director ibec/tif presentation may 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing...

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Prof. Linda Doyle Director [email protected] IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010

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Page 1: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Prof. Linda Doyle

Director

[email protected]

IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010

Page 2: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Trinity College (headquarters)

Dublin Institute of Technology

Dublin City University

National University of Ireland

Maynooth

University of

Limerick

University College Cork/

Tyndall National Institute

- industry informed research in telecommunications

- optical and wireless domains

Page 3: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 4: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

interesting things about spectrum

Page 5: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• dynamic spectrum access

• spectrum sharing

• opportunistic spectrum usage

• spectrum etiquettes

• spectrum trading

• technology and service neutral

spectrum regimes

Page 6: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 7: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 8: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

interesting things about spectrum

Page 9: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 10: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 11: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 12: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

primary user = licensed

secondary users = cognitive users = unlicensed?

Page 13: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

F1F2F3F4

the carriers are orthogonal => tightly packed.

Page 14: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 15: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

cognitive radio

Page 16: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 17: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Cognitive

Engine

Objective

Function

Policies

Allowed frequency bands for primary/secondary use

Maximize SNR, data rate

Occupied bands

Signal strength

Meters Knobs

Neighbour list

Frequency of

operation

Power

Waveform

Page 18: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

18

Thomas W. Rondeau, Application of Artificial Intelligence to Wireless Communications,

Ph.D. Dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2007

Page 19: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

not so dynamic dynamic spectrum access

Page 20: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 21: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Digital dividend - TV white space

digital TV signals will continue to use the

spectrum between 54MHz and 698MHz but there

will be geographical based empty spots

Page 22: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 23: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

TV White Space

New American Foundation

Page 24: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

the database view is winning out

Page 25: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

the debate in general is hotting up

WiMAX? 802.22? LTE? LTE+???

Page 26: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

FP7 - COGEU

Instituto de Telecomunicações –Portugal

THALES Communications S.A. - France

Rohde & Schwarz - Germany

Portugal Telecom Inovação - Portugal

Sigint Solutions -Cypres

Poznan University of Technology - Poland

University of Aegean - Greece

Institut für Rundfunktechnik - Germany

Page 27: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 28: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

cognitive radios

Page 29: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 30: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 31: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

FPGA

GPP Platform

Cell BEPicoArray

Page 32: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 33: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

© Linda Doyle CTVR, Trinity College

Page 34: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

cognitive radio – enabling a new kind of commons

– learning an etiquette

need to understand the context in which a system is

operating to do this – need to adjust operation

Page 35: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 36: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Even the highly popular 2.4GHz band

is only around 20% used on average

and 40% used in the busiest

locations. The 5GHz band, seen by

many as an “overflow” when 2.4GHz

becomes overly congestion, is almost

completely unutilised.

Page 37: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

spectrum trading?

Page 38: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

SLOW

Page 39: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

some countries that allow

trading

• Guatemala

• New Zealand

• Austraila

• UK

• USA

Page 40: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

http://www.sunriseconsultants.com/spectrum.html

Page 41: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 42: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 43: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 44: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Europe - Flexible User Rights and Spectrum Trading

• The RSPG launched a consultation on secondary trading of

spectrum in February 2004 following a request received

from the EC in 2003 for an opinion on secondary trading.

In November 2004, the RSPG published its Opinion on

secondary trading.

• RSPG has adopted a cautious stance with regard to

spectrum trading considering it to be “beneficial in

certain parts of the spectrum” and that “European

administrations should introduce secondary trading with

due care”.

• The EU now proposes that one-third of the spectrum below

3GHz could have flexible usage rights and be tradable by

2010.

• RSPG is elaborating on the concept of Wireless Access

Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS)

to move away from too narrowly specified allocations and

applications, for which specific spectrum is designated.

Page 45: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 46: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 47: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

DYNAMIC

Page 48: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

© Linda Doyle CTVR, Trinity

College

Page 49: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 50: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 51: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 52: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

tim

e

frequency

space

subletting

sub-subletting

Hierarchical Market Mechanism

Page 53: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Service &

Technology

Neutrality

different from current licensing

Page 54: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

FDD FDDTDD

TDD 1 TDD 2

FDD

UPTDD

TDD

1

TDD

2

FDD

DOWNTDD

Page 55: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 56: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

whatever?

frequency

whatever? whatever?

Page 57: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 58: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 59: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 60: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 61: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 62: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 63: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 64: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

© Linda Doyle CTVR, Trinity

College

Bansal, G., M. J. Hossain and V. K. Bhargava,

“Optimal and suboptimal power allocation schemes

for OFDM-based Cognitive Radio systems” , IEEE

Trans. Wireless Commun., 7(11): 4710-4718, Nov.

2008.

high order modulation

low order modulation

higher power

lower powerAzarnasab, Ehsan; Kempter, Roland; Patwari,

Neal; Farhang-Boroujeny, Behrouz Filterbank

Multicarrier and Multicarrier CDMA for Cognitive

Radio Systems. CrownCom 2007.1-3 Aug. 2007

Page(s):472 - 481

sculpting techniques

Page 65: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 66: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 67: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• SETUP: 3 pairs of “1 Laptop+1 USRP” for interfering Tx, primary Tx and primary Rx

– Laptops run baseband TX and RX chains implemented on Iris 2.0

– Baseband samples transferred to/received from USRP over USB

– USRP transmits/receives signal over air

Suppression of adjacent channel interference through shaping

No shaping → Harmful adjacent interference, no audio

Page 68: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

whatever?

frequency

whatever? whatever?

dynamic masks

(service & technology neutral)

Page 69: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

choice goes to spectrum consumer

(conservative old technology)

frequency

self-induced guardbands

Page 70: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

choice goes to spectrum consumer

(sophisticated techniques)

frequency

Page 71: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology
Page 72: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

choice goes to spectrum consumer

(bargaining with neighbours)

time t = t0

time t = t1

Page 73: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

coasean bargaining?

Page 74: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

thanks

Page 75: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Australia

• There are about 22,000 geographic

cells which vary in size according

to the population within them.

• The spectrum trading units can be

aggregated, and licensees are free

to use whatever device or technology

they wish, provided that they do not

cause unacceptable interference to

other users.

Page 76: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• Spectrum trading is carried out directly between

buyers and sellers, but any trades have to be

registered with the Australian Communications

Authority.

• The ACA publishes this information on its website.

• It has recorded a total of 246 trades since 1998.

However this figure substantially overstates the

volume of trading as it counts each spectrum

trading unit as a separate trade, and includes the

re-assignment of spectrum between related

companies in the same group of companies.

• In reality about 21 separate exchanges of spectrum

have taken place, and only 12 of these have been

between unrelated entities (representing about 140

spectrum trading units).

Page 77: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

Guatemala

• Up to 1996, spectrum was issued by the government in a bureaucratic manner, and was

often subject to long delays and corruption. However the Telecommunications Act of

1996 privatised the incumbent operator, set up a new regulatory body, and

revolutionised the approach to spectrum management. A "bottom-up" approach was

adopted by applying the right of "usofructo" to spectrum. In Guatemala usofructo

rights enable the use of a property owned by another person provided that the use

does not destroy or diminish the property itself. The 1996 Act establishes the

concept of "titulos de usofructos de frecuencias" (TUF), a property right which can

be subdivided, aggregated and traded. These last for 15 years, and this period can

be extended on request. The scheme covers television, radio, and communications

frequencies.

• The national regulatory agency, the Superintendencia de Telecomunucaciones (SIT),

maintains a register of spectrum and its allocation via the TUF. Anyone may apply

to the SIT for a frequency, and the SIT is required to respond in three days. If

the SIT does not reject the application (which it can do because of interference or

of reservations for other uses), it publishes a public notice. Interested parties

may then object or file an application for the same spectrum. Any objections must

be adjudicated in ten days. If there are other applications for the spectrum, the

SIT will then hold an auction of the spectrum; if there are not, there is no charge

for the spectrum.

• SIT reported that it received over 13,000 applications for spectrum since 1996, and

it issued over 5,000 TUF to about 1,050 people. Eighty TUF were subject to

auctions. SIT has had to authorise new details on about 25% of TUF, suggesting that

secondary trading is running at this level. As TUF can be used as a security

against loans etc, this may include financial transfers as well as operational

transfers.

Page 78: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

New Zealand

• New Zealand became the first country to implement spectrum trading when it started

the scheme in 1989. In order to do this, it created two types of property rights:

• management rights of a defined block of spectrum allow the manager to have use of

the spectrum for up to twenty years and to issue licences for the spectrum; there

are about 80 blocks of spectrum issued to eight bodies (mainly operators and the

government);

• licence rights permit the use of specified spectrum without interference from other

users. Licences may contain conditions of use, but they do not limit use to any

particular technology or application.

• Both rights can be traded, as with any property rights, and can be subject to

mortgages. The Ministry of Economic Development maintains a public record for

spectrum management and licence rights, but does not produce a separate record of

spectrum trading. However it is known that after television spectrum became

tradable in 1995, the operator of the fourth television channel used the system to

acquire sufficient spectrum to launch its service.

• In April 2005 the New Zealand government completed a review of its spectrum

management policy, and noted that the volume of spectrum trades has been low. It

attributed this to the small number of buyers and sellers, and to the ready

availability of unused spectrum. The report raised a number of questions about

whether the spectrum trading system could be made more effective, for example by

permitting geographical subdivision of spectrum management rights or instituting a

"use it or lose it" condition on spectrum management rights and licences.

Page 79: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

United States

• In 2003 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) introduced rules to govern spectrum trading, and

in mid-2004 simplified the scheme. It distinguishes between the transfer of de jure rights (that is,

assignment of the licence to another party) and de facto control (in which the transferee retains the

licence and legal responsibilities, but transfers management control of the spectrum). However

essentially both forms of transfer follow the same process, as follows:

• the spectrum holder and the transferee agree to the transfer;

• both notify the FCC and certify that they satisfy pre-defined public interest criteria (including

conformance with foreign ownership requirements, competition rules etc);

• the FCC gives immediate approval to the application;

• the application is placed on a public register, and interested parties have 30 days in which to

request that the FCC reconsiders its approval (and the FCC itself has 40 days if it wishes to

reconsider the application);

• if the FCC finds that the self-certification was incorrect, it can take enforcement action at any

time.

• The FCC specifically excludes from this process spectrum trading that would result in mobile voice

and data operators aggregating spectrum in their existing areas of operation. These arrangements

cover most spectrum bands, while restrictions are placed on some uses (for example emergency service

providers can only trade with other emergency service providers).

• In 2004 the FCC proposed a new concept to assist with spectrum trading, the "private commons". Its

purpose is to assist the development of smart devices which adjust the spectrum they use to take

advantage of under used spectrum. Holders of spectrum would enable other suppliers to share the

spectrum (the other schemes only permit the transfer of spectrum), but the spectrum holder would

retain the licensing responsibilities. This scheme would be limited to peer to peer devices that do

not use a hierarchical network or the infrastructure provided by the spectrum holder.

• A substantial volume of spectrum is traded in the USA. The FCC publishes all spectrum trades, and

during the first four weeks of June 2005, 186 separate trades were recorded. Of these, 77% were full

assignments of the spectrum to another party, and 10% transfers of de facto control. Most of the full

assignments were between business entities, and most of the de facto control transfers were for

spectrum used for educational television.

• At least one commercial company in the USA has set up an on-line spectrum trading exchange, which

enables buyers and sellers of spectrum to register and trade their interests.

Page 80: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• Forms of Spectrum Trading

• The European Commission identifies the following methods for transferring rights of

use:

• Sale – Ownership of the usage right is transferred to another party;

• Buy-back – A usage right is sold to another party with an agreement that the seller

will buy back the usage right at a fixed point in the future;

• Leasing – The right to exploit the usage right is transferred to another party for

a defined period of time but ownership, including the obligations this imposes,

remains with the original rights holder.

• Mortgage – The usage right is used as collateral for a loan, analogous to taking

out a mortgage on an apartment or house.

• In terms of the trade itself, there are a variety of mechanisms that can be used.

These include:

• Bilateral negotiation: The seller and (prospective) buyer directly negotiate the

terms of the sale and are not subject to any particular constraints set by the

regulator;

• Auctions: Once a type of auction has been chosen and the rules have been decided by

primarily the seller, prospective buyers have the opportunity to acquire the

spectrum usage rights by bidding in the auction;

• Brokerage: Buyers and sellers employ a broker to negotiate, with their consent, the

contractual terms under which the transfer of usage rights can take place;

• Exchange: This refers to the establishment of a commercial trading platform,

similar to a stock market, where transfers take place according to specific rules

established by the members.

• These mechanisms are most likely to be used in combination. In the first instance

an auction will be used as the primary means of assignment, tradable spectrum is

listed on an exchange and either direct negotiation or brokerage facilitate the

transfer of spectrum user rights. As we have discussed earlier band managers may be

delegated responsibility for managing certain bands on behalf of the regulator.

Page 81: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• New Zealand's Radiocommunications Act 1989 was pioneering and radically changed the

landscape of spectrum management. New Zealand was the first country to create a

management rights system whereby owners of blocks of “management rights spectrum”

are free to issue spectrum licences for the specified part of the spectrum

according to their own policies. In New Zealand‟s case, there are 209 management

rights blocks with 70 reserved for the government covering services like broadcast.

The other 139 blocks are reserved for essentially commercial services like fixed

and mobile services.

• Spectrum Licences granted by a manager of a block of management rights spectrum

usually have the following characteristics:

• assigned for a defined period of time;

• non-specific to equipment or transmission methods; and

• define an envelope within which the licence holder is free to operate at his or her

discretion.

Page 82: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• New Zealand's Radiocommunications Act 1989 was pioneering and radically changed the

landscape of spectrum management. New Zealand was the first country to create a

management rights system whereby owners of blocks of “management rights spectrum”

are free to issue spectrum licences for the specified part of the spectrum

according to their own policies. In New Zealand‟s case, there are 209 management

rights blocks with 70 reserved for the government covering services like broadcast.

The other 139 blocks are reserved for essentially commercial services like fixed

and mobile services.

• Spectrum Licences granted by a manager of a block of management rights spectrum

usually have the following characteristics:

• assigned for a defined period of time;

• non-specific to equipment or transmission methods; and

• define an envelope within which the licence holder is free to operate at his or her

discretion.

Page 83: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• Band Managers

• A band manager will typically have assignment rights over, or be the licensee of, a

block of spectrum, which it will then subdivide among many users. In many

respects, a band manager can be thought of as a „wholesaler‟ of spectrum, which it

then „retails‟ to individual users.

• Use of a band manager may simply be a means of reducing transaction costs, if

competitive tendering produces a manager which is more efficient in the relevant

business process than the regulator itself. Band managers can also permit more

efficient use of spectrum by pooling demand. Such policy is effective if:

• individual users have insufficient spectrum to achieve efficient usage, and

• different users of spectrum have demand patterns that peak at different periods.

• New technological developments such as „agile‟ technologies which allow

transmitters and receivers to „hop‟ across frequencies increase the potential role

of band management.

• On the other hand, band managers can become possessive of the spectrum which they

have been awarded to manage, and this can thwart spectrum policy objectives, for

example, when the spectrum regulator wishes to re-allocate the spectrum managed by

the band manager to another purpose.

Page 84: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• OFCOM is currently shifting U.K. spectrum policy towards a flexible system of

spectrum manage ment through the liberalization of spectrum usage rights and

spectrum trading. A gradual approach is being adopted, embracing progressively more

bands and greater flexibility in use but relying on competitive assignment methods.

This progression is exemplified by OFCOM‟s intention to apply service and

technological neutrality in a forthcoming spectrum assignment involving frequencies

currently used to support terrestrial analogue TV broadcasting, the proposed use of

spectrum user rights in a forthcoming auction of the L Band, and in other auctions.

• The United Kingdom has also adopted the policy of extending market methods of

spectrum management to public sector spectrum, giving public sector users the right

to trade or lease their spectrum and the obligation to go into the market place to

acquire additional spectrum. OFCOM is also extending the application of

administrative incentive pricing.

• Administrative Incentive Prices (AIP): are intended to encourage licensees of non-

auctioned spectrum to use their spectrum rights efficiently; legislation enables

annual licence fees to be set above administrative cost to reflect a range of

spectrum management objectives (efficient management and use, economic and other

benefits, innovation and competition), having regard in particular to availability

of present and expected future demand for spectrum. OFCOM has been using AIP since

1998 and revised the approach in 2004. There AIP is used to value spectrum at its

marginal value as a proxy for the opportunity cost to the representative spectrum

user in those bands where AIP fees were charged.

Page 85: Director IBEC/TIF Presentation May 2010 · •dynamic spectrum access •spectrum sharing •opportunistic spectrum usage •spectrum etiquettes •spectrum trading •technology

• International experience in spectrum trading was highlighted in the sections above

and the following similarities and differences were exhibited:

• there were few , if any, signs of intermediaries being active in the market;

• there were no signs of speculators entering the market;

• several countries exhibited significant levels of trade (Guatemala and El Salvador)

or a number of significant ($ hundred million) trades (the United States);

• in Australia and New Zealand, levels of trade have been fairly low (roughly equal

to the turnover of commercial property) reflecting an orderly turnover in spectrum

through trades;

• in the United Kingdom, trades in the limited bands available have been infrequent,

but the number of traded bands has been small and the spectrum regulator is in the

middle of a large programme of spectrum awards which may provide an alternative

source of spectrum to those who want it.

• Liquidity of spectrum markets remains a real issue, and the design of

liberalization measures should be in the foreground.