deterrence and defense in “the second nuclear age” · deterrence and defense in “the second...

A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R P A P E R S

March 2009

BY

ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR.

RAVI R. HICHKAD

DANA J. JOHNSON

PHILIP W. PRATT

Deterrence and Defense in“The Second Nuclear Age”

Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”


CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE ........................................................................................3

DEFINING “THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE” ...............................................................................................5

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ........................................................................5

ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ......................................................7

THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: LOOKING FORWARD....................................................................11

DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ......................................................................................12

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CONSTRAINING U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES..........12

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEWS: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY ...........................................13

TAILORED DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE.......................................................14

TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: MODERNNUCLEAR STATES .................................................................................................................................14

TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: ROGUE STATES, NUCLEAR ASPIRANTS, AND NON-STATE ACTORS........................................................................17

DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE...............................................................................................22

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE FIRST NUCLEAR AGE ...........................................................................22

TAILORING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE .......................24

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? ...................27

SYNCHRONIZING DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ..........................31

PREVIOUS EFFORTS ..............................................................................................................................31

OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION .................................................................................................33

ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION...........................................................................33

OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO ..........................................34

CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ...............................39

ABOUT THE AUTHORS .................................................................................................................................41

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The United States, the other sovereign members of the nuclear club, and a number ofwould-be proliferators have now entered what has been described as the “second nuclearage.” This paper examines the deterrence and defense requirements presented by this newage, arguing for the value to be gained through their integration. Offense-defense integra-tion will provide to national decision-makers timely and informed choices of securityoptions needed to address the spectrum of conflict likely to unfold within the secondnuclear age.

The second nuclear age has some similarities with the first, but also exhibits marked con-trasts. The security environment has transitioned from the first nuclear age, a bipolar, long-term competition between two technologically sophisticated states and their allies, to oneof multi-polarity with emerging threats, unstable actors, and varied inventories of nuclearweapons and delivery means. In addition to the post- Cold War nuclear capabilities ofRussia and China, new challenges are emerging from rogue states, fractured nuclear states,nuclear aspirants, and non-state actors. To deal with the uncertain environment and rangeof actors characteristic of the second nuclear age, the United States must revisit its policiesand force structure underwriting the missions of deterrence and defense.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a “tailored deterrence” strategy.This concept is built on the understanding that, owing to the range of actors present in thesecond nuclear age, Cold War deterrent theories, strategies and forces alone will not effec-tively address the new security environment. Tailoring nuclear deterrence for the future willrequire a careful mix of the strategies and forces proven in the first nuclear age, coupled withnew policies and capabilities to meet the emerging threats from new nuclear actors. Thesewill include modernization of the traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic mis-siles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bomber forces toenhance their deterrent capability and credibility.

The first nuclear age stressed the value of deterrence over defense. U.S. policy choices specif-ically rejected anti-ballistic missile systems to enable the stability engendered by the bipolarbalance popularly characterized as “mutually assured destruction.” However, the new actorsin the second nuclear age give little indication they will be similarly deterred. Therefore, thesecond nuclear age demands the development and deployment of layered missile defenses

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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capable of meeting a wide range of threats and a strategy leveraging their capabilities. Thissystem will require persistent awareness, global warning, tracking and handoff, and mobile,flexible, rapidly deployable missile defenses capable of intercepting inbound warheads intheir boost, ascent, mid-course and terminal phases of flight.

Critical to these new capabilities, and central to our argument, is a strategy to integrate andsynchronize deterrent and defensive systems to meet future threats, thereby providing abroad range of flexible, integrated, and time-sensitive options for U.S. decision-makers.Offense-defense integration unifies and synchronizes the operational elements—intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, layered missiledefense, and a range of offensive capabilities—to strengthen deterrence and defense acrossa spectrum of plausible contingencies.

Fashioning a strategy that unifies and synchronizes the offensive and defensive elements ofour military capabilities to provide a range of options is imperative to meet the challengesof the second nuclear age. Important steps toward this goal include:

• The U.S. Department of Defense should use the opportunity of the pending QDR and NuclearPosture Review (NPR) to sustain and strengthen the overall credibility and capability of the tradi-tional nuclear triad.

• New investments should be directed toward increased awareness and understanding of emergingthreats coupled with a prompt global strike capability to hold those threats at risk. A conventionalintercontinental ballistic missile, either sea- or land-based, and a next-generation bomber are deter-rent capabilities that should be called for in the next QDR and NPR and funded for fielding adecade from now.

• A layered system of global, rapidly deployable sea-, land-, air-, and space-based capabilities to defendagainst ballistic missiles in all phases of flight should be high on the list of the nation’s defense priorities.

• A distributed, automated, real-time, collaborative planning capability that is multi-dimensional(vertical through the strategic-operational-theater command structure and horizontal among geo-graphic combatant commanders and joint force commanders) and multi-mission (encompassing allmissions from ISR to missile defense and offensive options) needs to be implemented to supportthe operational synchronization of deterrence and defense.

• Sustained support for operational planning and exercise activities conducted by the combatantcommands and the service components is required to implement operational synchronization andto familiarize key decision-makers with its capabilities.

This paper examines policies and programs needed to underwrite new approaches to com-bining deterrence and defense across the spectrum of conflict in the second nuclear age.Planning towards the operational synchronization of offensive and defensive forces willprovide for a future in which national decision-makers are given a range of options to deteran enemy from striking U.S. or allied interests, or to defend in stages if deterrence fails. Thesecond nuclear age demands a military strategy integrating the policies, practices, and capa-bilities of deterrence and defense.

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INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSEIn his 1983 book titled The Nuclear Future, MichaelMandelbaum posited that the nuclear future wouldbe much like the past.1 The reason that the nuclearfuture would follow a middle path, he argued, wasthat the alternatives, disarmament and war, were“either too difficult to achieve or too terrible to risk.”This belief formed the basis of American defensepolicy and nuclear strategy during the Cold War.The “delicate balance of terror” existing between thetwo nuclear superpowers could be made less sothrough strategies designed to deter and forces fieldedto enhance stability. A credible nuclear “triad” ofstrategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), and ballistic-missile launching submarines(SSBNs) was seen as a guarantor of deterrence andstability. Considerable investment was dedicated tothat triad of forces throughout the Cold War toensure there could be no single point of failure.

There was not such a failure and, despite the fears ofFred Ikle� and others, nuclear deterrence managed tolast through the 20th century.2 It survived, it seems,owing to a condition termed mutual assureddestruction (MAD) in which the shared vulnerabil-ity of the two nuclear superpowers created a sense ofstability. The Cold War nuclear arsenals of the for-mer Soviet Union and the United States were soconservatively planned and technically redundantthat neither state could completely destroy theother’s retaliatory force by launching first, even inthe worst no-warning case—a “bolt from the blue.”The result of such a “non-splendid” first strike

promised, in the worst case, to be the destructionof the aggressor’s population and industry after a“counter-value” response.

The primacy of deterrence (currently defined byJoint Publication 1-023 as “the prevention fromaction by fear of the consequences”) over defenseduring the first nuclear age goes back to the earliestdays of the Cold War and deliberations over strate-gic containment of the Soviet Union within theTruman and Eisenhower Administrations. Withinthe Kennedy Administration, the McNamaraPentagon calculated the contribution of strategicoffensive and defensive forces toward reaching theobjectives of “assured destruction” and “damage-limitation.”4 Secretary McNamara’s inclinationtoward a strategy of assured destruction was ini-tially strengthened by a 1964 report authored byAir Force Lieutenant General Glenn Kent conclud-ing that a damage-limiting strategy mixing missileand civil defenses was far from cost-effective: theeconomic advantage remained decidedly with theoffense.5 As the missile defense debate continuedthrough the 1960s, additional studies by theDefense Secretary’s Systems Analysis office addedweight to Kent’s earlier thesis, arguing the Sovietscould easily offset the effect of any plausibleattempt to defend the U.S. from ICBM attack.McNamara’s decision against deploying the Nike-Xsystem designed to defend the U.S. solidified thedominance of deterrence over defense that was tolast throughout the first nuclear age.6

Deterrence and Defense in“The Second Nuclear Age”

1 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.2 See Fred Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Outlast the Century?” Foreign Affairs, January 1973.3 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.4 Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough, New York: Harper, 1971, p. 176. “Damage-limiting” forces included both offensive strikes and defensive systems.5 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 320-25.6 Enthoven and Smith, op.cit. pp. 188-194. Subsequent programs to defend ICBM sites received greater support, and the ABM Treaty allowed 200 ABMs in two sites for

both sides. However, the U.S. eventually fielded only one site, and soon dismantled it.

The United States, the other sovereign members ofthe nuclear club, and a number of would-be prolif-erators have now entered what has been describedas the second nuclear age.7 As we look to thenuclear future in this new age, can we remain asconfident as Mandelbaum was that the world willnot stray from a middle path between disarmamentand nuclear weapons use? And should we remainas fixed in our beliefs and policy prescriptionsregarding a policy choice between deterrence anddefense? In a classic Cold War bifurcation of whathe termed the “two central concepts of general warstrategy,” Glenn Snyder warned that debates onnational security policy were often inconclusivebecause participants argued from different perspec-tives: those of deterrence or defense. For Snyder,those differing premises were striking:

• Deterrence works on the enemy’s intentions, whiledefense reduces his capabilities.

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• Deterrence is by definition a peacetime objective,while defense is a wartime value.

• Nuclear weapons are designed and deployed to deter,conventional weapons are planned for defense.

Despite describing the differences between deter-rence and defense in the first nuclear age, Snyderwas prescient in anticipating the needs of the sec-ond. Thus, he argued, “We must find some way ofcombining their value on both yardsticks, in orderaccurately to gauge their aggregate worth or ‘util-ity’ and to make intelligent choices among the vari-ous types of forces available.”8 In examining thesecond nuclear age from a policy perspective, thispaper argues that a prudent road towards enhanceddeterrence and defense in the future begins byappreciating the necessity of integrating their valueto enable timely and informed choices of nationalsecurity options available along a spectrum of con-flict populated by actors and threats very differentfrom those of the first nuclear age.

7 See Fred Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999;Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1996; Paul Bracken, “The Second Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February2000; and the discussion in the following section.

8 Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction,” in Head and Rokke (eds.) American Defense Policy, Third Edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,1973, p. 100.

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Defining the second nuclear age provides a founda-tion for examining the roles of nuclear deterrenceand defense within the post-Cold War world.9

During the first nuclear age, Cold War nuclearstrategy was driven by clearly stated intentions anddemonstrated capabilities of the two principals toensure a bipolar nuclear balance of power. The sec-ond nuclear age features new actors whose posses-sion of nuclear weapons capability is likely to leadto a destabilized international security environment.

The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age

Understanding the structure of the second nuclearage may best begin by comparing it to the first. Atits core, the first nuclear age was a contest of strat-egy between the Soviets, the Americans, and theirrespective Cold War allies.That confrontation wasbipolar in structure, featur-ing nation-states with alle-giances or ties to one side ofthe ideological divide or theother. Nuclear weapons andtheir delivery systems weredeveloped, acquired, com-manded, and controlledwith the goal of maintainingstable and credible levels ofmutual deterrence. We cansummarize the first nuclearage as being characterizedby:

• A bipolar, long-term competition between two tech-nologically sophisticated states and their allies.

• Large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons.

• Sophisticated command, control, and communica-tions systems.

• Multiple phenomenological approaches to ensureaccurate and timely strategic and tactical warning.

• Continuing communications through arms controlnegotiations.

• Crisis management procedures and mechanisms toavoid or contain accidental launches or weapons system testing.

• Relative transparency of fielded forces through armscontrol counting rules.

• Open discussions of nuclear doctrine and declared policy.

• Escalation restraint.

• Mutual rationality postulat-ing that neither side wouldultimately risk the destructiveconsequences of nuclear war.

The stand-out feature of thesecond nuclear age is thatthe competition is nolonger confined to twoprincipal players. Its actors,extensive and growing inboth number and nature,add a level of complexityand volatility to today’s

DEFINING “THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE”

9 On the role of nuclear weapons see George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn (“A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p.A15). See also the response to that position by Harold Brown and John Deutch ("The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19),Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States of December 15, 2008, and the findings of the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report, "The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century" (March 2008) authored by Clark Murdock. We find ourselves in agreement withthose authors that the United States will “have nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.”

The second nuclear agefeatures new actors whose

possession of nuclearweapons capability is likely

to lead to a destabilizedinternational security

environment.

respective Cold War allies.That confrontation wasbipolar in structure, featur-ing nation-states with alle-giances or ties to one side ofthe ideological divide or theother. Nuclear weapons andtheir delivery systems weredeveloped, acquired, com-manded, and controlledwith the goal of maintain-ing stable and credible levelsof mutual deterrence. Wecan summarize the firstnuclear age as being charac-terized by:

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10 See Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Orbis, Summer 2003, pp. 399-413. 11 Marshall speaks in reference to the work of Yale economist Martin Shubik. See for example, Douglas McGray, “The Marshall Plan,” WIRED, February 2003. The recent

tragic Mumbai terrorist attacks provide a baseline for assaults using conventional weapons.12 Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age.” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, September 25, 2003, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030925.ameri-

cawar.bracken.secondnuclearage.html.13 From a 1965 speech to Pakistan’s National Assembly.

security environment making it increasingly diffi-cult to assess the role of nuclear weapons and theirimplications for policy.10 Additionally, the rationalactor model on which deterrence rested has beenbrought into question.

A number of nations, some of which could bedescribed as having rogue leadership at the helm,have either acquired nuclear weapons or demon-strated an interest in pursuing the capabilitiesneeded to develop them. In addition to these coun-tries, the rise of transnational actors suggests thereare terrorist organizations, some state-supportedand some not, actively seeking nuclear weapons notfor deterrence but for use as weapons of mass ter-ror. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon’s long-timeDirector of the Office of Net Assessment, has citedthe utility of thinking historically, within a time-line that represents the level of available technol-ogy from antiquity to today, about the number ofpeople ten determined individuals can kill beforebeing killed themselves.11 Given proliferationtrends linked to global terrorism, that number ishigher today than at any other point in history.

Some of the actors in the second nuclear age bene-fit from what some have called a “free-ride tonuclear know-how.”12 Much of the technologicalunderpinnings, strategic thinking, and planning ofnuclear forces are open to actors no longer requiredto undertake difficult and expensive research anddevelopment. This “free-ride” enables actors of thesecond nuclear age to estimate whether the benefitsof pursuing or expanding a nuclear weapons capa-bility outweigh the risks. The consequences of thislatent proliferation are several. First, any actor withmodest technical and economic resources has thepotential to exercise the option of going nuclear or,in some cases, to grow existing nuclear capabilities(although many actors, protected by the U.S. nuclearumbrella, have chosen not to or have disbandedongoing developmental efforts). Second, identify-ing opportunities and actions to dissuade thoseactors from going nuclear have met considerable

challenges. Finally, it will likely fall to the UnitedStates and its closest allies to offset or counter thesenuclear choices.

Acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in the sec-ond nuclear age (as it was in the first) is seen as asymbol of prestige and power – it puts one frontand center on the world map. This is particularlytrue among aspiring new powers; their perceivedstatus within the international community mightrise through nuclear empowerment. However,nuclear empowerment can be a two-edged sword:the level of investment put forth by an impover-ished state or non-state actor to indigenouslydevelop, steal, or buy nuclear weapons capabilitiesmay be disproportionate when compared to theireconomic strength and political clout. To illustrate,the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Ministerand later Prime Minister of Pakistan, said of obtain-ing the atomic bomb, “We will eat grass or leaves,even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”13

Given such sentiments, the costs associated withdeveloping or acquiring nuclear weapons may easilydisplace the prudent planning and resourcesneeded to manage them once they are in hand.Therefore, the extensive command and controlinfrastructure contributing to reliability and stabil-ity among players in the first nuclear age may notapply in the second. In times of crisis, a new mem-ber of the nuclear club lacking a strong commandauthority might too easily reach for a nuclearweapon. Lastly, a nation’s investment in nuclearweapons capabilities may also come at the expenseand marginalization of its conventional capabilities.As a result, the second nuclear age has the makingsof creating players with second-rate armies andnavies relying primarily on a nuclear-based militarystrategy. During times of crisis, this may create asituation of escalating tensions, dangerous unpre-dictability, and limited response options.

Although motives for acquiring nuclear weapons inthe second nuclear age may not differ widely from

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those of the first, what does vary is the evolvingcomplexity of how national interest in pursuing anuclear capability translates to national security.14

In the case of nation-states, a country’s pursuit ofnuclear weapons rests on the belief that its securitywill be enhanced. On the other hand, the notion ofnational security as a basis for acquisition amongnon-state terrorist networks has little meaning. Theirmotives are likely to be organizational image andpursuit of a radical agenda, rooted in a willingnessto inflict as much destruction as possible to achievetheir objectives.15 Thus, in the second nuclear age,the traditional “security dilemma” of internationalpolitics takes on a troubling dimension. Rather thanthreatening another nation’s security by enhancingone’s own, a non-state actor seeks nuclear weaponssolely to threaten the security of others.16

The characteristics of the second nuclear age, incontrast to the first, can be summarized as:

• A multi-polar security environment involving near-term and emerging threats and unstable regimes.

• Varied inventories of nuclear arsenals ranging fromemerging capability to sophisticated threats.

• Collaboration among state and non-state actors onproliferating nuclear technologies and weapon capabilities.

• Weak or non-existent nuclear command, control,and communications systems.

• Limited communications channels among would-beadversaries.

• Little protection against accidental/rogue launch.• Uncertain capabilities and intentions among many

nuclear actors.• Questionable doctrine well removed from tradi-

tional deterrence.

• Escalation and first-use as plausible options.

• The presence of non-deterrable actors.

• Domestic pressures to acquire nuclear weapons outweigh external pressures to discontinue nuclearweapon proliferation.

Actors and Capabilities in the SecondNuclear Age

The previous section offered a general overview ofthe second nuclear age, but this age’s developmentsare best examined in greater detail through an assess-ment of key players. Today’s nuclear weapons activi-ties involve both state and non-state actors; someare responsible powers and others are not. It is thecombination of these governments and entities andthe challenges they present that defines the secondnuclear age and that dictates policy and force plan-ning implications for U.S. deterrence and defense.17

The Modern Nuclear StateThe threat posed by a modern (peer or near-peerare other terms frequently used) nuclear state ismost reflective of what the U.S. faced in the firstnuclear age, and it continues to be one that cannotbe ignored in the second. This case is representedby Russia and China.

Russia at times looks strikingly reminiscent of theformer Soviet Union.18 It rarely sees eye-to-eyewith the U.S. on security issues, real democraticactivity and open media are scarce, and it interferesin the domestic and foreign affairs of neighboringformer Soviet republics by exploiting their depend-ence on Russian energy resources.19 These trendshave been labeled in different ways, but the notionof Russian “revanchism” may not be far off themark.20 Moscow appears bent on reclaiming its

14 An excellent analysis of this subject may be found in Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security,Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86. Furthermore, examining the instances of states that have pursued a nuclear capability but have subsequently chosen to deferor stop their pursuit, may offer insights for deterrence and defense as well as for counter-proliferation efforts. Strategies of “nuclear reversal” and “nuclear hedging” areaddressed in Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.

15 Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-8, pp. 10-11. 16 Unless the non-state actor is interested in increasing its own power at the expense of other non-state actors, e.g., Al-Qaeda by becoming the leading Islamic terrorist organiza-

tion to which other terrorist organizations swear allegiance.17 It is not necessary to forecast rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to define the second nuclear age; the current actors possessing a range of capabilities and

intentions do that quite well. For a good review of contemporary social science research on nuclear proliferation dynamics see William C. Potter and GaukharMukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Summer 2008, pp. 139- 169.

18 Certainly the comparison has been drawn recently given Russian military moves into the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. See “Russia, Pledging to LeaveGeorgia, Tightens Its Grip,” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, p. A1; and Stephen Sestanovich, “What Has Moscow Done?” Foreign Affairs, November/December2008, pp. 12-28.

19 Steven Woehrel, Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, CRS Report for Congress, RL34261, updated March 27, 2008, pp. 7-13. 20 See for example, Richard A. Clarke, “While You Were at War…,”The Washington Post, December 31, 2006, B01; and Paul Reynolds, “New Russian world order: The five

principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008 at http://news.bbc.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm.

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strategic dominance and geopolitical influence lostfollowing the end of the Cold War. In contrast tothe United States policy of decreasing its relianceon nuclear forces, Russia is expanding its nuclearweapons capability, deploying more road-mobileand silo-based ICBMs, fielding both a new class ofballistic missile submarine and associated SLBMforces, and pursuing a new long-range bomber.21

Former President and current Prime Minister ofRussia Vladimir Putin has also stressed that work tofield entirely new land-based systems beyond currentRussian Topol ICBMs continues.22 Furthermore,Russia has repeatedly engaged in provocative mili-tary exercises involving nuclear assets, has fore-warned the U.S. and its allies that it will targetproposed European missile defense sites, and hasthreatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. All indicationsare that Russia’s modernized nuclear arsenal willremain a defining factor of its force posture.23

Therefore, despite the view suggested in the 2001NPR that Russia was not a nuclear adversary toplan against, a preponderance of evidence arguesthat Russia will continue to prompt major consid-erations for U.S. nuclear strategy and deterrentcapabilities in the second nuclear age.24 In this age,the United States and Russia no longer view eachother as open adversaries locked in a battle forstrategic superiority, yet diplomatic relationshipsbetween the two nuclear superpowers are strained.25

Within this semi-adversarial relationship, the twoprimary actors of the first nuclear age maintainlarge nuclear arsenals in various stages of readiness.Here, the second nuclear age remains remarkablyreminiscent of the first.

China is becoming a regional political and economicpower with expanding global influence, raisingconcerns over its growing military power and risingspace and defense spending.26 Much of China’sstrategic focus continues to be centered on its claimof sovereignty over Taiwan. It is Beijing’s officialposition that an independent Taiwanese state mustbe prevented “at any cost.”27 This statement impliesthat China deems escalation to nuclear war to be acredible deterrent threat in the event of a militaryconflict involving Taiwan. However, Taiwan is notChina’s sole security concern. China is also prepar-ing its military for other contingencies such as con-flict over resources and disputed territories.28

21 “Russia: Sevmash Launch of New Borey-Class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy, Bulava Update,” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, April 17, 2007. Translated in Open Source Center, Doc.ID: CEP20070417330001; Aleksey Nikitin, “Who Will More Rapidly Obtain a New Generation Bomber,” Internet Natsionalnaya Informatsionnaya Gruppa. Translated inOpen Source Center, Doc. ID: CEP20070717358004.

22 “Putin Says Russia Developing ‘Completely New’ Strategic Missile Systems,” Moscow: Rossiya TV, October 18, 2007. Transcribed in Open Source Center, Doc. ID:CEP20070707950033.

23 Another factor is the large number of tactical nuclear warheads Russia has retained, and the nuclear moves suggested in response to U.S.-supported missile defense in EasternEurope, to include stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba or pointing nuclear warheads at Ukrainian territory. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Russia’s Nuclear Threat is More ThanWords,” The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2008, p. A11.

24 The fact that Russia suspended observing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and announced the INF treaty “no longer serves Russian interests” adds credenceto this conclusion.

25 Stephen J. Blank lists several examples of American “growing wariness about Russian intentions.” See Blank, Towards a New Russia Policy, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, February 2008. See also Edward Lucas, The New Cold War, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

26 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 1.27 “Xinhua: ‘Full Text’ of White Paper titled ‘China’s National Defense, 2004’,” Beijing: Xinhua, December 27, 2004. Transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Doc. ID: CPP200412270000034.28 Annual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 1.

A preponderance of evidence argues thatRussia will continue

to prompt major considerations for U.S.

nuclear strategy and deterrent capabilities inthe second nuclear age.

With those scenarios in mind, how is China mod-ernizing its strategic nuclear weapons? ShouldChina, for planning purposes, be regarded as asmall “modern nuclear state” or a large “rogue?”China has at least ten types of ballistic missile sys-tems either operational or in development, and ispursuing further SLBM deployments.29 Despite aprofessed “no first use” policy for its nuclearweapons, China’s military leaders have occasionallyindicated otherwise, particularly in a situation fac-ing American conventional capabilities.30 A bookpublished by the People’s Liberation Army’sSecond Artillery, the division of the Chinese mili-tary that oversees strategic nuclear missiles, notedthat a reduction in the nuclear use threshold beinstituted during wartime as a deterrent to enemyconventional strikes on the mainland.31 In the sec-ond nuclear age, China, like Russia, may increas-ingly rely on its nuclear capability to underwrite itsforeign policy objectives.

In the case of modern nuclear states such as Russiaor China, one must also acknowledge the less overtthreats that may emerge from a large, complex, andpotentially risk-prone nuclear infrastructure. Theseactivities range from illicit technology transfer orleakage, to the inadvertent or unauthorized launchof a nuclear weapon. Prescriptions for future U.S.nuclear policy and strategic defense must recognizethese myriad dangers.

The Fractured Nuclear State

The “fractured” nuclear state—one that hasachieved a nuclear weapons capability yet lacks thepolitical stability to ensure its sovereignty and thesecurity of those weapons—is one of the most wor-risome prospects of the second nuclear age.Pakistan may be the greatest concern in this regard.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex is thought tobe limited and distributed, however the reliabilityof its command and control of these weapons hasbeen questioned.32 Radical Islamic elements

sympathetic to various extremist causes are knownto be present in sectors of the Pakistani militaryand intelligence organizations, raising the prospectthat Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may fall into radi-cal hands. Moreover, Islamabad’s historical antago-nisms and conventional force shortfalls vis à visIndia, another nuclear power, illuminates a worri-some scenario in the event of a regional armed con-flict. Additionally, high levels of political upheavaland domestic strife suggest that Pakistan may atbest remain a fractured state and at worst become afailed one. While there is no obvious reason toconsider Pakistan as antagonistic towards U.S.interests, there are serious concerns about Pakistan’snuclear course, given its unpredictable future.

The Rogue State

If the previous cases are questionable regarding theactors’ nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions,the threat posed by a rogue state is highly unpre-dictable. North Korea illustrates this type of actor.

North Korea claims to have demonstrated itsnuclear weapons capability in a 2006 test. While ithas been suggested that the demonstration mayhave actually been a nuclear device that misfired, alater test might prove more successful. Coupledwith that consideration is North Korea’s longrecord of developing WMD and fielding ballisticmissiles capable of striking U.S. soil.33 While aNorth Korean nuclear weapons capability has beendismissed as simply a powerful diplomatic tool forits rogue leadership, its potential for employment isreal. Pyongyang has historically leveraged itsnuclear activities through a string of broken inter-national commitments; there is little evidence tosuggest a more transparent or reliable course. Evenin light of North Korea’s most recent pledge (andrecantation) to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-gram, its checkered past calls for continued U.S.wariness. Absent the verification that North Koreano longer poses a threat, holding Pyongyang’sfledgling but potentially devastating ICBM force at

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29 U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to the Congress, November 2006, p. 136.30 Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,” New York Times, July 15, 2005.31 The Science of the Second Artillery Campaigns, Beijing: Press of the PLA, March 2004, p. 394.32 David E. Sanger, “So, What About Those Nukes,” The New York Times, November 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/weekinreview/11sanger.html.33 Steven A. Hildreth, “North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2007, RS21473. North Korea is thought to have

enough plutonium to make between six to ten nuclear weapons. See “Disarming North Korea,” The Economist, July 19, 2008, p. 51.

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34 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” CRS Report for Congress, December 5, 2007, RL32048. 35 Ibid.36 See for example, Martha Raddatz, “The Case for Israel’s Strike on Syria,” ABC World News, October 19, 2007.37 Austin Long, Deterrence—From Cold War to Long War; Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research. RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 81.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., p. 83.

risk—and defending against it—is a prudent hedg-ing strategy in this evolving nuclear age.

The Nuclear Aspirant

The nuclear aspirant is defined as having a desirefor nuclear weapons capability yet lagging behindthe rogue in terms of progress towards that goal.Iran and Syria provide good examples.

Iran’s nascent nuclear program has also generatedmuch international attention, but Tehran’s capabili-ties and intentions remain largely unknown.Although a recently released National IntelligenceEstimate deemed Tehran’s nuclear weapons programon hold, indications are that Iran could have thecapability and resources to produce a nuclear weaponwithin several years if it continues its “peaceful”nuclear program.34 Added to that are the troublingfacts that Iran’s leadership continues to support andfinance terrorist organizations, to improve therange and payload of Iran’s long range missiles, andto declare opposition to Israel’s existence.35

Syria has long been thought to have had an interestin developing nuclear weapons, alongside its otherpursuits of stockpiling chemical and biologicalagents as well as acquiring advanced missile capabili-ties. How far along it may be or how considerable itsinterest in that capability remains uncertain.However, Israel judged Syria’s path toward develop-ment unacceptable enough to have recentlybombed a suspected Syrian nuclear site. If the spec-ulation that Syria received a reactor for producingplutonium from North Korea is true, this would bethe latest on a long list of Pyongyang’s proliferationpursuits.36 If Damascus maintains a desire fornuclear weapons, its long-standing relationship ofclandestine technology transfer with North Koreasuggests a path for that pursuit.

The Non-State Actor

The non-state actor is characterized by two differ-ent categories: (1) regional armed groups and

(2) transnational terror networks and spontaneousterror cells.37 The former category includesregional armed groups such as Hezbollah and theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that maycontrol, or attempt to control, territory and popu-lation, and may have organizational structure andaccess to substantial resources. Because of thesecharacteristics, this category of actor may be some-what predictable and deterrable in a more tradi-tional sense.38 Alternatively, the second category ofnon-state actor is characterized by a diffusion ofideology, high motivation and ruthlessness, and theuse of operational methods across wide geographi-cal areas.39 Little to nothing is predictable aboutnuclear weapons acquired by transnational terroristorganizations other than their desire to obtainthem. The most visible of these groups have alreadyapplied other unconventional weapons with devas-tating results, and some, including Al Qaeda, havemade it known that they seek nuclear weapons.

Given the potential for proliferation today, non-state actor acquisition of nuclear weapons may arisethrough numerous routes: direct transfer from apatron state or government actor within that state;theft or purchase of fissile material from any num-ber of compromised state nuclear complexes; ordevelopment of the technical base and materialsneeded to construct a bomb from scratch. Whilethe last of those possibilities is highly unlikely, thefirst two are certainly not. Clearly, the prospect ofnuclear weapons in the hands of individuals orsmall groups is the most uncertain dimension ofthe second nuclear age.

The potential for collaboration among the actorsdescribed above is also worrisome. A nuclear actorprompted by state-sponsored terrorism or moti-vated by state-supported religious zeal offers alikely scenario of weapons acquisition in the sec-ond nuclear age. Pakistan is often cited as anexample largely because of the combination of itsnuclear capabilities, sympathy and sanctuary forIslamic insurgents, and internal instability.

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Government-to-government collaboration is alsolikely, given a supplying government fraught withpolitical volatility. Pakistan’s record supports thetrend of collaborating with other nations—Iran,North Korea, and Libya— to facilitate nuclear pro-liferation.40 Recently, an assessment by theInstitute for Science and International Securitydocumented that A.Q. Khan, widely consideredthe father of Pakistan’s bomb and chief purveyor ofits illicit nuclear proliferation network, wasinvolved with the planned sale of blueprints forsmall highly-sophisticated nuclear weapondesigns.41

There is no shortage of actors with the capabilityto threaten the security of American interests andthose of its allies. If we envision a threat landscapethat stretches across the challenges of the secondnuclear age, we can position the types of nuclearactors based on their capabilities and intentions.As Figure 1 depicts, the categories of actors appearalong a spectrum, and the threat each poses is gen-erally defined by two inversely related qualities, theprobability of an attack and that attack’s intensity.Throughout this paper, the spectrum will serve as avisual reference for how the effectiveness of deter-rence and defense changes with the characteristicsof the threat.

The Second Nuclear Age: Looking Forward

Nuclear weapons will continue to be leveraged invarious ways: politically, as the proverbial big stickbehind soft words, and militarily, as the absoluteweapon.42 Will deterrence prevail as a strategy ofnon-use as in the first nuclear age? Or is the use ofnuclear weapons more likely in a world of continu-ing proliferation, potential “loose nukes,”unguarded or unaccounted fissile material, unreli-able command and control equipment and proce-dures, and duplicitous and rogue governments?

It is within the uncertain environment of this sec-ond nuclear age that the United States must craftits strategic policy and plan the necessary forcesand defenses to support it. Almost two decadesafter the collapse of the Soviet Union, it would bewise to examine how U.S. strategic offensive forcesand defenses originally deployed to deter theU.S.S.R. may now address a broader range of dan-gers. Does the deterrent strategy of assured second-strike carried over from the earlier age still hold?Should the long-held calculation asserting thatstrategic defenses may prove destabilizing in timesof crisis be revisited? The definition of deterrencemust be updated with considerations of strategicdefense to address the motivations and capabilitiesof new nuclear adversaries.

40 Richard P. Cronin, et al., “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” CRS Reportfor Congress, May 24. 2005, RL32745.

41 David Albright, “Swiss Smugglers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 16, 2008.42 In reference to Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.

Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in the Second Nuclear Age: A Threat Landscape.

Likelihood of Attack

ModernNuclear States

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43 Then President-elect Obama stated, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, I will retain a strong, safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent to protect us and our allies. But I will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons and related capabilities.” Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama athttp://armscontrol.org.

44 Despite Russian threats to break it, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) also limits the nuclear capabilities of both sides, but we are principally concerned here withstrategic nuclear forces.

45 See George P. Schultz, et al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGEThis paper examines the second nuclear age from apolicy perspective, with the specific intention ofadvocating the integration of offensive and defen-sive capabilities to meet the challenges of this newera. Issues of reducing the number of nuclearweapons, slowing proliferation, and avoiding thepossibility of nuclear weapons use remain high onthe national agenda, and there are choices withinthe structure of the nuclear triad, both old andnew, that must be made.43 This section of thepaper details how current policy and force struc-ture commitments will affect future assessmentsand choices.

The policy setting for nuclear weapons choices inthe second nuclear age is framed by two objectivescarried over from the first: reducing launchers/war-head numbers in accordance with internationalarms control agreements and treaties, and specify-ing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense pol-icy. The documents defining the parameters of thepolicy choices in these issue-areas are the StrategicArms Reduction Treaty (START I), in effect untilDecember 2009, and the Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty (SORT, otherwise known as theMoscow Treaty), with a target of 1700-2200deployed nuclear warheads on each side by 2012.The Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) of 1993 and2002 stand as guidance for how the U.S. willimplement those treaty agreements. In FY 2008legislation, Congress directed that an NPR be con-ducted in 2009.

Nuclear Arms Control: Constraining U.S.and Russian Nuclear Forces

START I is the one major nuclear arms reductionagreement remaining from the Cold War. TheStrategic Arms Reductions Treaty, first proposedby President Reagan in the early 1980s, was signedin July 1991, and entered into force in December1994.44 The principal focus of START I was notonly to reduce deployed nuclear weapons launchersystems (land and sea-based ballistic missiles andlong-range bombers) to 1600 for the United Statesand Russia, but also to establish counting rules lim-iting each side to 6,000 warheads. The deployment(and destruction) of warheads to reach this numberwas to be verified by an intrusive regime requiringon-site inspections and regular informationexchanges as well as continued reliance on“national technical means,” i.e., overhead surveil-lance satellites. Although the Treaty is scheduled toexpire on December 5, 2009, it can be extended infive-year increments, and both sides have expressedinterest in applying key provisions of START’s veri-fication regime to monitor force levels agreed tounder the 2002 Moscow Treaty reductions.45

SORT is the second major arms control agreementaffecting future U.S. nuclear force size and struc-ture. Signed in 2002 and entered into force the fol-lowing year, SORT commits the U.S. and Russia toreduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to1700-2200 warheads. The Treaty allows each country

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to determine for itself the number of bombers, mis-siles and SSBNs that would compose the force anddeploy those warheads. This deployed warheadlimit takes effect on the day the Treaty expires,December 31, 2012. After that, each side is free toadjust their deployed nuclear forces as they see fit.Because SORT lacks verification mechanisms, theinspection regime instituted under START I couldbe applied to reductions taken under SORT. But,as noted above, START I is due to expire at theend of 2009, three years before the Moscow Treatylimits must be reached.

Nuclear Posture Reviews: U.S. NuclearWeapons Policy

The U.S. Department of Defense has conductedtwo major reviews of its nuclear posture in anattempt to adjust American strategic nuclear forcesto a post-Cold War world. The first of thesereviews, chartered in 1993, concluded that despitethe international upheavals that brought about thedemise of the Soviet Union, “nuclear weaponsremained an essential part of American militarypower.”46

In considering the size and role of U.S. nuclearforces in a post-Cold War world, the 1993 NPRdeclared that it was the proliferation of nuclearweapons, not Russia’s nuclear arsenal (althoughthose might be related), that posed the greatest riskto the United States. Therefore, the context of theNPR became “lead but hedge.” That is, as the U.S.sought to strengthen the non-proliferation regimeby de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in Americandefense policy, some hedging was required. WithSTART I just entering into force and START IInot ratified, Russian nuclear capabilities remainedthe focus of the NPR because they constituted “theonly nuclear arsenal that can physically threatenthe survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.”47

The 1993 NPR determined it was essential that theU.S. retain sufficient nuclear forces to deter apotentially hostile Russian government by holding

at risk a range of assets valued by that nation’s lead-ership. The force posture required to meet thatdeterrent mission was slightly smaller than theCold War triad, and included 450-500 MinutemanIII ICBMs, each carrying a single warhead. In justi-fying the ICBM component, the NPR stressed theimportance of maintaining a triad of strategicforces to hedge against a failure in any one compo-nent, and noted that each leg of the nuclear triadpossessed unique characteristics and specific advan-tages.

The 2002 NPR offered a considerably differentcontext for U.S. nuclear force planning: an envi-ronment of uncertainty, military transformation,and capability-based planning.48 While the tradi-tional triad of nuclear offensive forces was main-tained, a “New Triad” presented in this NPRincluded conventional forces for strategic missions,missile defenses, and the nuclear weapons infra-structure. With regard to sizing the nuclear force,the NPR declared the United States would end theCold War-era nuclear relationship with Russia,consider multiple potential nuclear opponents, and“deploy the lowest number of nuclear weaponsconsistent with the security requirements of theU.S.”49 The uncertainties of the nuclear futureallowed this policy review to chart a path for war-head reductions in the near term, but it was unclearhow those forces would be structured to meet theSORT goals of 1700-2200 operationally deployedwarheads by 2012. What was clear was the GeorgeW. Bush Administration intended to rely on thenuclear triad of old, had plans to fully fund lifeextension programs for each leg, and declared thatland and sea-based ICBMs and bombers wouldplay a vital role in the nation’s defense until at least2020.50

Thus, the direction for future U.S. nuclear forcesand policy has been framed by the arms controltreaties and policy reviews of the past, and theauthors of the next NPR have much to build on.However, the challenges confronting U.S. securityas we enter the second nuclear age are considerably

46 “Nuclear Posture Review,” http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html.47 Ibid.48 “Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2002/us.49 U.S. Department of Defense, Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002. The theoretical Soviet “first strike,” the Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan

(RISOP), used to plan a U.S. second strike was formally cancelled in February 2005. See “FAS says U.S. continues nuclear strike planning,” Aerospace Daily, July 23, 2008, p. 2.50 Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review. By this time the U.S. had indicated its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, thus allowing for development and deployment of

integrated ballistic missile defenses.

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51 See Keith B. Payne, “Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century,” Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2006, Number 10,http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php.

52 See Keith Payne’s discussion of “the valor of ignorance” in Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. But Payne is not so much questioning the wisdom of maintaining forces andpolicies that deterred Cold War threats successfully. Rather, he is questioning the extension of those theories and practices to a new range of WMD-armed adversaries andexpecting similar successes.

more complex than whenthose documents weresigned. Importantly, as apart of the 2006 QDR, theBush Administration out-lined a “tailored deter-rence” strategy. Thisconcept is structured onthe understanding that,owing to the diverse actorsof the second nuclear age,Cold War deterrent theo-ries, strategies and forceswill have to be aug-mented.51 Tailoringnuclear deterrence for thefuture will require a carefulmix of the strategies andforces proven in the firstnuclear age coupled withnew capabilities to meetnew threats from newactors.

Tailored Deterrence for the Second Nuclear Age

How should nuclear deterrence be structured tomeet the requirements of the second nuclear age?There are good arguments for adhering to thestrategies and forces that have brought us stabledeterrence in the past against known nuclear rivals,while investing in tailored measures and capabili-ties to cope with the uncertainties of the future.

In dealing with traditional nuclear competitors,deterrence in the second nuclear age and the forcesunderwriting it may not differ significantly fromthe first. Classic deterrence convinces would-beaggressors that the costs of pursuing hostile actionsfar outweigh any prospective benefits. However, inthe second nuclear age, there is a spectrum ofdeterrence that can be tailored to specific actorsbased on their known capabilities and suspectedintentions, and on our ability to provide credibleattribution of their actions. Even at the highest levels

of Cold War confrontation,U.S. strategic nuclear policywas based on tailoreddeterrence of a sort, eversince the 1970s when“countervailing strategies”and “limited nuclearoptions” added counter-force capabilities to makeretaliation more credible.

The second nuclear agedeparts significantly fromthe Cold War stalemate oftwo superpowers. The U.S.and its allies face a widearray of actors occupyingvaried positions along aspectrum of potentialthreats. Nevertheless, thesaliency of respondingcredibly to the existentialthreat to one’s homelandand to extended deterrence

for allies requires a deterrent that maintains andsustains many of the properties that fostered peaceand stability during the first nuclear age.

Tailoring Deterrence for the SecondNuclear Age: Modern Nuclear States

Along the spectrum of deterrence that stretchesacross the challenges of the second nuclear age, firstpriority must be granted to the most serious threat,the nuclear inventories of Russia and China. Whatdo the lessons of the Cold War teach us aboutnuclear deterrence at these most dangerous levels?We must admit we don’t know for sure, because weknow only that those policies and practices didn’tfail. We don’t know that they worked, because theintentions of our adversaries are largely unknown.52

Yet prudence dictates that the United States main-tain and sustain its deterrent capabilities for sometime until it can conclude that the nuclear arsenalsof Russia and China threaten no more harm to theU.S. mainland than do those of Great Britain and

There are good argumentsfor adhering to the

strategies and forces thathave brought us stabledeterrence in the past

against known nuclearrivals, while investing in

tailored measures and capabilities to cope with theuncertainties of the future.

more complex than whenthose documents weresigned. Importantly, as apart of the 2006 QDR, theBush Administration out-lined a “tailored deter-rence” strategy. Thisconcept is structured onthe understanding that,owing to the diverse actorsof the second nuclear age, Cold War deterrenttheories, strategies andforces will have to be augmented.51 Tailoringnuclear deterrence for thefuture will require a carefulmix of the strategies andforces proven in the firstnuclear age coupled withnew capabilities to meetnew threats from newactors.

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France. Therefore, the near-term objective of U.S.nuclear policy must be to rationalize the offensivearms reductions called for in the Moscow Treatywith an adequate and affordable nuclear posture todeter the extant danger. From a variety of perspec-tives, as outlined below, continuing to field andmodernize a substantial force composed of all threelegs of the traditional triad appears to be a prudentcourse in underwriting this deterrent capability forthe future. Furthermore, because no explicit con-straints on the U.S. ICBM, SLBM or bomber forceremain in place, the United States retains consider-able freedom in structuring the size and compositionof nuclear forces to meet both legacy commitmentsand future challenges. A number of factors—stability, survivability, reliability, credibility, sover-eign basing, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, andflexibility—will shape and size that force.

Stability

In September 2002, the Congressional BudgetOffice (CBO) released a study examining the esti-mated costs savings of reaching nuclear arms reduc-tion goals through two approaches. The first ofthese alternatives presented was to maintain theexistence of all deployed delivery systems whilereducing the weapons load on each. The secondwas to completely retire delivery systems from serv-ice and remove entire legs from the nuclear triad.53

Unsurprisingly, it was shown that the option toretire nuclear delivery platforms allows for a con-siderable cost savings by eliminating the operatingcosts of associated systems. However, the decline indeterrence and stability accompanying any reduc-tion in force structure by increasing the number ofwarheads on the remaining missiles was deter-mined to be far more costly over the long termthan any short-term budget benefit. Therefore, theCBO recommended reducing the number ofdeployed warheads on each delivery vehicle, ratherthan decreasing the number of missiles. Over thelast fifteen years, reductions in the total number ofdeployed warheads have been partially achieved byretiring two components of the land-based ICBMforce, the Peacekeeper (MX) and Minuteman II

weapons systems. The remaining warheads have beenredistributed across the deployed force of MinutemanIII missiles. Maintaining a distributed alert force of450 land-based ICBMs helps convince an adver-sary not to attempt a disarming counter-forcestrike. However, reductions below this level beginto introduce stability concerns in that a nuclearpower such as Russia, in times of crisis, might con-sider a first-strike against a diminished target setrather than suffer a first nuclear blow against itsown vulnerable forces—particularly if strategicdefenses are included in the exchange calculations.Further weighing against a preemptive strike is adistributed and deployed force of submarine-basedmissiles, regarded as inherently survivable andtherefore stabilizing, and a bomber force that canbe generated and dispersed for survivability.

Survivability, Reliability, and Credibility

The December 2006 Report of the Defense ScienceBoard Task Force on Nuclear Capabilitiesconcluded that the “overriding priority for the U.S.nuclear weapons enterprise is to provide and sus-tain a reliable, safe, secure, and credible set ofnuclear weapons needed to maintain the nucleardeterrent.”54 It is precisely those qualities of relia-bility, safety, surety, and credibility that continue topoint to the need for an ICBM/SLBM/bomberforce to provide a complementary combination ofthese attributes. Regarding the sea-based deterrent,the first of the Ohio-class ballistic missile sub-marines will retire in 2029—with SSBNs back-fitted for the D-5 missile remaining in service untilat least 2042. Nevertheless, a retirement starting intwo decades suggests that the Navy must begindesigning a replacement submarine—theSSBN(X)—no later than 2012. SSBN optionsinclude a variant of the Virginia-class attack subma-rine, a new design, or a variant of the Trident.Other factors to be considered are the continuedmodification of SSBNs to SSGN configuration(with conventional cruise missiles) or reconfiguringthe Trident to meet the initial Prompt GlobalStrike system requirement.55 In any event, owing toits flexibility and inherent survivability, the SSBN

53 Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs and Savings from Implementing the Moscow Treaty, Washington, D.C., September 2002.54 Final Report of the DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,

December 2006.55 The DoD request, unsupported by Congress, was to modify two Trident II D-5 missiles on each of the 12 deployed strategic ballistic missile submarines and replace their

nuclear warheads with conventional re-entry vehicles. See the Statement of Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic Capabilities, to the SenateArmed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, March 28, 2007.

fleet will continue to form an important compo-nent of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force in thesecond nuclear age.

Sovereign Basing

A deterrent force based on American soil signifiesthat the U.S. maintains maximum control over itsnuclear arsenal and guarantees an appropriateresponse when a vital interest is threatened. Theland-based ICBM and bomber force coupled witha deployed SSBN fleet also reassures U.S. allies thatthey are protected by an American nuclear umbrella.The extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to alliednations has strengthened a presumption againstproliferation when those countries face a nuclearthreat. For example, Japan and South Korea, bothof which rely on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence andstability, each might have pursued an independentnuclear deterrent following North Korea’s provoca-tive nuclear activities.56 Given the prospects forfurther proliferation among rogue states andnuclear aspirants such as Iran, it is conceivable thatU.S. nuclear umbrella will be extended to coverfriends and allies in the Middle East and elsewherein Europe. Amid the uncertainties of the secondnuclear age, both allies and would-be nuclearadversaries are aware of the deterrent value—capa-bility and credibility—of the U.S. nuclear triad.

Responsiveness

A 2003 National Institute for Public Policy papernoted the traditional arguments for a triad ofnuclear forces in the second nuclear age, but specif-ically championed the ICBM’s “promptness, shorttime of flight and accuracy.”57 Until the UnitedStates pursues and successfully fields a conventionalprompt global strike capability, the ICBM is theprincipal weapon to hold at risk a strategic target—that could be hardened or deeply buried—threat-ening the American or an ally’s mainland with anuclear strike.58 The land-based ICBM maintainsexceptionally high rates of alert using continuous,secure communications, ensuring a timely response.

Cost-Effectiveness

Defense planners will be faced with a number ofbudgetary trades forced by rising operations andmaintenance (O&M) costs, expensive conventionalweapons programs, the continuing war on terror-ism, and contesting discretionary expenditures.With a future ICBM replacement beyond the hori-zon and current plans calling for extending the lifeof the Minuteman III to 2040, the appropriateinvestments to maintain that course and capabilityappear modest in comparison to the return. Whilethe other legs of the nuclear triad will continue todisplay complementary capabilities in the secondnuclear age, Minuteman III continues to be themost cost-effective weapon system for underwrit-ing tailored deterrence at the highest end of thespectrum of plausible nuclear conflict.

Flexibility

In a paper analyzing the 2002 NPR, LexingtonInstitute’s Dan Goure noted that the “new triad” ofthe NPR was wise in preserving the capability andsynergy of the old triad of nuclear forces that retainthe characteristics of being “robust, flexible andresponsive.”59 He also argued that the ICBM leg ofthe triad was emerging as the most relevant of thethree in the second nuclear age:

High accuracy, counterforce potential, speed andresponsiveness were all characteristics of ICBMsthat gave rise to problems in the context of the oldEast-West confrontation. …Now, those same opera-tional characteristics must be considered as positivebenefits in the context of the new security environ-ment… The operational characteristics of theICBM, prompt responsiveness, speed, precision andthe ability to deliver unique payloads, are highlydesirable when considering the range of strategicscenarios the United States could confront.60

If we now revisit the previously noted spectrum,this time from a deterrence standpoint as illus-trated in Figure 2, we see that triad forces carryincreasing significance as priority is granted to thethreats posed by modern nuclear states.

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56 Details of U.S. security obligations to Japan, for example, may be found in “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” Security ConsultativeCommittee Document, October 29, 2005, available at The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html.

57 “Strategic Offensive Forces and the Nuclear Posture Review’s ‘New Triad’,” Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2003, p. 24.58 A “Prompt Global Strike” capability has been called for by the Congress, but they have rejected plans to convert SLBMs, ICBMs or a space-plane-like concept to fill this

requirement.59 Daniel Goure, “Strategic Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security in the 21st Century,” Arlington, VA: October 2002, p. 18.60 Ibid.

Tailoring Deterrence for the SecondNuclear Age: Rogue States, NuclearAspirants, and Non-State Actors

To this point, this paper has argued that from anumber of policy perspectives, the traditional triadof nuclear forces remains essential to the formula-tion and execution of U.S. deterrence policy in thesecond nuclear age. Indeed, at the end of the spec-trum that remains less likely but potentially farmore devastating, the triad must meet the require-ments generated by the existential threat as the U.S.

builds down its nuclear force under the terms of theMoscow Treaty. If we extend deterrence to themore uncertain ends of the spectrum, however, theproblems of policy and force structure becomemore complex and choices less clear. The two newgroups of actors posing nuclear threats wheredeterrence becomes problematic are “rogue” stateswith nascent nuclear capabilities and non-stateactors that might gain rudimentary nuclearweapons and delivery systems.

Can “rogue” states be deterred? The United Stateshas acknowledged that the “contemporary andemerging missile threat from hostile states…requires a different approach to deterrence…:61

Deterring these threats will be difficult. There areno mutual understandings or reliable lines of com-munication with these states. Our new adversariesseek to keep us out of their region, leaving themfree to support terrorism and to pursue aggressionagainst their neighbors. By their own calculations,these leaders may believe they can do this by hold-ing a few of our cities hostage. Our adversaries seekenough destructive capability to blackmail us fromcoming to the assistance of our friends who wouldthen become the victims of aggression.62

There is a range of views on whether nuclearweapons can deter rogue states like North Koreathat may possess limited nuclear capability. Thebelief that such states cannot be deterred has con-tributed to a doctrine calling for preventive mili-tary action against such states before they couldthreaten to launch or transfer nuclear weapons.Indeed, that was one of the principal, if ultimatelymistaken, factors in prompting the U.S. invasion ofIraq in 2003. But Jeffrey Record has argued thatbecause “rogue states have critical assets that can beheld hostage to the threat of devastating retaliation”nuclear deterrence will likely remain credible.63

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Effective Deterrence




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Figure 2. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.

61 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 20, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2003.62 Ibid.63 Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,” Policy Analysis, No. 519, July 8, 2004, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf.

Can “rogue” states be deterred?

Record supports his analysis by pointing out thatno rogue state has ever used WMD against anenemy capable of such retaliation, and concludesthat strengthening deterrence against these emerg-ing threats is far more promising for internationalstability than resorting to preventive war.64

Because game theory provided considerable insightinto the behavior of nuclear adversaries during theCold War, it may also be useful to apply such adeterrent framework to the interaction of theUnited States and rogue states in the secondnuclear age.65 Game theory is based on an assump-tion that the players are rational but, as RogerMyerson has recently observed, although ouradversary’s interests may vary widely from our own,it is also likely that we share common interests,such as avoiding the costs of destructive conflict.66

Adopting a game theory perspective, Myersonargues against regarding any adversary as irrational,lest such a declared position evolve into a self-fulfilling prophesy during times of crisis.67

Others agree that deterrence must continue to berelied on in the face of these new nuclear threats.Baker Spring and Kathy Gudgel, in acknowledgingthe threats of regional powers armed with WMDwrote, “The Cold War arsenal must be adjusted, innumbers and types of weapons, to provide deter-rence in a new and dynamic situation.”68 Writingearlier, Keith Payne similarly noted that “it is notpossible to establish a generic formula for predictablydeterring a rogue challenger.”69 Because differentopponents (such as North Korea and Iran) willhave different motivations in acquiring nuclearweapons, Payne argued that “the U.S. nuclear deter-rent threat must be sufficiently flexible to speak toall of these particular opponents and incentives.”Payne’s prescription was therefore for substantial

and wide-ranging intelligence that identifies andweighs the factors influencing the rogue’s decision-making, and a flexible and certain nuclear forcewith global reach to underwrite regional deterrencepolicies. A recent RAND study concluded thatclassical Cold War deterrent strategy may not beapplicable against nuclear-armed regional adver-saries because those actors may conclude they willnot “be any worse off for having used nuclearweapons than if they were to forego their use.”70

Deterrence is much less likely to be effective indealing with terrorist groups threatening the use ofnuclear weapons. As David Holloway has argued,such groups should be deterrable in principle,“because something they value can be put at risk.”71

However, Holloway adds that they are likely to be“shadowy” groups with no return address, that theymiscalculate the consequences of their actions (9/11comes to mind), or that they actually seek to provokea massive response to fit their apocalyptic vision andcult of martyrdom. Acknowledging these factors,the U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy statesclearly that “traditional concepts of deterrence willnot work against a terrorist enemy whose avowedtactics are wanton destruction and the targeting ofinnocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyr-dom in death and whose most potent protection isstatelessness.”72 The June 2008 National DefenseStrategy reinforces this statement: “Deterrence maybe impossible in cases where the value is not in thedestruction of a target, but the attack and the verymeans of the attack, as in terrorism.”73

Those who believe that deterrence strategies willhave little success with transnational terroristgroups such as Al Qaeda tend to urge policies ofdefense, preemption or prevention rather thanthreats of punishment. Sophisticated defenses have

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64 However, demonstrating a willingness and ability to resort to preventive military action in certain cases may act to dissuade others from similar provocative behavior, includ-ing the acquisition or transfer of WMD. See Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage, “Dissuasion Strategy,” Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, www.CSBAonline.org.

65 The seminal classic is T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.66 Roger B. Myerson, “Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist’s Perspective,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007.67 Myerson goes as far to assert that, “It is generally much safer to assume that our adversaries will respond appropriately to a firm deterrent strategy when our resolve and

restraint are both made clear to them.” Ibid. p. 22. But that may not be true for all the potential players in the second nuclear age.68 “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Heritage Foundation, April 13, 2005, www.heritage.org/Reserach/NationalSecurity/wm721.cfm.69 Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, op. cit., p. 127.70 David Ochmanek and Lowell Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. The monograph goes on to advocate preventa-

tive measures to be taken before any missile launch, and active defenses to be employed after a launch.71 “Deterrence, Preventive War, and Preemption,” in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba (eds.) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006, p. 57.72 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002.73 National Defense Strategy, June 2008, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, p. 12.

important roles in the second nuclear age, and theyare discussed below. But there are those who arguethat, because terrorists seeking to use nuclearweapons are highly dependent on other actors intheir quest for nuclear capability, deterrence alsowill play a role.74

While threats of retaliation will not have muchutility if terrorists are bent on blowing up them-selves along with their victims, “deterrence tacticscan be employed against their organizations andterritorial bases in a targeted manner.”75 Nuclearterrorism is likely to be the result of theft or trans-fer from a nuclear-capable state, from indigenousproduction or the purchase of nuclear weapons ormaterial. But these proliferations of nuclear capa-bility cannot occur without some state support.76

The deterrent prescription, according to Paul K.Davis and Brian Jenkins, is stark: the United Statesmust “credibly announce that any state or non-stateorganization that even tolerates the acquisition ofWMD by terrorists within its borders will be sub-ject to the full wrath of the United States.”77 Thisstatement, with tones reminiscent of U.S. policyduring the Cuban-missile crisis, is followed up bythe authors with the assertion that the UnitedStates might “lower standards of evidence in ascrib-ing guilt and may violate sovereignty” in its pre-emptive attack to remove guilty regimes by force.

Although the United States has not moved to thislevel of declaratory policy, it has shifted in thatdirection. The 2006 National Security Strategydescribes a “new deterrent calculus” declaring thatstates harboring terrorists assume their guilt, andwill be “held to account.” This policy, referred toby some as “expanded deterrence” relies heavily onthe ability of the U.S. to “define the nature andsource of a terrorist-employed WMD” to enablethe rapid response efforts that “may be critical indisrupting follow-on attacks.”78 This process ofnuclear attribution, developing appropriate forensic

techniques and integrating them to levels of highconfidence, is still in its early stages, and faces bothtechnical and organizational challenges. AsTalmadge concludes, “deterrence will depend onconvincing other states … that the United Statesactually has the capability to identify the origins ofa nuclear weapon detonated on its soil.”79 If theU.S. develops a demonstrated nuclear attributioncapability, and backs it up with credible threats ofretaliation, the odds of nuclear deterrence againstterrorists and other non-state actors in the secondnuclear age will be strengthened.

What are the force planning implications for deter-ring these new actors in the second nuclear age?U.S. deterrent policies and forces must be preparedto address a wide range of nuclear threats, somestill requiring a clearly disproportional retaliatoryresponse. In other cases such punitive deterrentthreats may be ill-suited to deter an actor who doesnot highly prize the civilian population or anyinfrastructure that might be placed at risk.80

Maintaining and modernizing the traditional triadto deter the capabilities of modern nuclear states isessential as the United States builds down its strate-gic arsenal. But what additional capabilities mightbe required to deter actors emerging along thespectrum of plausible nuclear conflict? A 2003RAND study on future roles for U.S. nuclear forcesargued that the forces and operational practicesunderwriting a contemporary theory of nucleardeterrence “are likely to look very different fromthe current U.S. approach.”81 Specifically, theRAND authors posited three situations (counter-force, special targets and critical situations) inwhich the U.S. might threaten the use of nuclearweapons against such actors:

COUNTERFORCE

Counterforce is defined as the targeting of enemynuclear forces to limit damage to the United States

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74 See Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, pp. 21-34.75 Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “The Future of Deterrence,” SWP Research Paper S13, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2005, p. 13.76 See “Nuke blueprints found on computers kept by smugglers,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 19, 2008, p. 4.77 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism,” Santa Monica: RAND NDRI, p. xv. See also Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?

New York: Prometheus, 2008, in which the author advocates steps for securing and decreasing nuclear arsenals, and strengthening both international institutions and terrorist-related intelligence.

78 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, www.whitehouse.gov.nsc/nss/2006.79 Talmadge, op. cit. p. 30.80 See Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, “U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies,” Santa Monica: RAND, 1995.81 Glenn Buchan, David M. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, “Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces,” Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. xix.

in a nuclear exchange. The RAND authors speculate that fledgling nuclear powers are unlikelyto deploy hardened or survivable nuclear forces, andthat even a modest U.S. capability would represent“considerable inherent counterforce capabilityagainst emerging nuclear powers.”

SPECIAL TARGETS

If an adversary does take steps to harden or deeplybury nuclear assets such as command centers, man-ufacturing plants or storage sites, nuclear weaponsmay be required to destroy such sites. The RANDstudy notes that maintaining a capability to success-fully attack these targets “is the most fundamentaltenet of deterrence… holding at risk whatever theenemy values.”

CRITICAL MILITARY SITUATIONS

Crises might arise in which nuclear use surfaces asan option because other alternatives (e.g., conven-tional force, missile defense) appear inadequate.Such a situation may require flexible nuclear-capableforces that can be put in place to convey a deterrentthreat and that will be perceived as credible by theadversary.

In all of these cases, the RAND analysts concludedthat if the United States is to adopt a nuclear posturecapable of deterring emerging threats in the secondnuclear age, it will require the targeting flexibilityand the intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-sance support “comparable to that needed for con-ventional weapons.”82 In addition to preservingand modernizing the triad, then, three additionalforce planning initiatives to underwrite deterrencein the second nuclear age appear promising.

Next Generation Bomber

Within the traditional triad, the long-rangebomber force is critical to maintaining U.S. long-range nuclear capability, flexible targeting, andman-in-the-loop command and control (whetherthe aircraft is manned or not). The Air Force plans

to leverage near-term technologies to field a nextgeneration long-range strike system (NGLRS, alsocalled next-generation bomber, or NGB) to replacethe oldest B-52s by 2018, and continue the divesti-ture of legacy bombers. The NGLRS system isexpected to be manned and nuclear-capable.83

Persistent Awareness

The RAND argument calling for ISR supportcomparable to that for conventional weaponsdemands an integrated, layered system of sensors,platforms and decision support aids. ISR operationsin the second nuclear age may include overflightsin relatively benign air defense environments.Because of this, nonstealthy unmanned vehicles, suchas the Global Hawk and Predator, and manned sys-tems such as Joint STARS with improved moving-target indicator radars may be included as part ofthe ISR tools utilized by theater and ground com-manders.84 However, most proposed layered ISRsystems call for a mix of space-based capabilitiesand stealthy unmanned vehicles, with satellitesoffering both space and terrestrial situationalawareness and a hedge against intelligence predic-tion shortfalls, and stealthy unmanned vehicles ableto seek and track mobile missiles or similar fleetingtargets. The Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System(N-UCAS), currently in a demonstration phase, isa promising system to provide such targetableinformation over great distances and long durationwith sustained survivability.85

Prompt Global Strike

Recent proposals for a non-nuclear prompt globalstrike capability have been advanced on the prem-ise that there are several circumstances “in which itcould serve U.S. national objectives to be able tostrike targets very rapidly, with high accuracy andhigh confidence of reaching the target, and withnecessary military effect, but without using nuclearweapons.”86 The circumstances under which a

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82 Ibid. p. 93.83 But it will surely have conventional capability and an unmanned variant is a strong possibility. See Robert Haffa and Michael Isherwood, The 2018 Bomber, Northrop

Grumman Analysis Center Papers, August 2008.84 See Michael Isherwood, Global Hawk and Persistent Awareness, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Papers, August 2008.85 See Tom Erhard and Robert Work, The Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 10,

2007. N-UCAS is not being designed as a weapons platform, although it will have such a capability, if desired.86 Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability: Letter Report, Committee on Conventional Prompt Strike Capability, National Research Council, Washington D.C.: National

Academy of Sciences, May 11, 2007, p. 2. The topic of this paper generally restricts the conversation to nuclear deterrence and defense, although conventional force canclearly have a deterrent effect against emerging nuclear actors and capabilities and defensive systems that have for many years been conventional only. For a dated but valuablebibliographic essay on conventional deterrence see Charles T. Allan, “Extended Conventional Deterrence,” The Washington Quarterly, 17 (Fall 1994), pp. 203-33.

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prompt global strike capability might be used aregenerally conceived quite narrowly: a time-criticalstrike to counter non-state actor or rogue stateactivities or a strike at a distant target at the leadingedge of major combat operations. In the near termthe only non-nuclear option for such a global strikemust rely on forward-deployed conventional forces;however, several proposals have been advanced togain a prompt global strike capability. One optionis to convert some nuclear warheads on the TridentII missile carried on ballistic missile submarines toa conventional capability. But Congress has balkedat funding this proposal, owing principally to theconcern that, in a crisis, launching a conventionally-armed SLBM might be misinterpreted, eliciting a“launch on warning” response. Other promptglobal strike conventional options include conven-tionally armed land-based ICBMs, intercontinentalhypersonic boost-glide vehicles, modification ofthe Kinetic Energy Interceptor booster, or hyper-sonic cruise missiles launched from bombers or

ships. Even if politically acceptable, the desirabilityand feasibility of such capabilities will be subjectedto considerable scrutiny. As a search for a promptnon-nuclear global strike platform continues, in thesecond nuclear age the only existing capabilityremains with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Not long after the end of the Cold War, senior U.S. policy makers acknowledged that “deterrencemay not provide even the cold comfort it did during the Cold War. We may be facing terroristsor rogue regimes with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons at the same time in the future,and they may not buy into our deterrence theory.”87

Fortunately, the United States does not have to relysolely on deterrence in the second nuclear age as itdid in the first. It can now add missile defense and,perhaps more importantly, the synchronization ofdeterrence and defense. It is to these topics wenow turn.

Fortunately, the UnitedStates does not have to relysolely on deterrence in the

second nuclear age.

87 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, quoted in Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, p. 58.

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Although the United States has pursued defensivesystems since the ballistic missile threat firstemerged, the post-Cold War period has seen themost progress in developing and deploying missiledefenses. It is unlikely that these defenses will haveto contend with massive hypothesized Cold Warnuclear exchanges, nor are they designed to do so.Rather, it is the advent and rise of nuclear threatsposed by rogue nations, nuclear aspirants, fracturedstates, and non-state actors that necessitate layeredmissile defenses capable of rapid deployment andeffective response. Although a lengthy historicalreview of U.S. ballistic missile defense is beyondour scope, certain milestones in missile defenseconcepts and capabilities deserve a quick summaryto help position current programs and initiatives.

Missile Defense in the First Nuclear Age

In the late 1950s, owing to Sputnik, the perceived“missile gap,” Soviet ICBM development, and agrowing concern about the increasing vulnerabilityof U.S. strategic forces, a series of studies and testswere conducted to explore the desirability and fea-sibility of defense against intercontinental ballisticmissiles. At this time the U.S. Army pushed fordeployment of a national missile defense systembased on the Nike-Zeus program, but it was judgedto be ineffective against the large-scale attacks theSoviets might be capable of launching in the ensu-ing decade.88 The shortfalls in the Nike-Zeus

program led to the development of the Sprint-Spartan program: the Sprint for point, terminaldefense and the Spartan for defeating re-entry vehi-cles as they transited through space. Despite thisoriginal formulation of a layered missile defensesystem, the Systems Analysis office in the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense judged that the Sovietscould easily negate the system’s effectiveness.89

Efforts continued, nevertheless, focused on the rel-atively limited number of Chinese ICBMs ratherthan on the larger Soviet force.

In 1967 President Johnson ordered the fielding ofthe Sentinel system to provide a limited populationdefense from the Chinese missile threat.90 TheNixon Administration refocused U.S. missiledefenses to protect U.S. ICBMs, renamed the pro-gram Safeguard, and initiated the Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks that led to the signing of theAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty91 in 1972. TheABM Treaty limited the United States and the SovietUnion to two defense sites each, with no morethan 100 interceptors at each site. Additionally, theTreaty constrained each side’s ability to develop,test, or deploy ABM launchers and prohibiteddevelopment of sea-based, air-based, or space-basedABM systems.92 A 1974 protocol reduced theABM sites to one for each country. Soon there-after, Congress directed that the Safeguard site inNorth Dakota be closed, essentially abandoningmissile defense for the balance of the Cold War.93

DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE

88 The system was designed around a slow interceptor missile and mechanically-steered radars, limiting its ability to distinguish decoys from real warheads, and leaving it vulnerable to saturation attacks. See Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough, p. 185.

89 See Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 187-190.90 MDA Historian’s Office, Ballistic Missile Defense: a Brief History, MDALink, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html.briefhis.html, accessed June 24, 2008. Much of the

historical discussion in this paper comes from this document.91 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. 92 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Test and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 edition, Washington, D.C.:

ACDA, pp. 137-138.93 MDA Historian’s Office, op. cit.

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In addition to establishing the primacy of deter-rence over defense, the ABM Treaty focused oncontinental missile defense. This effectively sepa-rated missile defense into different national andtheater programs and stunted the development ofan integrated BMD system. A decade later,President Reagan’s 1983 speech again called for away to “render nuclear weapons impotent andobsolete…” through a “long-term research anddevelopment program…”.94 As a result, theStrategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)(later renamed the Ballistic Missile DefenseOrganization [BMDO] and now called the MissileDefense Agency) was formed. SDIO workedwithin existing treaty constraints and technicalhurdles weighing against national missile defenseto develop missile defense capabilities to counterprimarily the Soviet threat. However, the impor-tance of theater missile defense was heightenedduring the 1990-91 Gulf War when short-rangeScud missiles were launched against deployed U.S.and allied forces. The ensuing Global ProtectionAgainst Limited Strikes (GPALS) concept, com-prised of ground-basedNational Missile Defense,ground-based TheaterMissile Defense, and aSpace-based GlobalDefense proposed an inte-grated ballistic missiledefense system capable ofcountering these prolifer-ating threats.95

In 1993, the Clinton Administration increased thepriority on improving existing air defense programssuch as the Patriot and Aegis systems so that theycould intercept ballistic missiles. The administra-tion also promoted Theater High Altitude AreaDefense (THAAD), and advocated regional termi-nal missile defense technological advances, includ-ing the Army’s Extended Range Interceptor’s(ERINT) hit-to-kill capability. This emphasis ontheater missile defense continued as ballistic missiletechnology proliferated. On July 22, 1999, theNational Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law

106-38) was signed into law by President Clinton.The Act declared:

“It is the policy of the United States to deploy assoon as is technologically possible an effectiveNational Missile Defense system capable of defend-ing the territory of the United States against lim-ited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,unauthorized, or deliberate).”

Subsequently, in response to the Iranian and Koreantests of medium-range ballistic missiles, the Commis-sion to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to theUnited States pointed to a growing threat and recom-mended that U.S. practices depending on extendedwarning of future enemy missile deployment berevised to reflect a non-warning environment.96

It was principally diplomacy, rather than technol-ogy that had constrained the progress of missiledefense. It was not until 2001 when President Bushdeclared that the ABM Treaty had outlived itsCold War-era usefulness that BMD deploymentscould begin and an integrated ballistic missiledefense system (BMDS) could be engineered.

The 2002 National Policyon Ballistic Missile Defenseeliminated the artificialdistinction between“national” and “theater”missile defenses, andadvocated a globalBMDS capable of pro-tecting the U.S. home-land, as well as American

allies and friends. To deal with evolving threats,the policy called for a layered defense system capa-ble of defending against missiles throughout theirboost, mid-course, and terminal phases of flight.97

The result of that layered approach to ballistic missile defense is shown in Figure 3. It illustratesthe planned approach to the sensors (radar,infrared) on multiple platforms (space-, sea-, andground-based), interceptors and the command,control, battle management and communicationssystems to counter threats throughout the boost,

94 President Ronald Reagan, address to the nation, March 23, 1983.95 Ibid.96 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998. 97 Ibid.

It was principally diplomacy,rather than technology, thathad constrained the progress

of missile defense.

prised of ground-basedNational Missile Defense,ground-based TheaterMissile Defense, and a space-based GlobalDefense proposed an inte-grated ballistic missiledefense system capable ofcountering these prolifer-ating threats.95

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midcourse, and terminalphases of ballistic missiletrajectory. The complexityof designing, developingand integrating a BMDSfor operation along veryshort timelines is suggestedby this figure.

Tailoring Ballistic Missile Defenses for theSecond Nuclear Age

Just as we must tailor deterrence for the secondnuclear age, so must we also tailor defense. Indeed,defense takes on an even greater role in this age,because the U.S. faces a growing number of stateand non-state nuclear actors lacking the qualities ofstability, rational decision-making, and positiveweapons control that characterized Cold Wardeterrence. In the absence of sufficient and effective

intelligence of thoseactors’ capabilities andintentions, missile defensecan hedge against theuncertain nuclear pathadversaries such as Iran orNorth Korea may take.Thus, missile defense con-tributes to “deterrence bydenial.”98 Developing

BMD systems and conducting tests convey thecapability and the intent to defeat an attack, thusdissuading an adversary from aggressive acts againstU.S. or allied interests.99

Where should emphasis be placed in tailoring mis-sile defense in the second nuclear age? Figure 4illustrates the potential contributions of missiledefenses against individual categories of actors,defending against attack and denying the capability

98 Glenn Snyder developed the distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, suggesting that denial capabilities worked on influencing the aggressor’scalculations of achieving his objective, while deterrence by punishment affects his cost calculations. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York:Palgrave MacMillan, 2003 p. 107.

99 See M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum, No. 225, January 2007.

Just as we must tailor deterrence for the secondnuclear age, so must we

also tailor defense.

Sensors

Command,Control, BattleManagement &

Communications

NMCC USSTRATCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM EUCOM CENTCOM

Defense SupportProgram

Space Tracking andSurveillance System

Sea-Based Radars Forward-Based Radarwith Adjunct Sensor

MidcourseX-Band Radar

Early WarningRadar

Airborne Laser

KineticEnergyBooster

Aegis BallisticMissile Defense/

Standard Missile-3

Multiple KillVehicle

Ground-BasedMidcourseDefense

Designated Lead Service:

TerminalHigh AltitudeArea Defense

Sea-Based Terminal

Patriot AdvancedCapability-3

Boost Defense Segment Terminal Defense Segment

Midcourse Defense Segment

Army Navy Air Force TBD

Figure 3. The Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (Current and Planned).

Adapted from: Lt Gen Trey Obering, USAF, Director,Missile Defense Agency, "Ballistic Missile DefenseProgram Overview," 10 June 2008.

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of the attacker to inflict serious damage.100 In con-trast to Figure 2, where deterrence loses effective-ness against actors seen as less deterrable, defensegains effectiveness. Thus the contributions of mis-sile defense are likely to be the greatest preciselywhere the deterrent effect is the most uncertain.That suggestion deserves further elaboration.

The Modern Nuclear State

Russia possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in theworld, estimated at roughly 14,000 nuclearweapons, while its strategic nuclear warheadsdeployed on the Russian triad are counted at a

more modest 3,113.101 As previously indicated,observers have noted a resurgence of the impor-tance of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy,with modernization of ICBM, SSBN, and bomberforces all underway. Russia is expected to abide bythe terms of the Moscow Treaty, but may still pos-sess an inventory of 2,490 deployed strategicnuclear weapons in 2015.102

The quantity and quality of this post-Cold WarRussian inventory argues for an emphasis on strate-gic deterrence. Indeed, as the United States haswithdrawn from the ABM Treaty consistent withits national interests and moved to field missiledefenses, it has stressed that these defenses are nottargeted at Russian missiles nor meant to threatenRussia’s deterrent.103 Clearly, defending against anall-out attack of some 2000 Russian warheads fromfully-alerted forces is beyond the capability of theexisting and planned Ground-based MidcourseDefense system (GMD). The only plausible way inwhich these defenses could be useful to thwart aRussian nuclear attack is in the off-design scenariofeaturing an unauthorized attack by a “mad subma-rine commander” or from an unauthorized or acci-dental attack from a Russian ICBM site.104 Thus,

The contributions of missiledefense are likely to be the

greatest precisely where thedeterrent effect is the most

uncertain.

Effective Defense




Rogue States

NuclearAspirants

Non-stateActors

HIGHERLOWER

Inte

nsit

y o

f A

ttac

k

HIG

HE

RLO

WE

R

Figure 4. Ballistic Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age.

100 Although not shown in Figure 4, intelligence, broadly defined, provides insights into the nature and characteristics of individual threats to shape a tailored missile defenseresponse to those threats. Furthermore, accurate and timely intelligence can enable missile defenses to be more efficient and effective than they would be without.

101 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 2008, p. 54.102 Ibid. p. 57.103 See Remarks by the Honorable Walter B. Slocombe on “National Missile Defense Policy,” November 5, 1999,http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/Slocombe1199.html.

Also see “Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,” Moscow, Russia: March 17, 2008,http://www.stae.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/102315.htm.

104 See Russ Shaver, “Priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense,” in Paul K. Davis (ed), New Challenges for Defense Planning, Santa Monica: RAND, 1994, p.265.

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regarding Russia, missile defenses play a minor rolealong our spectrum of actors and threats in the second nuclear age.

China is the second state with the capability oflaunching an intercontinental missile attack on theUnited States—and it is increasing its capability todo so.105 Projections of China’s growing militarystrength suggest that the PRC “seeks to maintaindomestic and regional stability while it develops itseconomic, military, scientific, and culturalpower.”106 Consistent with that strategy and withan anti-access/area denial capability, the PRC isdeveloping numerous types of ballistic missiles,cruise missiles, and anti-ship missiles. Current esti-mates are that China now has about 176 deployednuclear warheads, and up to 240 counting storedwarheads. But China’s recent deployment of thenew DF-31 and 31A ICBMs with ranges up to7,000 miles may be the most worrisome develop-ment. The U.S. intelligence community predictsthat China may have about 100 warheads capableof reaching the United States mainland by 2015.107

Although the U.S. chose not to defend itselfagainst Soviet ballistic missile attack, that was notthe case regarding China. The Sentinel missiledefense system proposed by President Johnson in1967 and supported by President Nixon in 1970was primarily designed to provide an area defenseof the United States against Chinese ICBMattack.108 With the signing of the ABM Treatyand the eventual deactivation of the Safeguardcomplex in 1976, defense against Chinese ICBMswas forgone. However, the subsequent operationalcapability of the GMD system has again raised theissue of negating the Chinese strategic deterrent.When China and Russia issued a joint statementcondemning American plans to field national mis-sile defense, the U.S. State Department declaredthat such a system was not directed against them:

We’ve made it clear that our National MissileDefense is not directed against Russia and it is not

directed against China; it is designed to deal withthe emerging long-range ballistic missile threat.109

Despite that declaration, the U.S. deployment ofmissile defenses on its homeland may have proddedChinese strategic modernization. For that matter,the U.S. implied it did not object if China modern-ized its long-range missile force if that would makeChina more comfortable with American missiledefense plans.110 Regardless of that buildup and thestate of U.S.-Chinese relations, the missile defensecapability being deployed by the United States willpose a significant defense and “deterrent by denial”to any planned and deployed Chinese nuclear forceover the next decade and beyond.

Rogue States, Nuclear Aspirants, Fractured States,and Non-state Actors

The threats presented by rogue states, nuclear aspi-rants, fractured states, and non-state actors are thefocus of the current BMDS. Developing a meansof defense against rogue states possessing both WMDand ballistic missiles reduces the level of risk associ-ated with the uncertainty regarding these actors’motivations and intentions, and establishes a defen-sive hedge against a deterrence failure. NorthKorea is the rogue state most commonly referred toin arguments supporting missile defense, and Iranis a nuclear aspirant; both have demonstrated capa-bilities to conduct multiple-salvo missile launches.While these countries rightly receive the mostattention for missile defense, the global prolifera-tion of WMD and delivery means demand aBMDS capable of global flexible response.

North Korea publicly stated its intention to launcha satellite on its Taepo Dong I. While the 1998alleged satellite launch failed, the missile waslaunched over Japan’s Honshu Island, creatingpolitical turmoil in Japan and eventually pushingthe Japanese government toward its own missiledefenses and a change in its constitution to allowsuch capabilities.111 Variants of the Taepo Dong

105 “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, p. 42.106 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008, p. 1. 107 “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2008,” p. 42.108 Enthoven and Smith, op.cit., p. 192. See also Keith Payne, The Great American Gamble, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008, pp. 137-140.109 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “US Says Missile Defense not Aimed at China, Russia,” July 19, 2000,

http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/19/eng20000719_45848.html.110 See William E. Berry, Jr., “Northeast Asia Implications,” in Wirtz and Larsen (eds), Nuclear Transformation, p. 227.111 Steven A. Hildreth, CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, CRS RS21473, January 24, 2008, p. 2.

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missile have different ranges. The short or interme-diate range versions could reach Guam, Okinawa,and Japan, and the Taepo Dong II may be able toreach Alaska and Hawaii from North Korea.112

Iran has an ambitious ballistic missile developmentprogram aided by Russia, China, and North Korea.Its Shahab-3 long range ballistic missile was testedas recently as July 2008.113 That missile’s estimatedrange of 1,250 miles poses a threat not only toIsrael, but also to Pakistan, India, Afghanistan,Saudi Arabia, and parts of Eastern Europe. Thiscould lead the U.S. to assist its allies in seekingregional missile defense solutions. Iran’s refusal tohalt its nuclear production program promotes con-cern that fissile material could be diverted to aweapons capability.114 Publicly acknowledged U.S.intelligence assessments suggest that Iran coulddevelop a nuclear-tipped ICBM before 2015.115

Pakistan, motivated principally by India’s plans todeploy a nuclear triad of aircraft and land- and sea-based missiles, appears to be improving its nuclearweapons and delivery capabilities. Recent estimatesof the Pakistani nuclear arsenal suggest as many as60 nuclear weapons and perhaps four types of bal-listic missiles that can deliver significant payloadsover various ranges. The most troubling of these isthe Shaheen-2 with a range of more than 1,200miles. Still under development, that missile wastested in February 2007.116 It is not only thePakistani deterrent with respect to India that is ofconcern, but also the chance that instability, civilwar, or a coup could result in a new set of actors,hostile to U.S. interests, obtaining control of theseweapons and delivery systems.117

Non-state Actors are generally characterized asundeterrable extremists or terrorists seeking WMDto carry out their radical goals. The global reach ofthese non-state actors is a product not only theirown capabilities, but also their worldwide network

of state-sponsored terrorism and WMD technol-ogy transfer. The likelihood of these actors using anuclear weapon, once in their possession, is high.But the intensity of such an attack, and the proba-bility of ballistic missile use, is low. Nevertheless,any such prospect bolsters the need for mobile,flexible missile defenses, supported by persistentawareness, tailored to deal with a threat from unan-ticipated and unpredictable directions.

Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age:How Much is Enough?

Given the diverse threats of this second nuclearage, how much missile defense, and of what kind, isenough? Dean Wilkening sketched out anapproach to answering that question a decadeago.118 Once an intercontinental threat appeared,he argued, a defense with about 100 interceptorsdeployed at one or two sites around the U.S.should be able to intercept an incoming attack of10-20 warheads. That assumed that defensive sys-tems could detect and track those warheads withnearly perfect accuracy, but that the probability ofkill for each interceptor was relatively low.Challenges that could stretch these rates of successincluded more numerous threats, decoys, and coun-termeasures, and thus Wilkening argued for a lay-ered system of boost-phase, mid-course andterminal missile defenses, with particular emphasisplaced on airborne boost-phase intercept systems.

Eased by the U.S. withdrawal from the ABMTreaty in 2002, a good deal of progress toward thatlayered system of missile defense has been madesince Wilkening made those projections. In thewords of the Missile Defense Agency:

With the initial fielding of the BMDS in July 2006,the United States now has a limited defense againstballistic missile attack. This initial capability pro-vides a defense against short and medium-range bal-listic missiles using Patriot Advanced Capability

112 Ibid.113 “U.S. Source Disputes Iran Missile Tests,” CNN, July 10, 2008. While Iran launched seven missiles, including a Shahab-3, on July 9, U.S. intelligence community officials dis-

puted the Iranian claim to multiple launches on July 10. See also “Iran Reports Test of Craft Able to Carry a Satellite,” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, p. A5; and“Iran looks forward to next satellite launch attempt,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 14, 2008, p. 2.

114 Michael Goodman and Wyn Q. Bowen, “Behind Iran’s Nuclear Weapons ‘halt’,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 19, 2008, http://thebulletin.org. See also “Iran Issues New Warnings after Defying a Deadline,” The New York Times, August 5, 2008, p. A10.

115 Richard Garwin, “When could Iran deliver a nuclear weapon?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2008, http://thebulletin.org.116 See “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74.117 See David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex,” October 2001, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypper.html.118 Dean A. Wilkening, “How Much Ballistic Missile Defense is Enough,” Stanford University: Center for International Security and Cooperation, October 1998.

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(PAC-3) missiles and Aegis Ballistic MissileDefense (BMD) Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). Theinitial capability also enables engagement of inter-mediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missilesin the midcourse phase using Ground-BasedInterceptors (GBIs). These layers are integratedthrough an advanced C2BMC network.119

Operational integration of these various systemsposes a considerable challenge as each platform,interceptor, and the command and control and sen-sor systems enabling them, proceed along differingpaths to maturity. For example, the GMD systemhas encountered considerable testing hurdles, whilethe THAAD system, after a number of failures, hasenjoyed a string of successes.120 This unevenness insystem performance and technological maturityposes significant challenges to integrated missiledefense: “the interaction of active defense systems,passive defense systems, and attack operations, aswell as the battle management, command controland communications, and intelligence systemsrequired to support them.”121

Where should emphasis be placed in the BMDS aswe grapple with the threats of the second nuclearage? A glance at the spectrum of deterrence anddefense in the second nuclear age (Figure 4) sug-gests that the United States may wish to placeincreasing weight on the most problematic of thesethreats; the rogue, nuclear aspirants, and fracturedstates with nuclear weapons and delivery capability.While North Korea and Iran provide the focus forthe near term deployed BMDS, the growing rela-tionships among these actors suggest a strategycomprised of global, mobile BMD interceptorcapabilities integrated with the ability to provideglobal precise and persistent tracking, discrimina-tion, and space situational awareness.

In the previous section we outlined key factors, such asstability, survivability, flexibility and sovereign basing,that should shape U.S. deterrent capability in thesecond nuclear age. What are the factors that shouldstructure a missile defense system for the future?

Global Warning, Tracking and Handoff

Since the 1960s, the United States has developed ahighly reliable and accurate surveillance and missilewarning system comprised of space-based sensors,ground-based radars, and a command and controlnetwork providing integrated warning of ballisticmissile launches. Because of the criticality of mis-sile warning, the U.S. relies on sensors based onmultiple phenomenology (e.g., radar, electro-opti-cal/infrared) to ensure accuracy and confidence inattack warning and attack assessment. However,the increasing complexity of the global threat, cou-pled with technological improvements in sensorsand communications, drive the requirement foradvanced sensor capabilities serving both intercon-tinental and regional missile defense. Tracking bal-listic missiles in their midcourse phase against thecold backdrop of space calls for sensors able todetect and discriminate among decoys, chaff, andother countermeasures, to then track the warhead,and to hand off its trajectory to interceptor firecontrol. Multiple terrestrial and space-based sen-sors and their associated C3 form the foundationfor a layered approach to a global sensor network.

Mobile, Flexible, Rapidly Deployable Interceptors

Only a mobile interceptor capability can be suffi-ciently flexible to be deployed wherever needed torespond to a wide range of threats. The problemwith fixed missile defense sites, other than thoseconstructed on U.S. soil, is that they rely on strate-gic assumptions that may not prove to be long-last-ing.122 Daniel Goure has argued that assumptionsthat Russia could be treated as an ally, and that wecould safely predict the launch locations of ballisticmissile threats, leading to a decision to place a per-manent “third site” in Eastern Europe, must, inlight of the Russian invasion of Georgia, be ques-tioned.123 Unlike fixed installations that are subjectto political whim, geo-political pressures, and pre-ventive or pre-emptive attack, mobile missiledefenses can respond to each of these vagaries.

119 “Missile Defense Worldwide,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. DoD, BMDS Booklet, Fifth Edition, 2008, p. 1. C2BMC stands for Command, Control, Battle Management, andCommunications.

120 “U.S. anti-missile testing takes a hit, scores a hit,” C4ISR Journal, August 2008, p. 8. See also, Steven Hildreth, “Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A StatusOverview,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2007.

121 Kerry M. Kartchner, “Implementing Missile Defense” in Wirtz and Larsen, op.cit., p. 78.122 For instance, premising strategic decisions on the continued willingness of a sovereign nation to allow permanent missile defense basing on its territory may not prove viable

over the longer term.123 Daniel Goure, “Dealing with the Russian Threat,” Defense News, September 8, 2008.

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These land-mobile, sea-mobile, or air-based systemsdo not require a permanent, negotiated and, possibly,disruptive overseas presence, nor do they require alarge force protection footprint. They are respon-sive to changes in domestic attitudes on defense,are less vulnerable to foreign attack, and are pro-jected to be more cost-effective. A rapidly deploy-able missile defense capability provides a quick,defensive option to an unexpected missile crisis,could be used to reinforce existing defenses as a cri-sis escalates, and would have to be factored into anadversary’s deterrent calculus as he contemplatesthe success of an initial missile strike. Such a capa-bility, owing to its flexible deployment, basing modeand technologies employed, could add value to alayered system throughout the boost, ascent andmid-course phase of missile and warhead flight.

What are the force planning implications for a bal-listic missile defense system to meet the challengesof the second nuclear age? The good news is that,unlike deterrence, we do not have to ponder thequestion of whether the putative adversary will beinfluenced by the measures we put in place. Theability to defend against a missile strike is a techni-cal, not a psychological problem. The bad news isthat the threats are proliferating, and show no signsof abating. Thus the challenges for missile defenseare every bit as great as those facing an offensive“prompt global strike” capability, with the addedchallenge that these defensive systems mustrespond on a moment’s notice, and they cannotafford to miss. Given those challenges, and theabove requirements, a prudent investment path formissile defense in the second nuclear age shouldinclude the following.

Missile Defense C4ISR

“Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance” (C4ISR) is generally far tooencompassing a phrase to provide meaningful forceplanning guidance, but an integrated approach to aglobal ballistic missile defense demands investmentacross-the-board. The centerpiece of the MissileDefense Agency’s plans for a layered missile defensesystem is its Command and Control, Battle

Management, and Communications (C2BMC)program. C2BMC is designed to ensure the flow ofinformation necessary to detect, track, link sensorsand weapons, and defeat any missile attack on anyvector, in any phase of flight.

C2BMC provides a planning capability to locatesensors and weapons systems to counter identifiedthreats; situational awareness at all leadership levelsof the evolving battle and status of defensive assets,sensor netting to detect, identify, track and discrim-inate threats; global integrated fire control to pairthe right sensors and weapons systems against mul-tiple threats for the highest probability of kill andmost efficient management of a relatively limitedshot magazine; and global communications net-works to manage and distribute essential data effi-ciently.124

Ground, Airborne and Space-based Sensors

A layered integrated system of ballistic missiledefenses must first rely on a family of sensors. Thisfamily will include current and modified ground-based sensors, and mobile, sea-based sensors andradars such as X-band radars on Aegis destroyers aswell as a “very powerful X-band radar mounted ona semi-submersible.”125 Currently, the legacyDefense Support Program is the only operationalspace-based missile defense sensor providing earlywarning alerts on launch and initial trajectory aimpoint information. Critical additions to this capa-bility will be the Space-Based Infrared System(SBIRS) and the Space Tracking and SurveillanceSystem (STSS). These will provide attack warning,target detection, and precise tracking for intercep-tor fire control solutions and engagement in allphases of the missile’s ballistic trajectory. Deployedto a forward theater, airborne sensors provide addi-tional sources of sensor phenomenology for persist-ent awareness.

Sea-based Missile Defense

Reportedly, a threat posed by a new Chinese ballis-tic missile against U.S. Navy ships led to the recentdecision to build more DDG-51 class-destroyers tomeet sea-based missile defense requirements.Evidently, it also led U.S. regional combatant com-manders to demand upgrades to current sea-based

124 U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense—Worldwide,” Washington, D.C.: BMDS Booklet, Fifth Edition, p 15. 125 DoD News Briefing with Lt. General Henry Obering, Director, Missile Defense Agency, July 15, 2008.

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missile defense capability and increased productionto meet future demands.126 While these improve-ments may enable U.S. naval forces to overcomeanti-access barriers in place along the Pacific Rim,an integrated Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)ballistic missile defense system with sea-based capability able to defeat long-range ballistic mis-siles during boost, ascent and mid-course phases offlight will be a more important contribution. TheKEI system is designed to interoperate with exist-ing sensors, planned BMDS sensors, and theC2BMC system to add an additional layer of“high-performance, high-mission assurance, andcost-effective” BMDS capability.127 KEI’s fire con-trol allows the system to be sensor indifferent and,therefore, compute an intercept solution based onthreat information gathered from any sensor in the family.

Land-based, Rapidly Deployable Missile Defense

A major advantage of the KEI system is that it canbe rapidly deployable by air to land-bases abroad,and made operational within hours to meet anunexpected threat. This concept of operations is“based on the premise that if we have a very highacceleration booster that’s mobile, we can moveclose to the threat country and be able to get theacceleration needed to shoot down a missile” whilein the boost/ascent phase.128 Like its sea-basedcousin, a land-based KEI provides a high-confi-dence boost-phase defense layer while also offeringa flexible, forward-based mid-course interceptcapability.129

Airborne Boost-phase Missile Defense

The airborne laser (ABL) is the near-term airbornecapability of most interest to ballistic missiledefense. Focused on the boost-phase threat posedby ballistic missiles, the ABL uses a chemical oxy-gen iodine laser (COIL) “capable of producing amegawatt-class beam with a range of several hun-dred kilometers.”130 Integrated into a modifiedcommercial aircraft, the ABL is seen as a “first lineof defense” in the BMDS, owing to its ability todestroy a missile in boost phase. This capabilityreduces the number of targets that subsequent lay-ers of the system will need to engage. The ABL’sability to detect launch sites will also facilitatecounterstrikes as required.

To this point in the paper, we have described thefeatures of the second nuclear age, suggested itsdeterrent and defense requirements, and sketchedthe force planning implications of those requirements.But we also noted that a principal feature of this ageis the a departure from the Cold War separation ofdeterrence and defense in favor integrating andsynchronizing deterrent and defensive systems tomeet future threats. In a previous study, StrategicSynchronization, General John Piotrowski (USAF,Ret.) related the dangers of ignoring defense andcited historical events as evidence to support hisassertion.131 Recognizing the need for continuedstrong offensive/deterrent capabilities, he went onto emphasize that "[w]hat is needed is offense/defensesynchronization (ODS) for the entire U.S. defenseestablishment."132 The final section of the paperoutlines how synchronization might be achieved.

126 “Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut,” Defense News, August 4, 2008, p. 1.127 “Missile Defense—Worldwide,” p. 33.128 DoD News Briefing with General Obering, July 15, 2008.129 See Amy Butler, “Striving for Speed,” Aviation Week, September 15, 2008, pp. 48-50.130 “Missile Defense—Worldwide,” p. 19.131 Strategic Synchronization: The Relationship between Strategic Offense and Defense, General John L. Piotrowski, USAF (Ret.), The Heritage Foundation, 2002, p. 7.132 Ibid. p. 45.

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The prevailing paradigm in the first nuclear agewas that national interests and treaty obligationsnecessitated that deterrence, defense, and the forcesunderwriting them be separated in pursuit of dis-tinctly different objectives. Meeting the challengeof the second nuclear age calls for synchronizingdeterrence and defense to provide a range of flexi-ble, integrated, and time-sensitive response optionsenabling U.S. decision-makers to counter a range ofcurrent and emerging nuclear threats.

Previous Efforts

There was some conceptual and operational blend-ing of deterrence and defense in the first nuclearage. It was often argued that missile defenses could“deter an opponent from attacking because he hasless confidence that his attack will succeed.”133 Thisdeterrence by denial relied on a calculus very differ-ent from deterrence based on punishment.Therefore, most of the strategic thinking and forceplanning of the first nuclear age compartmental-ized the concepts of deterrence and defense, andballistic missile defense was seen by many as unnec-essary, costly, and possibly destabilizing. The reali-ties of the second nuclear age have altered thatoutlook considerably.

Writing in anticipation of the 2001 QDR and NPR,Elaine Bunn noted that the “piecemeal” handling

of nuclear weapons and missile defense issues was nolonger appropriate, suggesting the “complex nexusof offenses, defenses and multiple actors can beseen as a set of interconnected gears.”134 Althoughthe vectors of the varying nuclear actors could notbe predicted with high confidence, Bunn arguedthat it was necessary to understand their directionsand connections, “in order to develop a compre-hensive approach to nuclear deterrence and missiledefenses.” In that regard, she challenged theauthors of the next NPR to “take a longer view…ofwhere the United States should be headed withregard to the emphasis it places on offenses anddefenses and the proper mix of forces.”135

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review took severalimportant declaratory steps toward offense-defenseintegration/operational synchronization within theconcept of a New Triad. Nevertheless, its threecomponents—offensive (strike) capabilities,defenses, and infrastructure—were treated sepa-rately in that report.136 Accordingly, as analystssuch as Kurt Guthe concluded, “the innovativeaspect of the New Triad is primarily conceptual.”137

Perhaps the most important NPR initiative towardoffense-defense integration was that the three ele-ments of the New Triad would be supported by acommon command and control, intelligence andplanning infrastructure so it would be “adaptable tothe broader range of adversaries, types of conflict,

133 W.K.H. Panofsky and Dean A. Wilkening, “Defenses against Nuclear Attack on the United States,” in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, (eds.) U.S. Nuclear WeaponsPolicy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006.

134 M. Elaine Bunn, “Strategic Nuclear Forces and National Missile Defense: Toward an Integrated Framework,” in Michele A. Flournoy (Ed.) QDR 2001: Strategy-DrivenChoices for America’s Security, Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2001, pp. 319-349.

135 Ibid. p. 344. Others were contemplating the linking of deterrence and defense in post-Cold War strategic thinking as well. See Michael O. Wheeler, “The Limits of Defense,”http://www.ndu/inss/symposia/jointops99.

136 See J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002,http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2002.

137 Kurt Guthe, The Nuclear Posture Review: How is the “New Triad” New? Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, p. 5.

SYNCHRONIZING DETERRENCE AND DEFENSEIN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE

and military threats…”138 The emphasis on com-mand and control, intelligence and planning wasspecifically meant to develop secure wide-bandcommunications between national decision mak-ers, command centers and operational forces, todevelop advanced technology programs for intelli-gence, and to upgrade the United States StrategicCommand’s (USSTRATCOM) capability foradaptive planning.139

Three years later, the judgment of a conference on“Implementing the New Triad” held that muchwork remained to be done. The conferenceacknowledged that the foundation of the New Triadwas the C4ISR network intended to tie togetherthe three legs of the triad to “provide policymakerswith the timely information needed to calibrateeach of the legs to develop tailored strategies andcapabilities for a given contingency.”140 However,the conference then devoted its attention to judg-ing the progress made and efforts needed on thethree separate legs, rather than deliberating theways and means to integrate and synchronize thosecapabilities to meet an uncertain security future.

Although the following year’s Quadrennial DefenseReview was largely silent on nuclear deterrence,defense and the issues raised by the IFPAConference, it did reiterate the requirement for“tailored deterrence.”141 That appeared to be suffi-cient guidance for General James Cartwright,USSTRATCOM Commander, who in subsequenttestimony to the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee acknowledged that the progress to dateenabled and foretold the integration of nucleardeterrence and defense.142

In noting USSTRATCOM’s assignment to bringthe full range of offensive, defensive, command andcontrol, and intelligence, surveillance and recon-naissance capabilities to bear against any adversary,General Cartwright pointed to a reorganized head-quarters staff charged with “conducting integratedand synchronized strategic level planning.”

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138 Ibid. p. 8.139 Pentagon briefing slides, “Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review,” January 9, 2002.140 IFPA-Fletcher National Security Conference, “Implementing the New Triad, Washington, D.C.: December 14-15 2005, Executive Summary, p. ix. Proceedings available at

http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IFC36.pdf . See also James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen (eds.) Nuclear Transformation, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.141 Including “prompt global strike capabilities to defend and respond in an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks, and air and missile defenses…”Quadrennial Defense

Review Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, p. 27.142 Statement by General James E. Cartwright, Commander, United States Strategic Command, before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, March 29, 2006.143 Ibid.

Although his report to Congress also tended to fol-low achievements along the three legs of the triad,General Cartwright also emphasized the goal ofsynchronization through the “key enablers of com-mand and control, intelligence and planning.”Toward that end he pledged to:

• Enhance collaboration among distributed STRAT-COM assets as a step toward a global C2 capabilityconnecting all triad forces.

• Improve the apportionment practices to managelow-density, high-demand ISR assets more efficientlyand achieve persistence through the integration ofthose assets, capitalizing on the long dwell time ofunmanned and unattended sensors.

• Determine essential global strike command and con-trol services to include a more fully integrated terres-trial and space-based approach to situation awareness.

• Develop a more coherent global command and con-trol capability and a network-enabled architecture tomove information to the user.

• Transition intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-sance from a legacy, nation-state approach to aglobal enterprise tailored to meet regional needs,emphasizing unmanned vehicles to identify andtrack mobile targets.

• Improve responsive space access; integrate air andspace capabilities and resource space surveillancecapabilities.143

As depicted in Figure 5, a more flexible, compre-hensive military strategy that fuses deterrence anddefense is required in the second nuclear age. Formodern nuclear states, traditional deterrenceremains largely effective. For fractured, rogue, andnuclear aspirant states, and for other actors whomight not be deterred by traditional means, layeredmissile defenses and other adequate defenses areessential. This dual requirement drives the need toderive combined deterrence and defense strategiesand operational constructs that will provide deci-sion makers and Joint Force Commanders inte-grated decision aids and engagement options tomeet any contingency in the second nuclear age.

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As the graphic suggests, the Joint Force Commandermust be able to integrate deterrent and defenseoptions to counter threatened nuclear use in afuture scenario. That means capitalizing on jointforce capabilities within and among mission areas,merging inter-/intra-theater fights into a globalcollaborative activity, establishing flexible andadaptable kill chains, accommodating expeditionaryoperations and coalition warfare, and integratingoffensive-defensive capabilities.144 How might astrategy fusing deterrence and defense be imple-mented? Operational Synchronization, also knownas offense-defense integration and multi-missionintegration, offers an answer to that question.

Operational Synchronization

Operational Synchronization “… is the synergisticemployment of defensive and offensive operations,prompt and persistent ISR made possible by effectiveC2, and communications” to forge synchronizedactions through integrated engagements.145 Opera-tional Synchronization accomplishes this by combin-ing information throughout planning and operationsto provide an array of tailored decision options thatexploit the full range of military capabilities toachieve the military objectives. It is a multi-missionintegration that, through command and control,synchronizes the operational elements of deter-rence and defense—ISR, strike and missile defense.

Achieving Operational Synchronization

Operational Synchronization of deterrence anddefense is important because the pace of modernconflict compresses the battlespace and compelsdecision-makers to select response options withinseverely reduced timelines. Operational Synchro-nization creates synergy between offensive anddefensive forces through a four-phase processdepicted in Figure 6:

• Global Awareness and Understanding: Formulatingthe global situation requiring a response.

• Collaborative Planning: Applying existing processes,procedures, and tools in an automated, multi-missionenvironment to produce optimal, synchronizedcourses of action (COA) and options.

• Execution Planning: Refining these optimal COA/response options considering cost, risks, consequences,and probability of success.

• Execution: Implementing the plan.

Global Awareness and Understanding

Global Awareness and Understanding establishesthe initial conditions. During peacetime Deliberate/“What If ” Planning, a contingency is postulatedand placed within the context of declared objectives,policy, doctrine, commander’s intent, operational

144 USSTRATCOM Missile Defense Prioritized Capabilities List, March 2006.145 USSTRATCOM: Balancing the New Strategic Triad – Study Plan, 1 August 2006.

Effective Deterrence

Effective Defense




Rogue States

NuclearAspirants

Non-stateActors

HIGHERLOWER

Inte

nsit

y o

f A

ttac

k

HIG

HE

RLO

WE

R

Figure 5. Integrating Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Second Nuclear Age.

constraints, rules of engagement and other factorsthat drive the intelligence preparation of the battle-space. As a real-world situation intensifies and thesituation is updated with information from persist-ent surveillance and reconnaissance assets, Crisis/“What Is” Planning is employed as and offensiveand defensive force readiness are factored in.

Collaborative Planning

Collaborative Planning produces the optimalCOAs to be refined during Execution Planning.From this point in the process, planners collabora-tively develop an initial set of COAs and tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP). TheseCOAs/TTPs are wargamed, tested, analyzed, opti-mized, and evaluated to determine performance,effectiveness, and expected outcomes relative todesired mission objectives. Optimal COAs withfavorable predicted outcomes are submitted to theappropriate decision-making level and, once com-manders have approved the COAs, they arereleased for training and mission rehearsal.

Execution Planning

Execution Planning refines the final COAs/TTPsinto plans to be executed. Execution Planning hasthe attributes of collaborative planning, except thatit is typically fast reaction planning done with themost up-to-date global situation understanding,current forces, forecasted weather, and a reducedset of directly-applicable COAs/Plans/TTPs.

Execution

Execution implements the offensive and defensiveCOA/TTP options selected based on missionobjectives. During and after execution, surveillanceand reconnaissance assets are tasked to collect datafor analysis that will determine the degree to whichthe objectives were achieved. These analyses formthe basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the mis-sion, assessing the response of the adversary, replan-ning the next actions, preparing after action reports,and gathering lessons identified to be applied tofuture operations.

Operational Synchronization: AnIllustrative Scenario

Perhaps the best way to illustrate operational syn-chronization is through an illustrative scenario,reflected in Figures 7 thru 10, which steps througheach of the four phases described above. (Steps areindicated by numbers in the graphic illustrations.)In this scenario, we assume that a southwest Asiannation has escalated global tensions, has started tomobilize forces, and, consistent with the processabove, the U.S. is deliberating its options to deterand defend.

At this point in the scenario, [Step 1, Figure 7] U.S. global ISR assets have detected and are moni-toring suspicious activity in southwest Asia. Sensorsdetect transporter and erector launcher (TEL)movement and missile transportation to a launch

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Figure 6. Operational Synchronization through Automated, Multi-mission Collaborative Planning.

Execution

Execution

Planning

Collaborative Planning

Optimal

COAs

Wargames, Exercises

Analysis, Evaluation

Initial

COAs

Global Awareness

and Understanding

Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlespace

Plan Orders,

Directives,

Guidance

Policy,

Doctrine

Simulated Global SituationDeliberate / What If

Real World Global SituationCrisis / What Is

Commander s Intent,

Rules of EngagementPlan Repository

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site. The observed data are sent to the commandauthorities and intelligence analysts [Step 2].Additionally, when combined with other intelli-gence information, the analyses conclude with highconfidence that at least one of the boosters carries aweapon of mass destruction.

Upon receiving the confirmed intelligence analysisand conclusions, [Step 3, Figure 8] USSTRATCOMalerts the President and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) who in turn [Step 4] directGeographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) toprepare a range of defensive and offensive options

Figure 7. Global Awareness and Understanding.

1

Indications andWarning (Intel /Surveillance)Detect TEL

Movement andMissile

Transport toLaunch site.

2

USSTRATCOMReceives ISR

SituationalAwareness Data

and ValidatesCollection With

National Agencies

WMD:

Probability>95%

NationalAgencies

USSTRATCOM

with predicted probability of success. GCC plan-ning staffs then [Step 5] collaboratively develop acomprehensive set of coordinated, synchronizedcourses of action that are then [Step 6] sent forward

for leadership review and approval. ApprovedCOAs are returned [Step 7] to the GCCs andExecution Planning is authorized.

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Figure 8. Collaborative Planning.

5 3USSTRATCOMAlerts National

Leadershipand

CombatantCommandersCentralized Plan

Management

4

Combatant Commanders Collaborate to Develop a

Comprehensive Package of Dominant Options

Collect Courses of Action

IntelligenceSurveillance/

Recon.

Global Strike/

AttackOperations

IntegratedMissile

Defense

SpaceOperations

CyberOperations

Course of Action Approved

Collaborate,Prioritize, Evaluate

Special OpsMission

7

Joint Force

Commander

Distributed, CollaborativePlan Developed Using

Pre-planned COAs

USPACOM

NationalAgencies

USSTRATCOM

6

National

Leadership

Approved COAs

COAs for Approval

Select Course of Action

Early WarningRadars

THAAD

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Figure 9. Execution Planning.

8

Execution Planning for Specific COA(s)

CooperativeForeign

ISR

IntegratedMissile

Defense


Recon.

SpaceOperations

GlobalStrike

Conventional

Attack OpsStrike

Conventional

Foreign ISR AssetIncluded In SituationalAwareness Pipeline.

Foreign Asset

Alerted to Threat .Offers ISR

Assistance.

PGCS,

ICBM

THAAD,

CG(X)

ISR

Tasking

SATRAN /

‘Clearing

House’

B-2,

Cruise

Missile

CyberOperations

9

Collect Courses of Action Select Plan

Plan Approved

CG(X)Positioned

Joint Force

Commander

Network

Attack,

Defense

THAADPositioned

Early WarningRadars

Distributed, CollaborativePlan Developed Using

Approved COAs

USPACOM

NationalAgencies

USSTRATCOM

National

Leadership

11

10

Approved Plans

Plans for Approval

Collaborate,Prioritize, Evaluate

As with the previous deliberate, adaptive, and crisisplanning, GCC planning staffs [Step 8, Figure 9]plan engagement specifics for the approved COAs.As before, plans are derived collaboratively [Step 9]so that offensive and defensive actions are fully

coordinated and synchronized. The plans are then[Step 10] reviewed by appropriate leadership and[Step 11] approved and returned for any fine tun-ing and Execution.

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Figure 10. Execution.

IntegratedMissile

Defense

UseForeign

ISRBDA

BDA

THAAD,

CG(X) on

Alert


Recon

ISR

Tasking

Space Imaging

Assets

Airborne

ISR Tasked

Space IRAssets

Joint Force

Commander

Prompt Global

Conventional

Strike

CooperativeForeign

ISR

Tasking

CyberOperations

GlobalStrike

Conventional

PGCS:Transporter

ErectorLauncher

CG(X) on Alert /Intercept

Airborne Conventional

Strike

Network

Attack,

Defense

USPACOM

NationalAgencies

USSTRATCOM

National

Leadership

Attack OpsStrike

Conventional

B-2: To

Shelter

SpaceOperations

SATRAN /

‘Clearing

House’

Early WarningRadarsTasked

THAADon Alert

In this scenario, a prompt global conventionalstrike against the fixed launch site and an airborneconventional strike capability have been includedas deterrent options. Other options include for-ward basing of manned or unmanned stealthy air-craft, preparation for cyber offensive and defensiveactions, and contingency defense of allied interests.

Pre-planned defensive options might include therapid deployment of a sea-based, airborne or land-based missile interceptor systems. Deterrentoptions could fail for a number of reasons and, ifthey do, the defensive options provided by a lay-ered missile defense system would come into play.

In a recent article in Joint Force Quarterly, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AdmiralMichael G. Mullen, argued that a new deterrencemodel must be based on a ready and crediblenuclear and conventional force, and that it mustaddress the challenges to national security posed byextremists.146 We believe that we have presentedsuch a model in this paper, a model constructed ofcapable and credible offensive and defensive forcesthat, in this second nuclear age, must be increas-ingly seen as integrated and synchronized. Thechallenge of the second nuclear age is to fashion astrategy that provides efficient and effectiveresponses to emerging threats using integratedoffensive and defensive elements of military power.

We might begin by turning the trends we see evolv-ing in the second nuclear age to our advantage.That means leveraging existing capabilities andinvesting in and augmenting those capabilitiesneeded to meet requirements of precise, persistent,global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,fast reaction offensive and defensive weapons withglobal reach, and innovative practices permittingthe flexibility, agility, and adaptability needed tomeet the challenges of the changing threat environ-ment. Some steps that will take us down that pathinclude:

• The U.S. Department of Defense should use theopportunity of the pending Quadrennial DefenseReview and Nuclear Posture Review to sustain andstrengthen the overall credibility and capability ofthe nuclear triad of strategic forces.

• New investments should be directed towardincreased awareness and understanding of emerging

threats coupled with a prompt global strike capabil-ity to hold those threats at risk. A conventionalintercontinental ballistic missile, either sea- or land-based, and a next-generation bomber are deterrentcapabilities that should be called for in the nextQDR and NPR and funded for fielding a decadefrom now.

• A layered system of global, rapidly deployable sea-,land-, air-, and space-based capabilities to defendagainst ballistic missiles in all phases of flight shouldbe high on the list of the nation’s defense priorities.

• A distributed, automated, real-time, collaborativeplanning capability that is multi-dimensional (verti-cal through the strategic-operational-theater com-mand structure and horizontal among geographiccombatant commanders and joint force command-ers) and multi-mission (encompassing all missionsfrom ISR to missile defense and offensive options)needs to be implemented to support operational syn-chronization of deterrence and defense.

• Sustained support for operational planning and exer-cise activities conducted by the combatant com-mands and the service components is required toimplement operational synchronization and tofamiliarize key decision-makers with its capabilities.

In summary, deterrence and defense can no longerbe thought of and structured separately. If theUnited States is faced with a situation in which theU.S. homeland or that of an ally is threatened withan imminent missile attack, national decision mak-ers must be presented with a range of offensive anddefensive options to deter, prevent, or negate sucha strike. Those options should be presented along acollaborative continuum of action and reaction.

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146 Michael G. Mullen, “It’s Time for a New Deterrence Model,” Joint Force Quarterly, 4th Quarter, 2008, p. 2.

CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE INTHE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE

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This paper has examined the policies and programsneeded to underwrite new approaches to combin-ing deterrence and defense across the spectrum ofconflict. Planning towards an operational synchro-nization of offensive and defensive forces will pro-vide for a future in which national decision-makers

are given a range of options to deter an enemy fromstriking U.S. or allied interests, or to defend instages if deterrence fails. The second nuclear agedemands a military strategy integrating the policiesand practices of deterrence and defense.

4 1



ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR.

Dr. Haffa is Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy,

holds an M.A. degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology. He is an adjunct professor in the Government program at Johns Hopkins University. Prior to joining Northrop,

Dr. Haffa served as a career officer in the U.S. Air Force, retiring in 1989 with the grade of Colonel. His Air Force service

included operational tours in the F-4 aircraft in Vietnam, Korea, and Europe, teaching political science at the Air Force

Academy, and directing a staff group supporting the Air Force Chief of Staff. At Northrop Grumman, Dr. Haffa’s work has

included analyses of U.S. military strategy for the business sectors of the company and the development of Corporate

strategic planning scenarios.

RAVI R. HICHKAD

Mr. Hichkad is a Research Associate at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center where he provides research and analysis

regarding defense policy developments and their relationship to the company’s business sectors. Within the Analysis Center

his work involves assessing issues and trends related to space and ISR systems, missile defense, and naval programs. Before

joining Northrop Grumman, Mr. Hichkad completed graduate school and held an internship as a Research Associate at the

Congressional Research Service’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division. His post-undergraduate work involved employ-

ment with the governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea as well as experience in the private sector. Mr. Hichkad is an

honors graduate of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and holds a master’s degree in

security studies. His undergraduate education was at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill where he received a

bachelor’s degree in anthropology, graduating with honors and highest distinction as well as Phi Beta Kappa.

DANA J. JOHNSON

Dr. Johnson is a Senior Analyst with the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center in Arlington, Virginia, responsible for assessing

space and missile defense issues and trends for Northrop Grumman’s business sectors. Dr. Johnson has extensive experi-

ence in government and industry aerospace-related research. She joined Northrop Grumman in June 2003 from RAND where

she spent almost 15 years as a national security policy analyst with a specialty in space policy and operations. While at RAND

she led or participated in a number of studies in space, aerospace, and aeronautics conducted for the White House Office of

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Department of Defense, the Air Force, NASA, and the NRO. She also participated

in several congressionally mandated commissions, including the NIMA Commission, the Commission on Roles and Missions,

and the Aerospace Commission. Other prior experience includes policy and mission analysis of national security space pro-

grams in several leading aerospace companies, and diplomatic history and research at the U.S. Department of State’s Office

of the Historian. Dr. Johnson holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California, and is also an

Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, teaching space and security.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

4 2



PHILIP W. PRATT

Mr. Pratt is Director of Business Development with Northrop Grumman’s Information Systems Sector in Colorado Springs,

Colorado. Mr. Pratt’s current responsibilities are in developing Warfighter-advocated approaches to integrating missile

defenses into operational warfighting capabilities, Joint and Coalition BMC3ISR, Homeland Defense, and operational integra-

tion of C2 across multiple missions. Mr. Pratt’s thirty-seven years of industry experience has included both Department of

Defense research and development and Civil Space programs. Within the DoD, he has led Air and Missile Defense systems

engineering, integration, test, and analysis; developed and tested operational Missile Warning and Space Defense systems;

and developed ground-based synthetic environments for integrating and testing tactical fighter embedded computer opera-

tional flight programs. In Civil Space, Mr. Pratt‘s teams performed launch vehicle guidance, navigation, and steering equation

validation and verification for Earth-orbital and inter-planetary missions. In 1999, the Internal Research and Development team

Mr. Pratt co-led was awarded the TRW Chairman’s Award for Innovation. Mr. Pratt holds a Master’s and Bachelor’s Degree in

Aerospace Engineering from Iowa State University, and has completed course work toward a Masters in Business

Administration.


The NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION established the

Analysis Center in 1977 to conduct objective analyses of strate-

gic trends, defense policy, military doctrine, emerging threats

and operational concepts, and their implications for the defense

industry. The Analysis Center works on the leading edge in

shaping U.S. strategy and defining operational requirements.

The Analysis Center Papers present ongoing key research and

analysis conducted by the Center staff and its associates.

Analysis Center Papers are available on-line at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Web site at www.analysiscenter.northropgrumman.com. For substantiveissues related to this paper, please contact Robert P. Haffa, at [email protected], or call him at 703-875-0002. For copies, please call 703-875-0054.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense company headquartered in Los Angeles,California. Northrop Grumman provides technologically advanced, innovative products, servicesand solutions in systems integration, defense electronics, information technology, advanced aircraft, shipbuilding, and space technology. With more than 120,000 employees, and operationsin all 50 states and 25 countries, Northrop Grumman serves U.S. and international military, government and commercial customers.

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