dharmakirti:refutation of theism

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Dharmakīrti's Refutation of TheismAuthor(s): Roger Jackson

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 315-348Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398992 .

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Roger Jackson Dharmakirti's refutation of theism

I. INTRODUCTION

Indian civilization, no less than that of the West, is haunted by the concept of

God, and Indian philosophical writing, no less than the works of Aquinas,

Descartes, Kant, or Hume, has as one of its important concerns the existence or

nonexistence of an omniscient, eternal, independent, benevolent being who

createsand/or designs the cosmos. Despite LinYutang's description of India as a

nation "intoxicated with God," 1Indianskepticismabout such a being goes back

veryfarindeed,2and explicitarguments against theismfindan important place in

the writings of Buddhism,Jainism, and Mimamsa (as they must have in the lost

writings of Carvaka), while God's importance or even existence for early Sam-

khya, Nyaya, and Vaisesika is at best moot.3 Indeed, the only Indian philosoph-ical systems that are explicitly theistic are Vedanta, Yoga, and later, Nyaya-Vaisesika. It undoubtedly is due to the overwhelming preference for Vedanta

among modern exponents of Indian philosophy that Indian tradition so often ispresentedthrough theistically-shadedlenses, and it is not incorrectto assertthat,in general,Indiancivilization has become more theisticduringthe sameperiod in

which the West has become less so. Still, this should not blindus to the fact that as

recently as five hundred years ago thinkers like the Jaina Gunaratna were

adducing sharp and original argumentsagainst theistic assertions, and that even

today the unanimity of Indian belief in God may not be as thoroughgoing as

most swamis and scholars would have us believe.4

As might be expected,arguments

for the existence or nonexistence of thebeingvariously calledpurusa,brahman,paramatman,or isvara,or by the name of one

or another sectariandeity, increasedin sophistication as methods of philosoph-ical discussion grew more complex and precise. Sometime around the middle of

the first millennium A.D. a philosophical watershed was reached wherein the

various Indian schools arrived at least at a broad consensus on the criteria for

valid and invalid formal inferences, anumdna,and proper and improper argu-mentativemodes, tarka.In principle,at least, this permittedintersystemicdebateon the basis of commonly accepted "logical" canons, and thus prompted the

hope that arguments on fundamental philosophical issues might indeed becapable of resolution. In general,before the development of these canons, Indian

philosophical arguments that were not simply dogmatic were analogical ordialectical in form; arguments after the canons were developed still employedillustrative analogies and dialectical dilemmas, but within the much more care-

fully articulated frameworkof what is sometimes called the Indian "syllogism."Among those contributing greatly to the development of generallyacceptable

RogerJackson is an AssistantProfessorof ReligiousStudies at FairfieldUniversity,Connecticut.This

paper was originallypresentedat the seventhconferenceof the InternationalAssociation of BuddhistStudies, Bologna, Italy, July, 1985.

PhilosophyEast and West36, no. 4 (Oct. 1986). O by the University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.



316 Jackson

logical canons was the seventh-century Buddhist dcarya Dharmakirti, who

developed the seminal insights of his great predecessor, Dignaga, into an

epistemological and logical system that itself drew the attention of countless

commentators (not to mention opponents5) and has served as the basis of

epistemology and logic in the Tibetan Buddhist traditionright up to the present.

The majorityof Dharmakirti'swritings6areconcernedwith epistemologicalandlogical questions, but he was not uninterestedin matters of religious and meta-

physical doctrine, for the chapter titled "Pramdnzasiddhi,"r "Establishment of

Authoritativeness,"in his masterwork, the Pramdnavdrttika,7s devoted almost

entirely to a rational justification of Buddhist religious doctrines, such as the

authoritativeness of the Buddha, the reality of past and future lives, and the

validity of the Four Noble Truths. In the course of demonstrating these doc-

trines, Dharmakirti attacks the positions of a variety of non-Buddhist oppo-

nents, including the Lokayatas (= Carvakas), Samkhyas, Nyaya-Vaisesikas,

Mimamsakas, and Jainas. Although earlierBuddhistwritershad criticizednon-

Buddhist systems, and Bhavaviveka had subjectedthem to systematic scrutiny

nearly a century earlierin his Tarkajvald,Dharmakirtiwas the first Buddhistto

criticize non-Buddhist doctrines with fully developed methods of inference and

argumentation at his disposal.

Among the non-Buddhist doctrines criticizedby Dharmakirti in the "Pramd-

nasiddhi"chapter of the Pramdnavdrttikawas the assertion that an omniscient,

permanent, independent entity, Tsvara,s the creator of the cosmos. Although

George Chemparathyremarks that "the systematic and thoroughgoing attackon the Isvaradoctrineby Dharmakirti"gave a greatimpetusto the theist-atheist

controversy,8 and Gopimohan Bhattacharyya notes that the "time-honored

cosmological [sic]argumentwas for the firsttime subjectedto scathing criticism

by Dharmakirti, 'the centralfigurearound whom all the creativeminds in India

revolved',"9 Dharmakirti's arguments themselves, pivotal as they may have

been, have receivedsurprisinglylittle attention; most writerson Buddhist athe-

ism have focused either on the arguments of such earlier sources as the Pali

Nikdyas, Nagarjuna, Asvaghosa, and Vasubandhu, or the later, extended dis-

cussions in Santaraksita'sTattvasamgrahaand the Panjikd upon it by Kamalas-

ia. The earlier arguments are less systematic than Dharmakirti's, and the later

ones are largely based on the discussion of isvarain the Pramdnavdrttika, o it

seems desirableto examine these crucial arguments,for without an understand-

ing of them, our picture of the Indian theist-atheist controversy will be incom-

plete. This essay will sketch the pre-Dharmakirtidevelopment of theism, outline

earlierBuddhistrefutationsof it, contextualize and analyzeDharmakirti'sargu-

ments in some detail, note some of the directions taken in the theist-atheist

debate afterDharmakirti,

and conclude by examining problems inherent in

attempting to "decide" the debate and compare it to similar debates in the

Western tradition.



317

II. PHILOSOPHICALTHEISMBEFOREDHARMAKIRTI

Indian speculation about the cosmos, of course, goes back as far as the later

sections of the .Rgveda,where the first cause is said to be, for example, visvakar-

man ("the all-maker"),10or purusa ("the person"),11 or prajdpati("the lord of

creatures"),12or tadekam

("the one").13The divine

power,or

supremepurusa,first is referredto as isvara ("the lord") in the Atharvaveda,14while the Brah-

manas and Aranyakas continue Vedic speculations regarding prajapati and

visvakarmanand introduce the concepts of brahmanand brahmd.5 In most of

these accounts, the discussion of the first cause is couched in mythological

narrative; little real attempt is made to justify the concepts philosophically,

though lurking in the background are unstated assumptions about limiting

principles and simplicity of explanation. Discussions of the first cause in the

various Upanisads focus on the concept of brahman also referredto as atmanor

paramdtman),whose reality as the source and (most often) the substance of thecosmos is inferredusually througha reductiveprocess that moves fromchange to

permanence,multiplicity to unity, complexity to simplicity, materiality to spiri-

tuality, and grossnessto subtlety.16The earlier,more "monistic"Upanisads tend

to regard brahmanas an impersonal principle that simply becomes the cosmos

(while at the same time remaining in some way transcendent to it); in later

Upanisads, such as the Svetdsvatara,brahman s personalized-at least to the

point where it has a creativeaspect that is responsible for originating the cosmos

and that can be addressed as "lord"(Isa, isvara),

or"deity" (deva),17

or even as

Rudra. The Svetdsvataraactually lists non-Vedic explanations of the cosmos,

such as svabhdva(nature), kala (time), niyata (fate), yadrccha (chance), and so

forth, but it rejectsthem out of hand, simply assertingthat brahman,rather than

any of these, is the true explanatory principle.18 The BhagavadgTtdurther

personalizes the first cause by identifying its ultimate nature with the divine

person of Visnu,19 but, again, the fact is asserted rather than argued, and the

appeal is aimed more at the imagination and emotions than at rationality.

It is only with the development of theclassical darsanas n the last centuriesB.C.

or the first centuries A.D. that theism, widespread as it had become religiously,

began to receivephilosophical justification. If we take the term "theism" in the

broad sense in which I am using it-comprising any theory that attributes the

creation and/or ordering of the cosmos to one source, whether personal or

impersonal-then there are three darsanas that can be said to be "theistic":

Vedanta, Yoga, and Nyaya.The Brahmasutrasof Badarayanadid not receive their most important advaita

commentaries until Gaudapada and Safikara,both of whom probably postdate

Dharmakirti,20but the sutras themselves have as one of their central concerns to

establish that brahman s the source and substance of the cosmos.21 Brahman s

asserted to be that on which the world is dependent,22the material cause of all



318 Jackson

effects.23Badarayana's arguments rest primarily on scripturalstatements that

would not carry much force for a Buddhist, since the latter admits neither the

validity of the Vedas nor the existence of an independent sabdapramdna.This

Vedantin disinclination to proffer inferentially based arguments for its theistic

beliefs is seen clearly in later commentators such as Safikara,who denies that

brahman'sorigination of the cosmos ever can be established inferentially, sincebrahman is imperceptible and inferences must be perceptually based,24 and

Ramanuja, who refutes various rational argumentsfor theism so as to pave the

way for knowledge of God through scriptureand devotion.25

The Yogasutraof Patanijaliquite specifically asserts the existence of a "su-

preme purusa," Tsvara,who is unaffected by affliction, action, or fruition, is

omniscient, the eternalteacher,and the objectof the syllableom,and devotion to

whom is one way to achieve samadhi.26The Yoga tradition generally is more

concernedwith psychological than philosophical matters,and its literature s far

from being replete with rational discussions of the existence or nonexistence of

Tsvara,but Patanijali's ourth-century commentator, Vyasa, does interpret the

assertion that in isvara"the seed of the omniscient is not exceeded" as meaningthat Tsvara's nowledge and preeminenceare knowledge and preeminenceother

than which none greatercan be conceived.27If differentdegreesof knowledge or

preeminencebe admitted, then a supreme nstanceof theseis not inconceivable-

and that supremeinstance is Tsvara.t ought to be noted that the isvaraof Yoga

is not a creator-God like that of Vedanta. Yoga arises within the context of

Samkhya,accordingto which the cosmos is simplya transformation of insentientnature,prakrti, from which individualpurusas-and the supremepurusa-ever

are utterly separate.

Lying midway conceptually between the immanent brahmanof Vedanta and

the detached, inactive supreme purusa of Yoga is the isvara of Nyaya, who is

neither the material cause of the cosmos (like brahman),nor utterly noncausal

(like the supreme purusa), but, rather, the world's shaper and arranger-its

efficientcause, as it were. It is Nyaya (or, later, Nyaya-Vaisesika) alone among

Indian philosophical schools that seriously proposed to offer proof of the

existence and creative activity of tsvara. Ironically, the passage in Gautama's

Nyayasutrathat became the basis of latertheological elaboration28 s not unam-

biguously theistic-a number of scholars believe that, quite to the contrary, its

discussion of the relation between isvara and the results of human action is

intended as a criticism of theism, that is, that if isvarais posited, then human

action is pointless.29Be that as it may, by the time ofVatsyayana's Nydyabhdsya

(fifthcentury30),the moot passage in Gautama is interpretedas a demonstration

that Tsvaras the cause of all effects,and that humanaction could not have results

withoutthe action of Tsvara.Vatsyayana goes

on to define isvaraasbelonging

in

general to the category (paddrtha)of substance(dravya),and in particularto the

substancethat is self (dtman),of which it is a specialinstance,powerful,meritori-

ous, benevolent, and in control of both karman and the material elements.31



319

Prasatapada(sixth century) advanced the discussion still furtherin his Padarth-

adharmasamgrahaby arguing that tsvarais necessary as the conscious impellerof the unseen (adrsta) force that regulates karman, and as that which impelsatoms to movement and combination at the end of the universe's dormancy

(pralaya).32

The last important pre-Dharmakirti Naiyayika (although by now it is possibleto speak of Nyaya-Vaisesika) was Uddyotakara, who probably flourishedin the

period betweenDignaga andDharmakirti(late sixth or earlyseventhcentury).In

his Nyayavdrttika, he goes beyond arguing for Tsvaraon grounds peculiar to

Nyaya-Vaisesika and seeks to establish his existence on more general grounds.

Isvara,Uddyotakara asserts, is the instrumental cause (nimittakdrana)of things,because he assists beings in reaping the fruits of their actions. ITvara urther is

necessary as an adjunct to material results, because all results must be preceded

by conscious action, as a hatchet requiresa wielder in order to function, or the

flow of milk to a calf requiresthe cow's intention. Further, although Tsvaras a

permanent, unaltering entity, he can cause impermanententities, because we see

that, for example, spun yarn, though unmoving, is the cause of a movable

garment. Isvarais not the creator of the eternalatoms that comprise the material

world;his "creation,"therefore,is neither ex nihilonor out of himself. Rather, he

fashions the preexistent "material" into a cosmos in response to the necessaryfruition of the dharma and adharma of beings. Finally, tsvara's power and

consciousness areeternal,omnipresent,and unlimited, for events throughout the

entire extent of space and time require a conscious agent as their instrumentalcause; since that cause, Tsvara,can effect all results, his power is unlimited,and since he is conscious effector of all results, he must, by definition, be

omniscient.33

III. PRE-DHARMAKIRTIBUDDHIST ATTACKSON THEISM

Beginning with the great eleventh-centurydefender of theism, Udayana,34 anynumber of Hindu writers have attempted to argue that Buddhism, with its

worship of an omniscient tathdgata, actually is crypto-theism. The word

"theism" undoubtedly can be twisted in such a way that certain aspects of

Mahayana theory and practice fall under the term, but it is equally clear thattheism in the sense in which I am using it-as the assertion of an omniscient,

permanent, independent, unique cause of the cosmos-is rejected throughoutthe length and breadth of the Indian Buddhist tradition. Dharmakirti's anti-theisticargumentsmay have taken the Buddhistcritiqueto a new level of sophis-tication, but he had behind him a millennium of refutations, with many of whichhe undoubtedly was familiar, and which ought to be borne in mind when weconsider his discussion.

The Pali Nikdyas contain a number of explicit rejections of theism, and some

important implicit ones, as well. In the Brahmajalasutta,one of the sixty-twoviews discussed by the Buddha is the claim that brahmdis the creator of the



320 Jackson

cosmos; this claim is rejected on the grounds that it is based on a mistaken

inference: at the beginning of a world cycle, brahmd s the first being to arise.

Lonely, he wishes for other beings as companions, and they appear. He con-

cludes that he has createdthem, but is mistaken, for by the Buddhistexplanationthe beings simply are arisingdue to their own karman-karman, rather than the

will of adeity, being

the true creative force in the cosmos.35

A second explicit rejection,made on the grounds of theodicy, or the "problemof evil," occursat a numberof placesin theNikayas,36whereit is claimedthat the

postulation of a God as creator of the cosmos and the regulator of karman

undermines human moral responsibility,while at the same time vitiating claims

that the God can be benevolent, since evils are his creation, too. Other explicit

critiquesincludemockery of the "omnisicient"brahmd or his ignoranceregard-

ing the spherewherein all elements cease,37and skepticismregardingthe claims

of some brahmins to have seen brahmaface-to-face.38

For the later Buddhist philosophical tradition, however, the most important

early arguments are perhaps the implicit ones: those many passages in the

Nikayas where the concept of a permanentatta or dtman is rejected, principallyon the grounds that no permanententity is or can be encounteredin experienceor

justified by reason. It really is Buddhism'semphasis on universalimpermanencethat is at the root of its aversion to the concept of God, as becameevident in the

sorts of refutations offeredin the post-nikdya period (when the attributesof the

creator, identifiedby the Buddhists as Tsvara, erhaps had become more clearly

defined).Poussin remarks that Buddhist refutations of isvara "ont le tort de se

repeter."39 It is true that certain points are stressed again and again, but the

arguments do vary; indeed, their uniformity is more in style than substance:

virtuallyall arecouched in the form of logical dilemmas,in which the predication

of this or that attributeof isvara s shown to lead to unacceptableconclusions, no

matter how it is qualified. Post-nikdya, pre-Dharmakirti arguments are thus

broadly "logical," without being specificallyinferential.

One of the earliestpost-nikdyarejectionsof Tsvaras found in the Buddhacdrita

of Asvaghosa (first-second century A.D.), where at one place the rhetorical

question is posed: If Tsvaras the creator, then what point is there in human

effort?40 n a second passage, the Buddha is quoted as pointing out that if Tsvara,

the cause, is perfect and unchanging, then the cosmos that is his effect must be

perfect and unchanging, which it manifestly is not. Further, if it be argued that

Tsvara reateswith a purposein mind, then he has not achievedall purposes,and

his perfectionis limited;whereasif he createswithout a purpose, then he must be

regardedas no more sensible than a madman or a child.41

A numberof works attributed to Nagarjuna-generally believed to belong to

the same period as Asvaghosa-reject the concept of Tsvara.The Suhrllekha

mentions in passing that Tsvara s not to be accepted as the cause of the aggre-

gates.42 The Catuhstavaargues that isvara must either originate from another



321

entity, in which case his uncreatednessis violated, or be self-originated, which is

impossible, since an entity cannot at the same time be both the agent and objectof an action.43 The Bodhicittavivarananotes that (a) if isvara is alleged to be

permanent, then he cannot create, either simultaneously or gradually (sinceresults are impermanent,and so cannot have a permanentcause); (b) if he is said

to be efficient, then he must create the universe unaided all at once (sinceefficiency requires the immediate generation of a result); (c) if he requires as-

sistance in creation, then he is not trulyeternalor efficient;and (d) if he is allegedto be an entity (bhdva),then he cannot be permanent, since entities are observed

to be impermanent.44 Finally, the Visnorekakartrtvanirdkaranam,45hich is

entirely devoted to a refutation of isvara, argues that (a) he cannot create the

existent, since it already exists, nor the nonexistent, since it cannot come to be;and (b) he cannot be self-originated, as that is a contradictory concept; or other-

originated, for that would entail an infiniteregressof creators,even one of whom

exist before Tsvara,hereby vitiating his status as creator.46

Arguments against the concept of tsvaraalso are found in the Abhidharmika

literature of succeeding centuries. The great compendium of Sarvastivadin

thought, the Mahdvibhdsa,notes that (a) if isvarais the cause of everything, then

he must create everythingat once (since efficiencyimplies immediate causation);

(b) if he requireshelp, then he is not the sole cause;(c) if he is undifferentiatedand

eternal, so must his effects be (since effect must resemble cause); and (d) since

effects are known to be impermanent, their alleged permanentcause, isvara,has

no more "existence" than space.47Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosaand Abhidharmakosabhdsyaeject tsvaraat a

number of places, most extensively in the Bhasya to II,, 64d, which asserts that

the various dharmas do not arise from a unique cause like tsvara, because

dharmasaresuccessiveand tsvara s not. Among the points madeby Vasubandhuin his dialogue with a theist are that (a) if tsvarais said to will the successive

generation of dharmas,then he must have multipledesires;if he is single, he musthave a single desire, hence create dharmas all at once; (b) if isvara requiresassistance, then he is not the unique cause, and his assistant causes would require

furtherassistant causes, in infinite regress;(c) if s'varawills the creation of somedharmas n the present and some later, then he must be incapable of creating thelater dharmasnow, and if he cannot create them now, he cannot in the future,since his nature does not change;and (d) if the observed causes of various effectsare said to be auxiliaries to isvara'scausation, then it must be asked whethertsvara can prevent the effects from arising-he cannot, and therefore is both

impotent and irrelevant, for the observed impermanent causes are perfectlyadequate explanations for effects.48Vasubandhu also argues that since karmicresults are multiple, their cause cannot be

single,49and

that, similarly, sufferingcannot be originated by a cause that is single, nonsuccessive, or guided byintelligence.50

Among Mahayana Abhidharmika texts that include refutations of isvara,we



322 Jackson

will mention only the Yogacdrabhumi f Asafiga, which argues that (a) if isvara

has a reason for creation, then that reason is the real cause, whereas if he has

none, then he cannot be motivated to become a cause;(b) if isvara s immanentin

the cosmos, then he cannot stand outside as its creator, whereas if he is not

immanent in it, then he has no relation to it, and so cannot createit; (c) if isvara

createsintending

somepurpose, then it must be admitted that there is a purposehe has not yet fulfilled;and (d) if creation depends on Tsvara'swill alone, then

everything must arise simultaneously, while if it depends on an isvara who is

assisted, then he is not the unique cause.51

One final pre-Dharmakirtitext worthy of brief mention is the Tarkajvaldof

Bhavaviveka, or Bhavya (sixth century), whose discussion of isvara52 shows at

least a rudimentaryawareness of attemptsto prove isvara nferentiallyand of the

pitfalls entailed by those attempts. Bhavaviveka recitesa number of the standard

refutations, noting that the multiple events we observe in the world cannot be

assertedto arise from a uniquecause, but rather must be explainedas proceedingfrom a multiplicityof karmicconditions, and that isvaracannot be held to be anymore real than a sky-flower or a barren woman's son. He does note that one

possible argument for Tsvaras the syllogism, "The eye and so forth exist as

accompanied (that is, caused) by a maker,because they arearranged ike a pot."To this Bhavaviveka's response is that the syllogism is invalid because it proveswhat is already proven for the Buddhist, namely, that events have causes-for

the Buddhist, however, the causes are multiple (karman,the elements, parents,

and so forth), not a single arranger.A second syllogism, namely, "Isvarais themaker of the eye and so forth because he is permanent, uniqueand unproduced,"is rejected as unproved (asiddha)because of the absence of any corroborative

example of such an entity. Finally, the syllogism, "(The eye and so forth have)

isvara(as a makerprecedingthem) because (they are shaped),just as a pot has a

potter as its maker,"is rejectedon the grounds that a potter is (a) embodied and

(b) impermanent,neither of which is applicable to Tsvara.53

IV. DHARMAKIRTI'S CRITIQUE OF THEISM: CONTEXT

As noted in the introduction, Dharmakirti'srefutation of theism is found in thePramdnasiddhi hapter of his Pramdnavdrttika.The Pramdnavdrttikas loosely

constructedas a commentaryon Dignaga's Pramdnasamuccaya, nd the Pramd-

nasiddhichapter-regarded as the firstby modern editors and the second by the

Tibetan tradition54-is itselfan elaborategloss onjust one verse of thePramdna-

samuccaya, the first, wherein Dignaga salutes the Buddha as One Who Has

Become Authoritative (pramdn.abhzuta),ne Who Desires to Benefit the World

(jagaddhitaisin),theTeacher(sdstr),the Sugata,and the Savior(tdyin).The basic

purpose of the Pramdnasiddhi hapteris to demonstrate the Buddha'sauthorita-

tivenessfor those who desirespiritualliberation,through demonstratingthat it is

reasonableto regardhim as the BenevolentOne, theTeacher,the Sugata,and the

Savior.55These, in turn, are proven through a series of extended philosophical



323

arguments, the most important of which revolve around (a) defining authorita-

tiveness and giving negative and positive examples of beings who embody it, (b)

proving that positive mental qualities such as benevolence can be developed

infinitely, through demonstratingthat the mind-body relationis an interactionist

dualism that permits the existence of past and future lives, and (c) showing that

the Four Noble Truthstaught by the Buddha arein fact true, and, especially, thatacceptance or rejectionof a self (atman)is the key to samsdraand nirvana.As the

nineteenth-centuryTibetan commentator Mi pham notes, the proof of past and

future lives paves the way for proving that the Buddha has the causes for being

regarded as authoritative, while the proof that the Four Noble Truths are true

shows us the reason why he is authoritative.56

It is in the first general division of the chapter, that which defines and exem-

plifiesauthoritativeness, that the rejectionof Tsvaras to be found. After defining

pramdna (authoritativeness) in the first six verses57 as uncontradicted, fresh

cognition, Dharmakirti asserts in verse 7 that the Buddha fulfills this definition.

Before demonstrating generally (as he will in verses 29-33) that the Buddha is

authoritative because he knows what is to be rejectedandwhat accepted (heyopa-

deya) by those intent on liberation, Dharmakirti provides a "nonaccordant

example" for his definition of authoritativeness.This, of course, is Tsvara,whose

authoritativeness, creatorship, and existence are rejected in verses 8-28. The

argument can be broken down into three general sections: (1) verses 8-9 rejectisvara'sauthoritativeness;(2) verses 10-20 are a refutation of a theistic syllogism

purporting to prove that worldly effects must have a conscious cause, and thatcause is Tsvara; nd (3) verses 21-28 question the possibility that isvara could be

a causal agent, through a comparison between the characteristicsattributed to

Tsvaraand the reality of the causal process. We will consider each of these

arguments in turn, relying primarily upon Dharmakirti's own words. Where

necessary, we will turn for interpretive help to one of the greatest of Tibetan

Pramanavarttikacommentators, rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364-1432),58and, on occasion, to Dharmakirti's own disciple, Devendrabuddhi (or -mati).59

V. DHARMAKIRTI'SREJECTIONOF ISVARA'SAUTHORITATIVENESS

Dharmakirti already has established (in verses 3b-4b) that authoritativeness is

cognitive(dhT),an act of consciousness. Can one then posit the authoritativenessof a being whose nature is permanent (nitya)?

(8-9a:)

There is no permanent authoritative (being),Because authoritativeness cognizes (functioning) entities;Because, since objects of knowledge are impermanent,

That (which cognizes them) is unstable;Because that which is generated consecutivelyCannot be accepted as generated from a permanent (cause);(And because) it is unsuitable that (a permanentcause) depend on conditions.60



324 Jackson

Note that the explicit object of refutation here is simply a permanentauthorita-

tive cognition, which could define not only isvara,but such other non-Buddhist

concepts as dtman,purusa,and so forth. In fact, the termIsvaradoes not appearuntil verse 28. Still, isvara sprobablytheprimaryobjectof refutationthroughoutthis discussion, for (a) isvara is the only "permanent authority" mentioned

anywhere in the verses, (b) isvara is clearly indicated as the object of refutationby Dharmakirti's commentators, and (c) isvara had been singled out by pre-DharmakirtiNyaya-Vaisesikas as a permanent being who was the creator of all

effects, hence, by definition, authoritativeregardingall effects (omnisicient).

Taking isvara as the permanentauthoritativebeingwho is beingrejected,then,

we see that Dharmakirti'sargumentis as follows. That which any authoritative

cognition cognizes are the functioning entities (vastu)that are what is "real"in

the world. Functioning entities are known to be impermanent, that is, to exist

only momentarily. Any entity, therefore, actually is a succession of momentary

events, each following the other with inconceivable rapidity, and constituting a

"thing"only insofar as there is a certainsimilarityfrom one moment to the next.

Since it is objects that (conventionally, at least) generatecognitions, a cognition

of an object only can arise where an object exists. If an object exists only for a

moment, its cognition must be similarly momentary, generated successively.

Indeed,a permanentauthoritysaid to cognize all entitiesonlycould cognize them

simultaneously, for it does not change from one moment to the next. This would

mean that all objects in fact exist simultaneously, which manifestly is not so. If

it is maintained that isvara himself remains permanent, but that his cognitionsare impermanent in accordance with the succession of objects, then at least

two consequences ensue: (a) tsvarais being qualified with contradictory prop-

erties (permanence and impermanence)and (b) he is being accepted as depen-

dent on conditions (the succession of objects), which a permanentbeing cannot

be.61

It ought to be noted, before we continue, that Dharmakirti'sargument here

presupposes the validity of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, whereby

"existence"only is predicatedof efficient(arthakriya)entities, andefficiencyonly

can be predicated of momentary entities-since an entity that is not inherently

and instantly destructiblecannotbe destroyed, hence is immutable, and what is

immutable cannot interact with what is successive, as entities manifestly are.

Buddhistargumentsfor momentarinesswere highly controversial,62being open

to criticism for (a) vitiating causality by denying continuity and (b) begging the

questionby definingexistencein sucha way (asa particular ypeof efficacity) hat

onlymomentaryentities could fulfill the definition. It is not my intention to enter

into these fundamental argumentshere, but simply to point out that the debate

between Dharmakirti and hisopponents

is notnecessarily

self-contained, but

constantly opens out onto the broader metaphysical issues dividing them (and

these issues, in turn, are inextricablyintertwinedwith questions of the religious

psychologies of differenttraditions63).



325

To continue, having shown that a permanent authoritative cognizer is a

contradictoryconcept, Dharmakirtigoes on to rejectthe notion that isvaracould

be regardedas impermanent:

(9b:)

Because (a permanent cognizer) has not been helped in any way,There cannot be an impermanent authoritative (being).64

According to rGyal tshab, who follows Prajinakaraguptahere,65 "Because (a

permanentcognizer) has not been helped in any way" is intended as a proof that

isvara cannot be impermanent(hence a cognizer, since cognizers must be imper-

manent), for isvarais said to be self-sufficientand eternally liberated,while what

is impermanentmay or may not exist, may sufferor be liberated, in accordance

with helping or hinderingconditions. Thus, even if isvarais definedas imperma-

nent, other characteristics attributed to him vitiate that definition.66 As rGyaltshab rightly notes, Devendrabuddhi takes the line in question as furtherproofthat a permanentauthoritative cognition is impossible; indeed, he takes it as the

reason why a permanentcognizer cannot depend on conditions, that is, because

he cannot be helped in any way (being, by definition, permanent and self-

sufficient).67 f isvara'snot being helped is taken in this way, as furtherproof that

he cannot be a permanent cognizer, then the line, "There cannot be an imperma-nent authoritative (being)," stands alone, as a simple assertion that a beingdefined as permanentsimply cannotbe impermanent-although impermanence

is the nature of objects, and so of cognitions, too.

VI. DHARMAKIRTI'SREFUTATIONOF A THEISTICSYLLOGISM

Dharmakirti next addresseshimself to a specific formal inference that is allegedto prove the existence of a creator. First, he sets out the syllogism:

(10a:)

(Because of) intermittence, particularshape,Efficiency,etc., (a creator exists).68

The unnamed opponent here may be the Nyaya-Vaisesika, for, to our knowl-

edge, of all the Hindu theistic schools, only the Nyaya-Vaisesika had, byDharmakirti's time, sought to justify the creatorship of isvara through formalinference. Furthermore, the syllogism here phrased in rather skeletal form byDharmakirtibearsa close similarityto the argumentsprofferedby Uddyotakara,who insisted that worldly results requireda conscious motivator, like a hatchet,whose fashioning and use both point to the intervention of a conscious agent.69The syllogism also recalls Bhavaviveka's unnamed opponent, who argued thatall results

requirea creator because

theyhave a

specificarrangement,like a

pot,whose arrangementinforms us of the existence of a potter.70Commentarialglosses on Dharmakirti'spresentation of the theistic syllogism

make it clear that, in fact, threedifferentreasons arebeing offeredas probative of



326 Jackson

a creator. rGyal tshab, thus, restates the syllogism more fully as follows:

"Worldlyenvirons, bodies and enjoymentsarepreceded by themind of a maker,(a) because they act intermittently, like a hatchet, (b) because they have a

particular shape, like a pot and (c) because they are efficient(in fulfilling beings'aims), like a battle-axe." From these and other such statements, it is proven that

(abodes, bodies and possessions) have a maker whose mind has precededthem,and also that that (maker) is Tsvara.7'

The argument from intermittence makes the claim that because entities some-

times function and sometimes do not, their existence must be due to action by a

conscious agent.The argumentfromparticularshapemakesthe claimthat, quite

simply, designimpliesa designer,and thereis a designto entities, so there must be

a designer. The argument from efficiency makes the claim that the observed

efficiency of entities requires that they be preceded by an efficient maker who

foresaw the purposes they could fulfill. Dharmakirtidoes not turn to the argu-

ments fromintermittenceand efficiencyuntil laterin his discussion,wherehe will

rejectthem as part of his refutation of the causal agency attributedto Tsvara.He

will address himself first and in most detail to the argument from particular

shape.Dharmakirti's firstmove in refuting the syllogism, however, is to state gener-

ally the problems it entails:

(1Ob:)

(Here,)either (a) the assertion is already proven, or (b) the example is uncertain,

Or (c) the statement issues in doubt.72

According to rGyal tshab, (a) the assertion is already proven because the

syllogism simply states that "environs, bodies and enjoyments are preceded by

the mind of a maker," and this general concomitance will be accepted by the

Buddhist, too, since, according to the Buddhist, environs, bodies, and enjoy-

ments are precededby mental karman,hence by "the mind of a maker."One of

the requisitesfor posing a formal inferenceis that it seek to prove somethingnot

proven before, so the theistic syllogism is, in its general form, redundant. Fur-

thermore, if isvarain particularis posited as the conscious creator, then (b) the

example is uncertain,because all three examples-the hatchet, the pot, and the

battle-axe-are impermanent entities, which must, therefore, be made or em-

ployed by impermanent beings, whereas the entity to whose existence they are

supposed to point, Tsvara,s permanent.The examples, thus,may be probativeof

impermanentcauses, butnot of a permanentone. Finally, (c) the statementissues

in doubt, because even if environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by a

maker, there is no guarantee that that maker is TIvara,or Isvara s simply one

possibleexplanation for theway thingsare-and not a verypromisingone, given

that, for example, the entities whose explanation is sought areimpermanentand

intermittent,while Tsvaras permanent, and so cannot be intermittent.73

Dharmaklrtinow turns to an analysis of the argumentfrom particularshape,



327

that is, that environs, bodies, and enjoymentshave precedingthem the mind of a

maker (Tsvara), ecause they have particularshape, like a pot, or a mansion:

(11:)

(If) shape, etc., are proved such as to be

Positively and negatively related to a designer,

An inference from that (shape to that designer)Is reasonable.74

Much of the force of this statement is derivedby implication. According to rGyal

tshab, the main point is this: if, and only if, environs, bodies, and enjoymentsare

shapedjust as a pot is, can we infer that they are preceded by a single conscious

designer, as a pot is. "Shaped as a pot is" can have two differentmeanings here:

the arrangement of the material of the pot, and the process whereby that

arrangementwas achieved. By either interpretation, "particular shape" is found

to be a reason that is unproven in the subject ("environs, bodies, and enjoy-ments"). First of all, it is perfectly self-evident that environs, bodies, and enjoy-ments do not have the same shape as a pot (or a mansion), and so we cannot

necessarilyinfer that they have a maker in the same way that a pot does, for it is

entirely possible that different particular types of shapes may have different

particular types of causes generating them. Indeed, a Buddhist will argue that

such things as environs, bodies, and enjoyments actually have precedingthem a

multiplicity of mentalkarmans,not a singlecreator-designer.Secondly, the mere

fact that a particular shape, a pot, arises from a single conscious designer does

not mean that differentshapes or differenttypes of shapes need necessarilyarisein the same way; again, the Buddhist will posit mental karmans as the cause and

will claim that, although consciousness may be involved in producing karmic

effects, conscious designis not. Thus, unless the theist wants to claim, absurdly,that all entities are shapedjust as a pot is, he cannot make inferencesabout them

that are based on the particularcircumstances of the pot.75Dharmakirti turns now from an examination of "particularshape" to "shape

in general," to see whether it may be probative:

(12:)

(A quality) is proven in an entity by a particular(reason),(But that) a term similar(to the reason is probative) because of its (alleged) non-

difference(from the reason)Cannot reasonably be inferred;(That would be) like (inferring)fire from a grey substance.76

Here, the theist's problem is that if he tries to claim the term "shape"in general(rather than the particular shape of, for example, a pot) as probative, he has

provided a reason that is too general,and thus unproven in the subject.Granted,we legitimately apply the term "shaped" to environs, bodies, and enjoyments,but whereaswe areable to inferthat a pot or a mansion has precedingit the mindof some person, because we have observed positive and negative concomitance



328 Jackson

between these objects and a maker, we have not observed such concomitance in

the case of, for example, the particularrealms into which we are born, the bodies

we have, and the environment that we share, with its mountains, seas, and

forests. Thus, a particular designer is proven in the cases of some particular

shapes, but one cannot generalize from this that any object to which the word

"shaped"applies necessarilymust have a similardesigner,for the sources of theshapes of differing shaped objects may very well differ. Thus, just as the term

"greysubstance"(of which smoke is only one type) is too generalto be the basis

of a legitimate inference of the presenceof firein a particular place, so the term

"shape" alone is too general to be the basis of a legitimate inference that all

shaped objects must arise in the same way that some shaped objects do.77

Dharmakirti draws out the extreme consequences entailed by the probative

value of "shape" by pointing out that:

(13:)

If that is not the case, then a potterMay be proven to have made an ant-hill,Because it has some (similarity)to the shapeOf clay in a pot, etc.78

The example is an interestingone, becauseit can be read as refutingtheprobative

value of either a particular shape or the general term "shape," the particular

aspects of shape analyzed in the two precedingverses. First, an anthill-at least

of the Indian variety-has the same shape as a pot. We ought, therefore, toconclude on the basis of this similaritythat it was made by a potter, whereaswe

know quite well that it was made by ants. Thus, a similarityin shape does not

imply a necessarysimilarityin origin. Second, even if an anthill werenot shaped

like a pot, the general fact that it is "shaped" has no probative value for the

theistic syllogism. Indeed, if anything, the anthillis a counter-exampleto thepot,

since it is an instanceof a shapedobject,yet it is one that we know by observation

to be positively and negatively concomitant with causes that are (a) multiple

ratherthan single and (b) very possibly unconscious ratherthan conscious.79In

short, then, the term"shape"cannot be probative,becausespecificinquiriesinto

its meaning and relevance show that a particular shape (for example, a pot)

cannot be probative because not all objects have that particular shape, while

shape in general cannot be probative because differentshapes may arise under

differentcircumstances,as an anthill arises in a differentmanner from a pot.

In the next six verses (numbers 14-20) Dharmakirti digresses in a direction

that is more of logical than theological interest, and I will pass over this dis-

cussion relatively quickly. Against an opponent's suggestion that the analysis to

which he hassubjected

the reason in the theistic syllogism is an instance of

karyasama,an overly specificrefutation that can rebound upon or have "equal

results"for therefuter,Dharmakirtipoints out thatkaryasamaoccursonly when

a legitimate general reason is illegitimately undermined by an overly specific



329

analysisof its details,80as when thegenerallyvalid inference"A conch-sound is a

result,because it arisesfrom effort" is underminedby posing a sophistic dilemma

whereby a sound cannot arise before the effort or as a result of a new, unpre-

cedented effort.81The refutation of the theistic reason, on the other hand, has

rested on the principle that a reason may be probative of a predicate for a

particular class of objects, but that a term lexically similar but semanticallydifferent from that reason cannot thus be probative; one cannot, for instance,

maintain that words have horns simply because there exists a term, gotva, that

denotes both "cowness" and "wordness"82-any more than one can maintain

that environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by the mind of a creator,

tivara,simplybecause they have "shape."83Dharmakirti driveshome the conse-

quences of the theistic syllogism by pointing out that if words alone were

probative, then simply by uttering a word one ought to attain its object, and all

goals would be achieved, and all syllogisms proved, simply through the manipu-

lation of words-which, in fact, arise not from the existence of their referents,

but simply from a speaker's or writer's desire to express them.84

This same type of refutation, Dharmakirti adds, can be applied to the syllo-

gisms of other schools. For instance, the Samkhya assertion, "Buddhi s nonsen-

tient, because it is impermanent,"is refuted on the grounds that the Samkhya is

using a reason, impermanence,that he himself cannot really accept, since imper-manence only is admitted of momentary entities, which buddhiand the other

evolutes ofprakrti are not. The Jainaassertion, "A tree is sentient, because it dies

when its bark is stripped,"is refuted on the grounds that the definition of deathbeing applied by the Jaina is too broad to be admissible by his opponents, and

thus cannot be adduced.85In both cases, words ("impermanence," "death") are

used improperly, and so the syllogism is vitiated.

In the next three verses (and a supplemental verse found in Tibetan but not

Sanskrit),Dharmakirti goes on to draw from these considerations some generalconclusions about logical reasons. In the first place, the validity of a reason

depends on whether it is generally relevant to the subject and positively and

negatively concomitant with the predicate.If the reason is generallycorrect, then

it cannot be underminedby overly specificcritiques,as, for instance, the fact that"sound is impermanentbecause it is a product" cannot be refutedby attemptingto show that sound's relationshipto space is unaccounted for.86Further,even ifa particular term is unproven, if the meaning of the term is proven then the

syllogism is valid, as, for instance, the Buddhist syllogism "Atoms are imperma-nent because they have aspects (murti)" will be accepted for discussion by a

Vaisesika,who does not admit the wording of the reason "haveaspects,"but can

supply from his own system a term with equivalent meaning, "is tangible."87

Conversely, even if a word isunmistaken,

if themeaning

isinappropriate,

thenthe termcannot be probative, for entities areproven from otherentities, not from

words.88 The Tibetan version here adds an example illustrating this last point:one cannot argue that either (a) "A colored cow is a cow because it is a 'goer



330 Jackson

(jagat)'," or (b) "A babyelephantis an elephantbecauseit is an 'hand-possessor'

(hastin)',"for in each instance the reason is merely an expressionused colloqui-

ally to refer to the predicate,a cow or an elephant;in fact, there are "goers"that

arenot cows and "hand-possessors"that are not elephants.89By the sametoken,

there are shapes that presupposea single, conscious shaper,but thereare shapes

that may not. Hence, the theistic syllogism is invalid.

VII. DHARMAKIRTI'SREJECTIONOF ISVARA AS CAUSALAGENT

In the final eight verses of his discussion, Dharmakirtidirectly attacks the idea

that isvara can be considered a causal entity, exposing the logical difficulties

involved in the theistic belief in a permanentcreator-God. In the course of his

analysis, he refutes the two other reasons that formed part of the theistic

syllogism, that is, the argument from intermittence and the argument from

efficiency.He does not refutethem in as much detail as he did the argumentfrom

specificshape, but they arecentralto his concerns.We will signal those passages

in which they are addressed, since the refutation of the arguments from inter-

mittence and efficiencywill complete the refutationof the theisticsyllogismposed

in verse 10.

Dharmakirti first attempts to show that the argument from intermittence

entails a logical contradiction:

(21:)

How, if an entity is a cause,(But is said) sometimes to beA non-cause, can one assert in any wayThat a cause is a non-cause?One cannot so assert.90

The argumentfrom intermittencestates that the fact thatentitiessometimesarise

and sometimes do not, that is, are occasional or intermittentin nature, requires

the postulation of a conscious being that servesas theircauseat those timeswhen

they arise, and that that being is isvara.Dharmakirtipoints out, however, that a

being that serves as the cause of intermittententities must, by definition, be a

noncause, too, since (a) an intermittententity has times of nonproduction, whenits eventual cause is actually its noncause, and (b) at the time when the cause is

generatingthe intermittententity, there still are other intermittententities that it

is not generating,so it servesas the noncause of some entitiesat the same time as

it servesas the cause of others. (a) Successivecausality and noncausality poses a

problem because the causal entity posited by the theist, Isvara, s permanent.He

cannot, therefore, change from moment to moment, and if he is asserted to be

causal, then he must alwaysbe causal, and can neverbecome noncausal, for that

would entail a change in nature, an impossibility for a permanent entity. (b)

Simultaneouscausality and noncausality poses a problem, because isvara is a

single entity, yet is being furnishedwith contradictory qualities at one and the

same time. Contradictory properties cannot be predicated of a single, partless



331

entity at one and the same time, and if these propertiesarereaffirmed, hen Tsvara

cannot be single, but must be multiple.91 Isvara cannot, thus, be a creator of

intermittent entities.92

Dharmakirtinext turns to a series of problemsthat revolve around the theistic

contention that Tsvaras the actual empowering cause that gives to the causes we

observe the ability-or efficiency-whereby they yield their results. The firstdilemma entailed by this is that:

(22:)

(If Tsvaras an unseen cause, then) when Caitra is healed

By connection with a weapon or medicine,Why could not an unconnected post,Although not cognized, be the cause (of healing)?93

Dharmakirti's attack here is directed at the postulation of an extra causal entity

in situations where we already can provide an adequate accountof the causal

process. For instance, it is to Dharmaklrtia well-attested fact that a knife wound

can be healed by medicine or by the knife itself, the latter being an instance of

what Nagatomi calls "homeopathic magic."94If we areto posit a furtherunseen

cause behind the observed causes, then why not claim that an unseen, irrelevant

post be involved in the process?95One invisible entity, Dharmakirti implies, is

reallyno more absurd than another, and the postulation of any such entity tends

to make a mockery of our attempts to understandcausality, for the implication is

that anythingmay be posited as the cause of any result.

Dharmakirti presses the attack, pointing out furtherproblems in the conceptof Tsvara:

(23:)

One whose nature does not varyIs unsuitable as a creator;Since a permanent (entity) never is absent,Even if it has the ability (to be a cause), it is difficult to see.96

The first half of the verse is, in a sense, a reiteration of a fundamental and

recurring argument, namely, that a permanent entity cannot be posited as thecause of impermanent entities, since (a) the entity is asserted sometimes to be a

noncause, and its nature cannot change, so it cannot become a cause;97 (b)

causality is a process that involves intermittence,and a permanententity cannot

be intermittent, since intermittence involves a change in nature; and (c) if a

permanentcause is posited, then causality cannot be an intermittentprocess, but

must occur all at once, since a permanentcause could not alter so as to produceentities in a second moment. The second half of the verseraises still another basic

objection, namely, that if isvarais the unseen cause of everyresult, then he must

be ubiquitous and can never be absent. A cause, however, is definedas that in the

absence of which a result does not arise, so an entity that never is absent cannot

meaningfully be described as a cause. Indeed, whether Tsvara s only intermit-



332 Jackson

tently present (as argued earlier) or ubiquitous (as his nature would seem to

dictate) seems to have little actual bearingon our analysesof causality,which, in

fact, turn on the presence or absence of certain observable actors. One may, if

one wishes, posit an extra entity such as isvara as the cause behindobservable

causes, but positive and negativeconcomitance can only be observed with regard

to the observed causes. Since observedpositive and negative concomitance is anadequatebasis for the explication of any causal situation, the extra "behind-the-

scenes" cause (whether principal or assistant) must be either redundant or

impotent.98

Thereis a furtherconsequence of the postulation of an invisible cause-behind-

the-scenes, namely:

(24:)

When some (cause) exists, some (result)comes to be;

If some cause other than thatIs supposed, then there will be no endTo the causes of any result.99

rGyal tshab sums up this point succinctly by remarkingthat:

There would follow an infinite regressof causes for every result, because then itwould be acceptable to think that when some cause assists a result, the cause ofthe result is something else, which we do not see as being able to generatesomeresult.10

Once again, then, the postulation of an unseen cause destabilizes our notion ofcausality, for the admission of unseen and unseeablecauses opens the door to an

infinity of such causes, which is tantamount to causal chaos. Here, it ought

perhaps to be added in all fairness that the Buddhist notion of karmancan be

subjected to the same general critique as isvara. Karmanis certainly neither

permanent nor ubiquitous in the way that isvara is, but it is an unseen causal

factor that is operative in virtually every situation in which sentient beings are

involved. In those instances where other causes can be adduced, karman is

superfluous, unless we insist that there be a moral explanation for everything;

while in those instances where we do not have adequate explanations, karmanservessomewhat theway the "God of thegaps"does in Westerntheology, that is,

as a stop-gap explanation where observable concomitances have not yet been

established. Karman,like isvara, explains so much that it threatens to explain

nothing at all.

In the final four verses of the section, Dharmakirtiresponds to some possible

objections to his arguments, thereby clarifying his notion of the causal process

and tsvara'sunsuitability for participation in it. The firstobjection, as supplied

by rGyaltshab, claims that, "... according to you, when soil, etc., do not

generatea sprout, they cannot change theirnature,so there will be no generation

of a sprout." 101In other words, if entities cannot change their naturefrom that

of noncause to cause, then soil, moisture, sunlight, and the seed itself, which are



333

not at this moment generating a sprout, will never be able to. Dharmakirti's

response is that:

(25:)

In the generation of a sprout, the soil and other (conditions)Do change their nature

And become causes, for when we see that (cultivation)Is done well, (the harvest) is excellent.102

The implicit point here is that it is only a permanent entity, such as isvara, that

cannot become a cause once it has been a noncause; such causal conditions as

soil, moisture, sunlight, and the seed areall impermanent, momentaryentities, so

there is no contradiction in assertingthat at one moment they arenoncauses and

at another moment they are causes. Indeed, such must be the case, for we observe

that soil and the other conditions do serve as noncauses at one time (early in the

season) and as causes at another, later time (harvest).103Conversely, it might beadded, the fact that it clearly is the case that entities can change from noncauses

into causes is a further demonstration of their necessary impermanence, since a

permanent entity could not thus change.Dharmakirti next entertains and answers a related objection:

(26:)

If you say, "Just as object and organ,Meeting without alteration, cause cognition,So, too, (Isvara s a cause without

alteration,)"it is not so.

Because there is alteration (of organ and object) from when (they have notmet).104

The objector here evidently is a Nyaya-Vaisesika, for the account of cognition

being offered derives from the Nydyasutra,l05 where it is said that cognitionresults from the contact between an organ and an object. The claim is made that

just as organ and object do not perceptibly change from one moment to the next,and yet in the firstmoment there is no cognition while in the second there is, so

isvara,although he does not change, can be a noncause one moment and-our

nonperception notwithstanding-a cause the next. The Buddhist has two pos-sible responses, one doctrinal, the other logical. The doctrinal is that the Nyaya-Vaisesika account of the cognitive process is incorrect, and that there is a third

factor that determines a cognition, namely, a previous cognition, whose presenceor absence and particular qualities must be posited to explain the evident fact

that-even if organ and object areadmitted not to vary-cognitions do vary.106

Alternatively, if the opponent be taken as accepting the Buddhistpostulation of

threeconditions for cognition, then the logical objection can be made that, at the

very least, the organ must vary, for otherwise we could not explain the relative

clarity or dullness of cognitions.107A further logical objection, of course, is simply that the postulation of an

entity's noncausality at one time and causality at another requiresthat there be



334 Jackson

an alteration, because between a cause and a noncause there is a diference, a

difference that can only be explained by positing an alteration in nature. Thus,

Dharmakirti adds:

(27:)

(Factors) that are individually powerless (as causes),

If they do not change their nature,Will be powerless even when they meet.

Thus, alteration is proved.108

In the instance of the organ, object, and cognition, the three factors are con-

sidered individuallyunable but collectively able to generate a cognition. Dhar-

makirti's point, however, is that regardless of whether they are functioning

individuallyor collectively, the three factors cannot be causallypotent if it is not

admitted that their nature changes-for the simple reason that previously they

have been a noncause, and in orderto be efficacious,they must change in natureso as to become a cause. Thus, according to rGyal tshab:

... it is proven that the three conditions have different natureswhen they havemet and when they have not met, becausewe see the difference hat they generateor do not generate sense-cognition when they have met or have not met.109

Dharmakirticoncludes his refutationwith a final observation of the incompat-

ibility between the concept of cause and the concept of isvara-here named for

the first time as the object of refutation:

(28:)

Thus, those (factors) that are individually powerless(But bring about) the existence of the quality (of the result)when they have metAre causes; [svara,etc.,Are not (causes), because they do not alter.110

Causality, then, is a process entailing not only the presenceor absence of certain

factors (whereby,as we saw, s'vara ould not be considereda cause), but also the

alteration of those factors in such a way that they change from being noncauses

to being causes. Thus, the generation of a sprout requires (a) the presence ofcertain factors that might not be present, that is, the seeds, soil, moisture,

sunlight, and so forth, and(b) the alterationof the natureof each of these so that

theirindividual causal nonefficacitybecomes theircollective efficacity.Similarly,

a sense-cognition requires(a) the object, organ, and precedingcognition and(b)

an alteration of each of these such that individual nonefficacity can become

collective efficacity.Now, this alterationis not some superaddedprocessbeyond

the meeting of the conditions, but it must be specified as part of the causal

process,for without such specification, one might overlook the ontological

differencethat is entailed by causality. Difference, in turn, requires imperma-

nence, for entities are known sometimes to be causes and sometimes to be

noncauses of particularevents, but it is contradictory that they be both at the



335

same time, while apermanententity, like isvara,cannot alter its nature, and so it

must always be a noncause or always a cause. If it is always a noncause, then the

discussion is academic; if it is always a cause, then it must be ubiquitous, and it

cannot be accepted as a cause, because its presence or absence cannot be

observed to make a differencein the generation of a result.

Before leaving Dharmakirti, we ought to note that he adduces one additionalargument against 7svara,later in the Pramdnasiddhichapter, when he insists

(following the line of reasoning of such predecessorsas Vasubandhu111) that the

cause of the various sufferingsexperienced by beings cannot be a unique cause,

because the variety among resultspermitsus only to infera varietyof causes, and

because, as has been demonstrated, a permanent cause cannot be proven to

exist.112rGyal tshab, finally, adds his own version of the argumentfrom evil, at

the end of his discussion of the vital and trivialcharacteristicsof omnisciencethat

may be attributed to "authoritative" beings: "If someone who can make any-

thing because of his knowledge of the sciences is omniscient, then he also hasmade the sufferings of the lower realms...." With this in mind, rGyal tshab

concludes, we should turn not to such a being, but to "someone who, having

accomplished the elimination of every last fetter, is omniscient regardinghow all

objects really exist." 113 The latter sort of being is one who trulyis authoritative

for those intent on liberation, and is, of course, exemplifiedby the Buddha, who

has not made the world, but knows it, and knows the way out of it.

VIII. THE THEIST-ATHEISTDEBATEAFTERDHARMAKIRTI

Dharmakirti'sattack on theism was a stinging one, but it did not end the debate

between theists and atheists any more than did Hume's critique in the West.

Indeed, as noted earlier, Dharmakirti's discussions had the salutary effect of

raising the discussion to a new level of sophistication, and in the centuries

following him the issue was joined not only by Nyaya-Vaisesikas responding tohis attacks, but by still other Buddhists, as well as by Mimamsakas and Jainas.These debates have been covered well elsewhere,114and we have neitherthe neednor the space to outline them in detail. We will, however, survey them briefly.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika response to Dharmakirti's critique was far fromimmediate. Indeed, it was nearly three centuries after Dharmakirti, in the

Nyayamafijarl of Jayanta Bhatta, that a counterattack finally was mounted. Inthe meantime, furthercritiques of theism had been forthcoming, not only from

Buddhists, but from Mlmamsakas and Jainas, as well. The first important post-Dharmakirti Buddhist attack on theism is that of Santideva (eighth century),who criticizes a number of non-Buddhist views of causality in the ninth chapterof his Bodhicaryivatara. Among these is the Naiyayika claim that isvara, a

divine, pure, permanent, single creator, is the source ofeverything. But,

notes

Santideva, if tsvara is identified with the elements that are accepted as thematerial causes of material things, there is a contradiction, because these ele-ments are neitherpurenor permanentnor single. On the other hand, if he is said



336 Jackson

to be the creator of the permanentpaddrthasthat constitute the world accordingto Nyaya-Vaisesika, then there is a problem, because permanententities cannot

have an origin, while if worldly phenomena aregrantedimpermanence,thentheycannot be accounted for by a permanent, single entity.115 The remainder of

Santideva's argument recapitulates earlier Buddhist analyses of the problems

entailed by Tsvara's ermanence,his need for assistants, and his creation with orwithout a desire to do so.116

A century later, in the Tattvasamgraha, Santaraksita criticized creation

theories centering on both isvara and purusa1 7-though the characteristics of

purusa are not those of the Samkhya purusa, but of the Vedantin brahman.

Together with Kamalasila's Paijika, the Tattvasamgrahaprobably is the most

detailed extant Buddhist critique of theism. Much of the section on isvara

recapitulates and expands upon Dharmakirti's refutation of the theistic syllo-

gism, although Santaraksita does add points of his own. For example, to

Aviddhakarana's claim that the simultaneous functioning of two senses must be

explained by recourseto a conjunctivesubstratumand that, by analogy, so must

the combinations of the world be explained by the concept of isvara,he repliesthat it is unproveneitherthat therecan be two simultaneously functioning senses,or that the category of "conjunction" (samyoga) is admissible.118Santaraksita

also points out that isvara cannot be the source of a verbal revelation, for the

simplereasonthathe has no body, henceno mouth, and verbal communication is

dependent on the existence of a mouth.119 The critiqueofpurusa centers on the

dilemma posed by purusa's (a) motives (if he is motivated by another, he is notself-sufficient; f he is motivated by compassion, he must create a perfectworld,

while if he cannot createa perfectworld, he is not powerful;andif he is motivated

by "amusement," then he is both cruel and dependent on the instrument of

amusement, namely, the cosmos)120 and (b) potency (if he is able to create all

things, he must do so immediately,for potency entails immediategeneration).121

Attacks on theism also were launched by the two great theoreticians of

MTmamsa,Prabhakaraand Kumarila (seventh-eighthcenturies). Motivated in

partby their idiosyncraticconcern to show that the Vedas are without an author

(which isvara sometimes was said to be), the Mimamsakas adduced some refu-tations that overlapped those of the Buddhists, and others that were unique. Of

note among the latterwereargumentsthat raisedquestions of whether isvara can

be said to have a body or not: we know that creative agency withinthe world

requiresa body. If isvara s to be proved by analogy to worldlycreativity,he must

have a body, yet he is claimed by Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition to be bodiless-

although we know that will alone cannot generateresults: some physical agency

is required.If isvarais admittedto have a body, then variousconsequencesensue:

for instance, if isvarahas a body, whencehas that body come?If it is from another

creator, then that creator's body must have a creator, and so on, in infinite

regress; f from himself, then he must have had a body with which to create that

body, which must have had a preceding body-again, there is an infiniteregress.



337

Further, of what could isvara's body be made? It cannot be made of material

elements, because they have not been created yet, while it cannot be immaterial,

because the immaterial cannot be the cause of the material.122Jaina critiquesof theism, as in the eighth-century Saddarsanasamuccayaof Haribhadra, the

thirteenth-centurySyddvddamanjarTf Mallisena and the fifteenth-centuryTar-

karahasyadFpikdf

Gunaratna,are

easilyas

sophisticated as those of the Bud-dhists and Mimamsakas, and open some interesting areas of discussion, but

cannot detain us here.123

As noted above, the first concerted Nyaya-Vaisesika counterattack is con-

tained in the tenth-century Nydyamaijarl of Jayanta Bhatta, who states the

theistic syllogism in the following form:Tsvaraxists because he produces a result

(the cosmos) of a type that presupposes a maker who knows the process and

motive of production, like a potter. Jayanta considers at least twelve different

arguments against the existence of isvara, most of them familiar, such as the

inadequacy of the potter analogy, the problems entailed by Isvara'sembodimentor bodilessness, questions of motive, and the superiorityof "impersonal"expla-

nations, such as karman.Jayanta sets out to demonstrate that his various oppo-nents' disproofs are themselves riddled with logical flaws. The assertion, for

instance, that naturalobjectsdo not necessarilyhave a conscious designeris itself

uncertain, and thus cannot be adduced as a good logical reason refuting the

theistic reason, while the theistic argument by analogy is valid because in those

instances where we have observed an object's source of design, that source has

been a consciousdesigner. Thus,

all effects can bededuced to arise from aconscious designer, including the world itself. Jayanta reasserts Tsvara'snon-

corporeality, maintaining that his will can activate physical results in the same

way that the human will can activate the body; in either case, an immaterial

agency does have material effects. Isvara'scompassion is justified by explainingthat he creates, for example, hell only as a sort of "holding-cell" for beings untiltheir karmanpermits their salvation. Finally, the view, for example, that "col-lective" karmanratherthan a single designeris the cause of the naturalenviron-ment is rejectedon the grounds that human responsesto the environment are too

varied(some people love the mountains, others do not) to enable us to posit suchkarmic "cooperation." 124

Other Nyaya-Vaisesika defenses of theism included those of Vyomasiva'stenth-century VyomavatT, hich reiterates the point that an effectpresupposesan

intelligent designer, and reaffirmsthat the cosmos presupposes a powerful andomniscient designer,125and Vacaspatimisra's tenth-century Nydyavdrttikatdt-paryatlkd,whereit is arguedthat the law of parsimony (ldghava)requiresthat thecreation of the various entities of nature be attributed to one, rather than a

multiplicity of, divinities, and that such a divinity must be inconceivably power-ful and knowledgeable to be able to effect such a creation.126

The Buddhist position was reaffirmed in the eleventh century by Jfinas-

rimitra, whose Isvaravddais in part an expanded commentary on some of



338 Jackson

Dharmakirti'sdiscussion,and by Jfianaasris isciple,Ratnakirti,in his Isvarasdd-

hanadusana.127 It was in response to Jiananrimitra's attack, described by

Chemopathy128as the most thorough since Dharmakirti, that the last great

Nyaya-Vaisesika defense of theism, Udayana's Nydyakusumainjali,was com-

posed. Udayana's work is complex and sophisticated enough to have been the

subject of a number of scholarly monographs,129and I will not discuss it here,pausing only to note that it includes detailed attempts to refute other schools'

attacks on isvara,and sets out two series of positive proofs, the first (consistingof nine proofs) demonstrating isvara's existence, and the second (also nine

proofs) demonstratinghis authorshipof the Vedas. The firstseriesof arguments,

though a brilliantsynthesis,does not add a greatdeal to earlierNyaya-Vaisesika

discussions; the second series is quite original, but is directed primarily at the

Mlmamsakas, and would be considered irrelevantby a ndstika such as a Bud-

dhist or Jaina. The Nydyakusumdnjalitself stimulatedcounterattacks, from the

Vedanta school of Ramanuja and, eventually, in the last great classical work

of the theist-atheistdebate, Gunaratna's TarkarahasyadTpik.30

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

By way of conclusion, I want to addressmyself brieflyto two somewhat broader

questions that naturally emerge from our considerations of the theological

disputes engaged in by Dharmakirti and other Indian philosophers. The first

question is: To what degree are the arguments of Dharmakirti (or, for that

matter, any of his supporters or antagonists) philosophically conclusive withinan Indian frame of reference?The second question is: To what degreecan these

Indiantheological discussions be transposedonto the atheist-antitheist debateas

it has unfolded in the West?

In principle,the various Indianphilosopherswho arguedback and forth about

the existence of savaraccepted a common set of rules for their discussions, and

so deciding who was right and who was wrong ought to be a simple matter of

seeing who begs the fewest questions and who constructs syllogisms with the

most care. Such decisions only can be simple, however, if (a) the rational

structuresdevised for discussion are themselvesfoolproof and (b) the disputants

do not import any idiosyncraticdoctrinal notions into intersystemicdiscussions.

In point of fact, however, (a) the reliability of formal inference-either in

principle or, at least, for deciding metaphysical questions-was attacked even

from within the Indian tradition, by such thinkers as Nagarjuna, Safikara,

Jayarasiand Purandara,who claimed either that the positing and structuringof

pramdanasould not themselves be supported by any pramdnawithout begging

the question, or that inference,even if accepted as provisionally valid, could not

inform us on matters forever beyond perceptualken.

Further, (b) veryreal

differences in the ways in which different schools approached philosophical

problems tendedinvariablyto color even the most carefully "depersonalized"of



339

arguments. Indeed, I think that discussions of the existence or nonexistence of

Tsvara erve as a good example of the inevitability of such coloration.

If we strip away the almost bewildering variety of arguments we have re-

viewed, we find at bottom two basic issues on which-to take our two main

antagonists-the Nyaya-Vaisesikas and Buddhists have disagreed: (1) the

existence of a permanent entity and its relation to the impermanentand (2) therequirement that causal action entail a conscious agent. Many complex philo-

sophical discussions turn on these two issues, yet it might be argued that the

attitudes toward each entertained by each of the schools is, in fact, pre-

philosophical, and thus not essentially amenable to revision on the basis of

rational considerations.

(1) The permanence-impermanenceissue is one that goes very far back and

very deep in the Indian tradition. Much of the religious and philosophical search

that produced both the Upanisads and Buddhism was gearedtoward the discov-

ery of an immutable state that was free from the vicissitudes of samsara, yet in

searching for and explicating this state, Hindu and Buddhist schools arrived at

very different conclusions. Hindu schools, of which Nyaya-Vaisesika is one,concluded on the basis of religious experience and logic that the impermanententities we see around us must in some way be subsumedor limited by an eternal

substance that provides their continuity, the continuity that we know to be the

basis of order in the cosmos. Buddhists, on the other hand, concluded on the

basis of theirempiricaland logical explorations that there is not, nor could there

possibly be, a permanentsubstance,for sucha substance can neitherchange itselfnor interact with the impermanent. Thus, the Nyaya-Vaisesika (or Vedantin)insistence on the necessity of permanenceto explaincontinuity, and the Buddhist

insistence on the necessity of impermanence to explain change are deep-seatedand seeminglyirreconcilablepositions, and, much like a Kantian antinomy, each

seems logically to exclude the other and yet, when taken alone, to lead to

insuperable difficulties. To the degree that the dispute over permanence and

impermanenceis one of the core issues in discussions of isvara,those discussions

may be impossible to resolve.

(2) The question whether cause-and-effect requires a conscious agent alsoseems rooted in prephilosophical decisions that commit the Nyaya-Vaisesikasand Buddhists to irreconcilablepositions. Here, I think the problem may be thesource for the model of causality that each school constructs. Buddhist medi-tation and Buddhist logic tend to be radically depersonalized,that is, to de-constructpersonalnotions into impersonalprocessesmuch like those we observe

among nonsentient entities. Thus, causality is not even a "personal"process onthe level of the sentient individual, who actually is a nexus of impersonal forces,some materialand some

mental; and,needless to

say,nonsentient entities do not

requirea personalagent, either.The Nyaya-Vaisesikas, on the other hand-their

"atomism"notwithstanding-tend to drawtheirmodel of causality fromhuman



340 Jackson

activities:movement of the body is preceded(usually) by a conscious intention, a

pot by a potter, a house by an architect and builders. By analogy, then, we

conclude that other objects in nature-whose sources we do not know-must

also arise through personal agency, and so, by extension, must the overall

arrangementof the world; an agent responsible for the overall arrangementof

the world must be a vastly powerful and knowledgeable being, such as isvara.Once again, the antagonists seem to have arrived at completely antithetical

positions by beginning from different places, and it is difficult to see where a

common ground could be found.

Thus, Indianargumentsover the existenceor nonexistenceof [svarahave their

inherentfascinations, and yet we must remain awarethat they may not be finally

soluble, for the simple reason that, despite their agreementon the meanings of

many terms, the disputants have vastly different approaches to some basic

problems,and this disparityof approachesthreatens to render the argumentson

which they are based forever inconclusive.Let us turn, then, to the second general question with which we began this

section, that of the applicability of the Indian discussion to the Western debate

over the existence of God. One must, needless to say, be very cautious in

entertaining such comparisons, for concepts that seem identical in two different

cultural-philosophical traditions more often than not are revealed on closer

examination to be quitedifferent,both in denotation andconnotation. Certainly,

the frequenttranslation of isvaraas "God" seems at first blush to be legitimate,

for are not the basic characteristics of isvara-permanence, omniscience, inde-pendence, creatorship,compassion-very much like the attributesof the Chris-

tian God? A closer examination, however, reveals that there are considerable

differences between the Christian God and most of the Indian models. The

brahmanof most Vedantin schools, for instance, transformsitself into the world,

is the world's material cause, whereas the Christian God does not become the

world, but, rather,creates it ex nihilo,and remains forever transcendentto it. The

paramapurusa hat is isvara in the Yoga system does not create the world, or

arrange it, or relate to it in any way, whereas the Christian God does all three.

The tsvaraof Nyaya-Vaisesika does not create the eternalpaddrthasthat consti-tute the world, although he does arrange them into the cosmos that we know,

whereasthe ChristianGod createsboth the "raw material"and the arrangement

of the cosmos.

Theseconsiderations, in turn,must be weighedwhen we decide whetheror not

to describethe Nyaya-Vaisesika syllogism rejectedby Dharmakirtias simplyan

Indian version of the "argument from design" (or teleological argument) for

God's existence. 31 The Nyaya-Vaisesikas, afterall, weretalkingabout one type

of "God," while the God asserted by, for example, Aquinas and Newton and

rejected by, for example, Hume are, in fact, very different; furthermore, the

argumentsarisein differentcontexts and areconducted in differentphilosophical

languages.



341

All these points are well taken, but they do not totally undermine the com-

parison. To begin with, the "languages" of Indian and Western philosophy are

different,but that does not mean that there is not a fair degree of translatability

across traditions:the inductive and deductive processes generally accepted to be

the basis of sound reasoning are found in both, as are many of the same notions

of the types of flaws that may vitiate arguments. Secondly, even if there aredifferences between isvara and God, they are not so great as to obviate all

comparison between their roles and the arguments for their existence. The

argumentfrom design, afterall, simply attempts to show generallythat the order

we perceive in the cosmos presupposes a single conscious designer and/or sus-

tainerof that order. It reallyis a secondarymatter(pace Kant) whether the being

responsible for the cosmic order creates ex nihilo or arranges preexistent raw

material;in eithercase, it is not mode of orderingthat is at issue, but the existence

of a single eternal being who is the conscious agent of that ordering.

Thus, I think it is fair to call the Nyaya-Vaisesika syllogism rejected byDharmakirti an "Indianargumentfrom design,"just as I think it is relativelyfair

to call s'vara"God." Therefore, I think that the sorts of arguments proffered byDharmakirti and his opponents can be of interest to Western theologians. The

preciseways in which the Indian argumentsoverlap or deviate from the Western

ones must be the topic of another study, as must detailed considerations of

whether the Indian tradition has arguments that could serve either theists or

antitheists in the West.132Hume, Kant, and others have given fairly thorough

treatmentto the problem of conscious agency, and it is my suspicion that it is onthe permanence-impermanence ssue that the Indian traditionmay have the most

to contribute. The Buddhistcritiqueof a God believed to be immutable seems to

me an acute one, and the price of accepting God's mutability a high one, that is,his susceptibility to conditions, hence loss of omnipotence. There are, of course,currents in modern Christianity, represented by, for example, Hartshorne, or

Kazantzakis (in his TheSaviorsof God), that do not requirethe omnipotence of

God, and admit his dependence on his creatures for the fulfillment of his ends.

Thesewould escape the objections raisedagainst a permanent,independentGod,

though whether they could evade criticisms aimed at the concept of divine

teleology (especiallythose regardingthe admissibilityof extraneouscauses), I amnot so certain. It also is my suspicion, alas, that cross-culturaldebates may in the

end be no more conclusive than intra-cultural ones have been, and that the

arguments,if examinedcarefullyenough, will be seen to rest on prephilosophicalchoices and assumptions that cannot really be questioned, and yet which vitiate

the certainty to which philosophers forever aspire.This final note of uncertainty can, if we permit it, grow into a more general

uncertaintyabout the "order"weperceive

and discover in thecosmos,

anorder,incidentally, that was assumed by both theists and atheists in India, their only

disagreementbeing over how to account for it. Is it not, in fact, possible that this

order simply is not there, that it actually is conceived and invented rather than



342 Jackson

perceivedand discovered?This is the possibility entertainedin a modernmaster-

work from Bologna, Umberto Eco's TheNameof theRose. At theend, the monk-

detective protagonist, William of Baskerville, bemoans to the book's young

narrator, Adso, that his "solution" of a series of crimes has been purely acci-

dental, and implies thereby a sort of "argumentfrom no-design":

"I arrivedat (the killer) pursuingthe plan of a perverseand rational mind, andthere was no plan, or, rather, there began a sequence of causes, and concauses,and causes contradicting one another, which proceeded on their own, creatingrelations that did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? Ibehaved stubbornly,pursuinga semblanceof order,when I should have knownwell that there is no order in the universe."

"But in imagining an erroneous orderyou still found something....""What you say is very fine, Adso, and I thank you. The order that our mind

imagines is like a net, or like a ladder, built to attain something. But afterward

you must throw the ladderaway, becauseyou discover that, even if it was useful,it was

meaningless....""You have no reason to reproach yourself: you did your best.""A human best, which is very little. It's hard to accept the idea that there

cannot be an orderin theuniversebecause it would offendthe freewill of God andHis omnipotence. So the freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least thecondemnation of our pride."

I dared,for the first and last time in my life, to expressa theological conclusion:"But how can a necessary being exist totally polluted with the possible? Whatdifference is there, then, between God and primogenial chaos? Isn't affirmingGod's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regardto His ownchoices tantamount to demonstrating that God does not exist?"

Williamlooked at me withoutbetraying any feeling

in his features,andhe said,"How could a learned man go on communicating his learningif he answeredyesto your question?" 133

NOTES

1. Lin Yutang, ed., The Wisdomof Chinaand India(New York: Modern Library,1942),p. 11.

2. Comparesuch "skeptical"Vedicpassages as Rg (Rgveda)II, 12, 5; IV, 18, 12;and VIII, 100,

3; and their discussion in Depibrasad Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism(Calcutta:Manisha, 1969),

pp. 32-43. Chattopadhyaya's book, while occasionally straining for evidence that one or anotherambiguous passage is atheistic,presentsoverall a compelling pictureof the pervasivenessof atheism

in Indian philosophical (if not religious)thought-especially early in the tradition.

3. Compare Chattopadhyaya, IndianAtheism,chaps. 9 and 16.

4. Compare, for example, ibid., chap. 14;and NarendranathBhattacharyya,Jain Philosophy:

Historical Outline(New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1976), pp. 93-108.

5. Compare, for example, Nagin J. Shah, Akalahka's Criticismof DharmakTrti'shilosophy:A

Study, L. D. Seriesno. 11 (Ahmedabad:L. D. Instituteof Indology, 1967);andD. N. Shastri,Critique

of Indian Realism:A Study of the ConflictBetweenthe Nyaya-Vaisesikaand the BuddhistDignaga

School (Agra: Agra University, 1964).6. The Tibetansattributesevenworks to him:Pramanavarttikahereaftercitedas PV), Pramd-

n.aviniscaya,Nydyabindu,Hetubindu,SambandhaparTkisd,amtdndntarasiddhind Vadanydya.Onlythe PVand Nyayabinduarecompletelyextant in Sanskrit;the othersexist in Tibetan translation.For

a list of editions and translations,compare A. K. Warder,IndianBuddhism,2d ed. (Delhi: Motilal

Banarsidass, 1980), pp. 539-540.



343

7. Complete editions include:Dwarikas Shastri,ed., Pramdnavdrttika fAcharya DharmakTrti,with the Commentary" Vritti"ofAcharya ManorathdnandinVaranasi:Bauddha Bharati, 1968);andY. Miyasaka, ed., Praminavdrttika-KdrikdSanskritand Tibetan), n Acta Indologica2 (1971-1972),3 (1973-1975), and 4 (1977). Various parts of the Svdrthdnumdna hapter have been translated;

compare Warder, Indian Buddhism,and Leonard Zwilling, DharmakTrti n Apoha (Unpublished

diss., University of Wisconsin, 1976).The Pramdnasiddhi hapter(PS) was translatedby Masatoshi

Nagatomi in A Study of Dharmaklrti'sPramdnavdrttika:An English Translationand Annotationof

the Pramdnavdrttika,Book I (Unpublished diss., Harvard University, 1957). I translated rGyaltshab dar ma rin chen's tibetan commentary on the PS chapter as part II of my dissertation, Is En-

lightenmentPossible?An Analysisof Some Arguments n the BuddhistPhilosophicalTradition,With

Special Attention to the Pramdn.asiddhiChapter of DharmakTrti'sPramdnavdrttika Unpublisheddiss., University of Wisconsin, 1983). This annotated translation, revised,will be issued in 1986 as

Mind, Body, Selflessness,Freedom:DharmakTrti'sDefense of theBuddhist World-View as ExpoundedinrGyaltshab's"Elucidating he Path to EnlightenmentAccording o the 'Pramdnavdrttika"'London:Wisdom Publications).

8. George Chemparathy,An IndianRational Theology:An Introduction o Udayana'sNydyaku-sumdnjali,Publications of the DeNobili Research Library,vol. 1 (Vienna, 1972), p. 28.

9. Gopimohan Bhattacharyya, Studies in Nyaya-Vaisesika Theism,Calcutta Sanskrit College

Research Series,no. 14 (Calcutta: SanskritCollege, 1961), p. 44.10. .Rgveda, , 82, trans., for example, by SarvepalliRadhakrishnan and CharlesA. Moore, in

Radhakrishnan and Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 18.

11. Rgveda,X, 90, in SourceBook, p. 19.

12. Rgveda,X, 121, in SourceBook, pp. 24-25.

13. .Rgveda, , 129, in Source Book, pp. 23-24.

14. AtharvavedaVII, 102, 1 and XIX, 6, 4. Compare Margaret and James Stutley, Harper'sDictionary of Hinduism(San Francisco, California:Harper& Row, 1977),p. 120;and M. D. Sastri,"History of the Word Tsvaraand Its Idea," All India OrientalConferenceVII (Baroda), pp. 492 ff.

15. Cf. David Kalupahana, Causality:The CentralPhilosophyof Buddhism Honolulu, Hawaii:

University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 17-18. Kalupahana's summary of pre-Buddhistcausationtheories is a good one.

16. Compare, for example, Brhaddrdnyaka I, 1, 2-13, and 20; III, 6, in Source Book, pp. 79,85-86.

17. Compare, SvetdsvataraIII, 7-10; IV, 1, 1, and so forth, in SourceBook, pp. 90-91.18. SvetasvataraI, 2, in SourceBook, p. 89.19. BhagavadgTtdX, 21; XI, 9-35, in SourceBook, p. 136, 138-141.20. Ibid., p. 506; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Reprint, Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1, p. 418. Dasgupta notes (pp. 420-421) that most of the earlycommentators on the BrahmasutraswerequasidualisticVaisnavas.Comparealso HajimeNakamura,A History of Early VeddntaPhilosophy,trans. Trevor Leggett and others, Religions of Asia Series,

no. 1(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), section IV.21. Brahmasutras hereaftercited as BS) I, i, 2, in SourceBook, p. 511.22. BS I, iv, 3, in Source Book, p. 515. Safikara'scomments here, and at II, i, 6 (ibid., p. 522)

indicate that thismay be a variant of thecosmological argument,with the existence of the cosmos as awhole pointing to the existence of a cause on which it is contingent.

23. BS I, iv, 23, in SourceBook, p. 521.24. Commentary to BS I, iv, 23, in Source Book.25. Cf., e.g., Ninian Smart,DoctrineandArgument n IndianPhilosophy(London: George Allen

and Unwin, 1964), pp. 156-158.

26. Yogasutra(hereaftercited as YS) 23-28, in SourceBook, pp. 458-459.27. YS 25 and Bhdsyya,n SourceBook, p. 458;Smart(p. 157)arguesthat this is a modified formof

the ontological argument.28. Nydyasutra (hereaftercited as NS) IV, 1, 19-21, trans., eg., by MrinalkantiGangopadhyaya,Nydya Philosophy (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1973), IV, pp. 21-26.

29. Compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya, chap. 16;and Karl H. Potter, ed., Encyclopediaof



344 Jackon

Indian Philosophies:IndianMetaphysicsand Epistemology:The Traditionof Nyaya-Vaisesikaup to

Gahgesa(Princeton, New Jersey:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1977),p. 100.

30. Compare Potter, Encyclopedia,p. 239.

31. Compare Gangopadhyaya, Nydya Philosophy,and Potter, Encyclopedia,p. 263.

32. Paddrthadharmasam.graha0; compare Potter, Encyclopedia,p. 285.

33. NydyavdrttikaIV, 1, 19-21, summarizedby Potter, Encyclopedia,pp. 331-333.

34. Nydyakusumdnjali,I, 3; compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism p. 21;

Potter, Encyclopedia,p. 558.35. DTghanikdya hereaftercited as D) I, 17; compare, for example, Kalupahana, Causality,

pp. 20-21; and Helmuth von Glasenapp, Buddhism-A Non-Theistic Religion, trans. Irmgard

Schloegl (New York: George Braziller,1966),pp. 40-41, 144.

36. For example, MajjhimanikdyaI, 222;AhguttaraI, 173;JdtakaV, 238, and so forth;compare,for example, Kalupahana, Causality, p. 22; Glasenapp, Buddhism,pp. 39-40.

37. D II, 11, 81-83; compare Glasenapp, Buddhism,p. 146.

38. D II, 13,14-20; compare Glasenapp,Buddhism,pp. 146-148. OnNikdya discussions of God,

compare also Gunapala Dharmasiri,A BuddhistCritiqueof the ChristianConceptof God(Colombo:

Lake House Investments, 1974), passim.39. Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Vijnaptimdtratdsiddhi:a Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris: Paul

Geuthner, 1928),I, p. 30.40. BuddhacaritaIX, 63; compare E. H. Johnston, The Buddhacaritaor Acts of the Buddha

(Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), II, p. 136.

41. BuddhacaritaXVI, 18ff.;compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya,IndianAtheism,p. 103.

42. Suhrillekha 50; compare, for example, Geshe Lobsang Tharchin and Artemus B. Engle,

Nagarjuna'sLetter (Dharamasala:Libraryof Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979),pp. 84-86.

43. Catuhstava I, 33-34; compareChr.Lindtner,Nagarjuniana, ndiske Studier4 (Copenhagen:

Akademisk Forlag, 1982),pp. 150-151.

44. Bodhicittavivarana7-9; compare Lindtner,pp. 186-189.

45. Lindtner, in Nagarjuniana (p. 16), maintains that its attribution to Nagarjuna is "most

probably" false.

46. Compare George Chemparathy,"Two EarlyBuddhist Refutations of ITvaraas the Creatorof the Universe," WienerZeitschriftfiir Kunst und OrientalischeStudien,22-23, pp. 89-94, 97-99;

and Th. Stcherbatsky,Papersof Th.Stcherbatsky,trans. H. C. Gupta, ed. Debiprasad Chattopad-

hyaya, Soviet Indology Seriesno. 2 (Calcutta:Indian Studies Past and Present, 1969),pp. 1-16.

47. Mahavibhdsa,TT XXVII, 993b, summarizedin Nakamura, History, pp. 147-151.

48. Abhidharmakosa hereaftercited as AK ) and -bhdsyaII, 64d; compare Louis de la Vallee

Poussin, L'Abhidharmakosade Vasubandhu hereaftercited as AV ) (Paris:Paul Geuthner, 1923-

1931),I, pp. 313-315.

49. AKIV, 1.

50. AKVII, 13a;AVVII, pp. 38-39. These characteristicsare the last threeof the four aspectsof

the truth of origination, namely, samudaya,prabhavaand pratyaya.

51. Yogadcrabhumi,pp. 144-5; compare Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist Refutations,"pp. 86-89, 94-96.

52. Bhavya, Madhyamaka-hrdaya-vritti-tarkajvala,II, 9, in Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan

Tripitaka,Peking Edition (hereaftercited as PTT ) (Tokyo, Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research

Institute, 1957), no. 5256, vol. 96, pp. 49/3/6-50/2/2/.53. Ibid., pp. 49/5/2-7.54. For a discussion of this much mooted point, compare Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic

(Reprint,New York: Dover, 1962),I, pp. 38-39; and Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Frameworkof the

Pramanavarttika,Book I," Journalof the AmericanOrientalSociety 79 (1959):263, note 1.

55. For a discussion of the way in whichtheseepithetsstructurethe chapter,compareNagatomi,

"The Framework,"andcomparealso ErnstSteinkellner,"ThespiritualPlace of the Epistemological

Tradition in Buddhism," Nanto Bukkyo49 (1982): 1-18.

56. Mi pham, Tshadma rnam 'grelgyigzhung gsalpor bshadpa legsbshadsnangba'igter (Block-

print, Dehradun:Nyingma Monastery, n.d.), p. 257.

57. I am following Miyasaka's numberinghere. Shastrinumbers two introductoryverses that



345

Miyasaka does not, so the Shastrinumber is found by adding 2 to the Miyasaka number.Compare

previous note 7, for references.

58. rGyal tshab rje,Rnam-Agrel-Thar-Lam-Gsal-Byedhereaftercited as GT) (Sarnath:Tibetan

Monastery, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 238-248. The section on 'svara s, according to rGyal tshab (p. 239),

part of Dharmakirti's attempt to show the meaning of the word "became"(bhuta)authoritative:a

permanententity like Tsvara lways has been authoritative, and so cannot "become" so.

59. The PVpanjikd,or -vrtti(hereaftercited as PVV) is extant only in Tibetan: PTT no. 5717(b),

vol. 130;and sDe dge no. 4217, found at, for example, TheNyingmaEditionof thesDe-dgebka'- gyur

andbsTan-'gyur(Oakland, California: Dharma Press, 1981),vol. 94, fols. 732-746, pp. 184- 188. The

section on Tsvaras at the end of chapter 11 and the beginning of chap. 12.

60. nityam pramanam naivdsti pramdnydd vastusangateh / jneydnityatayd tasyd adhrauvyat

kramajanmanah / nitydd utpattivislesddapeksayaayogatah / (tshadma rtagpa nyid yod min / dngos

yodrtogspa tshadphyirdang / shesbyamirtagpa nyid kyis / denimibrtannyidphyirro/ rimbzhinskyeba can dag ni // rtag las skye ba mi 'thadphyir / Itospa mi rungpa yi phyir /).

61. GT, pp. 239-240; Jackson, Is EnlightenmentPossible?pp. 564-566.

62. Compare, for example, Shah, chap. 2; and D. N. Shastri, passim.63. Compare the concluding section for remarks on this issue.

64. kathancinnopakdryatvddanitye'py apramdn.ata- / (rnam 'gasphan gdags byaminphyir / mi

rtag na yang tshadmednyid //).65. Prajiakaragupta, Pramdnavdrttika-bha.syaor Vdrttikalahkdraof Prajntikaragupta,ed.

Rahula Sankrityayana(Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal ResearchInstitute, 1953), p. 34.

66. GT, p. 240; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 566.

67. PVV, NyingmasDe-dGe, vol. 94, fols. 733-734, p. 185.

68. sthitvapravrttisamsthdnavisesdrthakriyddisusdod 'jugdbyibskyi khyadpar dang / don byed

pa la sogs pa dag /). Cf Tattvasam.graha TS) 46 (for full references,compare note 117 following).69. Preceding, p. 6. Prof. Karl Potter has disagreedwith me that the syllogism being refuted is

Nyaya-Vaisesika, noting (a) that no such exact syllogism is found in Nyaya-Vaigesikaworks and (b)that no later Nyaya-Vaisesika works specifically defended the tradition against Dharmakirti's

attacks. Prof. Potter has suggested that Dharmakirti's opponent may, in fact, be a lost Sam.khya

work. This may well be, but it must be argued from silence, and it seems to me that (a) while thesyllogism refutedby Dharmakirtiis not preciselylike those found in Nyaya-Vai§esikaworks, there is

a significant overlap and (b) later Nyaya-Vai§esika works may not have specifically addressedDharmakirti'sobjections because by the time they were written, Dharmakirti'sargumentsperhapshad been overshadowed by those of Santaraksita, Kamala§ila and Jiama§ri. Prof. Potter also has

pointed out-and in this I quite agreewith him-that Dharmaklrti'sopponent may be unidentifiablefor the simplereason that DharmakTrti as distortedthe theisticposition in recastingit fordiscussion.

Thus, the Nyaya-Vai§esikas may have been the intended target, but not recognized for their own

position as restatedby Dharmakirti.Alternatively,Dharmakirtimay becombining the ideas of morethan one theistic school into the syllogism.

70. Preceding,p. 10.

71. GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 567. This does not depart substantially from theinterpretation of Devendrabuddhi, who differs only in describing that which must be created as

bodies, environs, and products, and cites as an example of "particular shape" not a pot, but a

mansion, PVV, fol. 734, p. 185.72. istasiddhirasiddhirvi drstdnte am.ayo 'thavi // ('dodpagrubpa 'amdpemagrub yang na the

tshom za ba yin //).73. GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 567-568.74. siddham. ddrgadhisthdtrbhdvdbhdvdnuvrttimatsam.nivesadiadyuktam tasmddyadanumTy-

ate// (byinrlabsyod medrjes jug can/ dbyibssogs ci 'drarabgrubpa / de las rjessu dpoggang yin / deni

rigspa nyidyin no //).75. GT, pp. 241-242; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 569; compare TS 63.76. vastubhede

prasiddhasya sabdasiamnyid abhedinah / na yuktdnumitih pdn.dudravyddivaddhutWsane/ (thadadngosla rabgrubpa / sgramtshungstha dadmedpa'iphyir / rjesdpog rigspa mayinte / skye bo'i rdzaslas me bzhinno //).




346 Jackson

78. anyatha kumbhakarenamrdvikdrasyakasyacit / ghatadeh karanat sidhyed valmFkasyapitatkrtih// (de Itamin na rdzamkhangyis / bumpa la sogs jim pa yi / rnam 'gyur'ga' zhig byedpa'i

phyir / grog mkharyang des byasgrub 'gyur /).

79. GT, p. 242; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 570;compare TS 65.

80. "When a generalresult is probative / Becauseit is concomitant with the predicate,/ (Then,)

when one (over-)differentiatesthe relator, / That differentiationis asserted to be the flaw called

kdryasama."sddhyendnugamdt drye sdmdnyendpiddhane sambandhibheddd hedoktidosahkdrya-

samo matah// (bsgrubbya'i rjes 'grophyir 'brasbu/ spyiskyangsgrubparbyedpa la / 'bralba cannyid

the dadphyir / tha dadskyon brjod'brasmtshungs'dod /) (verse 14).81. GT, pp. 242-243; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 570-573.

82. "(Although) one proves(a thesis) in regardto a particularclass, / It is not reasonableto prove

(a similarthesis)just from seeing / That there is a generalterm(that is similar to the reason);as if /

Wordscould be horned because(thereis a term,) gotva."jatyantareprasiddhasyasabdasdmanyadar-

sandt nayuktamsddhanamgotvaccchasdlzndm.isdnivat / (rigskyikhyadpar lagrubpa / sgrayi spyi

ni mthongpa las / sgrubbyedmi rigs ngag la sogs / go nyidphyir na rva can bzhin//) (verse 15).


84. "Because (words) are controlled by a desire to express, / There is nothing for which there is

not a word;/ If one attained(objects) through the existence(or words for them), / All people should

attain all objects." vivaksaparatantratvdna sabddh antikutravd tadbhdvad rthasiddhauu sarvam

sarvasya sidhyati// (brjodpar'dodpa'igzhan dbangphyir sgrarnamsgang la'angmed mamin deyod

pas ni don grub na / thams cad kyis ni thams cad grub //) (verse 16). See GT, p. 244; Jackson,

Enlightenment,pp. 573-574.

85. "Through this (approach) one can also investigate (and refute) such Samkhya (and Jaina

syllogisms as, respectively,)/ 'Buddhi is non-sentient, because it is impermanent,'/ And '(A tree) is

sentient, because it dies / When its bark is stripped."' etena kdpilddTndmcaitenyddicintitam /

anityddesca caitanyammaran.t tvagapohatah / ('disni ser skya la sogs kyi / mi rtag sogs phyir yang

semsmed/ sogs dangshungpa bshusna ni / 'chiphyirsems Idandpyadpayin //) (verse 17).GT,p. 244;

Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 574.

86. "If a generalentitative (reason) is unproven, (then the syllogism is invalid,) / Whereasif the

(general reason) is proven, then even if particular(details) / Are unproven, (the syllogism) is not

invalidated, / As (whether or not) sound "depends on space" (does not affect the permanenceor

impermanenceof sound). "vastusvarupesiddhe yamnydyahsiddhevisesan.am abadhakamasiddh~v

apydkddsarayavadhvaneh / dngospo'i ngobomagrubna/ tshul'digrubnamagrubkyang/ khyadpar

gnod byed ma yin te / sgra yi nam kha' la brten bzhin //) (verse 18). GT, pp. 244-245; Jackson,

Enlightenment,pp. 574-575.

87. "Even if a word is unproven,if the entity/ Isproven,then (the reason)will be proven,as / The

Buddhistsexplainto the Aulukyas / "(Atoms areimpermanent,because) theyarephysical."asiddhdv

api sabdasyasiddhevastunisidhyati/ aulukyasyayathdbauddhenoktam. urtyddisddhanam/ (sgrama

grubkyangdngosponi / grubnagrubpar 'gyur e dper 'ugpadalasangsrgyaspas / lussogssgrubbyed

bshadpa bzhin//) (verse 19). GT, pp. 245-247; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 575-577.

88. "If the (entity) is mistaken, / Then evenif the word is unmistaken,/ Theproof must be knownas flawed, / Because an entity is (only) proven from an entity." tasyaiva vyabhic&rddauabde'py

avyabhicdrini dosavatsddhanamneyam.vastunovastusiddhitah/ (denyid 'krula sogs yinna / sgrani

'khrulpamedna yang / sgrub byedskyonIdanshes byaste / dngoslas dngospo grubphyirro // (verse

20). GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 577. Note the strong elementof "realism"here:though

the connection between words and entities may be tenuous, it still is assumed by Dharmakirtithat

there is a definite and discerniblenature to entities, which may serve as the foundation for valid

reasoning.89. "'Because it is a "goer"' and 'because it is "hand-possessing"' / (As reasons) proving (a

colored cow) is a cow and (an elephantcalf) is an elephant / Are not (validly) asserted,for these are

verbalexpressions/ That aremerelycommon (sayings).""'groba'iphyirdanglag Idanphyir / rvacan

glangpo zhessgrub byed/ 'diyi sgra yi brjodbyani / gragspa yingyis brjod'dodmin// (verse20a). GT,p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 577-578.

90. yathd tat karanan?vastu tathaiva tadakdranam/ yadd tat kdranamkena matam nestam



347

akdranam / (ji Itardngosderhyuyinpa / delta denyidgang gi tshe/ rgyuminganggis de nirgyur 'dod

la rgyuma yin mi 'dod /).91. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 578-579.

92. Compare preceding,p. 16, alternative(c).93. sdstrausadhdbhisambandhdcaitrasyavranarohane asambaddhasyakimsthdnohkdranatvam

na kalpyate // (mtshondangsmansogs 'brelba las / nagpa'i rmadang 'drubsyin na / 'brelmedsdongdum ci yi phyir / rgyunyid du ni rtog mi byed//).

94. Nagatomi, A Study of DharmakTrti's ramdnavdrttika,p. 33.95. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 579. rGyal tshab probably was unfamiliar with the

instance of "homeopathic magic" cited by Dharmakirti,and glosses the verseas having the weapon

inflictthe wound and the medicine heal it. Devendrabuddhi(fol. 742, lines 6-7) supports the readingwe have given. Incidentally, an instance of homeopathic magic is cited in Dante's Inferno(XXXI,

4-6), where the poet recalls the lance of Achilles and his father, which could both wound and heal.

96. svabhdvabhedanavind vydpdro 'pi na yujyate / nityasydvyatirekitvdt dmarthyanca duran-

vayam / (rangbzhinkhyadpar medparni/ byedpar yangni mirungngo / rtagla Idogpamedpa'i phyir/

nuspa nyid kyang rtogpar dka' //).97. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 579.

98. Ibid.

99. yesusatsu bhavatyevayat tebhyo 'nyasyakalpane/ taddhetutvena arvatrahetunamanavasth-itih// (gang dagyod na gang 'gyurnyid/ dedag lasgzhandeyi rgyu / rtogpa yin na thamscad la / rgyurnamsthugpa medpar 'gyur /).

100. GT, pp. 247-248; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 579-580.


102. svabhavaparindmenaeturahkurajanmani bhuimyddisasya sam.skdreadvisesasyadarsandt

// (myugu skyedla sa la sogs / rangbzhinyongs sugyurnas ni / rgyu yin de legsbyas pa na / deyi khyad

par mthongphyir ro //).103. GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 580.

104. yathd visesena vindvisayendriyasam.hatihbuddherhetus tathedam cen na tatrdpivisesatah //

(gal teji Itaryuldbangpo / tshogspa khyadmedblorgyuyin / deItar'diyinzhe na min/ de laskhyadpar

yodphyir ro //).105. NS,I, 1,4.

106. This is the import of Devendrabuddhi's readingat PVV, fol. 745, line 2, p. 188.


108. prtak prtag asaktdndamvabhdvdtisaye sati / samhatdvapy asdmarthyam. ydt siddho 'tisayastatah// (so so so sor nusmed rnams rangbzhinkhyadpar medpas na / tshogskyangnuspa med 'gyurbas / dephyir khyad par grubpa yin //).

109. GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 580-581. Emphasis mine.

110. tasmdtprtag asaktesuyesu sam.bhdvyateunah/ samhatauhetutatesdm.nesvardderabhedatah

// (dephyirso sorgang nus med/ tshogsnayon tan srid 'gyurba/ dedagrgyu yin dbangphyugsogs / ma

yin khyad par medphyir ro //).

111. Compare preceding,p. 9.112. Verse 183; GT, p. 219; Jackson, Enlightenment,pp. 713-714. The verse is found in the

discussion of the aspect of origination (samudaya)of the truth of origination.113. GT, p. 251; Jackson, Enlightenment,p. 586.

114. Compare, for example, the writings of Chattopadhyaya, N. Bhattacharyya, and Potter

mentioned in this article (preceding,notes 2, 4, and 29).115. BodhicaryavataraIX, 118-123. It ought to be noted that Santideva is misrepresentingthe

Nyaya-Vaisesika view, whereby7~vara s not the creator of thepaddrthas,but their arranger.116. Ibid., IX, 124-125.

117. Tsvara s rejectedat TS 46-93, purusaat TS 153-170. Compare Ganganatha Jha, trans., The

Tattvasamgrahaof Sdntaraksita with the Commentaryof Kamalahsla Baroda: Oriental Institute,

1937),vol.

1, pp. 68-101,132-139.

118. TS 47-48 and 56-60; Jha, Tattvasamgraha,pp. 69-71 and 75-79.

119. TS 85; Jha, Tattvasamgraha,p. 92.



348 Jackson

120. TS 155-161, Jha, Tattvasamgraha,pp. 133-135.

121. TS 162-167; Jha, Tattvasamgraha,pp. 135-137.

122. Compare Chattopadhyaya, IndianAtheism,chap. 15, for a good summaryof MTmarmsaka

arguments.123. For references,compare preceding,note 4.

124. NydyamanjarT25-133; summarized in Potter, pp. 371-373.

125. VyomavatT40;ummarized in Potter, Encyclopedia,pp. 435-436.

126. NydyavdrttikatdtparyatrkdV, 1, 21; summarizedin Potter, Encyclopedia,pp. 481-482.127. The works of both Jiianaarimitra nd Ratnakirtihave been editedbyAnantalal Thakur in the

Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959 and 1957,

respectively).128. Chemparathy,An IndianRationalTheology,p. 28. 1have not as yetstudied Jfinansrmitra'sor

Ratnakirti'sarguments.129. Compare preceding,notes 8 and 9.

130. Compare preceding,note 4.

131. Indeed, there is not even agreementon whether the syllogism correspondsto the argumentfrom design: G. Bhattacharyya(p. 44) calls it the "cosmological argument,"while Potter (p. 102)considers it "cosmoteleological." In fact, the syllogism refuted by Dharmakirti-which seeks to

prove that entities are precededby a conscious designerbecause of intermittence,particular shape,and efficiency-seems most like the argument from design, while the later syllogism proposed by

Jayanta-in whichthe existenceof Tsvaraollows from the world'sbeingan effect-seems a bit more

"cosmological"-although the focus there still is on the analogical appeal to design.132. The most concerted attackon Westerntheismbya Buddhistis that of Dharmasiri(preceding,

note 38), who does not, however, often directly relate Buddhist arguments to Western ones, but,

rather,criticizes modernWesternargumentsdirectly,interspersinghisdiscussionwithpassagesfrom

and reflectionsupon the Theravadintradition.Theravadadoes not develop a rational a-theology to

anywherenear the degree that the Sanskritic"Pramdna" radition does.

133. Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 492-493.

dharmakirti:refutation of theism

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