discourse on curriculum & instruction

7/31/2019 Discourse on Curriculum & Instruction

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DISCOURSEON CURRICULUM &INSTRUCTION

We speak literally when we say thinking takes place on paper

or in the mouth, but we speak metaphorically when we saythinking takes place in the head. Wittgenstein


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THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT


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Wittgenstein asks: If I ask someone to go and fetch me a red flower

from that meadow how is he to know what sort of flower to bring as I

have only given him a word. (BB, pg. 3).


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Wittgenstein argues that most people will answer by use of

the method of interpretation or the theory of association.

However, he argues that it must not always be this

way..the mental model.

One could perfectly well use a color coordinated chart

instead of imagining a thought.


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However, he notes that this is not always practical and that

for most people the individual just walks over to the meadow

and picks the flower without comparing it to anything.

It appears that in this simple but yet powerful argument

Wittgenstein is deconstructing the idea of our traditional way

of thinking.


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Sure, its possible that the individual could have interpreted

the image of a red flower prior to picking it. However if you

stop and think about it why couldnt the individual just as

easily used the color chart to substitute for this process of

thinking.

Or as Wittgenstein suggest, couldnt the individual just walk

over to the meadow and pick a red flower without comparing

it to anything?


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Even if we could compare the red flower to a red image of aflower how are we to know if the mental image is actually the

exact red in question or for that matter the correct flower specie

configuration?

Our mental copy is not reliable and could not justify a proper

symbolic representation. So then, what else is at work here?

Might we not, just act? Is it necessary that we believe in a long

held belief that a mental act of thinking occurred prior to

selecting the flower? Even if we did just act, could we not

have just substituted the color chart in its place?


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THE RED PATCH ARGUMENT

To make his point, Wittgenstein then offered a more intuitive

argument: To see that the process of obeying the order can

be of this kind, consider the order "imagine a red patch".

You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying

you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern

for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine. (BB, pg.

3).

But we dont and that point is BIG!


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WE JUST ACT

He goes on to point out that the mental process of thinking

can be partly avoided with the act of looking at real objects.

He notes that a person may say that the mental act of

association would be more preferable then to have to carry

with him a color coordinated chart.

However, Wittgenstein argues that the idea of mental

association is really irrelevant and in many cases not even

true


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BUT I KNOWIMRIGHT

P1: Okay, so I dont quite see your argument. Are you saying that I

cant see a red image in my minds eye? I saw the red flower and the

red patch. I would think that I can see the color red.

P2: Explain

P1: Explain? Well, what is there to explain? I see the color red, plain

and simple. I have a mental picture of the color red, I think I know what

it looks like.

P2: Fine, Ill grant you that. However, how do I know that your concept

of red is like my concept of red?


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BUT I KNOWIMRIGHT

P1: The concepts have to be the same. Red is red! You know, like the

famous old saying: A rose, is a rose, is a rose.

P2: How do you suppose then that I would know that what your saying

is correct? How can we even begin to make a comparison?P1: Because I know what red looks like and I see a red image

P2: But you see, thats just not good enough

P1: Why not?

P2: Because, until you admit that your mental conception of this redobject is unreliable and that it is equally justifiable to point to a red

physical object I will not buy your claim


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BUT I KNOWIMRIGHT

P1: This is absurd. Look, bring me a red object or give me a red

marker and Ill show you what I mean by red

P2: Fine, Ill grant you that. However you do understand that by doing

this we are in essence agreeing that it takes a public understanding or

social agreement before we can even express our inner most thoughts.

This mental model you cling to is merely an optical illusion of the mind.

P1: Well then what is the mental for? I have a chair in my minds eye

and no one can tell me any different.


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BUT I KNOWIMRIGHT

P2: Exactly, and therefore it makes no sense to say that you know what

this chair looks like. Because if your going to use the word know then

there must be doubt. How can I doubt the existence of this chair without

any certifiable criteria? Youve essentially bankrupted the meaning of

the word know when used in this context.

P1: Well, I know what I know and just cause you cant doubt it in the

context of science doesnt mean that I cant have knowledge of this

mental thought.


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BUT I KNOWIMRIGHT

P2: Well, if philosophers are in agreement, then your knowledge of this

mental image of the chair should conform to the following three criteria:

that you believe it, that it is true and that it be justified thru observation

and agreement.

Right now, it seems as if though your right about one: belief. However,

you cant prove that its a fact or for that matter true and secondly you

cant justify your belief without a factual truth to observe and confirm its

tenability


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THE PRUSSIANBLUE ARGUMENT

He gives a classic example involving the color: Prussian

Blue. If an individual were ordered to paint a shade of blue

called Prussian Blue he might need to use a table that

would match the name with that particular color.

In this case the act of looking at the actual color would beyour copy or replacement for the mental act itself.


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IS THERE ONLY ONE WAYTO THINK

Wittgenstein Made the following remark: We could perfectlywell, for our purposes, replace every process of imagining by

a process of looking at an object or by pointing, drawing or

modeling; and every process of speaking to oneself by

speaking aloud or by writing. (BB, pg. 4).


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A SIMPLEBUTPOWERFULARGUMENT

This is a very simple but yet powerful argument on

Wittgensteins behalf. It seems as if though in some cases

we interpret a word before we execute an order and in other

cases we just act.

It we were to look at curriculum across the board we could

apply Wittgensteins pedagogical style to multifaceted

aspects of culture and to the learning process in general,

specifically when it comes to the concept of thinking


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The relevant point is whether we truly have a grasp of words

like: understanding, meaning, knowledge, thinking, thought or

for that matter mind.

How often do we rely on our students to possess an

extraordinary semantic memory? In history we require

students to remember specific dates and events?

In mathematics we often assume that students will be able to

recall the right formula and in physics we expect no less from

the conscientious pupil.


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In our English class we expect students to know the

difference between a noun, verb or adjective. In biology we

expect the learner to understand classification schemes as

they relate to the animal kingdom.

In chemistry we expect the student to memorize the periodic

table and the vast stores of data within the table. Why is it

that we attribute so much of our supposed knowledge and

thinking to meta-cognition and mind scaffolding.


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How is thinking occurring when we device new and

innovative ways of delivering curriculum and instruction?

How much of memorization can be attributed to interpreting a

command or directive and if so how is that a thought?

In retrospect, then what can we say that we are doing, if not

thinking? How might we be able to distinguish between this

and when we just act?


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As to interpretation, what is its relevancy to the field ofepistemology and to what degree can we say that its

justifiably correct?

Wittgenstein noted that if it cannot be counted on with utmost

certainty then what criteria could we use to deduce its

reliability and when would it be more suitable to just replace

the mental act of interpretation with a physical object one

could just point to.


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In other words, what do we stand to gain by utilizing thecomplete memorization of facts as opposed to just being able

to openly point to their physical representations.

If this point is open to debate then we should re-evaluate our

methodology that we so tacitly take for granted. Wittgenstein

once pointed out that the mental activity coined thinking

should be open to debate and possibly even be debunked.


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If you were asked to recite a specific poem by Walt Whitman I Sing the Body Electric or to recall the Pythagorean

theorem.could you?

Even if you had memorized the poem or for that matter

memorized the theorem some time back how would you

know the difference between a thought and a memory?

Merriam Webster Definition: MemoryThe power or process of

reproducing or recalling what has been learned and retained, especially through

associative mechanisms.

Merriam Webster Definition: Thought(Think)To form or have in

the mind, to form a mental picture.


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"But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For

example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of

departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a

page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?"No;

for this process has got to produce a memory which isactually correct... Wittgenstein.


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If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested

for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the

first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the

morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)


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So if the idea of a mental construct can be doubted or even

debunked, then what are its epistemological implications?

If, as philosophers imply that knowledge is nothing more than

justified true belief, than there must be an inherent

contradiction when it comes to this schematization.


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So, how fine is the distinction? Say, we were to suddenlyhave an image of the Pythagorean equation in our minds

eye, is that a mental thought or did we remember ( which is

the result of having stored the equation somewhere in our

memory?)

Memory or thought, which would it be attributable too? If

asked to write down the chemical symbol for Potassium (K)

and to note its atomic number.could you? You might find it

more useful to use a periodic chart and to coordinate the

name with the symbol etc


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Now a critic may in turn trivialize the argument by stating theobvious: Understanding occurs when the student is able to

recall and apply what has been taught in the class setting.

How else could we possible access or check for

understanding?

However, is that the only way? If thinking is some nebulous

form of the category of understanding , then how can we ever

pin down that were actually thinking


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The point is we cant, we have to assume. Whats unsettlingis just how much stock weve put into this recurrent view of

seeing the world

Providing a clear distinction between knowledge and thinking

has never been as clear a distinction as far as their inter-

relationship is concerned.

Can you see the connection between thinking and knowledge

or is that just something weve become accustomed tobelieving


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WHEN WE THINK WE OPERATEWITH SIGNS

According to Wittgenstein thinking is essentially the activity ofoperating with signs. By signs Wittgenstein is trying or

should I say intending to say words, sentences or

propositions.

This activity is performed by the hand when writing and by

the mouth when speaking.


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However, Wittgenstein states that when we insinuate that themind is thinking we are in essence saying that the mind is an

agent just as the hand or mouth are agents when writing or

speaking.

However, it appears that we are using the mind as agent in

a different sense when we make this metaphor. The problem

according to Wittgenstein is when we reference to the

locality of thinking.

Its the grammatical use of the mind as agent that obscures

our way of looking at this clearly.


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In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Section 6) Quine assertsthat our beliefs form a web. As such none of our beliefs are

un-revisable.

Some beliefs are so firmly entrenched at the center of the

web that we ordinarily (but incorrectly) consider them to be

un-revisable e.g. what we often (mistakenly) think of as

analytic truths.


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Heres where we run into the problem when using the mindas metaphor to explain a thought. If Quine is correct and

everyone has a web of belief then when you look at the very

center of your own web of belief you will notice that this is

where there are beliefs that are unassailable

Where does the the concept and beliefs associated with the

mind lie in this web of belief?


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Well, it would have to lie at the very center of our web ofbelief. It lies at the heart of our personification, where our

core beliefs lie.

These core beliefs do not depend on observation. It seems

as if no empirical evidence could prove them to be wrong.

These a priori beliefs lie at the core of our beliefs.

Those beliefs that lie on the outer edge of the web come into

contact with ultimate reality and are easily susceptible tochange while those in the middle of the web are more

inferential and require empirical evidence to be changed.


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Those at the center of our web of belief seem to becompletely protected by any observational empirical

evidence. They are untenable and not subject to change.

Examples of core beliefs:

Thoughts occur in our minds

Concept of objective time

Concept of objective space

The fact that 1 + 1 = 2


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NOTES

What are we discussing here? Philosophical psychology?

Many often attribute to Wittgenstein the idiom that thinking is

linguistic. or What we cannot speak we cannot think.

Author Phil Hutchinson believes that this is not necessarily the case.

So, did W actually propose any real views on thinking.

We often attribute thinking and understanding to be the same thing.

However they are grammatically different.


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NOTES

Much confusion arises out of the fact that we are unconsciously

unaware of this

We have this craving for generality.

We want to so badly theorize an inner mental process model.

However, not all substantives must correspond to things

The key is to go from the unconscious to the conscious

We are in the grip of a particular picture, deep in our unconscious.

This leads to us craving for generality or general theorizing.

It skews are view in regards to the inner mental process.


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NOTES

Wittgenstein wants to apply a therapeutic approach towards our

bewitchment..

Wittgenstein wants to treat this mental malady that keeps us in a vice

like grip.

The is that we assume

This craving for generality causes us to overlook what is essential.

Substantives must not always correspond to things.

There is only family resemblance.

When it comes to the mind or thinking we typically offer up three

theories.


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NOTES

We typically offer the following three models of the mind: 1.

Materialist theories, 2. Ethereal theories, 3. Quasi-hypothetical

theories.

Therefore, when we cant show how the mind or for that matter

thinking occurs we posit that these substantives MUST correspond

to: processes, states, things, quasi-hypothetical things.

We often assume that thinking and understanding correspond to

some type of process


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NOTES

We always point to some process and make mere assumptions.

Wittgenstein was no behaviorist

Wittgenstein believed that cognitivist and behaviorist were equally

confused concerning the matter of mental processes.

We unconsciously assume that mental processes are akin to

processes that we are consciously aware of.

We mistakenly employ or redefine the word process in an

unconscious manner

Wittgenstein believed that cognitivist and behaviorist must be held

accountable for their interpretation of the termprocess

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