development assistance in afghanistan after 2014: from the military exit strategy to a civilian...

7/27/2019 Development assistance in Afghanistan after 2014: from the military exit strategy to a civilian entry strategy

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SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security

SUMMARY

wAter the departure o the

International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF),

delivering development

assistance in Aghanistan can

return to common practices

and procedures used in other

insecure areas such as Somalia

and Sudan (and already in areas

o Aghanistan). This means

that the international

community must develop a

civilian entry strategy andcommunicate to the Aghan

population that civilian entry,

not military exit, is its strategy

or the uture.

Donors should ignore the

current commitment to channel

50 per cent o assistance

through the central

government budget. Instead, in

each sector (e.g. health care,

education, security) an

efective division o labourmust be established between

the central and provincial

governments, non-

governmental organizations

(NGOs) and the private sector.

Involving NGOs, the private

sector and the local population

in the delivery o basic services

does not have to be at the

expense o government control

or legitimacy.

International aid donorsneed to pay urther attention to

security and rule o law. But

alternatives to the current

strategy, which is oten

perceived as being militarized

and short-term, have to be

ound. It is oten more efective

to integrate these issues into

broader development

programmes.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER

2014: FROM THE MILITARY

EXIT STRATEGY TO A

CIVILIAN ENTRY STRATEGY

jar van der lijn*

No. 2013/4 October 2013

I. Introduction

Wth th cosu o th Itto Scuty Assstc Foc (ISAF)

th wthw o most Noth Attc Tty Ogzto (NATO) ocs

schu o th o 2014, tto ssstc o Aghst s

tg w . My oos h bcom ccustom to th psc o

ISAFs mty stuctu poc costucto tms (PRTs)

to pog ssstc hghy mtz omt. Thos

oos ow c umb o sttgc qustos mms gg th

poso o opmt ssstc t 2014. E though su t-

to mty psc w m, oos cosg how thy c

cotu to po opmt ssstc phps us t to cs

ssstc to th Agh Gomt th poso o scuty u o

w wh optg th bsc o th cut mty stuctus,

potty totg scuty omt, wth gomt

tht st hs sufct cpcty cs mpt coupto.

Ths pp coss th oowg th qustos.

1. At th ptu o ISAF, potty mo scu o-

mt, how c oos cotu to po opmt ssstc?

2. Though whch chs s th post-2014 opmt ssstc bst

stbut?

3. I bsc o th scuty mty toos pousy us to po

ssstc to scuty u o w Aghst, how c such sss-

tc cotu though opmt ssstc stumts?

Ths qustos ss tu sctos IIIV. Scto V psts

cocusos umb o commtos o how oos c omu-

t pomotmts o c ty sttgy to p

pc th mty xt sttgy. Th pp s t to cotbut to th

scusso o th wy ow o oos.

* The research for this paper was commissioned by Cordaid. SIPRI and the author aregrateful to Cordaid for its generous funding of this work.


2/16

2 sipri insights on peace and secur ity no. 2013/4

T fi fi k,

b w C, M 2013 A

Bk K Kb. Bk K

w b , ,

A. T fi b w

w A G f,

, - z

(NGO) , w , w -

z, NGO .1

II. Provision of development assistance after 2014

I b Bk K w

A w b ISAF ww

2014. T PRT ,

PRT

w PRT fi . N,

Bk, A w, 2014

k x w b . T w

b b . I K

b w w -2014 A: w

ISAF fi

b, (a) w

fi ; (b) w

A (ANSF)

w b f w . I Kb

w w , -

.

I w w .

T wk w

b

, . I w

b w w fi -

,

, A,

q b .

1 The research involved 38 interviews and 4 ocus group meetings. Interviews took place in both

Mazar i Shar i (capital o Balkh) and Kabul. For security reasons, interviewees rom Kandaha r were

contacted by telephone and 4 flew to Kabul or a ocus group meeting. Cordaid and its partners

selected the interviewees and ocus group participants in close cooperation with the author, giving

particular attention to diversity. The author also selected a number o additional interviewees.

The Aghan interviewees were o mixed ethnic origin. Those rom the south were predominantly

Pashtun, while a majority o those rom t he north were non-Pashtun. To balance the otherwise urban

selection o interviewees, 2 o the ocus groups in Mazar i Shari were held with representatives o

armer cooperatives.

Although the gender balance was poor, particular attention was given to ensure input rom

women. This was done in Mazar i Shari through a womens ocus group and in Mazar i Shari and

Kabul through interviews with women. No women rom the south were interviewed.The initial findings were discussed at a meeting with representatives o diferent donors in Kabul.

There is some optimism about the

security situation ater ISAF withdraws


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development assistance in aghanistan ater2014 3

Security after 2014

A A b U N

k wk,

b b w

.2 T, k -

w PRT

NATO . D b

b ISAF ,

, , (

) . I ,

b z

.

I w w

b Mz S ( Bk), Kb K-

( K ) . A

2014, b w b k , w Kb

b b b

b k. A b f w-fi

, wk

- b w NGO. M,

w b

.

B NGO w PRT

b .

T A 30 (

Tb )

A G PRT wk. F, NGO -

w NGO b PRT,

PRT. Hw,

w

:

b

w b , -

, .

NGO PRT b

fl-

, S S. M, -

w b Bk K

bfi PRT b

-. I, b

PRT. E x f

2 United Nations Oce or the Coordination o Human itarian Afairs (OCHA),Humanitarian

Bulletin: Afghanistan, no. 19 (130 Aug. 2013); and United Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan

(UNAMA),Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2013: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (UNAMA:Kabul, July 2013).

PRT inrastructure has not been needed

or delivering development assistance in

other conflict-afected countries


4/16


(ODA) PRT w, b

bw 5 10 .3

A w, NGO x

z A G

. I w b ,

fi. NGO

, b , . W w b

b b w Pk-

Tb (.. Tb b Pk),

b w A

Tb, w b w

. NGO Bk K -

k :

2014, b . T,

x b b f

w, .

W , k

k. A wk w,

b b (w

) w -

w- w

b . C , w

A, , NGO w,

x w q , , -

b w .

3 See e.g. Poole, L., Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 20022010 (DevelopmentInitiat ives: Wells, Jan. 2011), p. 11.

Box 1. Examples o alternative ways o monitoring aid projects

Third-party monitoring

Hire local researchers or non-governmental organizations, the government and international organizations.

Community-based monitoring

Use local communities, village elders or the aid recipients.

Complaint boxes

Use, or example, a local representative or phone number as a way or recipients o assistance to file complaints about projects.

Cameras

Collect video and photographic evidence.

Aer ial photography

Use satellite imagery or airplanes.

Soc ial media

Use social media.

Sources: Author interviews. See also Stoddard, A., Harmer, A. and Renou, J. S., Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote

Management of Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas (Humanitarian Outcomes: London, 25 Feb. 2010).


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Monitoring and evaluating aid projects

A

b , x, -A

b fi f ,

NGO w b -

b. T

, b

, w - NGO

w -

.

Hw, w x A, S

S w b k -

fl- q , ,

, x

.4 D b

, w, b fl-

b

b b b .5

W k , w

, x, Kb b

w b b k A, b

w w b -

, NGO. A w,

b A

fl- w

b b ( bx 1). M,

, w ,

A G . I

, .

A b , - (.. -

q, b ) b. F ,

- w b

z w b . N, f ,

k w

.

Business as usual after 2014

I , w , w bk

, x x 2001

w A w bk

b :

, fl- .

Hw, w , NGO,

( b ) A G w

4 Cox, M. and Thornton, N., Manag ing results in conflict-afected and ragile states: a stock-take

o lessons, experience and practice, Agulhas, May 2010, .5 Cox and Thornton (note 4).

Although compromises may have to be

made, a good-enough level o evaluation

is possible


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b , ,

x

.

III. Distribution channels for development assistance

A J 2012 Tk C A,

A -2014 . W k

b , b

( b 1). M,

2016 2017. T

w W Bk A w , -

fi .6

I Tk

80 w A G

6 World Bank,Afghanistan in Transit ion: Looking beyond 2014 (World Bank: Washington, DC,May 2012).

Table 1. International aid disbursements to Aghanistan, 200911 and 2015

Figures are US$ m.

Rank Donor

DisbursedPledged

2015a

Details o 2011 disbursementsb

Directly on

budget

Via on-budget

trust unds Of budget

Share on

budget (%)2009 2010 2011

1 United States 3 382 8 126 10 406 . . 674 468 9 264 11

2 Japan 615 752 670 600 70 240 360 46

3 United Kingdom 310 383 357 265 6 158 194 46

4 European Union 322 264 221 . . 60 161 27

5 Germany 140 205 216 552 77 139 36

6 ADB 108 290 123 240 123 100

7 World Bank 174 192 152 . . 152 100

8 Canada 201 78 116 54 32 84 28

9 Netherlands 184 91 95 . . 55 40 58

10 Austra lia 130 36 150 227 90 60 60

11 Sweden 94 100 101 120 29 72 29

12 Denmark 70 70 65 91 20 14 30 53

13 Norway 125 77 125 21 56 27

14 India 93 77 0 125

15 Italy 65 37 50 . . 12 10 28 44

16 France 33 38 25 38 2 23 8

17 UAE 4 56 35 . . 35

18 Finland 25 27 17 39 1 11 6 67

ADB = Asian Development Bank; UAE = United Arab Emirates.

a These figures are based on pledges made at the July 2012 Tokyo Conerence on Aghanistan. In the case o multi-year pledges,

the annual average has been taken. Exchange rates o July 2013 have been used where necessary.b On-budget disbursement reers to aid that is given directly to the central Aghan Government and which is reported in the

national budget. Aid disbursed via trust unds but which appear on the government budget is also considered as being on budget.

Of-budget disbursement reers to aid that does not pass through the central government budget.

Source: Aghan Ministry o Fina nce (MOF),Development Cooperation Report 2012 (MOF: Kabul, 2012), pp. 50, 53, 6162.


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N P P 50 -

b A G.7

A w , q,

A G -b

, k

b: (a)

; (b)

; (c) -

.8 A q, w

50 -b (

b 1).

The role of the central government

T bw -b w -

z A w. I kb

k A, w Bk, Kb K w

w

. Hw, w - b

, -

, w ,

- b , w -

,

, b . Hw,

NGO NGO

z : w

k , w b -

NGO.

A b, w -

. Iw k

. M, b k fi-

, w b b

. T -

z , b

z b. F x,

b bw

; w b fi w

. I, w b

, , w

b b w -

b .

7 Tokyo Conerence on Aghanistan , The Tokyo Declaration: partnership or sel-reliance in

Agha nistan, rom tran sition to transormation, Tokyo, 8 July 2012.8 World Bank,Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014 (World Bank: Washington, DC,

May 2012); Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR),Quarterly Report

to the United States Congress (SIGAR: Arlington, VA, 30 Jan. 2013); and Special Inspector General

or Aghanista n Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (SIGAR:Arling ton, VA, 30 Apr. 2013).

All interviewees saw having a strong

government with a large role or the

central government as a goal


8/16


A x b -

w, w,

w, b . M,

w b

-

.

T b w

, NGO b

wk . M NGO

: w b b -

w NGO, NGO

. M, NGO

, b

fi b .

Balancing the roles of government and NGOs

Iw NGO fi

, b

. W w

b , NGO w

. W b

z- , -

. Y

b - -b ,

b q:

w b w -

b, w b z w .

A w A, w b -

fi fi - -b

( -b w b) k

w . Iw

x w k bw

, ,

NGO b w

b wk b w, .

I b , x,

, b b NGO. I

Table 2. Examples o division o tasks by sector

The ollowing examples should be seen as illustrative rather than prescriptive.

Sector

Policymaking/

regulation Planning Implementation

Monitoring and

evaluation

Agriculture Central government Private sector Private sector Private sectorEducation Central government Provincial government Provincial government Central government

Health care Central government Provincial government NGOs Provincial government

Security Central government Central government Central government Central government

NGO = Non-governmental organization.

Sources: Author interviews.


9/16


ww , b NGO b

wk.

T A w b

, , A G ( -

b ) w k b b -

w k w b b k b . Iw

b , ,

k k, (.. -

w ) ,

(w NGO

). I , (..

) w b b b NGO

, w

, x, . I ,

b w .

Iw b,

W , z A b

( -

k ). S,

w b b

w b b k k ,

, . F x,

k b

, w NGO w b . T, ,

, k b b . A w-

, - b k NGO

, b b w

w.

I , w fi-

. A , w w

k b ( b 2 x). I

, w b x b

b k.

Earmarking and conditionality: from percentages to practical

solutions

I , w, Bk, Kb K,

b b

b k b . T,

b k

k z;

kb , ,

,

z.

A w, w A

; w k

b , w w -

w w k w . I

NGOs also aim to strengthen and support

the state


10/16


A , w

NGO w . I

, NGO

, w, b w

.

IV. Continuing support to security and rule of law through

development assistance

M A w

. T w . F,

b , .

S, b -

,

wkw w .

Priorities for international funding

W k , w

Bk, Kb K fi ,

( w ).

T b . Ab 60

wk ,

2003/042010/11 bw q A-

.9 E w b

w - , w

w . M,

w w b

.

I , A w w b

b . T b

b . Hw, b :

, w

kb .10

S b A F A

b b .11 A ,

b b b .12

W k b

w, w

, b . T

w b x w -

w: b b bk

w z , z

9 World Bank (note 8), p. 25.10 Aghan Min istry o Economy,Poverty Status in Afghanistan: A Profile Based on National Risk

and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08(World Bank: Washing ton, DC, July 2010), pp. 2629.11 Hopkins, N. (ed.),Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation: Kabul,

2012), p. 29.12 Hopkins (note 11), p. 31.

Aghan interviewees saw economic

development as the best and most

sustainable path to security


11/16


b b w

x . I b w k

b ,

w .

W x, A .

Policy instruments to address insecurity

Iw b q -

. I Bk, w x ,

w fi A N A

Pk x I w. I-

w K . T w fi

ANSF

ANSF ,

ANSF, ,

. I , -

w K b b w

b q 2014, b

fi b. T b ANSF q

bk . I Kb, w b

b x .

Iw , b

w z. T

fi , -

w. S- w

b b b b

- b. T w , ,

A N P A, A N

S U w A -

f, , w

, . I , w, -

w q . F,

b b

, w

b .

S fi w w

b w b b b

z NGO w b-

fi. M, w w

b b W ; , w

b x,

x, b Q H.

Iw b w

b b . R w,

x, b , w b

Bk

bw (Uzbk, Tk P-

) .

Security and rule o law should be

integrated into broader development

assistance programmes


12/16


P Bk , NGO w

w w fi w

. A NGO -

, b

, w b .

V. Conclusions and recommendations: a civilian entry

strategy

T ww ISAF b b . I

b A ,

S S. T 2014

A w w

, w

w . W ww

, b

x w ( fi

w).

I w x 2014 w

x A G-

,

. R x ,

b

A . S w

wk w b , w

b . I w,

A w

, b b w ,

x b 2014.

A , k

w b , x . F

, w -

w

b . M, w

A b

B b fi,

w .

1. D z b

w PRT.

Ex w z , x -

, b k S S, x

NGO A.

2. T w A G, NGO,

bfi , b x

. A w

,

.

Rather than a pessimistic military exit

strategy, a positive civilian entry strategy

could be communicated to the Aghan

population


13/16


3. D , b

k

.

4. D -

A G k

k .

5. T w A G ,

w z b q k

, , ,

w 50

b. P b

k.

6. D bw

NGO A G, x, b A

NGO .

7. R z w ,

b

k b b, x,

Q H.

8. D -

w , - .

9. D

A, x.

I k b,

w

A 2016 2017.


14/16


Abbreviations

ANSF A

ISAF I S A F

NATO N A T Oz

NGO N- z

PRT P


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SIPRI is an independent

international institute

dedicated to research intoconflict, armaments, arms

control and disarmament.

Established in 1966, SIPRI

provides data, analysis and

recommendations, based on

open sources, to policymakers,

researchers, media and the

interested public.

GOVERNING BOARD

Gran Lennmarker, Chairman

(Sweden)

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar

(Indonesia)

Dr Vladimir Baranovsky

(Russia)

Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi

(Algeria)

Jayantha Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

Ambassador Wolfgang

Ischinger (Germany)

Professor Mary Kaldor(United Kingdom)

The Director

DIRECTOR

Professor Tilman Brck

(Germany)

SIPRI 2013

Signalistgatan 9

SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00

Fax: +46 8 655 97 33

Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.sipri.org

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1

II. Provision o development assista nce ater 2014 2

Security a ter 2014 3

Monitoring and evaluating aid projects 5

Business as usual ater 2014 5

III. Distribution channels or development assistance 6

The role o the central government 7

Balancing the roles o government and NGOs 8

Earmarking and conditionality: rom percentages to practical solutions 9

IV. Continuing support to security and rule o law through development 10

assistance

Priorities or international unding 10

Policy instruments to address insecurity 11

V. Conclusions and recommendations: a civilian entry strategy 12

Abbreviations 14

Box 1. Examples o alternative ways o monitoring aid projects 4

Table 1. International aid disbursements to Aghanista n, 200911 and 2015 6

Table 2. Examples o division o tasks by sector 8

sipri insights on peace a nd secur ity no. 2013/4

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEIN AFGHANISTAN AFTER

2014: FROM THE MILITARY

EXIT STRATEGY TO A

CIVILIAN ENTRY STRATEGYjar van der lijn

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Jar van der Lijn (Netherlands) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Armed

Conflict and Conflict Management Programme, where he leads research on

peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict management. Previously he was a Senior

Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute o International Relations Clingendael

and an Assistant Proessor at Radboud University Nijmegen. His research interests

include the uture o peace operations, evaluation and actors or success and ailure o

peace operations, and comprehensive approaches in missions. His most recent

publications include Aghanistan post-2014: groping in the dark? (Clingendael, May2013) and The uture o peace operations (Clingendael, Jan. 2013).

development assistance in afghanistan after 2014: from the military exit strategy to a civilian...

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