dissemination of combat information 18 may 1953

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 18 May 1953

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,. /J. . ".UNCLASSIFIEDOFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES,

For t Monroe, VirginiaATTNG-26 350. 05/6(nOCI)(C)(18 May 53) 18 May 1953SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat I n f o - " , " ~ i ' I " " ' : " L ~ I B ~ R " ' : ' " A ' : " : ' R ~ Y : - - - - '

ARMY WAR COLLEGE 1PERIODICALS S E C T I O I ~ .Mt\y 25 1953TO: See distribution

COpy ... ..!. .... "1. In accordance with SR 525 -85 -5 , Processing of Combat Infor

mat ion, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluat ion and necessary action. It may be appropriate , in certain cases , to take actionupon a single extracted item; in others , i t may be desirable to developa cross -sect ion of accumulated extracts on a part icular subject beforeinitiating action; and often, the extracted i tem serves to reaffirm ourdoctrines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other mili tary agencies to keep theminformed concerning theater problems from the front l ine through thelogist ical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are class i fied SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user , this Office a ssigns each ext,racted i tem the lowest classification compatible with securi ty. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks , SO that none of th e original intent is lost .

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to t rain ing at th e company-battery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

~ V ' S S I F I E D BY AUTH RITYOF . ,fI.' i/./J *~ ~ : : - - ~ ~ ~ ~ . . . . - - - ON , O " c ; ~ " / /1 ~ /f(/I A. B. CHA THAM -.JExtracts f rom sources Lt Col, AGC U 5;30 thru 750 Asst Adjutant General (Y )


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DISTRIBUTION: 3 ACOFS, G-l , DA 10 Chief Signal Officer3 ACOFS, G-2, DA 10 The Surgeon General15 ACOFS, G - 3, DA 4 Chief of Transportation20 ACOFS, G-4, DA OCAFF2 The Adjutant Gene ra l 1 Gl2 Chief of Chaplains 1 G210 Chief Chemical Officer 20 G310 Chief of Engineers 2 G42 Chief of Finance 5 DT2 Chief of Information 1 Chaplain2 The Inspector Genera l 1 Cml2 The Judge Advocate 1 ComptGeneral 1 Engr2 Chief of Military History 1 Info2 Chief, National Gua rd 1 MedBureau 1 Ord10 Chief of Ordnance 1 PM2 The Provos t Marshal 1 QMGeneral 1 Sig10 The Quar termaster General 1 Trans2 Executive for Reserve and

ROTC Affair sCopies furnished:

13 4 TAG (40 CG, US Army Forces , Far Eas t (Main); 44 CINC, USArmy, Europe; 10 ea CG's, other Major Oversea Commands)CG's2 Firs t Army2 Second Army2 Third Army

10 Fourth Army2 Fifth Army2 Sixth Army4 Army AA Command2 Military District of Washington2 Tactical Air Command2 The Armored Center2 The Artil lery Center2 The Infantry Center1 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff1 Chief of Staff, Dept of the Army

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SOURCE: Command Report - I Corps ArtySource No 730ATE: December 1952'

(RESTRICTED)VT FUZE USED INIq'H 1 55-MM i\MMUNITION (DEEP CAVITY

SHELL). - The 204th FA Bn (155-mm gun Sp)1'est fired the variabletime fuze during th e month. Subsequent to the test , this fuze has beenused on appropriate personnel targets with premature burs ts averagingf rom zero to thirty per cent of th e total rounds fired. This percentageof premature burs ts is approximately the same as the percentage forthe 155-mm howitzer. Results of the test , and the subsequent firingindicate that the VT fuze can be employed effectively with the 15 5 -m mgun.

SOURCE: Command R.,....

KuthorityDATE: January 1953. , Source No 731

-(RESTRICTED) By. , ; ..

PERFORMANCE OF 155-MM DEEP eAVITY SHELL WITH FUZEM96 (T76E9). - The 145th FA Bn completed a combat tes t of deepcavity shell for 155-mm gun with fuze M96 (T76E9); the purpose of thetes t was to determine th e performance data on the projecti le using bothnormal and super charge.

On e hundred sixty-eight rounds were fired using super chargewith the following resul ts:

26 rds graze99 rds a ir39 rds dud

4 rds premature 'Three of the premature rounds occurred nine seconds after firing; oneoccurred five seconds before the expected t ime of detonation.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 75th FA Bn

DATE: October 1952 Source No 733(RESTRICTED)

TOCAFF EVALUATION: This is an example of improper use ofar t i l lery and unnecessary expenditure of ammunition. J

"STANDING GUARD" WITH AR TILLER Y. - Considerable quantit ies of ammunition were expended by this battalion and the organicdivision ar t i l lery battalions during the early stages of the operationsbecause of the requirement to keep a continuous curtain of defensive f i resin front of friendly infantry during th e hours of darkness whether theenemy was attacking or not. Fires were placed on avenues of approachand bat ter ies fired "continuous f i re, battery r ight at 20 -second interval ,"without varying the range or deflection settings. On one occasion, abattery of this battalion "stood guard with 155' s" firing one such barragefrom about 2200 to 2400 hours. A battery of the 31 s t Field Arti l leryBattalion (155-mm howitzer) picked up the same barrage, fired a t theproper interval after the l as t round of this battalion was on the way, andcontinued the barrage until 0400 hours when one of the l ight battalionstook up th e firing. Whi le th e resul ts of such use of ar t i l lery cannot beevaluated with th e facts available, i t appears that , aside from the largeexpenditures of ammunition and the resultant wear and t ear on Inateriel ,i t is tactically unsound as i t sets a pat tern of t iIne and place of firingwhich an aler t enemy can quickly determine and avoid.

SOURCE: Command Report - 987th Armored FA BnDATE: September 1952 Source No 734

(RESTRICTED)USE OF MODIFIED l05-MM HOWITZER. - Approximately 750/0 of

the f i res of the battalion were high-angle fire. No difficulties wereexperienced using th e modified I05-mm howitzer, self-propelled, M7(with well). Frequent shifting of the carriage is necessary because ofthe l imited t raverse at high angles.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 15th FA BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 735

(RESTRICTED)ORGANIZATION OF FSCC IN INFANTRY BATTALION. - In each

of the infantry battalion command posts , there is located a fire supportcoordination center , which consists of the ar t i l lery l ia ison o ff icer, theinfantry battalion ass is tan t S3, representat ives from the regimentaltank company, quad SOlS, 8l -mm and 4. 2-inch mor ta r s . Here a relocated direct l ines to the art i l lery and other infantry supporting weapons.

The FSCC at th e infantry battalion level has proven highly success ful. It provides the coordination that is needed between the infantryand its supporting weapons. In addition, i t provides the art i l lery S2with more information-collecting agencies than he would ordinarily haveat his disposal. In order to proper ly process shel l repor ts , soundazimuths and other target-get t ing reports received from infantry battal ion and regimental Opl s , this battalion I s survey section has undertaken the task of surveying those Opl s so that they m ay be accuratelylocated on the S2 countermortar chart .

(RESTRICTED)COUNTERFIRE ORGANIZATION. - The supported regimentls

counterf ire platoon has located its command post in the ar t i l lery battal ion fire direction center , so that the azimuths that they obtain may beplotted on the S2 countermortar char t as quickly as p>ssible. Many t imes,hostile mor ta r and art i l lery have been located by the intersection ofazimuths obtained from several sources .

Countermortar radar maintains direct wire and radio communications with this battalion. At the f irs t report of hosti le mortar activity,r adar is notified to go on the a ir in the desired grid squares , thus providing many targets which would otherwise go unlocated.

During the pas t month, I Corps directed that each company of eachinfantry regiment , an d each battery of each art i l lery battalion establ ishshel l - report ing teams consist ing Qf one officer and three enlisted men.The miss ion of a shel l-report ing team is to make cra ter analysis of allincoming rounds so that complete and accurate shell reports m ay be

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obtained. The S2 Section of this battal ion undertook the task of t:r:ainingteams for both the supported reg iment and this battal ion. Each teamwas re.quired to attend a two-hour class that incorporated prac t ica l workin cra te r analysis and shel l repc>rting. Since that t ime , the number ofshel l repor ts received from the infant ry has increased .

(RESTRICTED)ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL. - Tests conducted by this un i t have

revealed the following:a . Range deflection fans a re warped and rep lacement i t ems a re

not available. Sudden changes in weather cause contraction and expansion of range deflection fans, introducing e r ro r into the data sent to thehowitzers .

b. Grid sheets issued for surveyed fir ing char ts a re of a poorquali ty, and e r rors of four hundred meter s in ten thousand meter s oftenexis t .

c. These gr id sheets shrink and s tre tch, depending on the weather ,humidity, and amount of us e.

In order to compensate for this e r ro r and improve f i r ing, the folowing changes were introduced:

a . New fir ing charts were prepared as prescr ibed in FM 6-40,Chapter 12, and each deflection index was labeled with the appropria tedeflection.

b. Range deflection fan - all number ing and le t tering with greasepenci l was omitted.

c. Deflection fan was always placed on the r ight side of the plottedta rge t when reading deflections. Deflections were read f rom the lef tside of the fan only.

As a result of these s imple changes, the accuracy of the f ires ofthis unit improved considerably, and a la rge pe r cent of the e r ro r s dueto nonstandard equipment have been e i ther el iminated and /o r standardized and compensated for by registra t ion. Following are advantagesresul t ing from these changes:

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a . Five hundred m il e r r o r by the horizonta l control operatorwas completely el iminated.

b. E r r o r introduced by shrinkage or s t re tching of char ts andcontract ion or expansion of range deflection fans was compensated forby reading a ll deflect ions f rom one side of the range deflect ion fan andregis tra t ion. This would not be t rue i f deflect ions were read from boths ides of the fan, as the correc t ion would have to be applied in the opposi te d i rect ion, depending upon which side of the fan deflect ion wasread .

c. The width of the plott ing pin is also compensated for in thesame manner as b above.

The only disadvantage resul t ing f rom these changes is that a goodhorizonta l control opera tor i s slowed down by always having to place thefan on the r ight of the plotted target and reading deflect ions without num bers on the fan. The increased accuracy mor e than compensates forthis slow-down in obtaining char t data.

SOURCE: Command Report - 73 d Tank BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 73 6

(RESTRICTED)TANK BN TRANSPOR TATION REQUIREMENTS. - I t was definitely

proven that the tank battal ion, infantry division, equipped with the M46tank, needs mor e t rucks in i ts supply platoon. The consumption of gaso l ine by the M46 tank and the m a s s and weight of ammuni t ion required bythis tank is far more than that of a battal ion equipped with the M4E8 tank.During this per iod, the tanks of this unit were employed on an extremelywide front, all a t th e same t ime. This is not an unusual si tuat ion as thetank battal ion, infantry division, can be expected to be so employed. Asa resu l t this places an added burden on the supply platoon. In a movingsi tuat ion the supply system of the battal ion would have broken down fo rthe want of t ranspor ta t ion.

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(RESTRICTED)SIGNAL SHOP TRUCK FOR TANK BAT.TALION. - The tank bat

tal ion, infantry division, has a definite need for some type of vehicle formaintenance of communicat ions equipment. The battalion has a total of191 radios, al l of which require second echelon repai r and maintenance.Due to the lack of qualified personnel with knowledge of tank radios inthe infantry 'division signal company, i t is often necessary to per formthird echelon maintenance. In addition, the tank interphone system ,presents problems that require maintenance a t the tank which can not bedone at the battalion communicat ions maintenance installation.

The variety of radio equipment in the unit requires the use of manytypes of tes t equipment. Much of this equipment is very delicate and thepresent authorized t ransportat ion does not allow this equipment to becentral ized or carr ied properly for uti l ization under field conditions.Also there is a need for a place to se t up tes t mounts for the SCR 50 6and th e SCR 508.

The tank battalion, infantry division, in many cases finds i tselfcommttted over a wide front which places a burden on the l ine companiesto bring equipment needing repair to the battalion headquar ters area . I fthe battalion communicat ions section had a shop t ruck that could movefrom company to company and repai r radios and in tercommunicat ionssys tems , the maintenance could be performed quickly and efficient ly.Communication is essent ia l in fighting with combined arms t eams , andanything that will improve the maintenance of communicat ions will alsoimprove the over-al l capabili t ies of these teams.

Recommend that one shop t ruck, 2-1/2- ton , 6x6, General RepairSignal Corps M30 or M3l, be included in T /O&E for headquar ters andservice company, tank battalion, infantry division.

SOURCE: ' Command Report - 17th FA BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 73 7

(RESTRICTED)8 -INCH HOWITZER GFT MODIFICATION. - The Artil lery School

produced and issued a GFT (Extension FT8 -J -2 Special , 1 Oct 52) for

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a OJ JIMi'jp\ tilAlbA)); lJJi ONUNCLASSIFIED8-inch howitzers in order to cover the areas in the higher reaches of theranges not normally covered on the standard GFT. This GFT functionsadequately during the sum m er months. The window is to o smal l for useduring th e winter months because of the large range K. Recommend thatal l GFT's be made with the window large enough to be able to place theadjusted elevation gage l ine on it . Range K of 2000 to 2500 yards can beanticipated.

(RESTRICTED)BATTERY CHARGING EQUIPMENT. - Severa l instances of radio

communication failure have occurred within the pas t month due to insufficient battery charging equipment. The T/O&E power unit PE 210does not have sufficient capacity to charge the bat ter ies necessary tooperate T /O&E radios without continuous operation. Continuous operation resul ts in short life of the equipment, necessi tat ing evacuation fromthe theater for repairs and a delay of from tw o to three months for areplacement i ssue. The tank heater genera tor , Model HRU 28, has anoutput one and two-thirds t imes as great as the PE 210 and can be repaired by Ordnance third and fourth echelon installations within thetheater. Recommend that the PE 21 0 be replaced by the tank heatergenerator , Model HR U 28, an Ordnance i tem.

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th FA BnDATE: December 1952 Source No 738

(RESTRICTED)DIFFICULTIES WITH M4 TRACTOR. - The M4 t rac tor , having

insufficient t ract ion has grea t difficulty maneuvering howitzers overnormally simple ter ra in when the ground is frozen. Tracks slip andslide on frozen slope s even in the absence of snow and ice. Due tothese difficult ies, recommend that rubber t reads be issued during thewinter months for th e M4 t ractor , or that the M4 be replaced by abet ter t ractor .

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SOURCE: . Command Report - 245th Tank BnDATE: D e c e ~ b e r 1952 Source No 739

(RES TJ,l lCTED)TANK GROUSERS. - The installation of a wedge-shaped grouser

to th e head of the center guide bolt at the rate of nine grousers per t rackproved to be a valuable aid in t raversing ice coated roads an d mountains.However, the grouser does cause excessive wear to shock absorbersand makes i t difficult to turn at slow speeds; a lso, some can be expected to break off when on rocky or frozen ground.

SOURCE: Command Report - 48th FA BnDATE: October 1952 Source No 740

(CONFIDENTIAL)AVOIDING FIRE BROUGHT ON BY RADIO FIXES. - It was reported

by the FO's who were in the assaul t that . whenever they began t ransmit t ing on thei r radios. they would shortly thereafter receive concentratedenemy mortar fire on their posit ions. To counteract the enemy's abilityto fix the posit ions of friendly radios. two subterfuges were employed.One was to remote al l radios, placing the radios on reverse slopesrevetted as much as pract icable; and the other was to se t up salvagedradio antennas in nonoccupied areas to draw fire away from occupiedareas . These two subterfuges resul ted in immediate lessening of fireon the FO's and their part ies in thei r observat ion si tes. Most of th e FOpart ies were exposed and in the open due to the necessity for observingand th e difficulty of digging in.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 89th Tank BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 741

(RESTRICTED)LOGS USED IN TANK FIRING. - A log cutting program has beeninstituted to provide each tank position with sufficient logs to corduroy

th e tank firing and back-up positions. This was done to cut down to anabsolute minimum the possibility of having the tank t racks freeze to theground during quick freezes.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st FA Obsn BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 742

(RESTRIC TED)RADIOSONDE AN/AMT-2A. - Operational difficulties were en

countered during the month with balloons and radiosondes AN/AMT-2A,The Metro Section had three balloon breaks. These balloons were condit ioned before inflation. Cost of the balloons and expended charges was$113.76. Eight radiosondes AN/AMT-2A failed during flight. All ofthe radiosondes released were prepared and lchecked before re lease asset out in TM 20-240. The cost of eight radiosonde flights, less bat ter ies ,is $520. 16. The following chart indicates the type of trouble encounteredwith the AN/AMT-2A:Trouble Probable Cause1. Transmit ted only tempera Leaky anaroid capsule.

tu reaf te r 30th contact .2. No signal after release. Large frequency shift at r e l e a s e ~

Release was smooth and normal .3. Temperature and humidity Acted as though both temperature andsignal received simultane- humidity elements were in grid c i r

0usly af ter 30 contacts. cuit of blocking oscil lator at sametime. A layer of heavy moisture

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Trouble

4. Same as No 3.

S. No t empera ture signal .

6. Entire signal stopped at1S contacts .

7. Enti re signal stopped at2S contacts .

8. No temperature after 3Scontacts .

All other s ignals were perfect .

Probable Causewas presen t a t that alti tude. Could possibly have shorted across the relay.

This flight, launched immediatelyafter No 3, developed the same t rouble.Acted identically to No 3 and at th esame alt i tude.

The circui t in which the temperatureelement l ives, obviously becameopen. The most l ikely place is atthe element . Could have been ja r redopen at re lease , but re lease wasnormal .

Bad battery.

Bad battery.

As in No 5, th e circui t opened. Mostlikely place is at the element . Noexplanation for i t to open a t thatalt i tude.

SOURCE: Command Report - 378th Engr Combat BnDATE: November 1952 Source No 743

(RESTRICTED)REPLACEMENT OF MISSING TEETH. - We are continually con

fronted with the problem of arranging for the replacement of missingteeth with prosthetic appliances for many individuals who presen t suchcases . Since such t reatment is beyond the scope of this clinic, we mustdepend on the cooperation of other units capable of rendering such

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UNCLASSIFIED service . Such units a re more than willing to cooperate , but due to thef requent movement of the units, many cases cannot be carr ied to sa t i s factory completion. More effort should be made to render dental se rv ice within the Zone of Inter ior , where facili t ies are more readi ly avai l able. before individuals are t r ans fe r red to the Comb


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UNCLASSIFIEDthe most severe conditions - - 20 degrees below zero weather , st'eepgrades , and poor road surface condit ions. Because of the cold, operators will become lax when the need for maintenance is greates t , thusrequir ing closer supervision.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Inf DivDATE: December 1952 Source No 744

(RESTRICTED)SALVAGE. - Twenty-five thousand 105-mm brass car t r idge cases

and fifty tons of 50 cal iber brass were salvaged. Under a new Armydirect ive which demands th e str ingent accounting of all expended ammunition components, addit ional administrat ive difficulties w ere encountered in drawing replenishment stocks of ammunition for the division. Although all salvageable components must be returned throughsupply channels for reuse , a one for one t rade of expended for new isimpract icable unless transportation and other factors beyond divisioncontrol are taken into consideration. The availabil i ty of t ransportat ionand th e exact timing of return rai l shipments of salvage somet imes makesthe physical exchange of round for round impossible although new am munition is badly needed. Certif icates that salvage has been rai l loadedand shipped must be accepted by ASP's in such ins tances . Fai lure of thesupporting ammunition gr,rup to accept this fact caused a dangerous re duction in division stocks during December.

(RESTRICTED)WARRANT OFFICER, UNIT ADMINISTRATOR. - Personnel e l igi

ble for appointment as war rant officer, unit administrator . are onlythose who are obtained from cer tain combat mil i tary occupational specialtysources . Enlisted personnel wh o are special is ts in one of the fields ofunit adminis t rator duties are barred from appointment solely on th e basisthat they do not occupy a source position.

As the Adjutant General is the monitoring agency for unit administ ra tor warrant officers I and the duties of the warrant officers lie pr imar i lyin the administrat iye and technical f ields of company level units, someof the mos t logical sources for unit adminis t rators a re not being used.

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The additional source posit ions concerned which appear in the T/OAtE ofan infantry division are l isted below:

Grade E-7 At E -6Auth in T /OAtE 7ENL SSN MOS 15 May 52

1290 Personnel Management Supervisor 191502 Administrative Specialist 281585 Fi r s t Sergeant , Administrat ive 101816 Personnel Administrat ive Supervisor 31821 Unit Supply Specialist 1321824 Mess Steward 106

TOTAL 298

In view of the cri t ical shortage of unit administrators and the lackof eligible personnel who des i re war rant officer appointments, recommend'that a study be initiated to investigate the feasibility and possibility ofsecuring authority to draw on the sources l isted above for appointnlent ofadditional warrant off icers , unit administrators.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr Combat GpDATE: November 1952 Source No 74 5

(RESTRICTED)AR TILLERY PROPELLANT. - In recent months large quantit ies of

engineer explosives have been consumed in operations, part icularly inrock blast ing for new roads. The occasional short supply of these explosives, as well as considerat ions of economy, has suggested the use ofsurplus ar t i l lery propellants . Consequently, a ser ies of controlled testswere made to determine the most sat isfactory techniques for using thispropellant as an engineer explosive. Tests were specifically designed tolearn the following: Optimum method of priming and boosting propellantpowder; optimum placement of such pr imer in the powder charge; feasibility of springing rock holes i and effort-yield relat ionships for varyingcharge s . Limited data already available indicates the de sirabil i ty ofpriming with an electric cap, boosted with composit ion C3, and placednear the top of a bore hole.

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UNCLASSIFIEDSOURCE: Command Report - 229th Ord Base DepotDATE: November 1952 Source No 746

(RESTRICTED)MODIFICATION OF 4. 2-INCH MORTAR, M30. - Eighth Army has

experienced difficulty in the bridge breaking on the Mount M24 used withthe 4. 2-inch Mortar , M30, and has requested twenty-four bridges bemodified by strapping reinforcement of the bridge. This m odificationwill be made on all mor ta r s of this type which are on hand.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Cml Mortar BnDATE: September 1952 Source No 74 7

(RESTRICTED)MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY WITH 4. 2-INCH MORTARS, M30.

Four 4. 2-inch morta rs . M30. were out of action due to cracked bridges.One by one, the Allen screws worked themselves loose even af ter beingcounter punched by Ordnance personnel . The battalion fired the M30mortars until the loosening of the Allen screws , along with the crackedbr idges , forced the mortars out of action. The bridges are breaking andcracking jus t to the rea r of the bear ings for th e standard t runnions andin front of th e swivel on the bridge.

SOURCE: Command Report - X CorpsDATE: October 1952 Source No 748

(RESTRICTED)ORDER -OF-BATTLE SPECIALIST TRAINING. - Order-of-bat t lespecial is ts trained at Fort Riley, Kansas, are not receiving instruct ion

in CCF and NK order-of-bat t le . This resul ts in a long period of on-thejob training at unit level . Per sonnel trained at Camp Pa lmer Japan,receive this type of instruction.

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Recommend that order-of-bat t le special is ts assigned to combatunits receive instruct ion in CCF and NK orde r -of -battle.

SOURCE: Command Report - Sig Svc Bn (VHF). 8189th AUDATE: December 1952 Source No 749

(RESTRICTED)EFFICIENCY IN MAINTENANCE OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT. - Each

operating t ransmi t ter and receiver is allowed to operate for not more than72 consecutive hours . and i.s then replaced with spare equipment whichhas previously been thoroughly checked. cleaned and proper ly aligned onan operating frequency. The equipment taken out of service is thengiven ...complete f irs t echelon maintenance, realigned on the proper f re quency and placed in spare s ta tus . ready for immediate use when anemergency ar ises or when th e operating equipment has been in continuousservice for 72 hours. A very close study has been maintained by thebattalion maintenance section to determine th e effects of this program.This section reports that, over a peri.od of 60 days, the number of repairs made on receivers and t ransmi t ters in th e battalion maintenanceshop has decreased by 600/0, and that this decrease is the direct resul t ofchanging the equipment at leas t once every 72 hours .

Recommend that this practice or one of similar nature be placedin effect wherever this type of equipment is being used for continuousoperat ions.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth ArmyDATE: July 1952 Source No 750

(RESTRICTED)MATERIALS-HANDLING EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIESDEFICIENCIES. - Some difficulty is being experienced in operating Rossfork lift equipment in Korea because of basic construction. The Rossis built high and narrow with a central steering wheel which, ill effect,makes i t a tricycle with the tw o wide wheels forward. This tends to maketh e vehicle unstable on rough terrain . Part icular ly is this true of the

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15,000 pound and 18,000 pound end i tems. An added disadvantage existsin the very low gear ratio on the steering wheel. While this makes forease in turning, it requi.res the operator to turn the steering wheelapproximately five complete turns to turn th e vehicle 90 0

The steering shaft, constructed of tubular metal , on the ClarkYardlift , Model 150, shauld be strengthened. It has been necessary touse threaded steel bars to replace tubular steel construction in an effortto reduce deadlines.

The clutch discs on th e Clark Yardlift , Model 60, are wearing outtoo rapidly. The tensile strength of the springs is not distributed evenly,or possibly the thickness of the clutch disc can be at fault. In addition.i ts maneuverabil i ty on rough t er rain is unsatisfactory due to the smal lsteering wheel.

In order to improve the efficiency of th e Clark Planel.;ader. 3,500pounds. Model 51, the hose should be coupled to the hydraulic l if t cylinderin such a manner as to eliminate all pos sibility of contact between thehose and the drive shaft.

On all lift cyl inders , excessive replacement of packing is beingencountered. Research should be conducted to provide a packing whichwill withstand the abras ~ v e action of dust and mud which grinds into thepacking.

A constant problem exists wherein rocks become embedded betweenthe dual rubber t i res on this equipment and cause excessive wear andtf!ar. This problem also exists on Ordnance vehicles; thus far . no sat is ..factory solution has been found. The use of a detachable rubber str ip ofguard which could be mounted between the dual.t:i.respy.,attachment to theinner r ims of the dual wheels has been advanced as a possible solution.

" :l.;L 0;. \:. . . 1\

UNCLASSIFIED 21

dissemination of combat information 18 may 1953

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