deterrence by civilian defense

As the security environment of many states changes, some may be persuaded to explore defense strategies embodying methods of nonviolent civilian resistance. An important question for civilian-hsed defense strategies involves their deterrence potential. By inte- grating deterrence theories with researrh on popular mobilization and social movements, this article explores the requirements for evaluating the deterrence potential of civilian- based defense. It concludes that civilian defense can be evaluated as ifdeterrence mattered, although much work remains to be done to articulate measurable indicators of the social powers that would be engaged.

DETERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE

by William B. Vogele

The emerging world order compels national leaders to redefine security assumptions and defense strategies. Opportunities for new strategies emerge even as old conflicts are revived. The challenge of the current period is to expand the domain of alternative security strategies, because no single approach will be adequate for all cases. Arguably, one of the key problems for security policy derives from the recognition that “traditional” strategies, which rely primarily on military force, are counterproductive in many situations.

Civilian-bused defense (CBD) is one proposal that may offer new methods for providing security in the emerging conflict environment. Civilian-based defense is a strategy for national defense in which social values, institutions, and national territory are pre- served in the face of aggression, through nonmilitary methods of struggle. Thus it expands h e potential power base of a society by identifying and mobilizing “social powers” that are ignored by

AUTHOR’S NOTE: Fxlier venions of this article were presented at Ihe 1992 Peace Studies Association meetings and the 1932 meetings of Lhe New England Political Science Assariation. The research has been supported by the Program on Nonviolent Sandions of rhe Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Many thanks are due to Roland Bleiker, h g Bond, Peter Libeman. Michelle Markley. Roger Powers. and two reviewers for Peace & Change for their generous and helpful comments.

PEACE &CHANGE b l . 18 No. 1, J a n u y 1993 26-49 Q 1993 Council on Peace Research in History and Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Develapment

26

Vogele I DEIERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 27

traditional military defenses. Like military defense, of course, CBD is not capable of providing the one solution to all security problems. As a result, societies that move to adopt CBD may do so only partially, or in a mixed strategy with military methods. Before they are likely to do anything, they must be persuaded that CBD will provide adequate answers to the questions raised by their own security situation.

This article focuses on a central issue that must be addressed in the analysis of CBD proposals: What is the deterrence potential of a national defense strategy based on nonmilitary civilian resistance? At this stage of development, deterrence by civilian defense remains an arguable proposition, with some plausibility. However, the means for applying deterrence analysis to CBD strategies must be refined and, as the discussion that follows illustrates, any claims for deterrence by nonmilitary resistance must be subjected to more rigorous study. Beginning that task is the primary aim of this article. Among the most important issues are the need to specify in a measurable way the “social powers” that would be employed, the potentially provocative nature of civilian defense, and serious consideration of what types of aggression CBD might be best able to deter. In several significant ways, however, CBD strategies are both amenable to analysis by traditional deterrence theories and potentially promising as methods to deter aggression.

The next sections summarize civilian-based defense proposals and contemporary deterrence theories. Two central problem areas raised by deterrence theory are then explored as requirements for a deterrence analysis of CBD-the balance of capabilities in a conflict and the role of perceptions and communication. A concluding section suggests some directions for continuing research.

CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

Civilian-based defense is a national defense strategy that relies on the civilian members of society to defend their territory, institutions, and collective values without the use of military force. It is proposed as a means for the collective entity of the nation-state to

28 PEACE & CHANGE I January 1993

resist aggression, whether imposed from outside or from within by an internal usurpation of power. Like military defense, CBD oper- ates in situations requiring a method for prosecuting an acute conflict when alternative avenues of political action (such as diplomacy or international institutions) have been exhausted or are undesirable. Both strategies exist as groups of sanctions that can be applied as a situation warrants; CBD is promoted as the functional equivalent of military defense. It is rooted in the same general observation that social groups may find themselves in conflict with others, in which the institutions of their society are threatened or in which challenges to the integrity of their territorial claims and identity are raised.

A military strategy for defense seeks to deny an aggressor control of the national society and territory by repulsing his military forces with comparable forces. Military defense assumes that once superior physical force is established, the instruments of social control will fall into the hands of the aggressor. Note that this assumes that the purpose served by the application of military force in aggression is not wanton destruction and social annihilation. Rather, the actual andpotential application of physical force provides aggressors with a coercive instrument by which to demand cooperation or permit the achievement of their other objectives. Therefore, the basis of military defense is the presumed necessity to defeat the military forces of aggressors to deny them this political power.'

CBD theorists reject war and organized violence as the necessary means for social groups, including nation-states, to regulate their conflict and provide for their own security. Furthermore, they argue that superior physical force alone is insufficient for acquiring and maintaining social control. Any relationship of power depends fundamentally on the willingness of those who are ruled to consent to being governed. The capacity of a population to withdraw or withhold its consent, therefore, becomes an important source of power, even in an acute conflict in which one side can muster overwhelming force.

For example, the goals of political and military occupations often involve control of territory and the resident population. In this case, the ability of the population to withhold its cooperation can deny

Vogele / DETERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 29

the occupiers their capacity to rule. In addition, other goals of occupiers-including the extraction of resources, the free use of common resources, and even genocide-ften depend on some level of popular consent for their efficient achievement. To the extent that this is true, civilian resistance may be able to frustrate the aggressor.

In a defense strategy by nonmilitary civil resistance, attacking forces would not be prevented from entering the country, except perhaps by planned demolition of strategic rail lines, highways, or bridges2 Instead, defense would begin after the invasion. Occupy- ing forces would be prevented from achieving their principal objectives by concerted nonviolent resistance, noncooperation, and efforts to weaken the coercive effectiveness of the military forces themselves.

The population would be organized around occupational or social affinities, such as neighborhoods, churches, labor unions, factory groups, or public employee organizations, enabling defenders to focus their noncooperation or nonviolent interventions on narrow, but critical, aspects of the occupiers’ objectives. They might refuse to teach the occupiers’ educational program, close a city with a general strike, work strictly to rule, sabotage factories to prevent production, or encourage mutiny among invading tr00ps.~ In addition, mass demonstrations can be organized, and alternative news sources, publications, or broadcasts can be created. Alternative (nonoccupation) institutions can emerge to maintain social unity and re~istance.~

Resistance to occupation and tyranny employing many tech- niques of nonviolent struggle have had powerful effects in the past, including nonviolent opposition to military occupation and internal usurpation in Europe during this century. Notable examples are the Weimar government’s promotion of nonviolent resistance to French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, significant aspects of resistance to Nazi occupations between 1940 and 1945, and Czech resistance to the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968. As recently as January 199 1, the Lithuanian government and citizens, at the time still asserting independence from the Soviet Union, organized mass demonstrations, barricades of the republic’s parliament, and clan-


destine radio broadcasts in response to Soviet military actions to crush the independence movement. During the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 199 1, resisters in Moscow took a lesson from Lithuania-they barricaded the Russian Parliament and maintained communications inside and outside the country? That these largely unprepared efforts can claim some significant measures of success suggests that nonviolent mass mobilization can make a military occupation difficult and costly. Indeed, defense policymakers in several European countries take the task of planning civil resistance very seriously! Nongovernmental proponents of CBD take the strongest position regarding the strategy’s deterrence potential. If it can provide an effective defense, they argue, then it should be able to deter aggression in the first place.’

DETERRENCE THEORIES

Deterrence is the effort to dissuade somebody from undertaking an action that one does not want by means of threats to make the contemplated action unprofitable. Thus deterrence rests on three principles: the existence of conflict, the presumption of rationality (insofar as the opponent is able to calculate or estimate relative costs and benefits), and the imposition of sanctions. Of course, an adver- sary may be convinced not to undertake some action by means other than threats-reassurances or compromise are obvious alterna- tives! But when hostility is high, when the stakes at issue are not easily compromised, and when open conflict is either imminent or highly probable, reassurances are less effective, and the need for defense and deterrence is more acute.

The basic operation of deterrence is the communication by the defender in a conflict situation that the opponent’s attack will be made more costly than the benefits that it is likely to produce? Costs will result either from the failure of the effort itself (deterrence by denial) or from some sort of retaliation (deterrence by punishment). Successful deterrence depends, first, on “the acrual capacity of the society to deny the attackers their objectives and to impose unac- ceptable costs (either alone or in cooperation with others)” and,

Vogele / DJZIERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 31

second, on "the potential attacker's perceptions of that society's capacity to deny their objectives and impose co~ts."'~

Adefender must have the capability to carry out the threats made. The incapacity to defend obviously weakens any statements about the will to defend. Traditionally, deterrence theory (and strategy) focuses on the balance of military capabilities, as historical, quantitative, and policy-oriented studies of military deterrence empha- size." The immediate balance of military capabilities between the conflict parties appears to be the most relevant condition (more so than a more general balance of forces).'*

Closely related to the question of capabilities, successful deterrence requires sufficient resolve and commitment to defend the issues at stake. Some interests have greater intrinsic value than others, making them easier to defend by credible deterrent threats- for example, temtorial integrity, political and cultural integrity, economic integrity, or existing popular and legitimate government or institutions. It is difficult to make credible threats about issues that have little apparent intrinsic value, as U.S. governments have discovered in various situations.

The point also emphasizes the conditional (or contextdependent) nature of power. Military force that might be able to repel (and therefore deter) a massive military attack, such as a blitzkrieg, may be ineffective in detemng an attack with limited aims (either for territory or specific resource^).'^ A successful deterrence strategy, therefore, should be flexible. Within the constraints of available social and economic resources, deterrence success will be im- proved by the defender's ability to respond to avariety of situations.

The defender's threats, capabilities, and commitments must be communicated accurately to potential aggressors if the latter are to be deterred. Communications between states, especially between adversaries in an acute conflict, are notoriously perilous. Mispr- ceptions can result from the pressures of the immediate situation, from ambiguous messages, from strategic deception, or from motivated bias (when what one perceives reflects existing patterns of understz iding and c~gnition).'~

A central dilemma of military deterrence strategy is accommo- dating the possibility that communicating resolve by demonstrating


one’s capabilities to fulfill defensive threats may well be construed as offensive threats, even though no offensive posture is intended- the classic “security dilemma.” Domestic political insecurities and vulnerabilities on the part of potential aggressors can aggravate the problems of misperception. Lebow and Stein have argued that the internal political and psychological characteristics of the potential challenger are at least as important as the external security balance.” Challenges to deterrence occur, in their view, as a result of internal compulsions that have little to do with an opportunistic cost-benefit calculation (which is the presumed motivation in traditional deterrence theory). Leaders have launched attacks when their own political and strategic vulnerabilities were aggravated, even though they knew the probability for military success was 10w.I~ Lebow argues, therefore, that a successful deterrence strategy is one that does not aggravate the potential challenger’s insecurity so that he is motivated to take risks or to act preempti~ely.’~ By challenging the presumption of rational deterrence theories that aggression is largely opportunistic, Lebow and Stein acknowledge the difficulties of accurate communications but focus on a different set of dynamics and derive different strategic implications.

DETERRENCE BY CIVILIAN RESISTANCE

What is required to evaluate the deterrence potential of CBD? The brief discussion of deterrence theories above highlights two issues of importance. First, drawing on the “rational deterrence” tradition, a balance of capabilities must be maintained by the defender, and those capabilities must be known to the potential attacker. It is crucial, therefore, to develop meaningful measures of defense capabilities, as well as models for conflicts in which they might be used. Because the development of CBD to date has not specified measurable social powers in this sense, this remains a major direction for work. The discussion below is devoted primarily to identifying the theoretical basis for specifying these powers, which would then enable a deterrence analysis of the strategy. The second issue raised by challenges to traditional deterrence theories,

Vogele I DETERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 33

the role of threat perceptions, is taken up following the discussion of the balance of powers.

THE BALANCE OF POWERS AND CIVILIAN DEFENSES

If a balance of military power between adversaries is required for successful deterrence, how can relative power capabilities be assessed when one side employs a nonmilitary strategy of civilian resistance? What powers of the nonmilitary defenders will con- vince the potential aggressor that the costs of aggression will exceed any likely gains? The analysis of a military balance has the advan- tage of a great deal of data based on military experience and engagements. The strategic application of nonviolent action is far less mature.

In several important areas, the capabilities of a nonmilitary defense are both identifiable and measurable. The balance of physical and economic resources available to support each side in the conflict are readily identifiable and common to traditional strategic analysis. In addition, several of the important bases for social power that would be engaged in CBD can be derived from analyses of social conflicts and social movements. These include the relative degree of legitimacy for each side’s cause, the potential of the defender to mobilize crucial sectors of society to maintain control of valued institutions, the extent to which either side has developed strategy, training, and preparation oriented to achieving its goals, and the capacity of the CBD state to impose indirect costs upon the aggressor through the larger international community.

Economic and material resources are the most readily identifiable sources of power and are relevant for any defense struggle, military or civilian. As Kennedy argues, most of the major wars of the modem era have tumed not on the balance of technology (or the means of struggle) but on which side could muster the resources to hold out the longest.’* Material resources, therefore, are one important element of power.I9 For the nonmilitary defender, crucial measurements include the ability of the economy to absorb the shocks of deprivation and remain resilient under occupation. That capacity can be gauged by such measures as the nation’s depen-


dence on external sources of critical inputs like food, fuel, or labor; its general level of wealth; the specialization of the economy; and so on. The material resource strength of the nation may be aug- mented by prior planning (such as stockpiling foods and fuels), as well as access to external assistance. This kind of “resource power” affects the population’s ability to sustain its struggle-to fend off or delay the difficult individual and collective decision about whether collaboration is necessary for survival.

The Ruhr resistance of 1923, for example, illustrates the difficulties of maintaining a nonviolent struggle when the occupation regime can effectively control crucial material resources. German resistance to the French occupation of the Ruhr did not impose significant material costs on the French economy, although, for almost a year, it frustrated the objective of extracting war repara- tions directly. The effectiveness of German resistance rested on factors such as the legitimacy of the goals, existing organizations that facilitated communication and maintained discipline, and cross- class solidarity (elements that are discussed more generally below). However, it was sustained materially by funds from Berlin-in effect, “strike pay.”” By August 1923, the Weimar economy was unable to bear this cost, leading to the famous hyperinflation of the period-the exchange value of the mark against the pound sterling dropped from 160,000 in May to 4.5 million at the end of July.”As the policy of French General Degoutte and Prime Minister Raymond Poincare intended, the population of the Ruhr faced no alternative but collaboration in order to survive, and solidarity dissolved within and between classes. “Passive resistance” ended in September, and new agreements of cooperation with the occupation authorities were reached.22

The most distinctive feature of a nonviolent struggle is the capacity for popular mobilization to resist oppression or occupation. Sharp’s insight that people can exercise power over their rulers by withholding their cooperation depends crucially on the willingness of enough people to do so to make the occupation unprofitable. Nonmilitary defense depends on the power of numbers rather than the force of arms. The resistance increases the costs of occupation by creating “disruptions” in the occupiers’ regime, directly or

Vogele I DJXERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 35

indirectly frustrating their objectives. The mobilization potential of the defending population, therefore, is a crucial question.

Students of social movements, particularly in North America, have devoted considerable effort to understanding the dynamics of popular mobilization. Much of their work has focused on “protest” movements within advanced capitalist democracies-although movements in both Eastern Europe and Latin America have re- ceived attention. This body of scholarship provides important insights into one of the central issues of CBD. In particular, these studies have developed both theoretical frameworks for investigat- ing popular mobilization and the indicators necessary for its mea- surement. The context of action differs greatly between resistance to military occupation and policy protest in a largely democratic polity. Nevertheless, the fundamental problems are the same: Why do people choose to participate? What facilitates effective mobilization? What are the roles of individual versus social choices?

The central concept of mobilization potential in a population has been defined as “the set of individuals who can theoretically be mobilized by a social movement.” The size of that set will depend on the aggregate “willingness to identify with collective actors that challenge constituted authority,” which in turn is influenced by attitudes toward both the goals of the movement and the means of struggle chosen.23

Several factors influence the size of the social potential for action. First, the mobilization potential increases as the subset of society that experiences some grievance against the regime grows. In addition, collective action is more likely when people perceive that the existing institutions are not adequate avenues for redressing these grievances. One of the factors that appears to account for an individual’s decision to participate in protest activity, for example, is the degree of his or her alienation from the norms and institutions of the political system.24 Muller, Dietz, and Finkel, for example, found that alienation was positively correlated with willingness to participate in illegal protest among both the general population and students in Peru.=

In the context of invasion and occupation by a foreign military power, a significant fraction of the population is likely to feel


aggrieved. National institutions may be usurped by leaders compli- ant with the occupying regime, or they may be replaced by exter- nally generated institutions. Economic, religious, or cultural organizations may be reoriented to serve the purposes of the invading state. In all cases, it is likely that many (although certainly not all) of the occupied population will be alienated from the new system.

Students of social movements have recognized, however, that although grievances or alienation may be proximate causes for rebellion or resistance, they are insufficient explanations on their own. Collective action requires the “mobilization of resources” throughout the society, or at least among critical sectors.% This, in turn, depends on creating incentives for individual participation, networks of solidarity, and structures for action. The organizational modes proposed for a nonmilitary defense strategy indirectly recognize these requirements. Civilian defense, for example, builds upon those networks that already exist, such as churches, labor unions, or occupational groups. As Sharp proposes, “The groups and institutions [of society] most involved [in the defensive actions] will be those most affected by the attackers’ objectives-economic, ideological, political or other-and therefore best situated to resist them.”*’ But this does not tell us about the social sources of power that would enable these groups to be mobilized effectively.

From a rational choice perspective, people will join a protest or a resistance struggle when their own ideal values are closer to the values and policy goals of the struggle than to the values and policies of the prevailing or occupation regime.’* Because an occupation regime is, by definition, imposed by force of arms, a person’s willingness to participate in resistance will depend on his or her willingness to bear the cost of repressi0n.2~ This is a demanding criterion. But as noted above, a significant fraction of the population is likely to be alienated from the occupation regime. The success of the resistance hinges on the willingness of individuals to participate in collective action of protest and struggle and, most likely, the collective commitment to the national institutions of the status quo ante.

One of the central strategic problems of CBD identified by Sharp is to prevent the usurpation of the institutions of social authority by

Vogele / DEXEXRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 37

the attackers. It is the maintenance of these forms of civil and political society that support resistance and rebellion.M Put another way, it is the maintenance of sufficient solidarity within the defending population at both national and subnational levels so that the attackers’ efforts at control have no legitimacy-in Boulding’s terms-to enhance the integrative power that holds a community together in the face of the destructive ‘ b a t power” of aggression.”

Social movement studies indicate that an individual’s willingness to participate in collective action is increased by the existence of networks of social affinity with which the person can identify and which can be mobilized into action. These immediate networks of social acquaintance and friendship are very influential. People tend to construct their interpretation of social reality from the people they know and meet, as well as by taking cues from influential individual^.^^ McAdam has shown that direct contact with organizers strengthens the willingness to participate, even among those people already ideologically disposed to favor the m0vement.3~ Similarly, community integration can be a powerful source of social norms-which may facilitate or obstruct collective action.”

Social networks, organizations, and interactions take on a crucial role of legitimizing as well as mobilizing social powers and social action. Kriesberg notes:

Networks are crucial in the development of collective identity in conflict entities. People within each are linked through many inter- connected groups. These preexisting groups facilitate mobilization as the news of emerging contention spreads along interpersonal channels. Persons in churches, trade unions, informal friendship networks, and so on, can be more readily joined together than isolated persons or persons in another set of networks. . . . [Vhe more highly organized the group is and the more it precedes and transcends a particular conflict, the less problematic is mobilizing support for any particular conflict.35

Muller and his colleagues argue that the “benefits” people weigh against the prospective “costs” of participation are largely That is, prospective benefits are related to reinforcement of group solidarity or values and the desire to support these social goals. Thus it appears that, for many people, the social rewards of participation

38 PEACE & CHANGE / January 1993

in collective action of protest or rebellion outweigh desires for individual material gain.

Finally, people estimate both the movement’s potential effectiveness and the importance of their own contribution toward the group’s success.3’ If the perceived probability of movement success is low, people are less likely to participate (because, in expected utility terms, the costs outweigh the gains). Even if success is more likely, if an individual’s personal contribution is perceived as unimportant, participation will decline (reflecting the tendency for “free riding”). Social movements must find the delicate balance between predicting success and warning of failure if individuals do not join. Once again, the links to networks and organizations are clear. These links provide the framework for both increasing the perception of overall effectiveness of protest or resistance and reassuring individuals that their actions really do matter.

The requirements noted here for effective mobilization are measurable social phenomena. Levels of national and local solidarity, the existence of groups and networks of groups, the strength of popular support for national values and institutions-all can be ascertained with some confidence. Notably, similar issues are addressed in a serious analysis of the potential effectiveness of the military-how loyal are the troops? how strongly does the population support them? and so on. The strength of potential mobilization, as a crucial social power that must be activated in anonmilitary defense, can be estimated relative to a conflict situation.

Some of these social conditions for the effective mobilization of a population will depend on the character of the society, as scholars have noted comparing the Eastern and Western European experiences with Nazi oc~upat ion.~~ Some of the conditions also can be created or enhanced by effective organization, training, and preparation. Ebert notes, for example, that the Indian independence movement adjusted its leadership structure between the campaigns of 1920-22 and those of 1930. In the former, popular enthusiasm was high, but the leadership remained fairly centralized. When the leaders were jailed, the movement “began to disintegrate, despite its apparent strength.” In the latter campaigns, leadership was more systematically decentralized. As a result, the resistance continued

Vogele / DEI’ERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 39

to operate effectively, even after the obvious leaders were jailed. Furthermore, the movement was less vulnerable to internal disrup- tion by agents prov~cateurs.~~

Effective strategy and training in a nonmilitary defense may be the most difficult factors to measure and capabilities for a nation to demonstrate. As with a military defense, the proof is in the doing. To the extent that defense strategies and plans are discussed and known, they can be evaluated. Plans can be compared with historical experiences to build strengths and avoid weak choices. An effective strategy of civilian defense also will require observable active participation of the citizenry, which can add to credibility.

Finally, the capacity of the CBD state to call upon the larger international community will enhance its ability to threaten the imposition of a broader range of costs upon the aggressor. Clearly, if costs are taken very narrowly, much aggression may be unaf- fected by nonmilitary deterrence. A potential aggressor may well calculate that the direct material costs of military action on its part are so low that, even if its objectives are frustrated, there is little to lose by trying. After all, CBD does not threaten to kill the aggressors’ personnel or damage their military materiel.@ Most of the relevant powers suggested above relate to this narrow notion of direct costs.

Aggressors, however, also recognize that they face consequences and potential costs for their actions in the larger international community. The history of military alliances’ failures to prevent aggression, or of the impotence of other instruments of collective security, suggests that, relative to potential benefits, aggressors do not tend to be overly concerned about these costs. Nevertheless, they can be real, as the concerted international action to impose economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Iraq in late 1990 illustrates. The credible capacity of a CBD state to threaten these costs will depend on several factors. The state may participate in formal alliance networks that involve serious commitments by other states to take action in its defense in ways consistent with the nonmilitary defense policy--economic and political sanctions against aggressors, for example. The CBD state may also cultivate political sympathy among the wider interna-

40 PEACE & CHANGE/ January 1993

tional community-as happened in reaction to Iraq’s aggression. Each of these “threats” made by the CBD state, dependent as they are upon the actions of others, will be more credible if the actions required impose relatively light burdens on the sympathetic states.

It appears, then, that the basic concepts of organization and action in a nonmilitary defense are consistent with social analyses of what moves people to act together. To put it another way, they are consistent with what empirical studies have shown about how social power can be created and activated. This parallelism is important because the studies of movements provide observable measures and testable hypotheses.

Assuming that the powers of a civilian defense can be measured, how can the defender effectively communicate the nation’s willingness and ability to resist an armed attack? What are the policy requirements for effective communication? The existence of military forces-their deployments, known capabilities, employment strategies demonstrated through exercises or military engagements -“communicate” a capability to resist aggression. The same should be true for preparations and planning accompanying a nonmilitary defense-including perhaps “nonviolent wargames.’”’ Leaders’ declarations and observable levels of public support for the government’s decisions are indicators of the nation’s willingness to resist. The policy requirements for effective communication would be, first, the need for overt and unequivocal adoption of the strategy. In addition, the cultivation of national and international legitimacy for the regime and its strategy would greatly enhance credibility and communication.

One indicator of a nation’s resolve to resist aggression in a crisis is past behavior in similar situations: its reputation for resolve. For a military defense, this usually is assumed to be the willingness to use force in the past (weighted, of course, by the immediate relevance of the stakes, costs, and interests in the new situation). A nonmilitary defense, because of its novelty, cannot reflect on many experiences until it is tested in conflict. The primary cases used to suggest the potential value of the strategy (the Ruhr and Czecho- slovakia) did not succeed in driving the aggressors out and can offer


limited support. If reputation counts at all, it is within the more narrow universe of experience in which the same (or very similar actors) engage each other in conflict over the same (or very similar) issues?’What, then, are the indicators of resolve for a nation relying on nonmilitary defenses?

In the contemporary process of transformation in world politics, at least a few nations can point to significant experiences with nonviolent action that toppled long-standing dictatorships. Mass mobilizations and popular refusal to abide the charade of legitimacy were major factors in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.43 In Poland, the deep social structures related to workers’ movements and Solidarity provided the organizational bases for transforming political society. Sharp even suggests that the level of mobilization apparent in Poland in 1980-81 may have deterred a Soviet invasion at that time to restore ‘‘order.’’u Similarly, demonstrations and the creation of alternative political organizations continued in Czechoslovakia in 1989, even after protestors were shot in Wenceslas Square. And the government of Lithuania determined to pursue a defense strategy based explicitly on nonmilitary civil resistance, even after economic coercion (in 1990) and violent repression (in January 1991)?5 In certain situations, therefore, velvet revolutions may provide evidence of resolve based on experience. These are isolated incidents, however, and the best that can be said is that the evidence is mixed.

PERCEPTIONS AND THREATS

To what extent would a civilian-based defense strategy “deter” aggression by avoiding unintended provocation? Because a defense strategy based on nonmilitary civil resistance eliminates the potential military threat by definition, does it also gain deterrence potential? CBD strategies are in many ways broadly consistent with contemporary challenges to traditional deterrence theory, such as those raised by Lebow and Stein. CBD should reduce one motivation to attack by intercepting the military dynamic of the security dilemma. CBD strategies have the apparent virtue of removing an


important source for a “fear of loss” that motivates leaders to act aggressively. Civilian defense, therefore, appears to conform to Lebow’s argument that a successful deterrence strategy should not aggravate a potential challenger’s insecurity so that the leadership is motivated to take risks or act preemptively.*

However, the deterrence potential of any strategy will be dimin- ished if it neglects plausible means to impose costs for aggression. Military “deterrence by punishment,” for example, is the underly- ing principle of nuclear strategy. Civilian defense, therefore, should include elements that take the struggle into the adversaries’ homeland. Sharp suggests that a CBD strategy should include efforts to

subvert the reliability and loyalty of the attackers’ troops and functionaries and induce them to mutiny; report the attack, resistance, and repression to the population of the attackers’ homeland or their usual supporters; and encourage dissension and opposition among the attackers’ homeland population and usual s~pporters.~’

Similarly, Olson has argued that a “social defen~e”~’ strategy should actively pursue a “forward cultural policy” to undermine the opponents’ domestic supp0TfS.4~

Indeed, Martin suggests that “social offense” may be a necessary and positive complement to “social defense.”” Drawing on the analogy of mass mobilization in the French Revolution, he argues that the inherently revolutionary nature of civilian defense will threaten the structures of power in neighboring states-and “if the revolution does not expand, it is likely to be crushed or subverted from within by the supporters of military means.””

These kinds of considerations return the evaluation of perceptions and threats in a CBD strategy to the key dilemma of any deterrence strategy: To be effective, a strategy must be threatening in some sense. Lebow and Stein assert that aggression often is prompted by vulnerabilities for the political leadership of a potential aggressor, which derive from domestic and international pressures that threaten the leaders’ bases of domestic power. If this is correct, then CBD does not resolve the dilemma. If the leadership of the CBD state develops strategies to “project its forces” abroad


in an effort to undermine the neighboring regime, then the salience of perceived threats and vulnerability reemerges.

Thus, although CBD has the potential to avoid provoking aggression unnecessarily (by removing military threats to its opponents) and can be sensitive to some of the political dynamics that encourage armed attack, it can still be provocative. CBD would have little better deterrence value than military defense strategies if the social empowerment it embodies fed into the insecurity of already hostile neighbors by challenging the legitimacy of their domestic political power. CBD may allay fears of an armed attack only to replace them with threats of internal subversion.

CONCLUSIONS

The deterrence potential of CBD (or any other defense strategy) is always problematic. To the extent that successful deterrence of aggression rests on the capacity to mobilize sufficient resources that can, in turn, be used to raise the “entry price” for an aggressor, it is important that the balance of forces be known for both sides of the equation. Important aspects of CBD are identifiable and measurable using the insights of social movements studies. The capabilities that a nonmilitary defense might muster, therefore, can in principle be determined and the strategy’s deterrence potential can be evaluated. In addition, CBD strategies can make some contribu- tions toward overcoming the unintended consequences of military deterrence strategies, particularly unintended provocation.

One factor that has not been addressed, either here or extensively in the literature on civilian defense, is the strategy’s ability to deter aggression when the objective is less than total social and territorial control. Several defense analysts and policymakers in the United States and Europe have argued that the power of CBD lies in its capacity to prevent long-term occupation rather than short-term military operations (such as limited territorial objectives). It also may be an effective “force multiplier” in combination with military struggle in resistance to an ~ccupat ion.~~

44 PEACE Kc CHANGE I January 1993

Not all situations are conducive to a civilian defense. It is not clear, for example, how a CBD strategy could have successfully resisted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990. If Iraq’s goals were simply control of Kuwaiti oil production or, even more limited, setting the price and production levels of Persian Gulf exporters, civil resistance probably would have been ineffective. The native Kuwaiti population was rather small, and much of the labor involved in oil production was Palestinian or South Asian. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would not have required broad popular cooperation to achieve his goals, or he could have acquired an adequate level of collaboration from the diverse population. Nor does CBD provide a ready answer for the citizens of Vukhovar, in Croatia, or Sarajevo, in Bosnia, facing relentless artillery shelling from Serbian forces in the 1991-92 Yugoslavian civil wars.

Similarly, defense and civilian authorities in the Baltic states were not persuaded that civil resistance alone will provide effective security. The basic framework for Lithuanian security policy, for example, was set in February 1991 (several months before independence from the Soviet Union). The resolution of the Supreme Council (the parliament) stated: “In the event a regime of active occupation is introduced, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania are asked to adhere to principles of disobedience, nonviolent resistance, and political and social noncooperation as the primary means of struggle for independen~e.”’~ In policy development following independence, civilian resistance was seen as the principal means for resistance to massive invasion, but not necessarily the best response to other security threats-especially the dangers posed by “uncontrolled” units of the former Soviet Army (which remain stationed in Lithuania and the other Baltic states), internal subver- sions by terrorist groups or former Communist party or KGB members, or “security” problems like organized crime and drug smuggling. A mixed strategy emerged combining civil resistance and military elements based on armed militias.” Careful examina- tion of Baltic policy developments, as well as the security policies that follow other nonviolent revolutions, will be an important task. In part, it will help to suggest why these societies tend to choose

Vogele I DEERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 45

not to rely on strategies of nonviolent action for their international security problems.

Asking about civilian-based defense as if deterrence mattered suggests that the framework of strategic analysis offered by deterrence theories has utility both for the evaluation of CBD and for broader inquiries into social struggle and nonviolent action. In addition, applying deterrence analysis to nonmilitary defense highlights the limitations of an analytic tool grounded in specific assumptions about power. It points to the ways in which deterrence analysis has always considered social powers as the context for military powers. But it also suggests that analysis focusing only on military power will ignore the full range of national security policies. This analysis has attempted to “stretch out” deterrence theories and at the same time retain a useful analytic structure.

Several cases of resistance to armed aggression and occupation deserve reexamination, including those to which CBD proponents commonly point: the Ruhr occupation of 1923, resistance to Nazi occupations in the 1940s, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. To these can be added the Soviet threats of invasion of Poland that preceded martial law in 1981. None of these (with the partial exception of Poland) offers direct evidence of the deterrence potential of CBD; all are examples of improvised resistance without prior planning or preparation. But new questions arise from this inquiry about deterrence-questions that have not been addressed by the literature on nonviolent action or civilian-based defense.

How quickly did the crucial sectors of the society mobilize? How did they do so? To what extent was the society (or crucial portions) already mobilized at the time of the attack or threats? How strong was the sense of legitimacy of the social structures being defended? Did this increase or weaken through the struggle? Did the resistance alter existing structures of social divisions or inequalities (such as those based on class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or region) so as to remove obstacles to enhanced legitimacy? What were the sources of resources to maintain the struggle? How were the military forces of the attacker used to overcome resistance? How were these used to achieve political control (or other identifiable objectives)? None of these questions is bounded by a domain called


deterrence or even civilian-based defense-they are relevant to any inquiry into the strategic use and utility of nonviolent struggle and are of interest to theorists and practitioners alike.

NOTES

1. The instruments of military defense also may be used to impose punishment on the defeated aggressor, as an act of retaliation or “preventive medicine.“ Such implicit threats may be part of a deterrence posture, but conventional military deterrence and defense theories (and the line of argument pursued here) focus primarily on maintaining security through reactions to aggression.

2. Analysts of “nonoffensive” or “nonprovocative” military defenses devote a g a d deal of attention to the serious consideration of barriers and means of physical obstruction to armed advances. Although Sharp argues against the entire concept of military-based defensive defense, there is no reason in principle to reject the employment of some methods of physical obstruction in a nonmilitary defense. S e e Gene Sharp, Civilian-BusedDefense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 4-5; Joshua Epstein. Conventional Force Reductions (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 67-72; Dietrich Fischer, Wilhelm Nolte, and Jan Oberg, Winning Peace (New York Crane Russak, 1989).

3. Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack War without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defense (New York Schocken. 1975); Wilhelm Nolte, “Civilian-Military Co-Function: Auton- omous Protection, Alternative Defence from a West German Perspective,” in War in Europe: Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives, ed. Hylke Tromp (London: Gower, 1989). 266-70; Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985). 108-9, 111-12.

4. As examples of this practice in the American Revolution, see Ronald M. McCarthy, “Resistance Politics and the Growth of Parallel Government in America, 1765-1775.” in Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence. ed. Walter Conser et al. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1987). In Czechoslovakia in 1968, see Tad Szulc, Czechoslo- vokia since World War 11 (New York Grosset Dunlap, 1973). In the Palestinian uprising of the late 1980s. see Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990) and Gene Sharp, “Nonviolent Struggle and the Intifada,” Journal of Palestine Studies 73 (Autumn 1989): 3-13.

5. Alexander Pronozin. “Nonviolent Resistance to the Soviet Coup Took Many Forms,” Nonviolent Sanctions 3(Fall 1991): 1.

6. See Johan Jergen Holst, Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era (Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution. 1990). Nolte, “Civilian-Military Co-Function.” Bruce Jenkins and Gene Sharp, “Civilian-Based Defense for the Baltics, Including an Update from Recent Travels,” Nonviolent Sanctions Seminars Synopses, Fall 1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, 1992). Edward B. Atkeson, ‘The Relevance of Civilian-Based Defense to U.S. Security Interests.”Military Review 56 (May 1976): 24-32 and 56 (June 1976): 45-55; also excerpts of remarks ma& at Albert Einstein Institution Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions. in “Highlights of the National Conference on Nonvio- lent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense” Nonviolent Sanctions 2 (Spring/Summer 1990): 20.

Vogele / DEXERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 47

7. For example, Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable, 40. 8. For an insightful discussion of the relationship between deterrence and reassurance

strategies, see Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. Vol. 2, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York Oxford University Press, 1991), 8-73. For a discussion of the relevance of nonmilitary defense strategies to the emerging world political and security order, see William B. Vogele, “Social Powers and National Defense: Non-Military Defense in the New World Order” (Paper delivered at the New England Political Science Association meetings, Providence, RI. April 1992).

9. Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence,” World Polifics 4 1 ( J a n ~ q 1989): 143-69.

10. Sharp. Civilian-Based Defense, 87. emphasis in original. 11. John Mearsheimer, Convenfional Deferrence (Ithaca, Ny: Cornell University Press.

1985); Epstein, Conventional Force Reductions. 12. These analyses conclude that deterrence tends to succeed when the defender either

can maintain an adequate ratio of military forces prior to an engagement or is capable of maintaining a positive “loss ratio” in an engagement modeled over time. (In other words, the defense remains capable of destroying the attacker’s forces at a higher rate for a longer period of time than its own forces are destroyed). There is a lively professional debate about just how to measure and calculate a conventional military balance. See Mearsheimer, Convenfional Deterrence, and Epstein, Conventional Force Reduclions, for two sides. The point of agreement, nevertheless, restates the cost-benefit assumption: a potential attacker is less likely to challenge a defender when the probability of military success is low and the costs of using military force are high, relative to expected gains. See Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence andthe Prevention of War (New Haven. CT Yale University Press, 1988). 35-42, 71-74, 85-148; Jack Levy, “Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure,” in Perspectives on Deferrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York Oxford University Press, 1989).

13. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, “Deterrence and Foreign Policy,” World Politics 41(January 1989): 170-82.

14. See Robert Jervis, Percepfion and Mispercepfion in World Polifics (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

15. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics 41(January 1989): 208-24.

16. Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence, I: The View from Cairo,” in Psychofogy and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore. M D Johns Hopkins University Press. 1985).

17. Lebw, “Conclusions,” in Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Jervis, Lebow, and Gross. 18. Paul Kennedy, Rise and FaN of [he Great Powers (New York Vintage Press, 1987). 19. h i s Kriesberg, Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall, 1982). 13. 20. Peter Liberman uses this concept in his analysis of the Ruhr struggle: Does Conquest

Pay? ’Ilre Occupafion of Industrial Economies (Ph.D. diss.. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992). 89-115. See also Wolfgang Sternstein, ‘The Ruhrkampf of 1923: Economic Problems of Civilian Defence,” in The Sfrafegy of Civilian Defence: Nonvioient Resistance fo Aggression, ed. Adam Roberts (London: Faber & Faber. 1%7).

21. Franqois-And& Paoli.L’am’e fraqaisede 1919d 1939:L~pharede fermefe‘(Paris: Ministhe des armkes, service historique. 1%9-1975). 298. 306. See also Jacques Bariety, Les relations franco-allemandes apr& la prem’2re guerre mondiale (Paris: Edition Pedone, 1977).

48 PEACE & CHANGE1 January 1993

22. See Marc Trachtenberg, Repration in World Politics: France and European Ecotwmic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (New York Columbia University Press, 1980), 291-335; Bariety, Les relations franco-allemandes.

23. Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches,” in Vol. 1 of International Social Movement Research, From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures, eds. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwood, (JT: JAI, 1988) 10; James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,” American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 471-88.

24. Hanspeter Kriesi, “Local Mobilization for the People’s Petition of the Dutch Peace Movement,’’ in From Structure rodction, ed. Klandermans et al. Muller and Opp, “Rational Choice.”

25. Edward N. Muller, Henry A. Dietz, and Steven E. Finkel, “Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru,” American Political Science Review 85

26. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Move- ments: APartialTheory,”Amencan Journal ofSociology 82 (1977): 121241; CharlesTilly, Fmm Mobilization lo Revolutiori (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

(1991): 1261-82.

27. Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable, 40. 28. DeNardo. Power in Numbers. 29. Boserup and Mack. War without Weapons. 82-91; Liberman. Does Conquest Pay? 30. Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable, 107. 31. Kenneth Boulding. The Thme Faces ofpower (Newbury Park. CA: Sage, 1990). 32. B. Klandermans, “The Formation and Mobilization ofConsensus,” in From SIIUCIU~E

33. Doug McAdam, “Micromobilization Contexts and the Recruitment to Activism,” in

34. Klandermans, “Formation and Mobilization of Consensus.” 35. Kriesberg, Social Conflicts, 71-72. 36. Muller, Dietz, and Finkel, “Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion.” 37. Klandermans, “Formation and Mobilization of Consensus”; McAdam, ‘‘Micro-

mobilization ConIexts”: Muller, Dietz, and Finkel, “Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebell ion .”

38. Christian Mellon, Jean-Marie Muller, and Jacques Semelin, LA dissuusion civile (Paris: Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale, 1985), 71-73.

39. Theodor Ebert, “Organization in Civilian Defence,” in Strategy of Civilian Defence, ed. Roberts, 262-64.

40. I am grateful to Roger Powers for posing this question and prompting this line of argument.

41. This sort of exercise was suggested by General Edward B. Atkeson (US, ret.) in a presentation at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in 1985. See“Civi1ian-Based Defense and the Art of War,” in Transforming Struggle: Strategy and the Global Experience of Nonviolent Direct Action (Cambridge, MA: Program on Nonviolent Sanctions at Harvard University, 1992).

42. I am indebted to John Mercer for sharing with me his research on this important, but underappreciated, problem in the deterrence literature.

to Action, ed. Klandermans et al.

From Structure to Action. ed. Klandermans et at.

Vogele / DEERRENCE BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE 49

43. This does not deny. of course, the critical role of Gorbachev and Soviet policy changes, but it is hard to conceive of either of these forces alone bringing about the changes we have seen.

44. Sharp, Making Eumpe Unconquerable, 14-75. 45. See. Gene Sharp. Self-Reliant Defense without Bankruptcy or War: Considemtiom

for the Balrics, East Cenrral Europe, and Members of the Commonwealth of Independent Stares (Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 1992). 59-63.

46. Lebow, “Conclusions,” 226-32. 47. Sharp, Self-Reliant Defense, 21-22. 48. Social akfense is an alternative term for a nonmilitary security strategy, similar to

CBD. It is preferred in Europe and among various non-U.% scholars. and it has somewhat different implications for the social organization of society.

49, See the report on Theodore Olson’s seminar presentation to the Nonviolent Sanctions Seminars series, “The Theory of Civilian-Based Defense in Relation to Standard Deterrence and Strategic Thought,” in Tran.$oming Struggle.

50. See Brian Martin, “Revolutionary Social Defense,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22 (March 1991): 97-105. Reflecting a significant division among scholars interested in nondi ta ry defenses, some, like Martin, believe that the intrinsically empowering nature of experience with nonviolent direct action (which would enable civic society directly to challenge the political legitimacy of any state apparatus) makes the adoption of this kind of defense policy by a modem nation-state highly unlikely. A more “conservative” view (held by authors like Sharp and adopted here) holds that CBD can provide a “functional equivalent” for a military defense that any state could adopt. This latter view is more agnostic on the question of empowerment.

51. Martin, “Revolutionary Social Defense.” 101. 52. Holsf Civilian-hsed Defense in a New Era; Anders Boserup, “From Defensive to

Nonviolent Defense: An Interview with Anden Boserup,” Civilian-Eared Defense: New3 and Opinion 6 (December 1989): 3. Hans Vetschera, excerpts of remarks made at Albert Einstein Institution Conference on Nonviolent Sanctions, Cambridge, MA, in Nonviolent Sanctions 2 (SpringISummer 1990). See the reports on seminars by Gen. Georges Fricaud- Chagnaud, “Civilian Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence: A Substitute or a Complement?“ Col. Wilhelm Nolte, “Autonomous Protection in Europe,” and Jacques Semelin, “Civil Dissuasion,” in Transfonning Struggle.

53. Parliamentary Information Bureau, Vilnius, Lithuania, translated by the Lithuanian Information Center, Brooklyn, NY, February 28,1991.

54. Jenkins and Sharp, “Civilian-Based Defense for the Baltics;” Sharp, Self-Relionr Defense, 55-59.

deterrence by civilian defense

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