“Detainee Aspects of Transition”

National Defense University Feb 12th, 2009

Dr. Doug Stone, MajGen USMC

Introduction‐‐‐the ChallengeThe Basics (Islam, Islamists, COIN)

The new ApproachThe Role of Leadership‐‐‐The Challenge

2

COIN Campaign Design  Components

PURPOSE

GOVERNANCE

ESSENTIALSERVICES

TRAIN/ ADVISE

ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

COMBAT OPS

INFORMATION

3

SYMPATHIZERSSYMPATHIZERS

SUPPORTERSSUPPORTERS

MEMBERSHIPMEMBERSHIP

CADRECADRE

CORE

CoreStable membership, few changes 

over time, does not necessarily 

believe all aspects of the 

purported ideological program, 

maintains links to other groups, 

rarely exposes its members to risk, 

occasionally co‐opts promising or 

threatening individuals from the 

wider organization.

CadreThe most ideologically fanatical 

component, membership changes 

slowly, target of propaganda from 

core, trains membership, plans and 

leads operations, performs 

specialist functions.

SupportersFluctuating group of individuals or 

temporary alliances with other 

groups; carries out support and 

facilitation tasks (e.g. courier 

work, distribution of propaganda, 

sentinel duty) for the broader 

group. Sometimes includes a high 

proportion of women and 

children.

MembershipFluctuates frequently, target of 

indoctrination and training by 

cadre, individuals join and 

participate to differing degrees. 

Some absorb more of the ideology, 

some less. Some progress to cadre 

or (rarely) core status; most leave.

SympathizersNo firm commitment, often 

individuals sympathize with 

several groups and may shift 

loyalty opportunistically based on 

events. © David J. Kilcullen, 2007

Goal is to isolate irreconcilable insurgents, increase # of 

moderates, and minimize impacts of detention policy on 

alienating population (i.e., creating

insurgent supporters and recruits)

COIN doctrine, FM 3‐24/MCWP 3‐

33.5, 15 Dec 06Treating a civilian like an 

insurgent…is a sure recipe for 

failure.

Counterinsurgents 

that use excessive force to 

limit short‐term risk alienate 

the local populace.  They 

deprive themselves of the 

support or tolerance of the 

people.  This is what 

insurgents want. 

Frustrate insurgent recruiting.Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose 

the War.

Consider how the populace 

might react

Galula:“A system…which would 

encourage soldiers to kill or 

capture the largest number of

enemies…may well be 

disastrous in [COIN].”

‘Victory’

in COIN: “…not [just] the 

destruction…of the insurgent’s 

forces…that, plus the 

permanent isolation of the 

insurgent from the population, 

isolation

not enforced upon the 

population but maintained by 

and with the population.”

Avoid actions that might 

antagonize the population

TF‐134 promoting detainee policies that exploit Iraqi cultural peculiarities to 

turn moderates away from insurgency

4

TF‐134 Detention AOInterrogationObservationEvaluation

MNC‐

I Security AOPopulation Control & 

Protection

Much closer coordination

between TF‐134 / operational MNC‐

I 

subordinate commanders needed to enable extended effects

“Competitive Control”

model

© David J. Kilcullen, 2007

Strong indications that enhanced detention ops with

selective releases can positively impact

the greater COIN fight

–

reduce insurgent #s and capability,

bolster support for CF/GoI –

Potential Influence•

Each detainee a ‘chip’

to 

influence 100+ others•

Reduce AIF recruits•

Better intel/infiltration•

Enhance pro‐CF/GoI and 

IO support

•

CF/US recruitment? •

Empower moderates •

Firm policy – DO NOT:•

Conduct general mass 

releases

•

Release any

high risk 

detainees

TF‐134 PotentialArea of 

Influence

TF‐134 

Poten

tial

Area o

f 

Influe

nce

Defining Strategic Success

VICTORY•

Establish an alliance with moderate 

Iraqis                  

•

Empower them to effectively  marginalize violent extremists

•

Provide momentum to the process of  reconciliation with Iraqi society

Population and Capacity Projections

4002

0

3872

0

3742

0

3612

0

3482

0

3352

0

3222

0

3092

0

2962

0

2832

0

2712

0

2592

0

2522

0

2452

0

1672

5

1828

4

1940

8

2066

8

2160

6

2309

0

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

50000

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-0

7Ju

l-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-0

8Feb

-08Mar-

08Apr-

08May

-08Ju

n-08

Jul-0

8Aug

-08Sep

-08

Cropper Bucca Taji Ramadi

7

Projected net 1300 detainees per 

month grows TIF population to 40,000+ 

next year

Detention impacts on #s of insurgents and reconciliation major decision criteria, 

but detention capacity, resources used for TIFs, and eventual turnover of 

detainees to ISF also decision criterion

Study compares /  balances factors related to reducing # 

detainees and # of insurgents

Proposed, time‐phased reduction of 

detainee population down to ~8000 

Proposed accelerated rate of release 

precludes mass release or turning over 

large numbers of hardened detainees 

to Iraqis.  

24,5

13

23,8

89

23,7

78

21,7

63

21,4

63

21,1

53

20,8

53

20,5

43

20,2

43

19,9

43

19,6

33

17251495 1013 1437 1631

1691 1200 1240 1200 1240 1200 1200 1240

971872 902 904 900

940900 930 900 930 900 900 930

22,5

14

23,2

45

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08

Population Releases IntakesAPR 08 Projections: 

30 Intakes per day

40 releases per day

TIF Detainee Population Actual & Forecast

APR 08 Actual:

28 Intakes per day

21 Releases per day

Actual Forecast

‐754 ‐623 ‐111 ‐533 ‐731

Line of Operations:  1. Unite the Ummah

Momentum

“The sword and the word will complement one another.”--Zarqawi to Bin Laden, June 2004, (U//FOUO)

“The sword and the word will complement one another.”--Zarqawi to Bin Laden, June 2004, (U//FOUO)

“... Islamic governments… are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.” - Al Qaeda Manual, (U)

“... Islamic governments… are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.” - Al Qaeda Manual, (U)

Kinetic Operations

Momentum

Means

Call to Jihad

Contains OSC material.

10

11

NOT the Enemy

Detention: Viewed as a Problem

Historic failures in custody 

and care serve as recruiting 

tools for foreign fighters. 

Detention had also served 

as a place for insurgents to 

conduct recruiting, training, 

and disciplining of future 

combatants.  

Characterize Red (Area Of Interest)

Mosul

Irbil

Tal Afar

Rte 1

Dahuk

14

The HQ Soviet 40th Army  in Kabul, 1987.

Soviet Trucks in Afghanistan‐‐2002

The Fall of Saigon

TF‐134 Goals

• Ensure standards of care and custody

• Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk

‐ if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology

‐ when no longer a threat, release

• Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks 

•

Collect information from detainees and provide  intelligence 

• Defeat any insurgency within the TIF

CRRBCapture MAG CELL     &

Release Detention

Previous Detention Process  (before July 2007)

GO ReviewUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Govt of Iraq Reintegration & 

Reconciliation

MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting

EducationCivics & Islamic                  

Discussions

VOTECH & Work Programs

Family 

Advocacy

Pledge & Guarantor Post‐ReleaseRelease

MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition 

In

MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting

Capture

Current Engagement Process

Interrogation

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Historical Comparison: Non‐lethal Expenditures

DODIC Nomenclature Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08AA51 12 GAGE PNT CNTRL M1012 1482 895 343 78 929 282 15 10 5AA52 12 GAGE CRWD DISP M1013 1684 1425 677 70 1275 178 2 10 4AB08 12 G Extended range X1092 0 110 165 81 275 249 6 17 12B567 40MM CS TACT 47 97 30 0 8 1 0 0 0BA06 40MM N-L M1006 82 122 38 6 262 72 0 3 3BA13 40MM CRWD DISP M1029 103 97 114 9 286 125 1 0 2BA27 40MM MARKING IMPACT Ext Ran 0 3 43 4 108 23 0 2 0FN320 FN 303 IMPACT PROJECTILE 506 689 397 32 271 0 16 1 0FN330 FN 303 MARKING ROUND 1852 919 532 111 194 13 7 5 13G924 Grenade, Non-Burn CS NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0G963 GRENADE, HD TACT CS 23 12 31 0 0 0 0 0 0GG04 GRENADE, HD RUBBER BALL 86 78 56 0 0 25 0 0 1GG09 GRENADE, STUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0COTS GRENADE, CS EXPULSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0KM05 INDIVIDUAL CS DISPENSER.2/4 5 24 50 10 26 2 0 5 3WA97 CROWD CONTROL AMMUNITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0COTS TASER CARTRIDGES 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 0 3COTS OC Fogger 0 21 12 3 7 3 0 1 7

42nd NON LETHAL YEARLY

MAR‐JUL 2007

16,897 RoundsJAN‐APR 2008

1,134 Rounds

AFTERBEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

*  TIFRC

 SER

VICES BEG

IN

ARR

IVAL OF 16

THMP BD

E 

DEP

ART

URE

 OF 16

THMP BD

E 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

JAN07

FEB07

MAR07

APR07

MAY07

JUN07

JULY07

AUG07

SEP07

OCT07

NOV07

DEC07

JAN08

FEB08

MAR08

APR08

Disturbance/Riot Escape Murder Tunnels

TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts 

* TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07  

Surge

AFTERBEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

The Powder Keg Exploding,The Powder Keg Exploding,Jihadist UniversityJihadist University

2004‐2007Poor Intelligence

Inability to Segregate Extremists

Inadequate Command and Control

In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations. 

In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations.

No Services

BEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Empowering moderates through:

Intelligence

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Segregating Violent Extremists

Reconciliation Services

Proper Command and Control

TIF Weekly Re‐internments 2004‐2008

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

17-2

3 Oct 0

4

12-1

8 Dec

04

6-12

Feb

05

3-9

Apr

05

29 M

ay -

4 Ju

n 05

24-3

0 Ju

l 05

18-2

4 Se

p 05

13-1

9 Nov

05

8-14

Jan

06

5-11

Mar

06

30 A

pr -

6 M

ay 0

6

25 Jun

- 1

Jul 0

6

20-2

6 Au

g 06

15-2

1 Oct 0

6

10-1

6 Dec

06

4-10

Feb

07

1-7

Apr

07

27 M

ay-2

Jun

07

22-2

8 Ju

l 07

16-2

2 Se

p 07

11-1

7 Nov

07

6-12

Jan

08

2-8

Mar

08

27 A

pr -

3 M

ay 0

8

2004

26 Week Moving Avg.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Pledge

Start MNFRC StartReintegration Services Start

AFTERBEFOR

E

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

TIF Release & Re‐Internment2004 2004-2005 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2008

Cumulative Releases 10350 20412 34368 43319 49632Cumulative Re-Internments 37 571 1606 2847 3145Cumulative Re-Internment Rate 0.36% 2.80% 4.67% 6.57% 6.34%

7 Sept-31 Dec 07 7 Sep 07-17 May 08Cumulative MNFRC Releases 3743 8546Cumulative MNFRC Re-Internments 6 28Post MNFRC Re-Internment Rate 0.16% 0.33%

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cumulative Re‐Internment

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Expanding the Model توسيع النموذج

• High Under‐employed Rate

• Many Refugees Outside Iraq

• Many Internally Displaced

معدل عال لغير العاملين •

الكثير من اللاجئين خارج العراق •

الكثير من المهجرين داخليا •

• Lower the Under‐employed Rate

• Larger numbers Refugees Return

• Many happily return to their communities

معدل خفيف لغير العاملين •

عودة الكثير من اللاجئين •

عودة الكثير إلى مناطقهم فرحين •

A Provincial Re‐Integration Plan

مخطط المحافظات لإعادة إستقبال

GoI Provincial 

Re‐Integration Center

مرآز محافظات الحكومة لإعادة إستقبال

A Path to Radicalization

•

The West, led by the United States, is engaged  in a war against Islam

•

Muslims are obligated to defend their religion  and there are theological justifications for 

doing so

•

Violence is the necessary means to defend the  religion

•Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists  from population, and protect populations both inside and 

outside the TIF

•Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in  the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are 

contagious

•Phase III:  Engaging populations with detainees, families,  and releasees and establish a “social epidemic”

which 

advances the objective of empowering the moderate  ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq

The Plan

Envisioning the Engagement Process

DETAIN

ASSESS

RECONCILIATION

TRANSITION

DETAIN

DETAIN

DETAIN

DETAIN

Former Detention Operations

Care & Custody Only

Our Mission

= Strategic Advantage= Strategic Risk

Care & Custody+

POPULATION ENGAGEMENT

Doctrine

Successful Practices‐‐

Emphasize intelligence‐‐

Isolate insurgents from the 

population‐‐

Conduct IO‐‐

Provide amnesty and rehabilitation‐‐

Police lead; military support‐‐

Expand and diversify the security 

force

Unsuccessful Practices‐‐

“Overemphasize killing and 

capturing the enemy, rather than 

securing and engaging the populace.”‐‐

Ignore peacetime governmental 

processes, including legal procedures‐‐

Place a low priority on assigning 

quality advisors to HN forces

“Old Way of Doing Business”

The Way Ahead for Detention Ops

What Works and What Doesn’t in a COIN Environmentfrom  FM 3‐24 (Table 1‐1)

“In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and often impossible.  Treating 

a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for failure”

(7‐40).

Detention Operations in Counterinsurgency  

CollectionManagementDissemination Interrogation

Operations

JointExploitationCell

JIDCLNOsDivision Target Cycle

Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess

Screening

PropertyExploitation

Theater Internment FacilityInprocessing Holding Area

Interaction with OtherAgency, Coalition, and Iraqi Intelligence Agencies

Actionable and Targeting Intelligence

XX

The Interrogation CycleThe Interrogation Cycle

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

PV2 Byron FoutyPV2 Byron Fouty

CACHE 

LOCATIONS

SAFE 

HOUSES

PENDING 

ATTACKS

MEETING 

PLACES

INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP

SOURCE 

OPNS

OVER 1000 

INTERROGATIONS

TRIBAL 

ENGAGEMENT

INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPsCELLORGANIZATION

IDENTIFY 

INSURGENT 

LEADERS

IED EFFORTS WITH 

JIEDDO, CEXC, AND 

NGIC

WEAPON 

SMUGGLING 

ROUTES

UTILIZE 

LEGAL 

SYSTEM

INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQIDENTIFY SONS OF 

IRAQ 

INFILTRATORS

IDENTIFY 

RECONCILIATION 

CANDIDATES

AQI PERCEPTION OF 

SOI

ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ 

EFFECTIVENESS

IP CDR

ABUNUR

5XIIRsNINEWA

DEVELOP 

TARGETS

JIDCJIDC

4XEFP 

IIRs

RECOVERED

• Highlights of two month period (Oct ‐

Nov 2007) 

–

508 Detainees led to 422 capture / kill operations–

131 of 422 ops resulted in captured / killed terrorists –

1,181 cell phones were captured–

47,000 phone numbers–

21.9 terabytes of data•

355 Violent Extremists were captured in follow‐on operations

–

Tactical Interrogation Reports produced•

Unique insights and trends into AQ network•

Key Enabler for IA / OGA / Partner Nations

SECRET//NOFORN

Detainee / Sensitive Site Material Exploitation Results

**Effective Interrogation Techniques:  treat with dignity, courtesy, and 

respect / love of family

“Bernie’s”

Timeline (ISN 168058—

al Shayie)

Dec 2004 –

Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy31 July 05 –

Turned over to Saudi ArabiaMar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG‐DO in Saudi Arabia

Sunday, 18 September 2005

Strategic Releases:

Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees 

willing to publicly speak against Jihad

Strategic Releases

Task Force 134

DETENTION

Kuwait

City

Hamadan

Ahvaz

Dezful

Tigris R.

Euphrates R.

IRANIRAN

H3

22

6

Baghdad

1

KUWAITKUWAIT

JORDANJORDAN

H4

Tallil

2

5

12

1

10

1

Mosul Irbil

An

Najaf

Kirkuk

Al

Kut

Al

Amarah

Ar Ramadi

Ar’ar

As

Samawah

Umm QasrUmm Qasr

An

Nasiriyah

Al BasrahAl Basrah

Baqubah

Ar Rutbah

Dayr az Zawr

Rafha

Karbala

SulaymaniyahSulaymaniyah

Al

Qaim

Bashur

Al Hillah

Samarra

Fallujah

Al Kufa

Dahuk

Az Zubayr

Safwan

Tall Afar

Ad Diwaniyah

KarbalaKarbala

Al Muthanna’Al Muthanna’

Al BasrahAl Basrah

Dhi  QarDhi  Qar MaysanMaysan

WasitWasitBabilBabil

Al QadisiyahAl Qadisiyah

Al AnbarAl Anbar

DiyalaDiyala

Salah ad DinSalah ad Din

NinawaNinawa

At TamimAt TamimAs SulaymaniyahAs Sulaymaniyah

ArbilArbil

DahukDahuk

An NajafAn Najaf

9

SYRIASYRIA

SAUDIARABIASAUDIARABIA

LSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDA

FLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMORE

FLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUA

FLB CEDARFLB CEDARFLB CEDAR

4

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PL ALPHA

PL BRAVO

OBJ CHARLIE

Battlefield of the Mind

Moderates

GOI and CoalitionExtremists

Detainee Family Demographics: Family Social Structure is Complex

30%

48%

22%

OftenSometimesNever

66%

45%

59%

43%

5%

6%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Mother

Father

Brothers

Sisters

Grandparent(s)

Other

Does the detainee make the decisions in the household?

Who else lives in your household?

Most detainees live with extended family

Majority don’t make the decisions

Do you go to your tribal leaderto help solve problems?

Tribal influence is a factor

N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

55%

45%

YESNO

Detainees are Not Prepared to Compete  More 

than 60% of the Detainees Have not Completed High School

60%

5%

24%

31%

18%

11%8%

2%0% 1%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

No fo

rmal

schoolin

g 1-

5 yea

rs 6-

8 yea

rs 9-

12 ye

arsVoca

tional

schoo

l C

ollege 4

years

Military

school

Reli

gious sch

ool

Colleg

e more

than 4

years

N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

Religiosity Mosque Not Central to Most Iraqi Detainees Lives

Mosque Attendance Before DetentionDo Not Know

1%Other

1%

Special Days Only4%

Never36%

Every Week28%

Sometimes30%

Note: 70% of detainees did not attend mosque every week   

N=220

Many Detainees Exhibit Signs of Psychological Trauma and 

Anxiety; Very Few Have Ideas of Martyrdom and Aggression

Psychological Assessment

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Anxiety

Psychological Trauma

Depression

Aggressive Behavior

Martyrdom

Unknown 0% 0% 0% 6% 6%No 36% 56% 75% 88% 91%Yes 64% 44% 25% 6% 3%

Anxiety Psychological Trauma Depression Aggressive

Behavior Martyrdom

N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

14

8

10

4

3

2

2

5

2

2

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

MONEY

FEAR/THREATS

NATIONALISM/FIGHTOCCUPATION

"COALITIONACTIONS"

RELIGION/JIHAD

OTHER PRIMARY SECONDARY

14

8

10

4

3

2

2

5

2

2

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

MONEY

FEAR/THREATS

NATIONALISM/FIGHTOCCUPATION

"COALITIONACTIONS"

RELIGION/JIHAD

OTHER PRIMARY SECONDARY

Detainee Population Facts & Figures حقائق و أعداد إحصائية المعتقلين

Who is in detention? 

Attitude Toward Coalition Insurgency & Detention Impacts Extended Family – 57% had 

family member detained

27%

6%

3%

10%0%11%

43%

Brothers

Father

Son

Cousin

Grandparents

Uncles

None

Have any of your family members been detained by the Coalition?

N = 1016 Transition In Assessment

“Uneducated people join militias for 

money; if there were jobs, fewer 

people would join and this would 

also deter future fighters from 

turning towards the militias.”

“Most Al Qaeda members would like 

to leave the organization, but fear 

doing so because they will be hunted 

down and will not be accepted back 

into Iraqi society.”

Testimony from Inside the Wire

48

Attributes of a Successful Program

“Our facilities are to be a reflection of the society we desire.”

- Extremists identified and segregated from moderates- Psychiatrists/Psychologists engaged - Islamic clerics working with detainees- One-on-one counseling when required- Religious discussion programs- Family involvement- Civics classes- Art programs- Multilayered evaluation process- Provincial and Community Programs for post-release engagement- Material incentives for workers - Job placement- Continuing Education- Iraqis in the Lead

Govt of Iraq Reintegration & 

Reconciliation

MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting

EducationCivics & Islamic                  

Discussions

VOTECH & Work Programs

Family 

Advocacy

Pledge & Guarantor Post‐ReleaseRelease

MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition 

In

MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting

Capture

Current Engagement Process

Interrogation

Iraqi Correctional Officer Training

Care and CustodyCare and Custody الرعايــة و الاهتمام

Detention Operations

Quality of Life: We are dedicated to the welfare of the detainees. The highest standard of custody and care is given, to include allowing visitors, receiving mail and unannounced visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

: الإعتقالعمليات

مكرس ان عملنا : نوعية الحياةسمى ا نقدم . المعتقلين احةلر

من ، عناية ال لرعايه ومعايير ا ، تلقي بالزيارات السماح هاضمن

من قبل اةزيارات مفاج البريد و . اللجنة الدولية للصليب الاحمر

Detainees receive the same medical treatment as Coalition Forces.

Healthcare for detainees is available 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.

Medical

لعلاج ا لمعتقلون ذاتاـى يتلققوات للمقدم اي ـلطبا

.فالتحال

لصحية ا عنايةلتوفير ا 24 على مدارللمعتقلين ايام الاسبوع طيلةساعة و

لطبيّــة الخدمـات ا

VOLUNTARY ADULT EDUCATION CLASSES

The Inner-Compound School is taught in concert with hired teachers and volunteer detainees.

The curriculum is varied among many subjects including Arabic, English and math.

Over 10,600 students have gone to voluntary education classes.

لبالغيـن ادروس طوعيـة لتعليـم

العنابر (لداخلي ا–ع لمجمّامدرسة تعتمد لتعليم على معلمين يتعاقد افي )الداخليه .متطوعين معتقلين معهم و

بما د لعديد من الموا ا لمنهج بين ايتنوع نكليزيه ولإالعربية، ا للغة افيها

لرياضياتا

طالب 10600ِاشترك أآثر من

Dar al Hikmah

An education center will 

provide all detainees with a 

basic education program. 

The curriculum is based on 

a core of six subjects: 

Arabic, English, math, 

science, civics and 

geography.

Over 160 students attend 

Dar Al Hikmah each week.

لحكمــة ادار

تعليمي لامرآز ل اسيوفر اساسيا يا تعليمابرنامجعتقلين لم لكافة ا

على لتعليمي مبنيا امنهج ل ا: ستة مواضيع هي س ااس، ةنكليزي لإاة، ـعربيل الغة ل ا

التربية وم، ــات، عل ـرياضي.جغرافيا الوطنية و

طالب يداوم 160أآثر من في مدرسة دار الحكمه

اسبوعيا

Voluntary Religious Discussion

Islamic Clerics offer 

detainees a true 

understanding of Islam. 

Over 3,000 detainees have 

participated in this program 

thus far.

مسلمين دين رجاليقدم لإسلام امفهوما واضحا عن

. للمعتقلين

معتقل اشترك 3000أآثر من . في هذا البرنامج الى الآن

نقـاش دينـي طوعـي

Women’s Program

Counselors, teachers and clerics offer female detainees a true understanding of Islam.

Female detainees inside theater facilities comprise the group most at-risk for conducting suicide attacks on Coalition Forces.

The interment of females is controversial and poses a significant challenge for Muslim leaders and Iraqi society to understand.

57

Mental Health Program

Based upon the innovative work conducted by psychiatrists working in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, Task Force 134 is implementing a new Mental Health Program at Camp Bucca. Pilot studies are underway to evaluate the high risk populations within the facility and create a suitable engagement plan to treat detainees whose mental capacity is abnormal or maladjusted due to trauma and violence.

Work Program برنامج عمــل

لعملية ا برامج لاستشمل ة مراآز تعليمي ل المهنية او لنسيج وا صناعة تطويرل

ابوق تصنيع الط لمرافق ينعتقل لم ا تعوض لتي ساهم مكن آي ي ، إجور ماديّه ب

لدعم و ال المال من إرس . إعالة ذويهم

أنضّم للبرنامج أآثر من معتقل 3500

The work and vocational educational programs will include developing textile and brick manufacturing facilities that will compensate detainees for their labor, enabling the detainee to send money home that will help support their families. Currently, over 3,500 detainees have participated in the work program.

•

New Focus has been Sunni Shia Reconciliation Efforts in the Program   Designed 

by Abu Safa (300829)

–

“We need to get Imams involved in the Reconciliation Effort and for the Quad Chiefs to take 

ownership for the TAKFIRI within their quads”

•

“Imams can teach about tolerance and acceptance 

between Sunni and Shia. If they see and hear their 

Imam accepting change they will follow.”

(10C 

Chief)

•

“ We can not only affect what happens in Bucca 

but also what happens in Iraq. We are here 

because of this disagreement between Sunni and 

Shia. We are separated from our families because 

of this disagreement. We need to fix this both 

here and at home.”

(9B Chief)•

“Your quad is like a house that you built from the 

ground up. If there are TAKFIRI in your house its 

because you brought them in, so you need to get 

them out.”

(3B Chief)

(U) 3B Chief addresses the group on the rules of the 

meeting

Camp Bucca Chiefs and Reconciliation

Detention: A New Solution through  Reconciliation Efforts

Reintegration & Reconciliation Programs Modify Behavior‐

Educate, inform, train and empower moderate                    

detainees to 

reconcile in detention and prepare                              

for release                            

‐

Provide support through programs that facilitate               

reconciliation and 

reintegration back into Iraqi                                   

society                                       

‐

Shia and Sunni together in all programs

Defeat the Insurgency by Empowering Moderates‐ Identify individuals for separation early in the detention process 

‐

Create a transparent legal review process to                   

vet and 

release those who are reconciled 

‐ Criminals are turned over to ICS

‐

Extremists are separated.

Gangs and                                         networks are 

disrupted and exploited.   

Family Visitation

Family visitation is provided to the detainees, as well as letters and phone calls.

The International Committee of the Red Cross also coordinates communication with detainees and their families.

Over 1,200 families visit their loved ones at Camp Bucca each week.

لعائليــة الزيارات ا

لعائلية الزيارات اتوفير للمعتقلين، إضافة إلى الرسائل

.لهاتفية ا لإتصالات او

لدولي الاحمر امنظمة الصليب ايضا تعمل على تنسيق

لإتصالات بين المعتقلين ا. وذويهم

عائله 1200تقوم أآثر من بزيارة ذويهم في معسكر بوآا

من آلّ اسبوع

Rule of Law

Task Force 134 supports Iraqi Rule of Law.

Detainee’s case on a periodic basis.

لقانـــوناسـيادة

على 134يعمل مرآز قيادة مساندة سيادة القانون العراقي

ين معتقل يتم مراجعة ملف ال .ةدوري بصورة

Detention  Operations

Western Media

Iraqi      Media Pan‐Arab Media

Public Relations & Detention

(Al Iraqiya TV)

Most‐Read Newspapers Most Listened‐to Radio

Most‐Watched TV Stations

Feb 08 Al Iraqiya 25.6%-- Al Sharqiya 23.3%

Feb 08 Al Arabiya 12.6%-- Al Jazeera 9.9%

Dec 07 Al Hurra 7.9%None* 5.8%

Feb 08 Al Sabah 24.0%-- Azzaman 9.6%-- Al Mashriq 5.2%

Dec 07 Al Sabah Al Jadeed 5.1%-- New Kurdistan 4.8%

None* 34.8%

Feb 08 Al Iraqiya 16.2%Feb 08 Radio Sawa 15.9%Feb 08 BBC 7.0%Feb 08 Dar Alslam 6.1%

-- Monte Carlo 5.3%None* 25.3%

* None = No Answer / Not Sure / None

TV 78.7%Radio 9.6%Newspaper 2.6%None* 9.1%

Most‐Important Media by Type

Iraqi Media Engagement Viewer Data Collected by MNF‐I StratEff: Jan 2008

Pledge Program

The judicial pledge is the detainee’s promise to an Iraqi judge to maintain peace and good conduct. Over 7,200 detainees have made the pledge thus far.

لضمـان التعهـد و ابرنامـج

لمعتقل يتعهد فيه القضائي هو وعد من التعهد السلام و حسن اامام قاضي عراقي بحفظ

معتقل قد أدّوا هذا 7200أآثر من . لسلوكااليمين أمام قاض عراقي

إحتفالية فجر الاسد للإفراج

This special program celebrates the release of a group of detainees. It’s conducted as a public release ceremony for the detainees and their families. Iraqi VIPs attend the ceremony and typically invite Iraqi/Pan-Arab media to cover.

يحتفل هذا البرنامج المهم بإفراج مجموعة من يحتفل بمراسيم إفراج عامة . المعتقلين

يحضر هذه المراسيم . للمعتقلين و ذويهم شخصيات عراقية بارزة، و بالطبع يتم

إستدعاء الإعلام العراقي و المناصر للعرب . للتغطيه الاعلاميه

‘Lion’s Dawn’

Release Ceremony

Release

The Government of Iraq (GOI) and Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) have partnered together to expand the number of releases from Coalition Forces custody in an effort to foster throughout the year goodwill and reconciliation.

لسـراح اإطلاق

لعراقية الحكومة اعملت قـوة ألمتعددة لالإشـتراك مع اب داعدلأا زيادة على اتلجنسيامن ق سراحها لاطتم إلتي يا

محاولةلعهدة قوات التحالف ةـلمصالحا لنية واتعزيز حسن

. لعاما طولعلى مدى

As of Nov. 1, 2007: 6,300 detainees have been released

تشرين الثانى 1لغاية إطلاق تم 2007 معتقل 6.300سراح

Implications 

Releases are Strategic‐

Greater throughput between DO and Corps  is necessary to uphold

both the quality 

and                                               quantity of intakes and releases  

‐ Amnesty and mass releases are not viable options 

Releases will Reshape the Battlespace‐

There are over 20,000 Sunnis in detention   who might be released back into their 

communities

‐

Closely monitoring recaptures and recidivists  will be key indicators regarding the 

amount of risk 

Releases are Necessary ‐ If a detainee is no longer viewed as an “imperative security risk”

‐ Implications of the UNSCR expiration at the end of 2008

‐

“Passing the Buck”

will disadvantage follow‐on forces and potentially offset many of 

the gains which have occurred.  We need the involvement of the MNDs for successful 

reintegration to occur.

The Way Ahead 

Post‐Release Preparedness ‐ The impact of detainee return ceremonies 

‐ “Guarantors”

proceeding in Corps areas 

‐ Continuing efforts to evaluate and assess                      

Coordinating Our Efforts‐ Increased involvement from Corps in the MNFRC panel discussions

‐ Economic programs synced to meet the needs of battlespace owners  

‐Make every attempt to avoid the unmonitored detainee release 

‐ TF 134 programs and services are prepared to assist out the DHAs with:

Legal Assistance

Judicial Investigators

Assessments and Motivation Research

Early identification of irreconcilables and extremists

As a historical and 

geographical center of Islam, 

what happens in Iraq will 

echo throughout the more 

than 1 billion

people of the 

Muslim Umma.

Global Impact of Expanding the Model