digest - (3rd batch) ramirez vs. ca

8/19/2019 Digest - (3rd Batch) Ramirez vs. CA

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carlotroyacelotttapadomanalo

1. Ramirez V. CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

a!t":

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that

the private respondent, ster !arcia, in a confrontation in the latter"s office, allegedly ve#ed,

insulted and humiliated her in a $hostile and furious mood% and in a manner offensive to

petitioner"s dignity and personality,% contrary to morals, good customs and public policy&%

'n support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought

damages& The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the

confrontation made by petitioner&

As a result of petitioner"s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the

confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the (asay RTC for

violation of Republic Act )*++, entitled $An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other

related violations of private communication, and other purposes&%

(etitioner filed a otion to Quash the 'nformation, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground

that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R&A& )*++&

The CA declared the RTC"s decision null and void and denied the petitioner"s R, hence the

instant petition&

#""ue:

-./ the Anti0-iretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

$e%&:

'e". Section 1 of R&A& )*++ entitled, % An Act to (rohibit and (enalized -ire Tapping and 2ther

Related 3iolations of (rivate Communication and 2ther (urposes,% provides:

Sec& 1& 't shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private

communication or spo4en word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or

arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo4en word by

1

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using a device commonly 4nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal4ie0tal4ie or

tape recorder, or however otherwise described&

The aforestated provision clearly and une5uivocally ma4es it illegal for any person, not authorized

by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means

of a tape recorder& The law ma4es no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by

the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the privatecommunication& The statute"s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to ma4e such recording

is underscored by the use of the 5ualifier $any%& Conse5uently, as respondent Court of Appeals

correctly concluded, $even a 6person7 privy to a communication who records his private

conversation with another without the 4nowledge of the latter 6will7 5ualify as a violator% under

this provision of R&A& )*++&

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court"s

conclusion that in enacting R&A& )*++ our lawma4ers indeed contemplated to ma4e illegal,

unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications ta4en either by the

parties themselves or by third persons&

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute& The substance of the

same need not be specifically alleged in the information& -hat R&A& )*++ penalizes are the acts of

secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices

enumerated therein& The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private

communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1

of R&A& )*++& As the Solicitor !eneral pointed out in his C2/T before the respondent court:

$/owhere 6in the said law7 is it re5uired that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature

of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed&%

(etitioner"s contention that the phrase $private communication% in Section 1 of R&A& )*++ does not

include $private conversations% narrows the ordinary meaning of the word $communication% to a

point of absurdity& The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning $to

share or to impart&% 'n its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or

imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in

a conversation, or signifies the $process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between

individuals through a common system of symbols 6as language signs or gestures7%

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non0verbal, written or e#pressive

communications of $meanings or thoughts% which are li4ely to include the emotionally0chargede#change, on 8ebruary **, 19, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the

latter"s office& Any doubts about the legislative body"s meaning of the phrase $private

communication% are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms $conversation% and

$communication% were interchangeably used by Senator Ta;ada in his #planatory /ote to the


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2. (eop%e V. Car%o"

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3. )on!a&o V. (eop%e*" Court

=ilario oncado v& (eople"s Court case brief summary

$i%ario )on!a&o +. (eop%e*" Court!&R& /o& >0*), ?anuary 1), 19)

ACS: 'n an e@ectment case filed before the @ustice of the peace court of !ui@ulngan, /egros

2riental, after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered @udgment in favor of plaintiff& The

Court of 8irst 'nstance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September , 199 the notice

of receipt of appealed case and the period for pleading& Befendants were informed of such mail by

the postmaster but the same was not claimed, C8' of /egros 2riental, upon motion of plaintiff,

ordered defendants to vacate the land and to pay, @ointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of

(=( 1 as damages, plus costs& Befendant"s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get

notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff"s

motion for default&

C8' denied defendant"s motion on ?une 19, 19)+&

#SS-: -as defendant"s failure to get notice valid and e#cusable

R-/#NG: /o, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant"s are not entitled to a service of copy of the motion that they are in default e#cept when they file a motion to set aside the order of

default, in which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings 6Rule *D, Section 9,

Rules of Court7& Second, failure to get notice was not e#cusable neglect as claimed by defendants&

'ndeed, a notice, is deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within E days from

first notice of postmaster 6Rule *D, Section , Rules of Court7&

Appealed order affirmed&

0. a!e !o., V. Ruiz


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ACS4

Respondent isael (& 3era, Commissioner of 'nternal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to

respondent ?udge 3ivencio & Ruiz re5uesting the issuance of Search -arrant for violation of

Section )J of /ational 'nternal Revenue Code and authorizing Revenue e#aminer Rodolfo de

>eon, to ma4e and file the application for Search -arrant which was attached to the letter& At that

time ?udge was hearing a certain caseK so, by means of a note he instructed the Beputy Cler4 of

Court to ta4e the depositions of respondents de >eon and >ogronio& The stenographer, upon

re5uest of respondent ?udge, read to him her stenographic notesK and thereafter, respondent

?udge as4ed responded >ogronio to ta4e the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found

to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for per@ury&

#SS-4

-hether or not ?udge 3ivencio & Ruiz conducted a personal e#amination

$/4

/o& The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and andamus are granted& Search -arrant /o& *00

D+ issued by respondent ?udge is declared null and void&

RA#6NA/4

(ersonal e#amination by the ?udge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable

him to determine the e#istence or non0e#istence of a probable cause, the determination of whether

or not a probable cause e#ists calls for the e#ercise of @udgment after a @udicial appraisal of facts

and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary&

'n this case at bar, no personal e#amination at all was conducted by respondent ?udge of the

complainant and his witnesses&

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search

Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes to a

few words of warning against the commission of per!ury, and to administering the oath to the

complainant and his witness" This cannot #e considered a personal e$amination" %f there was ane$amination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was one conducted #y the &eputy 'ler(

of 'ourt

Se!tion 0 7amination o te App%i!ant:4

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The ?udge or ?ustice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally e#amine on oath or

affirmation the complaint and any witnesses he may produce and ta4e their depositions in writing,

and attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him&

5. ur;o" V. Cie o Sta 7A(:

?ose 0J)*J1

Becember *J, 19)

8acts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of $etropolitan

ail% and $-e 8orum% newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in

subversive activities& (etitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory

in@unction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be en@oined fromusing the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner&

(etitioners 5uestioned the warrants for the lac4 of probable cause and that the two warrants

issued indicated only one and the same address& 'n addition, the items seized sub@ect to the

warrant were real properties&

'ssue:

-hether or not the two warrants were valid to @ustify seizure of the items&

=eld:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a

typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be

searched set forth in the application& The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was

evident in the issuance of the two warrant&

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the

case of &avao Sawmill 'o" v" 'astillo, ruling $that machinery which is movable by nature becomes

immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed

by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person

acted as the agent of the owner&% 'n the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of

the land and.or building on which the machineries were placed& This being the case, the

machineries in 5uestion, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to

seizure under a search warrant&

=owever, the Court declared the two warrants null and void&

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(robable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a

reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the

ob@ects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched&

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the

re5uirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations&

8urthermore, @urisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants& 6Stanford

vs& State of Te#as7& The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched

and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items&


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interest& 6iller v& California7& Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the


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(etitioner contends that the term $television program% Oin Sec& of (B /o& 19J that the

respondent


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the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better

theology& The bedroc4 of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by

encouraging the mar4etplace of duelling ideas& -hen the lu#ury of time permits, the mar4etplace

of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spar4 of opposite speech,

the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth&

'n #0rating the T3 program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule& 'n *merican i#le Society v& 'ity of Manila, this Court held: $The

constitutional guaranty of free e#ercise and en@oyment of religious profession and worship carries

with it the right to disseminate religious information& Any restraint of such right can be @ustified

li4e other restraints on freedom of e#pression on the ground that there is a clear and present

danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent&% 'n 1ictoriano vs& li;alde

/ope Wor(ers #""ue"4 (rivacy

e"t4 importance of 82

(ena%t4

e!i"ion4 in@unction for breach of privacy set aside

Juri"&i!tion4 (hilippines 6Supreme Court7

8acts:

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Australian film ma4er =al clroy and his movie production company, Ayer (roductions,

envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the peaceful struggle of the 8ilipinos at BSA

6pifanio de los Santos Avenue7 to oust then (resident 8erdinand arcos& They consulted with

!eneral 8idel 3& Ramos and Senator ?uan (once nrile, who played ma@or roles in the events&

-hile !eneral Ramos signified his approval, Senator nrile wrote a letter stating that he would

not approve of the use of his name or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television

production for commercial e#ploitation, and advised petitioners that in the production ore#hibition of said or similar film, no reference 6whether written, verbal or visual7 should be made

to him or any member of his family& The film producer deleted the name of Senator nrile in the

script and proceeded to film the motion picture& Senator nrile then filed a Complaint with

application for a -rit of (reliminary 'n@unction with the Regional Trial Court of a4ati, see4ing to

en@oin clroy and Ayer (roductions from producing the movie& Senator nrile alleged that the

production of the film without his consent and over his ob@ection constitutes a violation of his

right of privacy& The trial court issued a writ of preliminary in@unction, ordering clroy and Ayer

(roductions to desist from filming the movie, and from ma4ing any reference to Senator nrile or

his family or any fictitious character identifiable with them& clroy and Ayer productions

5uestioned the trial court decision in a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, claimingtheir right of freedom of speech and e#pression&

=eld:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the -rit of (reliminary 'n@unction issued by

the respondent trial court&

8reedom of speech and e#pression includes the freedom to film, produce and e#hibit motion

pictures& The freedom of speech and e#pression includes the freedom to film and produce motion

pictures and to e#hibit such motion pictures in theaters or through television& 'n our day and age,

motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of e#pression& Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass

communication for information, education and entertainment&

Available to foreign0owned companies& This freedom is available in the (hilippines both to locally0

owned and to foreign0owned motion picture companies&

Commercial purpose does not affect the availability of the right& The circumstance that the

production of a motion picture is a commercial activity is not a dis5ualification for availing the

freedom of speech and of e#pression& (rivate sector0owned media facilities commonly re5uire to

be sustained by being devoted to revenue producing activities& To e#clude commercially owned

and operated media from the e#ercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of

e#pression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in the country&

(rior restraint presumed invalid& 't may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the

instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent ?udge upon the e#ercise of

speech and of e#pression by petitioners& The ?udge restrained petitioners from filming the entire

proposed motion picture&


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freedom of speech and of e#pression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of

prior restraint upon the e#ercise of such freedoms& The invalidity of prior restraint does not, of

course, mean that no subse5uent liability may be imposed upon a person claiming to e#ercise such

constitutional freedoms&

Counter0balancing with right of privacy on case0to0case basis& 2ur law, constitutional and

statutory, does include a right of privacy& 't is left to case law, however, to mar4 out the precise

scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations& The right of privacy or

Lthe right to be let alone,L li4e the right of free e#pression, is not an absolute right&

(rivacy of a Lpublic figureL necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens& A limited

intrusion into a persons privacy is permissible where that person is a public figure and the

information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a

public character& The sub@ect matter of the movie relates to the non0bloody change of government

that too4 place in 8ebruary 19J& Such sub@ect matter is one of public interest and concern as it

relates to a highly critical stage in our history& 't has passed into the public domain and as an

appropriate sub@ect for speech and e#pression and coverage by any form of mass media&

At all relevant times that petitioners propose to film were ta4ing place, private respondent was

what (rofs& (rosser and Geeton have referred to as a Lpublic figure&L A public figure has been

defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a

profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his

character, has become a public personage& =e is, in other words, a celebrity& To be included in

this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the

public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer&

The list is, however, broader than this& 't includes public officers, famous inventors and e#plorers,

war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the !rand

#alted Ruler of a lodge& 't includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public

attention is focused upon him as a person& Such public figures were held to have lost, to some

e#tent at least, their right of privacy because: they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so

could not complain when they receive itK or that their personalities and their affairs had already

become public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private businessK and that the press

had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become

legitimate matters of public interest&

(rivate respondent is a Lpublic figureL because of his participation as a principal actor in the

events of the change of government in 8ebruary 19J&


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private respondent& There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling

private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts& To the

e#tent that the movie limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent to those

events which are reasonably related to the public facts of the BSA Revolution, the intrusion into

his privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable& Such portrayal may be carried out

even without a license from private respondent&

9. Gonza%e" V. Come%e!

B2@ SCRA 835 G.R. />2@833 18 A(R 19


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before the utterance can be punished& The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil

sought to be prevented& 't has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a

definite rule in constitutional law& 't provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly

established& The Ldangerous tendency ruleL is such that $'f the words uttered create a dangerous

tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable&% 't is not

necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated& 't

is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms& /or is it necessary that the languageused be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness& 't is

sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the

substantive evil which the legislative body see4s to prevent&

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more

precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional re5uirements as to a valid limitation under the

clear and present danger doctrine& As the author Ta;ada clearly e#plained, such provisions were

deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not

merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual e#istence of a grave and substantive evil of

e#cessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country&

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to

meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of

grievances& As in the case of freedom of e#pression, this right is not to be limited, much less

denied, e#cept on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a

right to prevent&

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for

or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of thepublication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes

whether directly or indirectly, or the underta4ing of any campaign literature or propaganda for or

against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command&

1E. (eop%e V. "pue%a"

8acts:


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them the situation in Central >uzon, the =u4balahaps& Tell them about ?ulio !uillen and the

banditry of >eyte& Bear wife, write to (resident Truman and Churchill& Tell them that here in the

(hilippines our government is infested with many =itlers and ussolinis& Teach our children to

burn pictures of Ro#as if and when they come across one& ' committed suicide because ' am

ashamed of our government under Ro#as& ' cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty

government& ' committed suicide because ' have no power to put under ?uez de Cuchillo all the

Ro#as people now in power& So, ' sacrificed my own self&L spuelas was charged for violating Article 1)* of the Revised (enal Code, which punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate

scurrilous libels against the !overnment of the (hilippines or any of the duly constituted

authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir

up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community& spuelas

admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter and caused its publication in the 8ree (ress, the

vening /ews, the amdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one

Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as

Alberto Reveniera in a picture ta4en wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a

limb of a tree& spuelas was, after trial, convicted in the Court of 8irst 'nstance of


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the (resident, his Cabinet and the ma@ority of legislators to whom the ad@ectives Constitutional

>aw '', *++E 6 1 7 /arratives 6aw of the Gnife, a Lsummary and arbitrary e#ecution by the 4nifeL, the

idea intended by spuelas to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeacefulmethods to free the government from the administration of Ro#as and his men& The meaning,

intent and effect of the article involves maybe a 5uestion of fact, ma4ing the findings of the court

of appeals conclusive upon the Supreme Court&

11. Fa%&i+ar V. Gonza%ez

== S'/* .= > ?egal thics > 'ontemptuous ?anguage > &uty of a ?awyer

Ialdivar was the governor of Anti5ue& =e was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations ofthe Anti0!raft and Corrupt (ractices Act& !onzales was the then Tanodbayan who was

investigating the case& Ialdivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,

(rohibition and andamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases

under the 19D Constitution& The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Besist

2rder against !onzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing

informations against Ialdivar&

!onzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against

Ialdivar& !onzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one onthe Supreme CourtK that the Supreme Court"s issuance of the TR2 is a manifestation theta the

$rich and influential persons get favora#le actions from the Supreme 'ourt, while: it is difficult

for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to #e given due course+"

Ialdivar then filed a otion for Contempt against !onzalez& The Supreme Court then ordered

!onzalez to e#plain his side& !onzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were trueK that

he was only e#ercising his freedom of speechK that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the

Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error& =e also said, even

attaching notes, that not less than si# @ustices of the Supreme Court have approached him to as4

him to $go slow% on Ialdivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court&

#SS-4 -hether or not !onzalez is guilty of contempt&

$/4 es& The statements made by respondent !onzalez clearly constitute contempt and call

for the e#ercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court& =is statements necessarily

imply that the @ustices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office& Such statements

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constitute the grossest 4ind of disrespect for the Supreme Court& Such statements very clearly

debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of

administration of @ustice in the country&

!onzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech& -hat !onzalez seems unaware

of is that freedom of speech and of e#pression, li4e all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and

that freedom of e#pression needs on occasion to be ad@usted to and accommodated with there5uirements of e5ually important public interests& 2ne of these fundamental public interests is

the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of @ustice& There is

no antinomy between free e#pression and the integrity of the system of administering @ustice&

!onzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special (rosecutor who

owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment

and the repository of the @udicial power in the government of the Republic& The responsibility of

!onzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in

the administration of @ustice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer&

!onzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide& 'n

the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme

Court approached him, are of no relation to the Ialdivar case&

The Supreme Court suspended !onzalez indefinitely from the practice of law&

12.a&o V. Come%e!

A6' +". C6)/C

35 SCRA 285

a!t": Anacleto B&


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also mentioned with e5ual prominence&% Comelec Resolution RR0D*), as amended, merely

restates the ban in Section 1* 687&

#""ue4 -hether the ban in Section 1* 687 is valid or constitutional&

$e%&4 Hnder Section 1* 687, the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for

advertisements, comments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of anotheror which mention his name and the fact of his candidacy, is re5uired to mention all the other

candidates in the same district with e5ual prominence, to e#empt him from the penal sanction of

the law& The evident purpose of the limitation is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in

the election& The restriction is only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve suffrage

pure and undefiled and to achieve the desired e5uality of chances among all the candidates&

Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 1*687 in the light of the other provisions of RA

J1* designed to ma#imize, if not appro#imate, e5uality of chances among the various candidates

in the same district, the said restriction on the freedom of e#pression appears too insignificant to

create any appreciable dent on the individual"s liberty of e#pression& 't should be noted that

Section 6a7 of the same law, prohibiting political parties from aiding candidates and thus wasmore restrictive than Section 1*687, was previously upheld to be valid& The limitation in Section

1*687 is a reasoned and reasonable @udgment on the part of Congress& 't is not unconstitutional&

13.Sani&a& V. Come%e!

Constitutional >aw& (olitical >aw& (lebiscite Cases&

SA/'BAB 3S C2>C

D SCRA K 2ctober 1*, 19DJ

(onente: artin, ?

8ACTS:

2n September *D, 19DJ, (ablo Sanidad and (ablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with

preliminary in@unction to en@oin C2>C from holding and conducting the Referendum

(lebiscite on 2ctober 1JK to declare without force and effect (B /os& 991 and 1+, as well as (B&

1+1& (etitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new

constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis&

'SSH:

1& 's the case at bar @usticiable

*& Boes the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution

& 's the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed

sufficient and proper submission

=>B:

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The issue of whether the (resident can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a @usticiable

5uestion since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform

such act is in 5uestion& The president has the authority to propose amendments as the

governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis& The time for

deliberation of the referendum0plebiscite 5uestions, wee4s, is not too short especially since the

5uestions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation

of martial law&

10./e&e"ma V. CA

8ACTS:

Citiwide sold * cars to a certain ?o@o Consun@i evidenced by * invoices& Hpon delivery of the cars,

?o@o paid with a anager"s Chec4 6(h(1+1,+++&++7& -hen Citiwide deposited the chec4, it was

dishonored for being tampered& Amount was changed from 1+1&++ to 1+1,+++&++&

Citiwide reported the crime to the (hil& Constabulary where he found that Consun@i was actually

Armando Suarez, a professional criminal&

2ne car was found abandoned, while the other was discovered to be in the possession of ?aime

>edesma, who claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the registered owner, evidenced

by the >T2 Registration&

RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of >edesma&

CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of property through false

pretenses amounting to fraud&

'SSH:

-hether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property

=>B:

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/o& There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale& 8ailure to pay by Suarez through the

subse5uent dishonor of the chec4 did not render the contract of sale void& 2wnership was already

transferred by the delivery of the cars to Suarez&

15.-S V. u"to"

a!t"4 'n the latter part of 191E, numerous citizens of the (rovince of (ampanga

assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the #ecutive Secretary6privileged

communication7 through the law office of Crossfield and 2


24/25


The right to assemble and petition is the necessary conse5uence of republican institutions

and the complement of the part of free speech& Assembly means a right on the part of

citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs& (etition means that

any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch

or office of the government for a redress of grievances& The persons assembling and

petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made& All persons have an

interest in the pure and efficient administration of @ustice and of public affairs&

(ublic policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have

demanded protection for public opinion& The inevitable and incontestable result has been

the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege& All persons have an interest in

the pure and efficient administration of @ustice and of public affairs& The duty under which a

party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good

faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mista4en& Although the

charges are probably not true as to the @ustice of the peace, they were believed to be true by

the petitioners& !ood faith surrounded their action& (robable cause for them to thin4 that

malfeasance or misfeasance in office e#isted is apparent& The ends and the motives of thesecitizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were

@ustifiable& 'n no way did they abuse the privilege&

'n the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words& (rivilege destroys that

presumption& A privileged communication should not be sub@ected to microscopic

e#amination to discover grounds of malice or falsity&

8acts: 'n 191E, numerous citizens of (ampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the

#ecutive Secretary 6privileged communication7 through the law office of Crossfield and 2eoncio Quiambao: (unsalan ;a+e im (3E an& i" complaint was shelved&

/ow, (unsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,

defamatory, and libelous against him&

'ssue: -2/ accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and

free press&

=eld: es& The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the ri;t to !riti!ize Hu&i!ia%

!on&u!t& The administration of the law is a matter o +ita% pub%i! !on!ern& -hether the law

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is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit sub@ect for proper comment& 'f the people!annot

!riti!ize a Hu"ti!e o te pea!e or a @udge the same as any other public officer, public opinion

will be effectively suppressed& 't is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist

in the investigation of any alleged misconduct& 't is further the duty of all who 4now of any official

dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to

the notice of those whose duty it is to in5uire into and punish them&

Constitutional Biscussion:

8reedom of speech was un4nown in the (hilippine 'slands before 19++&

?ose Rizal in L8ilipinas Bespues de Cien AnosL describing Lthe reforms sine 5uibus non,L which

the 8ilipinos insist upon, said: Lreforms, must begin by declaring the press in the (hilippines free

and by instituting 8ilipino delegates&L

The alolos Constitution zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and

petition&

(resident cGinley in the 'nstruction to the Second (hilippine Commission 619++7 laying down

the inviolable rule LThat no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press orof the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the !overnment for a redress of

grievances&Lcralaw virtua1aw library

The (hilippine aw, the Act of Congress

of August *9, 191J, in the nature of organic acts for the (hilippines, continued this guaranty&

The adoption of the HS Constitution carries with it all the applicable @urisprudence of great

nglish and American Constitutional cases&

I)en in pub%i! %ie ma "uer un&er a o"ti%e an& an unHu"t a!!u"ation te

=oun& !an be a""ua;e& =it te ba%m o a !%ear !on"!ien!e. A pub%i! oi!er mu"t not

be too tin>"?inne& =it reeren!e to !omment upon i" oi!ia% a!t".

e ;uarantie" o a ree "pee! an& a ree pre"" in!%u&e te ri;t to !riti!ize

Hu&i!ia% !on&u!t& 'f the people cannot criticize a @ustice of the peace or a @udge the same as any

other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled&

?ustice !ayner: LThe people are not obliged to spea4 of the conduct of their officials in whispers

or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism&L

The particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be

considered libelous per se&

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digest - (3rd batch) ramirez vs. ca

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