DISECDISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

NAMUN2015 General Assembly

Background Guide

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DEAR DELEGATES:Welcome to the First Committee of the General Assembly, on Disarmament and International Security. It is our greatest pleasure to welcome all of you to the 30th session of the North American Model United Nations, NAMUN 2015. To establish a background upon those that will make up the Dais, introductions are in order before proceeding to the Committee itself.

Kristen Shi is a student at the University of Toronto pursuing a double major in Economics and Public Policy, and will act as one of your co-chairs this year. She has participated in Model UN all throughout high school and has extensive experience working specifically in DISEC. She is very interested in the repercussions of international security covenants on regional stability and looks forward to seeing new solutions to these issues.

Caitlin Morishita-Miki is currently doing a double major in French Literature and History at the University of Toronto. Her interests in Model UN stem from her experience throughout her high school career as well as university. She has a keen interest in international security as well as its historical ramifications. She is eager to see what this year’s delegates will bring to the table. This is her second year working as part of the NAMUN staff and she is very excited to serve as one of your chairs for NAMUN 2015.

Buchra Nassab is a third year student specializing in Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies and minoring in Political Science. She is currently the Director of External Affairs for the University of Toronto Refugee Alliance and the Director of Mentorship for the Association of Political Science Students. Buchra’s interests lie in the analysis of civil wars, post-conflict reconciliation, and international law. This is her first year with NAMUN and she’s looking forward to moderating!

Areya Desai will serve as the Vice Director for DISEC at NAMUN 2015. She is a second year student majoring in Peace, Conflict, and Justice Studies and Ethics, Society and Law. Her journey with NAMUN began last year when she chaired the discussion on landmines for DISEC, so she is particularly excited at having the opportunity to oversee this year’s committee.

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This year’s DISEC committee will examine the issues surrounding:

• Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

• Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

First, an enquiry concerning SALW will be tasked to find regional answers to international questions of SALW-related conflict and peacemaking, to discuss the increasing roles of producers and traders in illicit SALW trafficking, and question the feasibility of international implementation of the UN mandated Programme of Action. Second, the matter of an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone will prompt questions pertaining to the implementation of such a zone, the economic ramifications, and environmental consequences of inaction.

We look forward to the enthusiasm and creative problem-solving delegates will bring to the conference and the committee. Any further questions related to the committee can be emailed to:

• kristen.shi@namun.org (concerning SALW)

• caitlin.morishitamiki@namun.org (concerning Arctic NWFZ)

Sincerely,

Kristen Shi Caitlin Morishita-Miki

Chair, DISEC Chair, DISEC

Areya Desai Buchra Nassab

Vice Director, General Assemblies Moderator, DISEC

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TOPIC 1: SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Kristen ShiThe First Committee of the General Assembly, otherwise known as DISEC (Disarmament and International Security Committee) is committed to the creation and maintenance of global peace through the prevention of weapons proliferation. SALW is a blanket term to refer to small arms, light weapons, as well as all accompanying ammunition and accessories. The continued use of SALW in conflicts at global and local levels alike have demanded constant vigilance and oversight by the international community. They have been a long-standing concern of DISEC; despite multiple resolutions having been passed and global recognizance of the issue, SALW continue to be traded, transported, and used in large numbers worldwide, and remain the primary weapons of choice for civil conflicts. Due to their small size, the ease with which they are concealed, and their relative inexpensiveness, they are the most easily accessible form of weaponry to citizens and proliferation is rampant throughout the world, particularly in eastern Europe and northern and western regions of Africa. SALW include, but are not limited to, various forms of pistols, revolvers, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and portable rocket launchers. According to the Small Arms Survey, there are at least 1000 companies worldwide responsible for the production of SALW, stationed in over 100 countries and global production is estimated at 7.5-8 million each year.

The main users (and victims) of SALW are citizens as even in areas without eminent civil conflicts, more civilians die to firearms-related violence than battlefield violence. SALW are also linked to an “increasing number of killings of UN employees and peacekeepers, as well as workers from humanitarian and non-governmental organizations.” The proliferation of SALW is directly linked to an increased number of violations of human rights, including murder, maiming, rape, kidnappings, torture, child conscription, and other forms of subjugation. In addition, armed conflict has been acknowledged by the World Bank as the single greatest factor in undermining economic investment, playing a huge factor in increasing food insecurity and poverty.

One of the largest standing issues in achieving SALW non-proliferation is a lack of information. The Small Arms Survey recognizes that more is known about nuclear warheads and chemical stocks than small arms. To date, no accurate

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figures exist with regards to the number of SALW in circulation globally. The UN estimates the total to fall around 875 million, with approximately three-quarters of these weapons being privately owned.

This session will focus predominantly on how non-proliferation can be championed further. Delegates must do more than strengthen existing covenants; they must discuss how producers should (or shouldn’t) be included in encouraging non-proliferation, how illicit traffickers can be detected and tracked, how more information on SALW can be obtained and reliably shared with the UN, and how regional security and economic prosperity (or lack thereof) directly correlates with SALW presence. Delegates should discuss measures to modify existing punishments for violation of these covenants, and whether or not distributors ought to be simultaneously held responsible, create specific regional solutions for areas of high proliferation, and find ways to encourage transparency and lessen the threat of SALW stockpiles whilst respecting sovereignty. Delegates should also be careful to note that SALW proliferation is often linked to other issues, such as illicit trafficking, religious conflicts, or economic instability, and SALW are just as often used for self-defence as they are for initiating conflict. SALW affect every single UN member state in some way; delegates must find in what way they are affected and why that matters on a global level. Social and cultural understanding of a state’s history with SALW is encouraged.

Historical Background:In July of 2001, the Programme of Action (hereon referred to as the PoA) was established in New York City, USA. This Programme was a comprehensive resolution targeted specifically at the problem of illicit SALW trafficking, that included solutions at both the national and regional level. The nation-states participating in this resolution encouraged the creation and implementation of judicial systems to appropriately deal with illicit arms trafficking, the creation of bodies to oversee research regarding illicit arms, and the appointments of appropriate liaisons between states to share recorded information. They also encouraged a process of ‘marking’, by which producers would be legally obligated to place a unique symbol or seal upon their weapons, for the purpose of identifying country of manufacture. Some specific clauses highlight the following needs:

• To prevent the creation and usage of unmarked SALW

• To streamline the administrative processes for those who engage in SALW brokering, including but not limited to legal licensing and authorization of brokering transactions, and the creation of appropriate penalties for illicit brokering activities

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• To destroy all confiscated SALW

• To regularly review the national stockpiles of member states and ensure safe storage of SALW until their disposal

• To create effective demobilisation and reintegration programs for nations in a state of post-conflict

Another notable facet of illicit arms trade is that of international transfer. Even in areas where small arms trafficking is legal, ships or other forms of transportation are often diverted off their original paths, where small arms can be easily stolen. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has stated that about 90% of illicit weapons are legally produced, and later diverted into the illegal market, and that this illicit trade amounts to roughly 4 billion USD. The UN has also regarded this as the predominant issue within small arms trafficking, and passed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013 to rectify the issue. This treaty also provides recommendations to member states on what to do with stockpiles. Despite most UN member states signing onto it, only 11 have ratified it.

There are several organizations currently in place responsible for the creation of small arms solutions, as well as the publication of information of small arms. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) coordinates and oversees all international work pertaining to SALW proliferation. More specifically, it oversees the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), which in itself contains 21 departments working on different aspects of SALW control. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) also carries out research in terms of arms controls affairs, but is not specifically suited to SALW issues. UNROCA, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, acts as the first check for transparency, operating underneath UNODA. The most comprehensive source of information is from the Small Arms Survey, headquartered in Geneva. Several other sources, such as NATO, and the EU, provide their own reports, but little to none exist in areas of high corruption such as some conflicted states in the Middle East.

The United Nations is not the only body acting on this issue as NATO has also worked extensively in areas of high conflict to confiscate weapons surplus since the 1990s, and destroyed more than 4 million landmines and 2 million grenades. NATO uses a trust fund to aid two particular mechanisms: the Ad Hoc Working Group on SALW and Mine Action, and the NATO Partnership Trust Fund Mechanism. Delegates are encouraged to make use of NATO’s cooperation in this field in strengthening potential resolutions.

The European Union (EU), in particular, has also been very effective at curbing small arms trade. Due to its unique membership it has far greater access to information on stockpiles, and has been cooperative with the UN in sharing this information. The EU has expressed support at the international level by

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giving priority to implementing the PoA, and recognizes regional level issues as being its main area of expertise. It has provided extensive support to sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, in dealing with border security and customs, while also providing financial and technical support for regional organizations and agreements such as the ECOWAS moratorium, Nairobi Convention, and the SADC Protocol. The EU’s policy was decided in 2003, as in a meeting regarding “Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of light weapons” and it has recommended the aid of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in providing the funds for this. With regards to Europe itself, the EU identifies Europol, Eurocustoms, and Eurojust as the bodies responsible for dealing with arms trafficking. The above

In Africa, the Organisation of Africa Unity has unilaterally accepted the Bamako Declaration, made in December of 2000, as its policy. In it, member states pledged to identify, seize, and destroy all illicit weapons, and established measures for the trading and usage of SALW. Other accepted documents include the “AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation, and Trafficking of SALW”, accepted in September 2011. Finally, the AU, with the support of the EU, began a 3-year project to combat illicit firearms in Africa. This project was implemented by the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), and attempts to strengthen regional and civil actors such as the African Regional Police Chiefs Organization (RPCO) and other law enforcement agencies.

In Asia, particularly South Asia, the least progress has been made. An organisation called “Biting the Bullet” periodically releases a report termed the Red Book, noting progress made in SALW proliferation. In 2006, it identified the largest remaining issues in South Asia as being the lack of funding from NGOs, lack of civilian involvement, and national disinterest in the topic. This has contributed to the criticism that PoA action has been patchy, at best.

Lastly, few agreements exist on dealing with Cold War stockpiles. Cold War stockpiles are most dangerous in Russia and Ukraine where OSCE assistance has been requested. At least 6 million euros are required to address problems in Eastern Europe alone. Many of these stockpiles also have biochemical and environmental hazards associated with them (eg. Fuel from rocket launchers).

Current Conditions and Relevant International ActionEach year, the Small Arms Survey publishes a yearbook that focuses on a different aspect of small arms proliferation. Each report also focuses on issues stemming from specific countries, and provides relevant statistics to current

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conditions. In the 2014 yearbook, the Small Arms Survey has identified the following nations as being the top exporters of SALW, in descending order: United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Belgium, China, Turkey, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, it has also noted that from 2001 to 2011, legal trade of small arms has doubled, and trade of ammunition has tripled.

These reports act as the global source for SALW information. The foci of the previous 5 reports have been:

• (2014) The role of women in SALW conflict/peacemaking, including violence against women in post-conflict areas such as Liberia and Nepal. It includes an introduction on the 2014 Transparency Barometer.

The purpose of this barometer is to measure how reliable the export report of a country is with regards to small arms. Interestingly enough, it does not seek to verify the claims of the report, but only whether the information provided is considered sufficient for global standards. This is the first step towards achieving a global database of export information that holds nations accountable.

• (2013) Non-conflict related violence, including domestic violence, gang violence in Nicaragua, mafia violence in Italy, illicit market practices in Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia, and increased proliferation in Mexico and the Philippines. There was also a review on the Second Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action in 2012.

• (2012) Changing security goals, including what has and what hasn’t been working with regards to curbing proliferation. Special attention is given to firearm related violence in the Caribbean, war zones, and Somali piracy. Two country studies are performed on Somaliland and Kazakhstan.

• (2011) Privatization of the small arms industry, including emerging legislation of civilian possession.

• (2010) The emergence of gang violence, including pro-government gangs. Case studies on Ecuador and South Sudan are explored.

These are the most pre-eminent issues of small arms today. Consultation of these reports is expected for the committee.

North America:

The United States of America destroys military weapons which are no longer useful or economically repairable in a stockpile manage life-cycle program. Their most thorough method is through smelting, with a well-known

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smelting facility at the United State Army’s Rock Island Arsenal. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office accounts for SALW destruction, and is its voice of global accountability. The USA also employs a policy of firearm marking. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs provides technical and financial assistance in destroying at-risk SALW munitions, and since 2001 has destroyed approximately 1.6 firearm units and 90 000 tons of ammunition. It has assisted with destruction efforts in at least 37 other countries, conducting assessments and providing recommendations in aiding with the execution of the PoA.

Many of Canada’s contributions and efforts to SALW non-proliferation have been labelled as half-hearted. The nation-state has come under fire for only acting as signatory to many international conventions on the matter, and has also expressed doubt with brokering provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013. Canada has expressed a willingness to withdraw from the ATT altogether if the terms of brokering are not softened. Its main concern has stemmed from a fear of extraterritorial judicial responsibility for Canadians acting outside of Canada. Its brokering responsibilities are primarily carried about by the Canadian Commercial Corporation.

Mexico has been plagued by SALW violence, primarily in domestic and trafficking settings. Firearm use is particularly rampant among members of drug cartels, contributing to national instability. Nevertheless, Mexico has expressed a cooperative attitude, joining the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies in 2008. In 2005 it also adopted the Arms Trade Treaty in conjunction with several other Latin American states, and has expressed a desire for a Parliamentary Observatory body to oversee demilitarization efforts.

South America:

In Latin America, SALW are primarily used in cases of domestic violence, drug trafficking, cartel activity, or gang violence. The focus of Latin American governments, then, has been less on preventing SALW from falling into rebel hands, and more on making SALW less available to the civilian populace.

South America is an example where SALW is deeply connected to other issues. SALW is not a major issue in the area due to war or ethnic conflict, but more as a symptom of other issues, such as poverty, low educational levels, and poor policing efforts with regards to drug trafficking, inter alia. Leaders in this region cannot tackle this issue head-on, but must seek to diagnose the underlying issues that cause SALW proliferation to be such a major issue in the area.

One particular issue related to SALW in South America is that of transparency. On average, only about a third to a half of OAS states submit annual arms reports to UNROCA. This is largely due to a fundamental feature of UNROCA itself – namely, that it is not legally binding. Instead, the OAS has pursued more regional rather than international initiatives, having signed the Inter-

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American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions in 2001. Modeled after UNROCA, it differed in that it was legally binding, and required nations to submit information on weapons acquisitions 90 days after the fact. Unfortunately, it has faced even less participation than UNROCA, with no more than seven states in any given year submitting reports, and only Brazil and Chile reporting consistently.1

In addition, even with the few countries that do report, these repots often lack clarity and have been criticized by the Small Arms Survey for a lack of comprehensiveness.2 In light of this, many Latin American states have expressed a desire to better adhere to PoA and ATT practices, particularly those regarding transparency; however, several states, including Cuba, have noted that they would only be in support of such a resolution provided that reporting was not mandatory. Even Brazil, recognized as frequently cooperative in its reporting, has stated that the only condition under which it would support mandatory reporting is if reporting on SALW was not included.

Europe:

The European continent has been vigilant in its efforts to deal with SALW. So far, Europe has been the most organized continent in terms of disarmament and SALW destruction. In 2005 the EU adopted the “EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition.” The strategy has pulled together different branches at the EU’s disposal, including the civilian and military capabilities of individual states, external assistance instruments, police, customs, and judiciary action, and more. As a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has created financial support and regionalized programmes to tackle SALW related threats. Currently, it is sponsoring the following regionalized efforts: Southeastern Europe (SEESAC), OSCE financed area, and Libya.

The EU has also been working side-by-side with UNODA, financing operations in Africa. Every six months the European External Action Service presents a progress report to the Council of the European Union for review. Other monitoring services include the International Relations and Security Network, headquartered in Zurich.

Despite progress, Biting the Bullet has identified several goals Europe can continue to work towards. These include:

1 “The Long Road to Arms Trade Transparency in Latin America.” Council of Hemispheric Affairs. http://www.coha.org/the-long-road-to-arms-trade-transparency-in-latin-america/

2 “Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2012, Covering Major Exporters.” Small Arms Survey 2012. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Transparency_barometer/SAS_Transparency_Barometer_2012.pdf

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• Implementing effective SALW transfer controls, with stronger policing of OSCE and EU transport regulations

• Development of controls on SALW brokering

• Managing state-controlled stocks of SALW, by creating safe storage facilities

• Increasing commitment to regulating overseas production, which had been promised in the EU Strategy

• Integrating SALW control into other security and justice programmes

• Encouraging more international involvement in SALW initiatives

• The greatest amount of instability undoubtedly results from two factors:

• Cold War stockpiles in the former Soviet Union

• Current conflict in Ukraine

Unity within the EU has not been enough to tackle the full spectrum of SALW-related problems, and the EU has not faultless despite its efforts to combat the issues. The EU ended an 11-year arms Libyan arms embargo,3 resulting in nearly 1 billion euros of worth of weapons granted to Libya between 2005 and 2009. Belgium is noted as a major exporter of the EU, alongside Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK. Their weapons, too, end up in the hands of armed factions or rebel groups, and thus their responsibility to help prevent it in the future.

After breaking from the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a number of SALW depots. These have posed massive threats to the civilian population, even in times of peace. Many of these munitions are either improperly stored or go unnoticed altogether. Since 2003, there have been ten unplanned explosions at munition sites, resulting in in nearly 1 billion euros worth of damage. Ukraine nevertheless has requested assistance from international organization in the removal of SALW; NATO has been one such actor to do so. Since 2006, NATO has destroyed 1000 MANPADS, 15000 tonnes of conventional ammunition, and 400 000 SALW units. The United States has also expressed an interest in aiding Ukraine, after a 2005 visit by then-Senator Barack Obama. Member states of the EU have contributed financial aid to the first phase of what is currently the largest demilitarisation project in the world.This is not to say

3 Bessler, Julie. “Post-Uprising Arms Proliferation is Destabilizing the Middle East.” http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/post-uprising-arms-proliferation-middle-east-85463/

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Ukraine was solely a victim, however. The Ploughshares Monitor, in 2007, identified Ukraine was being one of the top six supplies of major conventional weapons in between 2001-2005.

Russia has been widely recognized as one of the largest producers, owners, and exporters of small arms, but information on exports coming from the country is cloudy. The Transparency Barometer suggested by the Small Arms Survey may be one way to begin holding the state accountable, but without more funding it is insufficient. Russia has been suspected as an SALW exporter to Algeria, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. Currently, Saferworld identifies Russia as a state that keeps its information on SALW employment, profit, and export figures classified, and that does not require its producers to publish comparable data on sales. This is complicated by the fact that many of the factories that produce SALW also produce civilian goods. Similar questionnaires sent out by the EU have returned uncompleted. Despite international secrecy, however, by way of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Russia has committed to providing confidential inter-governmental information on arms transfers.

One thing to note is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy, and its SALW branches, were hit particularly hard. It has been suggested that arms exports were a way to compensate for this. However, due to the sheer size of the economy, the EU questions whether the arms trade ever accounted for more than 5% of exports.

Despite this, Russia does have legislation in place to monitor controls and licencing of small arms brokering. These include the 1998 Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign states, which established strict controls on Russian military SALW exports, and the Federal Law on Arms in 1996, regulating possession, use, and internal transfers of SALW, as well as licencing requirements for their production and export.

Middle East:

According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), the Middle East is a region of ‘high military expenditure relative to gross domestic product (GDP), and it has correspondingly high levels of arm imports.’4 Thomas Greminger, Chairperson of OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), has also commented that the smuggling of SALW in the Middle East correlates with a rise in transnational terrorist trends, technological advancements, and increasingly porous borders.5 Aside from Turkey, all states in the region for which data was available increased their military spending from 1999-2008.

4 Perlo-Freeman, S. “Arms Transfers to the Middle East.” Sipri. http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/samperlofreeman82324e9ea9f3af411.pdf

5 “Small Arms, Light Weapons Smuggling in Middle East Growing.” Sputnik International. http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20141102/1014195130.html

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Although the United States has traditionally been recognized as the largest exporter to the Middle East, the EU has increasingly come under fire for permitting European weapons to reach the Middle East. Much of this, according to the Flemish Peace Institute, is in response to increasing austerity measures in the EU; weapons suppliers have had to look elsewhere for customers.6 Furthermore, it identified France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK as the main exporters to the Middle East in Europe, with their combined exports totalling more than 7 billion euros

Table 1. Military expenditure in the Middle East, 1999–2008

Figures are in US$ m. at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates for 1999–2008 and in the right-most column (marked *) in current

US$ m. for 2008. Figures are for calendar years.

Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008*

Bahrain 340 337 355 424 487 491 486 528 611 582 586

Egypt 2250 2405 2571 2689 2816 2665 2659 2721 2740 2585 3774

Iran 3200 4731 5220 3926 4594 5816 7213 7811 6486 6089 9174

Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. 1120 972 828 1926 5283

Israel 9299 9574 9996 11087 10421 9931 10303 11075 12513 12135 16194

Jordan 581 596 586 567 655 607 604 660 922 973 1250

Kuwait 2658 3082 3029 3126 3369 3626 3509 3486 3914 3622 4663

Lebanon 857 964 998 928 932 948 970 981 1155 1067 1301

Oman 1797 2139 2488 2562 2695 3030 3652 3905 3956 3739 4512

Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

Saudi Arabia 18260 20125 21434 18817 18956 21074 25393 28926 33320 33136 38223

Syria 4969 5353 5627 5841 6696 6708 6746 6067 6484 6300 7735

Turkey 16413 15885 14562 15494 13984 12762 12055 13016 11155 11663 15810

UAE 2950 2876 2836 2862 2807 2585 2559 .. .. .. 3724

Yemen 589 701 744 943 973 793 816 700 821 801 1196

. . = data not available; ( ) = uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate.

a The figures for Bahrain do not include extra-budgetary spending on defence procurement.

b Figures for Iran exclude spending on the Revolutionary Guard.

c The figures for Iraq should be seen in the light of the unstable security situation and high rate of inflation.

6 “European arms export to the Middle East reaches record high.” Flemish Peace Institute. http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/press/european-arms-export-middle-east-reaches-record-high

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d The figures for Israel include military aid from the USA, which in 2008 was $2.38 billion.

e The figures for Oman are for spending on defence and national security and exclude capital expenditure.

f The figures for Saudi Arabia are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure, and are for defence and security.

g The figures for Syria are based on the official exchange rate of $1 = 11.225 Syrian pounds.

h The figures for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) exclude the military expenditure of its 7 constituent emirates.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/>.

SIPRI identifies the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Turkey as major recipients of conventional weapons in the area. This has been attributed both to strong economic growth in the region, high oil prices, and increasing insecurity due to armed conflicts (including the US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s nuclear power programme, and the Israeli-Palestinian border conflict). Conversely, the United States, France, Germany, and Russia, respectively, constitute the largest suppliers of weaponry to the region, with the USA’s largest recipient being Israel (nearly 99% of Israel’s conventional weapon imports were from the United States.)

In terms of exports, the Middle East lacks significant native defence industries, with Israel and Turkey being the largest exporters of the region.

Most SALW concern related to the Middle East is not related to trafficking, but to usage. Israel, in particular, has been noted for extensively relying on US-supplied weaponry in its conflicts, including Gaza Strip assaults in 2008 and 2009, as well as the 2006 war in Lebanon. Other states, such as Syria and Iraq, also use large stocks of foreign weaponry, with most of their imports originating from Russia and China. However, as both the Small Arms Survey and SIPRI recognize, the total number of SALW available in the region, legal or not, has not been confirmed and not enough cooperation has been provided by relevant states to create a comprehensive database.

One way in which weapons become easily available to extremist groups in the Middle East is through poor policing. Iraq is one such example of this; following the disbanding of the Iraqi Army by the US Provisional Authority in 2003, security around Iraqi SALW stockpiles was weakened and units easily found their way into extremist hands.7 Tied directly to this issue is a poor implementation of the PoA’s marking system; the USA has made accusations regarding the smuggling of weapons across Iraqi borders to Syria and Iran, but

7 Perlo-Freeman.

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there is little to no evidence to support this and it has been virtually impossible to identify the initial suppliers of such weapons. This has resulted in the USA admitting to having lost track of the 30% of its supplied weapons to Iraq since 2004. Turkish officials have also confiscated US-supplied arms from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, likely due to poor tracking and policing measures.

In terms of private ownership, Yemen leads the Middle East. Up till 2008, 18 public arms markets operated there freely; their operation has suspected ties to Somalian conflict.

The focus of Middle Eastern states should be to increase transparency. According to SIPRI, ‘No state in the Middle East publishes an annual report on its exports of conventional weapons’8, and only three states (Israel, Jordan, Turkey) regularly submit reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, created in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s reign to combat SALW trafficking.

Despite difficulties, there have been attempts at improvement. The League of Arab States, in 2004, passed a resolution to combat illicit trade in the region, titled ‘Arab coordination for combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’.

Africa:

In 2011, the OAU met to develop a strategy similar in nature to that of the EU’s. Their primary objectives were to establish a culture of peace by carrying out education and public awareness programs, strengthening the capacity of African bodies for the purposes of implementing measures against SALW trafficking, promote cooperation, and enhance international cooperation.

Due to Africa’s unique cultural makeup, religious organizations play an important part in SALW proliferation. Many religious groups not only act as informal medical facilities for SALW victims, but also promote peace throughout the region. Delegates are encouraged to find a way to incorporate the aid of religious organizations into international action, and remember that much of the conflict in Africa is civilian in nature.

Western Africa: Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria

It is estimated that some 8 million firearms are in circulation in this region. These firearms are fuelling conflict, particularly in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote D’Ivoire. The ECOWAS moratorium of 1998, being the first regional moratorium on small arms in the world, is viewed by many as a solution to this problem; however, Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire frequently violate it.Western Africa has frequently looked to Europe for assistance. In 2007, the Kofi Annan

8 Perlo-Freeman.

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International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit, the German Development Cooperation, and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, published an informational guide for those with little to no understanding of SALW issues.

Eastern Africa: Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, DRC, Burundi

It is here where SALW are used most grossly to violate human rights. This region has experienced a series of long intra and international warfare that has resulted in displacement, delayed social and economic development, and urban crime.

However, attempts have been made to curb this. In 2004 eleven East African states signed the Nairobi Protocol, the first legally binding agreement on small arms in the region. Its objectives included the ban on civilian ownership of rifles, the registration of all guns, increased regulation for gun storage, ownership restrictions, and the ban of firearm pawning.

Southern Africa: Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South Africa

South Africa is primarily known for its production capabilities. Although states in the region previously engaged in conflict of their own using SALW, SALW primarily serve an economic purpose for them now.

This has been recognized as a problem and coordinated action has been carried out, primarily from the Southern African Development Community. Its protocol on firearms in 2004 required regional harmonisation of gun laws, and included provisions on marking, record-keeping, and broker registration.

In addition, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation tackles cross-border criminal activity.

Northern Africa and the Middle East: Western Sahara, Mauritania , Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman

Conflicts in Northern Africa are the most well-known worldwide, and create the majority of the demand for small arms in Africa. This region, including states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, received many small arms during the Cold War and continues to engage in illicit trading of SALW. These illicit transfers are often connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Governments in this region have been more preoccupied with WMDs, such as nuclear weapons, more than SALW. There have been few attempts at regional cooperation at stopping SALW proliferation. Most attempts at solving the small arms problem have been carried out by NGOs. One such attempt was in 2002, when several civil society groups of the region formed the Middle East and North Africa Small Arms Network.

Asia:

ASEAN has spearheaded the majority of SALW non-proliferation efforts in Asia, in conjunction with PoA branches, as the majority of SALW-related conflict occurs in South East Asia. The greatest fears of states in the region, according to ASEAN, is transnational crime, such as drug trafficking. Related concerns have been relayed to the UN, as such.

Only three countries have additional concrete action on SALW since 2001 besides the PoA (Cambodia, China, Philippines). There seems to be a general trend where states are reluctant to cooperate with external actors in solving the issue, and an additional reluctance to place regulations on brokering.

However, there still remains work for regional bodies to be done. ASEAN identifies 19 countries in the region as producers of SALW, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Meetings have been held, either solely with ASEAN members (1999, 2004) or with other national/international bodies (ASEAN + China, 2002) to draft solutions to the issues.

ASEAN has created a work program to combat arms smuggling. Its plan includes the following:

• Program of Information Exchange: Intended to establish a compilation of national laws and regulations of ASEAN member states pertaining to arms smuggling and establishing a regional repository of such laws, available on ASEANWEB, to conduct typology studies, to observe trends and modus operandi of arms smuggling in the ASESAN region, and to enhance the exchange of information among ASEAN officials.

• Program of Legal Matters: Intended to work toward a more unified and streamlined system of marking for ammunition and arms, in line with the PoA’s aims

• Program of Law Enforcement Matters: Intended to improve intelligence exchange, border and customs control, and encourage cooperation with Europol, Interpol, and other policing organizations. The program aims to strengthen law enforcement capabilities and encourage  more comprehensive domestic legislation.

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• Training Program: Intended to develop regional training programs, conduct conferences, improve surveillance, detection, and monitoring practices. Member states are encouraged to share their expertise with one another.

• Institutional Capacity Building Program: Intended to establish a database on illicit trafficking, including comprehensive information on trade volume, the types of cases pursued, and trade routes. The Program also intends to establish destruction procedures for surpluses, procedures to report missing government stockpiles, and encourage development along international lines.

• Extra-Regional Cooperation Program: Intended to increase information exchange between regional organisations and relevant specialized agencies of the UN, particularly information on specific transnational criminal organisations. This Program also acts as the communicative medium for requesting UN funding.

Central Asia: Central Asia has been identified as a relatively peaceful area in modern times. Despite increasing poverty, ethnic tensions, and corruption, SALW proliferation has not been a massive issue. However, delegates should be careful to remember that social issues are closely tied to civilian violence, and that a lack of violence now does not remove future threats. In addition, many states in Central Asia are close to regions currently undergoing conflict, such as Afghanistan.

Very few states in Central Asia have acted as more than signatory to the PoA. International Alert identifies increased transparency and cooperation in the region as the primary goal for Central Asian states.

China was accused in 2013 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as being a leading proliferator of SALW, whilst also being one of the least transparent. Its weapons have been linked to conflicts in Northern Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Its trading practices are complex and the routes by which arms are transferred to militant groups are dubious, at best.

The report, in conjunction with UN Comtrade, identifies at least 57 states who have imported SALW from China from 2006-2010.

China has come under increasing criticism for being hypocritical in its international actions. Despite signing onto more international protocols and acknowledging the dangers of SALW more openly, it resists transparency and its true stockpile count remains unknown.

Indonesia, due to its unique geographic shape as an archipelago, has an extensive coastline with a vast number of remote islands that are difficult to monitor. Many of these areas act as entry points for smuggling. Smuggling

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occurs not only for Indonesian purposes, but terrorist purposes, including the transfer of explosives from the Philippines and Malaysia. The uncontrolled SALW proliferation in the region has encouraged the creation of separatist movements and spawned higher rates of criminal activity. While Indonesia has expressed support for UN-mandated actions to address SALW, Indonesia believes that any such instruments to be used in the solution must not hamper the ability of governments to transfer weapons to each other.

Analysis and Job of the CommitteeDespite an almost universal agreement that SALW pose a massive and unnecessary risk to the lives of civilians, the PoA has not been implemented in its entirety yet. The problem with SALW is that they are a multi-faceted issue: the weapons themselves are not necessarily the cause of conflict, but are rather a symptom of underlying regional economic or political instability. SALW are connected to religious conflict in the Middle East, terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, illicit trafficking and human rights abuses in Africa, and drug trafficking in the Caribbean. There is no single solution that can deal with the issue head on.

Even if the multi-faceted nature of SALW non-proliferation is noted, many obstacles stand in the way of otherwise cooperative states. Funding is a massive issue. Not all states have the facilities to properly dispose of SALW. Furthermore, SALW often have important economic ties to producer states; delegates should note that halting production could have very serious consequences in regions like Southern Africa, Russia, and China.

Issues such as transparency also run rampant. The exchange of information is noted as being one of the biggest hindrances in stopping SALW proliferation. Currently the Small Arms Survey is the most reliable source of information, but until all member states of the PoA are held to some standard of information release, its reports will never be totally reliable.

Finally, delegates will notice that this background guide has pointed out at least a dozen regional actors working in the name of the PoA. While the efforts presented are hopeful, the lack of communication between them hinders progress.

The committee must find a multi-faceted solution that will be sensitive to the economic, political, and cultural backgrounds of participating states, find ways to streamline communication between all relevant parties, and create specific legislation to implement the PoA.

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Issues to be Addressed

• Creating a network of information between regional actors who have openly supported the PoA

• Creating a method to fund underdeveloped nations currently overcome by SALW conflict

• Strengthening, or revising existing covenants to encourage signatories to fully agree

• Finding the primary illicit trade routes, and the customers at the ends of those routes

• Reduction and proper disposal of Cold War stockpiles

• Ending regional conflict, whether by introducing new possession legislation or otherwise

• Finding ways to incorporate the work of NGOs, religious groups, humanitarian organizations, or other non-state actors

• Creating educational programs for civilians about the dangers of SALW

• Create specific regional solutions, addressing the root sources of conflict

Points of Consideration

• How can regional organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (mostly Western hemisphere, including the P5), ECOWAS (Western Africa), ASEAN (South Eastern Asia), etc. cooperate with international organizations likes CASA, UNIDIR, and UNODA?

• What can be done about nation states, such as Russia or China, who have remained tight-lipped about the nature of their arms exports? What can be done on an international level to encourage their further cooperation?

• If the number of SALW producers were to be reduced, what kinds of economic institutions would need to be set up to account for the economic downturn resulting? What is to be done about SALW facilities that produce both civilian goods and weapons?

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• Regional concerns differ from continent to continent, country to country. How can these differing interests be compromised? Should there be one document, or many, to deal with these issues? How do we know that such documents will not be repeats of what already exist?

• What do drug violence, mafia violence, and terrorist action have in common with regard to SALW? Do they acquire weapons the same way? Do they use weapons the same way? Would removing SALW solve the issue of violence, or would these militant groups turn to other methods instead?

• Some nation states are heavily invested into brokering. What responsibility do they have for current trafficking? Is all trafficking bad, or simply illicit trafficking?

• In many cases, even where trafficking is legal, poor security and border customs allow weapons to fall into the wrong hands. Is this a domestic or an international concern?

• How can education and peacemaking efforts play a part in all this?  

ConclusionWhen considered in its full scope, one can clearly see that nearly all of the world’s conflict is conducted by way of SALW. Whether through government hands or civilian, SALW have been used for decades not only in traditional warfare, but through terrorist regimes, displacement movements, trafficking activities, and even domestic abuse. The OSCE estimates that 1000 people die each day to SALW related conflict.

It is completely impossible to remove them entirely; that is not the goal of this committee. Delegates must find a way to allow SALW to exist without being the cause of further human rights abuses and violence. This is one case in DISEC where the goal is not complete and total disarmament, but rather peaceful coexistence.

Abbreviations and AcronymsSALW: Small arms and light weapons

UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

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SEESAC: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

EU: European Union

NATO: North Atlantic Trade Organization

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PoA: Programme of Action

ISS: Implementation Support System (Branch of PoA)

RECSA: Regional Centre on Small Arms

RPCO: African Regional Police Chiefs Organization

UNIDIR: UN Institute for Disarmament Research

CASA: UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms

ATT: Arms Trade Treaty

Additional ResourcesPublications by the Small Arms Survey, including yearbooks, regional reports, country reports and lists of relevant organisations to each region: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type.html

A UK based research organization, with articles and resources on relevant nations: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/

Includes reports on NATO’s efforts: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/index.htm

Bonn International Center for Conversion, a similar research body to the Small Arms Survey: https://www.bicc.de/

Project Ploughshares, a Canadian run anti-war research organization: http://ploughshares.ca/

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International Relations and Security Network, a Zurich-based security organization: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/

Bibliography“About CASA.” United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support

System. Accessed Nov 3, 2014: http://www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx

“About SEESAC.” South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Accessed Dec 1, 2014: http://www.seesac.org/about.php

“About UNIDIR.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Accessed Nov 3, 2014: http://www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx

“About UNODA.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed Nov 3, 2014: http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/about_us/aboutus.shtml

Bessler, Julie. “Post-Uprising Arms Proliferation is Destabilizing the Middle East.” Accessed Jan 8, 2015: http://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/post-uprising-arms-proliferation-middle-east-85463/

“ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition, and other related materials.” PoA-ISS. Accessed Dec 21, 2014: http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf

Epps, K. (2013) “Canada and the brokering provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty.” Project Ploughshares. Accessed Dec 22, 2014: http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Briefing-13.2-large.pdf

“European arms export to the Middle East reaches record high.” Flemish Peace Institute. Accessed Jan 8, 2015: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/press/european-arms-export-middle-east-reaches-record-high

“Guns in Ukraine.” GunPolicy.org. Accessed Dec 20, 2014: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/cp/ukraine

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“Implementation of the PoA in South Asia.” Supplementary to 2006 Red Book – Saferworld. Accessed Dec 20, 2014: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/197-implementation-of-the-poa-in-south-asia

“In War and Peace: Violence Against Women and Girls.” Small Arms Survey Yearbook – 2014. Accessed Dec 15, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-1-summary-EN.pdf

Keck, Z. “China is a Leading Proliferator of Small Arms.” The Diplomat. Accessed Dec 17, 2014: http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/china-is-a-leading-proliferator-of-small-arms/

Legaspi, E. “East Asia: In Action on Arms – Assessing Regional Compliance to the UN PoA on Small Arms and Light Weapons.” GSDRC. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=5035&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=gsdrc&utm_source=newsfeed

“National Report of the United States of America on its Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate te Illicit Trade in Small Arms nad Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNPoA)”. GunPolicy.org. Accessed Dec 16, 2014: http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/6780

Perlo-Freeman, S. “Arms Transfers to the Middle East.” Sipri. http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/samperlofreeman82324e9ea9f3af411.pdf

“Price Watch: Arms and Ammunition at Illicit Markets.” Small Arms Survey Yearbook – 2013. Accessed Dec 22, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-11-summary-EN.pdf

“Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.” United Nations. Accessed Nov 3, 2014: http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/poahtml.aspx

“SALW Basics.” Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. Accessed Dec 17, 2014: http://www.fecclaha.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=63:salw-basics-western-africa&Itemid=211

“Second Wind – The PoA’s 2012 Review Conference.” Small Arms Survey Yearbook – 2013. Accessed Dec 10, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2013/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2013-Chapter-7-summary-EN.pdf

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“Small Arms, Light Weapons Smuggling in Middle East Growing.” Sputnik International. http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20141102/1014195130.html

“Small Arms Survey 2010.” Small Arms Survey. Accessed Dec 15, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2010.html

“Small Arms Survey 2011.” Small Arms Survey. Accessed Dec 15, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2011.html

“Small Arms Survey 2012.” Small Arms Survey. Accessed Dec 15, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2012.html

“Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2012, Covering Major Exporters.” Small Arms Survey 2012. Accessed Jan 11, 2015: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Markets/Tools/Transparency_barometer/SAS_Transparency_Barometer_2012.pdf

“Small Arms and Conventional Ammunition.” OSCE. Accessed Nov 30, 2014: http://www.osce.org/fsc/24282?download=true

“Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)”. African Union. Accessed Nov 4, 2014: http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/62-small-arms-and-light-weapons-salw

“Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of light weapons.” Europa. Accessed Dec 17, 2014: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33244_en.htm

“The fight against excessive accumulation and illicit trafficking of SALW and their ammunition.” European Union External Action. Accessed Dec 13, 2014: http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/conventional_weapons/salw/

“The Long Road to Arms Trade Transparency in Latin America.” Council of Hemispheric Affairs. Accessed Jan 11, 2015: http://www.coha.org/the-long-road-to-arms-trade-transparency-in-latin-america/

“The Transparency Barometer.” Small Arms Survey. Accessed Dec 19, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/the-transparency-barometer.html

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“Trade Update – Transfers, Retransfers, and the ATT.” Small Arms Survey Yearbook – 2014. Accessed Dec 20, 2014: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-4-summary-EN.pdf

“TRESA – SALW Control Training Manual for West Africa.” Bonn International Center for Conversion. Accessed Dec 17, 2014: https://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/tresa-salw-control-training-manual-for-west-africa-354/

“Wassenaar Arrangement – Introduction.” Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Accessed Dec 13, 2014: http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html

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TOPIC 2: NUCLE-AR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

Caitlin Morishita-MikiNuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction powered by a nuclear reaction; these include but are not limited to atom bombs and hydrogen bombs. Since Nuclear weapons were first created there have been attempts to properly control their usage. Nuclear weapons have been heavily regulated since the implementation the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970.9 And since 1995, a subsequent conference has been held every five years to pursue the aim of nuclear non-proliferation. However, decisions have been made since to further regulate the usage of nuclear weapons by sanctioning nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are defined as “any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

• The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

• An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute”10 by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone differs from a Nuclear Free Zone in that it allows the shipment of radioactive cargo through its radius.11

9 United Nations. “Background Information.” UN News Centre. Accessed November, 2014.

10 “UNODA - Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” UN News Center.

11 “An Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Northwest Passage (Part 1 of 2).” NATO Council of Canada. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://natocouncil.ca/an-arctic-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-in-the-northwest-passage-part-1-of-2/.

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Global warming has recently caused the seasonal rapid melting of polar icecaps in the Arctic. Thus, during the summer months a large area, which was previously covered by ice, has become accessible. As such, a race to obtain and exploit seabed resources has already begun.12 Due to the current race for resources, states have begun to lay their claim on certain seabed regions. The race for resources could potentially end in a military conflict, as many larger states have already sent submarines into these waters.13 Many organizations fear that these plights for resources will soon become militarized and potentially affect the bordering nations, as well as bring up issues of arctic sovereignty.14

Though the issue of an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is becoming more prevalent, the idea was first suggested in 1964 by a team of scientists and has been reiterated many times since.15 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have become a heavily contested issue in recent years with the opening of the Northwest Passage and attempts to create an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. There are currently 6 non-nuclear-weapon states that border the artic; four of these states are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In recent years, different nations have set up their own plans on how to deal with the concept of creating an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. With the emergence of the Northwest Passage, all of this further complicates itself.

Historical Overview:On July 16th 1945, the United States first tested out their atomic bomb in New Mexico. The world first witnessed the devastating impacts that nuclear weapons could have on August 6th 1945, when the United States subsequently dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Following this many of the larger nations, such as Russia, The United States as well as the United Kingdom made attempts to further nuclear weapons testing within their own nations. It was not until 1954 that there was a call for a ban to be placed upon nuclear testing. In the years following there was much discourse on what was to be done about nuclear testing. The threat of nuclear weapons came to light on July 1st 1968, when over sixty nations signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, which would take effect in 1970. This treaty bars the propagation of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states and prohibits

12 Michael Wallace, & Staples, S. (2010). Ridding the Arctic of nuclear weapons a task long overdue. Ottawa, Ont.: Rideau Institute.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 H. Newcombe, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic* A Proposal.” Security Dialogue 12, (1981): 254

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non-nuclear weapon states from having access to them. At that point there were only five nuclear weapon states: the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United Kingdom.16 There are now three other nations which have added themselves to the list of nuclear weapon states, these are: North Korea, Pakistan and India.

Since the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty there have been Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones put in place all over the world. There are currently five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones across the globe. These include:

• The Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and Caribbean, also referred to as the Tlatelolco Treaty, was signed on February 14th 1967 and took effect on April 22nd 1968 all declared nuclear-weapon states signed this treaty. This treaty put into effect a Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ.

• The South Pacific Nuclear Free Treaty, also known as the Rarotunga treaty, was signed on August 6th 1985 and took effect on December 11th 1986. Though all nuclear-weapon states signed, the United States has yet to ratify the protocol.17

• The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, also known as the Bangkok treaty was voted upon on December 15th 1995 and came into effect on March 27th 1997. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the protocols; this can be explained by the objections raised by the United States as well as France. China also had certain reservations in regards to this treaty.18

• Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone was established through the Central Asian Treaty. This treaty was signed on September 8th 2006 and the treaty came into effect on March 21st 2009. In May of 2014, all 5 nuclear weapon states signed the protocols for this treaty.19

16 “A Brief History of Nuclear Weapons States.” Asia Society. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://asiasociety.org/asia101/brief-history-nuclear-weapons-states.

17 “South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/south-pacific-nuclear-free-zone-spnfz-treaty-rarotonga/.

18 “Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/.

19 “Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/central-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-canwz/.

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• The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, was signed on April 11th 1996 and was put into effect on July 15th 2009. All nuclear-weapon states signed the protocols.20

There are currently 4 Nuclear Weapon Free Geographical regions:

• The Antarctic NWFZ was established through the Antarctic treaty on December 1st 1959 and put into force on June 23rd 1961. All declared nuclear weapon states signed this treaty.

• The Outer Space treaty signed in January 1967 and put into force in October 1967 prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in space.21

• The Sea Bed treaty signed on February 11th, 1971 and put into effect on May 18th 1972. This treaty bans placing any nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed floor.22

• There is currently only one country with nuclear-weapon-free status, Mongolia. In 1992 Mongolia declared that they would be recognized as nuclear weapon free and this status is now internationally respected and entered into force as of February 3rd 2000.23

In total there are currently 9 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, however there have been consistent efforts in past years to add more territories as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, such as proposals for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Many nations have been focussing particularly on declaring the arctic as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

20 “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/.

21 “United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.” Outer Space Treaty. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html.

22 “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-prohibition-emplacement-nuclear-weapons-and-other-weapons-mass-destruction-seabed-and-ocean-floor-and-subsoil-thereof-seabed-treaty/.

23 “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-weapon-free-status-mongolia/.

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Current Conditions and relevant International ActionSince discourse began on the banning of nuclear weapons in 1954, there have been 9 approved Nuclear Weapon Free Areas declared. Furthermore 190 parties have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since its conception in 1968.24 However as previously indicated, there are still issues regarding nuclear proliferation in terms of weapons as well as energy. Most recently, at the 2010 review conference 172 of the signing nations participated. In previous treaties the United Nations have shown their support for a continuing dialogue between the United States and Russia on the subject of nuclear proliferation, particularly now as the impacts of climate change are becoming more relevant than ever.25 The United Nations has also welcomed the idea of nations working towards the development of more Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and hopes that all nations will consider relevant Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties.26 In addition the United Nations have shown their support of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the plight of ending Nuclear Proliferation.27

Shown above is a map of all current Nuclear Weapon Free Zones on earth.

24 “UNODA - Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” UN News Center. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.

25 “United Nations Official Document.” UN News Center. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/56/24.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid

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Currently there have been efforts by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to monitor the North West Passage and ensure the safety of their sovereign lands.

Canada has some claim to the North West Passage as they consider part of it to be within their internal waters.28 Members of the NATO council of Canada are currently working towards the implementation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic and states that this will not necessarily inhibit the presence of nuclear-capable submarines.29 Also, the militarization of the arctic by Nuclear weapon states would be detrimental to Canada as they are not able to militarize that region themselves currently. Current inaction by the Canadian government could potentially lead to sovereignty issues as well as those of national security in future. Canada has also recently amended their definition of Arctic waters to increase their economic zone north of the 60th parallel.30

The United States is a recognized Nuclear Weapon State. In recent years the U.S has become more willing to sign the protocols and agree to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, this constitutes change in their policies towards Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.31 In addition in recent years President Obama has emphasized the importance of striving towards a nuclear weapon free world.32 Canada and the United States have also had diverging views on who bears the right to the North West Passage.33 The New START treaty was signed in 2010 and will be in effect for the duration of ten years. Based on the New START treaty with Russia, the U.S has pledged to reduce the number of nuclear weapons deployed. The U.S currently has nuclear capable submarines located in the arctic.

Latin America is already under a treaty, the treaty of Tlatelolco, which created Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Caribbean as well as in Latin America. All nations included have now ratified this treaty, the last of which being Cuba. In previous treaties the signatories of this treaty have been called upon to propagate Nuclear Non-Proliferation and work towards more Nuclear

28 “An Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Northwest Passage (Part 1 of 2).” NATO Council of Canada

29 Ibid.

30 “Consequences of Inaction: Sovereignty Infringement (Part 2 of 2).” NATO Council of Canada. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://natocouncil.ca/consequences-of-inaction-sovereignty-infringement-part-2-of-2/.

31 Kevin P. Clements, and Suzanne Chais. “Nuclear Weapons‐free Zones.” Peace Review 9, no. 2 (1997):165

32 J. Kim, “Another Path to Nuclear Disarmament: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.” Fellowship 76, no. 1-3 (2010).

33 “Transnational Issues.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 1, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xq.html.

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Weapon Free Zones. As many of the nations affected by this treaty are developing nations, they are more likely to support the creation of an Artic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. An arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone affects more of the nuclear-armed states, rather than only developing nations, which has proven to be an issue in past.34

Russia is a recognized nuclear weapon state and it shares it borders the Arctic Ocean. In 2009, two Russian Tupolev 95Ms flew over the arctic, going almost as far as the border between Alaska and the Yukon.35 The New START treaty was signed in 2010 and will be in effect for the duration of ten years. Based on the New START treaty with the U.S, Russia has pledged to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that they deploy. Similarly to the U.S, Russia currently has nuclear capable submarines located in the arctic. More recently, Russian bombers have begun flights over the Arctic and Russia’s naval fleet is majorly placed in the Arctic.36 Russia is one of the nations currently attempting to gain access to Arctic resources as well as markets.37 In the past the arctic has served many military purposes for Russia, as well as a sought after point during the Cold War.38 The Arctic plays a major role in Russia’s relation with other nuclear weapon states, and a loss of control over the Arctic could potentially be a major blow to Russia.

Nordic nations have put forth many proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic. Three of the five Nordic nations are currently members of NATO. As they are all located in the proximity of the Arctic, an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would be beneficial to these nations. Officials from Norway have in past put forth proposals for stricter regulation on Nuclear weapons in the Arctic, though the focus was majorly put upon the Russian Arctic rather than the area surrounding the North West Passage.39 There have also been past proposals for a Nordic Nuclear weapon free zone by the former president of Finland, Kekkonen, amongst many others.40 This zone would not directly affect any of the nuclear weapon states in contrast to a proposal of an Arctic

34 H. Newcombe, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic* A Proposal.” 

35 Wallace, Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons a Task Long Overdue

36 “Canadian Pugwash Call for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone.” January 1, 2007. Accessed November 1, 2014. http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/events/documents/2007/2007.08.24-Arctic_ NWFZ.pdf.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Geir, Hnneland. “Nuclear Safety Discourse in the European Arctic.”  Polar Record 40, no. 1 (2004): 45

40 H. Newcombe, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Arctic* A Proposal.” 

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Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. As Northern nations, any of these five countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Finland could stand to formally propose a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic.

The rest of Europe would not be directly implicated in the ramifications of the treaty. At this point no part of Europe is a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and few nations are nuclear weapon states. The United Kingdom and France would not be directly affected by the implementation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, however as nuclear-armed states they would be affected. In the case of the U.K as a naval power the Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone could potentially affect them. In the case of both nations as well as many others, their support for a proposal would be based on strategic gain, as they are not directly involved.

Africa is entirely situated in a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone created by the Pelindaba Treaty.41 As such, the majority of nations will support attempts to create more Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. Furthermore, as developing nations, they support a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone that will affect more Northern developed nations rather than focusing on nations without any nuclear capabilities.

Oceania and Southern Asia are also Nuclear Weapon Free Zones due to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty42 and Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty43 respectively. As such they are likely to support further attempts to create more Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, especially those that will directly affect nuclear weapon states.

The rest of Asia would not be directly implicated in the ramifications of the treaty. At this point there are two Nuclear Weapon Free areas and one nuclear weapon state. Mongolia is a nuclear weapon free nation44 and Central Asia is a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.45 China would not be directly affected by the implementation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, however as a nuclear-armed state they would be affected. In the case of both nations as well as many others, their support for a proposal would be based on strategic gain, as they are not directly involved. Japan however will take a firm stance to expand the

41 “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative.

42 “South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative

43 “Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative.

44 “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative.

45 “Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) | NTI.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative.

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number of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as they have been attacked by nuclear weapons in past. Recently certain East Asian such as China, The Republic of Korea and Japan, states have expressed interest in involving themselves in Arctic research, as well as potentially gaining access to Arctic resources.46 Experts from these nations are also working towards resolving the issue of Arctic sovereignty with the aid of Canada, Russia and the U.S. In 2013 many experts gathered to attend a conference to discuss East Asia’s budding interest in the Arctic.

RESPONSE FROM NGOS OR NON-STATE ACTORS

The opening of the North West passage in recent years has been majorly caused by climate change. As the polar ice cap has been shrinking, territory it had previously covered is becoming accessible to submarines as well as ships, this area is very useful both economically as well as militarily. Due to the environmental causes, there has been a large response from Non-governmental organization (NGOs), as well as certain International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) to take quick action to preserve the arctic and potentially remove all potential for a nuclear threat in future. Many of the most involved NGOs are environmental organizations.

One such environmental organization, which has been particularly vocal, is the Canadian Pugwash group.47 The issues regarding the opening of the North West Passage are ones that have emerged very recently, as climate change has begun to take its toll on the ice caps. The Pugwash Group have set forth multiple proposals for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the first of which was set forth in 2007. They have also done intensive research into the ramifications it would have both environmentally as well as economically on Canada. They have performed this research with the aid of the Rideau Institute.48 Most recently the group has been making efforts to spread awareness on the issue of the North West Passage. Many environmental organizations have put forth proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic. In addition the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs have had speakers such as the Honourable Matt Robson discuss the potential for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone at great length. Another

46 “East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics.” Accessed November 1, 2014. https://www.cigionline.org/activity/east-asia-arctic-relations-boundary-security-and-international-politics?gclid=CNOH5arp2MICFeY-MgodZ1AAGw.

47 “Canadian Pugwash Call for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone.”

48

Wallace, Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons a Task Long Overdue.

35

NGO involved is the Inter Action Council. The Inter Action Council has also set forth its own proposal for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic, they did so in 2010.49

Certain IGOs have also heavily invested themselves in this issue. One in particular stands out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, many representatives have come forward with their own proposals form an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.50

Analysis and job of the committee:The melting of the polar icecap has brought forth the opening of the Northwest Passage to more ships, whether for transport, cargo or otherwise. The opening of the Northwest Passage has brought forth issues of sovereignty on the part of certain nations. The claim to these waters is contested by many northern nations, and divvying it up may have impacts on its usage as a route for cargo. Another significant issue is the current presence of nuclear capable submarines in the Arctic. No Nuclear Weapon Free Zone currently in existence directly affects on of the nuclear capable nations in the way that an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone potentially could. The responsibility of this committee is to judge whether or not the implementation of this Nuclear Weapon Free zone is appropriate at this time, as well as come to a consensus on its zoning. If the proposal to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic is accepted it is necessary to determine where its southern borders would be. Furthermore it is imperative to ascertain whether or not the Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would cover all of the Arctic rather than simply the Eastern or Western portion.

Issues to be addressed:

• Boundaries of an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

• Issues of sovereignty in America

• Issues of sovereignty In Europe

49

InterAction Council. (2010, January 1). Retrieved December 13, 2014, from http://www.interactioncouncil.org/proposal-arctic-nuclear-weapon-free-zone

50

An Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Northwest Passage

36

• Economic ramifications to the creation of this Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

• Effects on military bases currently stationed in the Arctic

• Current presence of nuclear capable submarines

• Current bomber flights over the Arctic

• Environmental consequences of inaction

• Different claims to the Northwest Passage

Questions to consider:

• There have been past attempts to create a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which would encompass a portion of the arctic. Why have these yet to gain any traction?

• Will it be possible for the Nations bordering the Arctic to agree on the land covered by the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone?

• What will be the ecological and economic impacts of creating an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone?

• Judging by the lack of direct involvement of nuclear-armed states in previous Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, is a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone so closely linked to two nuclear-armed states feasible?

• Is it possible to move forth with the implementation of an Arctic Zone without resolving the issues among those claiming the territory surrounding the North West Passage?

• How can states with past enmity agree on the boundaries for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone?

Conclusion:All in all, the issue of establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic is a controversial one. The resolution of this issue will be contingents on many varying factors, such as the agreement of the nuclear-armed states. However as the polar icecaps continue to melt away it is imperative that a solution be found sooner rather than later. The creation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic would most likely prove to be very influential in the efforts to stop to nuclear proliferation. The process for creating a Nuclear Weapon Free

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Zone has in past taken a long time, however the goal of abolishing the usage of nuclear weapons becomes more realistic with every Nuclear Weapon Free Zone created.

Additional Sources:2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/index.shtml

United Nations Office for Disarmament

http://www.un.org/disarmament/

CIA World Factbook

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

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