CHAPTER-4

Descartes Dualism and Derridean Deconstruction: A Comparison and Contrast

4.01 INTRODUCTION:

W c, in this chapter, shall expound and cxamll1e the basic

charges leveled by Jacques Derrida on the philosophy of Rene

Descartes. As a matter of fact, Descartes philosophy can be broadly

divided into two parts. First, the issues which are at the centre of his

philosophy like Cogito, rationality, scientific knowledge, existence of

God, existence of matter etc. And secondly, the issues which are at the

margins of his philosophy like dreams, madness, deception, demon,

fantasy etc. Derrida's critic of Descartes implies a deconstruction of

the central issues of Descartes' philosophy. And at the same time

bringing at the centre those issues which arc at the margins of

Descartes' philosophy. I-Iuman subjectivity, rationalism, truth are

subjected to rigorous criticism by Derrida. We shall therefore,

examll1e Derrida's critique of Descartes Cogito, rationality, scientific

knowledge etc. On this basis we shall develop Derridas deconstruclion

which centres around Descartes doctrine of dream, madness,

deception, fantasy, etc.

4.02 DERRIDA & FOUCAULT

We shall also dwell on the debate between Foucault and Derrida

regarding their reading of Cartesian text. To make it so comprehensive

113

we would like to divide this debate into two sections. In the first

section we will discuss about the Foucauldian reading of Cartesian

text and in the section two we will discuss about Dcrrida's rejection of

Foucauldian reading of Cartesian text. Derrida's own reading of

Cartesian text emerges in this process. We will develop the 'doubt'

'Cogito' and the existence of God' of Descartes in order to make a

comparison between Descartes and Den·ida. We will develop the

debate through the Cogito and the "History 0/ Madness" and "Sign.

Structure and play in the Human Science", in Writing And difference

and Foucault's History o/Madness.

4.03 DESCARTES FOUNDATION:

Rene Descartes as we have seen has developed the isslles like

human SUbjectivity, rationalism, Cogito and the existence of God,

which provide the ground work and the elaboration of debate between

structuralism and post-structuralism (particularly between Michael

Foucault and Jacques Derrida). We would like to develop the above

issues in order to understand the debate well. This study will provide

some new understanding by the debate between structuralism and

post-structuralism, i.e. Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

114

Rene Descartes has subjected the issues like s u bj ect i v i t y"

rationalism, development of science which are under the rigorious

criticism. Derrida and Michael Foucault, both have rejected Cartesian

concepts by their own ways of interpretation. Foucault has taken the

above issues and interpreted it in a different manner. A new scenario

has been found in the foundation of Cartesian subjectivity. Here to

make clear about Derrida's and Foucault's positions on Cartesian text,

Dalia .ludovitz says "if for Foucault, Descartes exclusion of madness is

instrumental in the fuundation of reason. for Derrida madn(;ss and

dreams, arc merely stages for the introduction of hyporbolic doubt.

which through its figurative function generates an access that comes to

define subjectivity in terms of a rational economy", I

4.04 DERRIDA AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS

Foucault has emphasized over the uses of madness in Descartes

whereas Derrida as madness and dream related with the introduction

of doubt only. Both have defined subjectivity and the exclusion of

madness from foundation of reason in Descartes. Foucault and Derrida

Judovitz Dalia, CUl7tinentu/ Phi/usuphy - II, Derridu und DeconstructiolJ, By Hugh J. Selverman, New York and London, Routledge, 1lJ89, pAO.

115

have given different statlls to the orIgin or reason. Reason is

constructed through the 'totalising gesture' or hyperbolic doubt. This

very 'concept of reason' leads to Saussure's structural foundation

which we already have mentioned.

Derrida in writing and difference says,

" .... Michael Foucault devotes three pages - and moreover

in a kind of prologue to his second chapter to a certain

passage from the first of Descartes' meditations. [n this

passage madness, folly, dementia, insanity seem,

emphasized seen. dismissed excluded, and ostracized

rrom the circle of philosophical dignity ..... Descartes -

this last tribunal of a cogito that, by its essence, could not

possibly be mad".2

[t shows that Derrida took only three pages in Foucault's text

which are taken from Descartes tirst meditation. And Cog ito IS

rational which excludes madness from the philosophical attention of

Descartes. Derrida disagrees with Foucault's explanation of Descartes.

In his Language-

Dcrrida Jacque; Wriling ond Difference, Trans. Allan Bass, (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1(76), p.32.

116

" ... Cartesian Cogito proposed to us engages III its

problematic the totality of this historv o/mudness ... "3

Descartes Cog/to or Sensory foundation is simple denounce In

order to get clarity and certainty in the mcditation. i3ut in order to get

a clear explanation regarding 'madness'-\et's expound his Meditation

where he has used madness two times.

We already have discussed the First meditation in the second

chapter of our thesis, which ends on the note of apparently universal

doubt. Let us IW\V think about the Clrst meditation where both the

thinkers begin tlll.:ir debate. In order to get indubitable knowledgc

Descartes needs to re-examine the foundations and opinions of his

predecessors. llowever lkscartcs effort entailed him a wonderful

result which is certitude.

Though we have mentioned this quotation in our earlier chapter

but still to get a clarity, we will mention it here also. In order to

explain the deceptive and uncertain nature of the senses, Descartes

writes,

Derrida Jacque; Writing and Difference, Trans. Allan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976. p.32.

1\7

"I have sometimes found that these senses played me

false and it is prudent never to tusk entirely those who

have once deceived us".4

This doubt is the turning point and leads Descartes to <: fixed

point from which he reconstructs the world. In the Firs! A1ecii!afiol7

Descartes says

"All that up to the present time I have accepted as most

true and certain, I have learned either from senses or

through the senses~ but it is sometimes proved- to me that

these senses are deceptive and it is wiser 110t to trust

entirely to anything by which we have once been

deceived".5

Descartes has concluded never to trust anything which has once

deceived. Descartes introduced the malign demon who has employed

all his energies in deceiving him. Descartes says,

"S uppose therefore that all the things 1 see are false; I

persuade mysel f that none of those things ever existed

that my deceptive memory represents to me; I suppose I

Descartes Rene, Discourse on method and the meditations, trnas. by fE. Sutdiffe (Penguine book 1979) p.96.

Ibid .. p.96.

I 18

•

have no senses: I believe that body, tigure. extension. -

movement and place are only fictions of my mind. what,

then shall be considered true'? Perhaps only this, that

there is nothing certain in the world".6

Here Descartes placed body, figure earth, shapes, sounds all are

simple delusions of dreams.

The "Method of doubt" in Descartes is placed at the center or

the debate between Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Derrida has

expounded his critique of Foucault in his later essay "Sign. structure

and play in the human sciecnes", and "Cogito and the history of

madness" in Writing and Difference.

Derrida observes Foucault, in his book History of Madness, and

it basically deals with two series of questions: First is the

interpretation of Descartes intention, proposed to us justifiable?

Secondly, Can madness be regarded as a philosophical issue?

These questions have two implications namely

Ibid, p.102.

119

(a) I lave \V e fully understood the sign its e I t'? Or do we per c e 1 \ e

what Descartes has mentioned?

(b) The Sccond implication of the first question. does the question

number one has the historical meaning assigned to it? [n other ~ ~

\,,'ords has Foucault given a meaning to Cartesian philosophy or

does it have the historical meaning descend to it? Before \ve

explain the above questions lets have a watch on "interiority of

the mind" in Descartes where he questioned the foundation of

knowledge. authority and legitimization.

An important consequence rollowed rrom Descartes hyperbolic

doubt that in case or dream and madness we are not even able to

rccognize the thing as such. Descartcs says.

"But it may be that although the senses sometimes

deceive us concerning things which we cannot reasonably

have only doubt, although we recognize them by their

means. For example there is the fact that I am here seated

by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper

in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I

deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not

perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons devoid

120

or sense whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by

black vapours of black bile .... I should be any less insane

were I follow example so extravagant".7

Foucault gives importance to this passage and claims a

!'undamental imbalance what he called "the economy of doubt"

between madness and dreams. Foucault says,

"dreams or illusions are surmounted within the structure

of truth but madness is inadmissible for the doubting

s u bj ec t" . X

Derrida responds Foucault's above said claims about the

exclusion of madness. Fouccault goes against the philosophical

tradition or interpretation of madness by differentiating between

dream <ll1d Ill<ldness. hLUcClult brings a different nature to both and can

function independent of each other. By doing this Foucault constitute a

new thought what Derrida calls "the advent of ratio" which leads

madness to silence.

Descartes Rene, Discourse on method and the Meditations trans. by F.E. Sutcliffe (Penguine book), p.1 02.

Foucault ell iehcl, !-'o/te-et-deraision; L 'it istone de la FI/te ul 'uge clussii.fue, quotation from [)aliazudovitz, Descartes and Den'ida, Econumizing thought, in C(}nlinental {'hilos()phy Ii (ed). 11..1 silverman New York, London, Routledge, 1989, pA4.

121

4.05 DESCARTE'S DREAM AND MADNESS:

But before discussing Foucauldian concept of madness,

insanity, dream in details, we would like to develop Descartes' notion

ur dream and madness. Uescartes' hyperbolic doubt brings an

important consequence. i3ut it is not only our problem but also we may

be deceived some times which we even not know or be able to

recognise it as sLlch i.e. in the case or dream and madness. Descartes

"But it may be that although the sense somctimes deceive

us concerning things which are hardly perccptible, or

\'Cry far away. there are yet many others to be met with as

to which we can't reasonably have any doubt although

we recognise dream and Madness".9

No doubt Descartes has emphasised over the things which are

hardly perceptible.

Descartes Rene, Method and Meditations by John cottingham etc. 1l)~6, pp.

122

4.06 DERRIDA AND MADNESS

For Derrida Foucault is the first who isolated madness from

dreams and sensation. In Writing And Difference, Den'ida says,

"Descartes is not concerned here with determining the

notion of insanity but rather to ask questions regarding

the general truth of ideas".1 0

Further Derrida says,

"it is in the case of sleep, and not in that 01" insanity, that

the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes

suspect" .11

Derrida took some or the totalizing qualities or doubt and

defined madness as a term which includes dream, error etc. Descartes

just used the popular notion of insanity in order to arnve at a

methodology, the truth of ideas. As M. Gueroutlt put it,

'" II

"the hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good

example, a revelatory example a good instrument of

doubt and for at lest two reasons (a) It does not cover the

Dcrrida Jacques, Writing and DifFerence, etc. pp.51.

Ibid., p.51.

123

totalitv of the field of sensory perception. The madman is

not always wrong about every thing; he is not wrong

otten enough. is never mad enough (b) It is not a useful

or happy example pedagogically. because it meets the

resistance ..... ,,12

Den"ida stressed that doubt' of Descartes IS simply an

amalgamation of hypothesis of insanity, example of madman,

dreaming argument and most of the sensory ongll1. I-Ie also

cmphasised 'doubt' as an idea or truth.

But Foucault's usc of madness is non-medical. Michael Foucault

has devcloped the terminology like psychiatry. h'ontiers or reason.

core or reason, madness in his book Madness (lnd Civilization.

Foucault is the first man who related philosophy to psychiatry core of

reason to frontiers of reason and psychiatry is short lived and leads

towards madness. Which is not a fact rather it is a judgement. Foucault

has not given any definition to it rather he has not used it from the

stand point of 'reason'" The title History of Madness as a 'history' of

'madness' is the counter history of 'other form of madness'. In this

context Foucault wrote in his Madness and Civilization

12 Quoted, Ibid, p.SI. 124

"We have yet to write the history of that other form of

madness by which men, in act sovereign reason. combine

their neighbours and communicate and recognise each

other through the mericiless languages of non-

madness".13

This 'Sovereignty of reason, is the basis of cartesian rationalism

and the use is meaning of madness. Foucault has emphasised

'madness' as the subject of his book and it can speak for itself, on the

basis of its own experience and own authority. The history of madness

cannot be explained within the structure in the language of reason.

rather 'the language or psychiatry on madness'.

4.07 HISTORY OF MADNESS IN FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA:

1.1

Derrida says,

"Foucault globally rejects the language of reason which

itself is the language of order.... The language of

psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason on madness,

could be established only on the basis of such a silence. I

Foueault Michel, Madness und Civilization, trans. Richard I-Iardward. (New York, I'atheon. 1965 and London, Tavistock, 1967), p.X/'

125

have not tried to write the history of that language but

rather the archeology or that silence" .14

hHlcault has related the history of madness to the archaeology

of a silence. He has used the term archaeology tirst time in his project.

But 'history' is purely imbibed with the Cartesian subject with the term

like continuity, causality and teleology or modern rationality.

But in the middle of the Seventeenth century. the age of reason

was born. In Madness and Civilization Foucault Says,

"The great threat that downed 011 the horizon of the

Ii I"teenth century Subsides, the disturbing powers that

inhabit Bosch's painting have lost their vioknce. Forms

remall1 now transparent and docile, bonning a cortege.

the inevitable procession of reason" ,15

Foucault wants to explain some forms of freethinking, which is

simply exercise of reason and simultaneously linked with unreason in

Derrida. But in Descartes reason is something which is posited as prior

and hierarchically superior to experience. Descartes emphasises that

reason must determine the happenings of the project, which is defined

14 Derrida Jacaues, Writing and Difference, Tr. by Allall3ass, etc., p.51.

r-oueault Michel, Madness and CivilizatIOn, etc. pp.35-36.

126

as an experience. This 'reason' is one of the criteria of his entire

philosophical system and foundation for proper and orderly

knowledge.

In writing and difference Derrida emphasizes over the concept

of reason and stresses it as the language of order. But Foucault

sometimes rejects this language of reason which is the language of

order, the beginning of revolution against reason and from the

beginning it started within reason. Foucault says

"we have just evoked the broken dialogue betv\lcen reason

and madness at the end of' the eighteenth century a break

that was linalised by the annexation of the totality of

language - and of the right to language by psychiatric

reason as the delegate of societal and governmental

reason, madness has been shifted" .16

Foucault has used a word called 'decision' by which he made a

distinction between reason and madness (unreason) in reading

Descartes. In order to get the development of unreason/madness let's

turn to Foucault's History of madness.

II, Den'ida, Writing and difFerences etc., p.34.

127

Derrida says,

"Foucault wanted to write a history of madness itself that

is madness speaking on the basis or its own experience

and under its own authority and not a history of madness

described from within the language of reason - the

language of psychiatry on madness.... On madness

already crushed beneath psychiatry, dominated, beaten to

the ground, interned, that is to say. madness made into an

object and exiled as the other of a language and a

historical meaning which have been confused with logos

itself" .17 Again Foucault says "but of madness itself, in

its most vibrant state, before being captured by

knowledge" .18

Here Derrida opines that Foucault used the concept 'madness'

which speaks for itself. In every sense of word Foucault wants

madness to be its first narrator, author, which speaks for itself only.

Foucault started with madness. Foueault has said that the history of

madness is link to silence. Again he himself admits that one ean not

speak of madness, except in relation to the other form of madness.

17

IX

Derrida Jacques, Writing & difference, etc. pp.33-34.

Ibid., p.34.

128

That allows men "not to be mad" that is except in relation to

reason" .Il) The history of truth can be received frol11 the economy of

negativity, thought and language. Here question comes to our mind

that how Foucault has related the history of madness to silence? What

is that silence? Derrida also questioned that.

"is there a history of silence? Further is not an

archaeology, even of silence a logic, that is an organized

language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a

work,?"20

Foucault emphasized that silence is an archaeology and an

organised language. But Derrida says that archaeology of silence

would be possible only in two different ways, that,

1'1

2U

21

..... either do not mention a certain silence, or follow the

madman down the road of his exile. The misfortune of

the mad, the interminable misfortune of their silence, is

that the best spokesmen are those two betray then

b 21 S'I . I' . h' h I est;... 1 ence IS a OglC, a project W lC excu pate

one's own language.

Ibid., p.33

Ibid., p.3S.

Ibid., p.36.

129

4.08 FOUCAULT AND DERRIDA: IN READING DESCARTES'

MEDITATION

Let's have a look over the objections and hesitations expressed

by Derrida and Foucault in their reading and interpretation of Rene

Descartes Meditations. Descartes has started a total skepticism and

has denied all the beliefs he gained. Deceptive nature of sensibility

which experienced passively in the case of sleep and madness lead

Descartes to reform a foundation of knowledge. Descartes placed his

madness and dream in the marginal placc v"here Derrida objected

Foucault's reading of Descartes first meditation and has cmphasized

"the philosophical project of excluding and silencing the

voice of madness")2

Again Foucault also responds to Derrida's claim regarding the

first meditation of Descartes. In the book 'histore de la Folie, Foucault

places his reflection on Descartes on the chapter "the great

confinement". He writes,

Derridian Deconstruction, Bernand Flynn. Edited by 1-1.1. Silverman, Routledge, 1989, p_12.

130

"madness. the voices of which were liberated in the

Renaissance but whose violence it had already mastered,

wi II be reduced to silence in the classical age by a strange

act of force"", in the road of doubt, Descartes encounters

madness on one side of the drl:am and all forms of

error",23

Descartes' meditation where he used madness is quite different

from the passage shown above, Descartes' third meditation where in

order to get the essence of his subject, feigning a set of conditions like

close his eyes, shut the ears, suspend the senses only because to reach

a better knowledge of himself. In the words of Dalia Jidovitz,

21

l3ut Descartes efforts to achieve a more familiar

acquaintance with himself could only take place through

an interior conversation with himself which implies the

use of representation and the exchange of signs that is to

say, the material aqd thus necessarily metaphorical

character of language at the very moment when he

pretends to exclude from his thoughts all image of

corporeal things. If madness can not be excluded on

Descartes, this is because in so doing Descartes would

have to eliminate the very medium through which he

Histoire de la I'olic. Cotted in Derridian Decollstructed by Bernard Flynn, p.202.

131

comes to know himself, which IS the language of the

dialogue in which thoughts are engaged which he can

came into existence as pure subjectivity.,,24

.Iudovitz's acceptance or Descartes madness is the initial

presentation of his philosophy. Descartes has used the concept to

understand pure subjectivity. Descartes has treated everything as no

more true then the reality of dream, illusion of fantasy. Descartes does

not want to feign the madness rather he accepts certain uncertainties of

human faith and belief. In the second meditation also Descartes does

the same which rejects the universal doubt and accepts only one

proposition i.e. Cogito.

Descartes says,

"I existed without doubt by the fact that I was persuaded,

or indeed by the mere fact that I thought at all. But there

is some deceiver both very powerful and very cunning

who constantly uses all his wiles to decieve me to be

nothing so long as I think, I am something. So that after

having thought carefully about it, and having screpously

ludovitz Dalia, "Descartes and Derrida": Economizing thought, in continuetal Philosophy etc., p.46.

132

examined everything, one must thelL in conclusion take

as assured that the proposition: I (1m, exist, IS

necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it

in my mind." 2S

Descartes method of doubt was purely to obtain the Cogito and

the Cogito ergo sum, Descartes asserted the mathematical method

which is certain and evidents of reason. By this Criterian Descartes is

even able to apply his reason in everything. Den'ida accept' Cogilo ' as

an impossible fiction. As the some time Dalia J udov itz says,

through a rhetoric of negation whose truth is based

on the totalizing character of fiction and whose evidence

relies on the power of representation to perform even its

own negation, as if the verisimilitude or subjectivity did

not require the substrate of language, even when

attempting not to speak. As Descartes himself later

admits 111 the second meditation, "I am exist IS

necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I

mentally conceive it."

This is simply the language which recogl1lses the process of

representation and constitutes subjectivity collectively. Cogito of

Ibid., p.I03.

133

Descartes is the locus or truth and subjectivity. The concept and

method what Descartes adopted is the implicit recognition of the

instrument of language. Cogito as Descartes says,

"A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is

wi lling in unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory

perceptions" .26

Again in the context of objection and replies, Descartes says "I

could not but judge that something which I understand so clearly was

true; but this is not because I was compelled so it judge by any

external force, but because a great inclination in the wilL alld thus the

spontaneity and freedom of my belief was all the greater in propotion

to my lack or indi fTcrencc". Descartes has emphasized over Cogi1o and

its individualistic as well as subjective tendencies which leads two

school of existence namely idealism and materialism. Descartes

established the truth of cogito by Feigning everything to a reality of

dreams.

The Philocophical Writting of Descartes, Trans. John Cattengham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoh, Vol.-ll, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.197.

134

Lcts have a closc look on Descartes text in which the articulated

dream, hyperbolic doubt, deception and its critique. Descartes says

"there are no certain indications by which we may clearly

distinguish wakefulness from sleep".27

Descartes takes for granted not to distinguish between

wakefulness and sleep. On the other hand Derrida analyses Descartes'

dream as an initial hypothesis that, the senses are sometimes

deceptive. In Writing and DUlerence. Derrida says

"In dreams the totality of Sensory images is illusory. It

follows that a certainty invulnerable to dreams would be

a fortiore invulnerable to perceptual illusions of the

sensory kind".2 8

Derrida claims Foucault isolated 'direction' and 'madness' from

sensation and dreams in first meditation where as Michael Foucault

claims that Descartes has taken madness along side dream and all of

sensory error and treated them in same manner. So far the question of

deception is concerned he found some evil genius who constantly

27 Descartes REne, Philosophical writings of Descartes etc., p.146.

Dcrrida Jacques, Writings and Differance, etc, pAS.

135

deceived him and by the cmergence of supreme being 'God' this

concept or deception is over. Dalia Judovitz says

"The fiction of the evil gel11us IS no longer vvithin the

preview of madness, rather its totality IS based on the

figurative power of hyperbole, that IS to say, the

rhetorical appeal to fiction.,,29

4.9 FOUCAULT: IN READING OF CARTESIAN TEXT:

Let us see how docs rOllcault read the Cartesian text. Foucault

strongly stressed that Descartes accepted madness alongside dreams

and all scnsory origins one side and refuses to treat them samely. So in

the economy 01" doubt Foucault says.

"

"there is a fundamental imbalancc betwecn madness, on

the one hand and error on the other..." 30

Again he pursues that

"Descartes does not avoid the peril of madness in the

same way he circumvents the eventuality of dream and

error" .31

Judovitz Dalia, Descartes and Economizing thought, etc., p.52.

Den'ida Jacques: - writing and Defference etc., p.46.

Ibid .. 46.

136

Foucault established two procedures or Descartes regarding

sensory origin. 1\s Foucault claimed that Descartes has said the sense

arc some times deceive us only regarding "things which arc hardly

perceptible or very far away" and he says in the passage where

Descartes says "But it may be that although the senses one away, there

are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably

have any doubt. ..

" unless one is mad, a hypothesis seemingly excluded II1

principle by Descartes in the same passage")2

Descartes shows the limits of the sensory origin which deceive

us II1 any time regarding the perceptible. Descartes also denied the

extention of imagination and dreams for any creativity. Descartes 111

his meditation says,

.12

"corporeal nature in general and its extension, the figure

of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and

number."33

Derrida Jacque, Writing and Difference, etc., p.47.

Derrida Jacues, Writing and Difference, etc., p.46.

137

Descartes has looked for not a sensory origin or dreaming image

to a confidence rather it to be like mathematics and geometry which is

invulnerable in any condition and in any doubt. Foucault in his reading

Descartes says

" that Descartes wishes to find in the analysis (taking

this word in its strict sense) or dreams and sensation a

nucleus, an clement or proximity and simplicity

irreducible to doubt. It IS in dreams and 111 sensory

perception", Again Foucault says, that "! circumvent

doubt and reconquer a basis of certainty,,)4

Again hHlcault says "Descartes docs not avoid the peril of

madness in the same way he circumvents the eventuality of dreams or

of error. .. Neither image - peopled sleep, nor the clear consciousness

that the senses can be deceived is able to take doubt to the extreme

point of its Universality; let us admit that our eyes deceive us, 'let us

assume that we are asleep - truth will not entirely step out into the

night, for madness, it is otherwise," later

14 Descartes Rene, The Philosophical Work of Descartes Trans. by Elizabeth, S. Holdane and G.R.T. Ross, Cambridge: The University Press, 1970, p.146.

138

"in the economy of doubt, there is an imbalance between

madness on the one hand and dream and error on the

other".35

Foucault clearly mentioned that the use of madness, dream and

doubt are quite different in Descartes. He has distinguished the

magnitude of truth in both dream and madness. Truth can be had from

the sleeping state and it can't vanish during the act. But in the question

of doubt madness is little different from dream and error. In order to

give the status of madness dream and error Foucault says

" dreams arc surmounted within the structure of truth;

but madness is in admissible for the doubting subject")6

Derrida claims Foucaults above distinction is first time isolating

madness from dream and error madness is not admissible in the

doubting subject. Truth is not completely impossible during sleep and

dream state. In the first meditation Foucault has interpreted Descartes

madness differently. Foucault has used 'madness' in his book madness

and civilization as the first narrator, and nucleus of foundation.

Descartes use of madness is not right and the way he interprets

" Ibid., pA7.

Ibid., pA7.

139

madness is not necessarily included in doubting subject. Also

Descartes has made a mistake by giving the same status to madness

and dream in search of 'Cogito I. Descartes has emphasized this

concept and simply reduced to 'doubt' which is one of important

feature of Foucault's interpretation of Descartes. Doubt consciousness

- madness, - dream- error- all placed in his first meditation shows an

inattentiveness of certainty. Most of all concepts are L1sed somehow in

the same manner and denounced to arrive at a central point without

doubting, 'a method'. Descartes never used the concept of madness as a

hypothesis and reduced it by decree which Foucault says "the advent

ora ratio".

4.10 DERRIDA: IN READING CARTESIAN TEXT:

Let liS have the same look to Derrida's reading of Descartes and

his interpretation of madness, dream and error. Derrida agrees with

Descartes statement over the world is no more real than his dreams.

And Descartes generalizes the hyperbole the hypothesis of dream and

sleep which leads to the natural 'doubt'. The presence of evil genius -

leads a capitulate and artificial truth. Derrida has also emphasized over

the decissive interpretation of first meditation where Descartes ruins

the old foundation and submits all his opinions to doubt. Derrida

140

somehow explained Descartes attempts to reach a conclusion. a truth,

Cogito on the basis of his method of doubt and use or madness, dream

- error - deception - doubt - etc. Derrida says.

"Descartes IS not interested in madness, he does not

welcome it as a hypothesis, he does not consider it. He

excludes it by decree")7

But Foucault explained as,

"Impossibility of being mad that is essential not to the

object orthought but to the thinking subject."3~

But Descartes - expels madness and denounces it in the

movement 'Cogito' emerged and has rejected from the inferiority of

mind.

4.10a DERRIDA: RE-READING OF CARTESIAN TEXT:

Again in re-reading Descartes, Derrida noticed two things. In

the first meditation where Descartes has used the passage for doubt

which is founded on natural reasons. Derrida says

Ibid., p.47.

Ibid., p.47.

141

"Descartes does not circumvent the eventuality of sensory

error or of dreams and does not 'surmount' them "within

the structure of truth;"39

Descartes has never placed the truth in dream or the knowledge-

Descartes dream IS radical, though radical, Descartes did not

accept the sensory error or dreams which Surmounted within the

structure of truth. Also Descartes has not accepted the total error for

all knowledge rather the formation of knowledge. Sensory images are

illusory in dreams. Derrida says:

... a certainty invulnerable to dreams would be a fortiori

invulnerable to perceptual illusions of the Sensory kind. It therefore

suffices to examine the case or dreams in order to deal with, on the

level which is ours for the movement, the case of natural doubt, of

Sensory error in general. Now which are the certainties and truths that

escape perception, and therefore also escape sensory error or

imaginative and oneiric composition? They are certainties and truths

of a non-sensory and non-imaginative origin. They are simple and

Ibid., p.4 7.

142

intelligible things".40 During the dream state what we perceived arc

raise and illusory. roucault has mentioned insanity with dream. On the

movement Descartes perception in dream is 'False and illusory'.

Denying the existence of body, hand, opening of eyes are simply

insanity which is admissible in the dreaming arguments. Descartes

says,

"let us suppose that all my oneirical representations are

illusory. Even in this case, there must be some

representations of things as naturally certain as the body,

hands etc ... ".41

In Cartesian sense all these things are illusory and the

representations are fictitious and is false. The painting of painter and

its representation also 'extravagant: but Derrida simply has taken

Descartes' concept of extravagant and detined it differently. He says at

the time of painting one should have final element which is not

illusion rather it is an analogy. Derrida has given an analogy between

'dream' and 'painting'. In case of colour Descartes has not accepted the

necessary existence of colour in general and colour is an object of the

40

41

Ibid .. 48.

Ibid.

143

senses among others'. Colour is always remalI1lI1g 111 a painting

whether it is imaginative or inventive. Derrida says,

"there IS 111 dreams an element of non-counterfeit

simplicity presupposed by all fantastical compositions

and irreducible to all analysis. But this time - and this IS

neither sensory nor-imaginative. It is intelligible" .42

Derrida's interpretation regarding painting and dreaming is a bit

difference. That, in painting, finality is there which include colour and

a qualified concept. Painter and colour are existing in an analogy.

which is quite different from sensory origin nor imaginative rather it is

an intelligible. Dream of Descartes and this analogy is different in

Dcrrida's interpretation. Derrida points out some point of Descartes -

which Foucault is not concerned about. And Den"ida has read

Descartes part that,

42

"for as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study

with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by

forms the most strange and extraordinary, can not give

them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a

certain medley of the members of different animals; or if

Derrida Jaques, Writing und diIJerence etc., pAS.

144

their imaginations IS extravagant enough to invent

something so novel that nothing similar has even before

been seen, and that then their work represents a thing

purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the

same that the colours of which this is composed are

necessarily real. And for the same reason, although these

general things, to wit, a body, eyes, a head, hands, and

such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same

time to confess that there are at least some other objects

yet more simple and more universal which are real and

true; and of these just in the same way with certain real

colours, all these images to things which dwell in our

thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, arc

rormed.

To such a class or things pertains corporcal nature in general,

and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or

magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time

which measures their duration, and so on.

That is possibly why our reasonll1g IS not unjust when we

conclude from this that physics, Astronomy, medicine and all other

sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite

things, are very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain

145

whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of

certainty and element or the indubitable. For whether I am awake or

asleep, two or three together always form five, and the square can

never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that

truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity.43

4.10b FOllcault: Derrida: in Re-I"eading of Cartesian Text:

I n the second phase of re-reading Descartes. Derrida has given

importance on the hypothesis of Insanity Descartes has simply said in

the first meditation that

44

"since the senses are sometime deceptive it is wiser not to

trust entirely to anything by which we have once been

deceived".44

Again Descartes has written

"And how could I deny that these hands and this body are

mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain

persons, devoid of sense, and I should not be any less

insane were I to follow examples so extravagant" .45

Descartes Rene, The Ph i losoph ical Work of Descartes, etc., pp. 146- 147.

Descartes Rene, The Philosophical Work of Descartes, etc., p.145.

Ibid., p.

146

Descartes has stressed over the knowledge of sensory origin

which are deceptive in nature. Derrida says.

"He (Descartes) pretends to put to himself the astonished

objection of an imaginary non-philosopher who IS

frightened by such audacity and says: no, not all sensory

knowledge, for then you would be mad and it would be

unreasonable to follow the example of madmen, to put

1'orth the ideas of madmen."46

Den'ida has clarified the uses of madness of Descartes and says

that 'I am sitting here, writing and you understand me, r am not mad

nor are you and we are sane. If 'X' is writing and 'y' understands x

then x and y both are not mad but sane. So Derrida interpret that can y

doubt about 'x' to be mad to doubt. The example of madness IS

therefore not indicative of the fragility of the sellSory idea.

Descartes acqUiesces this point and can think mad to doubt

about sitting near the fire etc. and also insane to follow the example of

madness. Descartes has elaborated all the possibility of formation of

truth, knowledge and intellectual foundation of certainty.

41> Derrida Jacques, - Wriling und difference etc .. p.50.

147

So far the question of dream is concerned Descartes has never

placed it in one side and has only excluded madness simply. Derrida in

his writing and difference says,

"Descartes is concerned here not with determining the

concept of madness but with utilizing the popular notion

of insanity for juridical and methodological ends, in order

to ask questions of principle regarding only the truth of

ideas".47

It is clear that Descartes intention of using madness and insanity

IS for a juridical and methodological ends. Descartes IS given

importance not for the notion of insanity but for the truth oj" ideas.

Derrida claims the sensory origin become suspect 1\1 case of insanity.

As Derrida notes echoing, Gueroult:

47

"The hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good

example, a revelatory example, a good instrument of

doubt - and for at least two reasons.(a) It does not cover

the totality of the field of sensory perception. The

madman is not always wrong about everything, he is not

wrong often enough, is never mad enough. (b) It is not a

useful or happy example pedagogically, because it meets

Den'ida Jacques, Writing and DifTerence, etc. [l.51.

148

the resistance of the non-philosopher who docs not have

the audacity to follow the philosopher \vhen he

speaks. ,,48

Insanity what Derrida has agreed with Guarolt, is not proper

example and simply is a revelatory example which is unable to cover

all the tield of sensory perception.

4.10c Foucault: Re-interpretation of Cartesian Text

After the close reading of Descartes text by Foucault and two

times by Derrida lets have a look over Foucaults re-reading of

Cartesian text which emphasizes on two truths and a different

interpretation with Derrida. Madness is simply a single case which is

not taken seriously in Descartes. It is treated as one of sensory and

corporeal fault. As Den'ida says,

.x

"madness is only a sensory and corporeal fault, a bit more

serIOUs than the fault which threatens all walking but

normal men, and much less serIOUS, within the

epistemological order, than the fault to which we

succumb in dreams" .49

Ibid., p.Sl.

Ibid., p.Sl.

149

Foucault qucstioned whether this reduction or madness does not

constitute an exclusion, also claimed madness is related to Cogito and

relation to the intellect, reason from madness. Foucault has stressed

certain factual determination of the concept madness, used by

Descartes (see reference below). When the question of madness exist

and we are taking it as the perversion of the senses or of the

imagination then it IS corporcal in relation with body. As Derrida

observe Foucault has given importance to the madness and it should

110t expel in the outer shadow 01" the cogilO. Derrida says

"Madness to usc an expressIOn proposed c1snvhere by

Foucault is confined to the interior of the exterior and to

the exterior of the interior. It is the other side of the

CogiIO". 50

Madness is just the other side of Cogito as Foucault claims in

the above passage. When I am thinking and distinguishing ideas from

other ideas is Cogito. 51

~o Ibid., p.52.

Reference: What is significant is that Descartes, at bottom, never speaks of madness itself in this text. Madness is not his theme. He treats it as the index of a question of principle, that is, of epistemological value. It will be said, perhaps that this is the sign of a profound exclusion. But this silence on madness itself simultaneously signifies the opposite of an exclusion. Since it is not a question of madness in this text, if only to exclude it, it is not in the mcditations that Descartes speaks of madncss itself.( W&D. pp.308).

150

One cannot be mad when one thinks and has clear and distinct

ideas. Foucault has also emphasized over Descartes' madness and his

cxplanation rcgarding the problematic of knowledge. Madness is not

only error of the body but only the modification of ideas. By doing

this Descartes has originates some error in his language,

"he would even, III the long run, he condemned to

construe it like all errors, not only as an epistemological

deficiency but also as a moral failure I inked to a

precipitation of the will; for will alone: can consecrate the

intellectual finitude of perception as error".

The concept or madness what Descartes has developed is simply

an error, epistemological deficiency in Foucault's language.

Derrida has claimed Foucault's interpretation of two truth is

perfectly correct. First madness - pervasion - relation with corporeal

in alliance with the body. And secondly madness - an error of body

and also a modification of ideas. Foucault has cited Haldone and Ross

that

"however, it seems that these truths becomes vulnerable

in turn, as soon as we come to the properly philosophical

lSI

metaphysical and critical phase or doubt" .52 (See the

re f'erence).

Re(erence: To underline this vulnerability and touch on the greatest

difficult, we could have to specify that the expression "sensory or

corporeal error" could have no meaning for Descartes. There is no

corporeal error, particularly in illness: judice or melancholy are only

the occasions of (In error {hal itself is born only with the concept or

affirmation of the will in judgement yellow. So finally, too, when the

imagination is diseased, as in cases of melancholia. and a man thinks

that his ()'vvn disorderly fencies represent real thing" (Rule XII

Descartes emphasizes this point: the most abnormal sensory on image

native e),perience. cOl1sidered in and of itself as its own level and at

its proper movements never deceive us: or never deceive

understanding. "If it restrict its attention accurately to the o~ject -

presented to it, just as it is given to it either first hand or by means of

an image; and if it moreover retrain from judging that the imagination

faithfUlly reports the objects of the senses, or that the senses take on

Haidane & Russ, p.44.

152

Ihe true forms of things, or in fine that external things always are as

they appear to be p. 53

Derrida absolutely agrees with the two truth of Foucaults

recalling and pointed out Descartes invention of truths in arithmetic,

geometry which are the notions that escape the first doubt and he

writes,

"nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief

that an all powerful God existed by whom I have been

created such as I (1111".54

This is the onset or the well knmvn movement leading to the

fiction of the evil genius. Den·ida in order to understand Foucault's re··

reading turned himself for a close notice of the first meditation.

Descartes' total madness conjures up by the emergence of evil genius

which is beyond control. A total dearrangement inf1icted by evil

genlUs without any responsibility and this dearrangement is of

madness. But in presence of the madness, insanity will spare nothing

This footnotes is an extract from 'Writing and difference' by Jacques Derrida, p.309.

Haldane &Rose etc. p.147.

153

ncithcr bodily nor intellectual perceptions, Derrida In his Writing {[Ild

Difference says

"Now the recourse to the fiction of the evil gelllus will

evoke, conjure up the possibility of total madness, a total

dearrangement over which I would have no control

because it is innicted upon me hypothetically Icaving me

110 responsibility for it. Total dearrangement is the

possibility of a madness insanity, will spare nothing

l1either bodily nor purely intellectual perceptions".55

Descartes has taken some or the Issues when converSlI1g to a

non-philosopher. To cite Descartes,

,,[ shall consider that heavens, the earth, colours, figures,

sound and all other external things are not but the

illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed

himself in order to lay trap for any credulity; I shall

consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no nesh, no

blood, nor any senses yet falsely believing myself of

possess all those things", 56

Den'ida Jacques, Writing and Difference, pp.53

Haldane & Ross, p.14S.

154

Descartes pretends to believe these things and these ideas are

also taken up in his second meditation.

This doubt were actually set inside as Foucault called 'insanity'

related to the interiority or thought, and denied any sorts or

intellectual or sensory origin rrom this new phase of doubt. Derrida

clearly suggests that by the emergence of evi I genius evokes the

possibility or madness. To Foucault "riladness is the absence or a

work". This is the fundamental motif or Foucault's book. Logos is

related with reason, a historical reason. Derrida says

"'and i I' madness in general, beyond any fictitioLls and

determined historical strLlcture is the absence of a work.,

then madness is indeed, cssentially and generally, si lence,

sti ned speech, within a Caesura and a sound that open up

life as historicity in general. Not in a determined silence,

imposed at one given movement rather than at any other,

but a silence - essentially linked to an act of force and a

prohibition which open history and speech" .57

Foucault has related madness to silence and the silence of

madness is the absence of work. But this silence IS not simply any

Ibid, p.54.

155

beginning or epigraph and it IS beyond the fictitious determined

structure. As Dcrrida says,

'"although the silence IS not simply the works epigraph,

nor IS it, as concerns language and meaning outside the

work. Like non-meaning silence is the work's limit and

profound resource of course, in essentiallizing madness

this way one runs the risk of disintegrating the factual

findings of psychiatric efforts. This is a permanent

danger, but it should not discourage the demanding and

patient psychiatrist". 58

Madness is evoked from the interiority or mind and not from the

body. Interiority of mind is possible only through the fiction of

language/language or fiction. In the second phase Dcrrida says

Foucault seems valid during his explanation aboLlt physical doubt.

Descartes rejected madness and radical doubt from knowledge.

Insanity, hypothesis of insanity are not the aspects of knowledge. As

Foucault pointed out Descartes has not raised a point where

knowledge alone be able to dominate madness.

Ibid., 54.

156

4.10£1 Cogito and the Madness:

By the assertion or Cogi/o the madness IS vanished or \ve can

say Cog ito escapes madness for its certainty. It reaches the point

beyond the madness. Foucault says "I who think. can not be mad".

the Cogi/o would escape madness only because as its own moment,

under its own authority it is valid even if I am mad, even if my

thoughts are completely mad. There IS a value and a meanll1g of ~he

Cogi/o, as or existence, which escape the alternative of a determined

madness or a determined reason. Confronted with the critical

experience of the CogilO, insanity, as stated in the discourse on

method. is irremediably on a plane with skepticism. Thought no longer

fears madness.59 It can elaborate further that in the word of Dcscartcs,

<')

Rcmarking that this truth' I think, therefore, am'

was so certain and so assured that all the most

extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics

were incapable of shaking it."60

Den'ida Jacques, Writing and Difference, etc, p.SS.

Philosophical writings of Descartes by Haldon and Ross etc., p.1 0 I.

157

Certainly followed from the emergence of Cogito. It docs not

depend upon any madness or insanity in order to reach its foundation

of certainty. As Foucault has explained in the above passage that even

if I am mad then also Cogito is certain, true, a supreme confidence

without taking madness into account. Thus, the certainty never

deduced from the madness and Derrida says,

"Descartes never in terms madness, neither at the stage of

natural doubt nor at the metaphysical doubt. lie only

claims to e.\:c\ude it during the first phase of the fIrst

stage, during the 110n hyperbolically moment of natural

Derrida has accepted the framework of 'Cogito and its scope

developed by Descartes. Derrida shows a notion of reason and

unreason in Cartesian CogilO. The concept of madness and its audacity

lead a step to a contradiction in every sense of word is only a case of

thought (within thought) Derrida in his writing and difference says,

"Invulnerable to all determined opposition between

reason and unreason it is the point starting from which

the history of the determined forms of this opposition,

(01 Derrida Jacques. Writings and Difference, p.56.

lS8

this opened or broken - off dialogue, can appear as such

and be stated. It is the impenetrable point of certainty in

which the possibility of Foucault narration as well as of

the narration of the totality, or rather of all the

determined forms of the exchanges between reason and

madness are embedded" .62

Den'ida reduced everything to a historical totality except the

hyperbole project, and a determined opposition (reason and unreason)

is historical totality to certainty. Emphasizing the totality of certainty

Derrida cited the existence of Cogilo is concrete even if he is mad or

insane. Den'ida says,

" ..... cven if the totality of the world does not exist, even

if non-mcaning has invaded the totality of the world, upto

and including the very contents of my thought, I still

think, I am while I embrace it, I still formulate the project

of doing so, and this project is meaningful in such a way

that it can be defined only in relation to a pre-

Writing and Difference, p.56.

159

comprehension of the infinite and undetermined

totality"63

Nothing is assumable than Cogito. And openll1g this can be

narrated as the basis of narrating itself only. It can be explained as the

basis or the pre undetermined totality. The undetermined totality has a

identity with the Descartes concept of the demon, evil genius and in

this way Cogilo is unshakable, determined what Derrida has asserted.

By the assertion or Cogito, Descartes wanted to reassure himself

through the veracity of (iod to furnish the activities of Cogito, what

Derrida called

"to identity the act of Cogito with a reasonable reason".64

But Descartes assures the existence of God who protects from

this madness and insanity. By doing this Descartes has 'temporize'

the Cogito which Derrida has claimed,

(,4

"it is God alone who, by permitting me to extirpate

myself from a Cogito that at this proper moment can

Ibid., p.S6.

Ibid., p.SS.

luO

always remain a silent madness, also II1sures IllV

representations and my cognitive determinations, that is

my discourse against madness,. It is without doubt that

for Descartes, God alone".65

But Descartes interpretation of God is absolute of reason, and

undetermined reason which amounts something - absolutely embrace

madness. Den'ida's view that,

"Descartes knows that, without God, llnite thought never

had the ri ght to exclude madness etc. which amounts to

saying that madness is never excluded, except in fact,

violently, in history, or rather that this exclusion."66

With the reference of God and memory Derrida asserted the link

between Cogtfo and unreason. The exclusion of madness can be

obtained as the basis of God, the supernatural power what Descartes

incorporated in his meditation. Foucault's reading \vas more powerful

and illuminating what Derrida observed. By differentiating madness

from reason he has given birth to a moment against the philosophical

tradition. Against Foucault's emphasis over Descartes Cogito, which

Ibid .. , p.SS.

Ibid., p.310.

161

IS. neither to take part or reason as reasonable order. nor the part of

disorder and madness is more illuminating as Foucault has claimed.

Derrida says "leaving in silence the problem of speech posed by

Cogito, Descartes seems to imply that thinking and saying what is

clear and distinct are the same thing. One can say

other,

What are thinks and that are thinks without betraying one or the

" ... the insane man, someone who could not think.

because he could not think what he said. Madness was for

him too. a silence, the voluble silence of a thought that

did not think its own words".67

Derrida has taken for granted Cogito as foundation and related

it as a work and before this work it is madness.

CONCLUSION:

Descartes followed a series of principles and axioms to pull out

himself from madness on the light of reason, and rationality. The

supreme concept of veracious God protects the existence of madness

{,7 Ibid., 59.

162

in Descartes meditation. Derrida says "this identification of the Cogito

with reasonable - normal - r.eason need not even await - in fact, if not

principle - the proofs of the existence of a veracious God as the

supreme protective barrier against madness. This identification

intervenes from the moment when Descartes determines natural light

(which in its undetermined source should be valid even for the mad)

from the moment when he pulls himself out of madness by

determining natural light through a series of principles and axioms.68

Emphasizing the truthfulness of God and certainty like Cogito

followed by certain axioms by Descartes.

Derrida says by separating the Cogito on the one hand,

hyperbole on the other hand, it follows a historicity of philosophy.

And historicity is impossible without a history. As Derrida in writing

and difference says

"I am not proposing the separation of the wheat from the

tares 111 every philosophy in the name of some

philosophia perennis, indeed, it is exactly the contrary

that I am proposing. In question is a way of accounting

for the very historicity of philosophy, and I believe that

Ibid., 59.

163

the latter would be impossible if we possessed only

hyperbole, on the one hand, or on the other, only

determined historical structures. "69

Historicity IS located only III transition the dialogue between

hyperbole and the finite structure. Foucault agalll says "in doubt's

confrontation with its major dangers, Descartes realized that he could

not be mad -- though he was to acknowledge for a long time to come

that the all powers of unreason kept vigil around his thought")O

Foucault searches out the activities of unreason around Descartes

'CogilO "

hi} Ibid., p.60. 70 Foucault MichaeL Folie et derason, Cotted in Writing and difference, p,61.

164