diaspora strategy canada

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Canadians Abroad Project

A Diaspora Strategy for Canada?

Enriching Debate through Heightening

Awareness of International Practice

Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin

Department of Geography and

National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA)

National University of Ireland Maynooth

County Kildare

Ireland

Project Paper Series

No. 11-1

May, 2011


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A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 1

About Project Paper Series

The Canadians Abroad Project produces a range of policy oriented research on various issuesrelated to Canadians living abroad. Previous Project Papers are available at the Canadians

Abroad Project website. (www.CanadiansAbroad.ca).

Us and Them: The Plumbing and Poetry of Citizenship Policy and the Canadians Abroad

- by Ajay Parasram, June 2010

Attached, Less Attached or Not Attached? Participation in Canada of Overseas Canadian Citizen

- by Kenny Zhang, June 2010

Mapping Canadian Diasporic Media: The Existence and Significance of Communicative Spaces

for Overseas Canadians

- by Sherry S. Yu, March 2010

Canadians Abroad: Policy Challenges for Canada

- by Kenny Zhang, November 2009

Canadas Secret Province: 2.8 Million Canadians Abroad (with French Version)

- by Don DeVoretz, October 2009

Immigrant Circulation and Citizenship: Hotel Canada?

- by Don DeVoretz, July 2009

Canadians Abroad: Foreigners with Canadian Passports or the New Canadian Diaspora?

- by Kenny Zhang, January 2009

Profiling Canadians in the United States and Hong Kong

- by Don DeVoretz, January 2009

Transnational Entrepreneurs as Agents of International Innovation Linkages

- by Xiaohua Lin, Jian Guan and Mary Jo Nicholson, December 2008

A Limited Engagement: Mainland Returnees from Canada

- by David Zweig, December 2008

Mission Invisible Rethinking the Canadian Diaspora

- by Kenny Zhang, September 2007


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Doing Business at Home and Away: Policy Implications of Chinese-Canadian Entrepreneurship

- by Barry Wellman and Wenhong Chen, April 2007

Recognizing the Canadian Diaspora

- by Kenny Zhang, March 2006

The Canadians Abroad Project consists of a policy research consortium initiated by the Asia

Pacific Foundation of Canada with the support of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Western

Economic Diversification Canada, the Government of British Columbia and the Walter & Duncan

Gordon Foundation. This three year (2008-2010) joint research project analyzes the causes and

consequences of the Canadian citizens by birth or naturalization living abroad.


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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 4

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 6

2. THE ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION: LEADING CANADAS TURN TOWARDS A

MORE SYSTEMATIC DIASPORA STRATEGY .................................................................... 8

3. THE RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING A DIASPORA STRATEGY ............................. 15

4. THE INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES THROUGH WHICHCOUNTRIES SEEK TO ENGAGE THEIR DIASPORA ....................................................... 19

5. DIASPORA AND NATION BUILDING ............................................................................ 23

6. DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................. 29

7. DIASPORA AND CITIZENSHIP ........................................................................................ 37

8. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 42

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ 46

INTERVIEWS .......................................................................................................................... 46

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 48

Key Web Addresses .................................................................................................................. 53


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A Diaspora Strategy for Canada?

Enriching Debate through Heightening Awareness of International Practice

Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past decade a growing number ofcountries have become interested inrevisiting, refreshing and rebuilding

relations with their overseas populations. Anew field of public policy, referred to asdiaspora strategy, has emerged. A diasporastrategy is an explicit policy initiative orseries of policy initiatives enacted by asending state, or its peoples, aimed atfortifying and developing relationships withexpatriate communities, diasporicpopulations, and foreign constituencies whoshare a special affinity. Notwithstandingtheir obvious differences, many countries

are seeing merit in sharing experiences andthrough joint policy transfer workshops,seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, andconferences are participating in an importantglobal dialogue on international best practicewith respect to the design andimplementation of diaspora strategies.

Given that 2.8 million Canadian citizens liveoverseas (equivalent to 8% of the nationalpopulation), including in such powerful

economies as the United States and GreaterChina, not surprisingly within Canada toothere now exists an embryonic interest in thepossibility of formulating a Canadiandiaspora strategy to enhance and buildrelations with this secret province. TheAsian Pacific Foundation of Canada inVancouver, an independent think-tank on

Canada's relations with Asia, has launched adedicated research program titledCanadians Abroad which is seeking tounderstand the Canadian diaspora and topromote new thinking on how transnational

connections might be better developed.Meanwhile, the Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade (DFAIT) inOttawa has established a high levelbrainstorming working group to consider

the possibility of rolling out a GlobalCitizens initiative which is fundamentallyinterested in harnessing the Canadiandiaspora to support Canadian foreign policyand trade interests internationally. Althoughboth posture only as preliminary

explorations at this point, it is clear thatdiaspora strategy is steadily starting to assertitself as a priority area within Canadianpublic discourse.

This report contends that any considerationof the virtues and vices of developing adiaspora strategy for Canada might beenhanced if the Canadian case is set intointernational context and if Canada drawsfrom and contributes to the emerging global

dialogue on diaspora strategies. Theprimary purpose of the report is to furnishinterested parties in Canada with a summaryoverview of the more important andpioneering strategic interventions,institutional innovations and policyinitiatives being undertaken globally. Ouroverview provides a comprehensive survey


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of existing international practice in the fieldof diaspora strategy and includes (but is notlimited to) the specific experiences of sixcountries who have been particularly activein leading debate across the past decade:

Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia,China, and India. We begin with adiscussion of Canadas recent turn towardsits diaspora and argue that the workcompleted to date by the Asia PacificFoundations Canadians Abroad Programme

and laterally the DFAIT Global CitizensProject, has resulted in the specification of atleast five critical questions or challenges forCanada:

a)

Why might Canada benefit from a morestrategic engagement with its overseas

citizens?b) Which institution(s) within Canada

should be tasked with the responsibility

of formulating and overseeing a

diaspora strategy and should a new

institution be created for this purpose?c) Should and can the Canadian

government play an enhanced role in

building the Canadianess of theCanadian diaspora and work to harness

the Canadian diaspora as a resource in

the formulation of Canadian foreign

policy and diplomacy?

d) How can the Canadian diaspora beharnessed so as to improve the

competitiveness of Canadian businessand to stimulate Canadian economicdevelopment?

e) What challenges does the Canadiandiaspora present to Canadian citizenshippolicy and how should Canadian

approaches to citizenship respond?

We then take each of these five questions inturn and review the ways in which they arebeing raised and handled in other countries;

in so doing we reflect upon what Canadamight learn from and in turn contribute tointernational practice. The report is carefulto avoid advocating specific policyprescriptions for Canada or to makepremature assertions as to specificinnovations which Canada might borrow,copy, and rework. But it does conclude bynaming a selection of pioneering innovationsand provocative exemplars which we hope,if studied and further debated, will serve toenrich the Canadian debate.


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1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade a growing number ofcountries have become interested inrevisiting, refreshing and rebuilding

relations with their overseas populations. Anew field of public policy, referred to asdiaspora strategy, has emerged. Given that2.8 million Canadian citizens live overseas(equivalent to 8% of the national population)not surprisingly within Canada too therenow exists an embryonic interest in thepossibility of formulating a Canadiandiaspora strategy to enhance and buildrelations with this secret province. TheAsian Pacific Foundation of Canada in

Vancouver, an independent think-tank onCanada's relations with Asia, has launched aspecial program titled Canadians Abroadwhich is seeking to map and betterunderstand the Canadian diaspora and topromote new thinking on how transnationalconnections might be better developed(Zhang 2007a, DeVoretz 2009a).Meanwhile, the Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade (DFAIT) inOttawa has established a high level

brainstorming working group to considerthe possibility of rolling out a GlobalCitizens initiative. This initiative isinterested in exploring the possibleharnessing of the Canadian diaspora tosupport Canadian foreign policy and tradeinterests internationally.

A cursory glance at existing internationalpractice suggests that a wide range ofdifferent institutions, strategies, policies,

programmes, and schemes are beingdeveloped and implemented across countriesdependent upon the scale, history,geography, and nature of particular diaspora;the foreign affairs institutional capacities

which exist in sending countries, and;homeland conditions, motivations andaspirations. Nevertheless notwithstanding

their obvious differences, many countriesare seeing merit in sharing experiences andthrough joint policy transfer workshops,seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, andconferences are participating in an important

global dialogue on international best practicewith respect to the design andimplementation of diaspora strategies.

Any consideration of the virtues and vices ofdeveloping a diaspora strategy for Canadamight be enhanced if the Canadian case isset into international context and if Canadadraws from and contributes to the emergingglobal dialogue. The primary purpose of thisreport is to furnish interested parties in

Canada with a summary overview of themore important and pioneering strategicinterventions, institutional innovations andpolicy initiatives being undertaken globally.Our overview provides a comprehensivesurvey of existing international practice inthe field of diaspora strategy and includessix countries whom have been particularlyactive in this area across the past decade:Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia,China, and India. Whilst some country casestudies bear more relevance to Canada thanothers, our purpose is not to prejudge fromwhere lessons might be learned. In ourexperience countries can and do gleaninsights from each other and can and doeffect policy transfers in spite of theirdissimilarity. Equally the report is careful toavoid advocating specific policyprescriptions for Canada or to makepremature assertions as to specificinnovations which Canada might borrow,copy, and rework. But it does include somereflection on the implications ofinternational practice for Canada and doesidentify a list of innovative programmeswhich might prove to be of particularinterest should Canada decide to moveforward in this field.


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Our review is organized to reflect our ownprior research and distinctive approach toglobal comparative analyses (Ancien, Boyleand Kitchin 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, Boyle,Kitchin and Ancien 2009; Kitchin and Boyle

2010). However, it also aligns itself withand, in many ways complements, otherimportant commentaries on diasporastrategizing (Newland and Patrick 2004,Kutzensov 2006, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007,Gamlen 2008, Aikins, Sands and White2009). In particular, we note the valuableseries of research reports on diasporaengagement produced by the MigrationPolicy Institute in association with USAidin2010. These papers examine respectively

diaspora entrepreneurship, diasporainvestment in capital markets, diasporatourism, diaspora philanthropy, diasporavolunteering, and diaspora advocacy(gathered in Newland 2010). We begin witha discussion of Canadas recent turn towardsits diaspora and argue that the workcompleted to date by the Asia PacificFoundations Canadians Abroad Project andlaterally the DFAIT Global Citizens Projecthas raised at least five critical questions orchallenges for Canada. We then take each ofthese five questions in turn and review theways in which they are being raised andhandled in other countries. In so doing, wereflect upon what Canada might learn fromand in turn contribute to internationalpractice. We conclude by identifying aspecific selection of pioneering innovationsand provocative exemplars which we hopewill prove to be useful reference materialwhich will enrich the Canadian debate.

To begin, a brief note on definitional mattersis in order. To date those who promulgate aneed for diaspora strategies have sought tomake decisions on three critical definitionalmatters. First, whether the term diaspora isan appropriate label for the populations they

seek to engage per se. and whether theymight be prepared to deploy the categoryeven if only to bring their initiatives intointernational debates. A by now legion ofsocial scientific excavation of the genealogy

and mobilization of the category confirmsthat its current celebrity status in academic,policy, and public circles has come at theprice of definitional clarity (Safran 1991,Cohen 1997, and Tsagarousianou 2004).Secondly, the extent to which diasporastrategies should target only native borndiasporic populations or national citizens orwhether it might be broadened toincorporate all populations with an affinityfor a particular homeland irrespective of

their nationality. A range of non nationals -the so called affinity diaspora - and for avariety of reasons often feel inclined tocontribute to particular countries; courtingthese wider audiences has positive andnegative ramifications. Finally, the degree towhich diasporic populations should bebracketed by generation; whether attentionbe afforded strictly to first generationmigrants, at most second generation, at mostthird generation, and so on. Indeed in thecase of some nations, national groupingshave never held citizenship of the state towhich they feel a primary sense of belonging- the state may have been created long afterthe nation was born; these groups cannot beignored but what status are they to beaccorded? We will refrain from fastening onany particular definition of diaspora and willinsist instead that definitional matters formpart of diaspora strategies and are notinnocent or neutral antecedents to suchstrategies. Clearly decisions on definitionslead to the inclusion and exclusion ofdifferent population groupings and as aconsequence carry important implicationsfor the types of diaspora strategies whichmight be imagined (Ho 2011).


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2. THE ASIA PACIFIC

FOUNDATION: LEADING

CANADAS TURN TOWARDS A

MORE SYSTEMATIC DIASPORA

STRATEGY

Hitherto, public discourse on the Canadianexpatriate community, to the extent it hasarisen, has focused upon the impacts ofCanadian migration to the United States(often speculatively referred to as a braindrain) on the Canadian economy. Prompted

in part by the evacuation of nearly 15,000Canadian passport holders from Lebanon in2006, the then imminent review of Canadianpolicy towards dual citizenship, and

Canadian diplomatic unrest over theconviction of a Canadian citizen in China oncharges of terrorism, in 2008 the AsianPacific Foundation of Canada launched asystematic research program titledCanadians Abroad. The objective of thisprogram was to map and profile Canadiansliving abroad, to produce a balanced andcomprehensive overview of the strengths,weaknesses, opportunities and threatspresented by the Canadian expatriate

community and; to consider whether Canadaneeded to think more strategically about itsdiaspora rather than dealing with problemsas they arose on a case by case bases. Thework of the Asia Pacific Foundation hasserved to produce important estimates of thescale and geography of the emigrantpopulation, insights into the socio-economicand attitudinal profiles of emigrants, andunderstandings of the connections whichalready exist between diasporic communities

and Canada. Now nearing completion, theCanadians Abroad programme is turning itsattention to the consequences of theCanadian diaspora for Canada and howCanada might respond so as to best engageits overseas populations.

Because emigration and immigration aresubstantially linked in Canada, it is firstnecessary to set the work of the AsianPacific Foundation against the backdrop ofCanadas long history of immigration (Boyd

and Vickers 2000, Bourne and Rose 2001,and Ley 1999 provide useful overviews).Record numbers of immigrants settled inCanada in the early 1900s. By 1931 2.3million or 22% of Canadians were foreignborn, deriving principally from Europe andin particular from the United Kingdom.Because immigration levels declined duringthe 1930s Great Depression and in theensuing years of the second world war, theproportion of foreign-born dropped to 17.5%

(2 million) in 1941 and 14.7% (2 million) in1951, but subsequently recovered and hassince grown again, to 15.6% (2.8 million) in1961, 15.3% (3.3 million) in 1971, 16% (3.8million) in 1981, 16.1% (4.3 million) in1991 and 18.4% (5.5 million) in 2001. In2006, 19.8% ofCanadas population (or 6.2million) was foreign born (Chui, Maheux,Kelly 2007). Whilst in 1971 migrants fromEurope constituted 61.6% of all newcomers,by 2006 they comprised only 16.1% of allnewcomers. Meanwhile whilst in 1971migrants born in Asia (including the MiddleEast) made up only 12.1% of recentnewcomers, by 2006 such migrantsconstituted the largest proportion ofnewcomers to Canada at 58.3% (Chui,Maheux, Kelly 2007). In 2006 863,100individuals, or 2.8%, of the nationalpopulation reported holding both Canadiancitizenship and at least one other citizenship.The majority (85.1%) of foreign-bornmigrants who were eligible for Canadiancitizenship in 2006 had become naturalized.

Long regarded as a home to immigrantsfrom around the world, Canada is less wellknown for its own large diaspora. Indeed in2007 Zhang referred to his seminal searchfor the Canadian diaspora as mission


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invisible. Given that Canada does not

collect official statistics about its overseaspopulation, Zhangs project represented apioneering first attempt to quantify the scaleand geography of Canadian flight overseas.

Zhang estimated the Canadian diaspora to becirca 2.7 million in number, representingapproximately 8.3 per cent of the nationalpopulation (Zhang 2006, 2007a). This meantthat on a per capita basis Canadians weretwice as likely as Australian citizens, threetimes more likely than United States citizensand four times more likely than citizens ofIndia, to move beyond their country oforigin. According to Zhangs early work,circa 1.2 million Canadians dwelled in the

United States, 270,000 were resident inHong Kong and 378,000 in the rest of Asia,486,000 now lived in Europe, and 378,000were distributed across countries in SouthAmerica and Africa and the Caribbean.Forty per cent of Canadians in Asia or theU.S. (or 720,000 people) were from Ontario;30 per cent (circa 550,000) were fromBritish Columbia, and; 12 per cent (216,000)were from Quebec (Zhang 2006). MoreoverZhangs data suggests that whilst 65% of outmigrants were Canadian by birth 35% wereforeign born, of which 29% gained Canadiancitizenship through immigration andnaturalization (Zhang 2007a).

DeVoretz (2009a) has since consolidatedand built upon Zhangs work to yield furtherestimates of the scale and profiles of thecharacter of the Canadian expatriatecommunity. DeVoretzs methodology was

based upon drawing inferences from a)population changes between census whichcannot be accounted for on the bases offertility and mortality, b) longitudinaladministrative data sets tracking populationchanges within specific populationgroupings, and c) census and administrativedate sets held in known and suspectedcountries of destination. Confirming the

accuracy of Zhangs estimate, DeVoretzconcluded that approximately 2.8 millionCanadian Citizens currently live abroad. Inaddition, DeVoretzs (2009a) work

demonstrated that 57% of Canadians living

abroad were located in descending order inthe United States (1.1 million), GreaterChina (292,000), the United Kingdom(70,000) and Australia (27,289). Withspecific respect to the outmigration offoreign born Canadian citizens DeVoretzsuggests that Canadas immigrant

population has a higher net exit rate (4.5%of the population) than its Canadian bornpopulation (1.3%), that migrants fromTaiwan (30%), Hong Kong (24%), Japan

(13%), Singapore (12%), and the UnitedStates (11%) have the highest net exit rates,and that even second generation South Asianand Chinese-Canadian citizens have exitrates of 9.9% and 11.0% respectively.

In seeking to better understand the attitudesand views of Canadians abroad, in 2007 theAsia Pacific Foundation undertook a surveywith 549 expatriates in Asia and the UnitedStates. This survey explored expatriatessocio-economic profile, reasons formigrating, expected duration of relocation,citizenship status and attachments toCanada, ties to Canada, and views on suchmatters as dual citizenship, voting rights,taxes, and government services. Perhaps themost interesting findings were that 95% ofrespondents had post secondary education,over 56% had lived outside of Canada forover five years, 64% continued to callCanada home, 65% had left Canada forcareer opportunities, 73% supported the ideaof establishing a Federal agency foroverseas Canadians, and 69% planned toreturn to Canada and establish permanentresidency there (Zhang 2007b).

In 2010 the Asian Pacific Foundationundertook a national poll (sample size 2093)


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within Canada itself in an effort to bettercomprehend Canadian views towardsCanadians living overseas. A significantmajority of the sample (73%) agreed thatCanada would benefit from a central agency

to oversee relations with Canadians abroad;66% agreed that children of Canadians bornoverseas should have the same citizenshiprights as children of Canadians born inCanada; 63% of Canadians agreed thatCanada should continue to promote a dualcitizenship policy, but only 51% ofparticipants were in support of the idea thatCanadian citizens living abroad should havethe same voting rights as Canadian citizensliving in Canada (Zhang 2010a).

In addition the Asia Pacific Foundation hascompiled a series of portrait reports onCanadian expatriate communities in theUnited States (estimated 1.1 million), India(estimated 1,530), Singapore (estimated5000), South Korea (estimated 15,000),United Kingdom (estimated 72,000), HongKong (estimated 250,000), Beijing(estimated 20,000), Chinas Xiamen and

Guangzhou province (estimated 577,000),Shanghai (estimated 6,121), Vietnam(estimated 1,500), and Trinidad and Tobago(estimated 5,000). More specificallyDeVoretz and Battisi (2009) have provided acomparative analyses of the socio-economicstatus of Canadian emigrants in the UnitedStates and Hong Kong, whilst Zhang(2010a) has profiled migration to and fromCanada and China, and has consideredfurther flows of tourists, students, and nonresident workers between both countries.

Canada of course already enjoys asubstantial and dense set of relations with itsoverseas communities. Arguably in theCanadian case, to date the mapping of theserelations has tended to be focussed uponCanadian expatriate groups in the United

States. This would include but would not belimited to:

C100 - a non-profit, member-drivenorganization dedicated to supporting

Canadian technology entrepreneur-ship and investment throughpartnerships among Canadians inSilicon Valley.

Canadians Abroad - a non-profit,volunteer, social and culturalorganization and social networkingvehicle for Canadians living in theGreater Los Angeles area.

All-Canada University AlumniAssociation - an alumni network for

all graduates from any CanadianUniversity which through poolingresources is able to organise alumnievents across the world.

The Canadian Expat Association - anon-profit, non-government lobby,social and cultural, and businessorganisation, linking all Canadiansliving abroad under one bilingualplatform

Connect2Canada - a government runsocial networking site designed topromote ongoing interaction andnetworking between Canadiansliving in the United States andCanada.

The Canadian Expat Network (CEN)- a privately run online communitythat connects Canadian expatriatesand informs overseas citizens of thelatest news from Canada.

The Canadian American BusinessAlliance of South Florida whichpromotes business networkingamong Canadians living in SouthFlorida and between South Floridaand Canada.

The Canadian American Chamber ofCommerce - a network bringingtogether those who share similar


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interests with the purpose ofexploring new businessopportunities.

The Canadian Snowbird Association- a national not-for-profit 70,000-

member advocacy organizationdedicated to actively defending andimproving the rights and privilegesof traveling Canadians.

In conducting their work the Asia PacificFoundation of Canada has began the task ofmapping diasporic groups both within theUnited States and elsewhere in greaterdetail. From this work it is clear that a wholerange of less well known Canadian business,

social, cultural, and political organizationsexists in Asia in particular. Examplesinclude the Canadian China BusinessCouncil, Canadians in China, Canadian Clubin Hong Kong, Chinese CanadianAssociation in Hong Kong, IndonesiaCanada Chamber of Commerce, Associationof Canadian Teachers in Japan, TokyoCanadians hockey club, CanadianAssociation of Malaysia, Canadian Club ofPhillipines, Canadian Association of

Singapore, Canadian Society in Taiwan,and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce inVietnam. Whilst an important start, morework remains to be done if the full range ofexisting organisations are to be identifiedand their functions understood.

On the bases of their work the Asia PacificFoundation of Canada has called for a publicdebate on the implications of the Canadiandiaspora for Canada and on the merits ofdesigning a formal Canadian diasporastrategy. DeVoretz states this caseparticularly cogently when he asserts:

The current approach to policy formulation

on Canadians abroad alternates betweencrisis management and benign neglect, with

little or no coordination among the many

departments that have a role to play.

Canadians abroad are often seen as a brain

drainfor the country, but it is also possible

to conceive of expatriates as overseas assetsfor Canada, much in way that we have come

to appreciate the value of Canadiancompanies with a global presence. Thechallenge is to develop a suite of policies

that embrace Canadians abroad and which

encourage their attachment to Canada. Atthe same time, prudent public policy

requires a careful assessment of the fiscal,

security and diplomatic risks posed by a

large overseas population. A concertedeffort to understand the opportunities and

challenges presented by Canadians abroad,

and a coordinated approach to policyformulation, could turn this underutilized

asset into a formidable advantage for

Canada.(DeVoretz 2009a)

In moving towards the formulation anddesign of a diaspora strategy for Canada,five questions would appear to be presentingthemselves as of especial importance.

a) Why might Canada benefit from a more

strategic engagement with its overseascitizens?

As the scale, geography, and character of theCanadian diaspora have become betterunderstood, attention has increasingly beengiven to whether the Canadian Governmentshould develop a formal diaspora strategy.Should the Canadian state intervene andwhat would the objectives of suchintervention be? The central propositionwhich has emerged from the CanadiansAbroad project is that because the overseasCanadian community holds importantstrengths, weaknesses, threats andopportunities for Canada such a strategy isnow overdue (Zhang 2007a, 2009a). Abeginning has been made in the conveningby the Department of Foreign Affairs and


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International Trade (DFAIT) of a workinggroup on Global Citizens and the organizingin March 2010 of a one-day workshop withexperts, practitioners and stakeholders fromDFAIT, other government departments, civil

society and academia on how global citizensmight support Canadian foreign policy andtrade interests internationally. Attention hasbeen given to the merits of developing newpolicies with respect to improving embassy,consular and emergency services, engagingother diasporas resident in Canada,promoting advocacy for Canada on theinternational stage among youth groups,students, teachers and alumni, andpromoting Canadian competitiveness in the

global economy. It remains to be seen if theGlobal Citizens project will emerge as apolicy priority for DFAIT and will come toany concrete fruition but certainly the seedsof a new journey would appear to have beensown.

b) Which institution(s) within Canadashould be tasked with the responsibility offormulating and overseeing a diasporastrategy and should a new institution becreated for this purpose?

To date, some consideration has been givento the importance of fortifying embassy andconsular services. In Embassy Magazine inMarch 2010 DeVoretz and Parasaram gofurther and consider the case for instituting anew Ministry of Canadians Abroad(DeVoretz and Parasaram 2010). They pointto the challenges Canada faced inresponding to the need for hasty evacuationfrom war zones in Lebanon and Sri Lanka,providing aid for earthquake survivors inPakistan and Haiti, addressing the panicwhich surrounded the finding of the SARSvirus among Canadians returning fromHong-Kong, and dealing with a Canadiancitizen reporter murdered in Iran and aCanadian dissident jailed in China. These

challenges produced a series of discrete andshort-term policies based upon the principalof crises management. A more strategic andlong-term approach might have helpeddefine the limits and possibilities of

Canadian Government support for itsoverseas citizens. DeVoretz and Parasaramsupport the concept of introducing acoherent and transparent triage approach. Tooversee this approach they argue that aformal Ministry of Canadians Abroad mightprove a useful innovation and contend that ata minimum, there needs to be acentralization of responsibility forCanadasoverseas population within a lead ministry.

c) Should and can the Canadiangovernment play an enhanced role inbuilding the Canadianess of the Canadiandiaspora and work to harness the Canadiandiaspora as a resource in the formulationof Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy?

Because it has emerged as a relatively newnation, because it has grown as a nation ofimmigrants, and because it lacks a popularhistory of trauma and victimhood, arguablyCanada has a relatively weak nationalidentity; marked perhaps by itscomparatively low key celebration ofCanada Day. Canadian national identity isalso complicated, defined in part by thecountrys indigenous roots, its British andEuropean legacy, its support for multi-cultural and tolerant values, and its othernessfrom the United States (Harder 2010). TheCanadian diaspora in no sense is anexemplar of a classic victim diaspora andfostering a sense of ethnic nationalism orethnic Canadianness in the diaspora is notappropriate or particularly relevant. But thisdoes not mean that building the Canadiandiaspora is not possible or important, thatCanadas overseas communities cannot bearwitness to and promote Canadian values andaspirations around the world, and that the


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Canadian diaspora cannot work to effectinternational diplomacy and enhanceCanadian foreign policy and internationalrelations. Waters (2008) has demonstratedthat in spite of keeping ties with their

country of origin, many migrants in Canadain fact display a high level of local loyaltyand engage substantially in civicparticipation. Zhang (2009b, 2010c)likewise has shown that Canadians livingabroad retain a strong sense of theirCanadianness and participate transnationallyin Canadian affairs. In addition Yu (2010)has mapped the existence of over 60Canadian diasporic media outlets, 53 mediaorganizations and 110 alumni publication

outlets in 12 selected destinations in Asia,Europe, North America and the Middle East.Abd-El-Aziz et al. (2005) and Carment andBercuson (2008) provide a valuable scopingstudy of what other countries diasporas whoreside in Canada might contribute to thefortification of Canadas role in internationalaffairs. Canadianness exists as a complexbut meaningful cultural identity amongdiasporic communities and decisions mightusefully be made about how the Canadiangovernment might support and nurturepatriotic good will towards Canada.

d) How can the Canadian diaspora beharnessed so as to improve thecompetitiveness of Canadian business andto stimulate Canadian economicdevelopment?

When set in international context, there is nodoubt that the Canadian diaspora is acomparatively well-resourced and well-endowed diaspora and one which isespecially ripe to be engaged to promote theglobal competitiveness of the Canadianeconomy: not least in terms of its scale,demography, geography, and skillcomposition. DeVoretz (2009b) hasdemonstrated that the Canadian diaspora is

comparatively large in proportion to nationalpopulation when compared with other globalcompetitors; is comparatively young andskilled; has its most significant presence inthe two leading economies of the present

century (the United States and China), and issourced principally from Ontario, BritishColumbia, and Quebec Provinces, whichinclude the financial, business, cultural, andpolitical muscle and might of Toronto,Vancouver, Montreal, and Ottawa. Theconditions seem right, both in the diasporaand within Canada, for a Canadian diasporastrategy to be particularly effective inbrokering Canadian participation in theglobal economy. Not surprisingly, an

explicit and core pillar of the GlobalCitizens project is to cultivate the Canadiandiaspora to further Canadas Foreign DirectInvestment (FDI) objectives. Zhang (2010b)points to the potential business, tourism, andeducational benefits which flow from Chinato Canada and which are lubricated byChinese Canadians. Lin, Guan, andNicholson (2008) identify a subset of theChinese community in Canada, InternationalEducated Professionals (IED), who havedeveloped a niche as transnationalentrepreneurs and who accomplishimportant work in improving technologicalinnovation in Canadian companies. Zweig(2008) meanwhile has argued that Canadacould do more to engage and harness thelong term business opportunities presentedby Chinese students studying in Canadianuniversities.

e) What challenges does the Canadiandiaspora present to Canadian citizenshippolicy and how should Canadianapproaches to citizenship respond?

Canadas recent interest in rethinking its

rules on citizenship stem from the fact that itis a country with a strong history ofimmigration, where a very particular subset


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of and minority of the immigrant populationarrives, becomes naturalised and re-emigrates (DeVoretz 2009a, Nyers 2010).Among some constituencies, there wouldappear to be concern that Canadian

citizenship is being appropriated by migrantsfor strategic reasons and that Canada isbeing treated as something of a migranthotel. But a much wider set of questionsdemand attention. According to Zhang(2010c) Canadas approach to citizenship

might be serving to discourage its overseaspopulation from engaging with Canadarather than encouraging the formation ofnew relationships. Zhangs focus is upon a)

the withdrawal of the right of Canadians to

vote in Canada after they have livedoverseas for five years (affecting anestimated 1.4 million people); b) the role ofCanadas tax system in discouraginginternationally mobile Canadians to retainties with Canada, and; c) amendments tocitizenship law (B-37) which wereintroduced in Canada in 2009 following thelost Canadians debate which restrictintergenerational transfer of Canadiancitizenship by descent to citizens who liveoverseas. Parasram (2010) meanwhile hasplumbed Canadian citizenship policy to

reveal eight challenges (residencyrequirements, under appreciation of nongovernment work abroad, statelessness,gender and motherhood, attachment, pluralcitizenship, equity, and security) which are

elevated and complicated by overseasCanadian populations. Meanwhile Macklinand Crpeau (2010) also show that Canadaalready offers a reduced franchise toCanadians abroad when compared with

other countries and that in any event accessto public health care, social services, andeducation is mediated principally byprovincial residence and not citizenshipstatus. The critical question remains an openquestion therefore: what kinds of citizenshiprights and responsibilities does and shouldCanada bestow on its expatriatecommunities and why?

As Canada deliberates over whether or not

to develop a formal and systematic diaspora,strategy finding answers to these fivequestions will assume ever greaterimportance. But importantly these questionsare ones that have vexed other governmentswho have already trodden this same path.Whilst undoubtedly each country will berequired to find their own way it is prudentthat the Canadian government reviews thedecisions and choices which have beenmade elsewhere and ruminates over thelessons, if any, which might be gleaned. Inthe remainder of this report we present asummary overview of the experience ofother countries who have chosen to pioneerdiaspora strategies and consider the potentialimplications of international practice forCanada.


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3. THE RATIONALE FOR

DEVELOPING A DIASPORA

STRATEGY

Why at this historical moment are a growing

number of sending countries seeking todevelop explicit and systematic strategiesaimed at creating, managing and energizingrelationships with their diasporicpopulations? Three overarching reasonspresent themselves. Firstly, whilsthistorically diasporic groups have played asignificant role in nation and state buildingprojects in the homeland and historicallynations and states have looked to diasporicgroups to promote their interests overseas,

the twenty first century is witnessing a newwave of nation and state building, and as acorollary a fresh and novel impetus for newmigrant contributions to and on behalf ofpolitical, social and cultural causes in thehomeland. Indeed within some countriesthere is now emerging a rethinking of thenation state as at once, a) a territoriallybounded community and; b) a globallynetworked community. Secondly, whilstemigration was once viewed as an

indictment of the failure of developmentpolicy (the so-called brain drain), overseasmigrant communities are now being re-appropriated as a potential catalyst foreconomic expansion and the securing ofglobal competitive advantage. Levering andharnessing the resources, contacts,knowledge, and talents of migrants fromoverseas locations, rather than simplyseeking to encourage return migration, isnow being viewed as a desirable policy

approach. Finally growing internationalmigration is challenging the models ofcitizenship adopted in many sending states,leading to a revisiting and clarification ofemigrants entitlements and obligations and

in some cases to the introduction of entirelyfresh categories of citizenship. Albeittempered by fears of geopolitical instability

and security concerns, yet ever more statesare permitting forms of dual and evenmultiple citizenship.

The population of Ireland is circa 4.4

million. There are 800,000 Irish born peopleliving overseas and 3.1 million Irish Citizens(passport holders) dwelling overseas (themajority in both cases in the UnitedKingdom). More broadly, there are anestimated 70 to 80 million people who claimIrish ancestry, mainly in the UnitedKingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, NewZealand, and Argentina. The history ofAnglo-Irish relations, the Great Irish Faminein the 1940s and the representation of the

Irish diaspora as a victim diaspora haveconspired to create an elevated patriotismamong Irish communities abroad. The Irishdiaspora has changed the course of Irishhistory through remittance payments andpolitical mobilization in support ofnationalist movements. In 2002, in themidst of the buoyant Celtic Tiger economicboom, Ireland commissioned a Task Forceon Policies Towards Emigration whichrecommended using the countrys newfound wealth to extend welfare assistance tooverseas populations, especially vulnerablegroups (the elderly, infirm, sick, the poorand prisoners) who left Ireland in the 1950sand the 1980s to move to British cities.Recently, Irelands policy towards its

diaspora has been equally motivated by twofurther considerations. Firstly, there isgrowing concern that the strength ofdiasporic attachment and affiliation toIreland might be waning (ironically not leastbecause of peace in Northern Ireland) andthat a certain level of disenchantment exists.The Irishness of the Irish diaspora can nolonger be taken for granted. As aconsequence, priority is now being given tothe nurturing of the social and cultural life ofthe diaspora and its continued enthusiasmfor matters Irish (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin


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2009a). Secondly, given the dramaticcollapse of the Irish economy, bankingsystem, and property sector from 2007, thereis growing recognition that diasporicnetworks have a role to play in brokering the

countrys economic revival. The Irishdiaspora is one tool to be harnessed torescue a country which is quite literallybankrupt.

The population of New Zealand is 4.3million. Circa 750,000 New Zealanders liveoutside New Zealand. Although present in178 countries, the New Zealand diasporadwells principally in Australia, with the UK,Canada, and the USA being of lesser

importance. New Zealands diasporastrategy arose in recognition of thegeographical isolation and peripherality ofNew Zealand and the importance ofharnessing expatriates to connect to theglobal economy. The strategy seeks topromote the idea that New Zealand is atonce a nation state in the remote Southernhemisphere and a globally networkedcommunity and as such New Zealand ispioneering the concept that the nation statecan be territorially bounded on the onehanded but deterritorialised and globallyconnected on the other. The New Zealanddiaspora strategy seeks to connect NewZealand and its diaspora to improve globaleconomic competitiveness, lever investment,circulate and embed technology andknowledge, promote the New Zealandbrand, and foster return migration.

The population of Scotland is 5.15 million.Overseas Scots total circa 1.27 million, twothirds of whom dwell in England. A widerancestral diaspora is estimated to be circa28-40 million and based mainly in the USA,Canada, Australia and New Zealand.Although Scotland now has its ownGovernment, it remains a constituent part ofthe United Kingdom and only enjoys a

limited number of devolved powers.Scotlands turn to its diaspora stems from

debates in the early 2000s about impendingskill shortages. At the time it was believedthat the Scottish population was in decline

and that Scotlands population could dipbelow five million and fortifying positivenet migration (including courting returningdiasporeans) was the preferred policyoption. From this point of departure, threeadditional progenitors of the Scottishdiaspora strategy have emerged. Firstly,there remains a belief that population growthwill be an important stimulus to theeconomic development of Scotland andScotland has set itself the target of matching

the average European EU (EU15) populationgrowth over the period from 2007 to 2017.Secondly, in so far as diasporic populationscan help Scottish businesses compete in theworld market and help broker transnationalcapital investment into Scotland, it isbelieved that the diaspora can help theScottish economy to become smarter andwealthier. Finally, with the ScottishNational Party now presiding over thedevolved Scottish Government, the Scottishdiaspora is seen as integral to the building ofa new species of Scottish civic nationalism.

Whilst emigration from Armenia has been aconstant feature of its history, the mainwaves of large-scale, systematic and forcedemigration were 1894-1896, 1915-22, and1988 to the present. The consequence is asizeable and classical victim diaspora ofsome six million plus located in fivepredominant geographic locations formerSoviet states (e.g., Russia 2,250,000;Georgia 460,000; Ukraine, 150,000); NorthAmerica predominately concentrated in theUnited States (1,400,000); Europe, with byfar the largest concentration in France(450,000); the Middle East (with largegroupings in Lebanon, 234,000 and Syria,150,000); and South America with a large


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group in Argentina (130,000). UndoubtedlyArmenia struggled with its transition from asocialist satellite state to an independentrepublic after independence in 1992 and atleast according to some viewpoints within

Armenia relations with the diaspora weremore a hinderance than a help. The first postindependence Armenian President Ter-Petrossian provoked the ire of the diasporaby adopting a strategic and pragmaticrelationship with historical foes Turkey andAzerbaijan. Petrossian recognised theresources of the diaspora to be a vast assetbut considered its brand of ideologicalforeign policy to be a liability. The electionof President Kocharyan in 1998 announced a

new departure. Kocharyan adopted a foreignpolicy which was more nationalistic and intune with the aspirations of the diaspora. Inreturn he sought and secured support fromthe diaspora. Walking the typerope betweensecuring domestic autonomy and sourcingoverseas assistance proved to be a challengebut one which generated benefits. Morerecently President Sargsyan, who waselected in 2008, has continued to court thediaspora aggressively and in his program forgovernment published in 2007 gave acommitment to prioritize the developmentand implementation of a conceptual

framework for Amernia diaspora relations,a comprehensive consolidation of diaspora

policies and the establishment of adedicated diaspora agency.

The population of China is circa 1.4 billion.The population of overseas Chinese is circa42 million, 80% of whom live in South EastAsia, with North America, Europe andAustralia being of progressively lesserimportance. Since the Peoples CommunistParty came to power in 1949 China(Peoples Republic of China or PRC) has

sought to reach out to overseas Chinesecitizens, even when at times they viewedthese citizens with a certain suspicion

especially during the isolationist periodswhen Mao Tse Tung held power. Article 98of the PRCs 1954 Constitution guaranteesthe legal protection and rights of overseascitizens and allows for their formal

participation in the National PeoplesCongress. Under the comparatively moremoderate Den Xiaoping, the PRCsperspective on the Chinese diaspora wasnevertheless dramatically transformed. Fromthe 1980s onwards, and certainly followingthe Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, thePRC has actively courted the Chinesediaspora with a view to brokering aprogressive relationship between China andthe world, and in particular to promote

international diplomacy, knowledge transfer,trade and investment.

The population of India is 1.2 billion. Thepopulation of the Indian diaspora is circa 25million, broadly spread and present in 110countries. The diaspora formed in fourwaves of migration: indentured labourmigration, post independence (1947)migrations, the Middle Eastern oil boommigration, and the more recent movement ofknowledge workers to Silicon Valley inCalifornia. Indias turn to its diaspora wasstimulated by a government commissionedreport undertaken by an influential HighLevel Committee on the Indian Diaspora in2001. With the country standing at thethreshold of emerging as a global economicpower, the strategy was motivated by aconcern to harness the economic potential ofthe global Indian diaspora. But the strategywas also stimulated by a desire to furtherdevelop and broadcast Indias confident

postcolonial identity to the world, using thediaspora to parade its technological prowess,brand of tolerant ecumenical Hinduism, andprogressive attitudes to multiculturalism(diasporeans are encouraged to be loyal totheir new homes first and foremost).


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Interest in engaging diasporic populationsthen normally originates in trigger eventswhich arise in one of three policy fields;nation and state building, improving globaleconomic competitiveness, and developing

new approaches to defining and servicingnational citizenship. For Ireland, diasporastrategy was initially conceived as anopportunity to spend the fiscal surpluses ofthe Celtic Tiger boom on the protection andwelfare of vulnerable and forgotten overseasmigrants; for Israel, motivation derivesprincipally from the desire to protect anddefend the right of the state of Israel to exist;for Scotland, concern initially was with lowfertility levels and the social, economic,

political, and cultural consequences of ashrinking population; for New Zealand, thediaspora is seen as a means of counteringgeographical isolation from the global

economy; for Armenia, the diaspora is beingseen as a resource in the reassertion andreclamation of a post-Soviet nationalidentity and trajectory; for India and China,diasporic groups are being deployed to

broker integration into the global economyat a moment when the global distribution ofpower is being realigned; whilst for Mexico,the efficient harnessing of diasporicremittances is being promoted to counter theeffects of population flight from the globalsouth. It is common for diaspora strategiesto broaden out from their point of origin andto populate all three policy fields. Quite howthe point of departure (the specific policyfield and particular triggers) of any diaspora

strategy enables and constrains thesubsequent rolling out of this strategyremains to be understood.

a) Why might Canada benefit from a more strategic engagement with its overseas citizens?

It is clear that Canada has stakes in its diaspora with respect to the three progenitors of diasporastrategy identified above; in promoting national economic development, in redefining citizenshiplaw and entitlements, and in promoting Canadian social, cultural, and political values and interestsglobally. But Canada has a unique point of entry to the global diaspora strategy debate too. Fromour vista, Canadas role as a global immigrant magnet and leading proponent of muti-culturalism,and the important subset of Canadians abroad who are naturalised Canadians, provides thecountry with a fundamentally unique resource which, if harnessed properly, could define itsdiaspora strategy and brand it as globally innovative. In the introduction to this report we insistedthat far from being a neutral bystander, definitions of diaspora condition the kinds of diasporastrategies that are capable of being imagined and enacted. In the DFAIT concept of the globalcitizen Canada has an opportunity to contribute original thinking to the global dialogue on diasporastrategy. The concept of the global citizen, incorporating as it does all constituencies in Canadawith resources which might help the country enhance its global activities and relations (includingother countries diaspora in Canada, whether naturalised or not, Canadian minded populations

overseas whether Canadian citizens or not and whether naturalised or Canadian born) significantlybroadens the populations which diaspora strategies might conceivable engage with. The concept ofthe global citizen needs to be developed, sharpened and operationalised but it does present aninternationally unique and politically progressive point of departure and provides Canada with anopportunity to contribute to as well as to draw from global dialogue in international best practice.


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4. THE INSTITUTIONS AND

STRATEGIC APPROACHES

THROUGH WHICH COUNTRIES

SEEK TO ENGAGE THEIR

DIASPORAS

Whilst it is relatively easy to identifybranches of state which deal withimmigration, it is more difficult to establishwho governs over matters of emigration.Cognate state departments andadministrative units such as Departments ofForeign Affairs, Departments of HomeAffairs, Departments of Heritage andCulture, and Enterprise and Development

Agencies, devise and implement solutions toemigration problems normally in an ad hocand isolated way. Gamlen (2008) developsthe useful notion of the emigrant state to

capture the totality of the work these rangeof state actors perform. Diaspora strategiesemerge when particular states decide it isnecessary to firstly secure an overview ofthe range of actually existing public, private,and voluntary diasporic ties (to map theexisting range of transnational connections)

and secondly to articulate and enact apreferred orientation as to how these tiesmight best be developed. A diasporastrategy, it should be noted, does notnecessarily demand the development of acoherent and formalized top-down,bureaucratically regulated, centralized andmanagerialist, blueprint. But it does imply astrategic understanding of the full extent ofthe emigrant state and the ways in which theemigrant state might be better deployed.

There exists a continuum of institutionalinnovation. Some states are content to maptheir emigrant state apparatus, to promotejoined-up thinking and to leave each statedepartment and administrative unit to itsown devices. Other states provideprotection for particular diaspora initiatives

proposed by their various state departmentsand administrative units and police andregulate these infant strategies. Moreinvolved, yet other governments encourage

and induce their various departments andadministrative units to bring forth particulardiaspora policies. A higher level ofengagement comes when a state teaches,cultivates, nurtures, and re-energizes statedepartments and administrative units whoare already pursuing particular diasporaengagements. Finally, more muscular statesagain further embark on a formal strategy ofactively governing over their emigrant state,dedicating whole ministries, sections of state

departments, or special purposeadministrative units to the task ofdeveloping and implementing coherentdiaspora strategies.

It is obvious why many governments mightwant to engage their diaspora, but whyshould state bodies intervene at all? What isthe justification for state intervention andwhen might such intervention beproductive? This is a question which hasgenerated particular scrutiny in the Scottishcase. According Rutherford (2009),intervention is particularly valuable whenthree particular types of market failureoccur: network effects, transactioncosts/information failure, and externalities.Firstly, market failure occurs when projectsare judged to be sufficiently risky orunproven to be tackled. Intervention to builddiasporic networks can be justified if thecost of network establishment proves to be adisincentive for early adopters, and whennetworks only become viable when moreestablished and mature. Governments caninternalise the costs of network creation andshepherd these networks until they reach thecritical size necessary to demonstrate theirsustainability. Secondly, market failure canoccur if transaction costs and the cost of


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researching and gaining knowledge ofopportunities are high. Governments canwork to produce and share information andservices to bring these costs down beneaththe level at which they prove to be a

disincentive. Finally, market failure onaccount of positive externalities occurs whenprojects produce both private and publicgoods, but where the profitability of theprivate good is not sufficient to encouragethe private actor to initiate the project.Governments can invest where the aggregategood includes, but is larger than, benefits toprivate citizens.

State interventions can be represented in the

continuum; absent, custodian, midwife,husbandry, and demiurge:

Absent - the state leaves theformation of links between thehomeland and the diaspora to themarket or to autonomous social,cultural and political movements,with the diaspora self-organizing itsengagement with its homeland.

Custodian - the state nurtures,protects, regulates, and polices newand emerging diasporic connections.

Midwifery - the state identifiespotential engagements, champions/leaders and mobilizes and cultivatesthem but leaves ownership ofinitiatives in the hands of thediaspora.

Husbandry - the state works with andre-energizes existing diasporaorganisations and networks.

Demiurge - the state directly createsand runs diasporic initiatives andnetworks, perhaps with the intentionof letting the market assumeresponsibility at a later date.

Within Ireland, The Irish Abroad Unit, adivision within the Department of Foreign

Affairs, seeks to promote joined-up thinkingand coordination across branches of the statefor instance with respect to the diasporicrelevant work of Enterprise Ireland, theIndustrial Development Agency, The

Presidents Office, and other departmentswithin the state. With respect to the policiesof these agencies, the motif of the Irish stateis let a thousand flowers bloom, with thestate at best lightly incubating existinginitiatives or seeding new initiatives. TheIrish schemes are slowly transferring tomore managerialist interventions, especiallywith regards to accountability andtransparency of spending, but there remainsan underlying inclination to leave diaspora

organizations and networks to runthemselves, providing only minimalresources (basic funding, advice, speakers,etc) and only when an organization ornetwork needs to be re-energized andrequires the short-term backing of the Irishstate.

A key weakness of the Armenian state in theyears immediately following independencefrom the Soviet Union was the lack ofcapacity within the state apparatus.Accordingly, across the past decade therehas emerged a concerted effort to build theArmenian state and undoubtedly theinstitutional capacity of the current staterepresents a momentous improvement onwhat the country inherited from the Sovietperiod. The limit of Armenias weak

institutional capacity is especially evidentwhen one considers the capacity of theArmenian state to engage, lever, and harnessdiasporic resources and expertise. Part ofthe challenge of developing a diasporastrategy then has been the creation ofinstitutional capacity and structures withinArmenia capable of extending existing tiesand establishing new relationships with thediaspora. Initially this engagement waslargely the preserve of the Ministry of


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Foreign Affairs and to an extent, theMinistry for Economy. More recently in2008 a new Ministry of Diaspora wasestablished. This Ministry represents adramatic development in state building in

the sphere of diaspora engagement; asignificant ramping up of what Armenia iscapable of doing with its diaspora.

India has a well-developed diaspora strategywhich is produced and managed by adedicated Ministry of Overseas IndianAffairs (MOIA), which came into existencein May 2004 as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians Affairs. Within theterminology of the Indian state, this Ministry

has the status of a Services Ministry. TheMinistry is primarily responsible for allissues relevant to Overseas Indians,comprising Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs)and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) which arenot specifically allocated to otherMinistries/Departments of the Governmentof India. Like Armenia, India has found ituseful to erect a powerful and central stateorgan to oversee its ties with its diaspora andmore specifically has adopted a highlyinterventionist posture, setting up schemesand managing programmes directly fromNew Delhi.

The Scottish Governments InternationalProjects Division instituted by and guidedby its International Frameworkpublished in2008 seeks to promote joined up thinkingand coordination across branches of thestate, for instance with respect to thediasporic relevant work of ScottishEnterprise, Scottish DevelopmentInternational, and VisitScotland. In 2009the Scottish Government hosted a ScottishDiaspora Forum in which invited thoughtleaders were asked to propose bold newinitiatives to better engage the ScottishDiaspora. In 2010 it published a wellthought out plan and list of priorities. Whilst

the International Projects Division performsmore as nimble and flexible coordinator thanas a key actor itself, and seeks to bring arange of agencies behind the plan, thespecific Scottish schemes tend to be highly

managerialist in nature. Whilst importantexceptions exist, in the Scottish case, thestate functions largely as the lead player inproposing, managing, and reviewingschemes. Indeed Scotland identifies itself asEuropes leading pioneer in the developmentof formal and systematic state led diasporastrategies.

New Zealands diaspora strategy is co-ordinated and managed by Kea New

Zealand, a non-for-profit organization whichworks in close relation with, but whichexists independently from, government.Whilst the New Zealand state anticipatesthat as the strategy matures Kea will knittogether with other expatriate initiatives(devised by other Ministries andDepartments including, for example, theNew Zealand Treasuries alumni networksscheme), to date Kea continues to dominatethe field and is the lead player. As such, theNew Zealand state operates with a lighttouch and has externalized diasporastrategizing. Kea was conceived andlaunched at the Knowledge WaveConference in Auckland in August 2001.Initially funded through privatephilanthropy, it is now funded in descendingorder by the Government (Ministry ofEconomic Development and New ZealandTrade and Enterprise), the private sector,sponsorship, service fees, and membershipfees (both corporate and individual). It hasfour full-time regional managers in the UK(London), Australia (Sydney), NorthAmerica (New York), and China (Shanghai),and fourteen international chapters: LosAngeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston,London, Manchester, Paris, Amsterdam,


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Dubai, Shanghai, Sydney, Melbourne,Brisbane, Vancouver.

Chinas approach to its diaspora is being

championed by the State Councils General

Office of Overseas Chinese affairs, theStanding Committee of the NationalPeoples Congress, and the PoliticalConsultation Conference. Within theCommunist Party the Department of theUnification Front assumes primaryresponsibility. Whilst these variousinstitutions promote dialogue with respect tohow best to engage and cater for theoverseas Chinese community, there exists no

formal overarching diaspora strategy.Undoubtedly the objective of the Chineseauthorities is to secure the loyalty of theoverseas Chinese and to engender asympathetic pro-Beijing, pro-socialist, but

still modern and technologically awarediaspora. In spite of its centralist reputation,much of what the Chinese state does ismainly designed to support initiatives led bydiasporic communities and to provide amacro-economic regulatory frameworkwhich incentivizes diasporic engagement.Whilst ultimately controlled by the ChineseCommunist Party, the Chinese diasporastrategy is still surprisingly light touch.

b) Which institution(s) within Canada should be tasked with the responsibility of formulatingand overseeing a diaspora strategy and should a new institution be created for this purpose?

International practice suggests that countries who are seeking to fortify and develop theirrelations with diasporic communities are viewing it as necessary to erect new institutionalcapacities to accomplish this task. Among the models of governance which are emerging arethe creation of dedicated new Ministries, the establishment of diaspora units within

Government departments, the establishment of nimble and flexible cross department workinggroups, and the outsourcing of diaspora strategy to voluntary and/or private sector groups. As afirst step it would seem imperative that Canada maps its emigrant state and reflects upon the

fitness of purpose of its emigrant state. Moreover some diaspora strategies fail becausegovernments seek to impose a fresh blueprint and set of structures on an already crowdedlandscape of organic transnational relations, without mapping these prior ties or workingcollaboratively with and alongside them. It would seem important that Canada fullyunderstands its existing connections with its overseas communities. In our experience,governments are often unaware, and on occasions surprised and taken aback, with what existsalready and what can be put offside and suffocated by new top down bureaucratic strategies.Critical market failures do occur and there is a role for states to intervene and sometimes to

intervene in a muscular way. But the skill in formulating diaspora strategies pivots aroundstrategic and timely state interventions. Whatever institution is given responsibility forformulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy for Canada, it is crucial that attention is given tothe particular spaces in which any intervention might work and how intervention might workwith and build upon actually existing transnational ties.


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5. DIASPORA AND NATION

BUILDING

Historically, diasporic communities haveplayed an active and at times key role in therise and fall of cultural and politicalnationalisms and nationalist movements inthe homeland. This support has taken theform of leadership and organization,volunteering, moral and political solidarity,fundraising for political parties, theprovision of armaments and explosives, andthe dissemination of political propaganda.This is especially true of victim diaspora ordiaspora whose history is fraught with thetrauma of a natural or human disaster(earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, genocide,famine, warfare) and who reside in diasporain exile with seemingly heightened patrioticfervour. Nation building continues to serveas an important progenitor of state interest inengaging diasporic communities. Accordingto Lainer-Vos (2010) at a more substantiallevel building the nation has come to implya simultaneous building of the nation athome and in diaspora. Here, renewedinterest has been given to recharging shortterm return visits, social and culturalactivities, honours and awards systems, andcommunication and ICT links. Whilst thismove might be read as a recognition thatdiasporic loyalty can no longer be taken forgranted, a more profound interpretationpoints to a re-conceptualization ofrelationships which have hitherto beenassumed to exist between nation andterritory.

Of course the significance attached by longestablished nations to promoting the virtuesof their national narrative and their valuesand beliefs within the internationalcommunity continues unabated. But thetwenty first century is also giving birth to anew generation of nation building projects

which in turn are once again activelyseeking to enlist diasporic support and toharness diasporic patriotism. Firstly, thelegacy of the European colonial adventure in

Africa, Asia, and Latin America continues toreverberate, in terms of the trials andtribulations of still vulnerable fledgling newstates. Secondly, the collapse of the SovietUnion has resulted in, at times, volatileethnic factionalism and in the creation ofpost-Soviet states in central and EasternEurope. Thirdly, recent US foreign policyhas created or is striving to create nationbuilding in, among other places, Afghanistanand Iraq. Finally, successionist and

independence movements continue to asserttheir right to self-determination in placessuch as the Balkans, Scotland, NorthernIreland, Quebec, Sri Lanka, and Palestine.

With respect to (but not confined to) thesefour contexts, the literature on diasporicintervention in state building has focusedupon three central issues. Firstly, there hasbeen considerable debate over the extent towhich diasporas contribute more to conflict

and political anarchy than to conflictresolution and purposeful statecraft (Shainand Barth 2003). Brinkerhoff (2009) arguesthat it is no longer possible to view diasporaas mere adjuncts to homeland conflicts andprovides a valuable summary of theconditions in which diaspora might serve asconflict entrepreneurs, competinginterests, or contributors to stability anddevelopment. Secondly, an alternativedebate has focused upon the readiness of

home states, institutionally and politically,to effectively interface with, and be engagedby, willing, motivated, and in some caseswealthy, diasporic sponsors. Freinkmans(2002) study of the early post-SovietArmenian state provides lessons both forwilling diaspora groups (that they shouldseek suitable institutional forms before


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engaging and investing) and home states(that without proper institutionalframeworks much effort can be dissipatedwithout effective results). MeanwhileWaterburys (2005) analyses of the

appropriation of diaspora strategy by elitesin post communist Hungary, and Mohans(2008) study of the Ghanaian governments

engagement of its diaspora points to thepolitical sensitivities which need to bemanaged if diasporic communities are to bedrawn into domestic nation buildingprojects. Finally, not only do some statesand political parties attempt to harness theenergy of diasporic communities to bolsterdomestic political agendas and programmes,

but so too diasporic populations arefrequently enlisted to broker foreign policy,influence international relations, promotecultural values, and perform diplomaticfunctions, in their roles as advocates,activists, agitators and ambassadors of thenation.

A prerequisite for a successful diasporastrategy is a motivated diaspora, willing andminded to contribute to nationaldevelopment. Whilst perhaps historicallytaken for granted, the social and culturalcondition, empathy, and inclination ofdiasporic communities is now emergingitself as an important arena for intervention.Diasporic patriotism varies in time andspace, with the patriotic flame being dousedand ignited by a variety of origin anddestination specific triggers. But states canplay a role in incubating, fostering andbuilding diaspora social and culturalnetworks. Arguably, the nation needs to bestrategically and consciously built in thediaspora first if the diaspora is to contributeto nation building in the homeland.Although at first glance a reasonablystraightforward proposition, in fact such aproject might imply and encourage aprofound shift in the ways in which nations

and territory are imagined. For Agnew(2005), contemporary interest in buildingnations at home and in diaspora points to apreparedness to de-territorialise the nationand to cast or re-territorialise the nation as a

global network. Only a small number ofcountries have begun the task of thinkingthrough the implications of this seismic shiftin thinking about the relations which existbetween geography, nations, and states.Ireland Armenia, Croatia and New Zealandare examples.

Projects designed to fortify and rechargenational pride for, and patriotism towards,the homeland have made use of organized

short-term visits. These visits are oftenmanaged and funded by governments andinclude visitations by more youthful cohortsfor short periods lasting from a week tomuch longer periods. By following a setitinerary which includes formal schooling inthe nations history and politics, visitingiconic places, participating in social andcultural activities including attending andcelebrating religious festivals, exposure tooral history, and access to leading nationalpoliticians and celebrities, the objective is toproduce a memorable visit which energizefuture diasporic leaders and which will sowthe seeds for a lifelong commitment andloyalty. Two frequently cited and classicexemplars of the workings and effectivenessof organized short term visits to thehomeland are the Taglit-Birthright Israel andMASA programmes, which repatriateJewish Youth to Israel. The Know IndiaProgramme likewise provides diasporayouth with a three week internship with aview to promoting a new awareness of andinterest in India.

Many diaspora groups have establishedhomeland specific social, cultural andsporting clubs and networks, someaccompanied with designated physical


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infrastructure such as theatres, schools,museums, sporting arenas, and libraries, andgovernments often support these groupsthrough direct and in-kind funding (such assupporting cultural visits by politicians,

celebrities, national icons, sporting heroes,artists, writers and performers) as a way ofmaintaining cultural identity. Ireland, forexample, funds creative artists to visit thediaspora, funds Irish sporting organizationsoverseas, and funds overseas Irish heritageresources such as the Kennedy Library inBoston. These supports are increasinglyforming part of, and being coordinatedthrough, national cultural and heritagestrategies. Countries may also provide

specific services relating to cultural identity.For example, India has set up a state-sponsored genealogy service Tracing theRoots which engages a private company(Indiroots) to construct a family tree for asmall fee. The Irish Department ofCommunity, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairssupports the teaching of the Irish language atthird-institutions outside of Ireland.Similarly, the Lithuanian government fundsLithuanian schools to teach the Lithuanianlanguage and cultural heritage to thedescendants of Lithuanian emigrants.

Some nations also make use of nationalhonours and awards systems to builddiasporic loyalty by recognising thecontribution of individual diaspora membersto the homeland and to society in general. Ofcourse most nations have an official honourssystem through which normally civilians arerecognised and rewarded for theircontributions to the furtherment andbetterment of the national cause. Some ofthese systems have sought to incorporateoverseas citizens and more generallyoverseas non-nationals who have also servedthe nation with distinction. The Frenchhonours system is perhaps the most famousexample; whilst awards to overseas citizens

rarely afford such citizens with membershiprights and entitlements enjoyed by Frenchnationals, France does still regularly rewardthe achievements of such citizens in itsprincipal honours: Lgion d'honneur (Legion

of Honour); L'Ordre National du Mrite(National Order of Merit); L'Ordre des Artset des Lettres (The Order of Arts andLetters); Palmes acadmiques (Order of theAcademic Palms); LOrdre du MriteAgricole (The Order of Agricultural Merit),and; LOrdre du Mrite Maritime (TheOrder of Maritime Merit). More particularly,some nations have created an entirely newset of honours and awards for their diasporicpopulation. For example, since 2003, the

President of India has presented the PravasiBharatiya Samman Awards to up to 20members of the Indian diaspora; the highestcivilian honour which can be bestowed onoverseas citizens. In 2006, KEA NewZealand started the World Class NewZealand Awards to honour New Zealandersmaking a significant internationalcontribution in different spheres.

Building a sense of nationhood in a diasporaalso necessitates opening up new dialoguewith diasporic communities, increasinglythrough the use of ICT technologies. Somecountries have set up formal arrangementsof consultation with their diasporas. Forexample, Jamaica has established theJamaican Diaspora Advisory Board. Itsmembers are elected and it meets twice ayear to discuss diaspora matters. In addition,a diaspora conference of invited delegatesmeets every two years, with regionalconferences held in interregnum between thebiennial Conferences. Similarly, Norway(Norgestinget), Finland(Ulkosuomalaisparlamentti), Sweden(Utlandssvenskarnas parliament), France(Assemble des Franais de ltranger) andSwitzerland (Organisation des Suisses deltranger) have recently established


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expatriate parliaments to consult with theirdiasporas about domestic and diasporamatters. India has established the PrimeMinisters Global Advisory Council of

Overseas Indians, and also hosts events to

meet with its diaspora twice a year, in Indiain January and overseas each September.

Many countries seek to inform the diasporaas to what is happening in their homecountry through newsletters and websites. Itshould be noted that many of theseinitiatives are organic and are led by actorsfrom the private and voluntary sector; othersare state led. Barabanstv (2005) identifiesmore than 30 Chinese newspapers published

in Europe alone, including the EuropeanTimes (ouzhoushibao) (France), EuropeDaily (ouzhou ribao) (France), ChineseCommunicator (huaqiao tongxun) (theNetherlands), United Business Paper(lianheshangbao) (Hungary), Romanian Chinese(lluo huaren) (Romania), Chinese NewPaper (huaxinbao) (Spain), AustrianChinese (auhua) (Austria).Web site portals,both state-sponsored (such asConnect2Canada) and run by NGOs orprivate organisations or even individuals(such as the Canadian Expatriate Network),detailing useful information to the diasporain situ and also about the home country, areseen by many in the diaspora and thoseseeking to serve the diasporic community asvital infrastructure. Some of these portals arevery broad in nature, often having a socialnetworking facility. Increasingly, Facebook,Twitter, and LinkedIn, and derivateequivalent social networking tools are beingdeployed. In addition, many diaspora canalso keep in contact with their homelandthrough broadcast media via satellite andInternet. Whilst there exist few state-sponsored free to air channels aimedspecifically at the diaspora as a constituentgroup, the BBC, SKY, CNN, Bloomberg,Euronews, CCTV (China), NDTV24x7

(India), NHKWorldTV (Japan), Al Jazeera(Arab World) all play an important role.Meanwhile the Indian government producesa monthly e-magazine (overseasindian).Likewise the Scottish government produces

a quarterly e-magazine (ScotlandNow). Inthe Irish case, Emigrant News, anindependent organisation provides a weeklynews summary of Irish relevant news.

Armenia presents a classic example of acountry which is seeking to refresh itsnational narrative but also to rebuild itsnational story for the twenty first century.The building the Armenian nation as aglobally dispersed cultural and political

community has emerged as central to thework of the new Armenian Ministry fordiaspora. Indeed arguably to date it has beenthe cultural fortification of Armenianess inthe diaspora that has been the primaryobjective of the new Armenian Ministry forDiasora. At the heart of the strategy has beenthe concept of the Armenian World. Ratherthan conceiving of Armenia as a smalllandlocked nation in the interior of theCaucasus, Armenia is now being imaginedand invented as a globally networked nationwhich surpasses the boundaries of the stateof Armenia itself. Armenia is keen to buildthe narratives of the Armenian World withdue reverence for its history of trauma butalso with respect to its potential to play anew role in the twentieth first century. Inimportant ways the Ministry has been keento help support the self organization of thediaspora and to avoid crowding into spacewhich the diaspora already occupies andservices itself. To gain some insights intoits work it is worth noting some of the chiefprojects pursued in 2010 were:

Development and implementation ofthe Ari Tun program (periodicvisits of Diaspora Armenian youth toArmenia)


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Development and implementation ofthe One Nation, One Culture Pan-Armenian Cultural Festival

Organizing professional forums andscientific conferences with Armenian

themes Coordination and organizing of the

contest for Best Armenian Schoolat the annual pan-Armenian awardceremony for notable contributionsto the preservation of Armenianidentity

Organizing and conducting the OurGreats program of events to payhomage to notable DiasporaArmenians

Implementation of the Year of theMother Language Organizing to provide public

educational institutions andcommunity organizations of theDiaspora with educational,

childrens, fictional and scientific

literature and Armenian emblems

Implementation of efforts aimed atexpanding the network of one-dayschools, the Sister Schools program

Organizing efforts aimed atbroadening educational opportunitiesfor Diaspora Armenians studying atArmenian universities andintermediate vocational institutions

Establishment of an Alley ofArmenian Benefactors program

Organizing Armenia-Diasporatheme-based video-conferences andteleconferences


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c) Should and can the Canadian government play an enhanced role in building the

Canadianess of the Canadian diaspora and work to harness the Canadian diasporas aresource in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy?

An overly patriotic and militant diaspora can often prove to be both a resource and a problem forsending states. In spite of this or in some cases because of this, sending states are seeing virtue inculturally fortifying and nurturing their diasporas. Supporting diasporas culturally is rightlybeing seen by many as an essential prerequisite for other types of engagement and in particulareconomic engagement. The cultural underpins the economic, and countries that seek to lever andharness their diaspora for economic benefit only without first attending to the culturalinclinations of their overseas populations will find their strategy quickly foundering. Crudely, if

people do no feel Canadian their chances of playing for Team Canada are lessened. Building thediaspora culturally requires a recasting of Canada as both a) a territorialized nation in NorthAmerica and b) a globally networked nation present in countries across the globe. Whilstbuilding the nation among diaspora groupings has emerged as a central theme of many countrysdiaspora strategies arguably it is in those nations who have suffered a history of trauma and thosediaspora that consider themselves to be victim diaspora that the greatest success has beenenjoyed to date. Although it is not always the case, it is diasporic populations that are alreadyheld together by virulent ethnic nationalism that present the most receptive audiences for suchprogrammes. Arguably the Canadian diaspora is held together by a more diluted set of nationalnarratives which pivot around varieties of civic nationalism. One need only compare the globalcelebrations which accompany St Patricks Day and Canada Day to appreciate the import of this

point. This does not need imply that the patriotism of the Canadian diaspora is insignificant northat work can be done to fortify the Canadian mindedness of the diaspora nor that the Canadiandiaspora and more broadly Canadas global citizens cannot play a role in promoting Canadianvalues around the globe. But it does suggest that the Canadian approach will need to think of thecomplex constituencies it needs to speak to, the varieties of Canadian national identities whichalready exist, and the kinds of social and cultural projects which are likely to resonate best with

the wide range of overseas Canadian communities which exist.


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6. DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT

Growing interest in diaspora strategy can betraced in part to new thinking inDevelopment Studies regarding the role ofemigration in the development of sendingcountries. Historically, emigration has beenviewed as a barometer of the success orfailure of national economic strategies; thegreater the loss of talent the moreimpoverished the strategy. Policyinterventions have tended to focus narrowlyupon arresting the brain drain and fostering

return migration, and increasing the scaleand improving the deployment of migrant

remittances. Since the early

diaspora strategy canada

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