liberty) and the substitution of initiative (or entrepre-neurship) for obligation, then, is now generally recog-nized as fundamentally distinguishing this form ofequalitarian “democracy” from that form of egalitarian“communism” (with populism remaining a democraticconundrum). A crucial question in regard to individualliberties is whether the exercise of individual freedomfrom obligations to governance results in those obliga-tions being delegated to responsible and responsiverepresentatives or whether they are abdicated such thatthey empower and entrench a political elite (i.e.,oligarchy); this latter issue becomes especially acutewhen private initiative manages to concentrate propertyand wealth (capital) in support of the political elite.

Development and Enfranchisement

Early architects of liberal, representative democracyrecognized the tensions between opposing tendencies indemocratic governance toward populism or oligarchy. Thetendency toward oligarchy was tempered through thedecentralization and deconcentration of governing author-ity. In the United States, where the first grand experimentin state democracy was initiated by the Declaration ofIndependence in 1776, this tempering was subsequentlyaccomplished through the preservation of “states rights”and the imposition of “checks and balances” among thethree principal institutions of central governance: execu-tive, legislative, and judicial. The tendency towardpopulism was tempered through formal restrictions onenfranchisement, or suffrage, that limited political partic-ipation to key sectors of the general population that couldbe reasonably relied upon as major stakeholders withvested interests in supporting, maintaining, and defendingthe general system (and central authority) through thevoluntary exercise of (delegated) obligations to gover-nance. Enfranchisement was incrementally expanded overthe course of nearly two centuries as societal integrationprogressed and additional groups of stakeholders demon-strated, petitioned, or sued for inclusion as lawful andpositive political participants in the governance system.1

Universal enfranchisement in the United States was onlyfinally accomplished in practice with the Civil RightsMovement in the 1950s and 1960s.2 More than anythingelse, the prior restrictions and later expansions of thefranchise demonstrated the importance of a (pro)active andinformed public in scrutinizing the exercise of delegatedauthority and ensuring the accountability of public officials(while protecting private property). Of course, the devel-opment of the (pro)active and informed public as guarantorof accountability could only be cultivated and empoweredthrough the complementary evolution of free association,open and public information, and independent media.

It was recognized very early in the “American”democratic experiment that decentralization of governingauthority, itself, could present a serious impediment toeffective, democratic governance. The deliberation andnegotiation of policy and the coordination of action in adecentralized authority system precludes a swift andcoherent response to the imperatives of political crisis.The Articles of Confederation, which were designed toconstrain executive action, presented a serious obstacle toeffective response in crisis situations, such as internalthreats posed by the disenfranchised (e.g., Shay’sRebellion) and external provocations, including theharassment of US shipping, naval impressments, andthe continued support of hostile native groups by Britishauthorities. A new, more centralized and flexible, federalConstitution was promulgated in 1787 that enabledexecutive initiative and response in crisis situations; italso focused central administrative authority in theexecutive office. Internal threats were largely defused,and the essential social order maintained, by theprospects of societal mobility (empowerment and enfran-chisement) underwritten by the largesse of the American“frontier” (vast expanses of untitled land and underde-veloped resources); also important in this regard was theenormous influx of “atomized” immigrants whose mobi-lization potential was diminished by the relative weak-ness of their transplanted social networks. Of course, inthis context, the repression of dissent was not uncommonbut remained largely confined and contained, except forthe secession of the Southern Confederacy which beganwith that of South Carolina on December 20, 1860, andled to the United States’ devastating Civil War.

The world’s second major experiment with democraticgovernance occurred in France in 1789. Whereas the priorUnited States’ experiment was established through an elite-led

2 Enfranchisement in the United States progressed through a series ofConstitutional Amendments, including the 15th (1870), extending thevote to all (male) persons regardless of “race, color, or previouscondition of servitude;” 19th (1920), extending the vote regardless ofsex; and 24th (1964), prohibiting the denial on abridgement of theright to vote “by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”

1 Initially (1788 89 and 1792) popular voting in presidential electionsin the United States involved only about 1.6% of the “free population”with only 6 of 10 states holding popular elections to choose Electorsfor the Electoral College (a further check on “populism”). Popularvote for the presidency in the United States, even within a highlyrestricted franchise, did not become the common form of choosingElectors until the 1828 election, when only Delaware and SouthCarolina chose Electors in their state legislatures (South Carolinacontinued to hold out until after the defeat of the Confederacy in1865). In the 1872 presidential election, about 16% of the populationcast ballots in the presidential election.

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independence movement, the French experiment was initiatedthrough a mass revolutionary movement against the Frencharistocracy. French democracy was necessarily established asa populist democracy; universal male suffrage was declared inFrance in 1792.3 However, the initial experiment in Francecame under attack from royalists within and from royalistforeign forces and fell into anarchy, culminating in a brutal“reign of terror” and an equally terrible counter-revolutionaryThermidor. An effective social order in France was onlyreestablished as a result of the 18 Brumaire military coupand demagoguery of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799, whichenlisted and redirected French populism to the cause offoreign imperialism. This remedy was similarly ill-fated andresulted in the devastation of the French forces andNapoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo in 1815. Democraticgovernance in France was only finally established andstabilized following its third democratic revolution in 1848.Only about 20% of the population of France cast votes innational elections from 1848 until after the end of World WarII (1945).

The notion of “majority rule” in democratic governancefacilitates the promulgation of general rule sets and specificpublic policies by providing an “independent” arbitrationmechanism to the decision-making process. Two issuesshould be highlighted in this regard: one concerns thepossibility that a particular constituency that encompasses amajority of the population and is able to maintain memberloyalty to group identity and organization over time canpersistently dominate outcomes in deliberative, majoritarianpolitics. This possibility constitutes a second form of the“tyranny of the majority” problem in democratic gover-nance wherein a stable, identity-based majority comman-deers the political agenda and enacts policies thatconsistently favor the majority group. Strict identity loyalty,while more common and stronger in societies at lesserlevels of development, is no less evident but weakened inmore active and productive societies through the counter-vailing dynamics of cross-cutting cleavages; multipleinterests; issue overlap and linkage; multiple association;and societal mobility, among other similar “non-congruency”or diversity factors. Non-compliance (civil disobedience)remains an important oppositional strategy when dealing withstable majorities and oligarchies alike. This strategy recog-nizes that the promulgation and implementation of laws andpublic policies remain distinct and separate activities in thepolitical process and that the withdrawal of constituencysupport, both from the state and civil society, is a vital check

on the exercise of arbitrary authority in more developed andnetworked social systems.

Decentralization and local autonomy (or “subsidiarity”) areimportant features of democratic authority and the integrationof constituencies within central authority remains essentiallyvoluntary.4 Separation and secession are provocative actionsby constituent groups that reject state authority and societalintegration. Although “separatist” actions may be definedand initiated through democratic procedure at the local (sub-state) level, they necessitate actions of state and anti-stateenforcement and, so, must necessarily be viewed asundemocratic, group responses to territorially-defined dis-putes leading toward state fragmentation. On the other hand,local autonomy and mobilized non-compliance actions areneutral, selective responses to central authority that arecongruent with the principal of subsidiarity and requirenegotiated outcomes to the demarcation of authority.

Democratic governance distinguishes itself from auto-cratic governance most critically as it governs primarilythrough open expression, conciliation, and voluntarycompliance with fair, just, and legitimate laws and policies;autocracy depends upon centralized repression and enforce-ment mechanisms to establish and maintain a biased socialorder. Elections, themselves, are ritualistic displays ofprevailing authority rather than definitions of that authority.They distinguish authority by the manner in which they areconducted and recognized by the state and its variousconstituencies. Given the democratic content of the electionprocess, elections can serve as a mechanism to propose, ordeny, the suitability of certain individuals or groups toclaim the capacity to represent a given constituency in thestate. “Voting the scoundrel out of office” can also beconsidered a dramatized ostracism ritual predicated on theaccumulated and articulated evidence of transgression,incompetence, or incompatibility. It does not stand inde-pendently as either a mechanism of oversight or account-ability.5

3 Ironically, France was one of the last major countries to adoptuniversal female suffrage; this took place in 1944 (Switzerland onlyinstituted female suffrage in 1971). Also of interest in this regard is thefact that the defeated Central Powers in 1918 were the first emergingdemocracies to operate under the tenets of universal suffrage; this, ofcourse, included the German Weimar Republic.

4 The principal of “subsidiarity” derives from political economy; itmaintains (positively) that administrative authority is most appropriately and efficaciously situated at that level of administration closest toand most knowledgeable of the activity being organized andconducted and (negatively) that higher levels of administration shouldnot take on authority over matters that can be handled efficaciously atlower levels of administration.5 While the societal act of “voting” does not ensure democracy, it doesprovide critical evidence of the quality of democratic process.Elections stimulate the mobilization and activism of the variousconstituencies that comprise the society and engage the state in theorganization and regulation of mass political activity. Elements of boththe state and civil society reveal practical aspects of their organizational and relational nature during the election procedure. In short,there is a reflective confluence of public attention and politicalobservables concentrated in the election period; this is the real valueof elections to the definition of authority: elections “open a window tothe soul” of a societal system.

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Integration and Representation

The identification of suitable representation and theorganization of particular interests into more general policyplatforms also pose dilemmas in democratic governance,especially for newly emerging democratic systems wheresocial networking, interests, exchange, and media areunderdeveloped and, again, as societies grow increasinglycomplex, abstract, and “distant” from particular constitu-encies and the coordination of multiple, divergent interestsgains paramount importance. The coherence and consisten-cy of representation in liberal democracies is augmented,and filtered, through the development and institutionaliza-tion of political parties and other advocacy organizations.While circumstantial dynamics in complex systems requiresome flexibility and innovation in response to unusualchallenges, the management and maintenance of the systemrequires continuity and standardization of both structuresand agency dynamics. Personalities gain prominence intimes of change and uncertainty, whereas commonperspectives and incumbency gain prominence in timesof continuity and stability. Multiple party structuresprovide alternative perspectives and interchangeable per-sonnel who stimulate and inform greater reflection,competition, criticism, and accountability in public offi-cials. Alteration in leadership roles ensures broaderrepresentation and currency in issue perspectives andbetter strategic response to existential dilemmas, whetherimposed or self-inflicted.

Dissent and conflict are common factors in all societalsystems; sociologists, such as Louis Coser, have evensuggested that conflict is necessary to energize societaldynamics and stimulate innovation (Coser 1956). Seriousproblems emerge when incentives to reform and refine theextant system are counterbalanced, or overwhelmed, byincentives to reject and/or discard the current system. Anti-system behavior is induced by structural imbalances(inequity) and perceived injustices (accountability deficits);such “negative participation” produces the most fundamen-tal challenge to democratic governance, especially asconstituencies polarize and factionalize around increasinglysymbolic and exclusive conceptualizations of group iden-tities, means, and goals. Polar factionalization (symbolicseparatism) and polity fragmentation (territorial separatism)actively resist the discovery and articulation of compromisesolutions, impede policy implementation, and induceenforcement measures.

Complex, innovative societal-systems find their focalpoint in the “state;” however, the state is just one of manyorganizational structures and seats of authority that consti-tute the societal-system. The state gains prominencethrough its capacity to regulate activity and manage conflictbetween and among its constituencies and facilitate greater

interaction densities throughout society and system. De-mocracy at greater levels of organization is made possiblethrough the preferencing of democracy at lesser levels oforganization, demonstrated through non-instrumental(sociational) interactions between constituencies andconsolidated through the demonstration of impartialityin the application of legal standards. Necessarily hierar-chical authority (autocratic) organizations, such as themilitary, must be de-politicized in order to minimize theirinfluence on the definition of central authority as theyremain structurally predisposed to autocratic rule. Just asit is conditioned by the organizational qualities ofinternal societal dynamics, the state is also conditionedby external societal dynamics. Democracy at lesser levelsof organization is also fostered and reinforced bydemocracy at greater levels of association. The state,then, provides a nexus and focal point for viewing thecomplex structure and dynamics of both inner societyand outer system.

The principal difficulty in measuring the quality ofgovernance in a particular society or political system stemsfrom the essential non-comparability of societal-systems inthe modern (Westphalian) state system, both horizontally(across space) and vertically (across time). Situationally andcircumstantially, no two states are the same and no singlestate stays the same through time. States range in size from2 km2 or less (Monaco and Vatican City) to more than ninemillion square kilometers (Russia, Canada, China, and theUnited States); they range in population (currently) fromless than 100,000 (several micro-states) to over one billion(China and India). Some countries have existed in theirpresent form for hundreds of years, while many others wereestablished in the past 50 years and some only in the pastfew years. Some countries are very close to being ethnicallyhomogenous, while most comprise some number of distinctethnic identity groups, many of whom lay claim to someterritorial “homeland” within a larger state. Formal eco-nomic activity in the world’s countries ranges from over tentrillion $US annually (European Union and the UnitedStates; 2008 figures) to less than 500 million $US and, insome countries, informal and uncivil economic activity(particularly drug and sex trafficking) rival the formaleconomy for political influence. Clearly, variations incharacteristics, histories, composition, and constituenciesaffect authority structures and management prospects.Fortunately, many of these complexities are both inputsand outcomes and can be measured to gauge and “control”for their particular influence on governance. The “non-comparability” issue can actually enrich the analysis ofstate-level phenomena by infusing the analysis of the statewith additional information. The vast array of circum-stances and conditions of societies over which states exertgoverning authority also gives support to the notion that the

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state is the natural locus of governance for societal-systemsat all levels and scopes of organization, regardless ofcircumstances.6

What many have termed “regime bias” in thediscussion of governance relates directly to the structureof the modern state system. Each state in the system isexpected to be independent and self-governing, that is,the state must be governed by a “sovereign regime” thatdirects and administers its constituents and engages withother states in foreign relations. There is a complemen-tary “state bias” in social measurement; the state is theprincipal unit of measurement and the main producer andconsumer of information at that level of measurement.States, sub-state entities, and non-state actors that have ademonstrated need or interest in measurement at non-state levels, and have the resources and capabilities tomeasure phenomena at that/those level(s), have and willmake such measurements. Some states have collected andarchived data at all levels of administration; some remainunable to collect data even at the state level. Generallyspeaking, more affluent states collect more data at morelevels with greater accuracy and reliability; poorer statescollect less data at fewer levels with more limitedaccuracy and reliability. Insecure states may suppress,embellish, or, even, fabricate data at any or all levels.Independent data collection efforts attempt to correct forinherent bias in the state system. However, all areas ofthe world are incorporated in states and, so, there is nopresent alternative to the state as a form of governanceand administration. What many “post-modernists” proposeas alternatives to the state, such as transnational issueregimes, multinational manufacturing and service regimes,and international transaction regimes, are also instruments,vehicles, and channels of state-based action in integratedsocietal-systems at greater levels of organization. Thus,“regime bias” cannot be viewed as structural analytic biasthat obscures our understanding of alternatives to the state,as it can be understood to incorporate the entire universe ofgovernance entities, organized both vertically (subsidiarity)and horizontally (territoriality).7

“Polity” and the Measurement of Authority

All political action results from concerted individualactions, which are ultimately based on individual choice.The organization, direction, and management of politicalaction reside in the state. The measurement of the essentialqualities of governance in states over time is foundationalin the systematic analysis of societal dynamics. In discus-sing the measurement of governance this paper focuses onthe Polity measurement scheme; the discussion cannotpossibly address all the current debates in conceptualizationand measurement or alternative techniques.8 Most extantmeasures have very limited horizontal (case) and vertical(time) coverage. Of the very few that have substantialbreadth and depth, two can be considered “minimalist” or“categorical” the so-called ACLP data (Alvarez, Cheibub,Limongi, and Przeworski, updated by Cheibub, Gandhi,and Vreeland) and the Polyarchy data (Vanhanen); theACLP data provide a dichotomous measure of governanceindicating either dictatorship or democracy and the Poly-archy data categorize basic type (military, executivedominant, or parliamentary/mixed) and provide two meas-ures of electoral participation (percent of total populationcasting votes and a herfindahl “concentration” index ofparty representation). Two other substantial data resources:the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions and theInstitutions and Elections Project (Regan and Clark)database can be considered “maximalist” or “attributional”measures; these databases provide extensive, mainly de-scriptive, details of governing institutions but no qualitativeor aggregate assessment of governance.9 The Polity dataseries should be considered a mid-level measurementscheme as it provides both disaggregated indicators andaggregate indices of governance. Polity covers all major,independent states since 1800 and is ubiquitous inquantitative political science research modeling. It wasoriginally designed by Ted Robert Gurr based on theoreticalpropositions detailed in his 1975 book, Patterns ofAuthority, written with Harry Eckstein. The Polity mea-surement scheme was further refined in 2000 by the authorof this tract, who continues to direct the, now, Polity IVProject.10

6 In my own theoretical work, I argue that the “social identity group”is the universal basis for social action, that complex societies arecomprised by an integrated network of myriad such associations, andthat each group is governed by a “societal elite” who form a “protostate” that governs that group and defines group relations with othergroups. See, Marshall 1999.7 The only current alternatives to states in the world system of statesare the supra state such as the European Union, which is simply alarger state; an international policy regime such as the World TradeOrganization, which is simply a specialized administrative mechanismof which states are members; and failed (anarchical) states such as thatobserved in Somalia currently. See, also note 5 (above).

8 Alternative measurement techniques derive from alternative perspectives and these are particularly important sources of crossvalidation and illumination in measurement and robustness and greaterconfidence in analysis in complex systems.9 Freedom House provides broad coverage of political rights and civilliberties in countries and these are often equated with qualities ofgovernance; however, these indicators do not directly assess governance or political institutions.10 The Polity IV Project is hosted by the Center for Systemic Peace;materials are accessible online (www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)

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Polity presents a unique measure of the qualities andcharacteristics of governance as it proposes that there are twodiscreet forms of governing authority, autocratic and democrat-ic, and that institutionalized elements of these two forms canoccur concurrently; mixed forms of authority have been termed“incoherent” or “anocratic.” Autocratic forms of authority arebased in exclusion and enforced through direct coercion and thethreat of force (repression); democratic forms of authority areinclusive and supported by voluntary compliance. In my 1999book, Third World War, the two fundamental forms ofauthority are termed “instrumental,” which manages conflictthrough physical force, and “sociational,” which managesconflict through Arendt’s concept of associational “power.”11

Demonstrated forms of institutionalized regime authority areassessed on three principal characteristics: the recruitment ofexecutive authority (i.e., how the chief executive gains office),executive constraints (i.e., checks and balances on executiveaction), and political competition (i.e., how public preferencesare represented). Aggregate patterns of state authority, then,are measured on separate, eleven-point scales (0–10; demo-cratic, DEMOC, and autocratic, AUTOC); the two scales areoften combined in a single, twenty-one point “POLITY” scale(−10 to +10) by subtracting the autocracy score from thedemocracy score, such that “fully institutionalized autocra-cies” are scored “−10” and “fully institutionalized democra-cies” are scored “+10.” This practice is not necessarily inaccordance with the original theory but presents an analyticconvenience while sacrificing some information. This practicealso implies that autocracy and democracy are oppositequalities on a unitary “governance” spectrum, rather thandistinct, alternative methods of governance.

The Polity data series is best considered a macro-comparative data resource and investigative tool incorpo-rating standardized assessments of observable, complexphenomena, rather than a statistical database compilingmeasured, objective attributes. In general terms, quantita-tive analysts must use due caution in drawing conclusionsfrom statistical techniques employing macro-comparativedata as it necessarily removes information on key qualitiesfrom their existential context. Macro-comparative dataresources use numbers to encode and record informationrelating to complex, social phenomena; however, it requiresan unsupportable leap in logic to assume that the numbersused to encode the targeted information, regardless of thequality of the design and construction of the datainstrument, necessarily impart objective mathematical qual-ities to the data. The data “matrix” in macro-comparativeanalysis provides an organization scheme by which theanalyst can expand the number of cases used in an inquiryto search for patterns of commonalities or differencesacross cases. Once the analyst has established confidence

in particular patterns, those patterns can be used to inform abroader array of relationships in complex systems.

Data analysis of social phenomena is best consideredinvestigational and the results evidentiary, that is, acomplementary tool, rather than a substitute or alternative,for knowledge-based, rational inquiry. Social inquiry is, andalways will be, about people and the quality of their lives.Data analysis using macro-comparative data resources mustbe “re-contextualized” in order for it to have real meaningthat contributes to knowledge accumulation and can beused to guide policy decisions. In “re-contextualizing” dataanalysis, the political analyst must be able to apply their“findings” insightfully to explain how these findings informand affect process narratives and contingent outcomes,using observable situations and plausible scenarios (i.e.,they must pass the policymakers’ “giggle test”).12 Oneadvantage that producers of macro-comparative data have isthat their commentary is informed by the broader body ofinformation from which macro-comparative data is dis-tilled, that is, they have intimate and intricate knowledge ofhow the data relates to the broader context from which ithas been taken. In fact, the acquisition of broader anddeeper knowledge may be the primary incentive forconducting a large, systematic, data collection enterprise.13

Polity was originally designed during the conjunction ofthe Cold War and Decolonization periods (late 1960s andearly 1970s). Its original focus was on “persistence andchange” in the nature of regime governance during a timewhen competition between the interests of opposing,ideological “blocs” exerted varying degrees of influenceover both persistence and change in the qualities ofgovernance in individual states populating the world systemof states (Gurr 1974). “Western bloc” forms of democracywere clearly considered the more favorable forms ofgovernance in the original Polity conceptual scheme andthe coding of democratic authority was clearly lessdetailed and less critical than was the coding ofautocratic authority.14 The distribution of Polity scores

11 See, Hannah Arendt’s 1970 essay “On Violence.”

12 Shawn Trier and Simon Jackman provide an example of the “giggletest” principle in their 2008 article in the American Journal ofPolitical Science, titled “Democracy as a Latent Variable,” in whichthey claim that by applying “formal, statistical measurement models”to the Polity IV data, they find that the “latent error” in the Politymeasure makes it impossible to confidently distinguish the level ofdemocracy in “roughly one half” of the countries in the world fromthat of the United States in 2000 (p. 210).13 The Polity IV Country Report series was designed to provide bothtransparency in the coding of particular cases and a contextual basisfor the particular Polity codings. The individual reports include bothquantitative and narrative interpretations.14 Also of note, the hegemonic one party authority systems thatcharacterized governance in the “Eastern bloc” countries wereconsidered autocratic in the Polity scheme, despite communistideological professions of “egalitarianism democracy” and the regularholding of formal elections.

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displays this apparent bias quite strikingly: whereasscores along the autocracy index scale are fairly evenlydistributed, scores along the democracy index scale areclustered at the “top” (+10) end of the scale. Thisclustering was less problematic prior to the end of theCold War, as there were relatively few democracies andmost of these were older and more affluent and consol-idated Western democracies.

With the post-Cold War wave of democratization, thislack of variance threatens to render Polity obsolete inthe analysis of democracy just as it becomes thepreeminent form of governance. In response to thisissue, we have systematically reexamined and recoded,to date, about three-quarters the countries covered in thePolity data series over the contemporary period, 1946-present.15 This research has “recovered” much of the lostcriticality of the “democratic camp.” However, in betterdistinguishing cases of “incomplete” democratic institu-tionalization and improving the distribution of casesalong the democracy index scale, the data refinementprocess has also verified and confirmed the clusteringeffect for “fully institutionalized democracies” at the“+10” end of the scale.16 This clustering could beinterpreted as support for the Fukuyama proposition thatdemocracy represents an “end state.” However, thisparticular interpretation is both controversial and mis-leading. Alternative interpretations propose that the “+10democracies” could be re-specified to further distinguishqualities and typologies of democracy and/or differentiate“full democracies” according to their adherence to ethicalstandards.

Means and Ends

In his article, titled “The Measurement of Democracy:Towards a New Paradigm,” Stein Ringen argues in favor ofthe latter interpretation. He proposes that “the measurement[of democracy] effort should follow through to observationsof how the [democratic] potential in the regime ismanifested in the lives of citizens” and offers a list ofindicators relating to the “potential” and “delivery” ofdemocracy.17 In assessing patterns of authority in the Polityscheme, great attention is given to both the practice ofgovernance as it is observed over time, that is, to theinstitutionalized qualities of governance (not the governingand administrative institutions themselves; these are struc-tured applications conditioned by unique, local circum-stances that vary almost infinitely among the countries ofthe world).18 This approach agrees with the sentimentunderlying Ringen’s assertion but differs on how best toincorporate observations regarding “the lives of citizens” inthe measurement effort. First, the effects of democracy onthe “lives of citizens” cannot be observed except as theseeffects are expressed by citizens in political action. Second,at least in theory, democracy is designed to enable citizensto voice both their preferences and their complaintsregarding quality of life issues. Who is better placed topass judgment on the manifestations of governance thanthose persons directly affected by governance? Can we notreasonably expect that the outcomes of fully institutional-ized democratic process take into account, to the degreepossible, the effects those outcomes will have on the livesof ordinary citizens and, when unintended or unanticipatedeffects accompany those outcomes, can we not reasonablyexpect that the democratic process will be responsive andaccountable for remedying and/or redressing those effects?

The voice and empowerment of difference and dissentwithin a complex system of democratic governance may beoutwardly characterized by electoral and deliberative proce-dures but these procedures are predicated upon an underlying,consensual pact among citizens to forego (prohibit) therecourse to force in conflict resolution. This prohibition onthe use of force necessarily requires deliberation andnegotiated outcomes in disputes among citizens and betweenconstituent groups, among which the “state” must beconsidered a constituent group that has been delegatedauthority to regulate and arbitrate disputes, not only betweenother constituent groups but between constituent groups and

15 We examine only the contemporary period due to constraints on thequality and consistency of information prior to the end of the SecondWorld War and limits on the relevance of historical circumstances toinform our understanding of democratic transition and consolidationgoing forward. The refinement process has also reexamined the set ofconsolidated (+10) democracies to reassess whether there have beenperiods during which the institutionalized use of coercive manipulation by the state and/or civil society had diminished the quality ofdemocratic governance. For example, in reexamining the quality ofUnited States’ governance, we determine that it should be recoded toreflect greater reliance on coercive tactics during the Civil Rights andAnti War movements in the 1960 s and early 1970 s when politicalinteraction neared polar factionalism. When completed, the refinedPolity data will be released to the public as a new edition in the series,Polity V.16 Systematic Polity reexamination and recoding of all countries overthe period, 1946 present, using primary source information (KeesingsOnline) is currently progressing; the refined coding will be issued in2011 as a new edition in the data series, Polity V. Preliminarycomparisons of countries completed (seventy three) show that therefinements result in changes to about 25% of the data points;however, Polity IV and Polity V index scores for this set of casescorrelate at 0.974, also confirming the general veracity of the Politydata series.

17 Several of the attributes Ringen lists in these two categories ofdemocracy “delivery” are either not directly observable, such as“strength/durability of democratic consolidation” or the “protection ofdemocratic processes from transgression by economic power,” orunobservable, such as “trust in government” or “confidence in thefuture of freedom.”18 See note 14 (above).

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the state itself. Peaceful conflict management within theinstitutional structures of a compliance-based social order canthen be viewed as the primary function of democraticgovernance and the quality of democratic governance can begauged by “failures” of conflict management which can beobserved as “negative participation” (non-compliance, oppo-sition, and anti-system actions) and measured by acts ofdefiance, coercion, restriction, repression, and force.19

Compliance systems require high densities of socialorganizations, networking, communication, and exchange;these all require sophisticated information media, sociali-zation, productive, and service technologies. Compliancefailures raise both incentives and stakes for targetedenforcement. Negotiation failures result in policy stagnationor paralysis and, over time, increase pressures to imposesolutions to the impasse. Protracted compliance and/ornegotiation failures may result in factionalism, polarization,and/or fragmentation of the polity governed by the state (or,even, the collapse of central authority) and these fracturesof the body politic tend to prioritize social order overliberalization, favoring more autocratic forms of gover-nance by justifying “emergency” policies or autocratic“backsliding.” The Polity scheme, then, takes into accountthe tactics used by the state to regulate the social order, thetactics used by the state and society to constrain executiveaction, and the tactics used by civil society to “voice” theinterests of various constituencies, hold agents of the stateaccountable for individual action, and express politicalwill.20 At the same time, it assesses the method by whichthe ruling executive initially gains office and the generalquality of the deliberative process.21 These characteristics

are monitored over time to identify patterns of authoritythat define the practical nature of state institutions (persis-tence) and discontinuities in prevailing patterns of authority(change). In essence, observable societal (conflict) dynam-ics are monitored to assess how governance by the state ismanifested in the “lives of citizens” and, in turn, how the“lives of citizens” are incorporated in governance by thestate.

Whereas, it would be quite cynical to argue thatdemocratic process will not or should not set high standardsof conduct by which its actions can be judged, it isunreasonably idealistic and impracticable to judge thequality of “democratic potential” by measuring its (observ-able) material shortcomings and imperfections. Thesenegative effects are conditioned by material endowments,circumstances, cultural values, and strategic considerationsthat together define, often, difficult political trade-offs madein the service of progress shrouded, as it were, by the“shadow of the future.” Both decisions made through thedeliberative process and the subsequent implementation ofpublic policy are subjected to oversight by the (pro)activeand informed citizenry in a democracy; such oversight isinvigorated by the application of ethical standards and canbe adjudicated according to legal standards. Self-criticismand transparency in the policy process may enable the stateto minimize opposition to governance; however, effectiveoversight requires an external perspective: first, by thoseadversely affected by public policy and, second, throughimpartial judgment based upon the application of ethicalstandards.

The measurement of conduct and affect is a separatefunction from the measurement of governance. Democraticprocess, in particular, is best evaluated according to themeans by which decisions are made; democracy itself willevaluate the efficacy of the decisions made and policiesimplemented. Once it has become fully integrated andinstitutionalized, democracy governs as a “means state” andengages its potential as a self-actuating, self-organizing,self-regulating, and self-correcting societal-system. Thisrepresents a “beginning” for efficacious management incomplex, innovative societal-systems. Democracy cannotbe viewed as an “end state” as the realization of its inner-potential leads the state to explore ways in which it canimprove and refine its own system and better integrate withits external, physical and social environment. In this sense,“fully institutionalized democracies” are consolidated,organic, compliance systems capable of reforming them-selves internally to increase their congruence with andeffectiveness within the external (global and regional)environment. Democracies, then, can then be measuredand distinguished by the quality of their approach tointegration and governance with the broader, externalsystem. Whereas consolidated democracies can be expected

19 In discussing “conflict management” as a primary function ofgovernance, we must recognize that “conflict” is a inherent, strategicdynamic in societal systems, whereas “armed conflict” is a contingent,tactical dynamic. The conflation of these conceptually distinct formsof social interaction underlies many of the claims made by scholarsthat references to conflict “contaminate” our understanding andmeasurement of governance; (see, for example Vreeland 2008). ThePolity IV measurement scheme considers “armed conflict” as evidenceof “polity fragmentation;” as such, groups using armed conflict toreject state authority are considered to operate outside the polity and,so, are not included in the assessment of institutionalized authority“inside” the governance regime.20 Executive constraints include not only the main governanceinstitutions, legislative and judicial, but also administrative institutions(bureaucratic, military, and police agencies), civil society institutions(political parties, trade unions, business and professional lobbies,interests groups), and, in some cases, informal and uncivil sectors.21 In order to be considered an elected executive in the Polity scheme,an executive must have initially gained office through both acompetitive electoral procedure and a peaceful transfer of executiveauthority. Persons who initially gain executive office by non electoralmeans and subsequently retain office following victory in an electionare not considered to be an elected official, although they may bedenoted as guiding a transition to elected authority. The executiveelectoral procedure must be substantiated by a peaceful (de facto)transfer of office.

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to operate democratically in their internal affairs, there canbe no presumption that a democratic state can or willnecessarily act democratically in its external affairs withoutfirst establishing the same open, reflective, and interactivedynamical networking with other states that authenticatesits internal democracy among constituencies.22

A corollary to this assertion concerns observations ofhow the democratic potential of the “means state” affectsthe lives of non-citizens, both within and outside theterritorial boundaries that define the state. In the develop-ment of democratic governance, as discussed earlier in thistreatment, we see evidence that the concept of “citizen” wasinitially tightly constrained in many emerging democraciesand only incrementally expanded over the course ofdecades as the system itself developed the capacity tofoster and support a broader distribution of vested “stake-holders” within the system.23 Such incremental and targetedexpansion of the democratic franchise no longer obtains indemocratizing states; the contemporary norm requiresuniversal enfranchisement as a necessary condition ofauthority transition. This ethical standard, while laudable,is indiscriminant as well as non-discriminating and may bethe main impediment to democratic transition in developingand reforming states, where problems of conflict manage-ment present severe challenges to the management capacityof the state. This “universal” standard certainly favorspopulist over oligarchic approaches to governance; this, inturn, complicates the organizational necessity of establish-ing functional coordination and direction within acompliance-based social order or “rule of law” bycounter-balancing non-stakeholders and stakeholders incharting the direction of the state. What is critical in thisregard is how well the state, societal elites, formal civilsociety, and informal society are and remain integrated andtheir interests remain congruent and compatible.24 Thesystemic incongruencies and inter-constituency tensions

inherent in the “unequal development” of societal sectorsfostered by the state’s and society’s interactions with its(more developed) external environment can be, at leastpartially offset and managed, by expanding the pool ofstakeholders through the micro-financing of smallholdingsthroughout society (see for example Sen 1999; de Soto2000; Yunus 1999). Resort to coercion and enforcement inconflict management, especially involving violence andregardless its rationalization or justification, underminestrust and compliance in the development of state and civilsociety relations in very complex and profound ways.

Further complicating democratization efforts have beenthe imposition of term limits, particularly on the executiveoffice. When there are many competing, and even disjunc-tive, interests being voiced in the political process andmany divergent demands placed on public policy, coher-ence and continuity in decision making is crucial butdifficult to maintain when wholesale changes are mandatedby constitutional provisions. Indeed, some of the mostcommonly appearing challenges to democratic consolida-tion in the post-Cold War period have involved actions toabrogate term limits for executives and efforts to useincumbency advantages, including fiscal and policy control,direction of service provision, and preferential access toinformation and media resources to establish one-partydominance over disorganized or decentralized oppositionparties. The tensions raised through manipulation ofdemocratic processes by ruling elites has been especiallyacute during election periods and has focused publicattention not only on incumbency advantages but also onthe regime’s control of the balloting procedure itself. Thepresence of independent election observers, while veryimportant in augmenting accountability in “civil” elections,has simply added an additional layer of ambiguity anduncertainty in less civil elections. In many cases, externalsupport and media attention have contributed to oppositiondecisions to boycott elections and challenge or rejectofficial results. Such actions further polarize the societal-system and impede democratic consolidation.

Autocratic governance appears to be a natural corollary tosevere conflict management imperatives that almost alwaysobtain in poorer, less developed, non-integrated, and weaklynetworked societies.25 By far, most civil wars occur inautocratic states and most of these take place in the poorerautocracies. These empirical observations are consistent withKenneth Bouldings’ emphasis on the importance of eco-

22 There is a very broad body of research related to the so called“democratic peace proposition” noting that democracies rarely if everengage in direct warfare with one another. Some researchers havesuggested that this “empirical law” may be largely due to an allianceof mutual interest and self preservation during the autocracypreeminent period in world politics. On the other hand, warfarebetween autocracies and democracies has been quite common and,often, quite intense.23 Contemporary “globalization” has created large, non citizen, immigrant and refugee populations in many countries; exclusion of thesegroups is often explained according to presumptions of temporaryresidence. However, many of these populations are remaining in hostcountries for extended, and even generational, periods of time,creating large communities of “unenfranchised” persons.24 The “fifth element” in complex, innovative societal systems, that is,“uncivil society” does not directly factor into the governance scheme.Criminal and anti social individuals and groups are separate by thenature of their activities and form of their relationship to both the stateand society. The relative strength of “uncivil society” is a function ofthe quality of relations between the four other elements.

25 There have been some democracies that have emerged in poorcountries; these have almost invariably been predicated on adepoliticized and/or unmobilized populace that defers to a, usually,urban elite. In effect, these situations resemble limited, stakeholderpolitical processes that appeared in early democracies. Thesedemocracies almost always begin to struggle or fail as the populationbecomes more politicized and organized.

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nomic “viability” in conflict management schemes (Boulding1962). Enforcement regimes can also be used by groups tocontrol wealth from resource extraction, such as the “nationalsecurity states” underwritten by external donors and theseveral “self-supporting” oil emirates in the Persian Gulfregion; these states use export or donor wealth to construct afortress state designed to prevent democratization. Acommon component of the “fortress state” is the use ofrepression to enforce the social order; cracks in the fortressinvite armed challenges. Enforcement authority tends toreinforce societal divisions and contentious interactionsbetween polarized fractions. Research conducted by the USGovernment’s Political Instability Task Force (initiated in1994; formerly known as the State Failure Task Force) hasprovided strong empirical support for the proposition that(polar) factionalism is, by far, the most powerful factor inexplaining setbacks in the democratization process (i.e.,mainly “adverse regime changes” toward more autocraticgovernance but also including onsets of societal warfare); it isalso an important factor in stalling democracy consolidation(Goldstone et al. 2010).26

Democratization remains “on track” when the (depoliti-cized) military and/or police “remain in the barracks”when thestate demands a crackdown on the opposition, necessitating anegotiated outcome to the political crisis. In brief, democra-tization reforms increase the voice of contending constituen-cies with divergent interests and demands empowered throughuniversal enfranchisement, challenging ruling elites and theestablished order; militant crackdowns on oppositional activ-ity (temporarily) silence critics and impose a tentative socialorder. In situations where social networking and informationmedia are weak, such imposed order can persist, at least overthe medium term; however, these situations can also providearenas and support refuges for anti-system activities andelements, encouraging armed rebellion. In the “new worldorder” characterized by globalization, even the weakest andmost isolated populations have recourse to support networksand media attention that constrain the capabilities of states toenforce social order over time. Autocratic governance systemscontinue to diminish worldwide and may soon becomeobsolete in all but the most challenging circumstances; at thesame time, however, democratic consolidation can be seen tobe progressing agonizingly slowly.

Democracy Consolidation and the New World Order

Having been born in ancient times within small and simplesocieties as a way to include a broader array of viewpoints

and interests among free citizens in a more proactive andenlightened political process, democratic governance hassince, in modern times, evolved and come to be recognizedas a more effective and efficient way to direct, manage, andpromote continuous, general well-being in large, complex,and highly technical societies. Whether the marriage ofliberal democracy and free market economics representsthe, or even an, “end of history” (as Francis Fukuyamafamously asserted) or is simply a contemporary artifact ofhistorical circumstances is a wholly separate debate. Whatcan be observed at present (since the end of the Cold War)is that autocratic forms of governance have transitioned tomore democratic forms of governance at an unprecedentedrate. We are, for the first time in history, witness to ademocracy-preeminent world system of states and thebeginnings of a global societal-system. This, of course,cannot be construed to constitute a democratic system at theglobal level, although some democratic authority character-istics can be observed; the emerging global system iscertainly neither anarchic, nor autocratic, although elementsof these forms are also evident. In Polity terms, the globalsystem, which is currently, loosely governed by the UnitedNations Organization, can best be considered an “anocracy”or mixed authority state. Various configurations and align-ments of global constituencies have formed and reformedover time and several functional policy regimes have beenestablished. Since 1990, the number of democratic states inthe global system has doubled, the number and magnitudeof armed conflicts has decreased by a similar margin, andthe resilience of global constituencies shows definite signsof both recovery and progress, despite periodic economicdownturns (Marshall and Cole 2010). These are allencouraging signs for the future world order.

What we are witnessing in the early years of the Twenty-first Century is a global shift away from the generaldynamics of democratic transition and toward a largelyuncharted course of democratic consolidation based on and,currently, led by an epistemic constituency of about twentymatured and consolidated Western democracies. A cursoryreview of the late Twentieth Century democratic transitionstates presents some very fundamental challenges to theprevalent perspectives on world politics and the globalorder. Three categories of states account for most of therecent shift toward democratic governance: former-communist countries of Eastern Europe (nineteen newdemocratic transitions since 1989, from one-party hegemo-nic systems); former-oligarchic and corporatist countries ofLatin America (five new transitions and fourteen reformeddemocratic systems); and underdeveloped, aid-dependentcountries of Africa (fifteen new democratic transitions).Asia accounts for only five democratic transitions; therehave been no transitions in the Middle East and NorthAfrica since 1989.

26 The association between civil war and (polar) factionalism is evenclearer when one includes autocracies as factionalized polities (themajority of civil wars take place in exclusionary, autocratic states).

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The relatively smooth transitions of closed, hegemonicone-party (“communist”) systems to open, multi-partysystems in the middle- and upper-income countries ofEastern Europe questions long-held understandings ofthe role of ideology in authority systems. The de-politicization of the military and the accommodation ofpopulism in the largely middle-income, former “anti-communist” states of Latin America will provide impor-tant information on the means and prospects of tran-sitions in the remaining non-democratic countries of theworld. Most curious, and perhaps profound, are thedemocratic transitions that have occurred in low-incomecountries in Africa and Asia; the prospects of democraticconsolidation in low-income countries appears to chal-lenge the fundamental linkage between development anddemocracy. However, many of the African cases maybe considered “aid-dependent transitions” that persistthrough substantial levels of donor engagement andsupport. The prospects for persistence in the low-income democracies are problematic and limited byexternal donor priorities and political will over the nearterm, although the experience of democratic authority inthese countries may lead to fundamental changes indevelopment processes that could increase their prospectsover the longer term. Research on the linkages betweentransitions to and consolidation of democratic governancewill be greatly enhanced by the large expansion in thenumber and variety of cases during the post-Cold Warperiod. This forward-looking research opportunity can beexpected to trigger a shift in basic research approaches tobetter understand the conditions and dynamics ofdemocratic consolidation. This research will be predicat-ed on distinguishing the means of governance from theends of governance; in doing this, we can maintain anaccurate and reliable measurement scheme by which wecan gauge general progress toward, or regression from,more consolidated or entrenched forms of democraticgovernance.27

The question remains largely, empirically unanswerable,at present, as to whether the same forms of liberaldemocratic governance we have come to associate as anideal “end state” for the upper-income countries of the(former-imperial) West can be viable as a “means state” fornewly independent and developing societies. Early evi-dence indicates that liberal democracy is struggling in itsnew role and that innovative, democratizing systems in theless affluent countries are searching for ways to respond tosocietal order imperatives with more emphasis on compli-ance methods augmented by more indirect or formalized

enforcement measures.28 The sudden wave of democratictransitions in the late Twentieth Century has created a largepool of consolidating democracies and incomplete transi-tions for which we have no precedent and little knowledgeto temper our expectations or inform public policy choices.What we should expect is that the new, democracy-preeminent global system will favor greater deliberation,engagement, and self-reflection in learning from experienceand charting its future course. The (further) consolidation of(more) non-Western democracies will alter our understand-ings of the democratization process and dilute the influenceof the Western democracies as the process continues. Ofcourse, the “dark side” of the process is found in thenegative influences that continuing social disruption anddisorder may have on the consolidated democraciesthemselves in the era of intensifying globalization.

Institution-building in consolidating democracies willhave to be responsive to the country’s unique context andcircumstances and innovative in their recognition of thenexus between extant/traditional societal-systemic dynam-ics and the anticipated needs and aspirations of evolvingconstituencies defining, and defined by, societal-systemdevelopment. Institutions are very limited in their capacityto shape societal-system dynamics and the structure ofassociations; viable, persistent institutions must incorporateand regularize extant dynamics to maintain legitimacy andinform and reform practices and networks incrementally.This will require both patience and perseverance on the partof both internal and external parties to the consolidationprocess. Attempting to do too much, too quickly willincrease the burdens on the donor community and maytrigger greater internal constituency demands for disen-gagement and protectionism. In the interim, what will bethe most highly valued inputs are not the more costly, directinterventions but the more efficacious efforts and mecha-nisms that can be provided by the stronger societal-systemsto offset oversight, accountability, and adjudication deficitsin the weaker systems that are integral to the consolidationprocess. Institutional design and conflict managementprocedures must remain within the creative power of thesocietal-system itself. “Security guarantees” short of overtenforcement are the logical outcome and continual outputof good governance.

In moving from a transitional to a consolidating globalsystem, researchers will need information and approachesthat enable greater insight into the workings of complex,innovative societal-systems. The “ends” of societal endeav-ors are largely circumstantial artifacts. Good governanceproactively conditions circumstances to favor sustainable

27 For a discussion of the importance of democratic “entrenchment,”(see Held 1995)

28 The most troubling of such “indirect” enforcement alternatives hasbeen extrajudicial “disappearances” and “unexplained deaths” inapprehension or custody of “criminals.”

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well-being and successfully manage societal conflict,without resort to violence, over the long-term. Our learningtechnologies and innovation techniques must evolve incongruence with the societal-systems under scrutiny. Theincreasingly technical demands of practical and appliedresearch in the globalization era require more technical andholistic understandings of governance in societal-systems.Theorists and researchers will need to collaborate moreclosely to map the structural terrain and chart the dynamicalprocesses that underwrite the freedoms we demand. As wedeepen the roots of knowledge and comprehension ofcomplex, innovative societal-systems, we will need tomove farther away from romantic and idealistic notions ofmessianic states and mechanistic societies to achieve morepractical and practicable understandings of the complexorganic systems on which our future well-being depends.

Further Reading

Boulding, K. E. 1962. Conflict and defense: A general theory. Harperand Row.

Coser, L. A. 1956. The functions of social conflict. Free Press.de Soto, H. 2000. Mystery of capital. Basic Books.Goldstone, J., Bates, R. H., Epstein, D. L., Gurr, T. R., Lustik, M.,

Marshall, M. G., Ulfelder, J., & Woodward, M. 2010. A globalmodel for forecasting political instability. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 50(1), 190 208.

Gurr, T. R. 1974. Persistence and change in political systems, 18001971. American Political Science Review, 68, 1482 504.

Held, D. 1995. Democracy and the global order: From the modernstate to cosmopolitan governance. Stanford University Press.

Marshall, M. G. 1999. Third world war: System, process, and conflictdynamics. Rowman & Littlefield.

Marshall, M. G., Cole, B. R. 2010. Global report 2009: Conflict,governance, and state fragility, Center for Systemic Peace andCenter for Global Policy, George Mason University. (www.systemicpeace.org)

Sen, A. 1999. Development as freedom. Oxford University Press.Vreeland, J. 2008. The effects of political regime on civil war:

unpacking anocracy. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(3),401 25.

Yunus, M. 1999. Banker to the poor. Public Affairs.

Monty G. Marshall is President of Societal Systems Research Incand Director of the Center for Systemic Peace; he most recently servedas Research Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University.He specializes in complex societal systems analysis, examining thecritical nexus among societal and systemic conflict, governance, anddevelopment dynamics with emphasis on the problem of politicalviolence. Dr. Marshall has been measuring and monitoring societalphenomena at the global level for the past 25 years, including theMinorities at Risk, Polity IV, Armed Conflict and Intervention, andState Fragility projects. He has served as a senior consultant with theU.S. Government’s Political Instability Task Force since 1998. Dr.Marshall’s societal systems theory is detailed in his 1999 book, ThirdWorld War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics. He produces anannual report series detailing global system performance: GlobalReport: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.

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