digests for persons august 28, 2013

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GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA

GANDIOCO VS. PENERANDA

Facts:

Teresita Gandioco, legal wife of petitioner, Froilan Gandioco, filed with the RTC of

Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of

concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a

complaint for concubinage against petitioner with the MTC of General Santos City. And

again, for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The

respondent judge Peneranda, ordered the payment of support pendent lite.

Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto

should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

ISSUE:

W o N the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended in view of the criminal case

for concubinage.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may

proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action

for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense.

Civil action is not one ―to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense‖ even if boththe civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support

pendente lite, as a remedy can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted

at the discretion of the judge.

KALAW VS. FERNANDEZ

Doctrine: In the case, there are grounds for legal separation but not for

psychological incapacity under FC36

Facts:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez

(Malyn) met 1973

Married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976

Tyrone had extramarital affair with Jocelyn who gave birth to his son in March

1983



May 1985: Malyn left conjugal home and her four children to Tyrone. Tyrone

started living with Jocelyn who bore him more children (3)

1990: Tyrone went to US together with Jocelyn and their children

He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle

Verde with only a househelp and a driver.

Nine years since de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36. Tyrone presented a

psychologist, Dr. Gates and a catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy to testify

Dr. Gates: Malyn may suffer from psychological incapacity due to evidence

(madjong, frequent nights out), reflect a narcissistic personality disorder, based

her diagnosis on facts revealed in interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (sister-

in-law) and their son

Fr. Healy: her psych inc. is totes grave and incurable: based his opinion on

interview with Tyrone, trial transcripts as well as reports from Dr. Dayan,

Malyn’s expert witness; clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of thefactual allegations regarding Malyn’s ―habits‖, because he believed it was the duty

of the court to do so

ISSUE: W o N Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psych inc?

HELD:

No. Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. He must prove that it

existed at the time of marriage and must be grave and incurable. Pet. Failed to prove

that res suffers from psych inc. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the

conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of

respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on

petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty

parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s

experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the

detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,

constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the

conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented

contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. What transpired between

the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from

dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be



grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that

voids a marriage.

Grounds for legal sep which may be present in the case: 1) sexual infidelity, 2)physical

abuse

REPUBLIC VS. QUINTOS

Facts:

Eduardo and Catalina married on March 16, 1977

April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing

Catalina’s psychological incapacity

Catalina did not object, but prayed to be given a share of conjugal house

Issue: Did the TC sufficiently prove Catalina’s alleged personality disorder and is this asufficient ground for declaring the marriage null and void due to psychological

incapacity?

HELD: No. Her traits did not meet the guidelines. Rather, the only fact established here

was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Abandonment is a

ground for legal separation. Petition dismissed.

ALMELOR VS. RTC

CAMPOS VS. CAMPOS

LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio on August 1953.

They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They

had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage.

Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go

Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which

among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share

of the conjugal partnership profits.



Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on

the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.

Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the

trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present rebuttal evidence,

petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.

Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition

for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond

the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the

Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario

Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal

separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if

property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their

source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,

so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If

death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,

death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected

consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic andthere could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,

that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired

by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be

resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the

heirs of the appellant.

MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES

FACTS:

Matubis and Praxedes were married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. OnMay 30, 1944, for failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, they

agreed to live separately from each other. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant

entered into an agreement on their legal separation. Starting January 1955, Praxedes

began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado, deported themselves as husband and wife in

the community; and on September 1, 1955, Asuncion gave birth to Praxedes’ child. On

April 24, 1956, alleging abandonment and concubinage,



Matubis, filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for Legal Separation and

change of surname against Praxedes, who denied the allegations and contended that it

was Matubis who left the conjugal home. CFI dismissed the complaint on ground that

the action has prescribed, but acknowledged that Praxedes’ acts constituted

concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for filing the petition had already prescribed.

RULING:

Yes, under Art. 102 of the Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed

except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant

of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred.

Matubis became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion

Rebulado in January, 1955, but the complaint was filed only on April 24, 1956. Thepresent action was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred.

Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

PEOPLE VS. ZAPATA

Doctrine: 2 separate instances of sexual intercourse can constitute 2 separate

counts of adultery. Thus, the accused may be charged twice without double

jeopardy. Reasons: (1) every sexual intercourse constitutes the crime of

adultery; (2) if paramour’s knowledge of marriage cannot be proven in the

first commission, it will be in the second

Facts:

A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his

wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual

intercourse.

The complaint was filed twice:

1. For the period 1946 to 14 March 1947

2. For the period 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948

In both cases, Dalmacio knew that Guadalupe was married. Respondents allege that this

will constitute double jeopardy.

Issue: W/N Double Jeopardy.



Held: NO

Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency. True, two or more adulterous acts

committed by the same defendants are against the same person — the offended

husband, the same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and

the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining andpreserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status society does not

argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were

carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved

and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.

There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints

for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits

perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other

adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as

charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not

included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.

Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not

included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy

clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the defendants twice in

jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male

defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of,

the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a

married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the

first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the

time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew

that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of

her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not

exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed

after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to

subsequent adulterous acts

ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION

Plaintiff LuisMa. AranetafiledcomplaintforlegalseparationagainstDefendantEmmaBenitez Aranetaonthegroundof adultery.Aftertheissues were joined,defendantthereinfiledanomnibuspetitiontosecurecustody of theirthreeminorchildren,amonthly supportof P5,000,andreturnof herpassport;to



enjoinplaintiff fromorderinghishirelingsfromharassingandmolestingher;and forattorney ’sfees.Plaintiff deniedsaidallegationsandprayedthatparties berequiredtosubmitrespectiveevidenceinthedeterminationof custody andsupport.

RespondentJudgeHon.HermogenesConcepcionresolvedtheomnibuspetition,grantingthecustody of thechildrentothedefendantincludingsupport(P2,300monthly allowance,P300forahouse,andP2,000forattorney ’sfees).Indenyingplaintiff ’smotionforsubmissionof evidence,RespondentJudgeinvokes Article103of theCivilCode, whichreads:

“Action forlegal separationshall in nocasebetried beforesix monthsshall haveelapsed sincethe filingof the petition.”

Plaintiff institutedthispetitionforcertiorariagainstsaidorderof theJudgeandformandamustocompelhimtorequirethepartiestosubmitevidence beforedecidingtheomnibuspetition.

ISSUE: W/NtherespondentJudgeshouldhaverequired thepartiestosubmitevidence beforedecidingtheomnibuspetition

YES .Article103isamandatory provision.Theintroductionof any evidenceisprohibitedinkeeping withtheintentionof thelaw topreservethefamily andhomefromutterruin. Admittingevidenceexposessuchfamiliestothedangerof

makingreconciliationdifficult,if notimpossible.

Theperiodof sixmonthsfixedinthesaidarticleisintendedasacoolingoff periodtomakepossiblereconciliation betweenthespouses, andtogivethemopportunity fordispassionatereflection.

But, thispracticalexpedientdoesnothavetheeffectof overridingotherprovisionssuchasthedeterminationof thechildrenandalimony andsupportpendentelite. Evidenceof allthedisputedclaims(allegationsof adultery –letterof authenticity asevidence—abandonmentof conjugalabode)should beallowedthediscretionof thecourtastothecustody andalimony pendentelitemay belawfully exercised.

Theruleisthatalltheprovisionsof thelaw evenif apparently contradictory should beallowedtostandandgiveneffect by reconcilingthemif necessary.



Thus,thedeterminationof thecustody andalimony should begiveneffectandforce,provideditdoesnotgototheextentof violatingthepolicy of thecoolingoff period.Thatis,evidencenotaffectingthecauseof theseparation,liketheactualcustody of thechildren,themeansconducivetotheir welfareandconvenienceduringthependency of thecase,theseshould beallowedthat thecourtmay determine whichis bestfortheircustody.

FALLO: The writprayedforishereby issuedandthe Respondent judgeor whosoevertakeshisplaceisorderedtoproceedonthequestionof custody andsupportpendenteliteinaccordance withthisopinion.Thecourt’sorderfixingthealimony andrequiringpaymentisreversed. Withoutcosts.

DE OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO

Doctrine: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon astipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

This case is about an action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife

Serafina, on ground of adultery. The court of Nueva Ecija dismissed the petition. CA

affirmed holding that there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to

the adultery and prescription.

This present petition for certiorari was granted to consider the application of articles

100 and 101 of the NCC.

NCC 100: Legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided

that there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either

of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the

dismissal of the petition.

NCC 101: No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting

attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is

no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order totake care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Facts:

1938- marriage of Serafina and Jose

March 1951- adultery of Serafina to Jose Arcalas



June 1955- adultery with Nelson Orzame

Defendant made no answer to the allegations against her, court defaulted her,

and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial fiscal to investigate

presence of collusion between parties, fiscal said there was no collusion; plaintiff

presented his evidence thru testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto Ocampo,

Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo, and Capt. Serafin Gubat.

CA:

o Evidence presented by plaintiff showed that they did marry (Plaintiff and

Defendant) on 1938, on 1951, plaintiff found out on several occasions of

his wife’s infidelity

o June 1951: sent her to Manila to study

o 1952: lived separately

o 1955: plaintiff surprised and caught his wife in the act of having illicit

relations with husband, p signified his intention of filing a petition for

legal separation, to which d manifested her agreeance provided she neednot be charged criminally

o CA said that husband’s right to legal sep has prescribed, action was not

filed a year after March 1951, when p first discovered her infidelity (NCC

102)

o As to 2nd infidelity (with Nelson Orzame), 1955: husband upon finding out

illicit connection, expressed his wish to file for legal sep and defendant

readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the

fiscal upon orders of the court, she admitted to having sexual

relations with Nelson Orzame, this was interpreted as a judicial

confession

ISSUE: W o N her confession constitutes a confession of judgment disallowed by the

law.

HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery,

in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession

of judgment disallowed by NCC 102. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment

done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery

independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of

separation should be granted since it would not be based on confession but upon

evidence presented by plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively

on defendant’s confession. Petition should be granted because action for second

adultery has not prescribed.

SOMOSA-RAMOS vs VAMENTA

GR No. L-34132



July 29, 1972

Fernando, J.

FACTS:

• June 18, 1971: Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation due to concubinage andan alleged attempt by Clemente Ramos against her life. She likewise sought the issuance

of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed

to be her paraphernal and exclusive property.

• July 3, 1971: Opposition to the hearing based on Article 103 of CC

• July 16, 1971: A pleading by him stated that if the motion asking for preliminary

mandatory injunction would be heard, reconciliation would be more dim.

• August 4, 1971: Order of Judge Vamenta granting Ramos’ petition for suspension of

the hearing for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction – this is the order assailed

in this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:

WON Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal

separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise

preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary

mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit

HELD:

It is the holding of this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the

hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month

period.

1. Delay is normally not permitted in deciding cases but it is different for legal

separation. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach

the quality of permanence. Despite constant bickering and the loss of affection for one

another, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the

wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason formaintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. Even then, the hope that the

parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of

time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and

the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-

month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.



2. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial

power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It

reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for

legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and

manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugalpartnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage

said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a

guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in

accordance with the orders of the court." There would appear to be then recognition that

the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved

even during such six-month period. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out

legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the

determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite

according to the circumstance

3. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4,

1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more

impediments for the lower court acting onthe motion of petitioner for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.GRANTED (Respondent Judge Vamenta is

directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory

injunction.)

PACETE VS. CARIAGA

Apr 1938 – Enrico Pacete married Alanis Pacete (Cotabato)

Mar 1943 – had a child (Consuelo)

1948 – Enrico contracted 2nd marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion

(Kidapawan)

Aug 1979 – Alanis learned of Enrico’s 2nd marriage

Oct 1979 – Alanis filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

o During her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting

of large tracts of land,

fishponds and several motor vehicles

o He fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name

and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other"dummies;"

o He ignored overtures for an amicable settlement

o Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he

evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

Nov 15, 1979 – Defendant was served summon – filed a motion for extension -

granted



Dec 18, 1979 – Defendant filed second motion for extension – granted

Jan 18, 1980 – Defendant filed another motion for extension – denied

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying

petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal

separation, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null

and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita

HELD:

Ordinarily, the petition would have been outrightly dismissed. However, Civil Code

Art 101 (Now FC 60) states:

No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by

confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, thecourt shall order the prosecuting

attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is

no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take

care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

State attorneys are called to intervene in case of uncontested proceedings for legal

separation to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates

that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall

have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties

a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the

parties to reconcile.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That

other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the

same action cannot dispense, nor excuse

compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

Petition for Certiorari GRANTED

DE LA VINA VS. VILLAREAL

FACTS:

On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance

of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña for divorce, partition of conjugal



property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month. Geopano and De la

Viña got married in 1888, but since 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, defendant

had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations

with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the

plaintiff. Because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected Geopano from the

conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she

had since established as her habitual residence. Scorned by her husband, Geopano had

no means of support and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters.

Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Geopano presented a motion alleging that

since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was

trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership

between her and De

la Viña and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain and prohibit De la

Viña in the premises. CFI granted preliminary injunction, but De la Viña appealed,claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile, and

that the judge has exceeded his power and authority in granting the preliminary

injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband

restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal

property during the pendency of an action for divorce instituted by the wife.

RULING:

Yes. Under Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 164, Act No. 190, an action for divorce

brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property

is an issue, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband,

prohibiting the husband from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal

property during the pendency of the action. Although the husband is the sole

administrator of the conjugal property, the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by is

not the right to administer the conjugal property, but the right to share in the conjugal

property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

SABALONES VS. CA

Facts:



Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his

wife and their children.

Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot

located at#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the

conjugal partnership.

In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a

counterclaim for legal separation. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree

of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture

of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She prayed that it enjoin the

petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property

and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.

After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a

bigamous marriage on October5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had

returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the

legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal

properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent

wife. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the

preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.

Issue: W/N the preliminary injunction is valid?

Held: Yes.

Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled tolive separately from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate

either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal

partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same

powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such

designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any

share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator

thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issuedin favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

Injunction was used to prohibit petitioner from administering the land. The twin

requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or

threatened violation.



Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife

as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to

continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the

petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with

Article 61 of the Family Code.

YANGCO VS. RHODE

LERMA VS. CA

FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On

August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and

a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of

Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused,Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment.

During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18,

1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for

legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support,

with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son,

Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for

legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. The

application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969,

which was amended in an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his

opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up asdefense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent

On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for

certiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned

orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day

the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary

injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders.

The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders

and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in

support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite.

The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had

not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The respondent

court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of October 8 and

rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant

proceeding for review.



ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the

respondent’s application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an

opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said application.

HELD: Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent

Juvenile andDomestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement enjoined, without

prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal

separation between the parties.

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership

property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such

right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that

after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live

separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is

himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at theinstance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law

granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to

give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed

some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for

disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss

of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for

support pendent lite.

PEOPLE VS. SANSANO

Doctrine: In adultery, a party cannot institute a criminal proceeding if he has given his

consent, either expressly or impliedly, to its commission.

Facts:

April 29, 1919- Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married. Shortly after

the marriage, Ventura left her for three year. She cohabited with Mariano Ramos.

1924- Mariano Ventura came back, filed an adultery charged against Sensano and

Ramos. The two were found guilty and was sentenced to serve the punishment of

arresto mayor. She tried to make amends with Ventura, but the latter refused to

forgive the former and told her ―(you) could go where you wished, (I) havenothing more to do with (you), and (you) could do as (you) pleased‖. He left again

for Hawaii.

1931 (after 7 years)- Ventura again came back, instituted another adultery

proceeding against the two for him to be able to obtain divorce.

Issue: Whether or not Sensano and Ramos can still be prosecuted for adultery?



Held: No.Art. 344 of the RPC states that the offended party cannot institute criminal

prosecution for adultery if he ―shall have consented or pardoned the offenders‖.The

statement Ventura made, and his conduct warrant the inference that he had consented

to the adulterous relations existing between the accused. That being the case, he cannot

institute another criminal proceeding against his wife and its paramour.

PEOPLE VS. SCHNECKENBERGER

March 16, 1926- Rodolfo Schneckenberger married Elena Cartagena. They agreed

to live separately after 7 years and executed a document stating the same on May

25, 1935.

June 15, 1935- Rodolfo secured divorce decree from Mexico, he married Julia

Medel on May 11, 1936.

As the divorce decree is not valid, people filed a case against him for bigamy and

concubinage. Rodolfo was found guilty of bigamy. In the concubinage case, he

contended that it was double jeopardy, the Court however did not give credenceto his statement and found him guilty of the said offense as charged.

Issue: Whether or not the case of concubinage must be dismissed by reason of the prior

consent given by Elena to Rodolfo in the document they executed prior to the

commission of the crime?

Held:Double jeopardy is not present in the case at bar as Rodolfo was not tried for the

same offense. Material to the case, the case of concubinage must be dismissed because

of the prior consent given by Elena Cartagena in the document they executed on May

1935. Priorconsent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party fromprosecuting the offense.

GINEZ VS. BUGAYONG

Facts:

July 1951- Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman to the US Navy and Leonila Ginez were

married. He soon left for the US. He was informed by his sisters, where his wife was

residing of the same’s adulterous acts.

August 1952- Benjamin Bugayong went home to Pangasinan and looked for Ginez. Hefound her and brought her to the house of Pedro Bugayon. They stayed there and lived

for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. He confronted Ginez about her supposed

adulterous acts, she did not answer and just packed her things and left. He filed for legal

separation on Nov. 18, 1952.



Ginez denied the allegations and contented that Benjamin cannot sue as he had already

condoned her deeds, assuming that it were true, by virtue of their sexual intercourse in

the house of Pedro Bugayong.

Issue: Whether or not sexual intercourse and living together as husband and wife for 2

nights and 1 day amount to condonation?

Held: Yes. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for

legal separation. It deprives the offended spouse the action to file for legal separation.

Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the

knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to

conclusive evidence of condonation.

A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery ofthe

offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation. The same necessary implies

forgiveness on the part of the offended spouse.

BROWN VS. YAMBAO

Doctrine: Decree of legal separation may not be given to plaintiff whose acts

also constitute for the grounds on which the complaint was based.

Facts:

July 14, 1955- William H. Brown filed a legal separation suit against Juanita Yambao on

the ground that the latter had contracted extra-marital affairs while the former was

interred at the UST during WW2.

Juanita Yambao did not respond to the court despite dure service of summons. The

Court later on order the State fiscal to determine whether there is collusion between the

parties.

Through cross examination, it has been established that Brown is not an innocent party

(he had lived martially with another woman after his liberation) and that there has been

connivance and that his actions to sue had already prescribed asstated under Article 102

of the NCC since it was shown that he knew of his wife’s actions in 1945 but only filed

the proceeding in 1955.Thus the petition was denied.

Issue: Whether or not legal separation may be given to a plaintiff spouse whereby the

same spouse also does the ground where the complaint was based?



Held: No. Recrimination is where an accused party in a case makes a similar accusation

against the plaintiff. (Simply put, it as a situation where the accused can say ―you too or

eh ikaw din naman eh‖) In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Juanita Yambao had

committed adulterous acts. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Brown committed also

the same acts. Therefore, Brown cannot use the ground of ―committing adulterous acts‖

against Juanita Yambao because that would constitute recrimination.

ONG VS. ONG

Facts:

July 13, 1975- Lucita and William Ong were married.

March 21, 1996- Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation based on petitioner’s

abusive conduct.

RTO ruled for the legal separation, the CA affirmed in toto the same decision. Both

courts found that there is indeed abuse on the part of William Ong that warrants the

grant of the decree of legal separation.

William Ong filed a petition at the SC, the petitioner raised for the first time that the

legal separation decree should not have been issued because it is the respondent herself

who has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a

quarrel.

Issue: Whether or not petition for legal separation shall be denied on the ground that it

is the respondent who left the conjugal dwelling and is thus who has given ground forlegal separation?

Held: No.

Role of the Supreme Court is only to determine whether there has been grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. It is

not a trier of facts.

The argument that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation

should not be granted, following Art. 56 par. 4 of the FC, which states that legal

separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation, is without merit.

The abandonment referred to by the FC is abandonment without justifiable cause

formore than one year. As shown by the evidence on record, Lucita left William

becauseof the latter’s abusive conduct.



REPUBLIC VS. CA

Facts: Eduardo De Quintos and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites

solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not

blessed with a child due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,

citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital

obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be

given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity

of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article

36 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not there was collusion between the parties.

Held:

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity

or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not

merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill

will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b)

the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act,

the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and

education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological

abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a

married personis not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be

incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a

mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital

covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be

characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the

confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling

in Molina, The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the

precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a

spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological

incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,

predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the



totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to

sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.

Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present

the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to start

with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorderand that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly

pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a

psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by

the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Her immaturity alone did not

constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to

psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations

of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the

essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or

immaturity.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with

Catalina. The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the

amount of P50, 000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not

to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part. The payment to Catalina could

not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo. To recall, she did not

interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological

incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego

her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the

amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her

unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not hedid so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing

the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence m

determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision

the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30,2003; and DISMISS the petition for the

declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of

merit.

MATUTE VS. MACADAEGFACTS

• Armando Medel brought an action forlegal separation against his wife,Rosario Matute,

upon the ground ofadultery committed with his brother,Ernesto Medel



• Nov 6, 1952 – CFI Manila granteddecree of legal separation andawarded to Armando

the custody oftheir four minor children, then 12, 10,8, and 4 years of age.

• Armando then went to the US, and leftthe children in Davao with his sister,Pilar Medel

• Rosario eventually lived there as well to be with her children

• Late 1954 – Armando returned to the Philippines

• March 1955 – children joined their father in Cebu

• April 1955 – With Armando’s permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to

attend thefuneral of her father, on the conditionthat she would return the

childrenwithin two weeks

• HOWE VER, Rosario did not return the children, and INSTEAD…

• June 10, 1955 – Rosario filed civil case for custody of the children and support of Armando in school fees and allowances. It was alleged that the 3 oldest children do not

want to go back to their father because he is living with a woman other than their

mother

• Armando opposed the motion, and countered with a petition to declare and punish

Rosario for contempt of court; refusal to restore custody of the children

• June 29, 1955 – Judge Macadaeg issued an order absolving Rosario from the charge of

contempt of court because she secured the consent of Armando before bringing the

children to Manila, but denying her motion for custody, and ordering her to deliverthe

children to Armando

• R osario filed for certiorari and prohibition

ISSUE

Whether or not Rosario should be granted custody of her children

HELD

NO.

1. Writ of certiorari and prohibition do not lie, because Judge Macadaeg did notact

without or in excess of jurisdiction‖ or with ―grave abuse of discretion.‖ If he made

mistakes, these are simply ―errors of judgment.‖ These are not ―errors of jurisdiction,‖

but errors in the exercise of jurisdiction that the lower court admittedly had.

- Proper remedy is review by appeal



- Order of June 29, 1955 enforced award in Nov 6, 1952 Order

- Decisions re custody of minorchildren is never final still subject to review at any time

that the Court may deem it for the best interest of said minors; until reviewed and

modified, said award must stand

- Since no modification has been made, respondent Judge has the duty to execute and

implement award.

- Rosario obtained permission of Armando to bring children to Manila; she holds it in

the name, on behalf, and by authority of Armando, she is the agent; he may demand

their return, and she cannot question such authority

2. Children over 10 years of age whose parents are living separately may choose which

parent to live with, unless parent is unfit due to ―moral depravity, habitual

drunkenness,incapacity, or poverty‖ (ROC 100, sec.6)

- Rosario is without means of livelihood, and she lives on the charity of her brothers; no

home of her own, and would shelter children under the roof of her brothers.

- Rosario is unfit to take care of the children or made it unwise to place them under her

care

DISPOSITION

Petition DENIED, without prejudice to appropriate action Rosario may file to secure

review of Order

QUIAO VS. QUIAO

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.

Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby

awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining

properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective

legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is

forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days

later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the



petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the

term ―Net Profits Earned.‖

RTC held that the phrase ―NET PROFIT EARNED‖ denotes ―the remainder of the

properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouseand the debts.‖ It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it

shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not

have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and

43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the

Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies

because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits

earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of

conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the

conjugal partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of ―net profits‖ earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the

same with the computation of ―net profits‖ earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family

code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same

are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as

established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is

already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in

so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is

Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.



2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is

governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the

petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership

of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: ―All property of the

conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.‖

While one may not be deprived of his ―vested right,‖ he may lose the same if there is due

process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First , he was

well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal

properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial

court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as

circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the

community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was

promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the

trial court termed as ―net profits,‖ pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus,

the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolutecommunity , the husband and the

wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each

spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those

excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s

properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common

mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the

proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have

originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established

that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them

is simply the ―net profits.‖ And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigidostates that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left

with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of

gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, ―the husband and the wife place in common

fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and



divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains

or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.‖ From the

foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law

does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the

spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses

have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed

properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what

remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses

and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the

guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in

favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest

we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the

guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property

which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads:

1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;

2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she married Mr. Enrique R.Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'EnriqueR. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;

3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of hermaiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation fromEnrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now;

4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable thatshe be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maidenname, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name.



Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of EliseaLaperal.

Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at baris, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein

petitioner. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is statedthat as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of herhusband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventualliquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the firstplace, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously noevidence to this effect had been adduced.

MACADANGDANG VS. CA

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang

were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They

started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work

and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking,

transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their

relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married

life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu

for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her

estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she

instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has

effect on the legal separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal

separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete

after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects,

such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal

property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects



of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of

whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article

106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the

decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as aninevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of

determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA

ARROYO VS. VASQUEZ-ARROYO

Topic: Rights and Obligations of Spouses; Obligation to live with the other spouse;

General rule and exceptions

Facts:

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when

Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate

from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the

matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.

The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the

part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of

separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and

permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence,

concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for

her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital

relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The

plaintiff appealed

Issues and Ruling:

(1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient

justification

No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven;

(2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited

his right to the marital society of his wife.



The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty

universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly,

where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her

husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate

maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney’s fees,

necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both

parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in

enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step

involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses—a state which is

abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it

follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife

unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and

separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the

plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is

under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him.

(3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to

compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife

Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented

herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined

to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be

entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that

the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the

return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the

complaint.

Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-

bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without

sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved

from cross-complaint.

CUADERNO VS. CUADERNO

Topic: Obligation to live with the other spouse (general rule and exceptions)

FACTS:

• Petitioner Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno filed a complaint for support against her

husband, respondent Angel Cuaderno on August 14, 1957 on the basis of maltreatment

and abandonment by Angel



o The couple have been living separately since November 1956, as a result of injuries

inflicted by Angel upon Lourdes during a quarrel; Angel took Lourdes to her mother’s

house where she stayed until the filing of the complaint

• Angel opposed, contending that it was Lourdes who left the conjugal dwelling; hence

she is not entitled to support

o However, during the hearing, he declared that, "all the trouble she (the wife) has given

me is enough for me to turn my back to her,"

• The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court decided in favor of Lourdes, ordering

Angel to give her monthly support of P150 from the date of the filing of the complaint,

attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs

• The CA reversed the decision of the JDRC "so that (in the language of the court)

appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation which they are hereby

admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife."

o CA decided upon the belief that conditions were such that cohabitation between the

spouses is not yet impossible

• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Lourdes is may claim support without being compelled to live with

Angel

HELD: YES. The decision of the JDRC is revived. The Court ordered the sum of P150.00

for the Lourdes's monthly support. As the separation has been brought about by thehusband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall

subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place.

• It would be taking an unrealistic view to compel or urge them to live together when

they, specially the husband are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation.

• While marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction

therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any

legal mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of

marriage in this jurisdiction.

• In this case, the infliction of the physical injuries upon the wife by the husband gave

rise to their separation. It was also the husband who took his wife to her parents’ home

where he left her.

• The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from

accepting any later because she was allegedly demanding for more, only indicates that



even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already providing

something for the separate maintenance.

• Continued support would not be unreasonable, considering that the wife has no

income while the husband was employed.

ILUSORIO VS. BILDNER

SSS VS. DE LOS SANTOS

SSS VS. FAVILA

CALDERON VS. ROXAS

YASIN VS. SHARIAH COURT

SHARICA MARI GO TAN VS. SPOUSES TAN

Doctrine: The principle of conspiracy in the RPC may be applied

suppletorily to RA 9262.

-Tan and Steven Tan were

married and they begot 2 children

a TPO (Temp Protective Order) against Steven and her

parents-in-law, R Spouses Tan

o She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with Rs, were

causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses

– in violation of RA 9262 or the ―Anti-Violence

Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004‖

-in-law,

they weren’t covered by RA 9262

-in-law not



included under RA 9262 (under the rule of law expressio

unius est exclusion alterius = the expression of one thing is

the exclusion of another and so, to include Rs would be a

strained interpretation of the provision of the law

ISSUE: WoN R-spouses may be included in petition for TPO in

accordance with RA 9262

Contentions:

P: RA 9262 explicitly provides for application of RPC – RPC Art. 8

on ―conspiracy‖ can be applied

Rs: They aren’t covered as said RA explicitly provides the offender

should be related to the victim only by marriage or a sexual

relationship

SC Ruling: Yes, they may be included.

connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a

sexual/dating relationship, it does not preclude the

application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC

(Sec. 47, RA 9262: ―For purposes of this Act, the RPC and

other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.‖

instant case, it is the protection and safety of victims of

violence against women and children.

and set aside.

SAN DIEGO VS. RTC

digests for persons august 28, 2013

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