29Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Gonzales v. COMELECPetitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on the grounds that it violates their rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly, to form associations or societies. More so, they question the forms of election campaigns enumerated in the act.Facts:1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral process and calling a halt to the undesirable practice of prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking public office.2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4th district of Manila and the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the position of Vice Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that position. Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in the City, and a political leader.3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. Specifically, they challenge the validity of two new sections included in the Revised Election Code under RA 4880 which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967. The said sections prohibit the too early nomination of candidates and limit the period of election campaign and political activity. More so, after defining the terms candidates and election campaign/partisan political activity, the acts which constitute election campaign were specified, and that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the election was not to be considered as part of an election campaign. This prohibition was furthered by a proviso which provided that nothing stated in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports.4. The acts deemed included in the terms election campaign of partisan political activity are: (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (c) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly.Ruling:1. The Court held that the challenged statute cannot be declared unconstitutional on several grounds. First, it is premature to challenge the statutes validity. Second, the required number of votes was not met when the Court deliberated on the scope of election campaigns or partisan political activities. Precisely, the Court declared that RA 4880 could have been narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.2. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then to previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.3. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to another American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.4. Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.5. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.6. As for freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. The Bill of Rights likewise extends the same protection to the rights of people peaceably to assemble. As pointed in US v. Bustos, this right is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of free speech. 7. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. 8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, it was not accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights and assurance afforded by the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights, wherein they are contained, applies to all. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right (right of people peaceably to assemble) is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.9. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association for purposes not contrary to law. With or without a constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With the explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantees, which are mostly American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast and could be traced to the Malolos Constitution.10. In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on its political significance. If such a right were non-existent, then the likelihood of a one-party government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing of the past.11. Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when their purposes are contrary to law. It is submitted that the phrase for purposes not contrary to law is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to form associations or societies.12. In considering whether Republic 4880 is violative of the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the Court cannot ignore the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To asset otherwise would be to close ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can we ignore the express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso that simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the elections shall not be considered as part of an election campaign, and in the other proviso that nothing herein stated shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. Such limitations qualify the entire provision restricting the period of an election campaign or partisan political activity.13. According to the act, [i]t shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding an election. This provision affects the right of association. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save the above cited, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there such an infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its validity unanimously.14. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free speech and press, of assembly, and of associations cut deeply into their substance. On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils, substantial in character, taint the purity of the electoral process. The justification alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the members of the Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to which such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware of the clear and present danger that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights of expression, of assembly and of association.15. The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is of the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity.16. The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the contention that this should be annulled.17. The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisan political activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election practices deemed inimical because of their collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such provisions did occasional divergence of views among the members of the Court. Originally, only a minority was for their being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any more. This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process.18. The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffers from the corrosion of invalidity. However, to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality, it lacks one more affirmative vote to that effect.19. It is understandable for Congress to believe that without the limitations set forth in the challenged legislation, the laudable purpose of RA 4880 would be frustrated and nullified. Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to elicit the assert of a majority of the Court. This is not to say that the conclusion reached by the minority that the above portions of the statute now assailed has passed the constitutional test is devoid of merit. It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or that undertaking of any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party, is repugnant to a constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.20. In terms of the permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it is considered opinion of the majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our most precious freedoms.22. It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to say at least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision found in RA 4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the implementation of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions. Santiago v. Far East BroadcastingSantiago, the campaign manager of the Popular Front Sumulong, asked Far East Broadcasting for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the political speeches delivered at the Opera House. However, respondent would only do so if the party submits in advance the complete manuscript of the speeches to be delivered.Facts:1. Petitioner (Santiago), being the campaign manager of the political party Popular Front Sumulong, asked respondent (Far East Broadcasting) for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the partys political speeches at the Opera House on September 3, 1941.2. However, respondent refused to do so except should the party submit in advance the complete manuscript of contemplated speeches. Because of this, petitioner questioned the act of respondent in refusing to allow the use of its station for broadcasting the speeches and constitutes unlawful censorship and a violation of the freedom of speech guaranteed by our Constitution.Ruling:1. It is clear from the laws and the regulations adverted to that the respondent had the right to require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the speeches which he intended to broadcast. 2. The Court failed to perceive the cogency of such argument. It does not bolster up the case for the petitioner. It impliedly admits that a speech that may endanger public safety may be censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How could the censor verify the petitioners claim that the speeches he intended to broadcast offered no danger to public safety or pubic morality, if the petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or even its gist? If the petitioner had complied with respondents requirement and the respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he might have reason to complain.Primicias v. FugosoThe Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not issue the permit.Facts:1. The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.2. However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue the permit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus.3. Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the City Mayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or meeting, parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine where to hold such activities.Ruling:1. The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But, it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.2. Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding of athletic games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district may be permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who shall determine the streets, or public places or portions thereof where said activities may be held. From the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no express and separate provision regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places.3. As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the City is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and other public places of the City, and second, that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latters reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, the Court believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting be held.4. The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions. Moreover, said construction would render the ordinance invalid and void as it contravenes constitutional limitations.5. The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches delivered in the meeting would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, [f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.Mutuc v. COMELECMutuc seeks to be a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his campaigns, he used political jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers.Facts:1. Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his making his candidacy known, he used jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers.2. By a telegram sent to him on October 29, 1970, the COMELEC informed Mutuc that his certificate of candidacy was given due course, but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units. However, according to Mutuc, the said order is violative of his constitutional right especially his freedom to speech.3. However, COMELEC contends that the justification for the prohibition was premised on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes and the like whether of domestic or foreign origin. More so, the contention was that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation.Ruling:1. In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.2. What the COMELEC did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could COMELEC justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculate by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.3. Mutuc was allowed to use political taped jingles.Navarro v. VillegasThe City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an assembly.Facts:1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.2. The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.Ruling:1. Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public.2. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant petitioners application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition.Reyes v. BagatsingThe Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the request of organization for permit.Facts:1. Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.2. A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador.3. The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request of the organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of the police authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit for mandamus.Ruling:1. Reyes petition was granted.2. The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit that [n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.3. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.4. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.5. Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest.6. What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US v. Apurado, [i]t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values.7. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.8. There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.9. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.10. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.Cabansag v. FernandezCabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for a line in his letter.Facts:1. Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez from a parcel of land who, on the other end, filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. Even though pleadings were submitted, the hearings were suspended several times from 1947 to 1952.2. Upon President Magsaysays assumption in office and creation of Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been long been pending be decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the said letter to the Clerk of CFI Pangasinan. 3. Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC when he wrote thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.Ruling:1. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions principles which the 14th Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.2. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press.3. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary. These are the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. 4. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The US Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy. The Court furthers clear and present danger of substantive evil as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press.5. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said that the [f]reedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judges decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida, [a]nd in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Thus, the question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.6. The second, which is the dangerous tendency rule, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the Constitution, are not absolute. As held in Gilbert v. Minnesota, [t]hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt.7. As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, the dangerous tendency rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.8. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.9. The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansags mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.10. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President, asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can the Court infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for Cabansag merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.Ruiz v. GordonA prayer rally and parade/march was to be conducted by petitioners. They allege that the Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, did not act on the matter.Facts:1. Petitioner (Ruiz) personally delivered to respondent Mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) a letter application which sought to request a permit to hold a prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 pm to early evening. Ruiz delivered the letter on behalf of the Olongapo Citizens Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All, Concerned Citizen for Justice and Peace, Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa and United Nationalist Democratic Organization.2. Aside from the holding of the prayer-rally, the said groups sought to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 pm. 3. In his manifestation, respondent, among others written, mentioned in the Guardian that he had granted the permit of the petitioner.Ruling:1. As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision of the request, such part or his representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favourable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit.2. The petition is dismissed. The Court deems it best to set forth the above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that the factual background on which is dependent the determination of whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied.People v. PerezPerez uttered phrases which called for the beheading of Wood in a discussion on political matters.Facts:1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters in Pilar, Sorsogon, uttered the phrases: Asin an mangna Filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo no Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines).2. Leonard Wood was the Governor-General during that time, April 1, 1922. For said phrases, Perez was accused for violating Article 256 of the Penal Code.Ruling:1. It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292(Treason and Sedition Law) must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assembly and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.2. In the case at bar, the person maligned by the Accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the presidency of the US and other high offices, under a democratic form of government instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. Being the representative of the executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power, a seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.3. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act contemplates the said situation. For such reasons, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and one an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government.US v. BustosThe justice of peace filed a case against numerous citizens of Pampanga after the latters case was dismissed. They were charged for the libellous statements against him.Facts:1. Numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through Crossfiled & OBrien charging respondent Roman Punsalan, justice of peace of Macabebe and Masantol with malfeasance in office. Likewise, they ask for Punsalans removal.2. Punsalan was charged for three specific charges which happened to Francisca Polintan, Valentin Sunga and Leoncio Quiambao. They allege that Punsalan used his position to benefit from their legal needs like keeping Polintan as a servant for 4 days aside from taking her two chickens and twelve gandus.3. The case against the justice of peace was dismissed. Thus, Punsalan filed criminal charges against defendants for the libellous statements against him.Ruling:1. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary for free speech. As held in Howarth v. Barlow, the US Supreme Court declared that [t]he people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism. Moreover, the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all to know of any official dereliction on the part of the magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty is to inquire into and punish them.2. The right to assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must assume responsibility for the charges made.3. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, through, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. 4. Qualified privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege.5. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. 6. A petition prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace. Criminal action was then begun against the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary was libellous. On a review of the evidence, the Court finds that express malice was not proved by prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavour to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship. 7. It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libellous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule, words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace of dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct, touching him in his office are actionable.Lagunzad v. Soto vda De GonzalesThe parties entered into a licensing agreement for the filming of The Moises Padilla Story. Soto vda. de Gonzales is the mother of Moises. Moises half-sister objecred to the movie as it exploited Moises life.Facts:1. Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing agreement for the former was filming The Moises Padilla Story. Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and, through his MML Productions, began the production of the movie. The movie was based on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.s The Long Dank Night in Negros.2. Although the focus on the film on the Moises life, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. De Gonzales.3. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961. Thirteen days prior to it, Moises half-sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as it exploited Moises life.Ruling:1. The Court neither finds merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he has a right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. 2. The clear and present danger rule was applied. In quoting Gonzales v. COMELEC, [t]he prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.3. In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account eh interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. CapulongAyer Productions Pty Ltd. sought to film the EDSA Revolution. They informed Enrile regarding the motion picture and he wrote that he would not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/ore exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema.Facts:1. Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. Through this movie production company, he intended to make a movie that would depict the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA in a six hour mini-series.2. The proposed motion picture is entitled The Four Day Revolution, and was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Petitioner McElroy had likewise informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture, enclosing a synopsis of it.3. Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. Because of this, petitioners deleted the name of Enrile in the movie script and proceeded to film the projected motion picture. Despite of the deletion, Enrile still sought to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie, which was later on granted.Ruling:1. Petitioners claim that in producing the The Four Day Revolution, they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution. Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.2. The freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theatres or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression.3. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially-owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.4. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondents right of privacy. More so, the motion picture is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile, but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government.5. The privilege of enlightening the public is not limited to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extends also to information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in newsreel and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt.6. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. To the extent that the motion picture limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondents privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent.People v. AlarconA columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his article. The letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a hacienda.Facts:1. A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed to his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and a copy of which, having found its way to a columnist of the Tribune, was quoted in an article of the said newspaper in its September 23, 1937 issue.2. The letter is about the charging and conviction of 52 tenants in Flroridablance, Pampanga for robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. The letter furthers that the tenants have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to given them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid with their share of their crop.3. For this purpose, respondent was required to show cause on grounds of contempt of court.Ruling:1. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well-defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after cause has ended. It must clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, the Court believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has a concession that the letter complained of was published after the CFI of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the question publication.2. It is suggested that even if there had been nothing more pending before the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the rule that the publication scandalized the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the United States, the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press. Other considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case has ended. In at least two instances, this court has exercised the power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle (Villavicencio v. Lukban), on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re: Lozano and Quevedo). Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and in considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent with the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his favour and he must be acquitted.3. Respondent was acquitted.In re: Vicente SottoAtty. Vicente Sotto, a member of the Congress, was frustrated with how the Court interpreted the law he authored in a particular case. In his letter, he mentioned that he would file a bill seeking the reorganization of the Court.Facts:1. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement, published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, in connection with the Courts decision in In re: Angel Parazo.2. Sotto is disappointed with how the Court interpreted the Press Freedom Law, of which he is the author, in the case of Angel Parazo. More so, he declared the incompetency of narrow-mindedness of the majority of the Courts members. He furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate narrow-mindedness is to change the members of the Court.Ruling:1. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well-founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill, which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause unless the Court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.2. The respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But, the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice.3. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice Holmes in US v. Sullens, [t]he administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.4. Sotto was found guilty of contempt of Court; thus, fined of Php 1,000.In re: LauretaIlustre, whose case before the Supreme Court was resolved against her favour, wrote to the members of the First Division of the Court and threatened them. Furthermore, she filed a complaint before the Tanodbayan.Facts:1. Wenceslao Laureta is the counsel of Eva Ilustre. Ilustre wrote to the members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, namely Justices Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano. In her letter, she threatened the members for their minute resolution which went against her favour.2. She threatened the members that the entire Filipino population would know the procedures in the Court and to charge them, which she apparently did so. She filed an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan for having knowingly and deliberately rendered with bad faith, an unjust extended Minute Resolution.Ruling:1. The Court finds Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.Zaldivar v. SandiganbayanGonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was found guilty of contempt of court and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.Ruling:1. The clear and present danger doctrine invoked by respondents counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger doctrine has been an accepted method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.2. Under either the clear and present danger test or the balancing-of-interest test, the Court believes that the statements here made by Gonzales are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. It is important to point out that the substantive evil which the Supreme Court has a right and duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a substantive evil consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the court. The substantive evil here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat to public disorder or rioting, but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.

US v. KottingerKottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the raided store of Camera Supply Co. of obscene and indecent pictures. The pictures revealed six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines.Facts:1. The premises of Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila was raided and subsequent to said raid, post-cards were used as evidence against the manager of the company (J.J. Kottinger).2. Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the store of obscene and indecent pictures in violation of Section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. Section 12 made obscene or indecent publications as misdemeanours. The pictures reveal six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines, including the Bontoc Woman, Moros, and Kalinga Girls, among others.Ruling:1. The word obscene and the term obscenity may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy. Indecency is an act against good behaviour and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.2. The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscenity or indecent pictures, writings, papers or books. But the words obscene or indecent at themselves descriptive. They are words in common use and every person of average intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case.3. Obscene as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the US Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.4. The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul or filthy.Gonzales v. KatigbakThe Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, upon condition that certain parts be changed and removed, classified the motion picture Kapit sa Patalim as for adults only.Facts:1. The motion picture Kapit sa Patalim was classified For Adults Only. As such, the president of the Malaya Films (Jose Antonio Gonzales) questioned the scope of the power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it should be exercised. The chairman of the said board is Maria Kalaw Katigbak and Gen. Wilfredo Estrada as its vice-chairman.2. In classifying the said movie as For Adults Only, there must be made certain changes and deletions enumerated. For this purpose, a petition for certiorari was filed.Ruling:1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression.2. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.3. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. As early as 1909, in the case of US v. Sedano, a prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court already made clear that freedom of the press consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license.4. It is the opinion of the Court that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.5. The test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh (almost) inevitable. The basic postulate is that where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned included that they are in freedom of expression censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.6. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It cannot be denied that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.7. The petition was dismissed because the enough number of votes was not mustered.People v. Go PinGo Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent and/or immoral pictures in a recreational center.Facts:1. Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at the Globe Arcade in Manila, a recreational center, a large number of one-real 16 mm films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. He pleaded not guilty at first but when allowed to change his plea, he did so.Ruling:1. Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of the at kind are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of art but profit would commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and the case of art only of secondary or minor importance.2. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.3. The decision is affirmed.Dela Cruz v. ElaMembers of the Jehovahs Witnesses applied for a permit from the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales in order to hold a public meeting with a kiosk at the public plaza. It was granted by the Mayor however specified that they hold the meeting at the north-western part of the plaza. Facts:1. Members of the Jehovahs Witnesses sought to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk on such date and time. As such, they applied for a permit from the respondent Mayor (Norberto Ela).2. In his answer, Ela stated that he had not refused the request of the petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as he gave them permission to use the north-western part of the plaza on the said date (July 27, 1952). However, the members of the Jehovahs Witnesses declined to avail of it. As such, petitioners brought an action to compel Ela to issue a permit.Ruling:1. The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society, and this power may be exercised under the police power of the State.2. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with this kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his duty to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety within the municipality (Section 2194(c) of the Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination.3. The power exercised by the respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by the petitioners.US v. ApuradoSeveral individuals compelled the members of the municipal council to dismiss several officials and replace them with the people they had recommended.Facts:1. A large number of individuals assembled about the building of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, crowded into the council chamber and demanded the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary and the chief of police, and the substitution in their places of new officials who were suggested by the spokesman of the party. This was done upon the opening of the session by the municipal council.2. The council, even though the persons who took part in the movement where wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes, acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its actions, which was signed by the councillors present. Moreover, the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a session of that body. The cause of such movement was that the members of the movement believed that said officials whom they want dismissed have outspoken allegiance to one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided.3. Apurado, together with several individuals, was convicted of the crime of sedition.Ruling:1. It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.2. The evidence does not establish the guilt of the accused.Malabanan v. RamentoStudent leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after holding the meeting, marched towards the Life Science building using megaphones and giving utterance to language severely critical of the school authorities. Classes were disturbed while the non-academic personnels work was interrupted. Facts:1. Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted the permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on August 27, 1982 at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court. However, they held the general assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS, contrary to what is stated in the permit.2. During the gathering, they manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in a vehement and vigorous language.3. After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they marched toward the Life Science building and continued their rally, using megaphones and giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities. As a result, classes were disturbed aside from the work of non-academic employees within hearing distance.4. The petitioners were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Scie