MATAAS NA LUPA TENANTS ASSOCIATION V. CARLOS DIMAYUGA AND JULIANA DIEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL

G.R. NO. L-32049JUNE 25, 1984

FACTS:For more than ten years prior to 1959, the petitioners have been occupants of a parcel of land

(With their 110 houses built thereon – 110 tenant families) formerly owned by Vda. de Gabriel to whom petitioners have been paying their rents for the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1969, without notice to petitioners, sold the same to respondent Dimayuga, who in turn mortgaged the same to her for the balance of the purchase price. On the discovery of the sale the petitioner filed a complaint for the exercise of their preferential rights before the CFI. And that pursuant to R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 a parcel of land in Manila and suburbs, with at least 50 houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to said tenants for at least 10 years prior to June 20, 1959, may not be sold by the land owner to any person other than such tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public instrument. Their complaint also states that since the aforesaid contract of sale is expressly prohibited by law, the same be declared null and void and for Vda. de Gabriel to execute a deed of sale in their favor because they are likewise willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the same terms and conditions observed in the contract of sale with respondent Dimayuga. On January 31, 1969, respondent Vda. de Gabriel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is not a land estate and not being such, the same cannot be expropriated and that no preferential rights can be availed by the tenants.

On February 6, 1969, Dimayuga filed his answer admitting therein certain factual allegations, denied some averments, interposed the affirmative defense that plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action, that the subject complaint stated no cause of action against the respondent and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and other remedies. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, maintaining that R.A. 116 2, as amended by R.A. 2342 does not refer to landed estates, but to any piece of land occupied by more than 50 families leasing the same for more than 10 years prior to June 20, 1959; that their preferential rights is independent of the expropriability of the land; that therefore, said rights may be exercised even if the land is not expropriable pursuant to the police power of the State for the general welfare. On October 30, 1969, the CFI issued the subject order which found respondent's motion to dismiss well-taken and thereby dismisses complaint. After a series of motions, reply, rejoinder, surrejoinder, and answer between both parties, the lower court issued its order of May 11, 1970 dismissing petitioners appeal.

Petitioner thus resorted to this petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the contract of sale is null and void.2. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential rights as tenants.

HELD:The Court finds that the said sale was made illegally and therefore void. Also, the court finds

that the petitioners’ case falls within the law thus they may invoke their preferential rights as tenants.

PELAYO V. LAURON12 PHIL 453 FACTS:

Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.

The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.

ISSUE:Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance

rendered to their daughter-in-law.

HELD:According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by

contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the defendant’s daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.

In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.