Ceniza v. Rubia

Facts: Ma. Earl Beverly Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents. Ceniza sought the legal services of Rubia in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. Allegedly, Rubia filed her complaint in a court that has no jurisdiction of the said properties to be recovered, forged the signature of Ceniza’s husband in a certain affidavit and misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court when in fact, upon verification, it was not. But upon the IBP investigation, the allegations filed by Ceniza have no factual basis. However, IBP found that Rubia committed some acts for which she should be sanctioned, she leave Ceniza with no representation and failed to maintain open communication regarding the status of the said complaint due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of services.

Issue: Whether or not Rubia’s withdrawal of service is reasonable.

Held: Rubia’s withdrawal of service is unreasonable because when she accepted to handle the case of Ceniza she is expected to do her duties with utmost attention, skill and competence, despite other workloads to do with other client. This is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that states: A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for god cause and upon notice appropriate to the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who is task to assist in the administration of justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to client. Thus, Rubia is suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. v. De Dios Transportation Co., Inc.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the decision of Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. This case stemmed-up when De Dios Transportation Co. (DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transportation Corp. (DMTC) executed a Deed of Conditional sale covering 58 buses and its franchise in favor of Coyukiat and Goldfinger with the price of P 12,000,000 and later on failed to follow the contract which both parties agreed upon. Coyukiat and Goldfinger through its counsel Padilla Reyes and De la Torre Law office filed a complaint against DDTC and DMTC for rescission of contract with plea for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction and posted Bond No. 71336 issued by Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. for P 11,000,000.00. DDTC and DMTC counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fee which is favored by the trial court. Aggrieved, Coyukiat and Goldfinger filed their brief through counsel Atty. Ronaldo Reyes with the Court of Appeals but before the adverse party can file their brief, Padilla Reyes and De la Torre Law office filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel and on the same day Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates filed its appearance as counsel for Coyukiat and Goldfinger and filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal but did not bear the conformity of their client and the adverse party were served copies via registered mail thru their counsel. DDTC and DMTC contend that the filing of withdrawal of appeal of Coyukiat and Goldfinger through new counsel without the client’s conformity to the substitution and to such withdrawal of appeal was not self-executory.

Issue: Whether or not Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates as counsel failed to submit the proper substitution requirements.

Held: Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates as counsel failed to submit the proper substitution requirements, when they substituted Padilla Reyes and De la Torre Law Office and filed the withdrawal of appeal without the written conformity of their client. A proper substitution of counsel requires: written application for substitution, written conformity of client and written consent of attorney to be substituted. In such case the written consent cannot be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of the application upon the attorney to be substituted. A substitution which does not comply with the required formalities is ineffective to effect a change of counsel or to terminate his authority.

Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda

Facts: Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association (ETCHA) filed a disbarment case against Atty. Michael Dioneda. Allegedly, ETHCA and Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s Agreement in handling a civil case of ETCHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank, for P 20,000 as attorney’s fee and P 1,000 as appearance per hearing. But when Mr. Garcia, ETCHA President, was not able to receive from Dioneda any update of the status of the case, he check on the record of the case and found out that Dioneda did nothing for the development of the said case. Garcia, then demanded for the return of P 20,000, but Dioneda respond that a portion of the money would be deducted as reasonable fee for the efforts he exerted and he had no intention to defraud ETCHA. Through IBP investigation, it was found that Dioneda failed to render the corresponding legal services to ETCHA and no factual basis to determine the value of his work as counsel.

Issue: Whether or not Dioneda is entitled to a reasonable fee.

Held: Dioneda is not entitled to reasonable fee because there is no evidence that determine the value of his work as counsel of ETCHA. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Dioneda’s negligence in the discharge of his duty restricts him to recover from his client a reasonable fee. Thus, Dioneda is suspended from the

practice of law for six months and ordered to return the P 20,000 to ETCHA with interest of 12% per annum from date of promulgation of the decision.

Albano v. Coloma

Facts: Angel Albano filed a disbarment case against Atty. Perpetua Coloma. Allegedly, Coloma as counsel failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the civil case of Albano and his mother, and intervened in the case just to collect attorney’s fee, but Coloma denied the accusations and averred that she filed more than 20 papers and pleadings, went to trial for several days and won the case in a 35 page brief filed with the Court of Appeals. She also claimed that her dismissal as a counsel was made without just cause and without her consent and only when she already won the case for them; well in fact she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity as counsel. Coloma then presented authentic evidence that Albano promised to pay her a contingent fee of 1/3 of whatever land and damages could be recovered from the said case.

Issue: Whether or not Coloma is entitled to claim her contingent fee.

Held: Coloma is entitled to claim her contingent fee, for the efforts she rendered in, and for winning the said case. A Contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing, fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, and made to depend upon the success of the case or litigation. Accordingly, in this case Albano and Coloma did entered into an agreement, and Coloma deserves to be compensated for the services she rendered. Thus, the case is dismissed.

Quirante v. IAC

Facts: Atty. John Quirante represented Dr. Casasola in a certain case against Guerrero who failed to fulfill his obligations as building contractor and PHILAMGEN (Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.) who acted as bondsman of Guerrero. During the course of the case, trial court favored Casasola and ordered Guerrero to pay certain damages and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay P 120,000.00 as surety bond. PHILAMGEN filed several motions and was denied, which elevated this case in the Supreme Court. When Dr. Casasola died, Quirante subsequently filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his fees pending adverse party’s filing of a petition for review on certiorari. Quirante claim that he and the late doctor had an oral agreement that in case of the recovery of surety bond, he will be given P 30,000 for his attorney’s fee and in case the court award damages in excess of P120,000 bond, it shall be divided equally between the heirs of Casasola, Quirante and Cruz, and this is confirmed in writing by Casasolas’ widow.

Issue: Whether or not Quirante’s claim for attorney’s fee is premature.

Held: Quirante’s claim for attorney’s fee is premature because the adverse party’s petition for review on certiorari was still pending in court, and attorney’s fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and subject for recovery is at the court’s disposition. The rule on the remedy for recovering attorney’s fee as incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Also, what is being claimed by Quirante as attorney’s fee is not as an item of damages but an award in favor of Casasola, not to his counsel and it is up to his heirs to enforce the judgment for attorney’s fee by execution, which is stipulated under Attorney’s fee as contract and as items of damages. Thus, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed.

Tanhueco v. De Dumo

Facts: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as a counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to collect from debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn over the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fee.

Issue: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.

Held: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of the total amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because he took advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Thus, De Dumo is suspended from the practice of law for six months and the attorney’s fee is reduced to 15% of the total amount collected by him. He is also ordered to return the P 10, 200.00 net amount of the P 12, 000.00 he collected and entitled of 15% attorney’s fee in case he made any other collection from Tanhueco’s debtors

Armovit v. CA

Facts: Atty. Raymundo Armovit filed a petition for his claim of attorney’s fee against Bengson. Armovit was the counsel of Bengson in a complaint against GSIS for an extrajudicial foreclosure of their properties, and agreed to pay Armovit P 15,000.00 as initial compensation and 20% contingent fee. After favorable judgment was rendered to them, Armovit was given P 300,000 instead of P 552,000 which is the 20% of the P2,760,000 that was recovered from the said case, and assured that the balance is forthcoming. But Bengson did not pay the balance and averred to the court that the P 300,000 was the final payment. Armovit appealed that there is nothing in the evidence receipt that shows that P 300,000 was the full payment of the agreed contingent fee.

Issue: Whether or not Armovit’s claim of attorney’s fee is reasonable.

Held: Armovit’s claim of attorney’s fee is reasonable for it is stipulated in the agreement with Bengson that he will be given 20% of contingent fee, and since the case obtained favorable judgment, the agreement must therefore be followed. A Contingent Fee Contract is an agreement in writing in which the lawyer’s professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation; and if in case the client acted in bad faith and refuse to pay what is due to the lawyer then the lawyer is entitled to recover the full amount as fixed in a valid written agreement. Thus, the petition of Armovit is granted and Bengson is ordered to pay P252,000.00 as balance of the contingent fee.

Metropolitan Bank v. CA

Facts: Atty. Arturo Alfafriz and Associates was the counsel of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company who handled civil cases for the declaration of nullity of certain deed of sale with damages. During the pendency of these suits, without the knowledge of Alfafriz the lands were sold by Metrobank to its sister company for P 600,000 and on the same day were sold to Herby Commercial for P 2.5 million, and later on mortgaged to Banco de Oro for P 9.2 million. Alfafriz then filed a motion to enter the charging lien in the records of the civil cases pursuant to Sec. 27 of Rule 138, equivalent to 25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties, as attorney’s fees and filed motion to fix its attorney’s fee based on quantum meruit. Metrobank claimed that they had fully paid Alfafriz, however the latter countered that the P 50,000 given could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the P 14,000 that was given to him. It also appears that Alfafriz attempted to arrange a compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount to P 600,000 but negotiations were unsuccessful. RTC issued order granting Alfafriz a payment of P 936,000 for attorney’s fees and this order is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari was filed by Metrobank impugning the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not Alfafriz is entitled to a charging lien for payment of his attorney’s fee.

Held: Alfafriz is not entitled to a charging lien for payment of his attorney’s fee, because the case does not involve a money judgment. Rule 138, Sec. 27 provides that: A charging lien is limited only to money judgment and not to any other kind of judgment. In this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of Metrobank, hence Alfafriz’s claim is without legal basis. The petition for review is granted; decision of Court of Appeal is reversed and set aside.

Pantranco v. CA

Facts: Tandoc (which is substituted by his heirs upon his death) and heirs of Mamenta filed a complaint against Pantranco North Express Inc. or PNEI for damages regarding the vehicular accident happened which they were involved both parties. The trial court rendered a decision holding that PNEI is liable to the heirs of Tandoc and Mamenta to pay for damages, one of which is the attorney’s fee that amounted to P80,000.00. Thus, PNEI filed this petition for review on certiorari on one of the grounds that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in upholding the lower court’s award for attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in upholding the lower court’s award for attorney’s fees.

Held: The Court of Appeals did not abused its discretion in upholding the lower court’s award for attorney’s fee because it only sustained the decision made by the trial court which has the discretion in giving award of attorney’s fees in favor of the prevailing party in a case. However, Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees; the award of P80,000.00 as attorney’s fee breaches the parameters of reasonableness. Thus, it is reduced to P 25,000.00.

Corpus v. CA

Facts: Juan David sought to recover attorney’s fees for professional services rendered to Mariano Corpus. David was asked to handle the administrative case against Corpus filed by several employees of the Central Bank Export Department. In the course of the case, the court rendered decision in favor of Corpus, ordering his reinstatement and payment of his back salaries and allowances. David, then filed a formal demand for collection of 50% of the amount recovered for his attorney’s fee but Corpus denied the demand and appealed to the Court of Appeals that David’s services were offered and rendered gratuitously and at most he is entitled to attorney’s fee of P 2,500.00. David, also appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in ordering Corpus to pay the sum of P 30,000.00 as attorney’s fee due to him.

Issue: Whether or not David is entitled to attorney’s fee.

Held: David is entitled to attorney’s fee because there was an implied agreement made by Corpus that he will pay attorney’s fee when a final decision shall have been rendered in his favor and upon issuing a check worth P2,000.00. The absence of contract for attorney’s fee in this case is no argument against the payment of such fee considering the close friendship between them. Canon 20, Rule 20.4 states that: A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. The Lawyer may enforce his attorney’s fees by filing an appropriate motion or petition as an incident in the main action where he rendered legal services. David’s action to protect his right to fees in the services rendered is only appropriate. Thus, Corpus is directed to pay David the sum of P 20,000.00 for attorney’s fee. Against But David was held in contempt and reprimanded for the improvident act made.

Sato v. Rallos

Facts: Primitivo Sato filed a case for the collection of attorney’s fee against Simeon Rallos in his capacity as administrator and distributor of the Testate Estate of Numeriana Rallos and the Intestate Estate of Victoria Rallos. Simeon Rallos engaged in the services of Sato for the reduction in the assessment of inheritance taxes on the estates, made by the collector of Internal Revenue and agreed to pay P 20,000 and one hectare of any commercial-residential lots of the estate if the reduction would be successful. After ten months of representation by Sato, the tax was very much reduced to P22,545.73 from P103,076.43. Sato, then served demand letters for the agreed attorney’s fee but Rallos failed to settle and instead, interposed several defenses.

Issue: Whether or not Sato violated the Code of Professional Responsibilities in filing a case for the collection of his attorney’s fee.

Held: Sato did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility in filing a case for the collection of his attorney’s fee, for he was just protecting his right to fees. As provided in Canon 20, Rule 20.4 that: A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Thus, Rallos is ordered to pay Sato P12, 500.00 as a reasonable compensation for his services to the estate.