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Descartes Ethics

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Descartes' EthicsFirst published Wed Aug 6, 2003; substantive revision Mon Feb 4, 2013

Descartes is not well known for his contributions to ethics. Some havecharged that it is a weakness of his philosophy that it focuses exclusivelyon metaphysics and epistemology to the exclusion of moral and politicalphilosophy. Such criticisms rest on a misunderstanding of the broaderframework of Descartes' philosophy. Evidence of Descartes' concern forthe practical import of philosophy can be traced to his earliest writings. Inagreement with the ancients, he identifies the goal of philosophy with theattainment of a wisdom that is sufficient for happiness. The details of thisposition are developed most fully in writings from the latter part ofDescartes' career: his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, ThePassions of the Soul, and the preface to the French translation of thePrinciples of Philosophy, where he presents his famous image of the treeof philosophy, whose uppermost branch is the highest and most perfectmoral system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the othersciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom.

1. The Place of Ethics in Descartes' Philosophy2. The Provisional Moral Code of the Discourse3. The Meditations and the Ethics of Belief4. Virtue and Happiness: The Correspondence with PrincessElisabeth5. Generosity and The Passions of the SoulBibliography

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1. The Place of Ethics in Descartes' PhilosophyDescartes did not write extensively on ethics, and this has led some toassume that the topic lacks a place within his philosophy. Thisassumption has been bolstered by the tendency, prevalent until recently,to base an understanding of Descartes' philosophy primarily on his twomost famous books, Discourse on the Method and Meditations on FirstPhilosophy. Although both works offer insight into Descartes' ethics,neither presents his position in detail.

Descartes' writings reveal a consistent conception of philosophy's goal. Inthe first rule of the unfinished Rules for the Direction of the Mind, hestates: The aim of our studies should be to direct the mind with a view toforming true and sound judgements about whatever comes before it (ATX 359/CSM I 9). The principal goal of philosophy is to cultivate one'scapacity for sound judgment, which Descartes identifies with goodsense (le bons sens) and universal wisdom. This goal should bepursued for its own sake, since other ends may distract us from the courseof inquiry. Nevertheless, Descartes insists upon the practical benefits ofthe wisdom thereby achieved: one should consider how to increase thenatural light of his reason in order that his intellect should show hiswill what decision it ought to make in each of life's contingencies (AT X361/CSM I 10). In this way, we can expect to realize the legitimatefruits of the sciences: the comforts of life and the pleasure to begained from contemplating the truth, which is practically the onlyhappiness in this life that is complete and untroubled by pain (ibid.).

The last point previews the principal concern of Descartes' ethics. Inagreement with the ancients, he takes philosophy's practical goal to be therealization of a happy life: one in which we enjoy the best existence that ahuman being can hope to achieve. Descartes characterizes this life in

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terms of a type of mental contentment, or tranquility, that is experiencedby the person with a well-ordered mind. Here the influence of Stoic andEpicurean writers is evident. In keeping with a central theme ofHellenistic ethics, Descartes likens philosophy to a form of therapy thatcan treat the mind's illnesses (those that stand in the way of its happiness),just as medicine treats the illnesses of the body. As he writes in one of hisearliest recorded remarks, I use the term vice to refer to the diseases ofthe mind, which are not so easy to recognize as diseases of the body. Thisis because we have frequently experienced sound bodily health, but havenever known true health of the mind (AT X 215/CSM I 3). Philosophy isthus charged with leading us to true health of the mind, which it doesthrough the cultivation of true and sound judgment. It is significant thatDescartesagain in agreement with the ancientsfocuses his efforts onthe happiness that can be realized within the natural life of a humanbeing. He is careful to note that it is a dogma of faith that the supremehappiness, consisting solely in the contemplation of the divine majestyand attainable only through divine grace, is reserved for the next life(AT VII 52/CSM II 36). However, in contrast to the position defended byAquinas and Roman Catholic theology, the consideration of thissupernatural bliss (batitude surnaturelle) plays no role in Descartes'system. On the contrary, he emphasizes that genuine happiness isattainable within this life, in spite of the trials we face. One of the mainpoints of my own ethical code, he tells Mersenne, is to love life withoutfearing death (AT II 4801/CSMK 131). The key to developing thisaffirmative attitude toward life is the cultivation of reason: Truephilosophy teaches that even amidst the saddest disasters and mostbitter pains we can always be content, provided that we know how to useour reason (AT IV 314/CSMK 272).

Descartes' estimation of the importance of ethics is expressed most clearlyin the programmatic statement that prefaces the French translation of thePrinciples of Philosophy (1647). Here he presents his conception of

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philosophy in strikingly traditional terms: the word 'philosophy' meansthe study of wisdom, and by 'wisdom' is meant not only prudence in oureveryday affairs but also a perfect knowledge of all things that mankind iscapable of knowing, both for the conduct of life and for the preservationof health and the discovery of all manner of skills (AT IXB 2/CSM I179). The key to the attainment of this wisdom, Descartes argues, is therecognition of the essential order among the different parts of ourknowledge, an order he depicts in his image of the tree of philosophy:The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branchesemerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reducedto three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals (ATIXB 14/CSM I 186). Within this scheme, metaphysics is foundational, butthis knowledge and the knowledge of physics that is built upon it aresought for the sake of the practical benefits that follow from the sciencesof medicine, mechanics and morals: just as it is not the roots or the trunkof a tree from which one gathers the fruit, but only the ends of thebranches, so the principal benefit of philosophy depends on those parts ofit which can only be learned last of all (AT IXB 15/CSM I 186).Foremost among these sciences is la morale: the highest and mostperfect moral system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of theother sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom (ibid.). It is for thesake of this science above all that Descartes hopes his readers willrealize how important it is to continue the search for these truths, and towhat a high degree of wisdom, and to what perfection and felicity of life,these truths can bring us (AT IXB 20/CSM I 190).

While it is clear that Descartes accords a privileged place to the sciencehe calls la morale, the fact remains that he left no systematic presentationof his ethical views. He offers several explanations for why he has notdevoted more attention to ethics. Given his conception of the order ofknowledge, conclusion about ethics must be established in a way thatreveals their dependence on the prior conclusions of metaphysics and

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physics. Thus, the systematic investigation of ethics can begin only aftercertainty has been achieved in these prior theoretical disciplines. In a lateletter to Chanut, Descartes cites two further reasons for his silence on thetopic: It is true that normally I refuse to write down my thoughtsconcerning morality. I have two reasons for this. One is that there is noother subject in which malicious people can so readily find pretexts forvilifying me; and the other is that I believe only sovereigns, or thoseauthorized by them, have the right to concern themselves with regulatingthe morals of other people (AT V 867/CSMK 326). The first of thesereasons reflects Descartes' inherent caution, reinforced by the hostilereception his philosophy had received at the University of Utrecht. Thesecond points to an important limitation in Descartes' conception ofethics: he does not enunciate a specific set of duties, because these, hebelieves, are the purview of the sovereign. This again may make it seemthat Descartes rejects a substantial role for philosophy in ethics, offeringin its place a Hobbesian account of the authority of moral dictatesgrounded in a sovereign will. There is an element of truth in thissuggestion, but uncovering it requires drawing a crucial distinction: ifDescartes limits the role of philosophy in determining specific moralrules, he nonetheless upholds the ancients' conception of philosophy asthe search for a wisdom sufficient for happiness. It is in this sense thatethics remains central to Descartes' philosophy.

2. The Provisional Moral Code of the DiscourseThe best-known expression of Descartes' ethical views is the provisionalmoral code (une morale par provision) that appears in Part Three ofDiscourse on the Method. Some have read this as a definitive statement ofDescartes' position, but this is consistent neither with the Discourse itselfnor with Descartes' later writings. Descartes frames the rules of hisprovisional moral code as part of the epistemological projectthe searchfor certaintyannounced in Part Two of the Discourse. In order that he

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may act decisively and live as happily as possible while avoidingprecipitate conclusions and assumptions, Descartes proposes aprovisional moral code consisting of just three or four maxims:

Descartes' apparent uncertainty about the number of rules in hisprovisional code (three or four) is noteworthy and may be explained bythe different status he assigns to the rules. While the first three prescribehow to act in the absence of any certain knowledge of good and evil(including the much-criticized deference to the laws and customs of hiscountry), the fourth rule holds out the possibility of cultivating his reasonso as to arrive at knowledge of the truth. Echoing his remarks in theRules, he says that in the discovery of such truths he has experiencedsuch extreme contentment that I did not think one could enjoy anysweeter or purer one in this life (AT VI 27/CSM I 124). This might beread as limiting our happiness to the contemplation of intellectual truthsof the sort announced in Part Four of the Discourse; however, Descartesmakes it clear that he sees the search for truth as having a practical importas well. By following the method he has prescribed for himself and

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country,holding constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I hadbeen instructed from my childhood. The second maxim was tobe as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to followeven the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, with noless constancy than if they had been quite certain. My thirdmaxim was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, andto change my desires rather than the order of the world. Finally,to conclude this moral code I thought I could do no better thanto continue with the [occupation] I was engaged in, and to devotemy whole life to cultivating my reason and advancing as far as Icould in the knowledge of the truth, following the method I hadprescribed for myself (AT VI 227/CSM I 1224).

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exercising his capacity for judgment, he is confident of eventuallyacquiring all the true knowledge of which he is capable, and in this wayall the true goods within my reach (AT VI 28/CSM I 125).

It is evident, then, that the first three maxims of the provisional moralcode are just thatprovisional rules that Descartes will follow while hecarries out his search for certain knowledgeand that he is confident thatthis search will terminate in knowledge of true goods that will supplyreliable directives for action. Descartes hints at the range of these goodsin Part Five of the Discourse. They will include the maintenance ofhealth, which is undoubtedly the first good [le premier bien] and thefoundation of all the other goods in this life. Because the mind dependsso much on the temperament and disposition of the bodily organs,Descartes adds, we must look to medicine if we are to find some meansof making men in general wiser and more skilful than they have been uptill now (AT VI 62/CSM I 143). The extent of Descartes' commitment tothe integration of physical and psychological health will become apparentin the Passions of the Soul. It would be a mistake, however, to concludefrom this that he proposes a reduction of ethics to medicine. As presentedalready in the Discourse, his ethics is founded on an ideal of virtue as aperfected power of choice, together with the assumption that virtue byitself is sufficient for happiness:

Expressed in this passage are the core ideas of Descartes' ethics: thenotion of virtue, as a disposition of the will to choose in accordance with

[S]ince our will tends to pursue or avoid only what our intellectrepresents as good or bad, we need only to judge well in order toact well, and to judge as well as we can in order to do our bestthat is to say, in order to acquire all the virtues and in general allthe other goods we can acquire. And when we are certain of this,we cannot fail to be happy. (AT VI 28/CSM I 125)

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reason's judgments about the good, and the notion of happiness, as a stateof mental well-being that is achieved through the practice of virtue. In hiscorrespondence with Princess Elisabeth, Descartes will elaborate on therelationship between these two ideas. Here is it worth noting that while itis virtue that links ethics to the broader goal of the cultivation of reason,Descartes gives no less weight to the importance of happiness, in the formof tranquility. This is made clear near the end of the Discourse, when heexplains why, in spite of his reservations, he has published the book underhis own name: I am not excessively fond of gloryindeed if I dare tosay so, I dislike it in so far as I regard it as opposed to that tranquilitywhich I value above everything else. [I]f I had done this [sc. concealedhis identity] I thought I would do myself an injustice, and moreover thatwould have given me a certain sort of disquiet, which again would havebeen opposed to the perfect peace of mind I am seeking (AT VI 74/CSMI 149).

3. The Meditations and the Ethics of BeliefThe Meditations is distinguished from Descartes' other works in explicitlyforeswearing practical concerns. The conceit of the Meditations is athinker who has abstracted himself from any connection to the externalworld. For this reason, Descartes feels confident in pursuing the methodof hyperbolic doubt, which rejects as false any opinion concerning whichthe slightest doubt can be raised: I know that no danger or error willresult from my plan, and that I cannot possibly go too far in my distrustfulattitude. This is because the task now in hand does not involve action butmerely the acquisition of knowledge (AT VII 22/CSM II 15).

On these grounds, one might feel justified in setting aside the Meditationsin an examination of Descartes' ethics. In fact, however, the Meditationspursues, in a theoretical context, an inquiry that is closely related toethics: the proper disposition of the will. Descartes takes the operation of

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the will to be integral to both action and judgment. In general, the will, orfreedom of choice, consists in our ability to do or not do something(that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simplyin the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmationor denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we donot feel we are determined by any external force (AT VII 57/CSM II 40).For Descartes, freedom is an essential property of the will; however, thisfreedom does not entail indifference: if I always saw clearly what wastrue and good, I should never have to deliberate about the right judgementor choice; in that case, although I should be wholly free, it would beimpossible for me ever to be in a state of indifference (AT VII 58/CSMII 40). We are indifferent only when our perception of the true, or of thegood, is less than clear and distinct.

Descartes assigns the will a pivotal role in the pursuit of knowledge.When presented with a clear and distinct perception of what is true, thewill is compelled to assent to it. When the perception is less than fullyclear and distinct, the will is not compelled in the same way. In suchcases, it has the power either to assent or to withhold assent. Given this,the correct use of free will is identified as the critical factor in theattainment of knowledge: If I simply refrain from making a judgmentin cases where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity anddistinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoidingerror. But if in such cases, I either affirm or deny, then I not using myfree will correctly (AT VII 5960/CSM II 41). Provided we refrain fromassenting to what is not clearly and distinctly perceived, our judgmentsare guaranteed to be true.

In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes draws a close parallel between thewill's relation to the true and to the good. Just as the will is compelled toassent to what is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true, so it iscompelled to choose what is clearly and distinctly perceived to be good:

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if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have todeliberate about the right judgement or choice (AT VII 58/CSM II 40).And analogously, we might suppose, just as the recipe for avoiding erroris to withhold assent from that whose truth is not perceived clearly anddistinctly, so the recipe for avoiding moral error, or sin, is to refuse tochoose that whose goodness is not perceived clearly and distinctly. In hisobjections to the Meditations, Arnauld cautioned Descartes on this point,suggesting that the comments he makes on the cause of error would giverise to the most serious objections if they were stretched out of context tocover the pursuit of good and evil (AT VII 215/CSM II 151). HeedingArnauld's warning, Descartes added a disclaimer to the Synopsis of theMeditations: But here it should be noted in passing that I do not deal atall with sin, i.e. the error which is committed in pursuing good and evil,but only with the error that occurs in distinguishing truth and falsehood(AT VII 15/CSM II 11). This assertion flatly contradicts the text of theFourth Meditation, where Descartes had written that, where the will isindifferent, it easily turns aside from what is true and good, and this isthe source of my error and sin (AT VII 58/CSM II 401). In light of this,and Descartes' insistence to Mersenne that the disclaimer be placed inparentheses to indicate that it had been added, there is reason to believethat Descartes is committed to upholding the same account of the will inrelation to the true and to the good.

There is nonetheless one important way in which the operation of the willin a purely theoretical context (such as the Meditations) must bedistinguished from its operation in a practical context. In the pursuit ofcertainty, Descartes claims that it is both possible and reasonable towithhold assent from any idea that is not perceived clearly and distinctly.Outside the isolated confines of the Meditations, however, it is impossibleto maintain such an attitude of detachment. Life demands that we act, bychoosing among competing goods on the basis of ideas that are often lessthan clear and distinct. When faced with the exigencies of existence,

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suspension of choice is not an option. Since we are forced to act underconditions of uncertainty, it might seem to follow that we are condemnedto a life of moral error, constantly making wrong choices on the basis ofinadequate perceptions of the goodness and badness of objects. This maybe the ordinary lot of human beings. However, Descartes does not believethat this situation is irremediable. In his later writings he presents anaccount of virtue that shows how we can be assured of our ability to makethe right choices, or to act virtuously, despite the inadequacy of much ofour knowledge.

4. Virtue and Happiness: The Correspondence withPrincess ElisabethDescartes' correspondence with Princess Elisabeth has as its central topicthe relation of mind and bodya relation that is explored from the pointof view of both theory (the problem of mind-body union) and practice.With the respect to the latter, Descartes is again concerned with theconnection between physical and mental well-being, and in particular thedeleterious effects of passions such as sadness, grief, fear andmelancholy. He discusses these topics in the course of advising Elisabethon how to cope with her own illness and distress. The question, however,is an ancient one: when faced with the hardships of lifephysical illness,loss, anxietyhow can one respond in a way that allows one to preservethe state of tranquility, or contentment, that is the core of our happiness?

Descartes' abiding interest in medicine is prominent here, since thetreatment of physical illness is the most effective way of removing one ofmain sources of mental disturbance. Yet he is well aware of the limits ofmedical knowledge, and so he acknowledges that the passions must alsobe confronted directly: They are domestic enemies with whom we areforced to keep company, and we have to be perpetually on guard lest theyinjure us (AT IV 218/CSMK 249). Descartes prescribes to Elisabeth a

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two-part remedy for protecting herself against the harmful effects of thepassions: so far as possible to distract our imagination and senses fromthem, and when obliged by prudence to consider them, to do so with ourintellect alone (ibid.). The first part of the remedy relies on our ability todirect the imagination away from the immediate objects of the passions.Given this power, Descartes argues, there might be a person who hadcountless genuine reasons for distress but who took such pains to directhis imagination that he never thought of them except when compelled bysome practical nececessity, and who spent the rest of his time in theconsideration of objects which could furnish contentment and joy (ATIV 219/CSMK 250). Intriguingly, Descartes speculates that this kind ofcognitive therapy by itself might be sufficient to restore the patient tohealth. In circumventing the causal pathway by which the passion arises,the body will be returned to a healthy state. Descartes offers his ownhistory as an example of this phenomenon: From [my mother] I inheriteda dry cough and a pale colour which stayed with me until I was more thantwenty, so that all the doctors who saw me up to that time gave it as theirverdict that I would die young. But I have always had an inclination tolook at things from the most favorable angle and to make my principalhappiness depend upon myself alone, and I believe that this inclinationcaused the indisposition, which was almost part of my nature, graduallyto disappear completely (AT IV 221/CSMK 251). This line of thoughtleads directly to the Passions of the Soul, in which Descartes discusses atlength the causation and function of the passions.

The second part of the remedy prescribed to Elisabeth aligns Descartes'position with that of the ancients, who stress the role of reason inregulating the passions. The person who is led by passion will inevitablyexperience sadness, grief, fear, anxietyemotions inconsistent withperfect happiness. Such happiness is the possession alone of thoseelevated souls in which reason always remains mistress:

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The link between reason and happiness is explored at length by Descartesin letters exchanged with Elisabeth during the summer and fall of 1645.The discussion begins with Descartes' suggestion that they examine whatthe ancients had to say on the topic, and he chooses as exemplarySeneca's work On the Happy Life (De Vita Beata). Descartes, however,quickly becomes dissatisfied with Seneca's treatment and proposes insteadto explain to Elizabeth how he thinks the subject should have beentreated by such a philosopher, unenlightened by faith, with only naturalreason to guide him (AT IV 263/CSMK 257).

Basic to Descartes' account is the distinction he draws between (i) thesupreme good, (ii) happiness, and (iii) the final end or goal, notionsgenerally taken as equivalent in ancient eudaimonism (AT IV 275/CSMK261). Descartes identifies the supreme good with virtue, which he definesas a firm and constant will to bring about everything we judge to be thebest and to employ all the force of our intellect in judging well (AT IV277/CSMK 262). Virtue is the supreme good, he argues, because it is theonly good, among all those we can possess, which depends entirely onour free will (AT IV 276/CSMK 261), and because it is sufficient forhappiness. Descartes explains happiness (la batitude) entirely in

the difference between the greatest souls and those that are baseand common consists principally in the fact that common soulsabandon themselves to their passions and are happy or unhappyonly according as the things that happen to them are agreeable orunpleasant; the greatest souls, on the other hand, reason in a waythat is so strong and cogent that, although they also have passions,and indeed passions which are often more violent than those ofordinary people, their reason nevertheless always remainsmistress, and even makes their afflictions serve them andcontribute to the perfect happiness they enjoy in this life. (AT IV202; translation from Gaukroger 2002, 236).

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psychological terms. It is the perfect contentment of mind and innersatisfaction which is acquired by the wise without fortune's favor (ATIV 264/CSMK 257). According to Descartes, we cannot ever practiceany virtuethat is to say, do what our reason tells us we should dowithout receiving satisfaction and pleasure from doing so (AT IV284/CSMK 263). Thus, happiness is a natural product of virtue and can beenjoyed regardless of what fortune brings. The dependence of happinesson virtue is confirmed by Descartes' account of the final end, which, hesays, can be regarded either as happiness or as the supreme good: virtue isthe target at which we ought to aim, but happiness is the prize thatinduces us to fire at it (AT IV 277/CMSK 262).

As Descartes defines it, virtue depends upon the employment of reason.While it is conceivable that one might have a firm and constant will todo something without having examined whether it is the right thing to do,one cannot have a firm and constant will to do what is judged to be thebest, unless one is capable of judging what the best is. Thus, virtuepresupposes knowledge of the relative goodness of ends, and thisknowledge Descartes assigns to reason: The true function of reason isto examine and consider without passion the value of all the perfections,both of the body and of the soul, which can be acquired by our conduct,so that we shall always choose the better (AT IV 2867/CSMK 265).

But how exactly does reason allow us to discriminate between lesser andgreater goods? On one point Descartes' position is clear: the claim ofvirtue to be the supreme good follows from the fact that it is nothing morethan the correct use of our free will, employing it to choose whateverreason represents as the greatest good. As Descartes argues in the FourthMeditation, we are in no way more like Godthat is, more perfectthanin our possession of free will. Hence the correct use of this will is ourgreatest good: free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have, since itmakes us in a way equal to God and seems to exempt us from being his

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subjects; and so its correct use is the greatest of all the goods we possess(AT V 85/CSMK 326). Reason shows that the greatest good within ourpower is the perfection of the will. In any choice we make, the value ofthe particular goods we pursue will always be less than that of the willitself; hence, provided we act virtuously, we can be content, whether ornot we succeed in obtaining whatever other goods we seek.

Yet this still leaves open the question of how to assess the value of theseother goods. The supreme good, virtue, consists in a firm resolution tobring about whatever reason judges to be the best. But on the basis ofwhat does reason make this determination? What knowledge allowsreason to form a well-founded judgment about the goodness and badnessof ends, in the pursuit of which we act virtuously? Descartes criticizesSeneca on just this pointthat he fails to teach us all the principal truthswhose knowledge is necessary to facilitate the practice of virtue and toregulate our desires and passions, and thus to enjoy natural happiness(AT IV 267/CSMK 258). In response, Elisabeth worries that Descartes'account, which promises the attainment of happiness, might presupposemore knowledge than we can possibly possess. In assuaging her concern,Descartes summarizes the knowledge he believes we can rely on indirecting our will toward virtuous ends. It consists of a suprisingly smallset of the truths most useful to us. The first two are basic principles ofCartesian metaphysics as presented in the Meditations:

1. The existence of an omnipotent, supremely perfect God, whosedecrees are infallible. This teaches us to accept calmly all the thingswhich happen to us as expressly sent by God (AT IV 2912/CSMK265).

2. The immortality of the soul and its independence from the body.This prevents us from fearing death, and so detaches our affectionsfrom the things of this world that we look upon whatever is in thepower of fortune with nothing but scorn (AT IV 292/CSMK 266).

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The next three truths derive from Cartesian natural philosophy, broadlyunderstood:

3. The indefinite extent of the universe. In recognizing this weovercome our inclination to place ourselves at the center of thecosmos, as though everything ought to happen for our sake, which isthe source of countless vain anxieties and troubles (AT IV292/CSMK 266).

4. That we are part of a larger community of beings, whose interesttake precedence over our own. Though each of us is a persondistinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in some waydifferent from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to thinkthat none of us could subsist alone and that each one of us is reallyone of the many parts of the universe. And the interests of thewhole, of which each of us is a part, must always be preferred tothose of our particular person (AT IV 293/CSMK 266).

5. That our passions represent goods as being much greater than theyreally are, and that the pleasures of the body are never as lasting asthose of the soul or so great in possession as they are in anticipation.We must pay careful attention to this, so that when we feelourselves moved by some passion we suspend our judgment until itis calmed, and do not let ourselves be deceived by the falseappearances of the goods of this world (AT IV 295/CSMK 267).

The final proposition is of a quite different character:

6. Whenever we lack certain knowledge of how to act, we should deferto the laws and customs of the land. [O]ne must also minutelyexamine all the customs of one's place of abode to see how far theyshould be followed. Though we cannot have certain demonstrationsof everything, still we must take sides, and in matters of customembrace the opinions that seem the most probable, so they we may

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never be irresolute when we need to act. For nothing causes regretand remorse except irresolution (ibid.).

The truths that Descartes takes to be most useful to us do not consist ofdiscoveries original to his philosophy. Rather, they reflect a generaloutlook on the world that could be embraced by someone withoutCartesian sympathies: the existence of an omnipotent and supremelyperfect God; the immortality of the soul; the vastness of the universe; thatwe have duties to a larger whole of which we are a part; that our passionsoften distort the goodness of their objects. What Descartes can claim atmost (and what he does claim in the preface to the Principles ofPhilosophy) is that he has supplied better reasons for believing thesepropositions to be true; he has established certain knowledge where beforethere was only unstable belief.

The establishment of a body of knowledge relevant to the practice ofvirtue supplies the basis for a new set of moral rules that replaces theprovisional morality of the Discourse. Descartes presents them toElisabeth as a succinct recipe for happiness:

It seems to me that each person can make himself content byhimself without any external assistance, provided he respects threeconditions, which are related to the three rules of provisionalmorality which I put forward in the Discourse on the Method. Thefirst is that he should always try to employ his mind as well as hecan to discover what he should and should not do in all thecircumstances of life. The second is that he should have a firm andconstant resolution to carry out whatever reason recommendswithout being diverted by his passions or appetites. The third isthat he should bear in mind that while he thus guides himself asfar as he can by reason, all the good things which he does notpossess are one and all entirely outside his power. (AT IV

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Here the Discourse's final provisional rule has become the first rule,reflecting the assumption that reason, in the form of judgments aboutgood and evil, can serve as a reliable guide for action. Similarly, theDiscourse's second rule, which prescribed that one be as firm anddecisive in [one's] actions as one can, and follow even the mostdoubtful opinions once adopted, has now become an injunction to carryout whatever reason recommends without being diverted by the passions.The two sets of rules overlap most closely in the third rule, whichcounsels us to recognize the limits of our power and to curtail our desiresfor things outside of it. In this case too, however, the rule now has adifferent status for Descartes, since it is supported by certain knowledgeof God, on whom all things depend, and the immortality of the soul.

The truths that Descartes presents to Elisabeth supply a body of rationalknowledge on the basis of which we are able to use our free willcorrectly, choosing good over evil. Clearly, though, the guidance offeredby these truths is of the most general sort. They do not underwrite specificdirectives for action or dictate what we ought to do in any particularcircumstance. Instead, they are best seen simply as facilitating rightaction, by removing impediments to it (anxiety about the future, fear ofdeath) or saving us from obvious errors (ignoring the concerns of others,giving priority to bodily goods). That the content of morality isunderdetermined by the knowledge on which it depends is made clear byDescartes' final proposition, which instructs us to defer to the laws andcustoms of the land when it is not obvious how we ought to act. Thisproposition echoes the first rule of provisional morality that Descartesprescribes for himself in the Discourse. However, this rule, too, hasundergone an important transformation. Whereas in the Discoursedeference to the laws and customs of one's country is presented as thefirst rule of provisional morality, to Elisabeth it is offered as a fallback

265/CSMK 2578)

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position, acknowledging that while we do indeed possess certainknowledge of good and evil, there are limits to this knowledge.

The recognition of these limits is an enduring feature of Descartes' ethics.The truths outlined to Elizabeth lay down a set of general guidelines forhow to use the will correctly. Following them, however, does notguarantee that we infallibly choose the greatest good; nor is success ofthis sort required for virtue. As far as virtue is concerned, the criticalpoint is that we do whatever we can to ascertain the best course of action,appealing if necessary to civil law or custom, and that we then willdecisively.

This creates an important disanalogy for Descartes between the theoreticaland the practical. In both cases, we have a responsibility to correct ourunderstanding before committing the will in judgment or action. Only inthe case of judgment, however, is it reasonable to suspend assentindefinitely if we lack the knowledge needed to be confident of thecorrectness of our decision. In the case of action, Descartes denies thatthis is appropriate: As far as the conduct of life is concerned, I am veryfar from thinking that we should assent only to what is clearly perceived.On the contrary, I do not think that we should always wait even forprobable truths (AT VII 149/CSM II 106). In acting, the essential thingis that we will in the right manner, allowing reason to guide our choice sofar as it can. It is not necessary that our reason should be free fromerror, he tells Elisabeth; it is sufficient if our conscience testifies thatwe have never lacked resolution and virtue to carry out whatever we havejudged the best course (AT IV 266/CSMK 258). Resolution, or firmnessof judgment, is crucial, for it is the lack of this, above all, that causesregret and remorse and thereby threatens our happiness (AT IV264/CSMK 257).

5. Generosity and The Passions of the Soul

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Descartes' correspondence with Princess Elisabeth led directly to thecomposition of his final book, The Passions of the Soul, a large part ofwhich was written during the winter of 16456. In a prefatory letter to thebook, Descartes maintains that in it he has set out to explain the passionsonly as a natural philosopher [physicien], and not as a rhetorician or evenas a moral philosopher (AT XI 326/CSM I 327). On the face of it, thisseems to be contradicted by the contents of the book, since much of it isdevoted to understanding the passions from an ethical point of viewthatis, understanding how they can be accommodated to the goal ofhappiness. The significance of Descartes' remark lies in the particularaccount he gives of the passions. In general, they are defined as thoseperceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we referparticularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened bysome movement of the [animal] spirits (art. 27; CSM I 3389).Descartes' central thesis is that the passions originate in bodily changes,which are communicated by the animal spirits to the pineal gland, andthereby give rise to affective states in the soulaffections which arereferred to the soul itself and not to the body. Because the passionsoriginate in the body, a large part of the book is devoted to differentiatingthe passions and accounting for their effects in physiological terms; henceDescartes' claim to explain them as a natural philosopher.

Descartes distinguishes six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred,desire, joy and sadness. All the rest are either composed from these orspecies of them (art. 69). The passions operate in a common manner: theprincipal effect of all the human passions is that they move and disposethe soul to want the things for which they prepare the body. Thus, thepasssions are in the first place motivational states that dispose the soul towill specific actions: the feeling of fear moves the soul to want to flee,that of courage to want to fight, and similarly with the others (art. 40;CSM I 343). Different passions result from the effects of different

Descartes Ethics


motions on the pineal gland; and these, Descartes assumes, have beenordained by God for the sake of preserving the human body: Thefunction of all the passions consists solely in this, that they dispose oursoul to want the things which nature deems useful for us, and to persist inthis volition; and the same agitation of the spirits which normally causesthe passions also disposes the body to make movements which help toattain these things (art. 52; CSM I 349).

Given their natural function of preserving the body, the passions are all bynature good (art. 211). They spur us to act in ways that are in generalconducive to our well-being. However, the effects of the passions are notuniformly beneficial. For the most part the passions are directed atimmediate ends, and for this reason they exaggerate the goodness orbadness of their objects, prompting us, for example, to flee quickly fromapparent dangers. The passions are also ordered for the sake of thepreservation of the body, and not the contentment of the soul; and becausethey originate in the body, any malfunction of the latter can disrupt thenormal operation of the passions. For these reasons, it is necessary thatthe passions be regulated by reason, whose proper weapons againsttheir misuse and excess are firm and determinate judgements bearingupon the knowledge of good and evil, which the soul has resolved tofollow in guiding its conduct (art. 48; CSM I 347). Summarizing hisposition at the end of the Passions, Descartes avers that the chief use ofwisdom lies in its teaching us to be masters of our passions and to controlthem with such skill that the evils which they cause are quite bearable,and even become a source of joy (art. 212; CSM I 404).

Over and above the role they play in the preservation of the body, thepassions also make a direct contribution to human happiness. In theconcluding article of the Passions, Descartes goes so far as to say that itis on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends(art. 212; CSM I 404). In the body of the article, he qualifies this claim,

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allowing that the soul can have pleasures of its own. But the pleasurescommon to it and the body depend entirely on the passions. Hisconsidered view on this question seems to be that the passions(particularly those of love and joy) form a valuable part of a human life,that the enjoyment of them is consistent with the happiness that is thenatural product of virtue, but that happiness of the latter sort can be hadeven in the presence of harmful passions such as sadness or grief.

Happiness, as Descartes defines it for Elisabeth, is a perfect contentmentof mind and inner satisfaction (AT IV 264/CSMK 257), or thesatisfaction and pleasure that accompanies the practice of virtue (AT IV284/CSMK 263). In the Passions, he distinguishes these affects from thepassions that originate in the body. The former are described as internalemotions of the soul, which are produced in the soul only by the soulitself. In this they differ from its passions, which always depend on somemovement of the [animal] spirits (art. 147; CSM I 381). Internalemotions are thus independent of the body and the basis of a happinessthat can withstand the most violent assaults of the passions:

internal emotions affect us more intimately, and consequentlyhave much more power over us than the passions which occurwith them but are distinct from them. To this extent it is certainthat, provided our soul always has the means of happiness withinitself, all the troubles coming from elsewhere are powerless toharm it. Such troubles will serve rather to increase its joy; for onseeing that it cannot be harmed by them, it becomes aware of itsperfection. And in order that our soul should have the means ofhappiness, it needs only to pursue virtue diligently. For if anyonelives in such a way that his conscience cannot reproach him forever failing to do something he judges to be the best (which iswhat I here call pursuing virtue), he will receive from this asatisfaction which has such power to make him happy that the

Descartes Ethics


Descartes is committed to the view that the pursuit of virtue is sufficientfor happiness. However, he firmly rejects the idea that virtue has only aninstrumental value as a means to happiness. On the contrary, virtue isgrounded in the one aspect of human nature that is of unconditional value:freedom of the willthe perfection of the soul that renders us in acertain way like God by making us masters of ourselves (art. 152; CSM I384). The recognition of this fact forms the basis of the moral idealDescartes calls generosity. Generosity incorporates both the perfectionof the intellect (wisdom) and the perfection of the will (virtue). Thegenerous person knows in what manner and for what reason anyoneought to have esteem or contempt for himself, and he possesses theperfection that is the object of that esteem. True generosity, therefore,has two components: The first consists in his knowing that nothing trulybelongs to him but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he oughtto be praised or blamed for no other reason than his using this freedomwell or badly. The second consists in his feeling within himself a firm andconstant resolution to use it wellthat is, never to lack the will toundertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is topursue virtue in a perfect manner (art. 153; CSM I 384).

Generosity is an ideal of individual ethical perfection, but Descartes alsodraws from it an important conclusion about our relations to others. Uponrecognizing an element of unconditional value within himself, thegenerous person is naturally led to extend this recognition to others:Those who possess this knowledge and this feeling about themselvesreadily come to believe that any other person can have the sameknowledge and feeling about himself, because this involves nothing whichdepends on someone else. Those who are endowed with generosity are

most violent assaults of the passions will never have sufficientpower to disturb the tranquillity of his soul. (art. 148; CSM I 3812)

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thus disposed to overlook conventional distinctions of class and socialstatus, and to focus on the true, intrinsic worth of each individual:

Thus, despite its nod to law and custom, which fill the space opened bythe limits of our moral knowledge, Descartes' ethics is crowned by aprinciple of moral universalism. In virtue of their free will, all humanbeings have the same moral status and deserve equal moral respect. Inthis we find an important anticipation of Kant's ethics, which emergesfrom a similar consideration of the unconditional value of a rational andfree will.

BibliographyPrimary Works

Descartes, Ren. Oeuvres De Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Charles Adamand Paul Tannery, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1983. [citedas AT followed by volume and page number]

. The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by JohnCottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, volume 3including Anthony Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1988. [cited as CSM(K) followed by volume and page number]

Just as they do not consider themselves much inferior to thosewho have greater wealth or honour, or even to those who havemore intelligence, knowledge or beauty, or generally to those whosurpass them in some other perfections, equally they do not havemuch more esteem for themselves than for those whom theysurpass. For all these things seem to them to be unimportant, bycontrast with the virtuous will for which alone they esteemthemselves, and which they suppose also to be present, or at leastcapable of being present, in every other person. (art. 154; CSM I384).

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. The Passions of the Soul, translated by Stephen H. Voss,Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.

. The Correspondence between Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia andDescartes, translated by Lisa Shapiro, Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 2007.

Secondary Works

Beavers, Anthony F., 1989. Desire and Love in Descartes's LatePhilosophy, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 6: 279294.

Brown, Deborah, 2006. Descartes and the Passionate Mind, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Cottingham, John, 1998. Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and thePassions in Greek, Cartesian and Psychoanalytic Ethics, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Frierson, Patrick R., 2002. Learning to Love: From Egoism toGenerosity in Descartes, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 40:313348.

Gaukroger, Stephen, 1995. Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, Oxford:Clarendon Press.

, 2002. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Gueroult, Martial, 1985. Descartes's Philosophy Interpreted According tothe Order of Reasons, Roger Ariew (trans.), Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, vol. 2.

James, Susan, 1994. Internal and External in the Work of Descartes, inPhilosophy in an Age of Pluralism, James Tully (ed.), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

, 1997. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kambouchner, Denis, 1995. L'Homme des Passions. Commentaires surDescartes. I. Analytique, Paris: Albin Michel.

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, 1995. L'Homme des Passions. Commentaires sur Descartes. II.Canonique, Paris: Albin Michel.

, 2009. Descartes, la philosophie morale, Paris: Hermann.Marshall, John, 1998. Descartes's Moral Theory, Ithaca and London:

Cornell University Press.Morgan, Vance G., 1994. Foundation of Cartesian Ethics, Atlantic

Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve, 1962. La Morale de Descartes, Paris: Presses

Universitaires de France., 1987. Le Denier Fruit de la Mtaphysique Cartsienne: La

Gnrosit, Les tudes philosophiques, 1: 4354., 1998. Descartes: His Life and Thought, Jean Marie Todd (ed.),

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.Pereboom, Derk, 1994. Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza,

Faith and Philosophy, 11: 592625.Rutherford, Donald, 2004. On the Happy Life: Descartes vis--vis

Seneca, in Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations, Steven K.Strange and Jack Zupko (eds.), New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Shapiro, Lisa, 1999. Cartesian Generosity. In Norms and Modes ofThinking in Descartes, Tuomo Aho and Mikko Yrjnsuuri (eds.),Acta Philosophica Fennica, 64: 24975.

Sorell, Tom, 1993. Morals and Modernity in Descartes, in The Rise ofModern Philosophy, Tom Sorell (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Williston, Byron and Gombay, Andr (eds.), 2003. Passion and Virtue inDescartes, Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

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