aswith the wars and plagues of the old testament)?

I Should we like a God that polices the world in this way?