detecting stepping-stone intruders with long connection chains wei ding

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Detecting Stepping- Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

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Page 1: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains

Wei Ding

Page 2: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Contents

Introduction

Measuring Upstream RTT

Comparsion of uRTTs Distribution

Validation

Conclusion

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Page 3: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Introduction

Measuring Upstream RTT

Comparsion of uRTTs Distribution

Validation

Conclusion

3

Page 4: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

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Based on IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center) Internet crime report for 2009, 336,655 complaint submissions which is a 22.3% increase over 2008.

Total dollar loss from referred cases was $559.7 million.

Just the tip of the iceberg. Many more cases are undetected and/or unreported.

It’s very important to prevent hackers from intruding into our systems and stealing our information.

World with serious Internet crime threats.

Page 5: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Intruders don’t want to be caught.

Victim

Attacker

In order for intruders to steal information from a host, it is necessary for the intruders to remotely login to the host.

To avoid being detected, most of intruders use long connection chains of stepping-stones to reach the victim host.

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Page 6: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Stepping-Stone Attack

Stepping-Stone

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AttackerVictim

Page 7: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Stepping-Stone Detection

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Page 8: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

End-of-Chain Protection

It is much more important for a host to protect itself from being a victim.

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Page 9: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

End-of-Chain Protection

Visible Hosts

Attacker

Victim

Connection Chain

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Page 10: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Introduction

Measuring Upstream RTT

Comparsion of uRTTs Distribution

Validation

Conclusion

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Page 11: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Hypothesis

There is no valid reason for normal users to use a long connection chain for remote login such as SSH connection.

If we can discriminate long connection chains from short connection chains, then we can identify intruders from normal users.

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Page 12: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Round-trip Time Can Be Used

If we can compute the round-trip time (RTT) of packets, we can estimate the length of the connection chain.

Computing downstream RTT is possible, but it is very difficult to compute upstream RTT.

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Page 13: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Request

Reply

Host 1 Host 2 Host 3 Host 4

RTT

Time

Downstream RTT

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Measuring downstream RTT is feasible. But measuring upstream RTT is very difficult.

Page 14: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

?

Host 1 Host 2 Host 3 Host 4

Te

Ts

Request

Reply

Client Server

Time

Upstream RTT

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Request

Unknown time gap between previous reply and the next request can be one problem.

Page 15: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Host 1 Host 2 Host 3 Host 4

Request

ReplyClient Server

Time

Gap1 < RTT

Cross over

Cross over

Gap2 < RTT

Another problem of Upstream RTT

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Cross-over of reply and request packets is another problem.

Page 16: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Is there any difference between short connection chains and long connection chains?

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What else we can use?

Page 17: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Sorted Short and Long Connection

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Page 18: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Two Types of Packet Time Gaps

c d l s w d p

(a) Inter-command gaps

(b) Intra-command gaps

c d l s w d p

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Page 19: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Comparison Between Short and Long Connection Distribution

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Distribution of Inter-command gaps only

Distribution of Intra-command gaps only

Page 20: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Introduction

Measuring Upstream RTT

Comparsion of uRTTs Distribution

Validation

Conclusion

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Page 21: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Using uRTTs of Short Chains to Build a Profile.

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Any extracted curves from new collected connection packet stream will be compared with this profile distribution to quantify the difference.

Page 22: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Absolute Difference

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N

1i

pp

][-gg[i]=)gD(g,

N

i

Niigg 1:|][

Niigg pp 1:|][

gp is the distribution of uRTT gaps of the profile chain.g is the test connection’s distribution.

This distance measure takes the absolute distance between the profile distribution and any test connection distribution based on inter-command time gaps.

Page 23: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Median of Ratio Adjustment

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N

1i

ppR

][-gRg[i]=)g(g,D

N

i

Niig

igMedianR p ,...,2,1|

][

][

A ratio R is used to adjust and compensate distribution with different average typing speed.

Short connection curves under the profile curve will get the ratio R greater than one which can decrease the distance from the profile curve by calculating DR.

But long chain may get also get decreased distance with the R less than one.

Page 24: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Weighted Ratio Adjustment

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SS

SSS

S

W

p

pp

,0

,1RWRw )1(

N

1i

pwpw

][-gRg[i]=)g(g,D

N

i

Most long connection chains will get a weight larger than 0 which gives an increased distance Dw.

Using this adjustment, most long chains will have a bigger chance to hold an increased distance.

S and Sp are the slopes of their uRTT distribution curves by linear regression (y=S*x + c).

Page 25: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Validation: Classifying 4-hops Chains

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20 sessions of 1-hop connection chains and 20 sessions of 4-hop connection chains are compared.

For different false positive rate, leave-one-out cross validation is used to select the threshold to calculate the true positive rate.

Page 26: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

Classifying 4-hops and 6-hops Chains with Weighted Ratio Distance

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Using weighted ratio adjustment, all 4-hops and 6-hops chains can be successfully classified when the FP is getting 15%.

Page 27: Detecting Stepping-Stone Intruders with Long Connection Chains Wei Ding

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Conclusion Our method of detection centers on utilizing the packet

stream of incoming connections to build inter-command gaps curve.

By using new connection distribution compared with a profile of short connection chains, it is possible to detect long connection chains with certain threshold.

Our experiments show that by tolerating a false positive rate of 15%, 100% of the test cases (4-hop and 6-hop) can be correctly detected with our weighted ratio distance measurement.

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