Alex HartProfessor Gregory FloydPerspectives I Spring 201526 April 2015

Descartes - The Mind and BodyOne of Descartes main claims in Meditations refers to the interaction between the body and the mind. Descartes posits that the mind and the body exist as separate entities, and he details several supporting arguments verifying this position. The conclusion that the mind and body are separate has significant implications. For example, such an assertion by Descartes would support the belief that the mind, or soul, can survive the death of the body and live on in an afterlife. Descartes was likely aware that this claim would consequently support the Christian belief in heaven given the fact that he claimed to be a devout Catholic. There are notable insecurities in the reasoning Descartes provides in support of his claims about the relationship between the mind and the body. Descartes concludes the sixth Meditation with a description of how the mind and body exist in extremely close relation to one another despite being separate. Responding to this conclusion, I will address the problem that arises when one questions how the mind and body interact with one another given their established separateness. This issue can be explored when considering the alternate view that the mind is in fact not separate at all and is instead manifested in the body as the brain. Descartes errs in his reasoning supporting the separation of the mind and body, and his work problematically lacks clarity with regard to how the mind and the body interact with one another. In the third Meditation, Descartes writes, I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true. (Meditations, 35). The notion that human beings are able to verify truths in the world as the things they perceive as clear and distinct is extremely important for Descartes. It is also important to note that this ability to verify truths through our own clear and distinct perception requires God to (1) exist and (2) that He not be a deceiver. Descartes goes on in the third meditation to prove the existence of a non-deceiving God. Therefore, he is able to utilize his own clear and distinct perception to ground his claims regarding the mind and body. I have a body that is very closely joined to me, nevertheless, because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, insofar as I am merely a thinking thing and not an extended thing, and because on the other hand I have a distinct idea of a body, insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (Meditations, 78).Descartes claims that he has a clear and distinct perception of himself as a thinking being as opposed to simply a material body. Since he also has a distinct idea of his own body alongside his perception of his true self, a conscious being, he can be sure that he, referring to his mind, is separate from his material body. As I explained, Descartes clear and distinct perception conveniently serves as sufficient evidence to support the fact that the mind is distinct from the body. For the most part, I agree with Descartes rationale regarding his method of identifying truth through his own clear and distinct perception. Descartes adequately accounts for the possibility of a deceiving God, as it is the obvious issue that arises with such a reliance on ones own human perception. While I dont have time to critique his actual proof of a non-deceiving God, I might ask if the accuracy of our own clear and distinct perceptions is a matter of which God is even responsible. Descartes perhaps attributes too much of our own intellectual function as a direct result of God. Accordingly, Descartes may be overstretching his proof of a non-deceiving God when he establishes the reliability of the truth yielded by ones clear and distinct perception of the world.Descartes points to the differences in divisibility between the mind and the body in further defense of his argument. He observes that, a body, by its very nature, is always divisible while the mind is utterly indivisible. (Meditations, 86). He goes on to illustrate how exactly the body is divisible. While our bodies are completely integrated, one can imagine the continued existence of him or herself if their leg or foot were to be amputated. This is completely true and I doubt anyone would disagree with Descartes view on the matter. Descartes is more than content with letting this notion stand as evidence that the mind is wholly diverse from the body (Meditations, 86). Descartes, however, is contrasting this divisible nature of the bodies with what he believes to be the utterly indivisible mind. This view is problematic considering the various diagnosed brain disorders that result in any form of a split that appears to occur in a persons mind. For example, dissociative identity disorder results when a person has two or more identities, which dramatically affect their behavior. Such a condition could stand as evidence against Descartes argument that the mind is complete and indivisible.It is important to note Descartes views towards the relationship of the mind and body. The mind, Descartes believes, is what actually constitutes an individual. That is not to say, however, that the mind is present merely to [the] body in the way a sailor is present in a ship. Instead, Descartes believes that he is most tightly joined and, so to speak, commingled with [the body], so much so that that [he] and the body constitute one single thing (Meditations, 81). Separate as they are, the human experience is still very much so dependent on the interaction that one has with the physical environment through the body. This is supported by the fact that our minds register the sensations of pain and pleasure received by our bodies in direct relation to our own well-being. In this dualism set forth by Descartes, both the mind and the body comprise what we call I. Descartes following observations that conclude the sixth Meditation seem to oddly contradict his previous arguments supporting the view that the mind and body exist apart. Instead, he shares several observations regarding the anatomical relationship between the mind and the body. Now, these observations are likely a further effort by Descartes to illustrate the interconnectedness of the mind and body despite their existence as separate entities. However, I find that Descartes observations could instead support an interpretation of the mind and body as one. If the brain could perform all the functions of the mind, the need for the mind to be conceived as a separate thing would be eliminated altogether. Descartes observes that the mind is not immediately affected by all the parts of the body, but only by the brain...Whenever this part of the brain is disposed in the same manner, it presents the same thing to the mind (Meditations, 86). This observation by Descartes is rather brief and does not provide a great deal of detail on his view of the relationship between the mind and its interaction with the brain. However, I believe that Descartes may be somewhat blinded by his own conviction that the mind exists as a separate entity altogether. He fails to acknowledge and let alone explore the possibility that the entire notion of the mind is manifested in the function of our own bodily organ the brain. It is somewhat surprising that Descartes does not pay attention to this possibility as he even begins to illustrate how closely tied the brain and the mind are. Descartes preserves the mind as an object that exists separate from the material organs of the body by describing a form of interaction between the brain and the mind as opposed to identifying the mind as a material organ. Antonio Damasios Descartes Error deals specifically with the issues in Descartes mind/body dualism. Damasio, an accomplished neurologist, argues that the human mind and the rest of the body constitute an indissociable organism, integrated by mutually interactive biochemical and neural regulatory circuits (Damasio, 87). Damasios view of the human being as an indissociable organism stands in contrast to Descartes understanding of a human being as one whose mind is tightly joined with the body but can still be separated. Damasios scientific insight with respect to the field of neuroscience granted him an astute perspective through which he could critique Descartes view of the human mind and body. Alternative to Descartes, Damasio illustrates the mind as a set of physiological operations referring to the interaction of the brain and body with the outside environment. These complex interactions forms what we observe within ourselves as mental states. I believe that the formation of human mental states described in Descartes Error is so complex a process that it is no surprise that Descartes defaulted to the explanation that the mind existed a an entirely separate object. It is, in fact an explanation that is much easier to grasp and defend without advanced knowledge of human neurological processes.Setting aside the issues with Descartes separation of the mind and body, there are further issues that remain within Descartes proposed dualism. Granting that the mind and brain are two distinct objects, Descartes fails to provide an adequate explanation of the interaction between the mental substance of the mind and the spatially extended matter of the brain. In other words, Descartes does not explain how the sensations received and processed by the material organs in our body are transferred to the immaterial realm of our mind. Descartes makes clear that the essence of matter/our bodies is extension into space, while thought is the essential property of our mind. Thus, the problem of interaction arises due to Descartes deliberate distinction between the essences of the mind and body. In short, I believe that Descartes is unable to offer any sort of meaningful explanation as to how the mind interacts with the body. Moreover, I do not believe that such a significant issue can be resolved by merely pointing to an obscure brain gland as the location for such a mysterious causal interaction. Furthermore, Descartes dualism runs into the issue when one considers the minds of others in relation to himself. This issue is somewhat an extension of the problem of interaction. Not to oversimplify interpersonal relationships, we as individuals experience others more or less through bodily sensations. We build our perception of others based on how they appear to us through our vision as well as their personality that comes through vocal communication. While this sort of communication certainly involves an engagement of our own individual minds, an actual interaction between the two nonmaterial minds never occurs. Thus, we are unable to verify the existence of anyone elses mind aside from our own. I find this issue to be a minor hitch in Descartes overall understanding of the mind and body. Our inability to verify that others experience a reality identical to our own is a critically important existential issue. However, I believe that such an issue is just as disruptive to the projects of many other philosophers as it is to Descartes. I do not view Descartes failure to explain the existence of other minds as a basis upon which his entire argument can be discredited. With that said, I certainly believe that there are questions that Descartes mind/body dualism cannot answer. I have sketched out the major tenets of his arguments regarding the mind and body and followed each section with what I believe to be a fair critique of Descartes positions. The thoughts Ive shared regarding Descartes principle of clear and distinct perception, the indivisibility of the mind, and the general interaction of the mind and body according to Descartes dualism represent an accurate illustration of the issues I take with Descartes work on the subject of the mind and body.

Works Cited

Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam, 1994. Print.

Descartes, Rene, Donald A. Cress, and Rene Descartes. Discourse on Method ; And: Meditations on First Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998. Print.

Thomson, Garrett, and Garrett Thomson. Bacon to Kant: An Introduction to Modern Philosophy. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 2002. Print.