dinglasan at neypes and rule 47 cases

7/29/2019 Dinglasan at Neypes and Rule 47 Cases

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DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOBOBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :CABACUNGAN,

Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO, PANGANIBAN,QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,CALLEJO, SR.,AZCUNA,

TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO andGARCIA,JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,SALVADOR and CARMEN, allsurnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANKOF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding

Judge, Branch 43, Regional TrialCourt, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,

Respondents. Promulgated :September 14, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob

Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of

land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest

Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del

Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.


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In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed

various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to

declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in

default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of

the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge

Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to

declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was

granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del

Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land

Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were

hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the

motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also

denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their

motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of

prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial

proper.

In an order[2]dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint

on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy

of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,

1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order

dismissing the motion for reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five

days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on

August 3, 1998.
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On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was

filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a

motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of

Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice

of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on

July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court

denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July

27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for

appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled

that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day

they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the

appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection

of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law isjurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectivelyrenders the judgment final and executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was

denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the

following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
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ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERSPETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OFTHE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERSAPPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THEAPPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING ANDAFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHENPETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THEAPPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THEWORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON.ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST ANDFINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BYPETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THEDECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE INTHE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WASRENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners

should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due

process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in

accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal

must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of

the right to appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP

129,[11]as amended, provides:
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Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days countedfrom the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from . Where arecord on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record onappeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial orreconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial orreconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice

of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally

disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an

adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares

categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or

judgment that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their

motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12,

1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of

their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to

appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the

start of the 15-day reglementary period to appealthe February 12, 1998 order dismissing

the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case ofQuelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared

petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the
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order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was

filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received

another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal.

But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the

dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules.

We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for

reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final orderas it

was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case ofApuyan v. Haldeman et

al.[14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for

reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated

July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final ordercontemplated in the

Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day

reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days fromnotice of judgment or final

orderto appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period

(March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion

for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the

15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the

15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal

upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were


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entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the

order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan andApuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the

decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-

day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar

cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the

manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.

[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound

practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become

final at some definite time fixed by law. [18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court

read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon theadverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice oforder or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. Thetime during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has beenpending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule

37.But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the

period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that inwhich the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. [19] (emphasissupplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days.

BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the

Committee on Judicial Reorganization[20]that drafted BP 129, the raison d etrebehind the

amendment was to shorten the period of appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and

dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period

of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22]and only in very

exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
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In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system

and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised

the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that

every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just

disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require

litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a

delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we

condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness

and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals,

we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal

application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our

decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.

But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently

applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.

Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between

the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the

full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.[26] It has the sole

prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and

inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to

it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27]43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows
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extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their

appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair

opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15

days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from

receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.[30]

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals

from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review

from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-

judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to

the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to

be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for

reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh

period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their

motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3

of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of

judgment orfinal order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies

disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be

construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above

provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of

judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to

refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which

shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The
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original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for

strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a

partyopts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the

trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the

case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to

resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite

time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-

day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or

from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days

from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the

order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed ofonlyif either motion is filed; otherwise,

the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period

provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt

of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of

appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. [34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability ofDenso (Philippines), Inc. v.

IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be

remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.


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G.R. No. 145420 September 19, 2006

A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case 1 on theground of newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was foundguilty2 of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, by theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case No. 21238.

On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented by its President, Dinglasan, andAntrom, Inc. (Antrom), also represented by its President, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandumof Agreement whereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation in favor ofElmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, will issue checks to guarantee the payment of itsobligations.

A few months after a number of financing transactions were made, Elmyra's indebtedness to Antromreached the amount of P1,476,000.58. As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank (draweebank) Check No. HO270451 with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October 1985 in the amountof P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank, however, the said check wasdishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Consequently, on 16 December 1985, an Information3charging Dinglasan with Violation of BatasPambansa Blg. 22 was filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21238,People of the Philippines v. A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. The Information reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippinesand within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well knowing that he hasno sufficient funds in or credit with the bank, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously makeout and issue Commercial Bank of Manila Check No. H0207451 dated October 3, 1985 in the amountof P515,000.00 in payment of his obligation to Antrom Inc., represented by Rosanna E. Velasco, butwhen said check was presented to the bank for payment, the same was dishonored and/or refusedpayment for reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" and accused, despite repeated demands andlapse of five (5) banking days from notice thereof, failed and refused to make good the said check and/orto deposit with the drawee bank the necessary amount to cover the aforesaid check, to the damage andprejudice of the herein complainant in the aforementioned amount of P515,000.00

On 16 December 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for having committed the crime charged. In aDecision4promulgated on the same date, the court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding accused A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violatingB.P. Blg. 22, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of TwoHundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and, to indemnify ANTROM, INC., the sum of Five HundredFifteen (sic) (P515,000.00) Pesos, at [the] legal rate of interest from October 3, 1985, until the full amountof P515,000.0 is fully paid.
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Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer ofthe same company. These affidavits, together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached toSolidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom,tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor.He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essentialelements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and refused to make good the said check within fivebanking days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.

In her affidavit,17 Ma. Elena Dinglasan attested that she was the Executive Vice-President and Treasurerof Elmyra for the period of 1985-1986. As such, she was in-charge of disbursing and sourcing ofcorporation funds including the preparation of checks and approval of vouchers supporting thedisbursements. In the course of its business, the affiant caused the issuance of Commercial Bank CheckNo. 270451 on 27 September 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00, but postdated on 3 October 1985,which was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds and which eventually caused Dinglasan'sconviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon receiving the notice of dishonor, she caused thepreparation of Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 in the amountof P150,000.00 intended to cover a part of the amount of the bounced check. The Solidbank check,together with its transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985, stating the purpose of the said check, was sent toAntrom and was received by its representative as evidenced by the signature appearing on the receivingcopy thereof.

Explaining why the said transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was belatedly offered as evidence on thiscase, Ma. Elena Dinglasan reasoned that that she was not aware that the said letter has any significanceon Dinglasan's liability. She explained further that in 1993 she was diagnosed of breast cancer and had toundergo surgical operation and chemotherapy.

To corroborate the statements of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan on her part,narrated under oath that her late husband used to bring some of Elmyra's documents home to work on atnight and after her husband's death in 1994, such documents were kept inside a box and left somewherein one corner of their house. It was only when a minor renovation was made therein several years afterher husband passed away that she was able to chance upon the said documents again. The saiddocuments were turned over to Dinglasan on 21 October 2000. It was later discovered that the said

documents include the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom.

18

In contrast, private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of theCase based on newly discovered evidence should be dismissed on the ground that the same isprocedurally and substantially defective.19

Elaborating, Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, the Motion for New Trial should befiled at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of theappellate court convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 137800dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory on 14 October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry ofJudgment. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed only on 30 October 2000 or a year after thefinality of the decision in G.R. No. 137800. The filing of the instant action, therefore, has alreadyprescribed.20

Moreover, Antrom continues, considering for the sake of argument that the instant action was filed withinthe reglementary period, still, the petition must fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence asground for new trial were not satisfactorily complied with. Let it be noted that the transmittal letter dated 8October 1995 was previously attached as evidence in a Petition for Review filed by Dinglasan before theMinistry of Justice (now the Department of Justice) on 15 December 1986, assailing the Resolution of theFiscal dated 11 December 1986 recommending the filing of Information against him. The same letter wasalso introduced as evidence before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 when Dinglasanassailed the RTC decision dated 16 December 1991. Hence, the claim that the alleged evidence was not
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available during the trial in the courts below, and is thus, newly discovered is erroneous, if notmisleading.21

Finally, Antrom stresses that, granting for the sake of argument, that the petition at bar was filed on timeand the alleged evidence is newly discovered within the purview of the law, such evidence introduced andadmitted, nevertheless, would not exculpate Dinglasan from liability. The gravamen of the offense is the

act of the drawer in making or issuing a check with the full knowledge that he does not have sufficientfunds to cover the amount. Such awareness was admitted by Dinglasan when he expressly requestedAntrom not to deposit the check without his explicit conformity in anticipation that such check will bedishonored if presented for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check and not the nonpaymentof the obligation is punished by law because of its deleterious effect on public interest.

The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on their part, submitted that the instantpetition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to beadmitted is neither material nor newly discovered so as to warrant new trial or reopening of the case. Thealleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not in any way alter the judgment. Upon perusal of thetransmittal letter dated 8 October 1985, it was nowhere stated therein that Solidbank Manager's CheckNo. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 was intended as partial payment of Commercial Bank Check No.270451 dated 3 October 1985 that bounced. The said letter was a mere proposal wherein a payment in

kind or dacion en pago was offered by Elmyra. The Solicitor General likewise noted that the letter dated 8October 1986 was already introduced as evidence in the Petition for Review with the Ministry of Justicefiled by Dinglasan.22

For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THE CASE BASED ON NEWLYDISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Rule 124 Procedure in the Court of Appeals.

Section 14. Motion for New Trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has beenperfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final,the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to hisdefense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)

Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the

appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.

While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition should be filed before thefinality of the judgment convicting the appellant, he, however argues that judgment attains finality onlyupon the receipt of the order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.

Dinglasan's argument is without merit.
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Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration was deniedby this Court as the subject matter thereof is a prohibited pleading and that the Motion forReconsideration was merely noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc Resolutiondated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration andwas further emphasized by the provision of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:

Rule 52. Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of ajudgment or a final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at the risk of occasional errors,judgments of courts must become final at some definitive date fixed by law.23

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying thesecond motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged toissue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the periodfor the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a rulingwould allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a

prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the winning party.

It bears stressing further that on 14 October 1999, the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 137800 dated28 June 1999 became final and executory as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according to thepertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

Rule 51. - Judgment.

"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial orreconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolutionshall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when thejudgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. Therecord shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed bythe clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laidto rest. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longerbe modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions offact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of theland.24

Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case on 30 October2000 was made way beyond the prescriptive period for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestlybelieved that this Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in his Second Motion forReconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-mature to file the instant petition before receiving the

Court's ruling on the said motion, could not be given credence.

The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience ofthe party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service,which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes beyond the power of the partybeing served to determine at his pleasure.25
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Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly made because the evidence sought to beadmitted were not available at the time the instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly, he claimsthat this evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence as contemplated by law.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Rule 121 New Trial or Reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the followinggrounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused havebeen committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not withreasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced andadmitted would probably change the judgment.

The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence couldnot have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it ismaterial, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, ifadmitted, will probably change the judgment.26

These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry v. State ofGeorgia27where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x xUpon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it isincumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy theCourt, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the

want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce adifferent verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, inrelation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should beproduced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of thetestimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for newtrial based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidencehe seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. 28

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether

the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered bydue diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporalone, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have beendiscovered.29

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and EncarnacionVda. De Dinglasan attest, that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was discovered recently or justbefore the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. The records, however, show otherwise.
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In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court already considered that transmittal letterdated 8 October 1985 in rendering its Decision dated 26 October 1998. The pertinent portion of theDecision reads:

It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10, 1986, (Exhibit "B") no mentionwas made of the two (2) manager's checks, considering that at least one of the two (2), both dated

October 8, 1988 (pp. 2-3, Records) was allegedly given to private complainant on the said date (pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment in kind or dacion en pago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial court correctly noted that, "x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He willnot part of more than one million pesos, in the form of manager's checks, as replacement of a check thatbounced, without any supporting document." (p. 8, Decision, Criminal Case No. 21238).

We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is no evidence establishing that accused-appellant asked for the return of the Combank Check in the same way that the PTB Check had beenreturned, other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check had been considered cancelled(p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check had already bounced. (p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd that accused-appellant would replace the Combank Check with an amountmore than the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was still subject to final liquidation. As evidencedby the voucher (Exhibit "5") accused-appellant issued Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check.

Hence, it is quite quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask for the return of the Combank check afterhaving issued two (2) manager's check.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be presented in this case was recentlydiscovered is a falsity. It is a desperate attempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause thathas long been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this Court but never did so in good faith. It iscontrary to human experience to have overlooked an evidence which was decisively claimed to have suchsignificance that might probably change the judgment.

The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as evidencein CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court ofAppeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is anattempt to raise again a defense which was already weighed by the appellate court. A contrary ruling may

open the floodgates to an endless review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying the disposition ofcases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial,in guise of newly discovered evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

G.R. NO. 150207 February 23, 2007

VALENTIN P. FRAGINAL, TOMAS P. FRAGINAL and ANGELINA FRAGINAL-QUINO, Petitioners,vs.THE HEIRS OF TORIBIA BELMONTE PARAAL, represented by PEDRO PARAAL, FELISAPARAAL, ABRAHAM PARAAL, IRENEA ACABADO and JOSEFA ESTOY, Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing theApril 24, 2001 and September 3, 2001 Resolutions1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.

64174.2

The material facts follow.

The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Paraal namely: Felisa Paraal, Abraham Paraal, Pedro Paraal,Irenea Acabado and Josefa Estoy (Heirs of Toribia Paraal), filed with the Office of the ProvincialAgrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB), Camarines Sur, a Complaint for Termination of Tenancy Relationship, Ejectment, andCollection of Arrear Rentals and Damages,3 docketed as PARAD Case No. R-0503-306-98, againstValentin Fraginal, Tomas P. Fraginal and Angelina Fraginal-Quino (Fraginal, et al.).

Fraginal, et al. filed an Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the PARAD on the ground that they are

not tenants of the Heirs of Toribia Paraal, for the land they are tilling is a 1.1408-hectare publicagricultural land within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources.4

The PARAD issued a Decision on October 8, 1998 ordering the ejectment of Fraginal, et al., thus:

x x x x

Our perusal of [the] records shows that the defendants so-called documentary evidence as proofthat the landholding cultivated by them is classified as public land contrary to the claims of hereinplaintiffs is a mere scrap of paper. First, although it states that a certain area situated at Pili,Camarines Sur is declared as alienable and disposable for cropland and other purposes, yet, it does

not specifically state through technical description or whatever the exact area of coverage, itslocation as well as the boundaries, hence, we cannot be sure or we have no way of knowing whetherthe subject property is part and parcel of that covered area. Second, it states that the list ofoccupants or claimants therein is attached to said document, however, a close scrutiny of the samereveals that it contains only one page without any attachment particularly the alleged list ofclaimants. Therefore, there is no proof that defendants are indeed one of the claimants listed therein.From here it can be inferred that such document was presented merely to confuse the Board in theirattempt to gain favorable judgment. Moreover, we are far from convinced that defendants otherallegations are tenable not only because they are self-

serving but also for being irrelevant to the issue at bar. The same allegations and arguments havebeen raised or asserted merely to resist the demands of the plaintiffs particularly on their ejectmentfrom the questioned landholding especially that all the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs havenever been effectively refuted by the defendants.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the termination of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract (Contrata sa Pag-Arquilanin Dagang Agricultural) dated January 7, 1997 entered into by and between herein parties;
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2) Ordering all the defendants, their heirs and assigns to vacate the premises immediatelyupon receipt of this decision;

3) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the total of 54 cavans of palay at 46 kls. percavan representing the arrear rentals for the entire year of 1997 until the filing of this case onJune 26, 1998, including succeeding lease rentals as it falls due until they finally vacate the

premises; and

4) Ordering the defendants to desist from further disturbing [the] herein plaintiffs in theirpeaceful possession and cultivation of their landholdings subject of the instant action.

SO ORDERED.5

On April 5, 2001, two years from issuance of the PARAD Decision, Fraginal,et al. filed with the CA aPetition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/orRestraining Order.6 They insisted that the PARAD Decision is void as it was issued withoutjurisdiction.

Unimpressed, the CA dismissed the Petition in its April 24, 2001 Resolution,7 thus:

A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court may be availed ofto have judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts annulled.Also, Rule 47 requires that recourse thereto may be had only when the ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no faultof the petitioner.

The petitioners ratiocinated [sic] this instant recourse for their failure to avail of the remedy providedfor under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, without fault (Rollo, p. 4). However, the petition failsto offer any explanation as to how it lost that remedy except for its claim that they failed to avail ofRule 65 without any fault on their part. And even if We are to grant it arguendo, Rule 47 being

exclusive to judgments and final orders and resolution in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts is notavailable to the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUECOURSE and ordered DISMISSED.8

The CA also denied the Motion for Reconsideration9 of Fraginal, et al. in the assailedResolution10 dated September 3, 2001.

Hence, the herein Petition.

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioners Fraginal, et al. raised these issues:

I.

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition filed before itfor annulment of judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB) that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as the land is a public agriculturalland.
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II.

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Rule 47 of the Rules ofCourt pertains only to judgment or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the RegionalTrial Court.11

It is only the second issue which is pivotal.

No doctrine is more sacrosanct than that judgments of courts or awards of quasi-judicial bodies,even if erroneous, must become final at a definite time appointed by law.12 This doctrine of finality ofjudgments is the bedrock of every stable judicial system.13

However, the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain equitable remedies;14 and one of themis a petition for annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.15

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character,16 and will not so easily andreadily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments orfinal orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remediesof new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available throughno fault of the petitioner.

Section 2. Groundsfor annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsicfraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in amotion for new trial or petition for relief.

The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Fraginal, et al. before the CA failed to meet theforegoing conditions.1awphi1.net

First, it sought the annulment of the PARAD Decision when Section 1 of Rule 47 clearly limits thesubject matter of petitions for annulment to final judgments and orders rendered by Regional TrialCourts in civil actions.17Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodiessuch as the National Labor Relations Commission,18 the Ombudsman,19the Civil ServiceCommission,20 the Office of the President,21 and, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible topetitions for annulment under Rule 47.

Speaking through Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court, in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, ratiocinated:

Rule 47, entitled "Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions," is a new provisionunder the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeitthe remedy has long been given imprimatur by thecourts. The rule covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders andresolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no faultof the petitioner."An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the casewhere the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easilybe resorted to as an instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards tobe put in place in order to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be
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based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not beinvoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for reliefor other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of thoseremedies through his own fault or negligence.

x x x x

x x x The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the mannerprescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expresslygranting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even more true in actions for annulmentof judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. 22 (Emphasis ours)

Second, Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgmentif other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, and a petition for relieffrom judgment or an appeal.23

The 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures, which was applicable at the time the PARAD Decisionwas issued, provided for the following mode of appeal:

Rule XIII

Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision ofthe Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period of

fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, resolution or decsion appealed from, and serving a copythereof on the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, anda copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oralappeal.

It does not allow for a petition for annnulment of a final PARAD Decision.

While the DARAB Rules provide for an appeal to the DARAB from a decision of the PARAD,Fraginal, et al. did not avail of this remedy. However, they justified their omission, thus:

9. Prior to the filing of this instant action, the petitioners, without fault, failed to avail of the remedyprovided under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, appeal the questioned decision and to file thecorresponding petition for relief from judgment, due to time constraint and want of sources as towhen the questioned decision be appropriately done as they were not assisted by counself from thevery beginning of the proceedings.24

Such pretext is unacceptable.

Fraginal, et al., could have appealed to the DARAB even without resources or counsel. They couldhave asked for exemption from payment of the appeal fee, as allowed under Section 5, RuleXIII.25 They could have also requested for counsel deoficio from among DAR lawyers and legalofficers, as provided under Section 3, Rule VII.26They appear not to have needed one, consideringthat they seem to have adequately fended for themselves as shown by the Answer they prepared,which raised a well-thought out legal defense.27As it were, they neglected to exercise any of theserights and chose to fritter away the remedy still available to them at that time. Their direct recourse tothe CA through a petition for annulment of the PARAD Decision was therefore ill-fated.
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Moreover, there is nothing in Rule XIII that allows a petition for annulment of a final PARADDecision. As held inMacalalag, there must be a law granting such right, in the absence of which,Fraginals petition for annulment of judgment was correctly denied due course by the CA.

With the foregoing disquisition, we find no need to treat the first issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice

G.R. No. 80892 September 29, 1989

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS of JESUS AMADOARANETA, respondents.

Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.

Antonio P. Barredo for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioner impugns the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 10 and December 2 and3, 1987 which, in effect, gave due course to private respondents' petition for annulment of judgment.

The antecedents of this case are as follows:

On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, as mortgagors, and Islamic Da'Wah Council ofthe Philippines (Council for brevity), as mortgagee, executed a real estate mortgage over a 4,754 sq.m. parcel of land located in Cubao, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. 30461 as security for the payment of a one million peso promissory note in favor of themortgagee. The mortgagors were unable to pay their obligation, hence, the Council institutedforeclosure proceedings with the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43746. OnFebruary 5, 1985 the parties submitted a compromise agreement wherein it was stipulated thatbecause of the Da Silvas' inability to pay their debt to the Council, and for the additionalconsideration of P 500,000.00, they jointly agree to cede, transfer and convey to the Council the landthey mortgaged to the latter. On February 12, 1985, the Regional Trial Court approved thecompromise agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. 328021 was issued in the name of the Council by theRegister of Deeds of Quezon City.


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Subsequent thereto, on August 8,1985, Jesus Amado Araneta filed with the Register of Deeds anotice of lis pendens in connection with Civil Case No. Q-47989 entitled "Islamic Da'Wah Council ofthe Philippines v. Jesus Amado Araneta" for ejectment. The complaint was converted into an actionfor collection of rentals with damages but was later on withdrawn by the Council. On August 13,1985 Araneta also filed with the same Register of Deeds an affidavit of adverse claim in connectionwith Civil Case No. Q-43469 entitled "Marconi Da Silva, et al. v. Jesus Amado Araneta, et al." for

recovery of possession. The notice of lis pendens and adverse claim were annotated at the back ofTCT No. 328021 by the Register of Deeds.

On October 9, 1985 the Council filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint forQuieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunctionagainst Araneta praying, inter alia, for the cancellation of all the annotations at the back of TCT No.328021. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. Q-46196.

While this case was pending, on July 6, 1987, the heirs of Jesus Amado Araneta, privaterespondents herein, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the judgment in Civil Case No.Q-43746 for foreclosure. In support of their petition the heirs of Araneta narrated the followingevents:

(1) on December 20,1953 Jesus Amado Araneta purchased the 4,754 sq.m. parcelof land located in Cubao from the Spouses Garcia and since then he and his familyhave always been in possession thereof;

(2) for some reason known only to Araneta and Fred Da Silva,an employee of theformer, title to the property was placed in the latter's name as evidenced by TCT No.30461 although from the time of its issuance the owner's duplicate copy of said TCThas always been in the possession of Araneta,

(3) on January 31, 1963, the parties decided to terminate the trust that had beencreated over the property, thus, Da Silva executed a deed of sale over the sameparcel of land in favor of Araneta but no consideration was given by the latter to theformer for said sale and any recital of consideration appearing in the deed is purelyfictitious;

(4) the Register of Deeds, however, refused to register the deed of sale because thetitle is in the name of "Fred Da Silva married to Leocadia Da Silva" and is thuspresumed conjugal and the conjugal partnership should first be liquidated as the wifehad already died;

(5) alleging that their copy was lost and/or destroyed, on February 1, 1984 Freddieand Marconi Da Silva, two of the three surviving children of Fred Da Silva who diedin 1963, filed a petition, docketed as LRC record Case No. Q-2772, for the issuanceof a new copy of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 30461. The petition was

granted by Judge Vera on March 24,1984:

(6) Araneta learned about this and immediately filed a motion to re-open theproceedings stating that he has in his possession the ,- owner's duplicate copy ofTCT No. 30461 and explaining the reasons for such possession;

(7) the motion was granted and on December 7,1984 the land registration courtordered the Da Silvas to (a) return to the Register of the second owner's duplicatecopy of the title and (b) neither enter into any transaction concerning said second


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owner's duplicate copy nor utilize the title for any purpose other than to return thesame to the Register of Deeds;

(8) on November 11, 1985, the Da Silvas manifested before the land registrationcourt that the title to the property was transferred to the Council based on acompromise agreement in Civil Case No. Q43746 for foreclosure; and

(9) on motion of the heirs of Araneta, who substituted him upon his death in 1985,Judge Vera consolidated Civil Cases Nos. Q- 2772 and Q-43469, both of which wereraffled to his sala, with Civil Case No. Q-46196 but the judge hearing the latter casewould not heed the order of consolidation.

(10) and then set out their case for annulment of judgment alleging that the DaSilvas, with the connivance of the Council, executed a purported promissory notesecured by a real estate mortgage the terms and conditions of which were made veryonerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of the property by virtue of aconfession of judgment; and, the Council had always known of the Araneta's claim ofownership over the land because the former's executive officer and secretary general

is the lawyer of the Da Silvas in the cases they filed against the Araneta's. The heirsof Araneta in their petition prayed, inter alia, that (1) the judgment in Civil Case No.Q- 43746 be annulled and set aside and (2) a restraining order be issued to enjointhe proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-46196 [Petition, Annex "A"].

In a resolution dated November 10, 1987 the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining the trial judge from hearing Civil Case No. Q-46196 until further orders from the court. Inthe same resolution the parties were ordered to appear for a pre- trial conference. The Council fileda motion for reconsideration of this resolution. Later on the Council filed a Supplement to Motion forReconsideration with Motion to Dismiss questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear thepetition for annulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council also invokedthe additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the Aranetas are not valid claimants of theproperty; lack of legal capacity to sue because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case;

litis pendentia because of the pendency of the quieting of title case between the same parties; and,abandonment, waiver and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds [Petition, Annex "H"]. OnDecember 2, 1987 the Court of Appeals denied the Council's motion for reconsideration for lack ofmerit. In the hearing conducted on December 3, 1987 the Council reiterated the grounds it raised inits Supplemental Motion and Motion to Dismiss but the same were summarily denied by the Court ofAppeals. Hence, this petition forcertiorari.

Petitioner contends the following: first, that the Court of Appeals should not continue to hear thepetition for annulment of judgment since it is already fully executed and the purpose for which thecase for annulment was filed will no longer be served, the parties having already complied with thedecision; second, private respondents have no right to question the validity or legality of the decisionrendered foreclosing the mortgage since they are foreign to the transaction of mortgage between

petitioner and Freddie and Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims that private respondents haveanother remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-46196 for Quieting of Title where the questionof ownership may be passed upon.

At the outset it must be clarified that the instant petition is one forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of theRules of Court. Thus, the inquiry this Court should address itself is limited to error of jurisdiction orgrave abuse of discretion committed by the Court, of Appeals, in particular, whether or notrespondent court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course tothe petition for annulment of judgment. This clarification is rendered necessary because the parties


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themselves, in their pleadings, have gone beyond this issue and have discussed the merits of theannulment of judgment case now pending decision with the Court of Appeals.

In its Petition, the Council contends that a Regional Trial Court has the authority and jurisdiction toannul a judgment of another Regional Trial Court, a coordinate or co-equal court Specifically,petitioner alleges that the filing of a separate action for annulment of judgment is unnecessary

because the Regional Trial Court hearing Civil Case No. Q-43469 for Quieting of Title can annul thejudgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for Foreclosure rendered by another Regional Trial Court [Rollo,pp. 15-16). In its Memorandum, however, the Council admitted that the Court of Appeals has theexclusive jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court [Rollo, pp. 152-1531.

Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to beannulled was rendered. The judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud[Canlas v. Hon- Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77691, August 8,19881. Jurisdiction over actions forannulment of Regional Trial Court judgment has been clarified by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129(otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Prior to the enactment of this law,different views had been entertained regarding the issue of whether or not a branch of a RegionalTrial Court may annul a judgment of another branch of the same court. * However, Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court of Appeals exclusive original jurisdictionover actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.129 expressly provides that:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ...

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RegionalTrial Courts; Thus, it is beyond dispute that it is only the Court of Appeals that cantake cognizance of the annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 renderedby the Regional Trial Court.

The next issue raised in this petition deals with the question of who may properly institute a petitionfor annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's contention that the remedy is available only to one who isa party to the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. Private respondents, onthe other hand, allege that "there are sufficient facts and circumstances sufficient to showprimafacie that [they] have a substantial interest in the ownership of the property which had beenforeclosed without their knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the question deals withwhether or not the heirs of Araneta have a cause of action against the Council.

In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 4731, an action forannulment of judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 between Edrosolano and Belosillo was filed byMilitante. The petition stemmed from a complaint instituted by Militante on September 6, 1965against Edrosolano for damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On January 18,1966Militante obtained an order of preliminary attachment on the property of Edrosolano. Alleging that hepurchased all of Edrosolano's TPU equipment on February 28, 1966, Belosillo filed a third-party

claim. It appears that on February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by default againstEdrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for collection of amount of P45,000.00, the value of thepromissory note executed by the latter on February 1, 1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts,Militante, in his petition for annulment of judgment contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil Case No. 6216"was based on a fictitious cause of action because [the] promissory note was without lawfulconsideration whatsoever" [at 476]; (2) Edrosolano did not file any answer to Belosillo's complaintand allowed the latter to obtain a judgment by default which judgment attained finality without theformer appealing therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 was promulgated iii 1963it was "only on January 19, 1966 when . . . Belosillo caused the execution thereof after [Militante]


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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the orders of the Court of Appeals datedNovember 10 and December 2 and 3,1987 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez,Jr., Feliciano and Bidlin,JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 178158 December 4, 2009

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,vs.RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONCORPORATION,Respondents.ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD, Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 180428

LUIS SISON, Petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and RADSTOCK SECURITIESLIMITED,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

Prologue

This case is an anatomy of a P6.185 billion1 pillage of the public coffers that ranks among one of themost brazen and hideous in the history of this country. This case answers the questions why ourGovernment perennially runs out of funds to provide basic services to our people, why the greatmasses of the Filipino people wallow in poverty, and why a very select few amass unimaginablewealth at the expense of the Filipino people.

On 1 May 2007, the 30-year old franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)under Presidential Decree No. 1113 (PD 1113), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1894 (PD

1894), expired. During the 13th Congress, PNCC sought to extend its franchise. PNCC wonapproval from the House of Representatives, which passed House Bill No. 57492 renewing PNCCsfranchise for another 25 years. However, PNCC failed to secure approval from the Senate, doomingthe extension of PNCCs franchise. Led by Senator Franklin M. Drilon, the Senate opposed PNCCsplea for extension of its franchise.3Senator Drilons privilege speech4 explains why the Senate chosenot to renew PNCCs franchise:
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I repeat, Mr. President. PNCC has agreed in a compromise agreement dated 17 August 2006 totransfer to Radstock Securities Limited P17,676,063,922, no small money, Mr. President, my dearcolleagues, P17.6 billion.

What does it consist of? It consists of the following: 19 pieces of real estate properties with anappraised value ofP5,993,689,000. Do we know what is the bulk of this? An almost 13-hectare

property right here in the Financial Center. As we leave the Senate, as we go out of this Hall, as wedrive thru past the GSIS, we will see on the right a vacant lot, that is PNCC property. As we turn righton Diosdado Macapagal, we see on our right new buildings, these are all PNCC properties. That is12.9 hectares of valuable asset right in this Financial Center that is worthP5,993,689.000.

What else, Mr. President? The 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC with a par valueof P2,300,000,000-- I repeat, 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC worth P2,300 billion--was assigned to Radstock.

In addition, Mr. President and my dear colleagues, please hold on to your seats because part of theagreement is 50% of PNCCs 6% share in the gross toll revenue of the Manila North TollwaysCorporation for 27 years, from 2008 to 2035, is being assigned to Radstock. How much is this

worth? It is worth P9,382,374,922. I repeat,P9,382,374,922.

x x x x

Mr. President, P17,676,000,000, however, was made to appear in the agreement to be onlyworthP6,196,156,488. How was this achieved? How was an aggregate amount of P17,676,000,000made to appear to be only P6,196,156,488? First, the 19 pieces of real estate worth P5,993,689,000were only assigned a value ofP4,195,000,000 or only 70% of their appraised value.

Second, the PNCC shares of stock with a par value of P2.3 billion were marked to market andtherefore were valued only at P713 million.

Third, the share of the toll revenue assigned was given a net present value of only P1,287,000,000because of a 15% discounted rate that was applied.

In other words, Mr. President, the toll collection of P9,382,374,922 for 27 years was given a netpresent value of only P1,287,000,000 so that it is made to appear that the compromise agreement isonly worth P6,196,000,000.

Mr. President, my dear colleagues, this agreement will substantially wipe out all the assets of PNCC.It will be left with nothing else except, probably, the collection for the next 25 years or so from theNorth Luzon Expressway. This agreement brought PNCC to the cleaners and literally cleaned thePNCC of all its assets. They brought PNCC to the cleaners and cleaned it to the tuneof P17,676,000,000.

x x x x

Mr. President, are we not entitled, as members of the Committee, to know who is RadstockSecurities Limited?

Radstock Securities Limited was allegedly incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. Ithas no known board of directors, except for its recently appointed attorney-in-fact, Mr. CarlosDominguez.


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Mr. President, are the members of the Committee not entitled to know why 20 years after theaccount to Marubeni Corporation, which gave rise to the compromise agreement 20 years after theobligation was allegedly incurred, PNCC suddenly recognized this obligation in its books when infact this obligation was not found in its books for 20 years?

In other words, Mr. President, for 20 years,

dinglasan at neypes and rule 47 cases

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