discussion paper 2020-04 aescon
TRANSCRIPT
TheEurasianLandbridge:ImplicationsoflinkingEastAsiaand
Europebyrail
Richard Pomfret
Professor of Economics and Jean Monnet Chair on the Economics of European Integration,
The University of Adelaide
DiscussionPaper2020-04
JeanMonnetCentreofExcellenceinInternationalTradeandGlobalAffairs
DiscussionPapers
1
TheEurasianLandbridge: ImplicationsoflinkingEastAsiaand
Europebyrail
RichardPomfret,Professor of Economics and
Jean Monnet Chair on the Economics of European Integration, The University of Adelaide
Email: [email protected]
PapertobepresentedattheAsia-EuropeSustainableConnectivityScientificConference(AESCON) in Singapore, scheduled for 25-27 February 2020, postponed to 22-25September2020.
2
THEEURASIANLANDBRIDGE:IMPLICATIONSOFLINKINGEASTASIAANDEUROPEBYRAIL
1. Introduction
OverlandtransportlinksbetweentheEuropeanUnion(EU)andChinawerealmostnon-
existent before 2011. Railway lines existed, notably the century-old TransSiberian
Railway,butoverlandfreighttrafficfromEastAsiatoWesternEuropewasminuscule.
ThepaperdocumentsthedevelopmentofoverlandrailtransportlinksbetweentheEU
andEastAsiaandanalyzestheconsequencesoftheincreasedconnectivity.
The central argument is that the catalyst for rail servicesbetweenEuropeand
China was demands from automobile and electronics companies coordinating their
Eurasianvaluechains,forwhichairfreightwastooexpensiveandseafreighttoolong
with imprecisearrivaldates. Privatesectoragentsrespondedbyofferingavarietyof
additionalserviceswhichmaderailfreightattractivetomorecustomers.Thesuccessof
therailLandbridgealsodependsuponcollaborationofgovernmentsandnationalrail
companies to facilitate transit by improving the soft infrastructure (e.g. minimizing
borderdelaysandbureaucraticrequirements).
The process was largely market-driven. However, after the announcement of
China’sSilkRoadEconomicBeltinSeptember2013anditsincorporationintotheBelt
andRoadInitiative(BRI)launchedinMay2017,theLandbridgebecameconsistentwith
the centrepiece of China’s foreign economic policy. Policy statements of the EU
Commission such as the 2016 Global Strategy and the 2018 Joint Communication on
ConnectingEuropeandAsiaalsostartedtogivegreaterprominencetoconnectivityto
China.
Althoughrailfreightwillnevermatchthequantityofseafreightorthespeedof
air freight, it has greater implications for sustainable connectivity. Thenatureof rail
operations, compared to stacking a ship with twenty thousand containers, involves
greaterneedforcoordination,especiallywhenshipmentsarelinksininternationalvalue
chainswhosesuccessrelineson just-in-timedeliveryofcomponentsateverystageof
production,andmoreintimateconnectivity.Electrictrainsalongwell-maintainedtrack
arealsoamoreenvironmentallyfriendlymodeofinternationaltransportthanshipsor
planes.
3
2. Development2011-191
Between1500and2010tradebetweenEastAsiaandEuropewasdominatedbymaritime
transport. Physical rail links existed but they were uncompetitive with sea freight,
especiallyafterthecontainerrevolution,whenEU-Asiatradegrewrapidly.Thesituation
startedtochangein2011whenrailserviceswereestablishedbetweenwesternChina
andEurope(startingwithChengdu-ŁódźandChongqing-Duisburg).Sincethen,services
haveimproveddramaticallywithregularservicesconnectingalargenumberofChina-
EUcitypairsand theannualnumberofcontainers travellingbyrail roughlydoubling
eachyear.2
Theprocesshasbeenessentiallymarket-driven(Pomfret,2019b).Animportant
initialdriverofEU-Chinarailserviceswastheeffortsbycarandelectronicscompanies
to link their European and Asian value chains into Eurasian value chains (Pomfret,
2019a). As rail services became more frequent and regular, freight forwarders
respondedbyprovidingnewservices(e.g.partcontainerloads,refrigeratedcontainers,
multimodal connections)with a greater variety of destinations.3 This broadened the
rangeofpotentialcustomerswhowerewillingtopaymorethansea freight for faster
more reliable transport but unwilling to pay for air freight. The advantage of rail
increasedinthe2010s;airfreightpriceshaverisen,andmaritimeshippingtimeshave
lengthened, due to slow-steaming to save fuel and reducepollution,while rail freight
becamefasterandcheaper(Figure1).
Figure1:TimeandCostofShippinga40-footContainerfromChinatoEuropebyAir,
RailandSea,2006and2017.
1 This paper develops and updates arguments contained in online papers at:https://voxeu.org/article/eurasian-landbridge-linking-regional-value-chains andhttps://voxeu.org/article/eurasian-landbridge-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative. For morein-depthanalysis,seePomfret(2020,chapter3).2 Typically cited numbers for journeys along the Landbridge (e.g. athttps://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/china-europe-rail-freight-transport-market)are17(in2011),42(2012),80(2013),308(2014),815(2015),1,702(2016),3,673(2017)and6,363(2018).Numbersarenotnecessarilybalancedinbothdirections;in2018,ofthe1,442trainsonthemostfrequentroute,betweenDuisburgandChongqing,728werefromtheEUand714fromChina.3EasternEuropeancountries(especiallytheCzechRepublic,Hungary,PolandandSlovakia)havebeenactiveGVCparticipantsandalsoincreasinglyimportantconnectingcitiestoChina(PomfretandSourdin,2018).ŁódźquicklyestablisheditselfastheEasternEuropeanhubforEU-Chinarailfreight(Jakobowskietal.,2018).Klaipéda(Lithuania)becameahubforsouthernSweden.
4
Source:Hillman(2018),reproducedfromZhang(2017).Note:basedondatainLandTransportOptionsbetweenEuropeandAsia:CommercialFeasibilityStudy,U.S.ChamberofCommerce,WashingtonDC,2006.andinZhang(2017–reportedinSchrammandZhang,2018).
Jakobowskietal.(2018)haveestimatedshipmentcostsalongdifferentrailroutes
fromChinatoEurope.Allsuchnumbersareapproximations,butTable1clearlyindicates
theprohibitivecostofairtransportforallbutveryhighvalue-weightortimesensitive
items.Railismoreexpensivethansea,butthepricegapnarrowsifplacesarefurther
from seaports (e.g. Chengdu-Warsaw).4 Thirdly, rail is faster than sea, with more
predictablearrivaltime.
Table1.ComparisonofShippingCost,inUSDpercontainer,andTime,indays,forGoodstransportedbetweenChinaandEurope.
Shanghai-Gdynia Chengdu-Warsaw Shanghai-Rotterdam Cost Time Cost Time Cost TimeAir 37,000 5-9 37,000 5-9 37,000 5-9Rail 4,500 19 5,000 15 5,000 18Sea 2,600 37-42 4,500 43-50 2,200 27-37
Source:Jakobowskietal.,2018,69.
The number of city pairs providing freight services has increased rapidly,
especially since 2015. Already in May 2017, China Railway Express trains were
4Pepe(2020,13-16)emphasizestheshiftinmanufacturingactivityawayfromChina’seasterncoastaswagesandlandcostsincreasedandtheintegrationofEasternEuropeancountriesintoEuropean value chains as they prepared to join the EU in the early 2000s as importantbackgrounddevelopmentsbehindcreationoftherailLandbridge.
5
connecting37citiesinChinatodestinationsinelevenEUcountries.ByDecember2017
thecumulativenumberoftripsalongtheLandbridgehadreached6,235,andoverhalfof
thosewerein2017.5Asmorecitiesofferservices,somesuccessfullyandothersnot,itis
hard tokeep trackofnumbersbut inbothEuropeandChinaover fiftycitiesarenow
Landbridge termini. Themost reliable volumedata are those from theEurasianRail
Alliance(Table2),whichreportsgrowthintrafficalongtheChina-Kazakhstan-Belarus
route from 46,000 containers in 2015 to 280,500 in 2018; extrapolating the rough
doublingeachyear,theypredicted(beforeCOVID-19)thatamillioncontainerswouldbe
transportedin2020.6
Table2:VolumeofTrafficonChina-EU-ChinaContainerTrains,2015-18
YearNumberoftwenty-foot
equivalentcontainers(TEUs)
2015 46,000
2016 104,500
2017 175,800.
2018 280,500
Source:UTLCwebsiteatwww.utlc.com.Note:TheEurasianRailAlliance(UTLC)wasfoundedbyBelarus,KazakhstanandRussia
in2014toprovideservices forcontainerblocktrainsrunningbetweenChinaandEurope.
InEurope,indicatorsoftheincreasedsalienceoftherailLandbridgeincludethe
holding of an annual Silk Road Summit attended by hundreds of logistics service
providers(the3rdinNovember2019wasinVenlo,Netherlands)andtheEUCommission
engaginginhowtorelatetheEU-Chinaservice,andtheBRIBelt,totheTrans-European
TransportNetwork(TEN-T)asatoppriorityin2020(Walton,2019).TheCommission’s
interestcanbetracedbacktothe2007-12RETRACKprojectwhichaimedto inducea
modalshiftoffreighttraffictorail;RETRACK’sfocuswasondevelopingahigh-quality
commercially sustainable rail freight corridor from the North Sea to the Black Sea
5ChinaRailwayreportedover6,000tripsin2018and5,266inthefirsteightmonthsof2019(http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1164438.shtml).6Thesenumbers remainsmall compared tomaritime freight. A single shipcancarry20,000TEUs.Nomorethan5%ofthevalueofallfreightbetweenEuropeandAsiagoesbyrail(EuropeanCommission,2018,3). However,goodsforwhichrailispreferredtendtobehighervalueandmoretech-intensivethanthebulkgoodstransportedbysea.
6
(Rotterdam-Constanza),butitalsoconsideredprospectsforestablishing“Eurasianland-
bridges”toChina.7ConnectivityviaRussiatoChinahasalwayshadastrategicdimension
and EU Commission policy is within the framework of the European Union Global
Strategy(2016).8
ForChina,therailLandbridgehasbeenrelatedtoPresidentXi’sflagshipforeign
policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that was announced in 2013 and officially
launchedin2017.However,thefirsttrainsprecededtheBRI,andmuchoftheactivity
has been driven by local governments in China rather than at the national level. To
encourage freight trains from their city, local authorities have offered substantial
subsidiesthataredifficulttodocumentwithanyprecision.Thecentralgovernmenthas
imposedacapof30%onsubsidiesin2020(Chu,2019)andthesubsidiesareeventually
to be discontinued (Jakobowski et al. 2018, 25; Pepe, 2020, 20). Given the non-
transparency, it is impossible to estimate the impact of terminating subsidies, but a
consensusamongusersisthatmostoftheserviceswillcontinuetobeprofitablewithout
subsidies.
3. Prospects
ImprovedconnectivitywillintensifytheeconomiclinksbetweenEUmembersandChina.
Although routes along the Landbridge are currently point-to-point, the prospects for
economicdevelopmentincountriesalongtheroute(e.g.CentralAsia)aregood,andthis
wouldstrengthenthosecountries’economiclinkstotheEU.Therearealsoprospectsfor
physicalreintegrationofageographicallyregionalizedEurasiancontinent,asIranand
SoutheastAsiaarebroughtintotherailnetwork.9Suchdevelopmentsareoftensituated
within China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a political challenge, but it is important to
recognizethesolideconomicfoundations,asrailoffersacompetitiveserviceintermsof
7TheconclusionsoftheRETRACKfinalreport(vanRooijenetal.,2012),thattheTransSiberianwasthemost immediatelyrelevantrouteandroutesviaKazakhstanhadthebest longer-termpotential,whiletheTRACECAcorridorwastheleastlikelytoflourish,haveprovencorrect.8TheTEN-T,includingguidelinesforthedevelopmentofaTrans-EuropeanRailNetwork,datesfromJuly1996(DecisionNo1692/96/EC).However,extensiontoeasternEuropewasslowand,despitestatementsofintenttolookeastin2011,onlyin2017wereEasternPartnershipstatesincluded. The Joint Communication on Connecting Europe and Asia (European Commission,2018)recognizesthesignificanceoflookingeastandincludesspecificproposals.9ProspectsforoverlandconnectionswithSouthAsiaarelimitedbygeographyandbypoliticaldisagreements.PakistanisbeinglinkedtoChinaviatheChina-PakistanEconomicCorridorbutthe geographical challenges of crossing the Himalayas are substantial. Poor India-PakistanrelationsandthesecuritysituationinAfghanistaninhibitEast-WestlinksthroughSouthAsia.
7
reliabilitythatisfasterthanseaandcheaperthanair.CurrentlyabouthalfofChina-EU
railtrafficusestheTransSiberianrailwaydirectlyfromNortheastChinaorviaMongolia,
andhalfpassesthroughKazakhstantoRussia,BelarusandPoland.Thedevelopmentof
alternativerailroutesispotentiallyimportantformaritimecountriessuchasAustralia
because Indian Ocean ports (Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Gwadar) andmany Southeast
AsianportsarelinkedtotheEurasianrailnetwork.
Central Asian links are primarily through Kazakhstan to Russia and Europe
(Pomfret,2019c,266-71).KazakhstanisalsothebridgeviaTurkmenistantoIranandfor
transittoUzbekistan,e.g. theKorea-Lianyungang-Tashkentservicethatgoesontothe
GMfactory(ex-Daewoo)inAndijan.KazakhstanwasanearlyBRIpartner,linkingitsown
NurlyZhol infrastructureprogramtotheBRI. TheNurlyZholprogrammefor2015-19
wasannouncedin2014;3,000kilometresofnationalroadswerebuiltandreconstructed,
15,000 kilometres of regional and district roads repaired, 1,400 kilometres of new
railwayscommissioned,sixairportrunwaysmodernised,thecapacityofKazakh-Chinese
border terminals increased to40million tonnesperyearand thecapacityof theport
infrastructureontheCaspianSeaincreasedfrom17.5millionto27milliontonnesper
year(Yergaliyeva,2019).10
A middle route crossing the Caspian Sea to Baku and then by rail through
AzerbaijanandGeorgiatotheBlackSeaandshiptoEuropehasbeensupportedbythe
EU since the early 1990s under the TRACECA program. Its attractiveness has been
improvedbyupgradingofportfacilitiesatAktauandTurkmenbashiandthenewAlyat
portinAzerbaijan,andbytheBaku-Tiflis-Kars(BTK)railway,whichhasbeenoperational
since November 2017 and offers an overland link to Turkey. The middle route has
attractedlittleChina-EUfreightduetotheinconvenienceoftransferringcontainersfrom
traintoshipandbacktotrain.However,thefirstChina-Turkeytrainfollowedthisroute
inNovember2019fromXian,usingtheBTKandcrossingundertheBosporustoIstanbul
(Pepe,202029).11
TheraillinkbetweenKazakhstanandTurkmenistan,formallyopenedbythetwo
presidentsin2013,offeredanewconnectiontoIran.AfterUNsanctionsonIranwere
easedinJanuary2016,thefirsttrainfromChinareachedTehraninFebruaryandChina
subsequently established regular services fromNingxiaAutonomous region (home to
10TheNurlyZholprogrammehasbeenextendedto2020-25.Seealso,Belgibayev&Zhang(2016).11TheDailySabah,27October2019,reportedthattheChina-Turkeyservicewouldrunwith42containers once a week; https://www.dailysabah.com/business/2019/10/27/two-years-on-baku-tbilisi-kars-railway-line-carries-275000-tons-of-freight.
8
Muslimminorities)andYiwutoIran.12Thecircuitousroutefortheseservicesthrough
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan reflected the decision to avoid the more direct route
throughUzbekistanwhichimposedmoreburdensomerequirementsontransittraffic.
Since Mirziyoyev was elected president in December 2016, Uzbekistan has
becomekeentorepairthefracturedrelationswithneighbouringcountriesandadopted
moreopeneconomicpolicies.Apartfromincreasingitstransitroleonthemoredirect
China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran route, Uzbekistan supports China’s
proposal to construct a rail link from Kashi in China via the Kyrgyz Republic to
Uzbekistan.ThelinkwouldshortentheroutefromChinatoIranandtheMiddleEastand
reduceChina’sdependenceontransitingKazakhstan.However,theKyrgyzgovernment
is concerned that themostdirectKashi-Andijanroute,whichpasses throughsparsely
populatedterritory,willbringlittlebenefittothecountryanditsconstructionmaylead
todebtdependenceiffundedbyChineseloans(Hurleyetal,2018).
TheSoutheastAsiancountrieshaveenvisagedthatthe2015ASEANMasterPlan
forConnectivitywillbeconsistentwiththeBRIandbenefitfromfinancingfromtheAsian
InfrastructureInvestmentBank.13Mostobviously,theSingapore-Bangkok-Kunmingrail
link would connect the Chinese rail network to major ocean ports. Construction of
railwaysfromChinatoportsinMyanmarwillsimilarlystrengthentheseinfrastructure
links. In all cases, however, progress has been slow as resistance to Chinese-funded
infrastructure investmenthasbeenencountered in transitcountries(e.g.Malaysia)as
wellasinleast-developedASEANcountries(MyanmarandLaos).
InNortheast Asia, Korea and Japan have connectivity programs (Korea’s 2013
EurasiaInitiativeand2015EurasiaExpressrailproject)orpartnerships(theEU-Japan
Connectivity Partnership announced in September 2019) that potentially involve
improvedtransportlinkstotheEU,althoughtheyarelightondetailsandit isunclear
whether theyare intended tobecomplementaryorcompetitive to theBRI.14 Korea’s
directraillinktoEuropepassesoverarailbridgeinthesliverofKoreanterritoryatthe
12Sofar,notrainsfromChinahavegonebeyondTehran.AlthoughthetrackexiststoIstanbulandtheBosporustunneleliminatesneedforinter-modaltransfers,manypartsoftheIran-Turkeyrailjourneyareslow.13 At the22ndASEAN-ChinaSummitinBangkokon3November2019,theheadsofgovernmentofthetenASEANcountriesandChinareaffirmedtheircommitmenttosynergisetheMasterPlanonASEANConnectivity(MPAC2025)andtheBeltandRoadInitiative.14 Schultze (2019) argues that the September 2019 EU-Japan Partnership on SustainableConnectivityandQuality Infrastructure representsa strategic reaction to theBRI rather thancontaininganyconcretemeasurestoimproveconnectivity.
9
mouthoftheTumenRiverandthenjoinsRussia’sTransSiberianrailway.Thereisalsoa
sea-railconnectionviaLianyungang
FurtherexpansionoftheLandbridgetrafficistiedtoongoingwillingnessofthe
EU,Chinaandtransitcountriestocontinuetofacilitatetheinternationalrailservice.The
current mainlines through Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus work well for Łódź or
Duisburg,butforSlovakia,orHungaryfasterroutesviaUkraineareconstrainedbythe
stateofRussia-Ukrainerelations.15DevelopmentofasouthernrouteviaIranandTurkey
couldbeevenbetter forSouth-easternEurope. Alternative routesalso improverail’s
attractivenessbyreducingthepotentialfordisruptionbyatransitcountry;anyroutecan
bedisruptedbyasinglenon-cooperatingtransitcountrywhetherseekinghighertransit
feesorinpoliticaldispute,althoughtransitcountrieshavestrongfinancialincentivesnot
to be disruptive in order to earn the transit fees.16 Competition can also encourage
countriestoeasebottlenecks;thechange-of-gaugetransferpointattheBelarus-Poland
borderisthemajorsourceofdelayfortrainsonthemainLandbridgeroutes,largelydue
tomanagerial rather than infrastructureproblems (van Leijen, 2018; Lobyrev, et al.,
2018), but under current conditions there is no practical alternative to this border
crossingpointandhencelittlepressureonPolishorBelarusauthoritiestoimprovetheir
services.
Looking further ahead the prospect of a high-speed China-EU rail link is not
implausiblegiventhespeedwithwhichChina’sdomestichigh-speedraillinkhasbeen
developedandthegenerallyfavourableterrainthroughwhichLandbridgeroutespass.17
15Inthepresentcontext,theCzechRepublic,Hungary,PolandandSlovakiaareespeciallyrelevantbecause they are the post-2004 EU members that have become most integrated into GVCs(Pomfret and Sourdin, 2018). However, improved connectivity offers a pathway for otherEuropeancountriestobecomeGVCparticipants if theyadoptappropriatepoliciesto facilitatetradeand improvecompetitiveness. SomeWesternEuropeancountrieshavebeenconcernedaboutgrowingChineseinfluenceinEasternEurope,e.g.underthe17+1(now18+1)initiative,inpartduetofearsoflostexportstoEasternEuropeduetoChinesecompetition.Stanojevicetal.(2020) find that Chinese exports to Eastern Europe in 2006-17 were complementary to EUmembers’ exports of machinery and electronics (i.e. sectors characterized by GVCs) butcompetitiveinfinishedgoodssuchastextilesorfurniture.16AccordingtoanAsianDevelopmentBanksource,KazakhstanearnedoveronebillionUSdollarsintransitfeesin2015(Pomfret,2019c,267). 17China’sfirsthighspeedrail(HSR)serviceondedicatedtrackopenedin2008betweenBeijingandTianjin,intimefortheOlympicGames.SpendingonHSRwasamajorcomponentofthe2008-9fiscalstimulus($88billionin2009).Bytheendof2019theHSRnetworkcovered35,000kms.HSRistypicallydefinedaspassengertrainsrunningbetween250and350kphandfreighttrainsatspeedsover200kph.In2019,Chinabegantestingmaglevtrainsthatcanrunatspeedsof600kph;theonlycurrentmaglevservice,fromShanghaicitycentretoPudongairport,reachesspeedsover400kphandcoversthe30.5kmjourneyinjustoversevenminutes.AlthoughreportingandanalysisofChineseHSRfocusesonpassengertraffic(e.g.Lawrenceetal.,2019),manylinesalong
10
Sucha linkwould further improvethe timeadvantagethatrailoffersoversea freight
fromChinatoEurope.
4. Implications
EconomicprospectsforcontinueddevelopmentoftheEurasianLandbridgearepositive.
Therailoption isattractive to traderswithhigh-valuegoods forwhich thesavings in
time-in-transitovermaritimetransportandmoreassureddeliverytimesjustifypayinga
higherprice.Ifthepricegapcanbefurtherreducedbyefficiencygainsandbyscaling-up
andtraveltimescanbefurtherreduced,thentherelativeattractivenessofrailfreightwill
increase. Improved connectivity will strengthen economic links between Europe and
China(andpotentiallyintermediatecountriestoo).
Thisprocessislikelytobelinkedtothephenomenonoflengtheningsupplychains.
Marketintegrationhasbeenadrivingforceoflong-termeconomicdevelopmentaslocal
marketsandproductionprocessesbecameregionalandthennationalandinternational.
Thecreationofinternationalvaluechainsreliesonlowcostsofinternationaltradeand
reliabledeliverytimestoreducetheneedforinventoriesateachproductionstage.The
phenomenon of global value chains (GVCs) has been a feature of the international
economysincethemid-1980s(Baldwin,2016;Johnson&Noguera,2017;UNIDO,2018),
initially identified with electronics, automobile and clothing production but now
characterizingmanygoodsandservices.
TheinitialdriversoftheLandbridgewereGVClead-firms.Europeancarmakers
sentcomponentstotheirassemblyplantinChina,whilecompanieslikeApple,HPand
AcershippedelectronicgoodsfromfactoriesinChinatotheirmarketinganddistribution
centresinEurope.Thesewereitemsthatweretooheavytoairfreightbuttoovaluable
tohaveintransitonashipforoveramonth;railprovidedamixofspeedandreliability
thatthecarmakersandelectronicsfirmswerewillingtopayapremiumovermaritime
freightrates
TheGVCphenomenonobservedsincethe1980shasrarelyincludedtrulyglobal
valuechainsbutratherinvolvedthreemainregionalvaluechainscentredonEastAsia,
the“fourverticalandfourhorizontal”corridors(extendedto“eightverticalandeighthorizontal”corridorsinthe2016plan)aremixedusepassenger/freightlines.
11
EuropeandNorthAmerica.18TheLandbridgehasbeeninstrumentalinthecreationof
EurasianvaluechainswithEUcarmakerssendingcomponentstotheirChineseassembly
plantandelectronicsfirmssendingassembledproductstotheirEUmarketingcentres.
ThismattersbecauseGVCtrade linkseconomiesmoretightlythanarms-lengthtrade
betweenindependentexportersandimporters
5. Conclusions
TheEurasianlandbridgehascontributedtoincreasedsustainableconnectivitybetween
the EU and China during the decade of the 2010s. Felicitously, this market-driven
development preceded, and also complemented, major foreign economic policy
announcementsbytheChinesePresident(theSilkRoadEconomicBeltandBRI)andby
the European Commission (Connecting Europe and Asia) and reinforces their goal of
increased connectivity. The resulting connectivity is likely to survive any bilateral
politicaldebaclesbecausetheeconomicfoundationisstrong.
18Inthetwenty-firstcentury,GVCscanbeobservedtoagreaterorlesserdegreeinalmostallsectorsandanygeneralizationaboutGVCshasexceptions.SomeGVCs(e.g.theBoeing787)arealreadyglobal.
12
References
Baldwin,R.(2016).TheGreatConvergence(HarvardUniversityPress,CambridgeMA).
Belgibayev,M., & Zhang X (2016).The OBOR and the ‘Nurly Zhol Path to the Future’:Complementarityandchallenges.WuhanUniversityCenterforEconomicDiplomacy.
Chu, D. (2019). China-EU railway link to be strengthened via communication.GlobalTimes,9June2019.
EuropeanCommission(2018).ConnectingEuropeandAsia–BuildingBlocks foranEUStrategy.JointCommunicationtotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,theEuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the EuropeanInvestmentBankJOIN(2018)31final,HighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy,Brussels.
European Union Global Strategy (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A StrongerEurope – a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy -available online athttp://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
Hillman, J. (2018). TheRise of China-Europe Railways, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, Washington DC– available athttps://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways.
Hurley,J.,Morris,S.,&Portelance,G.(2018).ExaminingthedebtimplicationsoftheBeltandRoad Initiative fromapolicyperspective.CGDPolicyPaperNo.121. Center forGlobalDevelopment,WashingtonDC.
Jakobowski,J.,Popławski,K.,&Kaczmarski,M.(2018).TheSilkRailroad:TheEU-ChinaRailConnections:Background,actors,interests.OSWStudiesNo.72.OsrodekStudiowWschodnich(CentreforEasternStudies),Warsaw.
Johnson,R.&NogueraG.(2017).APortraitofTradeinValue-addedoverFourDecades,ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics99(5),896–911.
Lawrence,M.,Bullock,R.,&Liu,Z(2019).China’sHigh-SpeedRailDevelopment(WorldBank,Washington,DC).doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1425-9.
Lobyrev,V.,Tikhomirov,A.,Tsukarev,T.,&Vinokurov,E.(2018).BeltandRoadTransportCorridors: Barriers and investments. Centre for Integration Studies Report No.50,EurasianDevelopmentBank,SaintPetersburg.
Pepe,J.M.(2020):ValueChainsTransformationandTransportReconnectioninEurasia:Geo-economic and geopolitical implications, Dialogue of Civilizations ResearchInstitute,Berlin,Germany.
Pomfret,R.(2019a).TheEurasianLandBridge:LinkingRegionalValueChainsalongtheNewSilkRoad.CambridgeJournalofRegions,EconomyandSociety12(1),45-56.
13
Pomfret, R. (2019b). The Eurasian Landbridge and China’s Belt and Road Initiative:Demand,SupplyofServices,andPublicPolicy.TheWorldEconomy42(6),1642-93.
Pomfret,R. (2019c).TheCentralAsianEconomies in theTwenty-firstCentury:PavingaNewSilkRoad(PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonNJ,2019).
Pomfret,R. (2020).China’sBeltandRoad Initiative, theEurasianLandbridge,andNewMega-regionalism(WorldScientificPublishingCompany,Singapore).
Pomfret, R., & Sourdin, P. (2018). Value Chains in Europe and Asia:Which CountriesParticipate?InternationalEconomics153,34-41.
Schramm,H-J,&Zhang,S.(2018):EurasianRailFreightintheOneBeltOneRoadEra,inJan Stentoft (ed.),30th Annual NOFOMA Conference: Relevant Logistics and SupplyChainManagementResearch(SyddanskUniversitet. Institut forEntreprenørskabogRelationsledelse:Kolding),769-98.
Schultze,K.(2019).EU-JapanConnectivityAspirations,EastAsiaForum,20December-available at https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/20/eu-japan-connectivity-aspirations/
Stanojevic,S.,QiuBinandChenJian(2020).Sino-EU15ExportCompetitioninCentralandEastern Europe: Is China Crowding Out Exports from the EU15?Eastern EuropeanEconomics58(3),264-82.
UNIDO (2018). Global Value Chains and Industrial Development: Lessons from China,South-East and South Asia (United Nations Industrial Development Organization,Vienna).
VanLeijenM.(2018).Małaszewicze-BrestBorderCrossingMainBottleneckonNewSilkRoad. RailFreight.com, 29 March – available athttps://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2018/03/29/malzewicze-brest-border-crossing-main-bottleneck-on-new-silk-road/
vanRooijen,T.,vandeLande,P.,Zhang,M.,Mortimer,P.,Jackson,R.,Islam,D.,Vleugel,J.& Eidhammer, O. (2012). The RETRACK Project – Reorganization of TransportNetworksbyAdvancedRailFreightConcepts.FinalReport(TNO,Delft,Netherlands).
Walton, S. (2019). TEN-T and New Silk Road Integration – Top priority in 2020.RailFreight.com, 27 December – available athttps://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2019/12/27/ten-t-and-new-silk-road-integration-top-priority-in-2020/
Yergaliyeva,A. (2019).KazakhgovernmentestimatesNurlyZholprogrammewillcost$16.91billionovernextfiveyears.TheAstanaTimes,24October2019.
Zhang,X.(2017).EurasianRailFreightintheOneBeltOneRoadEra,MScthesis,CranfieldUniversity.
14
Map:ChinaRailwayExpressRouteMap,May2017
Note:thegreenlinesaretheTransSiberianRailwayroutes.AndthesolidredlinewestofChinaisthemainrouteviaKazakhstan.Inmostcasesthetrackfortheproposedroutesalreadyexists.TheonlyexceptionisthelineacrosstheKyrgyzRepublic.TheBTKrailwayconnectingGeorgiatoTurkeyisnotshownonthis2017map.